ML081220241
| ML081220241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 02/25/2008 |
| From: | Operations Branch III |
| To: | FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML080920714 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346/08-301 | |
| Download: ML081220241 (80) | |
Text
FINAL OUTLINES FOR THE DAVIS-BESSE INITIAL EXAMINATION - FEBRUARY 2008
ES-301.-
Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301 Facility:
Davis-Besse Examination Level :
RO Administrative Topic (see Note)
Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Equipment Control Radiation Control Emergency Plan Type Code*
D NIA M
N D
Date of Examination:
211 812008 Operating Test Number:
Describe activity to be performed JPM A-6 Calculate RCS flow with F755 unavailable NOT SELECTED JPM A-3 Review a tagout and determine it is incorrect.
JPM A-4 Calculate Radiation Release using SGTL Abnormal Procedure, DB-OP-02531, Attachment 1 JPM A-7 Make E-Plan Offsite Notification NOTE:
All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
- Type Codes 8, Criteria:
(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (5 3 for ROs; 5 4 for SROs 8, RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)
(P)revious 2 exams (5 1; randomly selected)
(S)imulator NUREG-1021, Revision 9
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 DAVIS-BESSE RO NRC ADMINISTRATIVE TOPICS OUTLINE
SUMMARY
- 1. Conduct of Operations JPM A-6, Calculate RCS flow with F755 unavailable The candidate will be directed to perform DB-OP-03006, Misc. Instrument Shift Checks,, Calculation of RCS Total Flow Computer Point with F577 Unavailable SETTING: Classroom, Simulator or Plant WA 2.1.25
- 2. Equipment Control JPM A-3, Review a tagout and determine it is wrong The candidate will be provided a copy of a tagout and determine what is incorrect SETTING: Classroom, Simulator or Plant WA 2.2.13
- 3. Radiation Control JPM A-4, Calculate Radiation Release using SGTL Abnormal Procedure, DB-OP-02531. SGTL Rate Calculation Determine primary to secondary tube leak using the Steam Jet Air Ejector Radiation Monitors, RE 1003A and RE 1003B, and chemistty sheet.
SETTING: Simulator K/A 2.3.10
- 4. Emergency Plan JPM A-7, Make an E-Plan Offsite Notification An ALERT has been declared. The candidate will initiate offsite notifications using the dedicated (4-way ringdown) phone. The State of Ohio Highway Patrol will not answer.
The candidate will provide the information to Ottawa and Lucas Counties. The candidate will then find the Highway Patrol's phone number and call using a non-dedicated phone line.
SETTING: Classroom or Simulator K/A 2.4.43 NUREG-1021. Revision 9
Form ES-301-1.
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline
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-acility:
Davis-Besse Zxamination Level (circle one):
SRO Administrative Topic (see Note)
>onduct of Operations
- onduct of Operations iquipment Control iadiation Control Imergency Plan N
M N
D 211 812008
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Date of Examination:
Operating Test Number:
Describe activity to be performed
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JPM A-I Perform an on-line risk determination JPM A-2 Review an Auxiliary Feedwater Surveillance Test and determine Operability JPM A-3 Review a tagout and determine it is incorrect.
JPM A-4 Calculate Radiation Release using SGTL Abnormal Procedure, DB-OP-02531, Attachment 1 JPM A-5 Security Event Classification and Notification dOTE:
All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (I 3 for ROs; 5 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1 )
(P)revious 2 exams (s 1, randomly selected)
(S)imulator I
NUREG-1021, Revision 9
Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 ES-301 DAVIS-BESSE SRO NRC ADMINISTRATIVE TOPICS OUTLINE
SUMMARY
- 1. Conduct of Operations JPM A-1, Perform an on-line risk determination Perform an on-line risk determination SETTING: Classroom or Plant KIA2.1.19
- 2. Conduct of Operations JPM A-2, Auxiliary Feedwater Surveillance Test Review Review Acceptance Criteria and determine that the AFW Pum Setting: Classroom or Plant WA 2.1.33
- 3. Equipment Control JPM A-3, Review a tagout and determine it is wrong is nc perable The candidate will be provided a copy of a tagout and determine what is incorrect SETTING: Classroom or Simulator KIA 2.2.13
- 4. Radiation Control JPM A-4, Calculate Radiation Release using SGTL Abnormal Procedure, DB-OP-02531,, SGTL Rate Calculation Determine primary to secondary tube leak using the Steam Jet Air Ejector Radiation Monitors, RE 1003A and RE 10038, and chemistry sheet.
SETTING: Simulator WA 2.3.10
- 5. Emergency Plan JPM A-5, Security Event Classification and Notification The Security Supervisor reports that a Credible Threat has been reported. The candidate will classify the event, complete forms, and make NRC notification.
SETTING: Classroom or Simulator KIA 2.4.43 NUREG-1021, Revision 9
ES-301 Control Room/ln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant
[ L)ow-Power
[N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A)
R C A (P)revious 2 exams
[S)imulator Facility: Davis - Besse Exam Level: RO Operating Test No.:
Date of Examination: 2/18/08
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1 1 '.. 1
>. 1 / ': 1 / ':. 1
".. 2 I ".. 2 / > 1
- ,11.11,.1
.: 3 / ':. 3 / 2 (randomly selected)
Control Room Systems" (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U)
Type Code' Safety Functior Svstem / JPM Title
- a. I Loss of Service Water Loop 1 to Primary loads
- c.
Putting RPS in Shutdown Bypass D. L 7
- d.
Manually actuate SFAS afler some components blocked D
2
- e. I Purge Containment
- f. I CRD Sequence Fault Reset 1
- g.
Respond to a high Station Vent radiation alarm A. D 9
- h.
Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid N
6 In-Plant Systems" (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i.
Actions for steam binding of the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump D
4s
- j.
I Emergency Shutdown of an Emergency Diesel Generator I A, E, M I 6
- k.
Primary Side Reactor Operator Control Room Evacuation E. N, R 2
actions All control room [and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
NUREG-1021, Revision 9
ES-301 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems Outline.
Form ES-301-2
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C.
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- e.
- f.
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From a Mode 1 condition, the candidate will be directed to respond to a loss of Service Water to Primary loads Modified Bank JPM 14 WA:
062 AA 1.02 (3.2/3.3)
From a Large Break LOCA condition, the candidate will be directed to transfer the LPI Suction to the Containment Emergency Sump Bank JPM 33 WA:
011 EA 1.11 (4.2/4.2)
From a Mode 3 condition, the candidate will be directed to place the four RPS channels in Shutdown Bypass Bank JPM 21 WA:
012 A 4.03 (3.6/3.6)
From a LOCA condition, the candidate will be directed to actuate SFAS due to changing plant conditions and some SFAS equipment out of position Bank JPM 97 KIA:
013 A 4.03 (434.7)
From a Mode 1 condition, the candidate will be direct to start a purge on Containment Bank JPM 85 KA:
029 A 2.03 (2.7/3.1)
From a plant startup condition, the candidate will be directed to recover from a Control Rod Drive Sequence Fault Bank JPM 221 KA:
001 A2.14 (3.7/3.9)
From any Mode condition, the candidate will be directed to respond alarm procedure, DB-OP-02009 for high Station Vent radiation JPM 215 WA:
071 A 3.03 (3.W3.8)
From a Mode 1 condition, the candidate will be directed to synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid NEW JPM WA:
062 A4.07 (3.1/3.1)
From a Mode 1 condition, the candidate will be directed to relieve the steam binding of the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump Bank JPM 127 WA:
061 A 2.04 (3.4/3.8)
From a shutdown condition, the candidate will be direct to emergency shutdown the Emergency Diesel Generator Modified Bank JPM 115 WA:
056 AA 2.14 (4.4/4.6)
From any plant condition, the candidate will be directed to restore the Makeup system from outside the Control Room NEW JPM WA:
068 AA 1.13 (4.1/4.2)
NUREG-I 021, Revision 9
ES-301 Control Roornlln-Plant Systems Outline Fohn ES-301-2..
Facility: Davis - Besse Exam Level: SRO Date of Examination: 2118108 Operating Test No.:
Control Room Systems" (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U)
Type Code*
Safety Functior System I JPM Title Loss of Service Water Loop 1 to Primary loads A, M 4s Transfer LPI Suction to the Containment Emergency Sump I
A, D I
3 Putting RPS in Shutdown Bypass Manually actuate SFAS after some components blocked Purge Containment D, L a
CRD Sequence Fault Reset D
1 Respond to a high Station Vent radiation alarm Reactor Operator only I
In-Plant Systems" (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. I Actions for steam binding of the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump I D
I 4s
- i.
1 Emergency Shutdown of an Emergency Diesel Generator
[ A. E. M l 6
- k.
Primary Side Reactor Operator Control Room Evacuation actions I@
All control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-I I SRO-U (Alternate path I
4-6 14-6 12-3 (cjontroi room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (L)ow-Power (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams IWCA 1S)imulator NUREG-1021. Revision 9
ES-301 Conirol Roomlln-Plant Systems _.
Outline Form ES-301-2
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C.
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From a Mode 1 condition, the candidate will be directed to respond to a loss of Service Water to Primary loads Modified Bank JPM 14 KIA:
062 AA 1.02 (3.213.3)
From a Large Break LOCA condition, the candidate will be directed to transfer the LPI Suction to the Containment Emergency Sump Bank JPM 33 WA:
011 EA 1.11 (4.2/4.2)
From a Mode 3 condition, the candidate will be directed to place the four RPS channels in Shutdown Bypass Bank JPM 21 WA:
012 A 4.03 (3.613.6)
From a LOCA condition, the candidate will be directed to actuate SFAS due to changing plant conditions and some SFAS equipment out of position Bank JPM 97 WA:
013 A 4.03 (4.514.7)
From a Mode 1 condition, the candidate will be direct to start a purge on Containment Bank JPM 85 KA:
029 A 2.03 (2.7/3.1)
From a plant startup condition, the candidate will be directed to recover from a Control Rod Drive Sequence Fault Bank JPM 221 KA:
001 A 2.14 (3.713.9)
From any Mode condition, the candidate will be directed to respond alarm procedure, DB-OP-02009 for high Station Vent radiation JPM 215 WA:
071 A 3.03 (3.613.8)
Reactor Operator only From a Mode 1 condition, the candidate will be directed to relieve the steam binding of the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump Bank JPM 127 WA:
061 A 2.04 (3.413.8)
From a shutdown condition, the candidate will be direct to emergency shutdown the Emergency Diesel Generator Modified Bank JPM 115 WA:
056 AA 2.14 (4.4/4.6)
From any plant condition, the candidate will be directed to restore the Makeup system from outside the Control Room NEW JPM WA:
068 AA 1.13 (4.114.2)
NUREG-1021. Revision 9
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ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 1
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Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled withln each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each WA category shall not be less than two).
The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by i-I from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
Systemslevolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding elimination of inappropriate WA statements.
Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the arouo before selectina a second toDic for any system or evolution.
Absent a plant specific priority, only those KAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2 5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.
The generic (G) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the WA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.
On the following pages, enter the WA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#)for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the WA Catalog, and enter the WA numbers, descriptions, IRs. and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to WAS that are linked to 10CFR55.43 1
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 Davis Besse 2008 NRC Written Exam Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier 1 Group 1 007 i Reactoi Trip 1 008 I Pressurizer Vapor Space Acddent 1 3 022 I Loss of Reactor Cooianl Makeup i 2
025 i Loss of Residual Heat Removal System i 4 065 I Loss of Instrument Air I 8 E10 Post-Trmp Siabilization 008 I Pressurizer Vapor Space Acddent i 3 009 I Smail Break LOCA 13 01 1 I Large Break LOCA 13 015 I 17 I Reactor Codant Pump Malfunctions I 4 022 I Loss 01 Reactor Coolant Makeup I 2 025 I Loss of Residual Heat Removal System 14
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NUREG. 1021 2.1.23 AA2.30 2.4.50 AA2.06 2.1.32 EA2 1 AK3.02 EA2.25 EA2.05 AK2.10 2.1.23 AK1.O1 Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures duiins all modes of plant operation.
Abiiity to determine and interpret the followinE as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Inadequate wre moling Emergency Procedures I Plan Ability to verity system alarm setpoints and operate wntrois identified in the alarm response manual.
Ability to determine and interpret the following 2s they apply lo the Loss of Residuai Heat Removai System: Existence of proper RHR overpressiie protection Conduct of operations: Ability to expiai all system iimiis and precautions.
Ability to determine and interpret the fo lhey appiy to the (Post-Trip Stabilization) wnditions an0 seiection of appropriate duing abnormai and emergency opciati Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Why PORV or code safety exit temperature is below RCS or PZR temperature Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: Reactor trip setwnts Ability to determine or interpret the following as lhey apply to a Large Break LOCA: Significance of charging pump operation Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Cwlanl Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the following: RCP indicators and cnntrols Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform spectftc system and integrated plant procedures durinG all modes of piant operation.
Knowledge of the operational impitcations oi I l e following cancepfs as they apply to Lass of Residual Heat Removal System Loss of RHRS during all modes of operation
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4.0 4.7 3.3
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3.6 3.9 3.3 2.8
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3.9 3.9
ES-401 Davis Besse 2008 NRC Written Exam Form ES-401-2 Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 2.8
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3.0 Am1 ty 10 oetermine ana interpret Ine fol.omng as tney apply 10 the Loss of Component Cwlmg Water Tne iengtn of tme after tnc.oss of CCW flow to a mmponenl before tnal mponent may be oamaoeo 026 I Loss of Component Cooling Water i 8
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Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all mdeS of plant owration.
027 I Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction 13 2.9 -
3.1 Knowledge of the interrelations between the ATWS and the following: Breakers, relays, and disconnects Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the SGTR: Use of steam tables 029 I Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) I 1 038 I Steam Generator Tube Rupture 13 4.4 -
3.5 Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW):
HPI. under total feedwater loss conditions Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: Reduction of loads on the battery 054 I Loss of Main Feedwater 14 055 i Station Blackout I 6 056 I Loss of Off-site Power I 6 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: Order and time to initiation of power for the load sequencer 3.5 062 i Loss of Nuclear Service Water 14 Emergency ProceduresiPlan: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry level condibons for emergency and abnormal operating procedures 4.0 065 I Loss of Instrument Air i 8 3.0 Knowledge 01 the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air Cross-over to backup air supplies Knowledge 01 the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Inadequate Heat Transfer) Annunciators and conditions indicating sgnals. and remedial actions associated with the llnadequate Heat Transfer).
E04 Inadequate Heat Transfer 14 4.0 3.6
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55 Ability to operate and i or monitor the following as they appli. to the (Excessive Heat Transfer)
Operating Sehavior characteristics of the facility.
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E05 Excessive Heat Transfer i 4 NUREG-I021 3
E/APE # I Name Safety Function 1 G 1 K1 1 K2 I K3 I A I A2 I Number 1 K/A Topic(s)
I I
nnomeaqe 01 tne interrealions oelween lhe IPosI-Tr p Stao zal on) and trie lo owing Fac ly's neal E10 Post-Trip Stabilization X
WA Category Point Totals:
313 3
3 3
removal systems, induding primary coolant.
systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
3 313 56 NUREG-1021 4
ES-401 Davis Besse 2008 NRC Written Exam Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 Form ES-401-2 332 I Loss of Source Range Nuclear instrumentation I 7 A06 Shutdown Outside Control rwm EO9 I Natural Circulation Operations 14 E13 I Steam Generator Overpressure I 4 001 I Continuous Rod withdrawal I 1 005 I InoperableIStuck Control Rod I 1 060 I Accidental Gaseous RadWaste Release 19 074 I Inadequate Core Cooling I 4 A07 Plant Runback A04 Turbine Tnp 068 Control Room Evacuation
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X X
X 2.1.23 F I
AM'2 X
EM.2 2.4.31 6 AK3.03 AK2.02 EA1.09 AK1.2 4-AK3.2 2.1.32 Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specihc system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Shutdown Outside Control room)
Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Nalurai Circulation Cooldown)
Adherence to appropriale procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.
Emergency Procedures Pian Knowledge of annunciators alarms and indications, and use of the response instructions.
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal:
Proper actions to be taken if automatic safety functions have not taken dace 6rtonrenge 01 !ne rt~lasons fur me foliomng responses as Inc) apt, ) lo me inoperabe ! SIJCK Conlro. Roo Tecn-Spec. mi15 lor r o a mismatch Knowledge of the interrelations between the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release and the following: Auxiliary butlding ventilation system Ability to operate and monitor the folloMng as they apply to a Inadequate Core Cooling: CVCS Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Piant Runback) Normal. abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Piant Runback)
Knowledge of the reasons for the folloMng responses as they apply to the (Turbine Trip)
Normal. abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Turbine Trip).
Conduct of Operations Ability to explain and apply all system limtts and precautions
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4-NUREG-1021 5
ES-401 Davis Besse 2008 NRC Written Exam Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 Form ES-401-2 E14 Natural Circulation Cooldown EOP enclosures WA Category Point Total:
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Cooldown) Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Natural Cirwlation Cooldown).
Knowledge of the interrelations between the (EOP enclosures) and the following Facility's heat removal systems, induding primary mlant.
emergency wolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
I12 Group PointTotal:
9/4 NUREG-1021 6
ES-401 Conduct of Operations Ability to recognize indications for system operating parameters which 3re entry-level conditions for technical soeciiimttons Davis Besse 2008 NRC Written Exam Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 I
Form ES-401-2 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CVCS mponents:
Demineralizers and ion exchangers Knowledge of CVCS design feature@) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Temperaturelpressure wnlrol in letdown line:
prevent boiling. lifting reliefs, hydraulic shock, piping damage, and burst Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RHRS: RHR heat exrhmner a
Svstnm #/Name WA Topics Imp.
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2.5 3.1 2.5 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 007 Pressurizer RelieflQuench Tank 012 Reactor Prolection 026 Containment Spray 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cwling 007 Pressurizer ReliefIQuench Tank X
X X
2.1.33 -
2.1.32 A2.03 -
A2.06 -
2.1.12 -
A4.08 -
K6.02 -
K4.11 K6.03 -
Al.02 -
K1.03
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4.0 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the P Si and (b) based on those predictions. use procedures to correct. control. or mitigate the consequences of those malfunclions or operations.
Overpressurization of the PZR 3.9 Abiiity to (a) predict the impacts of the following maifunctions or operations on the RPSi and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to carrect. control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of RPS simal to trio the reactor 4.7 I
3.2 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the wntrol room: RCP wolinq water supplies Ability to predict andlor monitor changes in parameters (to prevenl exceeding design limits) associaled with ooeratina me ECCS controls 3.0 including Boron wncentration in accumulator, boron storage lanks Knowledge of the physical connections andlor cause~effect relationships between the PRTS and the foilowing systems' RCS
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ES-401 Davis Besse 2008 NRC Written Exam Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Group 1 Form ES-401-2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to coned, mntrol, or mitigate the mnsequences of those malfunctions or operations: Highflow CCW temperature 008 Component Cooling Watei A203 3.0 008 Component Cooling Water 2.4.31 -
K2.02 3.3 Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowledge of annunciators alarms and indications, and use of the response instructions.
Knowledge of bus power supplies lo the following:
Controller for PZR spray valve 2.5 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control A4.02 3.6 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control rwm: PZR heaters Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
RPS channels. components. and interconnections Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RPS.
includina: Bistables 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection K2.01 3.3
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3.6 A3.02 012 Reactor Protection 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation A3.01 Ability to mon lo( a~lorirailc opera1 on of me ESFAS mc damg lnpLl mnnnels ario cqlc 3.7 Ab8lily 10 (a) pre0.ct the moacls of me 101 0ur.n~
ma fmclions or opera! ~ n s on me CCS. anc (I))
oasea on tnose preo cllons J S ~
ProcrdLres IO correct. control, or miugaie me conseqLences 01 those malldncl ons or operabons' Major leak m ccs Knoweage 01 ous power s~pplies 10 me Ioliownq Conla.nment sofav oLmos 022 Containment Cooling A205 K2.01 3.1 3.4 026 Containment Spray K5.08 3 6 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts s the apply to the MRSS Effect of steam removal on reactivity Knowledge of MFW design feature@) andlor interlock(s) wtuch provide for the follownq Feedwater regulatory valve operation (on basis of steam flow, feed flow mismatch) 039 Main and Reheat Steam X
X K4.08 2 5
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3 9
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059 Main Feedwater Al.O1
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Ability to predict andlor monitor changes in DarameterS (to Drevent exceedin0 desian limits) 061 AuxillaryiEmergency Feedwater
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assouatea w th operat ng m e A M w~ilro~s inc,ding SIG leve NUREG-1021
ES-401 3.5 Davis Besse 2008 NRC Written Exam Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Group 1 19 Form ES-401-2 distance Ability lo monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: Emergency heat loads Knowledge of the physical connections andlor cause-effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems: ESF Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and aoolv all svstem limits and orecautions.
A3,02 X
K1.16 KIA Topics I ImD. I Q# I I Svstem #/Name 3.7 24 3.6 25 3.4 26 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ac distribution System and the follomng systems: OC distribution K1.03 062 AC Electrical Distribution 063 OC Electrical Distribution I
1 I
K4.01 Knowledge of dc electrical system design feature@) andlor interlock@) which provide for the following: Manuallautomatic transfers of control 2.7 I 20 I
3.1 I 21 Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowledge svmotom based EOP rnitiaation strateaies.
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I 2.4.6 I 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 1
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K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the EDIG system will have on the following:
EDIG (manual loads) 3.6 I 22 073 Process Radiation Monitoring 2.5 23 I
076 Setvice Water 076 Service Water I
X 078 Instrument Air 078 Instrument Air Knou. caqc 0' Iiic clfecl lhal a oss of malfLnClion of tne IAS n r
On Ine follovang Containment a r systcm M O M ~ P U S ~
)I 'ne M e a inat a loss or mallmct on 01 II cu)r I:! I uitrl s,s!em WII nave on m e lo t n nq - : c c
). mnlammcnl intcqrity Lnder sn,ic.>nn r i r c ions K3.01 K3.01 103 Containment
'oint T O ~ ~ I : I KIA Category Point Totals:
313 NUREG-I021 9
ES-401 Davis Besse 2008 NRC Written Exam Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 2 Form ES-401-2 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation X
033 Spent Fuel PwI Cooling X
035 Steam Generator 001 Control Rod Drive 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation X
01 1 Pressurizer Level Conlrol System 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam DumplTurbine Bypass Control 056 Condensate System X
075 Circulating Water
~~
~-
2.4.31 -
2.4.30 A2.03 -
K3.02 K5.10 A4.02 K2.02 A3.01 -
A I.02 -
K6.03 K1.03 K4.01 Emergency Procedures I Pian Knowledge of annunciators alarms and indications, and use of the response instrucllons.
Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowledge of which events related to system operationslstatus should be reoorted to outside aoencies.
3.4 -
3.6 Knowledoe of the ODeraIional imolications of the I
10 ow ng-concepts as they apply to me h s Exmre Detector operation :
I 2.7 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room: Recorders I
3.1 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
Pressurizer heaters ADiiitr to monilor a-tomaic operalion of lric FJCI 1
dano ng Systsm. ncluo ng Travel mits FJ Ability to predict andlor rnanilor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with owratino Vle SIGS controls 1
3.5 including SIG pressure Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on lhe following will have on the SDS. Controller 1
2.7 and wsitioners. includina ICs. SIG. CRDS Knoweoge of tne pnys.ca conwcions anJ UI cadse-effect reationsn ps betwec' tne Condensale Syslern and InP lo u*',?q <)5:crits MFW 2.6 Knowledge of circulating water system design feature@) and interlock(s) which provide for the I
2 ~ 5 following: Heal sink NUREG-1021 10
ES-401 A2,01 Davis Besse 2008 NRC Written Exam Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Group 2 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters(t0 prevent exceeding design limits) 2.9 38 asswiated with operating the SAS controls includina: Crass-connection with IAS Form ES-401-2 1
079 Station A r Group Point Total:
1013 079 Station AI I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I KIA Cateqary Point Totals:
1 0 / 2 1 1 I 1
I 1
I 1
I 1
I 1
I 1
1 1 / 1 1 1
~
A4 I Number 1 KIA Tooics I Imo. I Q# I NUREG-I021 11
Facility-Category
- 1.
Conduct of Operations
- 2.
Equipment Control
- 3.
Radiation Control t.
rmergency 3ocedures / Plan Subtotal I
1 2
1 2.2.33 Knowledge of control rod programming.
2.9 95 2.2.7 experiments not described iii thc? safety analysis 3.2 96 Knowledge of the process for conducting tests or 2.2.27 -
2.2.1 Knowledge of the refueling process.
Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivit.
I I
I I
Subtotal 1
2 1
1 2
I I
I I
Knowledge 01 10 CFR: 20 ani1 related tacility 3.0
!j f 2'3.1 I radiation control requiremeiils I Abilitv to werforrn urocedurcs to reduce I
I I
I 2.3.10 excessive levels of radiation arid guard against 3 3 Lifi personnel exposure.
Ability to control radiation releases.
Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and levels in excess of those authorized.
Knowledge of the process for performing a containment purge.
2.7 70 2.3.1 1 2.3.4 Contamination control, including permissible 2.5 71 2.5 72 2.3.9 I
I I
I I
Subtotal 1
3 1
1 2
2.4.36 2.4.28 2.4.5 2.4.4 2.4.47 2.8 99 3.3 100 Knowledge of chemistry / health physics tasks during emergency operations.
Knowledge of procedures relating to emergency response to sabotage.
Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and 2.9 73 emergency evolutions.
I I
I I
Ability to recognize abnormal indications for I
4.0 I 74 I I
system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the 3.4 75 appropriate controi room referencematerial.
Subtotal I
1 3
1 I
rier 3 Point Total 1
NUREG-1021 12
. Appendix D Scenario Outline
... FormES-D-1 I
-acility:
Davis-Besse Scenario No.:
1 Op Test No.:
Ixaminers:
Operators:
nitial Conditions:
100% Dower. 400 EFPD Hiah Pressure lniection Pump 2 is out of service HIS SP 16, Turbine Throttle Pressure, selected to PT SP16B (NNI-Y) t'urnover: The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 100% power with core age at 400 IFPD. The Plant Risk level will be YELLOW due to High Pressure Injection Pump 2 out of service for maintenance. Following turnover the Crew will take action to place TPCW Pump 1 in service and remove TPCW Pump 3 from service for maintenance.
Event No.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 a
Malf No.
HU 21A SFDVG L162L HH43 L6LE LlT2N Event Type*
N - BOP C - RO TS - SRO R - R O C - BOP C - R O TS - SRO M -All C - R O I - BOP Event Description
~
Swap Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pumps RCP 1-1 loss of oil to upper bearing Power reduction prior to stopping RCP 1-1 MFPT 2 hicrh vibration Stuck Control Rod at ~75%
power Reactor Coolant System leak - 2500 gpm SFAS Module L231 fails to trip SG 2 level transmitter fails above setDoint (N)ormal.
(R)eactivity, (1)nstrument. (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
Form ES-D-1 Appenaix D
... Scenario outline" DAVIS-BESSE 2008 NRC EXAM SIMULATOR SCENARIO 1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION The crew will assume control with power holding at 100% power.
The Lead Evaluator will cue the Crew to swap of the Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pumps in accordance with DE-OP-06263, Turbine Plant Cooling Water System.
The Lead Evaluator will cue the oil leak on RCP 1-1 thrust bearing. The oil leak will cause a low oil level computer alarm and an increase in bearing temperatures. The crew should respond to alarm 6-1-A, in accordance with DB-OP-02006, Reactor Coolant Pump Alarm Panel 6 Annunciators, and then enter DE-OP-02515, Reactor Coolant Pump And Motor Abnormal Operation, DB-OP-02515 will require the crew to reduce power to 572% using DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown, and then stop the affected RCP. The SRO should enter the proper Tech Spec afler the RCP is stopped.
After the RCP is stopped the Lead Evaluator will cue the increase in MFPT 2 vibrations. The Crew should respond using DB-OPdOl 0, Feedwater Alarm Panel Annunciators The vibrations will increase to the point that a trip of MFPT 2 is required. The plant will automatically runback to 155% power when the MFPT is tripped.
During the plant runback, a Control Rod will stick. The crew should respond to alarm 5-2-E, CRD ASYM-METRIC ROD, in accordance with DB-OP-02516, CRD Malfunctions. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.1.3.1. The crew should reduce power in accordance with DB-OP-02504, RAPID SHUTDOWN.
During the power reduction the Lead Evaluator will cue the RCS leak. This will lower Pressurizer level and the crew should trip the reactor when I O 0 is reached in accordance with DE-OP-02522, Small RCS Leaks. The crew will transition to DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture when the reactor trips.
RCS pressure will lower and a loss of subcooling margin will occur. The crew will trip all running RCPs and route to DB-OP-02000, Section 5.0, Lack Of Adequate Subcooling Margin. The RCS leak is large enough to cause an SFAS actuation.
The failure of a SFAS module will prevent Component Cooling Water Pump 1 from operating and SG 1 level will not control at the higher SG level setpoint. The crew should start CCW Pump 1 and manually control level at the higher level or manually select the HIGH setpoint for SG 1 level.
The failure of the SG 2 level transmitter will cause a loss of level in SG 2. Manual control of the SG 2 level control valve is required to maintain proper level in the SG.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 2 E v e n t N o. : L P a g e 1 of -
1 Event
Description:
After turnover is complete the crew will refer to section 3.2 of DB-OP-06263, Turbine Plant Cooling Water System, to start TPCW Pump 1 and stop TPCW Pump 3 due to increasing vibrations on TPCW Pump 3.
Verify the TPCW System is in service by checking that TPCW Pump 2 and TPCW Pump 3 are running Verify the prestart checklist is complete for TPCW Pump 1 Start TPCW Pump 1 using HIS 627 Stop TPCW Pump 3 using HIS 629 Direct an Equipment Operator to check the oil level on the motor for TPCW Pump 1 After TPCW Pump 3 is started direct the Simulator Operator to insert Event Line 2 for an RCP 1-1 oil leak Page 1 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 1 E v e n t N o. : m P a g e 1 of 3 Event
Description:
After the TPCW Pumps have been swapped an oil leak will develop on Reactor Coolant Pump 1-1 requiring a power reduction to 372% power in order to stop the pump. Tech Specs for operable RCS loops and RPS setpoints will be applicable Time Position Crew RO SRO SRO SRO RO RO RO Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize an oil leak on RCP 1-1 Computer point for RCP 1-1 Thrust Bearing oil level, L791 6-I-A 1-1 MOTORVIB HI Attempt to reset annunciator 6-1-A Implement DB-OP-02515, RCP and Motor Abnormal Direct load reduction to 72% power per DB-OP-02504 Rapid Shutdown Notifv the Load Dispatcher Perform Rapid Shutdown actions Place the SGlReactor Demand Set Rate of Change as directed by the SRO Verify the MIN LIMIT is set to 180 MWE Lower power using the DECREASE pushbutton OR Lower power using the toggle switch Monitor Rod insertion limits using the Reactor Operator Guidance sheet or Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 Maintain Imbalance using APSRs Page 2 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No.:
ScanarioNo.: 1 EventN0.:-
P a g e 2 of 3 Event
Description:
Continued I
SRO I aOP
-P-SRO 1
SRO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Perform Rapid Shutdown actions Notify Chemistry to monitor polishers and sample the RCS At 90%, remove the AFPT Main Steam Minimum flow lines from service When condensate flow is c7.0 MPPH then stop one Condensate pump When power has decreased to =72% return to DB-OP-02515
~
~
~
When power has decreased to -72% stop RCP 1-1 Run oil lift pump as necessary Verify proper feedwater re-ratio SG 2 flow should be r2.4 times the SG 1 flowrate Verify Tave control on the Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Refer to Tech Spec 3.2.5 for RCS flow 0
May refer to DB-OP-03006, Attachment 1 to check RCS flow using computer point F744 Refer to Tech Spec 3.4.1.1 for RPS trip setpoints Contact I&C to verify $/A$/Flow trips and adjust High Flux trips Refer to Tech Spec 3.4.4 if Pressurizer level exceeds 228 inches Page 3 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 1 Event No.:=
P a g e 3 of 3 Event
Description:
Continued BOP I
Ro Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reset ICs Input and ICs Transfer Annunciators at the SASS panel Depress the alarm reset pushbutton for each parameter in alarm As required, add boric acid to the Makeup Tank using the Batch Controller in accordance with the Reactor Operator Guidance sheet After the Tech Specs are reviewed, direct the Simulator Operator to insert Event Line 4 to increase vibrations on Main Feed Pump Turbine 2 Page 4 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize high MFPT 2 vibrations 10-3-8 MFP 2 OR BFP 2 BEARING VIB HI Computer Point V651, MFP, MFPT, GEAR, OR BFP 2 BRG CREW VIB Bop BOP I Refer to DB-OP-2010, Feedwater Alarm Panel Annunciators Check vibration reading on ZJR 2538, Main Turbine and MFP Turbines Bearing Vibration and Eccentricity BOP I Direct an Equipment Operator to monitor MFPT 2 vibrations locally Bop Check vibration levels are above the second computer alarm setpoint of 5.0 Mils BOP Trip MFPT 2 using HS 798 SRO I Refer to DB-OP-06401, ICs Operating Procedure CREW Verify a proper ICs runback to -55% power occurs RO Verify RC 2, Pressurizer Spray Valve, IS in automatic and closed Page 5 of 16 RO Perform an NI Power/Heat Balance Power comparison Event Line 5 for the stuck rod will automatically insert when power is less than 60%
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 2 Event NO.:^ P a g e 1 of -
2 Event
Description:
During the plant runback, Control Rod 7-4 will become stuck when power goes below 160% power. The stuck rod will require a Shutdown Margin determination, implementation of Tech Specs and a plant shutdown.
Recognize a stucWmisaligned Control Rod 5-I-CRD LCO 5-2-E CRD ASYMMETRIC ROD CREW Control Rod 7-4 misaligned with Rod Group 7 Implement DB-OP-02516, CRD Malfunctions beginning at step 4.5.1 SRO RO I Check Reactor Dower is > 5%
I RO I Check only one Control Rod is misaligned Refer to NOP-OP-1004, Reactivity Management SRO Notify Operations Management Notify the Shift Manager SRO I Request I&C investigate the misaligned Control Rod CREW I Determine Control Rod is stuck 1
SRO I Refer to Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 Page 6 of 16
~
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position CREW SRO SRO RO Applicants Actions or Behavior Request Reactor Engineering to determine if adequate Shutdown Marain exists Refer to DB-OP-02504 and beain a Dlant shutdown Notify the Load DisDatcher Perform Rapid Shutdown actions Set Rate of Change as directed by the SRO Verify the MIN LIMIT is set to 180 MWE Lower power using the DECREASE pushbutton Monitor Rod insertion limits using the Reactor Operator Guidance sheet or Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 Maintain Imbalance using APSRs After the power reduction has begun, direct the Simulator Operator to insert Event Line 6 to start the RCS leak Page 7 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CREW Identify symptoms of RCS leak inside Containment Normal sump level rising Radiation levels rising MU flow rising MU tank level dropping II I
SRO I Route to DB-OP-02522. Small RCS Leaks RO I When Pressurizer level falls below 1 0 0 then trip the Reactor Page a of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 SRO CREW Op-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 1 E v e n t N o. : U P a g e 2 of 4 Event
Description:
Continued Verify Immediate Actions Check for Specific Rules implementation r
r Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Position RO RO Perform DE-OP-02000 Immediate Actions Manually trip the reactor Verify power decreasing in the intermediate range 0 Manually trip the turbine RO Implement Specific Rule 6
- Recognize CCW Pump 1 did not automatically start "Manually start CCW Pump 1 Check for Symptom direction Recognize Loss of Subcooling Margin Implement DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube
- 1) 1 SRo 1 Rupture Implement Specific Rule 2 - Loss of Subcooling Margin Time SCM lost "Trip all RCPs Time RCPs are tripped RO Recognize neither SG is feeding up to the proper level
- Critical Task Page 9 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position SRO RO RO RO RO BOP ask Applicants Actions or Behavior Implement DB-OP-02000, Section 5 Verify all RCPs are tripped Time RCPs are tripped Implement Attachment 8, Place MUIHPIILPI in Service Set Pressurizer Level Controller to 100 inches Lock MU Pump suctions on the BWST Stawerify running the second MU Pump StarWerify running the standby CCW Pump Recognize only HPI Pump 1 running Verify open HP 2A, HP 28, HP 2C and HP 2D Open DH 64 and DH 63 Start both LPI Pumps Implement Attachment 11 for HPI flow balancing Verify HP 2C and HP 2D are open Compare HPI flow through each injection line to Figure 3 and verify flow is in the acceptable range Close MU 6421 OpenMU6421 Verify proper SFAS actuation Close CV 5070 using HIS 5070 Close CV 5071 using HIS 5071 Close CV 5072 using HIS 5072 Close CV 5073 using HIS 5073 Close CV 5074 using HIS 5074 Select HIGH on HIS 6453 Verify proper SFRCS actuation Page 10 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position BOP BOP RO CREW RO CREW CREW Applicants Actions or Behavior I
Jerify proper SG level control II qealign AFW if an SFRCS low pressure trip occurs so that each 4FW Pump feeds its own SG
- heck for LPI flow II
- heck for Overcoolina II Isolate possible RCS leaks per Attachment 19 RC 2, Spray Valve RCS High Point Vents Pressurizer Sample Valves RC 11, PORV Block Valve RC 10, Spray Block Valve RCS Sample Vaives I
- heck for ICC Conditions II Monitor for adequate Subcooling Margin rermination Criteria SG levels at the proper setpoint HPI and Makeup are maintaining core cooling Site Area Emergency based on EAL 2.A.4 for an RCS leak larger
- han High Pressure Injection system capacity Page 11 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION Trip all RCPs within 2 minutes of a loss of subcooling margin SSig - Failure to do so could lead to uncovering the core if stopped later Cue - SCM less than 20", Procedural guidance MPI - RCP switches to OFF OPF - RCPs green lights on, zero amps KSA Number: 01 1-EA1.03 (4.0/4.0) Ability to operate and monitor the securing of the RCPs Manually start a CCW Pump SSig - Failure to do so could lead to loss of cooling to the only available HPI Pump Cue - CCW Pump 1 not running, Procedural Guidance MPI - CCW Pump 1 switch to START OPF - CCW Pump 1 RED light on KSA Number: 008-A4.08 (3.1/2.8) Ability to manually operate CCW Pump Control Switch from the Control Room Manually control AFW flow to feed at least one SG SSig - Provide for auxiliary feedwater for core cooling via the SGs when subcooling margin is regained Cue - Procedural direction MPI - Target rock controllers in MANUAL and throttled open OPF - Flow to at least one SG, SG(s) level(s) increasing KSA Number: 061a2.05 (3.113.4) Ability to predict the impact of an automatic control malfunction for AFW Page 12 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 SCENARIO ATTRIBUTES Total Malfunctions Malfunctions after EOP Entry Abnormal Events Major Transients EOPs EOP Contingencies Scenario Runtime EOP runtime Crew Critical Tasks Technical Specifications Exercised Required Operator Actions 7
2 3
1 1
2 (Specific Rule 4, Specific Rule 6) 75 minutes 30 minutes 3
2 Form ES-D-2 Page 13 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CUE SHEET Event 1 - Swap TPCW Pumps Role play as an Equipment Operator to inspect TPCW Pump 1. Report oil visible in the bullseye on the motor Event 2 and 3 - RCP Oil Leak and Power Reduction level is Role play as the System Dispatcher to acknowledge the power reduction Role play as Chemistry to support the power reduction Role play as I&G for verifying $/A$/flow trips and resetting High Flux trips Event 4 - MFPT 2 High Vibrations Role play as an Equipment Operator to monitor local vibrations on MFPT 2 Event 5 - Stuck Control Rod Role play as Operations Management for Reactivity Management Role play as I&C for investigating the potential misaligned rod Role play as Reactor Engineering to provide assistance for the stuck rod Role play as the System Dispatcher to acknowledge the power reduction notifications Event 6, 7, and 8 - RCS Leak, Reactor Trip and AFW Level Control Malfunctions Page 14 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Simulator Setur, Instructions Form ES-D-2
- 1. Verify the following:
- a. Previous data on Yokogawa recorders is cleared
- b. Chart recorders are rolled forward
- c. Applicable procedures are wiped cleaned
- d. Used Alarm Typer paper is removed
- e. Computer alarms are clearedlacknowledged
- 2. Initialize at 100% power
- 3. Equipment Status:
- a. Hang License Requirement Sheet on the status board
- b. Tag out HPI Pump 2 Switch
- c. Turn on the HPI blue status
- d. Hang Protected Train 1 signs
- e. Select SP16B for Turbine Throttle Pressure input
- f. Reset SASS annunciators as required
- 4. Set Up Batch File
- a. Initial Setup
- Rackout the breaker for HPI Pump 2 IRF BFP2A RACKOUT
- Fail SFAS Channel 1 Output Module L231 IMF L6LE
- Fail SP16A low to put SP16B in service IMF LlT2N 0.0 Page 15 of 16
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- b. Triggers
- Reactor power c 60% activates the stuck rod TRGSET 5 "RATPW<59.0
- Reactor power c 5% activates the SG 2 Startup Level transmitter (SP9A3) failing to 1140' TRGSET 8 "RATPWc5.0
- c. Events Event 1 -Swap TPCW pumps Event 2 - RCP 1-1 loss of upper bearing oil IMF HU21A (2) 0.85 00:03:00 Event 3 - Power Reduction Event 4 - MFPT 2 vibrations IMF SFDVG (4) 1.O 00:06:00 0.0 Event 5 - Stuck Rod 7-4 at ~ 6 0 %
power IMF L162L (5)
Event 6 - 2500 gpm RCS leak IMF HH43 (6) 0.0028 00:05:00 0.0 Event 7 - SFAS Modules L231 fail to trip Event 8 - Reactor power c 5% triggers SG 2 Startup Level transmitter (SP9A3) failing to 4 4 0 "
IMF LlTH20 (8) 0.55 00:00:20 0.17 Page 16 of 16
1 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 1
=acility:
Davis-Besse Scenario No.:
2 Op Test No.:
fxaminers:
Operators:
nitial Conditions:
50% power, 400 EFPD 3 Reactor Coolant Pumps running, RCP 1-1 not running Decay Heat Pump 1 is out of service HIS SP 16, Turbine Throttle Pressure, selected to PT SP16B (NNI-Y)
Turnover: The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 60% power with core age at 400 EFPD. Three RCPs are running. RCP 1-1 was stopped due to low oil level in the lower bearing
'eservoir. Senior Management is currently deciding when to begin a plant shutdown to repair
?CP 1-1. The Plant Risk level will be YELLOW due to Low Pressure Injection Pump 1 out of service for maintenance on the motor bearings. Following turnover the Crew will take action to
- ransfer Gland Steam from Main Steam to Auxiliary Steam in order allow packing adjustment on 23 2384, Seal Steam Supply Valve Event No.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
Malf.
No.
SFEJA HI70 L153B NP19D PLZZ G529B SFERE Event Type*
N - BOP TS - SRO C-RO R-RO TS - SRO I - BOP M -All C-RO C - BOP Event Description Transfer Gland Steam from Main Steam to Auxiliary Steam The crew will be notified that Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 has no Governor oil Pressurizer level control valve (MU 32) fails to operate in auto Control Rod drop LOSS Of NNI-Y DC Loss of Offsite AC Emergency Diesel Generator 1 fails to auto start AFW PumD 2 aovernor valve closes (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
1 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I DAVIS-BESSE 2008 NRC EXAM SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION The crew will assume control with power at 60% power and 3 Reactor Coolant Pumps in operation.
After turnover is complete the Lead Evaluator will direct the crew to transfer Gland Steam from Main Steam to Auxiliary Steam.
The Lead Evaluator will cue the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 governor oil problem. The crew should review T.S. 3.7.1.2 and declare AFW 1 inoperable. This will put the plant in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Action Statement.
The Lead Evaluator will cue the MU 32 failure to operate in automatic due to a blown fuse.
Annunciator 14-2-E, ICS/NNI FUSE BLOWN on MSRllCS Alarm Panel 14 Annunciators will alarm. The crew should refer to DB-OP-02014 and identify the blown fuse is preventing MU 32 from responding in automatic. The crew should take the MU 32 to HAND and control Pressurizer level by adjusting Makeup system flow manually.
The Lead Evaluator will cue the dropped rod. The crew should enter DB-OP-02516, CRD Malfunctions. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.1.3.1. The Tech Spec Limit with a dropped rod and 3 RCPs running is 45% power (1320 MWE). The crew should reduce power in accordance with DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown.
The Lead Evaluator will cue the Loss of NNI-Y DC power during control rod recovery.
Annunciator 14-1-E, NNI-Y 24 VDC BUS TRIP, on MSR/ICS Alarm Panel 14 Annunciators will alarm. The crew should enter DB-OP-2532, Loss of NNlllCS Power. The crew should recognize a minor transient is in progress due to the mid-scale failure of Turbine Throttle Pressure by transferring the Turbine to MANUAL and transferring the SG/Rx Demand Station to HAND, and lowering the Turbine load.
The Lead Evaluator will cue the Loss of Offsite AC power. The crew will enter DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture, when the reactor trips. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1 will fail to auto start. EDG 1 should be started manually.
The AFPT 2 governor valve will fail closed when AFW Pump 2 receives a start signal. The crew will route to Attachment 6 of DB-OP-02000 to re-power D2 Bus. The crew should energize non-essential electrical bus D2 from the Station Blackout Diesel Generator or one of the EDGs and align the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump to feed at least one of the Steam Generators. The crew may implement Attachment 4 of DB-OP-02000 to begin aligning Makeup and HPI for core cooling.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Dp-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 P a g e 1 of -
1 Event
Description:
Following turnover the Crew will transfer Gland steam from the Main Steam system to the Auxiliary Steam System in accordance with section 3.6 of DB-OP-16205, Turbine Generator And Main Feedwater Pump Turbine Gland Steam And Turbine
]rains Time I Position I
BOP I
BOP 1
BOP I
BOP I
BOP I
BOP Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify the 235 psig Aux Steam Header is in service Open AS1934, Aux Steam Supply to 5# Condensate Tank 1-1 Control Valve, for 1 minute and then close AS 1934 Throttle open GS 2385, Steam Seal Feed Bypass, to control Gland Steam pressure at 14.5 psig using HIS 2385 Close GS 2384, Seal Steam Supply Valve using HIS 2384 Open GS 2380, Aux Steam Supply Steam Seal Valve, using HIS 2380 Close GS 2385 using HIS 2385 Verify Steam Seal Header pressure is between 2.5 to 4.5 psig After the Gland Steam System supply is transferred to the Auxiliary Steam System direct the Simulator Operator to enter Event Line 2 and to call the Control Room to report the oil sight glass on the AFPT 1 governor is broken and the oil has leaked out of the governor Page 1 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of -
1 Event
Description:
An Equipment Operator will report that AFPT 1 Governor oil sightglass is broken and the oil has leaked out. The SRO should declare AFPT 1 inoperable and enter the AFW Tech Spec Time I Position I
_jn I-
+
Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine AFW Pump 1 is inoperable Refer to Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 Notify Operations Management of the unplanned entry into Tech Specs May contact the Work Week Manager to determine any changes in the risk level May contact an Equipment Operator/Field Supervisor to close the AFPT 1 Trip Throttle Valve After the AFW Tech Spec is entered, direct the Simulator Operator to enter Event Line 3 to fail the automatic response of MU 32 Page 2 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Dp-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 2 Event NO.:^ P a g e 1 of 1 Event
Description:
The NNI fuse that powers the automatic control for MU 32 will blow
- ausing MU 32 to fail closed while the HAND/AUTO station is in automatic. The Crew will sither control MU 32 in manual or place the alternate Makeup injection line in service Position CREW BOP BOP RO I
Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize a blown fuse to MU 32 controller 14-2-E ICSlNNl FUSE BLOWN Pressurizer level decreasing with MU 32 closed Computer Alarm (Q718) NNI FUSE Refer to DB-OP-02014, MSRllCS Alarm Panel 14 Annunciators Check the blown fuse indicators in the top of the front and back of the NNI Cabinets NNI cabinets are not modeled on the simulator. The Shift Manager will inform the Operator that the blown fuse indicator is lit for Fuse 1 in NNI Cabinet 57598. The fuse is labeled RC-LIC14
~~
Place MU 32 in MANUAL and maintain desired Pressurizer level Place the Makeup System alternate injection line in service OR Close MU 6422, Makeup Train 2 To RCS Isolation Open MU 6421, Makeup Train 1 To RCS Isolation Throttle open MU 6419, Makeup Train 1 Injection, to maintain desired Pressurizer level Direct an Equipment Operator to open MU 64238, Makeup Train 1 Flow Controller Bypass After Pressurizer level is restored, direct the Simulator Operator to enter Event Line 4 to drop Control Rod 5-8.
Page 3 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Dp-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 2 Event NO.:^ P a g e 1 of -
2 Event
Description:
Control Rod 5-8 will drop requiring a rapid power reduction in accordance with DB-OP-02516, CRD Malfunctions, to comply with Tech Specs.
Position CREW SRO RO SRO SRO SRO RO BOP Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize a dropped control rod Annunciator 5-1-E, CRD LCO Annunciator 5-2-E, CRD ASYMETRIC ROD Control Rod 5-8 Rod Bottom light ON ImDlement DB-OP-02516. CRD Malfunctions Reduce Reactor power to <45%
Reduce ULD MAX LOAD LIMIT to 320 MWE Set ULD to 30 MWEl MIN Refer to DB-OP-02504. Rapid Shutdown Notify the Load Dispatcher of plant shutdown Contact Chemistry to monitor Condensate Polishers and sample the RCS Maintain MakeuD tank level May remove a Main Feed Pump from service Trip the MFPT Place the ICs controller in HAND and lower speed to 3950 RPM Null the transfer volts using the MDT 20 output Place the MDT 20 control in MANUAL Lower the MDT 20 to the LOW SPEED STOP Verify the Discharge NRV is closed Page 4 of 10
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of __
2 Event
Description:
Continued Applicants Actions or Behavior Manually control Pressurizer level Stabilize power at c 45%
Adjust the ULD MAX LOAD LIMIT as directed Adjust the ULD RATE OF CHANGE as directed Refer to NG-DB-00230. Reactivitv Manaaement Contact Reactor Engineering Contact Work Week Manaaer/l&C to investiaate Refer to DB-OP-02516 Attachment 3 to determine Tech Spec applicability Tech Spec. 3.1.3.1 for the dropped rod After power is stabilized and Tech Specs are reviewed direct the Simulator Operator to enter Event Line 5 for the loss of NNI-Y DC power Page 5 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Ip-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of __
1 Ivent
Description:
A loss of NNI-Y DC power will cause Turbine Throttle Pressure to fail nidscale since the controlling signal is powered from NNI-Y. The Crew will be required to nanually control the Main Turbine to maintain Throttle Pressure Time Position I
CREW RO CREW I
BOP Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize a loss of NNI-Y DC Power 14-1-E NNI-Y 24 VDC BUS TRIP Loss of Y-DC NNI Power Indicating Light on Control Room Panel C5722 Implement DB-OP-02532, Loss of NNlllCS Power, section 4.4 Monitor Makeup Tank level using NNI-X powered indication and manually transfer Makeup Pump suction valves as required Recognize a midscale failure of Turbine Throttle Pressure Recorder SP 16 and Group 61 indicates 900 PSI Steam Generator and Turbine Header Dressures decreasina Place the EHC Control Panel in MANUAL Place the SGlRx Demand Station in HAND Adjust Turbine load using the INCREASE andlor DECREASE pushbuttons to restore Turbine Throttle Pressure as directed by the SRO After the Turbine Throttle Pressure is restored, direct the Simulator Operator to insert Event Line 6 for the loss of offsite power Note: Event Line 6 will automatically activate if the Reactor is triDDed Page 6 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Op-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 2 Event NO.:^ P a g e 1 of -
7 Event
Description:
A loss of offsite electrical power causes a Reactor trip and a loss of all RCPs. The loss of the RCPs causes a SFRCS actuation. AFPT 1 will start and overspeed trip due to the loss of governor oil. AFPT 2 fails to start requiring the use of the MDFP. D2 Bus will have to be reenergized to provide power to D2 Bus. EDG 1 fails to automatically start but can be started manually from the Control Room Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW Recognize a loss of offsite power and Reactor trip Perform DB-OP-02000 Immediate Actions Manually trip the reactor Verify power decreasing in the intermediate range Manually trip the turbine RO II I
SRO I Route to DB-OP-02000. Section 3 II II I
SRO I Verifv immediate actions II II I
CREW I Implement Specific Rules II ROIBOP
- Use Attachment 6 of DB-OP-02000 to re-power D2 Bus
- From the SBODG OpenABDD2 Verify AD213 is closed Verify Bus D2 energized Verify AD2DF7 is closed Verify BDF7 is closed Verify AD 110 is open Start the SBODG by pressing START at the SBODG Control Panel C5740 Check SBODG speed approximately 900 RPM Close AD 301 to energize Bus 02
- Critical Task Page 7 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 2 EventNo.:
P a g e 2 of -
7 Event
Description:
Continued ROIBOP "Use Attachment 6 of DB-OP-02000 to re-power D2 Bus
- From EDG 2 Verify AD301, SBODG BKR is open Verify AD205, XFMR BDFG is open Verify AD206, CLNG WTR PMP 2 is open Verify AD201, STA AIR CMPSR 2 is open or lock out Verify AD202, CLNG TWR MU PMP 2 is open Verify AD204, HTR DRN PMP 2 is open Verify AD207, CNDS PMP 2 is open Verify AD210, MOTOR DRIVEN FEED PUMP is open Open ABDD2, HIS 6228, ABDD2 Place D1 SYNC SELECT to BKR to D2 Close AD110, HIS 6233, AD110 Verify 02 is energized Place D1 SYNC SELECT in the OFF Close AD2DF7 Verify BDF7 is closed Verify AD301, SBODG BKR is open Verify ABDD2, BUS TIE XFMR BD is open Verify AD205, XFMR BDFG is open Verify AD206, CLNG WTR PMP 2 is open Verify AD202, STA AIR CMPSR 2 is open or lock out Verify AD202, CLNG TWR MU PMP 2 is open Verify AD204, HTR DRN PMP 2 is open Verify AD207, CNDS PMP 2 is open Verify AD210, MOTOR DRIVEN FEED PUMP is open Verify AD1 10 is open, HIS 6233, AD1 10 Verify HBBD is open, HIS 6214, HBBD Verify AC110 is open, HIS 6223, AC110 Place the C1 SYNC SELECT Switch to BKR TO XBD Close ABDCl, HIS 6220, ABDCI Place the C1 SYNC SELECT Switch to OFF Close ABDD2. HIS 6228, ABDD2 Verify D2 is energized Close AD2DF7 Verify BDF7 is closed
- From EDG 1 Page 8 of 18
~~
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
~~~
lp-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 2 Event No.:-
P a g e 3 of __
7 ivent
Description:
Continued
=
- Use Attachment 5 of DB-OP-02000 to start the MDFP
- Enable BOTH MDFP Discharge Valves HIS6460 HIS6459 LIC6460 LIC6459
- Close BOTH MDFP Discharge Valves
- Start the MDFP
- Establish feedwater flow to both Steam Generators at less than 1000 gpm indicated flow on the MDFP Flow Indicator FI 5876 Verify proper SG level control at 49' using Specific Rule 4, Steam Generator Control Direct an Equipment Operator to locally shifl MDFP recirculation to the CST Control SG pressures by place the Atmospheric Vent Valves in manual using Attachment 3 Start the ElAC Recognize lowering instrument Air pressure Place the A W Hand/Auto Stations in HAND Reduce the A W demands to zero Press the A W BLOCK pushbuttons Press AUTO on the A W Hand indicating Switches Control Steam Generator Pressure as required from the HandJAuto stations to maintain RCS Tave constant or slightly lowering using both A W s Page 9 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 2 Event No.:
Page 4 of -
7 Event
Description:
Continued RO RO CREW SRO RO RO Applicants Actions or Behavior Implement Specific Rule 6 Manually start EDG 1 0
Verify MU Pump 1 breaker is open Verify C1 Bus is energized Verify CCW Pump 1 is running Verify Service Water Pump 1 is running
~~~
~~~~
~
~
Per Specific Rule 4 start both Makeup Pumps if no feedwater flow exists Per Specific Rule 4 monitor RCS temperature for 600°F (600°F is a trigger to route to Attachment 4 to initiate MUIHPI cooling. Should have MDFP flow prior to this temperature)
ImDlement Attachment 4 if RCS temperature reaches 600°F Implement Attachment 8, Place MUIHPIILPI in Service (from )
Set Pressurizer Level Controller to 100 inches Lock MU Pump suctions on the BWST StarVVerify running the second MU Pump StarWerify running the standby CCW Pump Start both HPI Pumps Open HP 2A, HP 28, HP 2C and HP 2D Start both LPI Pumps nH e?
Turn off all Pressurizer Heaters (from Attachment 4)
Page 10 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 2 Event No.:-
P a g e 5 of __
7 Ivent
Description:
Continued Position RO RO RO SRO CREW RO Applicants Actions or Behavior Align both MU injection lines (from Attachment 4)
Close MU 6409 Open MU 6420 Open MU 6421 Open MU 6419 Verify open MU 6422 Close MU 6407 Close MU 6406 Verify open RC 11 (from Attachment 4)
Lock open the PORV (from Attachment 4)
Afler the BOP has started the MDFP and initiated flow to the SGs, route to section 4 for Supplementary Actions Check for symptom direction Check for all Group 1-7 Control Rods fully inserted Page 11 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
-~~
RO Perform Attachment 1, Primary Inventory Control Actions Perform ANachment 2, Steam Generator Inventory and Pressure Control Actions BOP BOP
[
RO 1 Monitor Makeup Tank level using the NNI-X powered level indicator Check for NNI Power available BOP Check for ICs Power available Verify proper SFRCS actuation for the trip parameters present using Table 1 I
Bop I
BOP RO Page 12 of 18 Check for Instrument Air available Check SFAS has not actuated
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6-7-&
P a g e 7 of -
7 Event
Description:
Continued Time Position
--I--- +
Check for:
Adequate subcooling margin SG Tube Rupture Proper primary to secondary heat transfer Termination criteria MDFP supplying AFW to both SGs Pressurizer level being manually controlled at the proper level Unusual Event per EAL 4.A.1 for loss of offsite power Page 13 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION Re-power D2 Bus SSig - Failure to do so will cause a loss of all feedwater Cue - Loss of normal power to D2 Bus, Procedural guidance MPI - D2 Bus powered from SBODG OR D2 Bus powered from D1 Bus OR D2 Bus powered from C1 Bus OPF - D2 Bus Voltage indicates =4160 Volts KSA Number: 064-A4.06 (3.9/3.9) Ability to manually start and load EDG from the Control Room Feed at least one SG using the MDFP SSig - Failure to do so will cause a loss of all feedwater Cue - Aux Feedwater Pumps not running, Procedural Guidance MPI - MFFP switch to START, MDFP discharge valve(s) open OPF - Flow to the SG(s), SG level(s) increasing KSA Number: 056-MI. I O (4.314.3) Ability to operate Aux/Emergency Feedwater Pumps during a loss of offsite power Page 14 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions SCENARIO ATTRIBUTES Total Malfunctions Malfunctions after EOP Entry Abnormal Events Major Transients EOPs EOP Contingencies Scenario Runtime EOP runtime Crew Critical Tasks Technical Specifications Exercised Form ES-D-2 7
3 3
1 1
2 (Attachment 6 and Attachment 5 of DB-75 minutes 30 minutes 2
2 OP-02000)
Page 15 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CUE SHEET Event 1 - Transfer Gland Steam from Main Steam to Aux Steam Event 2 - Loss of oil in AFPT 1 governor Role play as an Equipment Operator to call the Control Room to report the oil sight glass on the AFPT 1 governor is broken and the oil has leaked out of Role play as Maintenance to investigate the broken sightglass on the AFPT 1 governor If requested, role play as the Work Week Manager to report risk level has increased to Orange If requested, role play as an Equipment Operator/Field Supervisor to close the governor the AFPT 1 Trip Throttle Valve Event 3 - MU 32 blown fuse Role play as I&C for investigating/replacing the blown fuse Event 4 - Dropped Control Rod Role play as Operations Management for Reactivity Management Role play as an Equipment Operator/l&C for investigating the dropped rod Role play as the System Dispatcher to acknowledge the power reduction notifications Event 5 - Loss of NNI-Y DC Role play as I&C for investigating loss of NNI-Y DC Event 6, 7 and 8 - Loss of offsite power, Reactor trip, failure of EDG 1 to automatically start and loss of both AFW Pumps Role play as an Equipment Operator to investigate the loss of both AFW Pumps. Report AFPT 1 tripped on overspeed due to no Governor control oil and AFPT 2 governor valve is stuck closed Page 16 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Simulator Setup Instructions
- 1. Verify the following:
- a. Previous data on Yokogawa recorders is cleared
- b. Chart recorders are rolled forward
- c. Applicable procedures are wiped cleaned
- d. Used Alarm Typer paper is removed
- e. Computer alarms are cleared/acknowledged
- 2. Initialize at 60% power
- 3. Equipment Status:
- b. Tag out LPI Pump 1
- c. Turn on the LPI blue status
- d. Hang Protected Train 2 signs
- e. Select SP16B for Turbine Throttle Pressure input
- f.
Reset SASS annunciators as required
- 4. Set Up Batch File
- a. Initial Setup
- Rackout the breaker for LPI Pump 1 IRF BDPIA RACKOUT
- EDG 1 fails to automatically start IRF G529B
- RCP 1-1-1 seal 1 leak IMF HN09 0.4
- RCP 1-1-1 seal 2 leak IMF HN08 0.0017 Page 17 of 18
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
- Fail SP16A low to put SP16B in service IMF LlT2N 0.0
- b. Triggers
- Reactor power < 5% activates the loss of offsite power TRGSET 6 "RATPWc5.0
- AFPT 2 Gov Valve closes when AFPT 2 steam admission valve opens TRGSET 8 "SXA5889B>0.2"
- c. Events Event 1 - Transfer GS from Main Steam to Auxiliary Steam Event 2 - Loss of oil from AFPT 1 governor IMF SFEJA (2)
Event 3 - Blown fuse causes MU32 to fail to control in automatic IRF H170 (3) TRUE Event 4 - Rod 5-8 drops, location M-5 IMF L153B (4)
Event 5 - Loss of NNI Y DC IMF NP19D (5) TRUE Event 6 - Loss of offsite power IMF PLZZ (6)
Event 7 - EDG 1 fails to automatically start Event 8 - AFPT 2 Gov Valve closes when the AFP starts IMF SFERE (8) TRUE Page 18 of 18
r r
l Appendix D Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Davis-Besse Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
0 50% power, 400 EFPD Emeraencv Diesel Generator 1 out of service
~
~~
11 MFPT 1 on the Turnina Gear 1
HIS SP 16. Turbine Throttle Pressure. selected to PT SP16B (NNI-Y)
Turnover: The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 50% power with core age at 400 EFPD. Emergency Diesel Generator 1 is out of service for maintenance. The Plant Risk level will be YELLOW. MFPT 2 is on line and MFPT 1 is on the turning gear. Following turnover the Crew will take action to perform the Turbine-Generator Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test Event Malf.
Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
N - BOP Perform TG BackuD OversDeed Test. DB-SS-04154 2
B2M1 N C - RO Make-up Pump 1 trips 3
BV24B C-RO MU 1903 fails closed 4
HH50 R - RO SG 1 tube leak and plant shutdown TS - SRO TS - SRO 5
UFOSA C - BOP Turbine Vibration UF08A UFIIA UFO6A 6
HH50 M -All SG 1 Tube Rupture and Reactor trip 11 7
I SFDPC I M - All I Loss of Main Feedwater 11 8
I F30AB I C -BOP I SFRCS Channel 1 fails to actuate (N)orrnal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
DAVIS-BESSE 2008 NRC EXAM SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 GENERAL DESCRIPTION The crew will assume control with power at 50% power. Following turnover the crew will perform DB-SS-04154, Turbine-Generator Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test Following the completion of DB-SS-04154 the Lead Evaluator will cue the loss of the running Makeup Pump. The crew will respond to annunciator 6-64, SEAL INJ TOTAL FLOW, in accordance with DB-OP-02006, Reactor Coolant Pump Alarm Panel 6 Annunciators, and enter DB-OP-02512, Loss Of RCS Makeup and DB-OP-02515, Reactor Coolant Pump And Motor Abnormal Operations. The crew should close MU19, Seal Injection Flow Control Valve, and start the standby Makeup Pump. The crew should restore Pressurizer level and RCP Seal Injection flow. The SRO should evaluate the loss of the Makeup Pump and determine Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 applies.
Following the start of the standby Makeup Pump the Lead Evaluator will cue the inadvertent closure of MU1903, Letdown Demin Inlet. The crew will respond to annunciator 2-2-A, LETDOWN PRESS HI, in accordance with DB-OP-02002, LetdownlMakeup Alarm Panel 2 Annunciators. The crew should isolate Letdown to stop an interfacing system LOCA. An Equipment Operator will call up and identify that MU1903 had been inadvertently closed.
Letdown will be re-established in accordance with DB-OP-06006, Makeup And Purification System After Letdown flow is re-established the Lead Evaluator will cue the Steam Generator 1 Tube Leak. The crew should respond to annunciator 12-I-A, MN STM LINE 1 RAD HI, in accordance with DB-OP-02531, Steam Generator Tube Leak. The crew will evaluate the SG leakage and determine the leak rate is in excess of T.S. 3.4.6.2 and start a rapid shutdown.
During the power reduction Main Turbine bearing vibration levels will increase to the point annunciator 15-2-E T-G BEARING VIB HI will alarm. The crew will respond in accordance with DB-OP-02015, Turbine Alarm Panel Annunciators and manually trip the Main Turbine.
After the Main Turbine is tripped the Lead Evaluator will cue the increase in SG tube leakage.
This leak size will be larger than Makeup capacity. The crew will enter DB-OP-02000, RPS SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture and trip the reactor.
After the reactor trip, the Main Feedwater Pump 2 speed will coast down leading to a loss of all Main Feedwater. SFRCS Channel 1 will not actuate either automatically or manually requiring the crew to start AFW Pump 1 and reposition SFRCS Channel 1 actuated valves.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Bop Op-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 3 E v e n t N o. : L P a g e 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Following turnover the crew will perform the Backup Overspeed trip test for the Main Turbine in accordance with DB-SS-04 154, Turbine-Generator Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test Depress and hold the Backup Overspeed Trip - Push To Test pushbutton located on the EHC Monitor Panel (C5757B) 11 Time I Position I
A pp licant's Actions or Behavior BOP Place HIS MP11 lA, Backup Overspeed Trip Test Switch, in TEST 11 1
BOP 1 position Release the Backup Overspeed Trip - Push To Test pushbutton Bop Check that the Backup Overspeed Trip - Push To Test lamp comes Place HIS MPI 1 lA, Backup Overspeed Trip Test Switch, in NORMAL position I
I I Check that the Backup Overspeed Trip - Push To Test lamp goes I1 I
Ioff It BOP I Notify the Shift Manager this procedure is complete After the Backup Overspeed Trip Test is complete direct the Simulator Operator to insert Event Line 2 to trip Makeup Pump 1 Page 1 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-Dd Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 3 E v e n t N o. : L P a g e 1 of __
2 Event
Description:
Makeup Pump 1 trips causing a loss of RCS Makeup and RCP Seal Injection. The Reactor Operator should isolate Letdown and start the standby Makeup Pump.
The SRO should implement DB-OP-02512, Loss of RCS Makeup and enter the applicable Tech Spec.
Applicants Actions or Behavior H
Recognize a loss of the running Makeup Pump 0
6-5-C SEAL INJ FLOW LO 6-6-C SEAL INJ TOTAL FLOW Zero Makeup flow 0
Makeup Pump red light OFF lmolement DB-OP-02512. Loss of RCS MakeuD II Monitor Pressurizer level Close MU 28 to isolate Letdown N
Isolate normal Makeup by closing MU 32 Refer to DB-OP-02515, Reactor Coolant Pump and Motor Abnormal Operation, section 4.2 Page 2 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior P
P RO
'Start the standby Makeup Pump 2 RO Restore Seal Injection flow as follows Over =2 minutes open MU 19 to a setpoint of 12-15 gpm After 10 minutes increase total Seal Injection flow to =20 to Afler another 10 minutes adjust total Seal Injection flow to the normal range Return MU 19 to AUTO 25 gpm
- Restore Makeup Flow as follows:
RO Slowly raise Makeup flow using MU 32 When Pressurizer level is correct return MU 32 to AUTO I
RO Open MU 28 to restore Letdown SRO Refer to Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 (72 Hour LCO)
Afler the SRO refers to Tech Specs, direct the Simulator Operator to enter Event Line 3 to close MU 1903, Purification Demin 3 Letdown Flow Inlet Page 3 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 P a g e 1 of 2 Event
Description:
MU 1903, Purification Demin 3 Letdown Flow Inlet is inadvertently closec from the local switch and causes a loss of Letdown Time Critical Position CREW RO RO RO RO RO RO SRO -
isk Recognize a loss of the Letdown flowpath:
Zero Letdown flow 2-2-A LETDOWN PRESS HI Refer to DB-OP-02002, LetdownlMakeup Alarm Panel 2 Annunciators
- Verify MU 4, Pressure Reducing Valve, is closed (Can also close MU 28, MU2A or MU 3 to isolate Letdown)
Verify MU 6, Letdown Flow Control Valve, is closed
~
Crew may use guidance in DE-OP-02522, Small RCS Leaks for loss of Letdown flow Set MU 32 setpoint to 4 6 0 inches Lower Seal Injection flow to e3 gprn per RCP Request Chemistry to maximize sample rate Check for correct valve lineup in the Letdown line Recognize MU 1903 is closed Re-establish Letdown Re-open MU 1903 Re-open MU 4 (or MU 28, MU2A or MU 3 if closed instead of MU 4)
If Pressurizer level is > 228 inches, enter Tech Spec 3.4.4 Page 4 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 3 Event NO.:^ P a g e 2 of __
2 Event
Description:
MU 1903, Purification Demin 3 Letdown Flow Inlet is inadvertently closed from the local switch and causes a loss of Letdown Applicants Actions or Behavior I
n After Letdown is restored direct the Simulator Operator to insert Event Line 4 for a tube leak in SG 1 Page 5 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4&5 Page 1 of 4
- vent
Description:
A tube leak of -75 gpm in SG 1 will require a plant shutdown. During the lower reduction vibrations will increase on the Main Turbine requiring the Main Turbine to be nanually tripped Time I Position I I RO 1
SRO 1
-P=
Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize indications of a SG tube leak 12-I-A MN STM LINE 1 RAD HI 9-4-A VAC SYS DISCH RAD HI 0
Increasing Makeup flow Route to DB-OP-02531, Steam Generator Tube Leak Monitor Pressurizer level Determine SG 1 has the tube leak Calculate a leak rate Direct Chemistn, to perform Attachment 2 Direct Radiation Protection to perform Attachment 3
~
Direct an Equipment Operator/Field Supervisor to perform Direct a plant shutdown Notify the SCC Load Dispatcher of plant shutdown Page 6 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 lp-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4&5 Page 2 of 4
- vent
Description:
Continued RO SRO SRO RO SRO CREW BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Begin plant shutdown Set RATE OF CHANGE Set MIN LIMIT - MW to 180 MWE Depress DECREASE Contact Chemistry to monitor Condensate Polishers and sample the RCS As time permits:
Direct a Reactor Operator to transfer station electrical loads Direct an Equipment Operator to realign the MDFP to the MFW mode Direct an Equipment Operator to fire the Aux Boiler Maintain Makeup tank level (May transfer MU Pump suctions to the BWST)
Refer to TS 3.4.6.2s Event Line 5 will automatically activate to begin increasing Turbine Vibrations when Reactor power goes below 40%
Recognize increasing vibrations on the Main Turbine 15-2-E T-G BEARING VIB HI High vibration on any Turbine or Generator Bearing at ZJR 2538, Main Turbine & MFP Turbines-Bearing Vibration
& Eccentricitv Refer to DB-OP-02015. Turbine Alarm Panel Annunciators Page 7 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4&5 Page 3 of 4 Event
Description:
Continued Time I Position I I BOP 1
BOP I
-F-Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify bearing vibration location and intensity at ZJR 2538 When vibration intensity is greater than 12 mils for any bearing, then trip the Main Turbine Refer to DB-OP-02500, Turbine Trip Check Turbine Stop Valves and Turbine Control Valves are closed Check Feedwater is controlling on Low Level Limits Check SG pressures controlling at 1870 psig Verify ACB 34560 and ABS 34561 are open Verify power is not flowing on the Main Generator Verify the Generator Field Breaker and the Exciter Field Breaker are open Verify MS 199 and MS 314 are closed Check proper RCS response RCS pressure RCS temperature Pressurizer level Page 8 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4&5 Page 4 of 4 Event
Description:
Continued insert Event Line 6 to increase the size of the SG tube leak Page 9 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Route back to section 4.1 of DB-OP-02531 Op-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 3 E v e n t N o. : m P a g e 1 of -
4 Event
Description:
The tube leak in SG 1 will increase in size and require entry into DB-OP-02000 for a SG Tube Rupture. Since the plant is on Low Level Limits, the Crew should trip the Reactor. Following the Reactor trip the running MFPT speed will decrease to the point that an SFRCS actuation should occur. SFRCS Channel 1 fails to actuate requiring the Crew to manually reposition the SFRCS actuated valves I
~
Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize increase in leak rate Makeup flow increasing Pressurizer level decreasing Close MU 28 to isolate Letdown I
Go to section 8 of DB-OP-02000. RPS SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Recoanize PZR level still droDDina II I il Tube Rupture Implement Attachment 8, Place MU/HPI/LPI in Service Set Pressurizer Level Controller to 100 inches Lock MU Pump suctions on the BWST StaWerify running the standby CCW Pump StaWerify running both HPI Pumps Verify open HP 2A, HP 28, HP 2C and HP 2D Open DH 64 and DH 63 Start both LPI Pumps Trip the reactor when Pressurizer level drops to 100 inches or lower 11 Page 10 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No.:
ScenarioNo.: 3 Event NO.:^ P a g e 1 of 4 Ivent
Description:
Continued Position RO SRO CREW BOP BOP BOP Applicants Actions or Behavior Perform DB-OP-02000 Immediate Actions Manually trip the reactor Verify power decreasing in the intermediate range Manually trip the turbine Verify immediate actions Check for Specific Rule implementation Recognize AFPT 1 did not automatically start Implement Specific Rule 4 Align Auxiliary Feedwater to SG 1 using Table 1 for guidance
- Open MS 5889A to start AFPT 1
- Start the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump OR 0
Start the MDFP FeedSG 1 Enable both MDFP Discharge Valves Close both MDFP Discharge Valves Realign the following valves for a SFRCS Actuation using Table 1 for guidance Close W 6 1 2 Close ICs 11 B Close MS 394 OpenMS 106 Open MS 5889A Page 11 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Dp-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:
Page 3 of 4 Event
Description:
Continued 1
CREW I
RO I
-t-Applicants Actions or Behavior Maintain RCS pressure constant or slightly decreasing using the Atmospheric Vent Valves Check for Symptom direction Recognize SG 1 tube rupture Route to Section 8 Verifv Attachment 8 is comDlete Set Pressurizer Level Controller to 100 inches Verify the following attachments from DB-OP-02531 are in progress:, Chemistry Responsibilities, Radiation Protection Responsibilities, Control of Secondary Contamination Page 12 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.:
Page 4 of -
4 Event
Description:
Continued Block SFAS low RCS pressure trips I
Applicants Actions or Behavior I
Direct an Equipment Operator/Field Supervisor to place the Auxiliarv Boiler in service Beam a RCS cooldown using the Atmospheric Vent Valves II Turn off all Pressurizer heaters 1
Begin spraying the Pressurizer to lower RCS pressure Control MUlHPl to maintain Pressurizer level 80 to 120 inches Termination Criteria HPI maintaining Pressurizer level RCS cooldown in progress using both SGs Alert based on EAL 2.A.2 for an RCS leak greater than 50 gpm
)I Page 13 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION Start the standby Makeup Pump and restore Makeup flow Required Operator Actions SSig - Prevent loss of RCS inventory control Cue - Procedural direction MPI - Makeup Pump 2 hand switch to START OPF - Makeup Pump 2 RED light lit KSA Number: 004-A4.08 (3.8/3.4) Ability to manually operate the Makeup Pumps Isolate the Letdown line SSig - Loss of RCS inventory/pressure outside of Containment Cue - Letdown high pressure, Procedural direction MPI - MU 4 CLOSE pushbutton depressed MU 28 CLOSE pushbutton depressed MU 3 CLOSE pushbutton depressed MU 2A CLOSE pushbutton depressed OR OR OR OPF - MU 4 green light on OR MU 28 green light on OR MU 3 green light on OR MU 2A green light on KSA Number: 004-A4.06 (3.6/3.1) Ability to manually operate the Letdown isolation and flow control valves Form ES-D-2 Page 14 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 SCENARIO ATTRIBUTES Total Malfunctions Malfunctions after EOP Entry Abnormal Events Major Transients EOPs EOP Contingencies Scenario Runtime EOP runtime Crew Critical Tasks Technical Specifications Exercised Required Operator Actions 6
2 4
1 1
1 (SP cifi Rule 4) 75 minutes 30 minutes 2
2 Form ES-D-2 Page 15 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CUE SHEET Event 1 - Turbine-Generator Backup Overspeed Trip Circuit Test Event 2 - Makeup Pump 1 trips Instantaneous Overcurrent on BKR AC105 is showing Role Play as an Equipment Operator to report a 50/51A target, Alarm-Time Role play as the Work Week Manager/Electrical Maintenance to begin trouble shooting AC105 and Event 3 - MU 1903, Purification Demin 3 Letdown Flow Inlet is inadvertently closed CLOSE pushbutton (NV 19030) was inadvertently depressed Event 4 8 5 - SG 1 tube leak of =75 gpm and high vibrations on the Main Turbine Role play as Chemistry to perform Attachment 2 of DB-OP-02531 Role play as Radiation Protection to perform Attachment 3 of DB-OP-02531 Role play as an Equipment OperatodField Supervisor to perform Attachment 4 of Role play as the System Dispatcher to acknowledge the power reduction After MU 1903 is closed, role play as an Equipment Operator to report the local DB-OP-02531 Event 6,7 (L 8 - SGTR, Reactor Trip and Loss of Main Feedwater Page 16 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Simulator Setur, Instructions
- 1. Verify the following:
- a. Previous data on Yokogawa recorders is cleared
- b. Chart recorders are rolled forward
- c. Applicable procedures are wiped cleaned
- d. Used Alarm Typer paper is removed
- e. Computer alarms are clearedlacknowledged
- 2. Initialize at 50% power
- a. Verify MFPT 2 running
- b. Verify MFPT 1 on the Turning Gear
- 3. Equipment Status:
- a. Hang License Requirement Sheet on the status board EDG 1: TS 3.8.1.l.b, fuel oil and lube oil filter replacement, DB-SC-03023 due (current time + 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />) DB-SC-03071 due (current time + 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />). Restore by (current time + 7 days)
- c. Turn on the EDG blue status
- d. Hang Protected Train 2 signs
- e. Select SPI6B for Turbine Throttle Pressure input
- f. Reset SASS annunciators as required
- 4. Set Up Batch File
- a. Initial Setup
- Remove EDG 1 from service.
Close DA44 IRF GD44 close Close DA 30 IRF GD43 close Form ES-D-2 Page 17 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Rack out AC 101 IRF G535A 3.0
- Fail SFRCS Channel automatic and manual actuation IMF F3OAB IMF F30AC
- Fail SP16A low to put SP16B in service IMF LlT2N 0.0
- b. Triggers
- Reactor power 40% activates the turbine vibrations TRGSET 5 "RATPW<40.0
- Reactor power < 10% activates the MFPT 2 loss of speed TRGSET 6 "RATPW<10.0"
- MU 4 green light on TRGSET 9 "B20MU04g==l"
- c. Events Event 1 - Main Turbine Backup Overspeed Trip test Event 2 - Fail Makeup Pump 1 breaker open IMF B2M1 N (2) TRUE Event 3 - MU1903 Demin 3 Inlet closes IRF BV24B (3) CLOSE Event 4 - SG 1 tube leak IMF HH50 (4) 0.015 0O:Ol:OO Form ES-D-2 Page 18 of 19
Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Event 5 - Main Turbine high vibrations IMF UFO9A (5) 1.0 60 0.1 IMF UF08A (5) 1.0 90 0.1 IMF U F l l A (5) 1.0 120 0.1 IMF UFO6A (5) 1.O 150 0.1 Event 6 - MFPT 2 speed lowers IMF SFDPC (6) TRUE Event 7 - Increase size of SG 1 tube leak Use CAEP File Line 2 Event 8 - SFRCS Ch 1 fails to actuate automatically or manually Event 9 - Bleed Letdown system pressure IRF BM77 (9) 0.0 IRF BMSIB (9) 1
- d. CAEP File
- Clear failure on MU 1903 IRF BM77 1.O (04:00:00(2 IRF BMSIB 0.0 104:00:0013
- Raise SG 1 leak rate to 0.09 after reactor trip CAEP Line 2 -MMF HH50 0.09104:00:0012 Page 19 of 19