ML051030163

Draft - Section C Operating (Folder 2)

ML051030163
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	11/19/2004
From:	Nielsen P Exelon Generation Co
To:	Todd Fish NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-277/05-301, 50-278/05-301 50-277/05-301, 50-278/05-301
Download: ML051030163 (58)

Text

Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No.

1. 1 Op Test No.

Examiners Operators CRS PRO URO Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at 4% power during a reactor startup. During the turnover, the crew is directed to swap RBCCW pumps for inspection of a noisy bearing on the '6' RBCCW pump.

Following the swap of RBCCW, the crew is to continue with the reactor startup pulling control rods in accordance with the approved startup sequence. A loss of power to System 1 End of Cycle Recirc Pump Trip Logic will require investigation and the application of Tech Specs.

After the Tech Spec determination, a high Standby Liquid Control Tank temperature alarm will be received. An investigation will determine that the tank heater had stuck on and the crew should take action to open the breaker for the heater. A review of Tech Specs will result in the SBLC system being considered inoperable due to the loss of NPSH to the pumps.

Once the Tech Spec interpretation is complete, a recirc leak develops in the drywell requiring entry into OT-101, High Drywell Pressure. The crew will take actions for the rising drywell pressure and will manually scram the reactor and enter T-101, RPV Control. During the scram, five rods will fail to insert resulting in an ATWS.

Attempts to spray the drywell will fail due to a drywell spray logic failure and the crew will need to perform a T-112, Emergency Blowdown when drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 281 degrees F. With several rods stuck out, the crew will need to terminate and prevent injection in accordance with T-240 prior to the emergency depressurization. The scenario may be terminated when the RPV depressurization is performed.

Initial Condition IC-1 21,4% power rurnover:

See Attached "Shift Turnover" Sheet Swap of RBCCW pumps.

Power Ascension with Control Rods.

1 End of Cycle -Recirc Pump Trip (EOC-Standby Liquid Control Tank High Temperature (Tech Spec).

Recirculation System leak in the drywell.

Five Rods stick full out during the scram.

7 I

Override I

I BOP I DW Spray Valve Logic Failure prevents Drywell Sprays.

I SRO I

' (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:

0 0

Unit 2 is starting up at 4% rated power.

The Drywell is still deinerted due to required inspections.

INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:

None SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

Swap RBCCW Pumps, placing the A RBCCW Pump in service and shutting down the B RBCCW Pump Continue the reactor startup using GP-2 beginning with Step 6.50 and Rod Sequence Step 15.

SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

None GENERAL INFORMATION:

Predictive Maintenance reports a noisy bearing on the B RBCCW pump motor and has requested a swap to the A RBCCW pump to permit installing instrumentation on the B pump. When the crew has the shift, perform SO 35.6.A-2, Placing the Standby Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Pump in Service. When the pump swap is complete, notify the Work Control Supervisor, and they will send in the Clearance.

After the pump swap the crew is expected to resume power ascension. GP-2 is complete through Step 6.2.47, begin with Step 6.2.48. A Reactivity Briefing was already completed and you are ready to begin withdrawing rods at the beginning of Sequence Step 15 with Control Rod 18-35.

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.:

1. 1 Event No.:

1 Event Description :

Swap of RBCCW pumps.

ES-D-2 Page 1of10 Cause:

None Automatic Actions:

None Effects:

None Time Position Apdicant's Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct the PRO to perform SO 35.6.A-2 'Placing the Standby Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Pump in Service" to place the 'A RBCCW pump in service and shutdown the 'B' RBCCW pump.

PRO Perform SO 35.6.A-2 "Placing the Standby Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Pump in Service."

- Review SO procedure, including prerequisites and precautions.

- Contact the Equipment Operator (EO) to perform SO 35.6.A-2 Step 4.1 to verify alignment, oil level, and vent the 'A' TBCCW pump to verify it ready for start.

- PRO starts the 'A TBCCW pump and informs the EO.

- PRO stops the 'B' TBCCW pump and places it in AUTO (may choose to leave the pump in OFF due to impending maintenance).

- If directed by shift management, the PRO directs the EO to perform the RBCCW routine inspection.

- PRO informs the CRS of the pump swap and contacts the WCS.

URO Monitor plant parameters.

Peer check and assist as requested.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:, Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Power Ascension with Control Rods Page 2 of 10 Time Position Amlicanrs Actions Or Behavior CRS Directs the URO to commence rod withdrawal in accordance with the Startup REMA and the Startup Sequence beginning with Rod Sequence step 15, Rod 18-35.

URO Commence rod withdrawal beginning with Sequence Step 15, Rod 18-35.

Coordinate with the r'd Verifier communicating:

0 Rod Selected 0 Switch Selection and direction of motion 0 Target Rod Position.

Withdraw control rods by selecting the rod on the matrix and then using the Single Notch Withdrawal switch to withdraw control rods.

PRO Monitor balance of plant conditions during rod withdrawal.

NOTE Scenario will continue when the evaluators are satisfied with their observation of the reactivity manipulation.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.:

3 Page 3 of 10 Event

Description:

Loss of Power to System 1 EOC-RPT Logic Cause:

Failure of the DC power supply (20D23) switch Effects:

Cause a loss of the trip circuitry that would result in a trip under EOC-RPT conditions. Requires tech spec actions to be taken in accordance with TS 3.3.4.2.

Time Position bdicant's Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize by reporting SYSTEM I EOC-RPT LOGIC PWR FAIWEST (214 D-3) Annunciator is alarming.

Recognize by reporting that the 'A' and 'B' System 1 EOC-RPT Breakers have lost their normally lit red light indication.

Enter and execute the Alarm Response Card (ARC) for 214 D-3.

CRS Enter and execute the Alarm Response Card (ARC) for 214 D-3.

Direct troubleshooting of the issue.

Review Tech Spec 3.3.4.2, determine that with a loss of power to the System 1 trip breakers, power must be maintained <29.5% RTP until the problem is corrected. (If the plant was already at a higher power level, then the system would have needed to be restored in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or reduced power to 29.5% within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.)

URO If directed, contact the Work Week ManagedOutage Control Center (or others) to assist in troubleshooting the loss of power to System 1 EOC-RPT Breakers.

PRO If directed, coordinate EOs to investigate the loss of power to the System 1 EOC-RPT Breakers.

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

L-SBLC Tank High Temperature.

ES-D-2 Page 4of10 Cause:

Heater switch failed leaving heater energized after it should have shutdown.

Effects:

With tank temperature >120°F, SBLC must be considered INOP.

Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize by reporting STANDBY LIQUID OR PIPE HI-LO TEMP (21 1 J-3) annunciator is alarming.

URO Enter and execute ARC 21 1 J-3 0

Dispatch an operator to check tank temperature locally.

0 Report tank temperature to CRS.

Direct operator to verify that the heater is NOT on and the control switch is in auto.

PRO Determine the power supply to the SBLC Tank Heater and report it to the CRS.

CRS Direct that the Tank Heater be deenergized.

Reference Tech Spec 3.1.7 and recognize that with 123°F tank temperature, SBLC must be considered INOP.

Tech Spec 3.1.7, Condition C applies requiring temperature to be restored in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

PRO Direct the EO to deenergize the tank heater using switch #52-3604 on E-124-R-C.

UROlPRO Recognize by reporting that the tank heater is off when STANDBY LIQUID TANK HEATER POWER OFF (21 1 J-4) annunciator is received.

~

ES-D-2 Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No. #I Event No.:

5 Page 5of10

- Event

Description:

Small Recirc Rupture Cause:

Small Recirc Rupture results in Drywell temperature and pressure rising but not fully depressurizing the RPV.

Automatic Actions:

"Drywell Hi-Lo Press" alarms (210 F-2,225 A-4)

High Drywell Pressure Scram Signal, Isolations, Diesel and HPCI auto starts.

Effects:

Rising drywell pressure indicated. Manual scram at 1.2 psig or auto scram at 2 psig with isolations, HPCl and diesel starts.

Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize Drywell High Pressure alarms 0 Recognize that Drywell pressure is going up and announce entry into OT-101 for High Drywell Pressure.

0 Trend the Drywell Pressure Increase CRS Enteddirect actions in accordance with OT-101, High Drywell Pressure:

0 Verify that Drywell lnerting is not in progress Direct placing additional drywell cooling in service.

0 Directs actions to monitor components e.g., RRP seals.

0 Directs crew to isdate and restore systems IAW OT-101 to stop the source of the leak. OT-101 systems include: RWCU, HPCl and RCIC.

URO/PRO Perform OT-101 actions as directed:

0 Monitor drywell pressure and plant parameters.

0 If directed, verify that inerting is not in progress.

0 If directed, place additional drywell cooling in service.

0 Monitor components for abnormal indications as direded by the CRS.

0 Isolate plant systems to include RWCU, HPCI, RCIC as directed by the CRS IAW OT-101.

CRS Directs a GP-4 Manual Scram when drywell pressure reaches 1.2 psig.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario No. #1 Event No.: 5 Page 6of10 Event

Description:

Small Recirc Rupture (Continued)

Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior URO Performs GP-4 Manual Scram actions:

0 Places the Mode Switch to Shutdown.

0 Verify Rods inserting 0

Manually control the Reactor Feed Water System to control Reactor Level

+ Pressing Emergency Stop for the 'C' RFP

+ Shut MO-2149C, the 'C' RFP discharge valve

+ Open MO-8090 the Startup Level Controller isolation 0

VerRy APRMs are downscale and report to the CRS.

0 Verify all control rods inserted and report to the CRS.

PRO Performs scram actions Verify all isolations.

0 Restore Instrument Nitrogen to the DW when directed by the CRS.

URO PRO CRS Recognize by reporting entry into T-102, Primary Containment Control when Drywell Pressure exceeds 2 psig.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

Five Rods stick full out during the scram.

Cause:

Effects:

Time -

ES-D-2 Page 7of 10 Rods are mechanically stuck in the full out position.

AlWS actions must be completed for the stuck control rods.

This will require injection to be terminated and prevented prior to completing a RPV Blowdown.

Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior CT URO Recognize by reporting that NOT all control rods inserted on the scram.

CRS Direct that the control rods be manually inserted using T-220, Driving Control Rods during a scram. (T-216, Control Rod Insertion by Manual Scram or Individual Scram Test Switches, OR T-246, Maximizing CRD Flow to the Reactor Vessel, OR T-215, Control Rod Insertion by Withdrawal Line Venting are also appropriate but T-220 is typically directed first because it is the most expedient method to insert a few control rods that failed to scram.)

URO Attempt insertion of the control rods by the method specified by the CRS.

For T-220:

0 Place the CRD Flow Control in MANUAL and open the Flow Control Valve Fully OR Direct an Operator to close HV-2-3-56, the Charging Wtr Hdr Blk Vv to Hydraulic Control Units.

0 Request permission and by pass the Rod Worth Minimizer.

0 Attempt to insert the rods using the Emergency IdNotch Override Switch.

0 Report to the CRS the inability to insert the control rods.

PRO Note that the PRO will be required to perform T-240, Termination and Prevention of Injection into the RPV, later in the scenario as a result of this A W S condition.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.:

7 Page 8oflO Event

Description:

Drywell Spray Logic failure prevents containment spray.

Cause:

Failed Containment Spray Override 2/3 Core Coverage switch (S18) prevents spray valve operation.

Automatic Actions:

2 psig isolations, HPCl auto start, emergency diesel starts.

Effects:

Drywell pressure continues to rise above 2 psig and requires the crew to perform an Emergency Blowdown when drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 281°F.

Time Position hdicant's Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and respond to 2 psg drywell pressure and announce entry into T-101 and T-102:

Recognize and vertfy Group IWlll isolations.

0 Recognize and verify Diesel Generator starts and has cooling water.

0 Recognize and report the HPCl auto start if it has not been previously 0 Trend and report containment parameters.

identified by the CRS.

CRS Recognize and respond to 2 psig drywell pressure and announce entry into T-101 and T-102:

0 Reenter T-1 01, RPV Control, and enter T-102, Primary Containment Verify adequate level and may direct either a HPCl shutdown or Control.

isolation.

PRO Performs an isolation or shutdown of HPCl as directed by the CRS.

0 For an isolation, depress the HPCl isolation pushbutton and verify that HPCl shuts down and and the HPCI Steam Line Isolation Valves close.

0 For a HPCl shutdown, trip HPCI, venfy that the HPCl aux oil pump starts as required, and place the HPCl Aux Oil Pump in Pull to Lock when HPCl stops rotating.

CRS Directs T-102 actions:

0 Directs Torus sprays IAW T-203 using 'B Loop RHR 0 Directs T-223 actions to restore drywell ventilation.

Trends containment parameters specifically drywell pressure and bulk average temperature.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.:

7 (continued)

Page 9of10 Event

Description:

Drywell Spray Logic prevents containment spray (continued)

Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior Time Position PRO URO/PRO CRS CRS URO URO/PRO CRS URO/PRO CT CRS URO PRO CT PRO Perform Torus Sprays IAW T-203, Initiation of Torus Sprays using RHR:

Open the MO-39B, Torus Hdr. Valve.

Open the MO-89D HPSW Outlet Valve.

With CRS permission, place the S18B switch in Manual Override.

Momentarily place the S17B switch in 'MAN".

e Start the "D" HPSW Pump Start the 'D" RHR Pump Recognize by reporting to the CRS the failure of the logic that prevents Torus (or Drywell) Sprays from being placed in senn'ce.

Recognize and report Containment parameters:

Bulk Drywell temperature at 145°F and entry into T-102.

Re-enters T-102 on Bulk Average temperature 145°F Continues T-101 Actions:

Directs RPV level controlled +5 to +35 inches Maintains RPV level using additional feedwater that is required to keep up with the recirc leak.

Trend and report containment parameters.

Directs URO/PRO to perform T-223, Drywell Cooler Fan Bypass, to Bypass and restore drywell ventilation.

Performs T-223:

Directs EO to place drywell fans in slow.

Verifies T-223 requirements.

When Drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 281 OF, the CRS directs:

T-240, Terminate and Prevent Injection into the RPV (due to the 5 rod ATWS).

T-112, Emergency Blowdown.

When directed, perform T-240 to Terminate and Prevent Injection into the RPV.

Verify that HPCI is not injecting.

Shutdown any running Reactor Feedwater Pumps by depressing the trip pushbuttons.

e Contact the floor operator and direct the isolation of Stayfull from RHR and Core Spray. (This step does not need to be complete prior to the blowdown.)

When directed, performs a Emergency Blowdown by opening all five ADS valves.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 1 Event No.:

7 (continued)

Page 10of10

._ Event

Description:

Drywell Spray Logic prevents containment spray (continued)

Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior URO Control Reactor level as directed following the blowdown. (Note that level will swell high during the actual blowdown).

TERMINATION CRITERIA Scenario may be terminated when a plant depressurization has been performed.

POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:

Classify this condition as an ALERT (FAI)

Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No.

m Op Test No.

Examiners Operators CRS PRO URO Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at 100% power with a RClC surveillance in progress. Following the RClC testing, the mew is to commence a GP-3, Normal Plant Shutdown.

After the RClC turbine is started, a low lube oil pressure alarm is received (similar to a recent Peach Bottom HPCl event). The crew will shutdown RClC and complete a Tech Spec interpretation. The crew will then commence a GP-3, Normal Plant Shutdown. After the reactivity manipulation has beer observed, the running Control Rod Drive pump will trip. The crew will pursue the issue using ON-107, Loss of CRD Regulating function. The inability to restore either CRD pump for 20 minutes after CRD Charging Header pressure drops below 940 psig with two accumulator alarms, will result in a required Tech Spec scram.

When the RO attempts to shutdown the plant, an electrical ATWS will occur requiring entry into T-101, RPV Control. Shortly after tripping the recirculation pumps, the 'D' SRV will fail full open requiring entry into OT-114, Stuck Open Safety Relief Valve, and ultimately T-102, Primary Containment Control.

When the RO maximizes torus cooling, the 'A' Loop RHR Torus Cooling Valve (MO-39A) will trip on magnetic overcurrent resulting in no Torus Cooling on the 'A' Loop of RHR causing torus conditions continue to degrade. This will result in an entry into T-102, Primary Containment Control when 95°F is reached. When torus temperature cannot be maintained below 110°F. Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) will be attempted and the pumps will fail to start.

After level has been lowered to control p e r, the ATWS will be terminated by T-214, Venting the Scram Air Header. The scenario may be terminated after all control rods are verified inserted.

nitial Condition rurnover:

IC-1 22, 100% power with the 'B' loop of Torus Cooling in service.

See Attached "Shift Turnover Sheet

!vent I Malfunction I Event uo.

I No.

I Type*

I I N PRO 1

CRS Preinserted C

PRO 2

Override on CRS R

URO 3

PRO Event Trigger CRS CRH03 C

URO 4

PRO CRS Preinserted M

PRO 5

Overrides CRS Preinserted C

URO 6

MSSOSD PRO CRS Event Description Perform RClC Surveillance Test.

RClC Low Lube Oil Pressure Alarm (Tech Spec).

Commence GP-3. Normal Plant Shutdown with Control Rods.

Loss of Control Rod Drive System pumps results in a Tech Spec required scram when it cannot be restored promptly (Tech Spec).

Electrical ATWS.

Safety Relief Valve 'D fails open.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrurnent. (C)omponent. (M)ajor

SHIFT TURNOVER

/

PLANT CONDITIONS:

0 Unit 2 at 100% Power 0

ST-0-13-301-2, the RClC Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test has been completed through step 6.3.14.

0 GP-3, Normal Plant Shutdown has been completed through step 6.4.

INOPERABLE EQUIPMENTILCOs:

0 RClC is currently available, but not operable until post maintenance testing is complete. RClC has been inoperable for over 13 days due to maintenance.

SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

0 Perform ST-0-13-301-2, the RClC Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test beginning with step 6.3.15.

0 After the RClC surveillance is complete, begin a shutdown using GP-3 Shutdown starting with step 6.5 and the existing Shutdown Sequence. The reactivity briefing has already been completed for this evolution and the Reactor Engineers will return to provide support after power has been lowered to 90% using the provided shutdown rod sequence.

SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

ST-0-1 3-301 -2, the RCIC Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

GENERAL INFORMATION:

0 A RClC system outage has just been completed and it is due back in service no later than end of shift. RClC requires the completion of ST-0-13-301-2, the RClC Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test to demonstrate operability. This ST has been completed through step 6.3.14. The B Loop of Torus cooling has been placed in service in support of this test.

A Fourth RO will be completing Torus Temperature Monitoring using Data Sheet 8 of ST-0 30 1 -2.

0 Station management has determined that Unit 2 will be shutdown following the RClC surveillance.

The reactivity briefing has already been completed for this evolution and the Reactor Engineers will return to provide support after power has been lowered to 90% using the provided shutdown rod sequence.

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.:

1. 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Time Position CRS PRO URO ES-D-2 Page 1 of 9 Perform the RCIC Pump, Valve, Flow and Cooling Unit Functional Test.

None None None Applicant's Actions Or Behavior 0

Reviews the RCIC Surveillance Test and directs the completion of the RClC surveillance test beginning with step 6.3.1 5.

Start the RCIC pump by:

0 INITIATE AND TIME RClC quick start by opening MO-2-13-131, RCIC 0 OPEN MO-2-13-132, the RClC Cooling Water Valve.

0 Adjust FC-2-13-091 between 600 and 615 gpm AND Throttle MO 0 Stop the stopwatch when the desired flow and pressure are obtained.

0 Veriry that MO-2-13-027, the RClC Min. Flow Valve doses 0 Record the initial system parameters on Data Sheet 2 (RCIC may be Supply and starting the stopwatch.13-030 to obtain desired flow rate greater than 600 gpm and discharge pressure of greater than 1090 psig.

automatically.

shutdown before readings are taken).

Monitor plant parameterdassist as directed or requested.

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 2 EventNo.: 2 Page 2of9 Event Description :

v RClC Low Lube Oil Pressure Alarm (Tech Spec)

Automatic Actions:

None None ES-D-2 Effects:

RClC must be shutdown and becomes inoperable.

Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize by reporting RClC TURB BEARING OIL LO PRESS (222 A-

3) annunciator.

CRS Enter and execute the Alarm Response Card for 222 A-3.

0 Direct that the RClC Turbine be shutdown using SO 13.2.A-2, RClC System Shutdown.

0 Direct monitoring of RClC Bearing Temperatures 0

Direct troubleshooting of the RClC Turbine PRO Shutdown the RClC turbine (Note that the candidate may immediately manually trip RClC and then follow-up with the procedure or may obtain the procedure prior to a shutdown).

0 Trip the RCIC turbine by depressing the Trip Pushbutton.

0 Verify closed MO-2-13-021, To Feed Line 0

Close MO-2-13-131, Supply 0

Verify the following:

+ AO-2-13-034, Drain Isolation to Main Condenser OPEN

+ AO-2-13-035, Drain Isolation to Main Condenser OPEN

+ MO-2-13-132, Cooling Water CLOSES Place MO-4487, Trip Throttle Valve to CLOSE, then back to OPEN (may leave tripped due to Lube Oil Failure).

PRO Contact Equipment Operators and/or the Work Week ManagedOutage Control Center to troubleshoot RCIC.

URO Monitor Balance of plant and assist as requested.

CRS Recognize that Tech Specs must be evaluated.

Tech Spec 3.5.3 Condition A requires that RClC be restored in 14 days, however, the plant is already 13 days into the RClC spec so time will elapse at the end of shift.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Page 3 o f 9 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

-v Commence GP-3, Normal Plant Shutdown with Control Rods Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct initiating a GP-3 Shutdown to 90% power using Control Rods.

URO Commence driving Control Rods in accordance with the Shutdown Sequence.

0 Select the appropriate Control Rod.

0 Perform verification with second verifier including

+ Rodselected

+ Current Position and Target Position

+ Switch to be moved and direction.

0 Place the Rod Movement switch to IN and hold until the rod is full in.

0 Monitor rod position and release the switch when it is full in.

0 Move to next rod after settle function is complete.

PRO Monitor Plant conditions and assist if required.

NOTE:

Scenario can move forward anytime the evaluators are satisfied with their evaluation of the reactivity manipulation.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #2 EventNo.: 4 Page 4 o f 9 Event

Description:

Loss of Control Rod Drive System results in a Tech Spec required scram when it cannot be restored promptly. (Tech Spec)

Cause:

CRD Pumps trip in instantaneous ground overcurrent (Relay 150G)

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Alarms 21 1 F-1 CRD Pump A trips, CRD Pump B cannot be started, a Tech Spec Shutdown will be required.

Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize by reporting A CRD WATER PUMP TRIP (21 1 F-1) and A CRD WATER PUMP OVLD (211 F-2).

CRS PRO Enter and execute Alarm Response Cards (ARC) 21 1 F-1 and 21 1 F-2.

PRO Direct an EO to check the breaker for relay flags.

CRS PRO Regulating Function (ON-107).

URO Recognize by reporting that an entry condition exists for the Loss of CRD CRS Enter and execute ON-107, Loss of CRD Regulating Function.

Direct placing the B CRD Pump in service.

Direct shutting down the Reactor Water Cleanup System.

PRO URO Start the B CRD Pump using SO-3.1.B-2, CRD Hydraulic System Startup with the System Filled and Vented.

0 Dispatch an operator to perform the pre-startup checks for the B CRD Pump using step 4.1 of the SO procedure Place the CRD Flow Control Valve controller in Manual and close the valve.

0 Verify MO-2-3-20, Drive Water Header Pressure Valve, is open 0

Verify the Reactor Recirc Pump Seal Purge is isolated by shutting MO-2-2A-8029A and B.

Attempt to start the B CRD Pump 0

Recognize by reporting the failure of the B CRD Pump to start.

URO PRO Shutdown the RWCU system by tripping the running pump and then shutting the MO-15, MO-18, and MO-68 Isolation Valves.

Operator Actions v

Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #2 EventNo.: 4 Page 5of9 Event

Description:

Time Position CRS URO CRS CRS PRO CRS URO CT URO CRS PRO URO ES-D-2 Loss of Control Rod Drive System results in a Tech Spec required scram when it cannot be restored promptly. (Tech Spec)

Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Monitor Charging Water Header Pressure and when it drops to 940 psig and accumulator alarms for withdrawn control rods.

Monitor and report Charging Water Header Pressure and Accumulator Alarms as directed by the CRS.

When Charging Water Header Pressure drops to 940 psg AND two or more accumulator alarms exist on withdrawn control rads, THEN start a 20 minute clock until a Reactor Scram is required.

Direct that house loads be transferred (this can be directed in antidpation of the plant shutdown, or completed as a part of the GP-4 Shutdown).

When directed, transfer house loads in accordance with RRC 53.1-2, Unit 2 House Loads Transfer During a Plant Event.

For each 13 KV bus:

0 Install the sync switch key in the normal off-site source and turn it on.

Close the selected off-site source breaker 0

Verify that the associated Generator breaker trips.

0 Turn off the synch key.

0 Repeat for the other 13 KV bus.

0 Remove the alternate off-site breakers from Pull To La&.

When it is determined that CRD cannot be restored before 20 minutes elapses after Charging Water Header Pressure drops to 940 psig concurrent with two or more accumulator alarms on withdrawn control rods, then direct a GP-4, Manual Reactor Scram.

Perform a GP-4, Manual Reactor Scram 0

Run Recirculation Pumps to minimum speed.

0 Immediately place the Mode Selector Switch in Shutdown Recognize by reporting that the reactor did NOT scram.

Recognize by reporting an entry condition into T-101, R W Control.

Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #2 v

Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Time Position CRS CT URO CRS PRO Operator Actions EventNo.:

5 Page 6of9 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

Scram Condition With Power Above 4% or Unknown.

None.

Requires the crew to take actions to terminate the ATWS, as well as enter T-117 LeveVPower Control.

ES-D-2 Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Direct T-101, RC/Q ATWS actions:

0 Initiation of ARI.

0 Trip Recirc pumps at least 10 seconds apart.

0 T-213, 'Deenergize Scram Solenoids".

0 T-214, "Vent Scram Air Header". (This direction is critical because it is 0 T-220, 'Drive Rods".

0 Enter T-117, 'LeveVPower Control".

the only success path to insert control rods during the AMIS.)

Performs T-1 01, RC/Q actions when directed:

0 Initiates ARI. Report to the CRS that it was not successful.

0 Trips Recirc pumps at least 10 seconds apart.

0 Direct an Equipment Operator to perform T-213. Attempts URO portion of T-213. Reports to the CRS that it was not successful.

0 Direct an Equipment Operator to perform T-214.

0 Performs T-220 to insert control rods.

Direct T-117 actions:

0 Inhibit ADS.

0 T-221, 'Bypass the MSlV -160 inch Isolation".

0 Lower RPV level to below -60 inches by terminating and 0 Preventing RPV injection using T-240.

Performs T-I 17 actions when directed:

0 Inhibits ADS.

0 Directs Equipment Operator to perform T-221, Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass, to keep the MSlVs open as level is lowered.

0 Performs T-240. Controls RPV level below -60" and within the specific RPV level band directed by the CRS.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #2 EventNo.: 6 Page 7 o f 9 Event

Description:

Safety Relief Valve 'D' inadvertently fails open.

Cause:

Mechanical drift of relief valve setpoint.

Automatic Actions:

Alarms 210 D-2, 'SAFETY RELIEF VALVE OPEN" and 227 8-4, "BLOWDOWN RELIEF VALVES HI TEMP".

Loss of Generator Load, steamflow/feedflow mismatch, heat input to the primary containment. SRV will later close when pressure lowers to 800 psig.

Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize, report, and take actions IAW ARC 210 D-2, 'Safety Relief Valve Open", and ARC 227 B-4, "Blowdown Relief Valves Hi Temp".

CRS Enteddirect actions IAW OT-114:

0 Lead crew in confirming an SRV is open.

0 Direct Torus Cooling to be maximized.

0 Direct attempts to close the 'D' SRV.

URO/PRO Confirm that the 'D' SRV is open IAW OT-114.

PRO Place RHR in Torus Cooling IAW RRC 10.1-2, "RHR System Torus Cooling During a Plant Event", when directed by the CRS and monitor Torus temperature.

PRO Cycle the 'D' SRV control switch when directed by the CRS.

URO/PRO Coordinate removal of fuses by Equipment Operators and monitor valve status during attempts to close the 'D' SRV. Communicate to the CRS that the 'D' SRV has NOT closed.

CRS Declare the SRV Inoperable AND verify compliance with Tech Spec 3.4.3. (Since adequate SRVs available, this Tech Spec call will likely be delayed due to the transient condition)

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 2 Event No.:

7 Page 8of9 L

Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Time Position CRS PRO URO CRS PRO PRO CRS NOTE CRS PRO CT "A" Loop RHR Torus Cooling valve MO-39A trips on magnetic overcurrent reducing the effectiveness of Torus Cooling.

Magnetic Overcurrent of MO-39A Valve trips and cannot be opened.

Torus cooling is unavailable on the 'A' Loop of RHR.

ApplicanPs Actions Or Behavior Recognize by reporting entry into T-102, Primary Containment Control on High Torus Temperature of 95°F.

Enter and execute T-I 02:

Direct that Torus Cooling be maximized.

Establish maximum Torus Cooling:

0 Stroke open MO-39 A and B, RHR Torus Cooling Header Valves.

0 Stroke open MO-89 A and D, RHR Heat Exchanger HPSW Outlet Valves.

Recognize by reporting the failure of the MO-39A valve to open.

Complete lineup of ' B Torus Cooling by:

0 Starting the 'D' HPSW Pump.

0 Starting the 'D' RHR Pump.

Opening MO-34B, Full Flow Test Valve.

0 Starting the 'B' HPSW Pump.

Opening MO-89BI HPSW Outlet Valve.

0 Starting the 'B' RHR Pump.

Direct troubleshooting of the M039A valve.

This valve NOT opening will result in a significant loss of Torus Cooling capability causing the torus to heat up more rapidly, complicating the transient for the operators.

When Torus Temperature reaches I 10°F' directs the PRO to perform T-240 again to lower level until it reaches the T-240 Figure 2 conditions.

Performs T-240 again to meet Figure 2 requirements. Specifically, RPV level is lowered and injection restored when any of the following are reached :

- RPV level reaches -172 inches or

- Reactor power drops below 4% or

- All SRVs remain closed and Drywell pressure drops below 2 psig.

PRO controls level manually as directed by the CRS to prevent dropping level below -226 inches (a3 Core Coverage).

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 2 Event No.:

8 Page 9of9 Event

Description:

L Standby Liquid Control Pumps fail to start.

Cause:

SBLC Pumps fail due to a common mode breaker failure.

Effects:

SBLC Pumps are not available.

Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct initiation of SBLC at or before 110°F is reached in the Torus.

URO/PRO Initiate SBLC Place the SBLC switch to either "System A" or "System B" Recognize by reporting the Standby Liquid Control Pump failure to start.

Attempt the initiation with the other system.

Recognize by reporting that it is also failed.

CRS Direct alternate methods of SBLC Injection. These could be any of the following:

T-210, CRD System SBLC Injection T-211, CRD System Non-enriched Boric Acid and Borax Injection T-212, RWCU System SBLC Injection PRO URO directed by the CRS.

Direct Equipment Operators to perform alternate SBLC injection as NOTE The failure of SBLC to inject will significantly complicate the transient by ensuring that the operators must lower level to control power.

URO Recognizes "Scram Valve Pilot Air Header Press Lo" (21 1 D-2) alarm and/or control rods inserting due to T-214 and informs the CRS.

URO Verifies all control rods inserted and informs the CRS.

CRS Determines the A W S is terminated, exits T-117 Level /Power Control and enters T-101 RC/L:

0 Directs PRO to restore level to +5 to +35 inches.

0 Directs restoration actions.

CRS Exit T-117 Direct that level be restored to a normal level band.

PRO Restore level band as directed by the CRS TERM1 NATION CRITERIA The Scenario may be terminated when all rods have been inserted and reactor level is being controlled above the top of active fuel.

POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:

Classify as a Site Area Emergency (MS4) (or a General Emergency ( M a ) if level drops below -195"')

Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No.

1. 3 Op Test No.

Exam in ers Operators CRS PRO Event No.

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 I

URO Malfunction Event Event No.

Type*

Description PRO scram (Tech Spec).

CRS PRO CRS CRH03B PRO CRS PRO CRS URO PRO CRS PRO CRS Overrides I

URO Drywell Pressure Instrument fails upscale without the expected half N

URO Swap Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valves.

Preinserted C

URO Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valve Fails Open.

CRH043035 C

URO Single Control Rod Drifts (Tech Spec).

R Fast Power Reduction due to the Drifting Control Rod.

RWCOG M

URO RWCU Leak in the Reactor Building.

Preinserted C

URO RWCU Isolation Valves Fail Open.

Overrides I

PRO 1

Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at 95% power. The turnover directs the crew to swap Control Rod Drive (CRD) Flow Control Valves when maintenance is ready to observe operation of the standby valve.

8 Shortly after assuming the shift, a Drywell Pressure Instrument will fail upscale without inserting the appropriate half reactor scram. The crew will apply tech specs and insert the half scram using GP-25, Installation of Tripsholations to satisfy Tech SpedTRM Requirements. After the scram is inserted, maintenance will call requesting that the CRD flow control valve be swapped to the standby valve. When it is swapped, it will be recognized that the standby valve is failed open and CRD will be swapped back to the original flow controller. When the swap is complete, a single control rod will begin to drift. The crew will enter ON-121. Drifting Control Rod and drive the rod in. A fast power reduction to 950 Mwe will be required due to the drifted control rod. Again, the crew will review and apply the tech spec requirements for these conditions.

CRS Preinserted I

URO Bypass Jack Control Fails.

Overrides PRO CRS

v

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)OmpOnent, (M)ajor

SHIFT TURNOVER L

PLANT CONDITIONS:

0 0

Unit 2 at 95% rated power operation due to a Minimum Generation Emergency.

Power was reduced from full power using only recirculation flow in accordance with Reactor Engineer Guidance.

INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:

SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

Swap Control Rod Drive (CRD)

Flow Control Valves ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

GENERAL INFORMATION:

0 The crew is to swap CRD Flow Control Valves from the AO-19A to the AO-19B using SO 3.6.D-2, "CRDH System Flow Control Valve Swapping", when maintenance reports that they are standing by to observe the function of the AO-196.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.:

1. 3 Event No.:

1 Page 1 of9 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Time Position URO URO PRO CRS PRO CRS PRO URO CRS NOTE Drywell Pressure Instrument fails upscale without the expected half scram (Tech Spec).

PIS-2-5-12A Fails Upscale DRYWELL HI PRESS TRIP (210 F-1)

RPS/PCIS TRIP UNITS IN CALIBRATION OR GROSS FAILURE (210 D-4)

Drywell pressure instrument fails high in gross failure and half scram fails to occur as expected.

Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize by reporting the DRYWELL HI PRESSURE TRIP (210 F-1)

Enter and execute the ARC for 210 F-1.

Enter and execute the ARC for 21 0 F-1.

Direct an EO to check the instrument racks in the Reactor Building to determine the cause of the trip.

Contact an EO to investigate the trip.

Recognize by reporting that the DW Pressure instrument failed to cause a RPS half scram.

Consult Tech Specs for RPS and PCIS:

TS3.3.1.1 TS 3.3.6.1 TS 3.3.6.2 Recognize that trips must be installed in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Crew may consult GP-25, but the required trips do not need to be installed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 3 EventNo.: 2 Page 2 o f 9 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

L A

Time Position CRS URO PRO NOTE Swap Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valves None None Manual Operator actions.

Amlicants Actions Or Behavior Direct the URO/PRO to coordinate with the Equipment Operator (EO) to swap CRD Flow Control Valves in accordance with SO 3.6.D-2, Section 4.1.

Swap CRD Flow Control Valves (FCV) in accordance with SO 3.6.D-2, Section 4.1 Direct the EO to perform Steps 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2 Place CRD FCV Controller in Manual and adjust to zero.

Direct the EO to place the local flow control station selector switch in the valve B position.

The Flow Control Valve Failure can be identified as failed anytime after the B position is selected and the operator attempts to control the FCV with the manual controller.

See Event #2 for details on the failed Flow Control Valve actions.

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 3 Event No.:

3 Page 3of9 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Time Position URO PRO CRS URO PRO ES-D-2 Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valve Fails Open The standby flow control valve is failed open, which will be noted when it is placed in service.

Flow control valve position indication in the control room will indicate a solid red light with the green light off, indicating the valve is full open with the manual controller set to full closed.

Indicated flow will rise to greater than the flow setpoint.

ADulicanYs Actions Or Behavior Recognize by reporting the failed open Flow Control Valve (FCV).

Direct swapping back to the 'A" Flow Control Valve.

Swap CRD FCV using S03.6.D-2, Section 4.2:

Direct the Equipment Operator (EO) to perform steps 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2.

Place the CRD FCV Controller in 'Manual" and adjust to zero.

0 Direct the EO to place the local FCV station selector in the 'A" position.

Open the FCV to 55 - 65 gpm.

0 Place the CRD FCV Controller in 'Automatic" and verify flow.

0 Direct the EO to perform steps 4.2.5.1 and 4.2.5.2.

0 Perform Section 4.1 of the CRD routine inspection.

0 Direct the EO to perform Section 4.3 of the CRD routine inspection.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Single Control Rod Drifts.

Page 4of9 Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Control Rod Drive Mechanism Fails permitting the rod to drift ROD DRIFT (21 1 D-4)

Control Rod 30-35 Begins to Drift.

Time Position Acmlicant's Actions Or Behavior CT URO Recognize by reporting ROD DRIFT (21 1 D-4) 0 Determine which rod is drifting 0

Enter ON-121, Drifting Control Rod CRS Enter and execute ON-121, Drifting Control Rod.

0 Direct that an EO be sent to investigate.

0 Direct that the control rod be selected and driven full in.

PRO Direct an EO to investigate the HCU.

URO Select Control Rod 30-35 Drive the Control Rod full in and hold for 30 seconds.

CRS Direct a power reduction to 950 W e using GP-9-2, Fast Power Reduction.

URO Reduce power with Recirculation to 950 W e. (See event #5 for details of the power reduction.)

CRS Reference Tech Spec 3.1.3 and dedare the Control Rod Inoperable.

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No. #3 EventNo.: 5 Page 5 o f 9 ES-D-2

- Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Time Position CRS URO PRO Fast Power Reduction due to drifting control rod ON-121, Drifting Control Rod, action to place the plant in a safe power configuration.

None Power reduction reduces the flux preventing damage from the out of position rod until it can be evaluated by Reactor Engineering.

Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior Directs the URO to perform a GP-9, Fast Power Reduction, to 950 h e.

Performs power reduction using Recirc flow to approximately 950 Mwe IAW GP-9 'Fast Power Reduction".

Assists in the power reduction 0

0 Monitor Reactor Feed Pump Flows during the power drop and remove a Reactor Feed Pump from service, if required.

Maintain the Generator Auto-Manual Voltage Regulator

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #3 EventNo.:

6 Page 6of9 Event

Description:

Cause:

Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) leak in the Reactor Building Crack in RWCU line in the secondary containment.

L Automatic Actions:

"High Area Temp" alarms (210 J-3)

Effects:

Time Position URO PRO URO PRO CRS CRS PRO Temperatures rise initially in the Reactor Building 165' Elevation Valve Pit and then spread throughout Reactor Building 165' Elevation.

Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize by reporting a Potential T-103 Entry on High Temperature.

Verify which temperature point is alarming, confirm T-103 Entry, and inform the CRS.

Monitor and trend Reactor Building conditions.

Enter and execute T-103, Secondary Containment Control.

Direct a GP-15 'Local Evacuation' of the Reactor Building Determine that a primary system is discharging into the Reactor Building.

Enter and execute T-101 'RPV Control" from T-103.

Direct a GP-4, Manual Reactor Scram.

Enter T-101, RPV Control from T-103.

Conduct a GP-15 evacuation of the Reactor Building.

URO GP-4, Manual Reactor Scram Actions 0 Places the Reactor Mode switch to Shutdown.

0 Verify control rods are inserting.

0 Verify that APRMs are downscale.

0 Establish and maintain RPV with feedwater.

0 Verify all control rods inserted.

0 Verify RPV pressure, trend and status of EHC.

CRS Direct URO to control level between +5 and +35 inches with Reactor Feedwater.

PRO Perform GP-4, Manual Reactor Scram Actions:

Transfer 13 KV House Loads.

0 Trip Main Turbine at <50 Mwe and verify the generator lockout.

0 Verify PClS isolations and SGTS initiation. (See Event #7 for RWCU 0 Verify Scram Discharge Vents and Drains are closed.

0 Verify Hydrogen Water Chemistry is isolated.

0 V e r i Recirc pumps have runback to 30%.

0 Monitor Instrument Air header pressure and drywell pressure.

0 Restore Drywell Instrument N2 when directed by the CRS.

isolation failure actions).

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario No.: # 3 Event No.:

7 Page 7of9 Event

Description:

RWCU Isolation Logic failure Cause:

Relay failures prevent a RWCU isolation Automatic Actions:

Isolation is failed for RWCU MO-15, MO-18, and MO-68.

Effects:

Operators attempt a manual isolation and the valves will not dose.

Reactor Building conditions degrade requiring a RPV depressurization.

Time Position Aoplicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize excessively high temperatures in the 165 Reactor Building Valve Pit.

Recognize by reporting that RWCU has not automatically isolated..

0 Attempt to manually dose the RWCU isolation valves by taking their control switches in the counter-clockwise direction to CLOSE.

CRS Recognize excessively high temperatures in the 165 Reactor Building Directs the PRO to manually close the RWCU isolation valves (if it has Valve Pit.

not already been attempted).

URO Monitor and trend degrading Reactor Building conditions and PRO temperatures.

Monitor for additional areas exceeding the Action levels.

0 Direct plant support personnel to troubleshoot and repair isolation valve failure.

I 0 Investigate the failed isolation valves.

CRS 0 Recognizes temperatures in additional T-103 areas continue to rise.

0 Continue T-101 actions and directs the URO/PRO to begin a R W depressurization <lOO°F (See Event ##8).

CRS If the crew has not yet identified the Bypass Jack Failure (Event 8), the CRS may direct a Rapid RPV depressurization with Bypass Valves in accordance with T-I 01, RPV Control Step RC/P-12 when he determines that the plant is approaching an Emergency Blowdown from T-103.

Note that this step is optional based on the CRS perception of the rate of rise in temperatures.

I CT CRS 0

Recognize two or more areas above the Action level and a primary system breach is in progress.

0 Directs T-I 12 Emergency Blowdown actions.

Directs the URO/PRO to open all ADS valves (See Event ##9).

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #3 Event No.: 8 Page 8of9 Event

Description:

Cause:

-v Automatic Actions:

7 Time Position PRO URO PRO URO CRS URO PRO The Bypass Valve Jack Control fails to function Bypass Jack Control Failure None When the Bypass Jack use is attempted, for either cooldown or rapid depressurization, it will fail to operate.

Amticant's Actions Or Behavior Attempt to open the Bypass Valve Jack as directed by the CRS for either a normal or a rapid depressurization.

Recognize by reporting the failure of the Bypass Jack.

0 Acknowledge the failure of the Bypass Valve Jack.

0 Direct that the normal depressurization be performed using Safety Relief Valves (SRVs).

Use SRVs to initiate a normal depressurization as directed by the CRS.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #3 EventNo.: 9 Page 9of9 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Time Position PRO CT CRS PRO URO PRO ADS SRV faits to open on Emergency Blowdown ADS solenoid failure.

None Only 4 ADS valves will initially open and operator action is required to open an additional SRV to accomplish the Blowdown as designed.

Amlicants Actions Or Behavior 0

Opens all ADS valves by placing their hand switches to open as directed by the CRS.

0 Recognize by reporting that the C ADS Safety Relief Valve failed to open.

Reviews T-112 steps and directs an additional SRV opened to achieve 5 open SRVs.

Opens an additional non-ADS SRV 0

Verify 5 open SRVs and informs the CRS.

Control reactor level (which will initially swell very high) during the Emergency Blowdown.

TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario may be terminated after the Emergency Blowdown is initiated to depressurize the RPV.

POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:

Classify the event as a Site Area Emergency (FS1)

Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No.

1. 4 Op Test No.

Examiners operators CRS PRO URO Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at 97% power. The Power System Director has provided Peact Bottom with advance notice that he will be requiring Unit 2 to carry additional reactive loading.

Following turnover, A loss of DC power to the in-service RPS MG Set Output Breaker requires investigation and the application of tech specs. When the required actions have been taken, the Power System Director calls to request that Reactive Loading be raised to 200 MVARs. After reactive loading has been raised, HPCl will isolate requiring investigation and the application of Tech Specs. When this is completed, the 'A Condensate Pump will trip and the expected Recirculation System Runback will not occur. Power must be manually reduced using Recirculation to prevent a low-level scram.

When conditions have stabilized, the #2 Auxiliary Bus will trip on overcurrent removing the remaining Condensate Pumps from service. The automatic and manual scrams will fail requiring entry into T-101, RPV Control, and the use of Alternate Rod Insertion to shutdown the reactor. The Scram Discharge Volume will fail to isolate and must be manually isolated. When started either manually or automatically, RClC will trip removing the final source of high pressure feed.

As level deteriorates, the crew should enter T-1 1 1, Level Restoration, and start available low pressure ECCS pumps. When level reaches -172 inches, the reactor will be depressurized using T-112, Emergency Depressurization and level will be recovered with low pressure ECCS. The scenaria may be terminated when level has been restored to greater than -172 inches.

Initial Condition Turnover:

IC-14, reduced to 97% power, Full Power Rod Pattern See Attached "Shift Turnover" Sheet Event Malfunction No.

No.

AN0236RE2 2

BATCH FILE 3

HPCI-AUTO-ISOLATION IMF MCSOSA ZYP06A52 1 S16 FALSE I

WITH IOR BATCH BUS OVERCURREN I RPSoVERRIDE Event Event Type*

Description URO PRO CRS URO N

PRO CRS URO PRO CRS I

Loss of DC Power to the '6' RPS MG Set Output Breaker (Tech Spec).

Raise Reactive Loading as requested by the Power System Director.

I HPCl isolates due to a logic system malfunction (Tech Spec).

URO C

PRO CRS

'A' Condensate Pump TripdAutomatic Recirc Runback Fails to O a r.

I URO I R

PRO CRS URO CRS URO Power Reduction with Recirc in response to the failed Recirc Runback.

M PRO

1. 2 Auxiliary Bus Locks Out on Overcurrent.

RPS fails to initiate a Scram/Altemate Rod Insertion (ARI) is required.

CRS

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:

u 0

0 Unit 2 at 97% Power Control Rods are in a full power alignment.

INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:

0 None SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

0 SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

Recover power to full power as directed by the instructions provided by the Reactor Engineers.

ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

GENERAL INFORMATION:

0 GP-5, Power Operations, power had been lowered to 90% under the Reactor Engineers guidance to perform a rod pattern adjustment. Rod manipulations are complete. The Reador Engineers will bring guidance for raising to full power when they complete running predictors.

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.:

1. 4 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

Cause: -

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Time Position URO PRO CRS PRO URO CRS ES-D-2 Page 1 of9 Loss of DC Power to the B RPS MG Set Output Breaker Loss of DC power to breaker from 2DD25, circuit 19 Loss of Trip Capability for the RPS Output Breaker.

Diagnostics, Tech Spec Interpretation and actions.

Applicants Actions Or Behavior 0

0 Recognize by reporting RPS B M-G SET TROUBLE OR IN TEST (208 E-2) Annunciator.

Recognize that RPS 8 is NOT tripped.

Enter and Execute ARC 208 E-2:

0 Recognize that 2BCf57 breaker is not tripped due to RPS not tripping with resultant plant effects.

Direct that the EO be contacted to verify the status of DC Control Power at 2DD25, Ckt. 19.

Use the ARC to assist in troubleshooting the annunciator as directed.

Monitor plant pararneters/assist as directed or requested.

Reference Tech Spec 3.3.8.2 to make the following determination:

With DC power and therefore trip capability lost for one of the two RPS Output Breakers, the associated RPS MG Set must be removed from service in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 4 Event No.: 2 Page 2of9 Event

Description:

Raise Reactive Loading as requested by the Power System Director.

Cause:

Request from Power System Director.

Automatic Actions:

None Effects:

Reactive Loading is raised to 200 MVARs.

Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior PRO Receive request from Power System Director (PSD) to raise readive power on Unit 2 to 200 MVARs and forward the request to the CRS.

CRS Review the request to raise reactive loading to 200 WARS. Consider the Generator Capacity Curve to ensure that adequate room is available.

(NOTE: due to the operators awareness of the capacity of the generator, they could raise loading without referenang the curve. If the evaluator has any question, it should be asked during post scenario follow-up questioning).

CRS Direct that reactive loading be raised to 200 MVARs.

PRO Raise reactive loading by slowly turning the AUTO VOLTAGE REG RHEOSTAT in the CLOCKWISE direction until the meter indicates 200 MVARs.

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 4 Event No.: 3 Page 3of9 Event

Description:

HPCl isolates due to a logic system malfunction.

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects :

HPCI Logic malfunctions and results in an automatic initiation and isolation of the HPCl system.

ES-D-2 HPCl RELAYS NOT RESET (228 C-5)

HPCl TURB TRIP (221 El)

HPCl will become inoperative requiring a Tech Spec interpretation and severely challenging RPV level recover later in the scenario.

Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior URO PRO Recognize by reporting the isolation of the HPCI system.

CRS Recognize by announcing that HPCl is unavailable PRO Investigate the HPCI isolation using ARCS.

Enter SO 23.7.C-2, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Recovery from System Isolation or Turbine Trip.

CRS Reference Tech Spec. 3.5.1 Condition C to determine that with HPCl inoperable:

0 RCIC must be verified operable immediately by administrative means AND 0

HPCI System must be restored to an operable status within 14 days OR 0

the plant must be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reactor steam dome pressure must be 1150 psig within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

CRS Request the Work Week Manager (or others) to assist in troubleshooting HPCI.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #4 EventNo.: 4 Page 4 o f 9 I

Event

Description:

'A Condensate Pump Trip/Automatic Recirc Runback Fails Cause:

'A Condensate Pump trips on overcunenVRecirc fails to runback due to a relay failure in the runback logic Automatic Actions:

A CONDENSATE PUMP BKR TRIP (203 E-2)

A CONDENSATE PUMP OVERLOAD (203 E-I)

Recirc automatic runback is failed.

Reactor level will begin to drop and will lower until power is reduced with recirculation.

Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior URO PRO Recognizes by reporting the trip of the 'A' Condensate Pump.

URO PRO CRS Recognize by announcing entry into the Operating Transient (OT)

Procedure for Reactor Low Level (OT-I 00).

CT URO PRO occur automatically.

CRS Recognize by reporting that the 45% Recirc Pump Runback failed to NOTE: Actions in response to this runback failure are contained in the actions for Event #!5.

URO Recognize that the level drop is caused by a lack of makeup capability requiring that power be lowered with Recirculation.

PRO Investigate the cause of the 'A' Condensate Pump Trip using the ARCS.

Direct an EO to investigate the breaker for the cause of the trip.

0 Green flag the 'A Condensate Pump Control Switch.

CRS Refer to GP-5, Power Operations, to determine that GP-5 recommends that power be limited to ~80%

total feedwater flow with 2 Condensate and 3 Reactor Feedwater Pumps.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #4 EventNo.:

5 Page 5of9 Event

Description:

Power reduction with recirculation Cause:

Runback failed to occur automatically when the condensate pump tripped.

Automatic Actions:

None.

Effects:

Operator is required to manually run recirc flow to 45%.

Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct the URO to lower power by lowering recirc flow manually to 45%

speed.

NOTE: the RO may wait for the CRS to direct this action, but is NOT required to wait since a failure of an automatic action has occurred and needs to be manually verified.

URO Reduce power (which will also stop the RPV level drop) by lowering both the A and the B Recirc Pump Controllers to a Recirc Speed Demand of 45%. This must be performed in a controlled manner that does not result in a high level trip of the Reactor Feed Pumps on the power drop.

PRO Monitor RPV level to ensure proper Reactor Feedwater Pump response to this power change.

CRS Enter and execute OT-112, UnexpectedNnexplained Change in Core Flow.

0 Determine position on the PBAPS Power Flow Operation Map.

0 Direct monitoring for Thermal Hydraulic Instability (THI).

URO Monitor for THI as directed.

Opera tor Act ions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: ##4 Event No.: 6 Page 6 o f 9 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Time Position PRO URO CRS

1. 2 Auxiliary Bus Locks Out on Overcurrent.

Failure in the bus work results in an overcurrent condition.

2 AUX BUS OVERCURRENT RELAYS (219 A-2) 2 AUX BUS LO VOLTAGE (219 8-2) 2 Aux Bus Breakers trip deenergizing the bus and its loads.

The most immediate impact of the Loss of #2 Aux Bus is that the remaining condensate pumps lose power and reactor level drops rapidly requiring a Reactor Scram.

Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize by reporting the loss of the #2 Aux Bus.

0 Recognize by reporting that reactor level is dropping rapidly.

Attempt to manually shutdown the reactor by placing the Mode Selector Switch in Shutdown.

0 Acknowledge the reports related to the #2 Bus and reactor level.

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 4 Event No.:

7 Page 7of9 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Time CT Position URO CRS URO URO CRS URO CRS PRO RPS fails to Scram resulting in an ATWWARI is effective RPS 'B' Automatic and Manual Channel Failure.

Full Reactor Scram does not occur.

ES-D-2 Crew is required to procedure for ATWS conditions. Reactor level drop is greater because more time is spent under power conditions with no High Pressure Feed.

Applicant's Actions Or Behavior 0

Recognize by reporting that a full RPS scram has failed to occur.

0 Report entry into T-1 01, RPV Control, for the ATWS condition.

0 Attempt to scram 'B' RPS by depressing the scram pushbutton.

Enter and execute T-1 01.

Direct that Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) be initiated.

Initiate ARI and report that the Scram Header is depressurizing.

Monitor and report when rods begin to insert and when all rods are fully inserted.

Announce an additional entry condition for T-1 01 based on Reactor Level below -48" and dropping.

Direct maximizing CRD flow using T-246.

Direct injecting with Standby Liquid Control.

Coordinate with the EO to maximize CRD flow using T-246 (may not initially be time for many of these actions, will follow through on when possible).

Initiate injection with Standby Liquid Control by placing the SBLC Keylock switch in either START SYS A or START SYS B.

Determine that level cannot be maintained >-172" and enter and execute T-1 1 1 I Level Restoration:

0 0

Direct inhibiting the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS).

Direct starting all Core Spray and RHR Pumps on minimum flow.

0 Inhibit ADS by placing keys in both ADS keylock switches and placing them in the INHIBIT position.

0 Start ALL Core Spray and RHR Pumps on minimum flow.

0 perator Act ions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 4 Event No.:

8 Page 8 o f 9 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Time Position CT URO/PRO CRS Scram Discharge Volume Vents and Drains fail to automatically isolate.

PClS Logic failure Auto isolation does not occur.

A failure of the SDV vents and drains is effectively a primary to secondary containment leak. The SDV vents and drains can, however, be manually isolated.

Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize by reporting the failure of the SDV vents and drain valves to automatically isolate. Upon recognizing a failure to isolate, the RO should:

Manually isolate the valves by moving the SDV Isolation Handswitches counter-clockwise to the CLOSE position.

Ensure a complete isolation.

Inform the CRS as conditions permit.

0 Acknowledge SDV Vent and Drain Valve isolation failure.

0 Reinforce manually verifying the isolation if required.

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: # 4 Event No.:

9 Page 9of9 ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Time Position PRO CRS CRS PRO URO TERMINATION CRITERIA RClC Trips when started manually or automatically.

Trip Throttle valve failure.

RCIC will attempt to start and then will trip when it reaches 500 RPM.

RCIC will attempt to start and then will trip when it reaches 500 RPM.

This removes the last source of High Pressure Feedwater to the RPV.

Severely complicates level recovery.

Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize by reporting that RClC has tripped and is NOT injed'ng.

Monitor and report RPV level drop.

Acknowledge report on RCIC and request assistance to assist in recovering RCIC for injection.

When level drops to -172". then enter T-112, Emergency Blowdown.

Direct that Instrument Nitrogen be bypassed and restored (if not already complete).

Direct that all five ADS SRVs be opened.

When Core Spray and RHR begin to inject, direct that level be recovered to an appropriate band (+5 to +35 inches or another suitable band above the top of active fuel at -172").

Restore drywell instrument nitrogen by placing the valves to close, placing the keylock switch in bypass, and then reopening instrument nitrogen valves. (NOTE: this activity may be coordinated between the URO and the PRO).

When directed, open ALL five ADS SRVs to perform an Emergency Blowdown.

When Core Spray and RHR begin to inject, manually control pumps to control level in the CRS specified band.

Assist in critical parameter monitoring.

Complete other assigned tasks.

The scenario may be terminated after the RPV has been depressurized and reactor level has been recovered and controlled.

POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:

Classify the event as a Site Area Emergency (FS1)

Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No.

1. 5 Op Test No.

Examiners Scenario Summary operators CRS PRO URO The scenario begins with the plant at 73% power with the "B" RHR Pump Blocked For Motor Replacement. The turnover will direct the crew to perform a Main Turbine Stop Valve Routine Test.

A loss of Feedwater Heaters will require the crew to respond to a positive reactivity addition and reduce power to ensure thermal limits are not exceeded. The crew should recognize and respond to the failure of a RPS Low Vacuum Pressure Transmitter.

Following the Tech Spec determination, a steam leak develops in the Turbine Building. As the steam leak grows in magnitude, the crew should recognize the need to shutdown the plant. During the manual scram, a Reactor Mode Switch failure will require the crew to use the manual pushbuttons or Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) to terminate the ATWS.

A failure of the Group I isolation will require a manual isolation and the 'D' MSL will fail to isolate. The crew will enter T-104, Radioactive Release and evaluate the release. When the release exceeds General Emergency level, the crew will perform an Emergency Blowdown per T-112, Emergency Blowdown. A failure prevents three ADS valves from opening which requires alternate depressurization methods.

Initial Condition IC-125, 73% power Turnover:

Event Malfunction Event Event See Attached "Shift Turnover" Sheet No.

No.

Type*

Description URO CRS URO CRS URO 1

N PRO Perform the Main Turbine Stop Valve Routine Test.

2 Override C

PRO Loss Of Extraction Steam To Feedwater Heaters (Tech Spec).

3 R

PRO Reduce Reactor Power.

4 Override I

PRO Failure of a Vacuum Transmitter (Tech Spec).

CRS URO CRS URO 5

MSSlO M

PRO Steam Leak In The Turbine Building.

PClOl Group I Failure To Auto Isolate (Manual worksYFailure Of The 'D" 6

Override C

PRO MSL To Manually Isolate.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:

0 Approximately 73% power with a GP-2 Startup in progress.

0 GP-2 is complete through step 6.3.57.

0 RES are currently evaluating the rod pattern and will contact you with directions.

0 The Unit 2 Turbine Building 116' Cardox Tank is being refilled.

0 A routine Diesel Fuel Oil delivery is expected this shift.

INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:

0

" B RHR Pump out of service for motor replacement, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into LCO 3.5.1, expected return to service in 2 days SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

0 Perform RT-0-001-400-2, 'Individual Full Closure of Main Turbine Stop Valves". It is already completed through step 6.1.3.

SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

Perform RT-0-001-400-2, "Individual Full Closure of Main Turbine Stop Valves". It is already completed through step 6.1.3.

ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

0 "B"RHRPump GENERAL INFORMATION:

0 Complete the Main Turbine Stop Valve RT

Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #5 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of8 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Stop Valve Routine Test Cause:

None Automatic Actions:

None None Amticant's Actions Or Behavior ES-D-2 Time -

CRS Direct PRO to perform RT-0-001400-2, the Main Turbine Stop Valve Individual Full Closure Routine Test.

PRO Perform RT-0-001-400-2, the Main Turbine Stop Valve Individual Full 0 Review RT Place the CV/SV Test Selector to SV TEST Verify all four MSV test button lights are ON 0 Place the backup EHC Pump in Run and document in RT For Each Main Turbine Stop Valve Closure Routine Test:

+ Depress and Hold the Test pushbutton

+ Verify the position indicator moves smoothly at low speed to less then 10% open and then fast closes

+ After 2-3 seconds at full close, release the pushbutton

+ Verify that the indicator moves smoothly from 0-1 00%

Place the CV/SV Test switch to OFF 0 Verify the lights on all four MSV test buttons are OFF 0 Place the backup EHC Pump in STOP and then AUTO URO Monitor plant parameters/assist as directed

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #5 Event No.: 2 Page 2of8 Event

Description:

Loss Of Extraction Steam To Feedwater Heaters Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

A 0 Valves supplying various heaters fail closed due to a common airline break None, no alarms Loss of extraction steam to heaters, lowering feed temps, rising reactor power Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize rising reactor power, inform CRS and announce entry into the Positive Reactivity OT (OT-104)

CRS Enteddirect actions IAW OT-104 0

0 0

0 0

Monitor position on Figure 1 of OT-104 Direct the insertion of control rods as required to bring power to 10%

below the pre-transient level.

Lead crew in determining the cause of the Positive Reactivity Direct troubleshooting of feedwater heater problem Direct isolation of the air leak URO PRO 0

Recognize lowering feedwater temperatures, inform CRS Investigate cause of power rise 0

Recognize loss of extraction steam to feedwater heaters, inform CRS URO Reduce power as directed by the CRS (see Event #3 for details).

PRO Assist with troubleshooting feedwater heaters as directed CRS Evaluate the crews position on Figure 1, to determine whether Tech Spec Action is required to implement Thermal Limit penalties, recover RN heating, or drop power <25%.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.:

1. 5 Event No.:

3 Page 3 o f 8 Event

Description:

Reduce reactor power.

Cause:

Loss of Feedwater Heaters Automatic Actions:

None, no alarms Effects:

Power reduction Time Position Amticant's Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct power to be lowered as directed by OT-104 Maintain power 10% below the pretransient level using GP-9-2 rods.

URO 0

Maintain power 10% below initial pre-transient level by driving GP-9-2 Rods as required (to 63%)

PRO 0

Inform Power Systems Director of the power reduction.

0 Monitor plant parameters (especially feedwater flow status) and assist asnecessary.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #5 Event No.:

4 Page 4of8 Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Time Position URO PRO URO CRS PRO Failure of a Vacuum Transmitter (Tech Spec)

PT-2-5-11 C fails resulting in an RPS Trip 21 0 B-1 "CONDENSER LO VACUUM TRIP" Alarm "A" RPS Channel Half Scram "A" RPS Channel Half Scram, no rod motion Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize and report 210 D-1, "CONDENSER LO VACUUM TRIP" Recognize and report the 'A" Channel Half Scram V e m actual condenser vacuum is normal Take action IAW ARC 210 D-1 'CONDENSER LO VACUUM TRIP" and 21 1 B-1 ('A" Channel Auto Scram) 0 0

0 Direct troubleshooting of failed instrument Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 to determine that a trip must be inserted in "A2" RPS within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Initiate GP-25 to insert a redundant trip into the 'A2" RPS logic using Appendix 1. (Note: that this is not required to be performed for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and may not be performed during the course of this scenario)

If directed, perform GP-25 Appendix 1 to insert a redundant trip into the

'A2" RPS logic.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #5 Event No.:

5 Page 5of a Event

Description:

Cause:

Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Time Position URO PRO CRS URO PRO PRO CRS URO PRO Steam Leak In The Turbine Building

" D MSL weld cracks Initially alarms will be received indicating vent stack problems and then will progress to Group 1 conditions High steam line flow Group 1 isolation condition and resultant reactor scram signal on MSIV closure Amlicant3 Actions Or Behavior Recognize, report, and take actions IAW ARC 218 B-5 & C-5 (Vent Exhaust Stack Hi Radiation) 0 0

Monitor Rl-2979 to verify a valid signal Enter ON-104, Vent Stack High Radiation Enter ON-1 04 and direct search for source of high vent exhaust rad Recognize and report High Area Temperature Alarm with a potential T-103 (Secondary Containment Control) Entry 0

Monitor Area Temperatures and determine that the leak is in the turbine building and NOT a T-103 entry 0

Recognize by reporting the Group 1 alarms and failure of the Group 1 to occur Direct a Reactor Scram and closure of the MSlVs Attempt to scram the reactor and report the ATWS and entry into T-101, "RPV Control" SEE EVENT #7 FOR FAILURE TO SCRAM DETAILS 0

Attempt to manually isolate the MSlVs 0

Report inability to isolate the 'D" Main Steam Line to the CRS SEE EVENT #6 FOR FAILURE TO ISOLATE DETAILS

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #5 Event No.:

6 Page 6 o f 8 Event

Description:

Group I Failure To Auto Isolate (Manual works)/Failure Of The "D" MSL To Manually Isolate Cause:

Failure of remaining channel of isolation logic to actuate (see Event 4), " D MSL will not isolate manually Automatic Actions:

None, no alarms Effects:

Group 1 failure to isolate, manual isolation will work on all MSL with the exception of the "D" line, reactor scram signal from MSIV closure will not occur until MSlVs closed by operator Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior CT PRO Recognize by reporting indications of major steam leak and the MSlVs failing to close 0

Close MSlVs with handswitches, recognize the 'D" Main Steam Line Failure to manually isolate CRS 0

0 Direct the performance of A0 1A.2-2, Closing Stuck Open MSlVs Direct a GP-15 evacuation of the Turbine Building PRO 0

0 Direct an EO to perform A 0 1A.2-2 for the MSlVs Perform a GP-15 evacuation of the Turbine Building URO PRO Rad) 0 0

Recognize, report alarms 218 6-4 & C-4 (Vent Stack Exhaust Hi Hi Announce T-104 'Radiation Release" Entry CRS Enteddirect actions IAW T-104, 'Radiation Release" 0

Initiate Dose AssessmenVReference ERPlO1 as appropriate 0

Continue to attempt to isolate the MSlVs 0

Continue to take action in T-101, 'RPV Control" to shutdown and depressurize the plant (SEE EVENT #7) 0 When the release can not be maintained below the General Emergency Level by Dose Assessment Reports, then direct T-112,

'Emergency Blowdown" (SEE EVENT #8 FOR DETAILS)

ES-D-2 Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: #5 EventNo.:

7 Page 7 o f 8 Event

Description:

Cause:

Failure to scram (Reactor Mode Switch / B RPS Auto Scram Channel failure)

Mode Selector Switch (MSS) contacts do not make up, MSS remains in 'Run",

'B' RPS Channel does not trip Alarms 21 1 D-l & E-I are NOT received Manual pushbuttons or ARI will scram the reactor Automatic Actions:

Effects:

Time Position URO CRS CT URO CRS URO PRO ADDliCant'S Actions Or Behavior 0

0 Initiate Scram actions by placing the Mode Selector Switch in Shutdown.

Recognize by reporting that the control rods are not inserting and APRMs are NOT downscale (ATWS)

Exit T-I00 and enter T-101 based upon scram condition with power greater than 4% (MSS failure) 0 Direct that Manual Scram Pushbuttons be pressed or ARI be initiated 0

Press Manual Scram pushbuttons or press ARI manual pushbuttons Verify and report that the rods inserting and APRMs are downscale 0

Verify URO/PRO Scram Actions completed 0

Direct that level be maintained +5 to +35 inches 0

Direct the restoration of drywell instrument nitrogen 0

Direct a depressurization Control level +5 to +35 inches after initial transient.

Performs Scram actions 0

Verlfy house loads transferred 0

Verify main turbine tripped and generator locked out 0

Attempt to restore Drywell instrument nitrogen (SEE EVENT #8) e Initiate a depressurization (if time allows - RPV is depressurizing slowly through the break)

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Scenario No.: #5 Event No.:

8 Page 8of8 Event

Description:

Only 2 SRVs Operate On Emergency Blowdown/Depressurization Via Alternate Methods Cause:

Drywell nitrogen not available and some SRVs with mechanical failures Automatic Actions:

None Effects:

Only able to open 2 of the required 5 SRVs for the Emergency Blowdown, required to depressurize via alternate methods Time Position Amlicant's Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize by reporting that while attempting to restore DW instrument nitrogen, the valves will not reopen CT CRS 0

0 Direct alternate methods of supplying nitrogen to the SRVs Determine that release rates are going to reach General Emergency level by plant indications or outside reports.

Emergency depressurize the reactor using T-112, 'Emergency Blowdown"

+ Direct URO to control condensate injection

+ Direct PRO to open all ADS SRVs URO Prevent uncontrolled condensate injection PRO 0

Take the switches to open on all ADS valves Recognize that 5 ADS valves will not open, inform CRS CRS Direct additional SRVs to be opened until 5 are open PRO 0

Attempt to open SRVs until 5 are open 0

Recognize by reporting that only 2 SRVs can be opened CRS Direct depressurization using alternate means, such as:

0 Main Steam Line Drains 0

HPCl Steam Line Drains 0

RCIC Steam Line Drains 0

Others from Step EB-17 of T-112.

TERMINATION - Scenario may be terminated when alternate depressurization is initiated.

POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:

Classify this condition as a General Emergency (RGI)