ML051250508
| ML051250508 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/2005 |
| From: | Hironori Peterson NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB |
| To: | Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| 50-331/05-301 50-331/05-301 | |
| Download: ML051250508 (3) | |
Text
DAEC 2005 Simulator Scenario Exam Material Comments Scenario Event # /
S,E,U COMMENTS RESOLUTION 1
ESG #1 (ILC 17)
Event #1 (E)
Not necessary to include all the details of the SRO brief on control rod pull.
Reduced as needed.
Event #2 (E)
Add clarification from the simulator booth operator concerning the already bypassed A IRM, to allow unbypassing A and bypass C IRM.
Done. Previously identified during outline review, this was only for clarification of booth operator.
Event #3 (E)
Need additional info concerning the steps for the operator performing the SRV surveillance.
Done.
Also noted that the expected response for performing the surveillance was incorrectly listed for the At-The-Controls (ATC) or Reactor Operator, when it was actually for the Balance of Plant (BOP) operator. Typo corrected.
Event #4 (U)
The original event called for a auto lock-up of the feed reg valve (FRV), and the only operator action is to reset the lock out of the valve. No appreciable evaluative action by the operator.
Required change to have FRV fail high which required operator action to manually control feedwater flow. Changes made as recommended.
Event #5 (E)
Add steps for OI 324 for unloading the diesel generator and opening the output breaker before shutting down the diesel.
Done.
Event #6 (E)
As originally written following the cycling of the safety relief valve (SRV), one statement incorrectly noted that the SRV closed and another statement noted it did not close. This contradiction required correction. The SRV did not close which requires scramming the reactor.
Corrected the statement.
Event #6 (E)
Per the validation and expected operator action, add step that MSIVs may be closed to slow down the cooldown rate.
Done.
Event #6 (E)
Actions to direct a reactor scram by the SRO and associated RO action for scramming the reactor should be noted as critical to this event.
Updated for the as written scenario.
Event #7 (E)
Deleted step which noted scramming the reactor when drywell (DW) pressure reaches 2 psig. Not needed, the reactor would already be scrammed per Event #6.
Step removed.
Event #7 (U)
Required adding more detail associated with the expected and required actions per EOP 2, e.g., overrides, Torus Spray before 11 psig, alternate level control steps.
Changes made as recommended.
Event #8 (E)
Original malfunction was to have the RHR inject valve fail to open in auto which required the operator to manually open valve to maintain level. As written controlling water level with RHR per procedure required manual control of the inject valve with or without a malfunction on the valve. Recommend more for diagnoses or potential consequences. Limited evaluation.
Recommended enhancing the RHR malfunction to have a permanent failure of the inject valve on the selected RHR loop.
This required operator diagnoses to use the non-selected loop of RHR, but also requires knowledge of waiting for the 10 minutes LPCI loop select to time out. Being able to inject into the RPV with RHR was a Critical Task. Done.
DAEC 2005 Simulator Scenario Exam Material Comments Scenario Event # /
S,E,U COMMENTS RESOLUTION 2
ESG #2 (ILC 18)
Event #4 (U)
During validation determined that additional tech spec items that would be evaluated.
Include TS 3.3.6.1, TS 3.4.5, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO.
Done.
Event #8 (E)
Remove statement concerning Defeat 11, that the RO informs the SS that the override did not work. It does work.
Done.
Event #9 (E)
Switch event #9 electrical ATWS for removing the RPS fuses as part of event #8, Major malfunction which includes ATWS. Change the new event #9 as the required actions for stopping the main turbine per AOP 693 for loss of lube oil.
Done. Also, note that the incorrect AOP was noted for the stopping the turbine. It originally noted AOP 683 which is for the relief valve. The correct AOP is 693.
ESG #3 (ILC 19)
Event #2 (E)
Add steps to identify and acknowledge specific alarm and block conditions are verified to CLEAR after each of the APRM bypasses are performed - they should be added to the scenario guide in the Expected Student Response to facilitate following the scenario with only the guide. (Also - note the "Leak" Evaluator typo under Instructor Activity)
Done.
Event #3 (E)
Add steps associated with BOP actions to monitor bearing temperatures.
Done.
Event #4 (E)
Add specific rod number to the expected actions section to assist evaluator.
Add step IAW annunciator procedure to reset the Rod Drift alarm.
Done.
Event #4 (E)
Add specific steps expected to be taken IAW TS 3.1.3 Condition C. Insert malfunctioning control rod within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and disarm within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Done.
Event #5 (E)
Noted that the critical step (3.1.e) is to control 1E-3B LP Heater Level in the MANUAL Mode for the BOP operator. During validation noted minimal response for 3B heater. For a better response and potential consequences, reselected the malfunction to occur on 6B heater. Also, add appropriate annunciators expected for the 6B heater malfunction.
Done.
Event #6 (E)
Add a clarifying step for the evaluators to note that the mitigating actions for the electrical buses are for both 1A3 and 1A4.
Done.
Event #6 (E)
Noted during exam administration, that both conditions A and B applied for TS 3.8.1.
Done.
DAEC 2005 Simulator Scenario Exam Material Comments Scenario Event # /
S,E,U COMMENTS RESOLUTION 3
Event #7 (E)
The ATC or the RO actions to reduce reactor power, as the reactivity manipulation, should be noted as critical for this event. Although progressing through the fast power reduction will eventually result in a reactor scram, the critical portion for reactivity manipulation credit will be the recirc reduction of power to 27 Mlb/hr.
Done.
Event #8 (E)
Clarify the scenario critical step for initiating drywell sprays, note per the EOP that it is initiated before drywell temperature reaches 280 deg F.
Done.
Event #8 (E)
Clarify the torus spray criteria. It was noted that when torus pressure rises above 2 psig then spray the torus. However, the EOP criteria is above 2 psig but before reaching 11 psig.
Done.
Event #8 (E)
Typo noting PRV level, when it is RPV level.
Also, clarify the statement for determining all high pressure injection systems are injecting to all available high pressure injection.
Done.
Event #8 (E)
Clarify the alternate level control (ALC) and emergency depressurization (ED) scenario critical task. It was noted in the instructor activity column when it should be in the expected student response. In addition, add more detail of the ALC and ED actions.
Done.