ML051250508

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NRC Comments to the Proposed Scenarios for the Duane Arnold Initial Examination - Jan/Feb 2005
ML051250508
Person / Time
Site: Duane Arnold NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/31/2005
From: Hironori Peterson
NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:
Nuclear Management Co
References
50-331/05-301 50-331/05-301
Download: ML051250508 (3)


Text

DAEC 2005 Simulator Scenario Exam Material Comments Event # /

Scenario COMMENTS RESOLUTION S,E,U ESG #1 Event #1 Not necessary to include all the details of the Reduced as needed.

(ILC 17) (E) SRO brief on control rod pull.

Add clarification from the simulator booth Done. Previously identified during outline Event #2 operator concerning the already bypassed A review, this was only for clarification of (E) IRM, to allow unbypassing A and bypass C booth operator.

IRM.

Need additional info concerning the steps for Done.

the operator performing the SRV surveillance. Also noted that the expected response for performing the surveillance was incorrectly Event #3

" listed for the At-The-Controls (ATC) or (E)

Reactor Operator, when it was actually for the Balance of Plant (BOP) operator. Typo corrected.

The original event called for a auto lock-up of Required change to have FRV fail high Event #4 the feed reg valve (FRV), and the only operator which required operator action to manually

" action is to reset the lock out of the valve. No control feedwater flow. Changes made as (U) appreciable evaluative action by the operator. recommended.

Add steps for OI 324 for unloading the diesel Done.

Event #5 generator and opening the output breaker (E) before shutting down the diesel.

As originally written following the cycling of the Corrected the statement.

safety relief valve (SRV), one statement Event #6 incorrectly noted that the SRV closed and (E) another statement noted it did not close. This contradiction required correction. The SRV did not close which requires scramming the reactor.

Per the validation and expected operator action, Done.

Event #6 add step that MSIVs may be closed to slow (E) down the cooldown rate.

Actions to direct a reactor scram by the SRO Updated for the as written scenario.

Event #6 and associated RO action for scramming the (E) reactor should be noted as critical to this event.

Deleted step which noted scramming the Step removed.

Event #7 reactor when drywell (DW) pressure reaches 2 (E) psig. Not needed, the reactor would already be scrammed per Event #6.

Required adding more detail associated with Changes made as recommended.

Event #7 the expected and required actions per EOP 2,

" e.g., overrides, Torus Spray before 11 psig, (U) alternate level control steps.

Original malfunction was to have the RHR inject Recommended enhancing the RHR valve fail to open in auto which required the malfunction to have a permanent failure of operator to manually open valve to maintain the inject valve on the selected RHR loop.

level. As written controlling water level with This required operator diagnoses to use the Event #8

" RHR per procedure required manual control of non-selected loop of RHR, but also requires (E) the inject valve with or without a malfunction on knowledge of waiting for the 10 minutes the valve. Recommend more for diagnoses or LPCI loop select to time out. Being able to potential consequences. Limited evaluation. inject into the RPV with RHR was a Critical Task. Done.

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DAEC 2005 Simulator Scenario Exam Material Comments Event # /

Scenario COMMENTS RESOLUTION S,E,U During validation determined that additional Done.

ESG #2 Event #4 tech spec items that would be evaluated.

(ILC 18) (U) Include TS 3.3.6.1, TS 3.4.5, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO.

Remove statement concerning Defeat 11, that Done.

Event #8 the RO informs the SS that the override did not

" work. It does work.

(E)

Switch event #9 electrical ATWS for removing Done. Also, note that the incorrect AOP the RPS fuses as part of event #8, Major was noted for the stopping the turbine. It Event #9 malfunction which includes ATWS. Change the originally noted AOP 683 which is for the (E) new event #9 as the required actions for relief valve. The correct AOP is 693.

stopping the main turbine per AOP 693 for loss of lube oil.

Add steps to identify and acknowledge specific Done.

alarm and block conditions are verified to CLEAR after each of the APRM bypasses are ESG #3 Event #2 performed - they should be added to the (ILC 19) (E) scenario guide in the Expected Student Response to facilitate following the scenario with only the guide. (Also - note the "Leak" Evaluator typo under Instructor Activity)

Add steps associated with BOP actions to Done.

Event #3

" monitor bearing temperatures.

(E)

Add specific rod number to the expected Done.

Event #4 actions section to assist evaluator.

" Add step IAW annunciator procedure to reset (E) the Rod Drift alarm.

Add specific steps expected to be taken IAW TS Done.

Event #4 3.1.3 Condition C. Insert malfunctioning control (E) rod within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and disarm within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Noted that the critical step (3.1.e) is to control Done.

1E-3B LP Heater Level in the MANUAL Mode for the BOP operator. During validation noted Event #5 minimal response for 3B heater. For a better (E) response and potential consequences, reselected the malfunction to occur on 6B heater. Also, add appropriate annunciators expected for the 6B heater malfunction.

Add a clarifying step for the evaluators to note Done.

Event #6 that the mitigating actions for the electrical

" buses are for both 1A3 and 1A4.

(E)

Noted during exam administration, that both Done.

conditions A and B applied for TS 3.8.1.

Event #6 (E) 2

DAEC 2005 Simulator Scenario Exam Material Comments Event # /

Scenario COMMENTS RESOLUTION S,E,U The ATC or the RO actions to reduce reactor Done.

power, as the reactivity manipulation, should be noted as critical for this event. Although Event #7 progressing through the fast power reduction (E) will eventually result in a reactor scram, the critical portion for reactivity manipulation credit will be the recirc reduction of power to 27 Mlb/hr.

Clarify the scenario critical step for initiating Done.

drywell sprays, note per the EOP that it is Event #8 initiated before drywell temperature reaches (E) 280 deg F.

Clarify the torus spray criteria. It was noted that Done.

when torus pressure rises above 2 psig then Event #8 spray the torus. However, the EOP criteria is (E) above 2 psig but before reaching 11 psig.

Typo noting PRV level, when it is RPV level. Done.

Also, clarify the statement for determining all Event #8 high pressure injection systems are injecting to (E) all available high pressure injection.

Clarify the alternate level control (ALC) and Done.

emergency depressurization (ED) scenario Event #8 critical task. It was noted in the instructor

" activity column when it should be in the (E) expected student response. In addition, add more detail of the ALC and ED actions.

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