ML051960176

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Final As-Administered Scenarios for the Monticello Initial Examination - May 2005
ML051960176
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/02/2005
From: Mcneil D
NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:
References
50-263/05-301, ES-D-1 50-263/05-301
Download: ML051960176 (40)
v • d • e


Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: ____MNGP__________ Scenario No.: ____1___

Op-Test No.: W90115 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: Approximately 90% reactor power, ready to complete Turbine-Generator test 1040-01 quarterly requirements and return to full power after turbine testing. Normal electrical lineup. RCIC is inoperable due to planned maintenance on the turbine stop valve and is scheduled to be returned to service tomorrow.

Turnover:

Complete Test 1040-01 and raise reactor power to 100%. Load Dispatcher requests a rate of 5 -

7 MWe / minute.

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

N/A N (BOP)

Complete steps 23-25 of test 1040-01. (Turbine Bypass Valve Exercise and Speed Load Changer Exercise portions of Turbine-Generator testing).

2 N/A NI14D CH05 R (RO)

I (RO)

C (RO)

(SRO)

Raise power with recirc pumps.

APRM #4 Fails Inop Single Control Rod Scram due to failed RPS fuse and recovery T.S. LCO review for APRM 3

HP01 I (BOP)

(SRO)

HPCI inadvertent initiation T.S. LCO entry, shutdown requirement with RCIC inop 4

HP07 HP08 M (ALL)

HPCI steam line break (ramp)

Failure of group 4 isolation (HPCI Isolation Valves fail to close on PCIS automatic action)

Unable to manually isolate HPCI 5

CH22A M (ALL)

C (RO)

EOP 1300 entry (Secondary Containment Control)

EOP 1100 entry (RPV Control) Scram SDV failure to close (RPV - Secondary containment leak) scram will not reset (cannot isolate SDV) 6 S054-01 C (BOP)

EOP 2002 entry (Emergency RPV Depressurization) 1 ADS SRV fails to manually open (opens 1 non-ADS SRV)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 01 Event No.: 01 Event

Description:

Complete steps 23-25 of Turbine - Generator test 1040-01. This is the portion of the test that is required to be performed quarterly and requires reactor power to be <90%. All required steps (1-22) have been already completed. (Validated but not used.)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs the completion of the test steps 23 and 24.

BOP Reviews test steps BOP Verifies reactor power is <90%

BOP Verifies Main Condenser vacuum is 24.5 or greater and the Circ Water system is in the normal lineup.

BOP Performs step 23

  • Records generator gross load
  • Selects respective valve with BYPASS VALVE TEST pushbutton
  • Time valve opening:

o Press BYPASS VALVE TEST pushbutton o Time the bypass valve travel to the OPEN position by the change in position indication lights o Record time to OPEN

  • Record generator gross load
  • Timing valve closing:

o Release the BYPASS VALVE TEST pushbutton o Time the bypass valve travel to the CLOSE position by the change in position indication light o Record time to CLOSE

  • This alarm may energize and would be expected when performing this test and the ARP may not be referred to.
  • The ARP NOTE states that the alarm may initiate due to TBPV opening BOP Performs step 24
  • Slowly operates the SPEED LOAD CHANGER control switch in LOWER direction until a slight decrease in generator load is noted
  • Observes control valve and bypass valve position
  • Verifies the bypass valve OPENS slightly as the control valves CLOSE to reduce load Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
  • After operating on the speed governor control for a few minutes, restore turbine control to the pressure regulator by operating the SPEED LOAD CHANGER in the RAISE direction
  • WHEN the pressure regulator takes control, THEN raise the SPEED LOAD CHANGER to its high speed stop.

RO Respond to annunciator 5-B-32 (MAIN STEAM LINE LEAKAGE)

  • This alarm may energize and would be expected when performing this test
  • The ARP NOTE states that the alarm may initiate due to TBPV opening BOP Notifies SRO that test steps 23 and 24 are completed.

Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 01 Event No.: 02 Event

Description:

Raise reactor power with recirculation pumps from ~90% in order to achieve 100%

power. At approximately 93.5% power annunciators will be received and a half scram will initiate due to #4 APRM failing INOP. Control Rod 10-43 will fully insert due to a failed fuse on the A scram bus. The crew should stop raising power, diagnose the failure, bypass the APRM and reset the half scram. The Nuclear Engineer will be consulted for guidance for the control rod and will be told to withdraw the control rod using continuous withdraw to return it to position 48. The SRO should also refer to Technical Specifications for the APRM and determine that no LCO condition is required.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs reactor power be raised to 100%

Refers to C.2 POWER OPERATIONS:

  • Verifies no changes were made to the rod pattern (Nuclear Engineer states no changes)
  • Demands and Reviews 3D Monicore Periodic Log (Nuclear Engineer states all conditions are satisfied to raise reactor power to 98%)
  • Verifies Hydrogen Water Chemistry is in service (Informed that it is)
  • Verifies APRM readings against the NSSS Heat Balance at each of the following intervals:

o Every 10% power o Every 15 minutes RO Raises reactor power with recirc pumps by raising speed on both pumps and monitoring reactor power response BOP Provides peer check RO Acknowledge and report annunciators 5-A-3 (ROD WITHDRAW BLOCK), 5-A-30 (APRM HI HI INOP CHANNEL 4,5,6), 5-B-3 (REACTOR NEUTRON SCRAM TRIP), 5-B-5 (REACTOR AUTO SCRAM CHANNEL B) & 5-A-27 (ROD DRIFT).

RO Report Rx power, level, pressure RO Informs SRO that APRM #4 Hi Hi or INOP light is lit and the APRM indicates the same power as the other APRMs RO Informs SRO that control rod 10-43 has fully inserted (may initially diagnose that the blue scram light is lit and that the rod scrammed).

BOP Goes to back panel and observes on APRM #4 that the INOP light is lit and reports this to the SRO SRO Directs #4 APRM bypassed when diagnosis is complete per 5-A-30 SRO Directs half scram be reset after APRM is bypassed per 5-B-5 RO Bypasses #4 APRM RO Resets half scram Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

SRO Determines T.S. applicability 3.1.A and verifies requirements of table 3.1.1 are met RO Reviews ARP for rod drift and is sent to C.4-B.01.03.C (Control Rod Drifting):

Verifies proper CRD system operating parameters Refers to B.01.03-05.H (CRD Hydraulic System - System Operation) (Which directs actions for B.05.05-05.G Recovery from an Inadvertent Control Rod Insertion)

Verifies core thermal power and margins to thermal limits have not been exceeded RO Refers to B.05.05-05.G.1 (RECOVERY FROM AN INADVERTENT CONTROL ROD INSERTION:

Determines that only one control rod inadvertently inserted more than three notches into the core and proceeds to step 6.

Determines that with reactor power >50%, the Nuclear Engineer must be notified for guidance.

SRO Notifies Ops manager, Engineering and Work Control SRO When notified that the fuse was replaced for control rod 10-43 and when provided recovery guidance from the Nuclear Engineer, directs control rod 10-43 be returned to position 48 by continuous notch withdrawal.

RO Withdraws the control rod to position 48 using continuous notch withdrawal.

Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 01 Event No.: 03 Event

Description:

After crew brief or when directed by the lead evaluator, HPCI will inadvertently initiate.

The crew is expected to note a change in MWe output and/or HPCI alignment for injection. Actions to respond to the abnormal event are expected per C.4-G (INADVERTENT ECCS INITIATION). The SRO will determine that a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO is required.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP May report MWe lowering RO Reports annunciator 5-B-24 (REACTOR WATER LEVEL HI/LO)

  • Refer to C.4-B.5.07.A (LOSS OF REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL)
  • Notify Shift Supervision RO Reports RPV water level is rising BOP Reports HPCI initiation BOP Notes D/W pressure <2 psig and RPV water level is >-48inches SRO Directs HPCI shutdown BOP Performs Actions to secure HPCI per C.4-G (INADVERTANT ECCS INITIATION):
  • Verify HPCI turbine stopped (observe zero speed)
  • Investigate the cause of the initiation and correct
  • WHEN the cause of initiation has been determined, AND the condition is corrected, AND the system reset, THEN return the affected systems to the desired lineup, as required by the current plant conditions.

RO Report Rx power, level, pressure SRO Determines T.S. applicability (3.5.A.)

  • If the requirements or conditions of 3.5.A.1, 2 or 3 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated and Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

the reactor shall be placed in a condition which the affected equipment is not required to be operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SRO Determines shutdown required by T.S.

SRO Notifies Ops manager, Engineering and Work Control SRO Directs crew brief (Past, Present, Plan, Poll)

Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: WP90115 Scenario No.: 01 Event No.: 04 Event

Description:

After the HPCI initiation event, a steam leak in the HPCI system becomes evident when annunciator 3-B-56 (HIGH AREA TEMP STEAM LEAK) alarms. HPCI area temperatures and radiation levels annunciator 4-A-11 REACTOR BUILDING HIGH RADIATION) will be observed to rise. EOP-1300 Secondary Containment Control, will be entered. The automatic group 4 primary containment isolation will not function and HPCI cannot be manually isolated.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Reports annunciator 3-B-56 (HIGH AREA TEMP STEAM LEAK):

  • Monitor area temperatures as indicated by TR-4926 on C-21 and determine affected area(s).
  • Refer to the following procedures:

o C.4-B.2.4.A (STEAM LEAKS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT) o C.5.1-1300 (SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL) o A.2-101 (CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES) o C.4-B.8.7.A (VENTILATION SYSTEM FAILURE)

BOP Reports annunciator 20-A-32 (HPCI ROOM V-AC-8B TROUBLE)

Recognize both HPCI room fans are running BOP Reports EOP entry condition BOP Enters C.4-B.02.04.A, Steam Leaks Outside Primary Containment

  • Evacuate personnel from area
  • Isolate leak
  • Monitor indications
  • Scram SRO Directs check of secondary containment temperatures BOP Reports HPCI area temperature is above (or approaching) max safe from TR-4626 (AREA TEMPERATURE MONITOR) on C-20 and (if checked), HPCI radiation levels are rising from SPDS screen 110 or HPCI room ARM on Panel C-20.

BOP Reports annunciator 4-A-11 (REACTOR BUILDING HI RADIATION):

  • Check ARM Indicator and Trip Units AND determine affected areas and radiation levels.
  • Evacuate personnel from affected areas
  • Notify Radiation Protection to survey area
  • Consider initiating the EFT High Radiation Mode if there is detection of radiation outside or within the MCR.
  • Refer to C.5 (EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES), A.2 (EMERGENCY PROCEDURES) and Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

B.05.02 (AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM)

SRO Enters EOP-1300 (Secondary Containment Control) and directs:

  • Isolate leak
  • Operate area coolers BOP Attempts to isolate HPCI Steam Isolation Valves:
  • Takes the control switch for MO-2034 and MO-2035 to close (HPCI STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES)
  • Reports MO-2034 will NOT close
  • Reports MO-2035 cycles closed and back open (may diagnose this is due to the initiation signal)

Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 01 Event No.: 05 Event

Description:

Performs a Reactor Scram per C.4-A (Reactor Scram). The SDV vent valves will fail to close upon the scram, which provides an additional primary to secondary un-isolable leak. The attempt to isolate the leak by resetting the scram will not be successful.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enters EOP-1100 (RPV Control) and Directs Reactor Scram Determines un-isolable primary leak into the reactor building Directs scram before temperature, radiation level, or water levels exceed max safe pararmeter RO Performs immediate scram actions of C.4-A (REACTOR SCRAM):

  • Places reactor mode switch in shutdown
  • Reports reactor scram, mode switch in shutdown, all rods inserted RO Performs subsequent scram actions C.4-A (REACTOR SCRAM):
  • Control RPV water level o Place low power feed controller in auto and set for

~15 inches o Close both FRVs o Close both FW block valves

  • Select IRMs to recorders
  • Verify SDV vent and drain valves isolate BOP Performs subsequent scram actions C.4-A (REACTOR SCRAM):
  • Verify electric plant line-up
  • At 0 MWE, open 8N4 and 8N5 (disconnects)
  • Place DISCH VOL ISOL TEST switch to ISO
  • Verify reactor mode switch in shutdown
  • Place DISCH VOL HIGH WTR BYP switch in BYP
  • Reset scram RO Reports scram will not reset (reset switch is overridden)

SRO Directs RPV cooldown not to exceed 97°F/hr BOP Initiates RPV cooldown Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

SRO As 2 area radiation levels are approaching max safe conditions, may direct Anticipate Emergency Depressurization per EOP 1100 over-ride BOP If directed to anticipate emergency depressurization, coordinate with the RO and open turbine bypass valves to initiate a reactor cooldown in excess of 97°F/hr Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 01 Event No.: 06 Event

Description:

While continuing to monitor secondary containment temperature and radiation levels, when 1 area is above max safe and another is approaching max safe, the SRO may direct the anticipation of emergency RPV depressurization and direct a cooldown exceed 97°F/hr. When 2 or more areas are above max safe, an emergency RPV depressurization will be performed. One of the 3 ADS SRVs will not open and an addition non-ADS SRV will be opened for a total of 3 SRVs. When the RPV is depressurized and RPV water level is stable, the scenario is complete.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO As 2 area radiation levels are approaching max safe conditions, may direct Anticipate Emergency Depressurization per EOP 1100 override.

BOP If directed to anticipate emergency depressurization, coordinate with the RO and open turbine bypass valves to initiate a reactor cooldown in excess of 97°F/hr BOP Reports 2 area radiation levels are above max safe conditions SRO Enters EOP 2002, Emergency RPV Depressurization:

  • Verifies all rods inserted
  • Verifies D/W pressure <2 psig
  • Verifies torus level > -5.9 ft

Directs Torus Cooling BOP Initiates Torus Cooling:

Verifies Tours suction valve open Starts RHRSW pump(s) and adjusts flows Open Torus Cooling INBD injection valve 8 seconds Starts RHR pump(s)

Open RHR Discharge to Torus Open Torus Cooling INBD injection valve to adjust flow (4000gpm for 1 pump / 8000gpm for 2 pumps)

Verify minimum flow valve closed Verify Heat Exchanger dP is at least 20 psid BOP Opens 3 ADS SRVs BOP Reports 1 ADS SRV will not open SRO Directs opening of 1 non-ADS SRV BOP Opens 1 non-ADS SRV RO Maintains RPV water level Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: ____MNGP__________ Scenario No.: ____2___

Op-Test No.: W90115 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: Approximately 100% reactor power. Normal electrical lineup. HPCI is inoperable due to planned maintenance on the auxiliary oil pump and is scheduled to be returned to service tomorrow. Surveillance test 0143, Drywell - Torus Monthly Vacuum Breaker Check is to be performed.

Turnover:

Perform surveillance test 0143.

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

N/A PC07A N (BOP)

C (BOP)

(SRO)

Perform test 0143, Drywell - Torus Vacuum Bkr Check B drywell - torus vacuum bkr fails to fully close T.S. LCO entry for PCIS 2

RR13A I (RO)

Recirc Scoop Tube Lockout and Subsequent Reset 3

ED05E C (BOP)

C (RO)

R (RO)

(SRO) 4160V AC Essential Bus #15 Lockout Loss of and start #12 CRD pump due to the bus lockout Reduction in power to maintain generator amps in spec T.S. LCO entries due to loss of power 4

AP01A C (BOP)

R (RO)

A SRV fails open and is closed by pulling fuses Rapid Power Reduction due to open SRV 5

RR1B M (ALL)

Leak inside Primary Containment / scram (ATWS) 6 PP04 PP06 I (RO)

I (BOP)

EOP 1200 (Primary containment Control) and EOP 2007 (Failure to Scram) entry Rods insert when ATWS (ARI) initiation, exit EOP 2007 Auto sprays closure requires manual closure to prevent neg. containment pressure.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 01 Event

Description:

Performance of Surveillance test 0143, Torus-Drywell Monthly Vacuum Breaker Check is to be executed. A marked up copy of the test to provide Shift Manager approval to commence, reason for performance and prerequisites will be provided. During the performance of the test for the second vacuum breaker, it will be found to stick in the partially open condition, which will result in the termination of the test and a T.S. LCO entry.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Reviews testing requirements and steps to perform SRO Conducts or insures a pre-job brief per OWI01.09 is performed:

  • Obtains an existing pre-job brief from the data base OR
  • Uses the OPERATIONS PRE-JOB BRIEFING GUIDE BOP Performs Step 1 of test:
  • Directs out plant operator to open air isolation valve AI-215
  • Opens CV-7956 on panel C06 BOP Performs Step 2 of test:
  • Selects AO-2382A, Torus-DW Vac Breaker, on valve select switch 16A-S60, Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vac Bkr Vlv Sel Sw (Panel C-04)

BOP Performs Step 3 of test:

  • Opens AO-2382A by placing valve operation switch 16A-S61, Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vac Bkr Vlv Op Sw, (Panel C-04) to TEST BOP Performs Step 4 of test:
  • Verify AO-2382A OPENED by observing the following:

o The green indicating light is OFF and the red indicating light is ON above the valve select switch, 16A-S60 o The green indicating light is OFF and the red indicating light is ON on the wall mounted cabinet in the northeast corner of the Reactor Building at elevation 935.

BOP Performs Step 5 of test:

o 5-A-41 (CR VAC BKR DW/TORUS) o 5-A-42 (LOCAL VAC BKR DW/TORUS)

OATC/BOP Reports Annunciator 5-A-41 (CR VAC BKR DW/TORUS) and 5-A-42 (LOCAL VAC BKR DW/TORUS)

OATC/BOP Reviews Annunciator Response and determines that the alarm was due to the surveillance test BOP Performs Step 6 of test:

  • Place valve operation switch 16A-S61 to OFF BOP Performs Step 7 of test:
  • Verify AO-2382A CLOSED by observing the following:

o The green indicating light is ON and the red indicating light is OFF above the valve select switch, 16A-S60 o The green indicating light is ON and the red indicating light is OFF on the wall mounted cabinet in the northeast corner of the Reactor Building at elevation 935.

BOP Performs Step 8 of test:

o 5-A-41 (CR VAC BKR DW/TORUS) o 5-A-42 (LOCAL VAC BKR DW/TORUS)

OATC Reports the following annunciators reset:

  • 5-A-41 (CR VAC BKR DW/TORUS)
  • 5-A-42 (LOCAL VAC BKR DW/TORUS)

BOP Performs Step 9 of test:

  • Select AO-2382B, Torus-DW Vac Breaker, on valve select switch 16A-S60 (Panel C-04)

BOP Performs Step 10 of test:

  • OPEN AO-2382 by placing valve operation switch 16A-61 (Panel C-04) to TEST.

BOP Performs Step 11 of test:

  • Verify AO-2382B OPENED by observing the following:

o The green indicating light is OFF and the red indicating light is ON above the valve select switch, 16A-S60 o The green indicating light is OFF and the red indicating light is ON on the wall mounted cabinet in the northeast corner of the Reactor Building at elevation 935.

BOP Reports that BOTH the red and green indicating lights are lit.

OATC/BOP Reports Annunciator 5-A-41 (CR VAC BKR DW/TORUS) and 5-A-42 (LOCAL VAC BKR DW/TORUS)

OATC/BOP Reports that the ARP references Tech Specs 3.7.A.4 and requires notification of the system engineer BOP Requests the valve position from the Out Plant Operator and reports that BOTH indicating lights are lit.

BOP Performs Step 13 of test:

  • Place valve operation switch 16A-S61 (Panel C-04) to OFF BOP Reports that BOTH indicating lights remain lit SRO Directs termination of test

SRO Notifies Ops Mgr, Engineering, and Work Control SRO Enters T.S. LCO 3.7.A.4.and recognizes 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO condition based on:

a. When primary containment integrity is required, all eight drywell-suppression chamber vacuum breakers shall be operable and positioned in the closed position as indicated by the position indication system, except during testing and except as specified in 3.7.A.4.b through 3.7.A.4.d below.
b. Any drywell-suppression chamber vacuum breaker may be nonfully closed as indicated by the position indication and alarm system provided that drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure decay does not exceed that shown on figure 3.7.1
c. Up to two drywell-suppression chamber vacuum breakers may be inoperable provided that:(1) the vacuum breakers are determined to be fully closed and at least one position alarm circuit is operable or (2) the vacuum breaker is secured in the closed position or replaced by a blank flange.
d. Drywell-suppression chamber vacuum breakers may be cycled, one at a time, during containment inerting and deinerting operations to assist in purging air or nitrogen from the suppression chamber vent header
e. If requirements of 3.7.A.4 cannot be met, the reactor shall be placed in a Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SRO Directs initiation of test 0213 as directed to be performed upon failure of test 0143

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 02 Event

Description:

After the crew has exited the Surveillance procedure, Annunciator 4-C-5 (FLUID DRIVE A SCOOP TUBE LOCK) will alarm. The #11 Recirc Pump scoop tube will be locked. Shortly after the annunciator alarms, a report from the plant will indicate that the out plant operator bumped against the Recirc MG lube oil pressure switch which caused the lockout condition. The crew is expected to reset the scoop tube based on this information.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OATC Responds to annunciators 4-C-5 / 4-C-10 (FLUID DRIVE A/B SCOOP TUBE LOCK):

  • Reports alarm to SRO
  • Verifies automatic actions
  • If scoop tube lock is to be reset, refer to Ops Manual Section B.01.04-05.H.2.

SRO Acknowledges annunciator reports SRO After report of cause for the lock by RP tech, Directs scoop tube be reset OATC Performs Ops Manual Section B.01.04-05.H.2. Actions:

  • Coordinates with the Reactor Building Operator to verify that the Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD) indication displays a steady state value of 0000 and that the ASD RUN pushbutton light is ON (green).
  • Resets the Scoop Tube by depressing P/B 2A S2A OATC Resets Annunciator and reports #11 Recirc Scoop Tube is Reset SRO Acknowledges report SRO May perform crew brief (Past, Present, Plan, Poll)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 03 Event

Description:

Essential Bus 15 lockout occurs as directed by the Lead Examiner. The BOP will respond to the electric plant alarms, observes 15 bus 0 voltage and lockout alarm and report to SRO. The RO will respond to the loss of the #11 CRD pump and start the #12 CRD pump. The SRO will enter a T.S.

LCO recognize the requirement for a normal reactor shutdown.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to numerous annunciators on panel C08:

4160V Breakers associated with sources or breakers that could backfeed Bus 15 TRIP.

(152-501, 152-502, 152-511, 152-308, 152-509) o Enter C.4-B.9.6.C (LOSS OF BUS 15)

BOP Performs Subsequent Operator Action of C.4-B.09.06.C:

  • Determine if Bus 15 is being powered by 1AR or its respective EDG o Shutdown EDGs not required to supply their respective bus
  • IF power was lost to Bus 15, THEN execute C.4-B.09.07.C (ABNORMAL PROCEDURES - LOSS OF POWER TO LC-103 OR ITS MCCS) concurrently.
  • IF Bus 15 is de-energized, THEN perform the following:

o Place the following control switches in PULL-TO-LOCK:

152-511/CS, 1AR TRANS TO 15 BUS 152-502/CS, 11 STBY DIESEL GEN TO 15 BUS o IF an extended loss of Bus 15 is anticipated, THEN consider feeding LC-103 from LC-104 per E.4-07 (RESTORE LC-103 FROM LC-104)

BOP Remote Shutdown of Diesel from C-08 with Emergency Start signal Present (Ops Man B0.9.08-05)

  • In the back of Panel C-08, jumper terminals 5 and 6 on the Fast Start relay (95-7 for 11 EDG and/or 95-8 for 12 EDG) of the diesel(s) to be shutdown
  • Place the control switch of the emergency diesel(s) to be shutdown in the PULL-TO-LOCK position.
  • Remove the jumper from terminals 5 and 6 on the Fast Start relay 95-7 for 11 EDG and/or 95-8 for 12 EDG RO Reports annunciator 5-B-17 (CHARGING WATER LO PRESS)

RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions of C.4-B.01.03.A (LOSS OF CRD PUMP FLOW)

  • Verify a CRD pump is running (starts #12 CRD pump)

RO Reports reactor power, pressure and level.

BOP Performs Subsequent Operator Actions of C.4-B.09.07.C

  • Monitor system operation and take appropriate actions for the following systems:

o RBCCW o Stator Cooling o Drywell Ventilation o Service Water o Hydrogen Seal Oil

  • IF power to MCC-131 is lost, THEN refer to B.09.02-05.H.3, Less than Full Cooling for Generator Transformer, for permissible transformer loading
  • IF annunciator 8-B-1 (NO. 2R XFMR TROUBLE0 is in ALARM, THEN verify B2145, 2R AUXILIARY XFMR COOLING AUTO TRANSFORMER SWITCH, has transferred to the alternate source (MCC-121)
  • IF power is lost to LC-103, THEN refer to the attached tables to determine items of concern:

o MCC-131 o MCC-132 o MCC-133A o MCC-134 BOP Performs B.09.02-05.H.3:

  • IF there is less than full cooling available for the generator transformer, THEN find the permissible load for any combination of pumps and fans out of service by the following method:

o Count the total number of fans which are out of service on the coolers which are still in operation (those with pumps running) o Multiply the total number of pumps out of service by 3

o Add a. and b. (above) to obtain equivalent fans out of service o Refer to the following table to obtain permissible load.

  • NOTE: Loss of MCC-131 results in loss of 7 pumps and 21 fans
  • Permissible load is determined to be 482 MVA / Equivalent Low Side Current KILOAMPS is 12.66
  • Informs SRO of limits SRO Directs lowering of reactor power to achieve <482 MVA or 12.66 Kilo Amps SRO Enters T.S. to determine applicable LCOs:
  • 3.7.D.1 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) o During reactor power operating conditions, all Primary Containment automatic isolation valves and all primary system instrument line flow check valves shall be operable as specified in 3.7.C.2 o In the event one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable, reactor operation in the run mode may continue provided that within the subsequent 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> restore the valves to operable status, or at least one valve in each line having inoperable valves is deactivated in the isolated condition
  • 3.5.A.1 ECCS Systems o Except as specified in section 3.5.A.3, both Core Spray subsystems and the Low Pressure Coolant Injections (LPCI) Subsystem (LPCI Mode of RHR System) shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor water temperature is greater than 212°F o If the requirements or conditions of 3.5.A.1, 2, or 3 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated and the reactor shall be placed in a condition in which the affected equipment is not required to be operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

is made or found to be inoperable, reactor operation is permissible only during the following 7 days provided that the redundant component is operable.

  • 3.9.A.1 Auxiliary Electrical Systems o The reactor shall not be made critical unless all the following requirements are satisfied:

At least two (2) NSP transmission lines, associated switchgear, and at least two offsite power sources are fully operational and energized to carry power to the plant 4160V AC buses as follows:

  • 2R and 1R transformers, or
  • 1R and 1AR transformers, or
  • 2R and 1AR transformers (source from 10 transformer)

Both diesel generators are operable and capable of feeding their designated 4160 volt buses 4160V Buses #15 and #16 are energized 480V Load Centers #103 and #104 are energized o When the mode switch is in Run, the availability of electric power shall be as specified in 3.9.A, except as specified in 3.9.B or the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SRO Notifies Ops Mgr, Engineering, and Work Control SRO May perform crew brief (Past, Present, Plan, Poll)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 04 Event

Description:

After the crew has stabilized conditions from 15 Bus lockout, the A SRV will open. The immediate actions to close the SRV will be unsuccessful, but when RPV power is lowered and fuses are removed per C.4-B.03.03.A (STUCK OPEN RELIEF VALVE) the SRV will close. The crew man elect to initiate a manual scram as a conservative action.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to annunciator 3-A-9 (AUTO BLOWDOWN RELIEF VLV LEAKING):

  • Reports alarm to SRO
  • Refers to C.4-B.03.03.B (RELIEF VALVE LEAKING)

OATC /

BOP Responds to annunciator 5-A-46 (SRV OPEN):

  • Reports alarm to SRO
  • Check amber indicating light on Panel C03 to determine which valve is open.
  • Refer to C.4 (ABNORMAL PROCEDURES)
  • Verify proper instrumentation response as required by Technical specification Table 4.14.1, Note 4, per Procedure 0408a (SRV POSITION INDICATION RESPONSE CHECK).

SRO Acknowledges annunciator reports BOP Performs Immediate Operator Actions of C.4.B.03.03:

  • Place the handswitch for the affected SRV to the OPEN position and then return it to the normal AUTO position (Operator cycles A SRV control switch)
  • Notify Shift Supervision SRO Acknowledges annunciator reports RO Performs Subsequent Operator Actions:
  • Monitor and control Reactor pressure
  • If SRV remains open, THEN execute C-4-F (RAPID POWER REDUCTION) concurrently to reduce Reactor power.

SRO Directs lowering of reactor power per C.4-F RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions of C.4-F:

  • Reduce recirculation flow as necessary
  • IF core flow is <32 Mlbm/hr, THEN execute C.4-B.05.01.02.A (CONTROL OF NEUTRON FLUX OSCILLATIONS) concurrently
  • IF condition require initiation of a manual scram, THEN execute C.4-K (IMMEDIATE REACTOR SHUTDOWN)
  • Notify Shift Supervision

RO Performs Subsequent Operator Actions of C.4-F:

  • Determine if the reactor is operating in the allowed region of the power flow map:

o IF an unanalyzed or unallowed region of the power-flow map is entered, THEN immediately exit by inserting control rods or changing recirculation flow.

  • If time allows and conditions have stabilized for at least 5 minutes, demand an Official 3D-Monicore calculation and check thermal limits. If thermal limit Action Limits are reached, perform the appropriate actions per OPS Manual C.2-05.B.1. (this cannot be demanded from the simulator)
  • IF power must be reduced further, THEN insert control rods to position 04 or deeper using RWM Rapid Power Reduction Menu BOP Performs Subsequent Operator Actions of C.4-B.03.03.A:
  • IF SRVs A, B, C or D are open by an electrical signal RED LIGHT ON), THEN, remove the respective four (4) fuses listed below for the affected SRV(s):
  • Directs the Reactor Building Operator to remove the following fuses located in the Cable Spreading Room Panel C-32:

o 2E-F3A, 2E-F4A, 2EF7A, 2EF8A BOP Two minutes after the direction, the Reactor Building Operator reports that the fuses are pulled and the BOP observes that the A SRV indicates closed.

SRO Acknowledges report and directs reactor power reduction to be stopped.

SRO Reviews T.S. and determines 1 ADS valve inoperable and enter s a 14 day LCO per 3.5.A.3.h.

SRO Notifies Ops Mgr, Engineering, and Work Control SRO May perform crew brief (Past, Present, Plan, Poll)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 05 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the Drywell. The BOP will observe and report Drywell leakage, temperature, and pressure rising. SRO directs reactor scram.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Reports annunciator 4-B-35 (DRYWELL - TORUS HI PRESS)

  • Check Drywell and Torus pressure indicated by PR-2994 on C04
  • Check the following indications to determine if a primary system leak in the Drywell exists:

o Drywell Particulate level indicated by RR-7993 on C02 o Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain Sump levels indicated by LR-7409 on C04 o Drywell Equipment and Floor drain Sump Pump flows indicated by FR-2544 on C04 o Drywell and Torus air temperature (TR 23-15 on C21) o Drywell radiation level indicated by RI-7860A on C257 and RI-7860B on C258

  • IF primary system leakage is indicated, THEN refer to C.4 (ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES) AND A.2 (EMERGENCY PROCEDURES)

BOP Performs Subsequent Operator Actions of C.4-B.04.04.F:

  • Monitor Drywell pressure and temperature o IF Drywell pressure or temperature is rising, THEN determine status of operating Drywell coolers, AND place the standby Drywell cooler in service

o Monitor RBCCW surge Tank level and discharge pressure o Monitor Recirc Pump Seal pressure o If the change in unidentified leak rate has increased by more than 0.5 gpm within any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period, THEN notify the Operations Manager, AND Manager System Engineering o Refer to Tech Spec 3.6.D BOP Reports Drywell temperature and pressure approaching EOP entry conditions SRO Directs reactor scram per C.4-K

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 06 Event

Description:

When the SRO directs a reactor scram, the RO will insert a manual reactor scram, and observe and report all rods NOT fully inserted and reactor power >3%. EOPs 1100 (RPV CONTROL),

1200 (PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL) AND 2007 (FAILURE TO SCRAM) are entered due to drywell conditions and failure to scram. The initiation of the ATWS (ARI) system will be successful and all control rods will insert. EOP 2007 will be exited and EOP 1100 will be re-entered. Drywell cooling, Torus spray and Drywell sprays will be initiated. When plant conditions are stable with Drywell Sprays secured, the scenario is complete.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions of C.4-K (IMMEDIATE REACTOR SHUDOWN)

RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions of C.4-A:

  • Places reactor mode switch in shutdown
  • Determine if all control rods are inserted to or beyond position 04 Reports reactor scram, mode switch in shutdown, all rods NOT inserted, reactor power is >3% (or may provide indicated power level)

BOP Reports EOP entry conditions based upon drywell pressure and/or temperature SRO Enters EOPs 1100, 1200, 2007 SRO Directs:

  • MSIV low low water level isolation bypassed per 3301
  • Reactivity control per hard card BOP Performs actions:
  • Inhibits ADS by placing both ADS inhibit switches in bypass
  • Bypasses MSIV isolation by placing all 4 key lock switches on back panel to bypass

o Place CS INJECTION BYPASS switch to BYPASS o Close CS INJECTION OUTBOARD valves o Close CS INJECTION INBOARD valves

  • Prevents LPCI injection per 3205:

o Close MO-2015 o Opens knife switch

RO Performs Reactivity Hard Card actions:

  • Verifies mode switch in shutdown
  • Runs recirc pumps back to minimum speed
  • Trips both recirc pumps
  • Place fan switches in off
  • Bypass ECCS fan trip
  • Starts fans (only 2 & 4 are available)
  • Report drywell cooling in service SRO Directs Torus Spray initiation per C.5-3502 BOP Initiates torus sprays:
  • Place CNTMNT 2/3 height C/S to bypass
  • Place CNTMNT Spray/Cooling LPCI initiation C/S to bypass
  • Open MO-2007
  • Open MO-2011
  • Throttle open MO-2009
  • Report torus spray in service SRO Observes drywell temperature and pressure continuing to rise and directs drywell sprays per C.5-3502 BOP Initiates drywell sprays:
  • Place CNTMNT 2/3 height C/S to bypass
  • Place CNTMNT Spray/Cooling LPCI initiation C/S to bypass
  • Open MO-2021
  • Open MO-2023
  • Verify closed MO-2009
  • Verify closed MO-2012 & MO-2013 SRO Directs securing torus and/or drywell sprays when containment pressure lowers to 2 psig BOP Continues to monitor drywell temperature and pressure and controls sprays as directed and manually secures Drywell Spray before Drywell pressure goes below 0 psig.

SRO May perform crew brief (Past, Present, Plan, Poll)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: ____MNGP__________ Scenario No.: ____3___

Op-Test No.: W90115 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: Approximately 100% reactor power. Normal electrical lineup. HPCI is inoperable due to planned maintenance on the aux oil pump and is scheduled to be returned to service tomorrow. Surveillance test 0225-14-IA-1, Reactor Water Cleanup Valve Operability and Position Indication Tests is to be performed.

Turnover:

Perform surveillance test 0225-14-IA-1.

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

CH07B C (RO)

CRD FCV fails closed 2

N/A DS165-02 N (BOP)

C (BOP)

(SRO)

Perform test 0225-14-IA-1 (shuts down RWCU)

MO-2398 closure outside required range T.S. LCO entry due to test failure 3

FW20A C (RO)

A FW REG valve lock up and subsequent reset 4

B54 (SRO)

Loss of power to Alternate S/D panel, T.S. LCO 5

FW15A FW16A C (BOP)

R (RO)

RFP bearing high temp / vibration RFP Remove from service Rapid Power Reduction to 50%

6 TU03D TU03E TC07B TC07D C (BOP)

M (ALL)

Main turbine vibrations with failure to auto trip Turbine Bypass Valves Failure to Open Scram due to turbine vibrations(ATWS) 7 PP04 PP06 ATWS, EOP 1100, 1200, & 2007 entry Level Power control and SBLC injection required

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 01 Event

Description:

The RO may recognize CRD flow indications lowering or after about 2 minutes respond to annunciator 5-B-41 (CRD HI TEMPERATURE) and diagnose a failure of the in service CRD FCV. Actions to swap the in service CRD FCV will be initiated per B.01.03.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Responds to annunciator 5-B-41 (CRD HI TEMPERATURE):

Directs the Reactor Building Operator to determine the high temperature CRD by monitoring TR-3-244 at Panel C-59 Refers to B.01.03 (CRD HYDRAULIC SYSTEM -

SYSTEM OPERATION)

Notify Shift Supervision and System Engineer SRO Acknowledges report, direct swap to the B FCV RO Performs actions to swap FCV per B.01.03:

If, CRD Flow Control Valve B, CV-3-19B, is in standby, and CRD Flow Control Valve, CV-3-19A, is in service, Then perform the following:

o Open valve CRD-18-2, Flow Control Valve CV 19B Outlet Isolation. (Out Plant Action) o Open valve CRD-16-2, Flow Control Valve CV 19B Inlet Isolation. (Out Plant Action) o Place CRD Flow Controller, FC-3-301, to manual o Close CV-3-19A with CRD Flow Controller o At Panel C-05, place the CRD Flow Control Valve Selector Switch to the B flow control valve position o Slowly open CV-3-19B while monitoring system pressures with CRD flow controller to obtain desired flow. If recirc pump seal injection is in service, desired flow is 54 to 56 gpm minus 0.4 gpm for each isolated HCU.

o Place CRD Flow Control in auto o Close valve CRD-18-1, Flow Control Valve CV 19A Outlet Isolation. (Out Plant Action) o Close valve CRD-16-1, Flow Control Valve CV 19A Inlet Isolation. (Out Plant Action)

RO Reports CRD FCV B in service SRO Acknowledges Report SRO Notifies Ops Mgr, Engineering, and Work Control

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 02 Event

Description:

Performance of Surveillance test 0255-14-IA-1, Reactor Water Cleanup Valve Operability and Position Indication Tests is to be executed. A marked up copy of the test to provide Shift Manager approval to commence, reason for performance and prerequisites will be provided. The test requires the RWCU system be removed from service via normal procedure B.02.02-05. During the performance of the test MO-2398 stroke time will exceed the allowed time, which will result in the termination of the test and a T.S. LCO entry.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Reviews testing requirements and steps to perform SRO Conducts or insures a pre-job brief per OWI-01.09 is performed:

  • Obtains an existing pre-job brief from the data base OR
  • Uses the OPERATIONS PRE-JOB BRIEFING GUIDE BOP Performs Step 1 of test 0225-14-IA-1:
  • IF the Reactor Water Cleanup system is in operation, THEN place both filter-demineralizer units in HOLD, AND STOP both cleanup recirculation pumps using Ops Man B.02.02-05 (REACTOR WATER CLEANUP - SYSTEM OPERATION)
  • Direct Reactor Building Operator to remove RWCU Filter/Demineralizers A and B and place in HOLD
  • Check RWCU Filter Demin Panel C-82 to determine alarm received
  • Alarm received due to testing event, expected BOP Performs Step 3 of test:
  • CLOSE valve MO-2397, RWCU Inlet Inboard Isol, and record closing time.
  • OPEN Valve MO-2397 and record opening time.

BOP Performs Step 5 of test:

  • CLOSE valve MO-2398, RWCU Inlet Outboard Isol, and record closing time
  • Observes and reports to SRO that closing time was >22 seconds and exceeded LST time SRO Acknowledges report, directs test to be stopped and declares MO-2398 inoperable and review T.S. 3.7.D.1

except as specified in 3.7.D.2

  • 3.7.D.2.a: In the event one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, reactor operation in the run mode may continue provided that within the subsequent 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for MSIVs and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for EFCVs) restore the valve to operable status, or at least one valve in each line having an inoperable valve is deactivated in the isolated condition SRO Notifies Ops Mgr, Engineering, Chemistry, and Work Control

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 03 Event

Description:

The A Feed Regulating Valve will lock up. Annunciator 5-B-40 (FW CONTROL VALVE LOCKED) will alarm. With the plant at steady state conditions, RPV water level will not be impacted and the B RFV will maintain RPV water level stable. The RO should enter and use procedure C.4-B.05.07.A to reset the lock out condition and then return the FW REG valve to automatic control.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Responds to annunciator 5-B-40 (FW CONTROL VALVE LOCKED):

  • Reports alarm to SRO
  • Monitor Reactor water level
  • IF Reactor water level is NOT being maintained by the Reactor Water Level Control System, THEN refer to C.4-B.05.07.A (ABNORMAL PROCEDURE - LOSS OF REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL)
  • IF Reactor water level is being controlled manually, THEN one Operator shall be assigned to monitor and control Reactor water level.
  • IF amber RESET lights for CV-6-12A (6A-S3A) and CV 12B (6A-S3B) are not illuminated, AND Annunciator B 32 (MAIN STEAM LEAKAGE) is also in ALARM, THEN refer to C.4-B09.13.E (ABNORMAL PROCEDURE -

LOSS OF Y-30)

RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions of C.4-B.05.07.A:

  • Control Reactor level in MANUAL using any unlocked FW REG valve M/A station.
  • Notifies SRO RO Performs Subsequent Operator Actions of C.4-B.05.07.A:
  • IF level control cannot be restored from the Control room, THEN dispatch an operator to take local manual control of the locked FW REG valve
  • IF additional actions are required to control Reactor level, THEN use any or all of the following:

o FW LOW flow valve o RWCU reject o Recirc pump speed adjustment o Throttling of FW Block valves MO-1133 and MO-1134

  • IF one of the FW REG valves is locked up, AND an attempt has NOT been made to reset the lockup, THEN perform the following to reset it:

o Verify M/A station in MANUAL

o Verify M/A station output meter is at the black memory pointer o Verify no major air leakage at the valve o Depress the reset pushbutton for the affected FW REG valve

  • IF a FW REG valve is still locked up, THEN take local manual control per B.05.07-05 (REACTOR LEVEL CONTROL - SYSTEM OPERATION)
  • Control Reactor level between 30 and 40 inches
  • Notify the System Engineer to investigate the cause and correct if possible
  • WHEN the cause has been corrected, THEN restore Reactor Level Control to automatic per B.05.07-05 RO Reports alarm 5-B-40 reset RO Reports FW REG valve lock up reset SRO Directs FW REG valve be returned to automatic RO Performs action of B.05.07-05.G.Part 2 to return the FW REG valve to automatic:
  • IF one Feedwater Control MAN/AUTO Station is in MANUAL and the other is in AUTO and automatic control of both Feedwater Regulating valves is possible and desired, THEN perform the following:

o Maintain Reactor Water Level between +30 and +40 inches o Verify Vessel Level Master Controller (6-83) is in MANUAL o Manually adjust the Vessel Level Master Controller 6-83, until the demand signal on the vertical scale of Feedwater Control MAN/AUTO station 6-84B approximately matches the output on the horizontal scale of Feedwater Control MAN/AUTO station 6-84B.

o Place the Feedwater Control MAN/AUTO Station in AUTO o Adjust the setpoint dial on the Vessel Level Master Controller 6-83, to place the deviation meter needle in the green band, THEN place Vessel Level Master Controller 6-83 in AUTO.

o Verify automatic control properly maintains desired level RO Reports that the A FW REG valve is in automatic control SRO Notifies Ops Mgr, Engineering, and Work Control SRO May conduct crew brief (Past, Present, Plan, Poll)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 04 Event

Description:

Annunciator 5-B-54, ASDS TRANSFER SW ACTVD OR PWR FAIL alarms due to a trip of supply breaker Circuit 14 on Y-80. The RO will send the outplant operator to investigate and the SRO will enter Technical Specifications to determine the LCO.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Responds to annunciator 5-B-54 (ASDS TRANSFER SW ACTVD OR PWR FAIL):

  • Reports alarm to SRO
  • Determines cause of alarm
  • If power failure is cause, then dispatch operator to the EFT building, and direct operator to verify the following power supplies are available:

o Y-80 Circit 14 o D-100 Circuit 14 o C-292 fuses SRO Notifies the following per the ARP:

Shift Supervision System Engineer Plant Electrician SRO Refers to Technical Specifications 3.13.A:

3.13.A.1: The system controls on the ASDS panel shall be operable whenever that system/component is required to be operable 3.13.A.2: If system controls required to be operable by Specification 3.13.A.1 are made or found to be inoperable, restore operability within 7 days, or perform one of the following;

a. Provide equivalent shutdown capability and within 60 days restore the inoperable system controls to operable; or
b. Establish a continuous fire watch in the cable spreading room and the back-panel area of the control room and within 60 days restore the inoperable system controls to operable; or
c. Verify the operability of the fire detectors in the cable spreading room and the back panel area of the control room and establish a hourly fire watch patrol and within 60 days restore the inoperable system controls to operable; or
d. Place the reactor in a condition where the systems for which the system controls at the ASDS are inoperable are not required to be operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SRO May conduct crew brief (Past, Present, Plan, Poll)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 05 Event

Description:

The #11 Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) will degrade. Alarms 6-A-26 (RFP BEARING HIGH TEMP) and 6-A-1 (RFP HIGH VIBRATION) will provide warning to the crew. The initial RFP vibration report will be 4.8 mils, which requires power reduction and RFP trip. Reactor power will be lowered rapidly to <50%, the RFP will be tripped. C.4-F (RAPID POWER REDUCTION) and C.4-B.05.01.02.A (NEUTRON FLUX OSCILLATIONS) will be entered.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to annunciator 6-A-26 (RFP BEARING HIGH TEMP):

  • Reports alarm to SRO
  • Monitors TR-1712 (Panel C-20) and determine affected bearing(s)
  • Dispatch T.B. operator to the Turbine Building
  • Monitor affected Reactor Feed Pump vibration (Panels C-297A and C-297B)
  • Verify adequate Reactor Feed Pump lube oil flow and lube oil cooling. Refer to B.6.5-05 (CONDENSATE AND REACTOR FEEDWATER - SYTEM OPERATION) and perform concurrently with this procedure
  • Reports alarm to SRO
  • Dispatch an Operator to investigate
  • IF the Operator reports that the vibration level is in the ALERT range (2.5 to 4.5 Mils), THEN notify the Shift Supervision and System Engineer
  • IF the Operator reports that the vibration level is in the DANGER range (>4.5 Mils), THEN perform the following:

o Reduce Rx power per C.4-F (RAPID POWER REDUCTION o WHEN Rx Power is < 50%, THEN TRIP 11 RFP o Notify System Engineer SRO Directs Rapid Power Reduction per C.4-F to 50%, then trip #11 RFP RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions of C.4-F:

  • Reduce recirculation flow as necessary
  • IF core flow is <32 Mlbm/hr, THEN execute C.4-B.05.01.02.A (CONTROL OF NEUTRON FLUX OSCILLATIONS) concurrently

execute C.4-K (IMMEDIATE REACTOR SHUTDOWN)

  • Notify Shift Supervision RO Performs Subsequent Operator Actions of C.4-F:
  • Determine if the reactor is operating in the allowed region of the power flow map:

o IF an unanalyzed or unallowed region of the power-flow map is entered, THEN immediately exit by inserting control rods or changing recirculation flow.

  • If time allows and conditions have stabilized for at least 5 minutes, demand an Official 3D-Monicore calculation and check thermal limits. If thermal limit Action Limits are reached, perform the appropriate actions per OPS Manual C.2-05.B.1. (this cannot be demanded from the simulator)

IF power must be reduced further, THEN insert control rods to position 04 or deeper using RWM Rapid Power Reduction Menu BOP At <50% power, trips #11 RFP RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions of C.4-B05.01.02.A:

  • IF core flow is <32 Mlbm/hr, THEN determine if the stability BUFFER or EXCLUSION regions have been entered
  • IF neutron flux oscillations are observed for any reason while operating in the stability BUFFER or EXCLUSION regions, THEN initiate a MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM
  • Notify Shift Supervision RO Performs Subsequent Operator Actions of C.4-B.01.02.A:
  • IF the stability EXCLUSION region is entered, OR the stability BUFFER region has been entered in an uncontrolled fashion, THEN immediately perform either of the following until the Reactor is operating outside of the stability BUFFER region:

o Increase Recirculation flow, OR o Insert control rods using C.4-F (RAPID POWER REDUCTION)

  • IF Reactor power is oscillating in response to pressure control perturbations, THEN refer to B.05.09-05 (MAIN STEAM PRESSURE CONTROL - SYSTEM OPERATION)
  • IF an unanalyzed or unallowed region on the Power-Flow map is entered that is not part of the stability EXCLUSION or BUFFER regions, THEN immediately exit by inserting control rods or changing recirculation flow SRO Notifies Ops Mgr, Engineering, and Work Control SRO May conduct crew brief (Past, Present, Plan, Poll)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 06 Event

Description:

The rapid power change results in main turbine bearing vibrations. Annunciator 7-B-33 (TURB VIBRATION HIGH) will alarm. Vibrations will continue to rise requiring the crew to scram and initiate a turbine trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to annunciator 7-B-33 (TURB VIBRATION HIGH):

  • Reports alarm to SRO
  • Monitors Turbine vibration as indicated on VR-1716 (Panel C-07)
  • IF Turbine vibration remains at 10 Mils, THEN refer to C.3 (SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES), AND remove the Turbine-Generator from service
  • IF Turbine vibration is rising, THEN refer to C.4-F (RAPID POWER REDUCTION), AND remove the Turbine-Generator from service, WHEN reactor power has been reduced to 15% power
  • IF Turbine vibration approaches 15 Mils, THEN perform the following:

o Reduce recirculation flow to minimum o Initiate a manual Reactor scram o Manually trip the Turbine-Generator

  • Notify Shift supervision and System Engineer BOP Reports turbine vibrations rising on 3 bearings and approaching 15 Mils SRO Direct Reactor Scram per C.4-K and Turbine-Generator trip

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: W90115 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 07 Event

Description:

An ATWS condition will exist when a reactor scram is initiated. The main turbine will automatically trip (if not manually tripped) on high vibrations. The turbine bypass valves will fail to open resulting in significant energy addition to the torus and reactor power / level swings. EOPs 1100 (RPV CONTROL), 1200 (PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL) and 2007( FAILURE TO SCRAM) will be entered. Alternate control rod insertion actions will allow individual rods to be inserted and level/power control will be utilized to control reactor power. The automatic RCIC flow controller fails downscale requiring manual operation to raise RPV water level after SBLC has been initiated and hot shutdown boron weight has been achieved. The scenario is terminated when RPV water level is returned to +9 - +48 inches.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions of C.4-K (IMMEDIATE REACTOR SHUDOWN)

RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions of C.4-A:

  • Places reactor mode switch in shutdown
  • Determine if all control rods are inserted to or beyond position 04 Reports reactor scram, mode switch in shutdown, all rods NOT inserted, reactor power is >3% (or may provide indicated power level)

BOP Reports turbine trip, failure of TBPVs to open BOP Reports EOP entry conditions based upon torus temperature SRO Enters EOPs 1100 (RPV CONTROL), 1200 (PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL) and, 2007 (FAILURE TO SCRAM)

SRO Directs:

  • MSIV low low water level isolation bypassed
  • Reactivity control per hard card BOP Performs actions:
  • Inhibits ADS by placing both ADS inhibit switches in bypass
  • Bypasses MSIV isolation by placing all 4 key lock switches on back panel to bypass per 3301.

o Place CS INJECTION BYPASS switch to BYPASS o Close CS INJECTION OUTBOARD valves o Close CS INJECTION INBOARD valves

RO Performs Reactivity Hard Card actions:

  • Verifies mode switch in shutdown
  • Runs recirc pumps back to minimum speed
  • Trips both recirc pumps
  • Takes actions per C.5-3101 o De-energize scram logic by taking RPS system subchannel test switches to TEST o Increase cooling water differential pressure and use RMCS to insert control rods SRO Directs SBLC injection RO Initiates SBLC:
  • Turns C/S to either system 1 or system 2
  • Verifies RWCU trips and the following valves closed o MO-2397 o MO-2398 o MO-2399
  • Selected pump running light on
  • Discharge pressure slightly higher than reactor pressure
  • SBLC tank level lowering SRO Observes the following:
  • RPV water level above -126 inches
  • Torus temperature above 110°F SRO Directs prevent RPV injection from:
  • Condensate & Feedwater o Verify closed A main feed reg valve o Verify closed B main feed reg valve o Verify closed low flow feed reg valve
  • LPCI o Open knife switches to bypass LPCI 5 min seal in o Close LPCI INJ OTBD valves
  • Reports systems are prevented to SRO SRO Directs the following parameters monitored and reported:
  • RPV water level reaches -126 inches
  • Reactor power <3%
  • SRVs remain closed RO Reports reactor power (or RPV water level) is <3%, continues control rod insertion

SRO Directs RPV water level be maintained between the current level and -149 inches BOP Recognizes RCIC running at minimum speed, reports to SRO, takes manual control SRO Directs torus cooling BOP Initiates torus cooling:

  • Verifies RHR pumps running
  • Opens MO-2007, MO-2009, Close MO-2003
  • Opens MO-2006, MO-2008, Close MO-2002 RO Reports SBLC tank level is at hot shutdown boron weight (1040 gal)

SRO Directs RPV water level be restored and maintained to +9 - +48 inches BOP Slowly injects to RPV by:

  • Raising RCIC flow rate and/or
  • Injecting from feed and condensate
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