Information Notice 2007-12, Tactical Communications Interoperability Between Nuclear Power Reactor Licensees and First Responders
| ML070710233 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/15/2007 |
| From: | Michael Case NRC/NRR/ADRA/DPR |
| To: | |
| References | |
| IN-07-012 | |
| Download: ML070710233 (8) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
W ASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 March 15, 2007 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2007-12: TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS
INTEROPERABILITY BETW EEN NUCLEAR
POW ER REACTOR LICENSEES AND FIRST
RESPONDERS
ADDRESSEES
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who have
permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed
from the reactor vessel.
PURPOSE
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to
provide addressees information for achieving tactical communications interoperability between
licensees, Federal, State, and local first responders in the event of an emergency at a nuclear
power reactor. It is expected that recipients of this document will review the information for
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to enhance tactical
communications interoperability. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC
regulatory requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES
For the purpose of this IN, interoperability and tactical interoperable communications are terms
defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In general, interoperability refers
to the ability of emergency responders to work seamlessly with other systems or products
without any special effort. W ireless communications interoperability specifically refers to the
ability of emergency response officials to share information via voice and data signals on
demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized (Ref. 1). Tactical interoperable
communications is defined as the rapid provision of on-scene, incident-based, mission-critical
voice communications among all first responder agencies (i.e., emergency medical services
[EMS], fire, and law enforcement), as appropriate for the incident (Ref. 2).
There may be unforeseen instances where licensees may deplete their typical communication
resources such as land lines, cellular phones, or radio frequencies to the point where they need
to rely on a more robust system to maintain tactical communications interoperability with their
stakeholders, especially first responders. Policies, training, exercises, and procedures also play
a vital role in achieving tactical communications interoperability and ensure that a steady flow of
critical information is maintained between the licensee and first responders.
Various examples of lapses in effective tactical communications interoperability have been
documented by response organizations. Specific examples include the responses to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and to Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005. These
events have generated valuable lessons for Federal, State, and local response organizations.
These lessons learned can apply to a major event response at a nuclear power reactor site
(i.e., hurricane, terrorist attack).
The following examples of enhanced communications are provided as a means for other
licensees, in coordination with State and local response agencies, to self-identify ways to
improve tactical communications interoperability. Each of the examples is intended to describe
different scenarios and challenges, and solutions implemented through collaboration with
Federal, State, and local public safety officials.
Exelon Nuclear (Mid-W est)
Exelon Nuclear (Mid-W est) sites have enhanced tactical communications interoperability by
integrating their systems and processes in partnership with a broad range of State-wide
communications enhancements implemented by the State of Illinois. These enhancements
were coordinated by the State of Illinois Communications Committee using funding available
through the DHS Office of Training and Grants. Enhancements made to communications
capabilities to ensure interoperability include:
- Deploying mobile command vehicles around the State to provide work space for various
response agencies at the incident scene, as well as communications gear to patch
together local agency radio frequencies;
- Providing 700/800 MHz radios and digital very high frequency (VHF) radios to response
agencies in the State of Illinois to facilitate communications with first responders;
- Providing a satellite-based warning and alert system, capable of receiving simultaneous, authenticated text messages from the State Emergency Operations Center, to county
emergency management agencies and other public safety agencies;
- Providing all hospitals in the State of Illinois with Medical Emergency Radio System of
Illinois radio units; and
- Providing transmitters and equipment to counties that did not have access to the States
inter-agency radio system (Illinois Radio Emergency Assistance Channel) to allow
response agencies within that county to communicate with each other.
Since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the State of Illinois has opened a new State
Emergency Operations Center. This center merges the State Incident Response Center, the
Illinois Emergency Management Agency 24-hour Communications Center, the Statewide
Terrorism and Intelligence Center, and the State Radiological Emergency Assessment Center
under a common facility.
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant
Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (TPNP), in the State of
Florida, installed dedicated phone lines and other wireless communication methods to improve
tactical communications interoperability with local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs) and State
and local response organizations. These modifications were subsequently evaluated following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This evaluation revealed that responding
organizations communication equipment, in many cases, were not compatible or interoperable.
TPNP subsequently procured a modular interface/interconnect system, available on-site, that
allowed for the patching of various licensee and first responder radio frequencies, cellular
phones, satellite phones, and land lines. A few challenges surfaced during the implementation
of this patching process. The licensee recognized the need to collaborate with the vendor in
developing procedures, installing the equipment in a weather-tight enclosure, testing the
equipment, and training of TPNP staff on equipment and procedural usage. An in-house
subject matter expert collaborated with the vendor and resolved these issues. Another
challenge related to site-shared frequencies with the LLEA was resolved when the LLEA
recognized the benefits of sharing radio frequencies with the licensee.
Fermi 2 Nuclear Generating Station
Prior to 2000, Fermi 2 had one base station on the same frequency as Monroe County, Michigan, the sites host county. In preparation for millennial computer problems (i.e., Y2K or
year 2000 problems), the licensee purchased radio units, similar to ones owned by the Michigan
State Police, to aid in communications interoperability. This acquisition supported a similar
investment by Monroe County. The County used DHS grant resources to acquire the same
800 MHz radio system as the Michigan State Police and thus achieved interoperability between
local response units in the county and within the State. Subsequently, Fermi 2 purchased base
stations and additional portable units similar to the Michigan State Police radio system, thereby
further enhancing the sites tactical communications interoperability with the county and the
State.
Currently, the Fermi 2 security organization performs daily system radio checks with the county.
Fermi 2 intends to assess the system performance and user proficiency during upcoming
security-related emergency preparedness drills.
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) security organization has achieved a higher
level of tactical communications interoperability through enhancements to its 800-MHz
communication system. These enhancements involved the reprogramming of LLEA radios with
licensee communication software that improved communications with the licensee. The LLEA
was able to re-configure the channel frequency which the licensee was using into their existing
and newly purchased portable radios. The communications system works by creating an
additional CCNPP security channel for LLEA to switch to when they are enroute to respond to
an incident at the plant. These enhancements allow for the lines of communication with LLEA
responders to remain open and facilitate the appropriate handling of incident command and
control. This communications system can also be used to improve outside response to the site
by incorporating another frequency for local fire departments and EMS personnel.
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
For the initial licensing of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP), the licensee acquired radios, as part of its site-trunked 800-MHz radio system, which shared at least one frequency with the
local fire department to ensure better communications during incident responses. More recently, local county authorities upgraded their radios to a digital (i.e., more efficient) 800-MHz
system and partnered with the PNPP site to ensure compatibility. In a joint effort between
PNPP and Lake County, Ohio, county departments reprogrammed their digital radios so that
both PNPP and the local fire department had at least two channels that were programmed to
operate in their common frequencies. PNPP further enhanced its capability to create additional
patched frequencies by using the countys Viper frequency matching system and the State of
Ohios Buckeye State Sheriff Association Communication Vehicle. This capability was available
to patch in additional responders into PNPPs security and the fire brigade common tracked
frequencies, such as county LLEAs, and fire, medical, and FBI responders.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
In addition to the examples provided above, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania)
has upgraded its communications capabilities since September 11, 2001. Pennsylvania
deployed an 800-MHz, non-scannable, encrypted data and voice system, which uses a virtual
Internet protocol network to create stable platforms for interoperable communications.
Pennsylvania has offered nuclear power reactor licensees within the Commonwealth access to
the system by means of providing a secure user profile that allows the site to become a party to
the Talk Group involved in the overall response to an incident. These prearranged Talk Groups
include the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, LLEAs, fire departments, emergency medical services, hospitals, and other local response organizations. This system, as designed, allows continuous communication with all stakeholders making possible the
exchange of voice and data, as needed. For example, the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection through its Bureau of Radiation Protection is currently structured to
use this system to maintain interoperability between field teams during any response to
incidents at a commercial power reactor facility.
BACKGROUND
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, communications interoperability has
gradually improved nationally (Ref. 3). This improvement is partially due to financial support by
DHS and through coordinated efforts among Federal, State, and local first responders and
public safety officials. Nuclear power reactor sites rely on Federal, State and local first
responder resources to support the licensees response to an emergency. As such, effective
tactical communications is essential in the coordination of these offsite resources.
The DHS Office of Grants and Training (G&T) Interoperable Communications Technical
Assistance Program (ICTAP) is designed to enhance interoperable communications between
Federal, State, and local emergency responders and public safety officials (Ref. 4). The goal of
ICTAP is to enable local public safety agencies to communicate as they prevent or respond to
weapons of mass destruction attacks. ICTAP is associated with the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) program. ICTAP works with State and local coordinating bodies to assess gaps
in the current communications infrastructure and determine the technical requirements for
designing an interoperable communications system. Recently, ICTAP has supported the
development of a Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP) for 75 urban areas and
designated multi-jurisdictional metropolitan areas. ICTAP and G&T are working together with SAFECOM to develop national interoperable
communications guidance. SAFECOM, a DHS program within the Under Secretary for Science
and Technology, has dedicated its resources to the selected UASI sites. Therefore these
resources are unavailable for private entities (Ref. 5). For example; under these guidelines, SAFECOM has partnered with the Commonwealth of Virginia and developed a strategic plan for
improving Statewide communications interoperability, which is identified as the Statewide
Interoperability Communications Planning (SICP) methodology. SICP methodology uses a
10-phase collaborative planning process, shadowed by SAFECOM as the technical expert, to
develop and adopt key essential initiatives for a Statewide strategic plan (Ref. 6).
Nuclear power reactor licensees that are located near the selected UASI sites could benefit
from the ongoing efforts to improve communications interoperability. However, these benefits
are currently hampered by the existing variations of governance structures, interoperable
equipment, equipment policies and procedures, incident communications resource plans, and
communications unit leadership (Ref. 7). Nevertheless, key essential initiatives, such as the
SICP methodology plan template, can be used as a tool by any organization committed to
improve communications interoperability, including NRC power reactor licensees and their
respective stakeholders.
In addition to the references provided in this IN, addressees can access more information
related to improving tactical communications interoperability at the following W eb sites:
- Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/ta_ictap.htm
- Office of Grants and Training
- Interoperable Communications Users Handbook
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/equipment_interopcomm.htm
- Lessons Learned Information Sharing
- SAFECOM
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/
- Interoperability Continuum
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/interoperabilitybasics/
1190_interoperabilitycontinuum.htm
- Interoperability Library (Interoperability in Virginia)
http://www.interoperability.virginia.gov/library.html
DISCUSSION
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.54(q) requires nuclear power
plant licensees to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans that meet the standards in
10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Planning standard
10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) states that provisions exist for prompt communications among principal
response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.
These requirements are amplified in NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev.1, Criteria for
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in
Support of Nuclear Power Plants,Section II, Planning Standards and Evaluation Criteria, Subsection F, Emergency Communications. Subsection F.1 states that: 1) Each organization
shall establish reliable primary and backup means of communication for licensee, local, and
State response organizations and 2) such systems should be selected to be compatible with
one another. Additionally, Subsection F.3 states that each organization shall conduct periodic
testing of the entire emergency communication system (i.e., to ensure prompt communications
among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public).
Currently, no NRC requirements directly address or mandate communications interoperability
between nuclear power reactor licensees and first responders. Nevertheless, establishing such
communications interoperability could enhance a licensees ability to respond to an event or
emergency.
NRCs phone line conferencing system through the Headquarters Operations Center (HOC) is
available to all stakeholders who need to establish communications with each other, whenever
a need arises to address matters related to NRC-licensed facilities or materials. The NRC HOC
can always be reached on a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week basis.
REFERENCES
1. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. SAFECOM: Interoperability.
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/interoperability/default.htm.
2. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Tactical Interoperable Communications
Scorecards Summary Report and Findings, January 2007.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grants-scorecard-report-010207.pdf
3. Chertoff, M. May 8, 2006, Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at
the Tactical Interoperable Communications Conference.
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0281.shtm.
4. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interoperable Communications Technical
Assistance Program (ICTAP). http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/ta_ictap.htm 5. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: G&T Information Bulletin No. 205, March 23, 2006. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/info205.pdf
6. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, SAFECOM, Interoperability Case Studies:
Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning (SCIP) Methodology.
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/interoperabilitycasestudies/1223_sta
tewidecommunications.htm
7. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ICTAP Fact Sheet.
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/ICTAP_Fact_Sheet.pdf
CONCLUSION
This IN is intended to provide information for achieving tactical communications interoperability
and is presented solely to share information among nuclear industry stakeholders. It does not
contain a definitive solution to the wide range of current challenges to tactical communications
interoperability between power reactor licensees and Federal, State, and local first responders.
This IN does not endorse specific tools, methods, or equipment that may be used to enhance
tactical communications interoperability.
CONTACT
S
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any
questions about this matter to the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
/RA/
Michael J. Case, Director
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Arlon O. Costa, NSIR Michael D. McCoppin, NSIR
301-415-6402 301-415-2737 E-mail: aoc@nrc.gov E-mail: mdm2@nrc.gov
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public W eb site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
ML070710233 *Incorporated DHS input into Background section
OFFICE NSIR:DPR:EPD TECH EDITOR BC:NSIR:DPR BC: NSIR:SPLB DD:NSIR
NAME ACosta * HChang (e-mail) AMcMurtray RJohnson NMamish
DATE 02/08/07 03/14/07 02/28/07 03/02/07 03/05/07 OFFICE LA:PGCB:DPR PGCB:DPR BC:PGCB:DPR D:DPR
NAME CHawes DBeaulieu CPJackson MCase
DATE 03/12/07 03/12/07 03/14/07 03/15/07