ML050480112
| ML050480112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/2004 |
| From: | Gosekamp M Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| To: | Caruso J NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| Download: ML050480112 (45) | |
Text
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Op-Test Facility: Vermont Yankee Scenario No.: 1 No.:
Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions:
100% power, ORAM Sentinel is YELLOW, Rapid Shutdown Sequence is latched Turnover:
AAPRM is bypassed due to inability to adjust gain - I&C troubleshooting is in progress The plant is at 100% power. The HPCl quarterly surveillance was performed last shift. HPCl has been restored and is available, but has not been declared operable. Engineering is evaluating vibration data, and will notify the control room in the next few hours. The Speed Load Changer Bypass Test OP 41 60 is schedule to be completed this shift.
Scenario Summary:
Following turnover, the crew will commence the performance of the Speed Load Changer Bypass Test OP 4160. Following the surveillance, the A SRV will fail open. The crew will implement OT 3121. After cycling A SRV shut, control power will be lost. As a result, the CRS will evaluate Tech Specs for SRVs (3.6.D.1) and ADS (3.5.F.3). With HPCl inoperable in combination with ADS a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> depressurization less than 150 psig is required. When Engineering subsequently notifies the sontrol room that the vibration data is satisfactory, the CRS will exit the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> action and enter a 7 Jay LCO for the one inoperable ADS valve.
Subsequently, a loss of DC-1 will occur, requiring a Technical Specification plant shutdown and mplementation of ON 3159 to mitigate the event. After control power is transferred for Bus 1, the A
?ecirculationpump will trip resulting in entry into the exclusion region. OT 31 17 and OT 3118 will be mplemented to address the recirc pump trip and operation within the exclusion region. Control rods Nil1 be inserted to exit the exclusion region.
Nhile still operating in the exclusion region, thermal hydraulic instabilities will be experienced
- equiringa manual reactor scram. Control rods will insert partially requiring actions from EOP-2, STWS Control, to be implemented. Following rod insertion, a HPCl steam line break with a failure of Sroup VI isolation will occur. The crew will implement EOP-4, Secondary Containment Control to nitigate the event. Secondary containment temperatures will exceed their maximum safe limits in wo different areas and an EOP-5, RPV-ED will be performed.
Awendix D Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks:
With the reactor at power and a scram signal required manually scram the reactor Actuate the manual scram pushbuttons within 1 minute of reaching an LPRM High Alarm With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by inserting control rods to prevent exceeding a primary containment design limit Actions taken within 10 minutes of the scram failure to implement appropriate appendices.
Only one method needs to be used. The method must result in successful control rod insertion.
With a primary system discharging into Secondary Containment and area temperature exceeds maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, initiate an RPV-ED.
Initiate RPV-ED within 5 minutes of area temperature exceeding maximum safe operating levels in more than one area.
Note: Actions to anticipate RPV-ED and prevent two area temperatures from exceeding maximum safe operating levels will be evaluated as a substitute Critical Task.
Event Description I 2 AD08A C 1 A SRV Failure - OT 3121 Technical Specification I
SRV Event Trigger I 3 I EDOGA I C I Loss of DC-1 ON 3159 Technical Specification I 4 I I C I Recirc Pump Trip on Control Power Restoration - OT 31 18 I 5 I I R I Power Reduction - Control Rod Insertion - OT 31 17 6 Instability M Instabilities - Man Scram Event Trigger 7 RD12NB C ATWS - Partial ATWS EOP-2 8 HPO9 M HPCl Line Break with PClS Failure PC1HP15 RPV-ED on Secondary Containment Temperatures
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test Event No.: Scenario No.: 1 No.: 1 Page 1 of Event
Description:
Speed Load Changer Bypass Test OP 4160 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Speed Load Changer Meter
- 1TBV Meter I Direct BOP to perform OP 4160 Section A Speed-Load Changer Bypass Test
~~
I BOP Implement OP 4160 Section A Speed-Load Changer Bypass Test Slowly operate the Speed-Load Changer switch by going to LOWER until it is noted that there is a slight decrease in electrical output and No. 1 bypass valves begins to open Slowly operate the Speed-Load Changer switch by going to RAISE until no further load increase is noted (bypass valves closed)
The pressure regulator now has control of load and the Speed-Load Changer switch may be set per OP 0105
Atmendix D Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Op-Test Event No.: Scenario No.: 1 No.: 2 Page 1 of Event
Description:
ASRV failure Indications and Alarms Monitored:
RX RELIEF/SAFETY VLV TEMP HI (3-8-4)
RX RELIEF VLV OPEN (3-A-1)
RX RELIEF VLVBELLOWS LEAKAGE (3-8-8)
SRV indicator lights CRP 9-3.
RPV level decrease Steam Flow/Feed Flow mismatch Generator load reduction ADS POWER FAILURE (3-A-4)
Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report A SRV is open Report level and pressure transient Enter and direct actions in OT 3121 Direct BOP to cycle the control switch on CRP 9-3 from AUTO to OPEN tl Cycles the control switch on CRP 9-3 from AUTO to OPEN to AUTO Reports SRV indicates shut by tailpipe indications and alarms Reports following indications and alarms:
Control power lost for both red and green lights coincident with AC POWER FAILURE (3-A-4)
Center amber light is lit and RX RELIEF VLVBELLOWS LEAKAGI 8)
Appendix D Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Review and evaluate the following Tech Specs:
0 3.6.D.1 During reactor power operating conditions and whenever ther reactor coolant pressure is greater than 150 psig and temperature greater than 350F, all safety valves and at least three of the four relief valves shall be operable.
3.5.F.2 From and after the date that one of the four relief valves of the ADS are made or found to be inoperable due to malfunction of the electrical portion of the valve when the reactor is pressurized above 150 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless such a valve is sooner made operable, provided that during such seven days both the remaining Automatic Relief System valves and the HPCl System are operable.
0 Determines 3.5.F.2 does not apply since HPCI is still inoperable 0 3.5.F.3 If the requirements of 3.5.F cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to 4 5 0 psig within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> CRS After being notified HPCl is operable, reevaluate Tech Specs and determine 3.5.F.3 no longer applies.
Enter 7 day LCO for 3.5.F.2 Engineering Report: Make report following 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> action determination. HPCl vibration has been evaluated satisfactorily.
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page of -
Event
Description:
Loss of DC ON 3159, Technical Specifications Indications and Alarms Monitored:
DC-l/DC-2 BKR TRIP (8-N-1)
B A T VOLTAGE LO (8-P-1) 0 Loss of position indication for HPCl System valves and components.
0 Loss of position indication for inboard MSiV.
Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRO/BOP Recognize and report loss of DC-1 CRS Enter and direct actions in ON-3159 Inform CRO feedwater pump high level trips are inoperable Direct CRO to Monitor reactor vessel level closely and secure feed pumps as necessary.
Request Electrical Maintenance assistance in determining the cause of the loss Of DC-1 CRO Monitor reactor vessel level closely and secure feed pumps as necessary.
After obtaining concurrence from electrical maintenance, Direct BOP to coordinate with an A 0 to transfer 4KV Buses 1 and 3, 480V Bus 8 CRS and DG-1-1B control power to DC-2 Review Tech Specs and determine the following:
0 4KV Bus 3 and 480V Bus 8 (and their associated equipment) are considered inoperable without DC control power when on their alternate supply. Inoperability of Bus 3 requires placing the plant in cold shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. (Note in ON 3159 page 4) 0 With the loss of DC-1, both the qualified immediate and delayed access sources and the alternate immediate access source are inoperable per 3.10.8.3 requiring the reactor be in cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. (Note in ON 3159 page 6)
BOP Coordinate with an A 0 to transfer control power for Bus 3 Coordinate with an A 0 to transfer control power for Bus 8 Coordinate with an A 0 to transfer control power for Bus B D/G
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page of -
Event
Description:
A Recirculation Pump Trip - OT 31 18 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
MG SET A GEN LOCKOUT (4-A-1)
MG SET A GEN AUX LOCKOUT (4-A-2)
MG SET A DRIVE MOTOR TRIP (4-A-5)
Recirc flow reduction APRM power, reactor pressure, RPV water level I Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior I I BOP I Coordinate with an A 0 to transfer control power for Bus 1 I I CRO I Recognize and report the trip of A Recirculation pump I I CRS I Enter and direct actions in OT 3118 I Direct CRO to immediately, close PUMP DISCHARGE RV-53A of the tripped Pump-Direct CRO to monitor APRM indications After determining B pump speed, direct CRO to reduce speed to 170%
rated speed, at a rate of power change not to exceed 10% RTP/min.
Close PUMP DISCHARGE RV-53A Monitor APRM indications Reduce speed to g o % rated speed, at a rate of power change not to exceed 10% RTP/min Contact Rx Bldg A 0 to monitor recirc lube oil temperatures Monitor plant parameters (reactor power, reactor pressure, reactor level) and recirculation parameters (recirc MG speeds, recirc flow)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 1 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page Of Event
Description:
Power Reduction - Control Rod Insertion - OT 3117 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Power-Flow Map - ERFIS Control Rod Displays APRMs, reactor power, reactor water level I I I Enter and direct actions in OT 3117 Direct CRO to monitor LPRM readings by selecting the STBLY key on ERFIS Direct CRO to manually scram reactor if either core wide or regional instability is verified Direct CRO to Insert control rods per the Rapid Shutdown sequence to exit the Buffer and Exclusion Regions I I CRO I Monitor LPRM readings by selecting the STBLY key on ERFIS Monitor for either core wide or regional instabilities Insert control rods per the Rapid Shutdown sequence STA Surrogate: Report entry into buffer and exclusion regions of power-to-flow map
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page - of -
Event
Description:
Reactor Thermal Hydraulic Instabilities - Manual Reactor Scram Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Multiple, periodic (Typical e3 sec.) high or low LPRM alarms Multiple, periodic (Typical e3 sec.), LPRM oscillations >20% peak-to-peak Multiple, periodic (Typical e3 sec.), APRM oscillations >lo% peak-to-peak Critical Task Standard:
With the reactor at power and a scram signal required manually scram the reactor Actuate the manual scram pushbuttons within 1 minute of reaching an LPRM High Alarm Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I CRO I Recognize and report indications of thermal hydraulic instabilities I initiate a manual reactor scram (OT 3117 Immediate Action) CRITICAL TASK
~~~
Acknowledge report for instabilities, direct a manual reactor scram if not already CRS performed by CRO as an immediate operator action
Amendix D Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page Of -
Event
Description:
ATWS - Partial ATWS - EOP-2 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Control rod display 0 Post Scram Report Program (PSRP) ERFIS 0 APRM Downscale indications 0 Reactor water level and pressure Critical Task Standard:
With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown] take action to reduce power by inserting control rods to prevent exceeding a primary containment design limit Actions taken within 10 minutes of the scram failure to implement appropriate appendices. Only one method needs to be used. The method must result in successful control rod insertion.
I Report APRM downscale condition I ' I CRS I Enter and direct actions in OT 3100, SCRAM Enter and direct actions in EOP-1 RPV Control Direct verification of Table A, Initiations and Isolations Exit EOP-1 and enter EOP-2, ATWS Control Direct ADS inhibited Direct Appendix P jumpers installed Inhibit ADS Install Appendix P jumpers (See Attachment 1-2)
Direct CRO to place Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN when steam flow is c0.5Mlbdhr Direct CRO to initiate ARVRPT I 1 CRO 1 Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN I CRS Initiate ARVRPT and trip " 6recirc drive motor breaker Direct RPV Water Level 177 using feedwater Direct RPV Pressure Control 800-1000 psig using MHC-TBVs
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 1 CRO I Control RPV Water Level 177 using feedwater I Control RPV Pressure 800-1000 psig using MHC-TBVs 1 Insert SRMARM and monitor reactor power decrease I CRS I Direct control rod insertion using Appendices F, GIor BB CRITICAL TASK 1 CRO I Implement control rod insertion appendix as directed (See Attachments 1-3,-4,-5)
Report when rod insertion has commenced and when are fully inserted with the exception of rods 10-19,14-23, 10-27 1 CRS Direct additional appendices to insert the last three control rods. Appendices H lorF I CRO
~~
rlmplement control rod insertion appendix as directed (See Attachment 1-6)
Report when rod insertion has commenced and the status of the three remaining control rods (10-19, 14-23, 10-27) as they are inserted.
I CRS 1 After verifying reactor shutdown criteria by Table B, Exit EOP-2 and enter EOP-1 I Direct RPV Water Level 127-177 using feedwater 1 Direct a reactor plant cooldown at <1OOF/hr psig using MHC-TBVs I CRO 1 Control RPV Water Level 127-177 using feedwater BOP Commence a reactor plant cooldown at e1OOF/hr using MHC-TBVs CRO/BOP Backup automatic actions PClS Groups 2, 3, 5 STA Surrogate Report: Report reactor power ~ 2 % following initial scram BOP Surrogate Report: TBV indication is not available due to the loss of DC-1; however, steam flow is being used as an alternative indication
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page of -
Event
Description:
HPCl Line Break with PClS Failure - EOP-4 RPV-ED - Secondary Containment Temperatures - EOP-5 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
STEAM LEAK DET PANEL TEMP HI (4-L-1)
RX BLDG/REFUEL FLR CH NB RAD HI (5-H-1) (5-J-1)
Secondary Containment Temperatures EOP-4 Limits ERFlS RPV pressure RPV water level Critical Task Standard:
With a primary system discharging into Secondary Containment and area temperature exceeds maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, initiate an RPV-ED.
Initiate RPV-ED within 5 minutes of area temperature exceeding maximum safe operating levels in more than one area.
Note: Actions to anticipate RPV-ED and pre.vent two area temperatures from exceeding maximum safe operating levels will be evaluated as a substitute Critical Task.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRO/BOP Recognize and report high temperature in secondary containment BOP On CRP 9-21, determine which detector is alarming I Monitor the area temperature and radiation levels I CRS I Enter and direct actions in EOP-4 I I Operate all available RRUs as required I Isolate all systems discharging into the area - Direct BOP to shut HPCI-15 I Determine source of leakage is from a primary source I Monitor secondary containment temperatures I I Enter and direct actions in ON 3158
Appendix D Rewired Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Shutdown the reactor, Ensure adequate core cooling, Suppress a fire, Maintain primary containment integrity Consider using the plant paging system to warn unnecessary personnel to stay away from the area I I CRO/BOP I Monitor and report secondary containment temperatures Attempt to shut HPCI-15, and report failure of valve to operate Announce reactor building evacuation due to high area temperatures CRS Contact maintenance to investigate and attempt to shut HPCI-15 Monitor secondaw containment temperatures Implement pressure leg override to anticipate RPV-ED exceeding cooldown CRS rates using TBVs due to lowering torus water level Direct CRO to anticipate RPV-ED rapidly depressurizing using TBVs CRO Initiate actions to anticipate RPV-ED using TBVs Limit TBV operation controlling MS flow less than Group 1 isolation and controlling RPV water level l i Determine two different area temperatures have exceeded Maximum Safe CRS Operating Limit and an RPV-ED is required Exit EOP-1pressure control and enter/direct actions in EOP-5 F Direct 4 SRVs opened - CRITICAL TASK STA Surrogate Report: Report EOP-4 entry condition STA Surrogate Report: Report Group 6 isolation signal on HPCl from ISOL screen STA Surrogate Report: Report EOP-4 maximum safe operating temperatures have been exceeded in a given area.
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachments 1 OP 4160 Turbine Generator Surveillance 2 OP 3107 Appendix P Bypassing the PClS Group I Low Low Reactor Water Level Isolation Signals 3 OE 3107 Appendix F Initiation of a Manual Scram and Individual Control Rod Scrams 4 OE 3107 Appendix G Manual Insertion of Individual Control Rods 5 OE 3107 Appendix BB Insertion of Control Rods Using Cooling Water Differential Pressure 6 OE 3107 Appendix H Vent the Control Rod Drive Over Piston Volume
Amendix D Reauired ODerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Malfunctions Malfunction Name Malfunction Severity/ Key Note Ramp/Delay Auto Scram Failure RPO1A Preinsert Partial Scram RDl2NB 7% Preinsert HPCI-15 Closure PC1HP15 Preinsert Failure ~~
Stuck Control Rods 10- RD021019 Preinsert Delete stuck control rod after 19, 14-23, 10-27 RD02 1423 either the performance of RD021027 Appendix H or after resetting scram during the performance of Appendix F A SRV Failure AD08A 1 Following the completion of SRV Event the Speed Load Changer Trigger surveillance LOSSof DC-1 EDOGA 2 Enter after Tech Spec evaluation Bus 3 Control Power EDR03 ALTER 3 Enter as requested Bus 8 Control Power EDR43 EMERG 4 Enter as reauested B D/G Control Power EDR44 EMERG 5 Enter as requested Bus 1 Control Power EDRO1 ALTER 6 Entry will result in A Recirc pump trip. Enter as reauested I -
Instability Event Trigger I ET (7 Enter after 2d control rod is I NSTABILlTY inserted HPCl Line Break HP09 25%/300 8 Following insertion of all control rods
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Op-Test Facility: Vermont Yankee Scenario No.: 2 No.:
Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions:
100% power, ORAM Sentinel is YELLOW, Rapid Shutdown Sequence is latched Turnover:
AAPRM is bypassed due to inability to adjust gain - I&C troubleshooting is in progress C RHR pump is tagged out for motor replacement.
Control Rod Operability Check, OP 41 11 Section A, is schedule to be completed this shift. Steps 1-3 of OP 41 11 are complete.
Scenario Summary:
Following turnover, the crew will respond to a failure of a Group II PClS valve. To address the containment Technical Specifications, the other in-line valves will be shut. As a result of the actions to address the containment valves, the CRS will enter a 7 day LCO for isolation of the DW floor and equipment sumps.
The crew will commence the performance of the Control Rod Operability surveillance. When the coupling check is performed on rod 26-43, the coupling check will fail requiring actions from ON 3144 to be implemented. Control rod 26-43 will be declared inoperable until the control rod is fully inserted and disarmed. During the power reduction with recirculation, the master recirc controller will fail to respond. Control will be transferred to the individual recirculation controllers for the power reduction.
Following the insertion of control rod 26-43, a leak on the AD/G air system will result in an inoperable D/G. The CRS will need to evaluate the inoperable D/G in combination with the C RHR pump and apply the inoperable definition with respect to power supplies.
After the crew enters a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> COLD SHUTDOWN Tech Spec action, a small recirc break will occur requiring actions in OT 311 I.When DW parameters have been stabilized with the start of additional RRUs, the C RFP trips without the auto start of BRFP. When the B RFP is started, a loss of bus 1 will occur causing a loss of all reactor feed pumps and require a manual reactor scram as directed in OT 3113.
Following the scram, Bus 2 will fail to transfer and A D/G will fail to start. The loss of normal power will be implemented; however, bus 4 restoration from the Vernon tie will fail. HPCl will start but the HPCl inverter will fail preventing injection. RClC will fail to automatically start, but should be started manually to maintain RPV water level. With RClC maintaining RPV water level, containment parameters will be addressed by spraying the torus and drywell.
Following drywell sprays, the recirc break will exceed the capacity of the RClC system causing RPV water level to lower. The CRS will address the competing priorities associated with the containment and the RPV. With only two injection systems (D RHR and B CS pumps) available, containment sprays will be lined up for injection prior to TAF when an EOP-5 RPV-ED will be required. RPV water level will be recovered using low pressure pumps.
1 Amendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-I Critical Tasks:
With the reactor shutdown and RPV level approaching +6 inches, restart available high pressure feed systems and maintain RPV level above +6 inches RPV level maintained above +6 inches; RPV-ED NOT required due to RPV low level Prior to RPV-ED, when torus pressure exceeds the suppression chamber spray initiation pressure, initiate drywell containment spray while in the safe region of the drywell spray initiation limit Spray the drywell within 10 minutes of exceeding 10 psig torus pressure AND RPV level not an overriding priority. Decreasing level below 82.5 inches is considered and overriding priority With the reactor shutdown and reactor pressure greater than the shutoff head of the low pressure systems, initiate RPV-ED BEFORE RPV level reaches -19 inches Initiate RPV-ED (begin opening valves) BEFORE RPV level reaches -48 inches Event No. Malf. No. Event Event Description Type* Scenario #2 1 PC2 C PClS Group II valve failure -Technical Specifications 2 N Control Rod Operability 3 RD032643 R Uncoupled Control Rod Technical Specifications, Power Reduction with recirculation flow - ON 3144 4 RR10 I Master Recirc Failure 5 AN8G7 C AD/G low starting air - Technical Specifications AN8G7 6 RROlA C Small Recirc break - OT 3111 7 FW08C C C RFP trip with failure of B RFP to auto start FW22B 8 ED12B M Loss of Bus 1 ED03A Loss of Normal Power ED18C Loss of Bus 4 (AD/G, Vernon Tie)
ED21 DG05A 9 HPIO C HPCl Inverter Trip RC02 RClC failure to auto start
?O RROlA M Recirc Break RPV-ED RPV Low Level t (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Amendix D Rewired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test Event No.: Scenario No.: 2 No.: 1 Page 1 of Event
Description:
PCIS Group Ii valve failure -Technical Specification indications and Alarms Monitored:
0 LRW-82 and LRW-94 valve position indication on 9-4 DWL SUMP VLV CLOSED (4-M-3)
Recognize and report loss of indication for LRW-82 and 94.
Determine LRW-83 and 95 should be shut as second in-line PClS valve to CRS comply with Tech Spec 3.7.D.2 Direct CRO to shut LRW-83 and LRW-95 CRO Place control switches for LRW-82/83 and LRW-94/95 to CLOSE Verify and report LRW-83 and 95 are shut After isolating DW Floor and Equipment Sumps by completing the required PClS Tech Spec action, recognize sumps are inoperable. Determine Tech Spec CRS 3.6.C.2 requires a 7 day LCO for the resulting condition
Amendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 0p-Test Event No.: Scenario No.: 2 No.: 2 Page 1 of Event
Description:
Control Rod Operability - OP 41 1I Provide CRO with a copy of Control Rod Position Display. Steps 1-3 have been completed, this is NOT the first time this surveillance is being performed this month.
Indications and Alarms Monitored:
0 Control rod displays 0 APRM recorders I CRO I Review precautions and prerequisites for OP 4111, Section A Select the first control rod shown on WOPF 41 11.02 without an asterisk and drive it in one notch.
Verify rod position indication decreases to the next even notch.
Return the control rod to its original position, if the original rod position is 48, perform a coupling check at position 48 Repeat the above steps for all operable control rods shown on WOPF 41 11.02 without an asterisk that are not fully inserted
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: % Page of -
Event
Description:
Event 3 Uncoupled Control Rod - ON 3144 Event 4 Master Recirculation Controller Failure Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Event 3 ROD OVER TRAVEL (5-D-4)
ROD DRIFT (5-D-5) 0 Rod drift red light on rod 26-43 0 Control rod display for rod 26-43 Event 4 0 Master Recirc signal - no change 0 Individual Recirc Controller speedkignal - no change 0 Recirc flow - no change 0 APRM power, reactor pressure, RPV water level - no change Time I Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Perform coupling check on rod 26-43 Provide continuous withdraw signal for 3 to 5 seconds by simultaneously going to NOTCH OVERRIDE and ROD OUT. Verify the following:
0 The display window continues to show 48 0 The computer printout indicates coupling check SAT The ROD OVER TRAVEL (5-D-4) annunciator does not alarm 0 If during the coupling check, the 48 disappears, the rod display window goes dark, and the ROD DRIFT (5-D-5) and ROD OVER TRAVEL (5-D-4) alarms are received, the control rod is uncoupled 0 If a rod is uncoupled, refer to ON 3144 Report rod 26-43 is uncoupled I CRS Enter and direct actions in ON 3144 Direct CRO to immediately reduce reactor power by reducing recirc flow to 27.5-29 Mlbmlhr at a rate not to exceed 10% RTP/min Direct CRO to Fully insert rod 26-43 using the CONTINUOUS-IN mode
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Immediately reduce reactor power by reducing recirc flow to 27.5-29 Mlbm/hr at CRO a rate not to exceed 10% RTPlmin Contact Rx Bldg A 0 to monitor recirc lube oil temperatures Monitor plant parameters (reactor power, reactor pressure, reactor level) and recirculation parameters (recirc MG speeds, recirc flow)
CRO Recognize and report failure of the master recirculation controller Place recirculation controller to individual manual control for both controllers Continue reducing power using individual manual control Report actions to the CRS Direct recirculation controllers be placed in individual manual control for both CRS controllers and continuing with the power reduction. (If not already completed)
CRO Fully insert rod 26-43 using the CONTINUOUS-IN mode Reset the ROD DRIFT alarm Review Technical Specifications and determine rod 26-43 is inoperable 3.3.F 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> COLD SHUTDOWN until control rod is fully inserted and electrically CRS disarmed Contact tagging desk for a tagout to electrically disarm rod 26-43
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page Of -
Event
Description:
A D/G low starting air pressure Indications and Alarms Monitored:
DG A START AIR PRESS LO AIR (8-G-7)
DG A TROUBLE (8-G-8)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Report A DG low starting air pressure CRS Declare A D/G inoperable as a result of low air pressure Review Technical Specifications 3.1O.B. 1 and determine all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices supported by the operable diesel generator are NOT operable IC RHR pump powered from Bus 3PB DIG - operable D/G Since required features supported by the operable D/G are inoperable, the redundant required features supported by the inoperable D/G are immediately declared inoperable and the applicable Tech Spec actions taken 0 A and BRHR pumps are declared inoperable (bus 4) 3.5.A.6 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> COLD SHUTDOWN LCO entered Surrogate Report: Report a leaking hand hole on D/G air receiver with pressure 100 psig and lowering. The air compressor is running
Amendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page Of -
Event
Description:
Small Recirc Break - OT 3111 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
Drywell Temperature and Pressure - ERFIS W C T M T BLDG RAD MONITOR TROUBLE (3-F-9)
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRO/BOP Report rising DW pressure/temperature CRS Enter and direct actions in OT 31I 1 Direct closure of AC-20 Direct verification of the torus vent path Directthe start of all available RRUs BOP Close NL MAKE-UP AC-20.
Check open the following normal Torus vent path isolation valves:
0 TORUS 3 VENT AC-6B e VENT TO SBGT SGT-6 0 INLET ISOLATION SGT-2A(B) 0 DISCH ISOLATION SGT-3A(B)
Start all available Drywell RRUs CRS Determine additional DW RRUs have stabilized containment parameters CRS Direct the transfer of house loads to startup transformers (if time allows)
STA Surrogate Report: Report rising DW pressure based on ERFIS trend
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page Of Event
Description:
C RFP Trip with failure of B RFP to auto start Indications and Alarms Monitored:
FW PUMP C TRIP LVL HI/ELEC (6-E-7)
B RFP ammeter and indication lights
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page of -
Event
Description:
Loss of Bus 1 Loss of Normal Power Loss of Bus 4 ("AD/G, Vernon Tie)
Indications and Alarms Monitored:
0 Bus Voltage meters and breakers 0 RPV Water Level, RPV LEVEL HVLO 5-E-I) 0 RFP breaker indications 0 FW Flow indicati Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior P
Recognize and report loss of both operating feedwater pumps and lowering CRO reactor water level.
Initiate a manual reactor scram (OT 31 13 Immediate Action)
Acknowledge report for loss of all feedwater pumps, direct a manual reactor CRS scram if not already performed by CRO as an immediate operator action BOP Recognize and report loss of bus 1 Following the scram and turbine trip, report:
0 The failure of Breaker 23 to close and failure of Bus 2 to transfer to the startup transformers 0 The loss of normal power 0 The loss of Bus 4 and the failure of "A"D/G 0 Only Bus 318 have power Complete LNP Immediate Actions 0 Verify both diesels start and supply power to Buses 3 and 4 at normal voltage and frequency 0 Start or verify operation of a minimum of 2 SW pumps and start others as required 0 Restart station air compressors A & B CRS Enter and direct actions in OT 3100, SCRAM Enter and direct actions in OT 3122, Loss of Normal Power Enter and direct actions in EOP-1, RPV Control Direct verification of Table A, Initiations and Isolations Direct RPV Water Level 127-177 using HPCVRCIC Direct RPV Pressure Control 800-1000 psig using SRVs, HPCl
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 P
Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Control RPV Water Level 127-177 using HPCVRCIC I Control RPV Pressure 800-1000 psig using SRVs, HPCl Report critical parameter status I CRO/BOP Backup automatic actions PClS Groups 1,2, 3, 5 Complete LNP Followup Actions If only one DG started, close or verify closed SW-19A -19B Check open the normal bus supply breaker 4T2 If the diesel restart fails and the Vernon tie is available energize the dead bus as follows: Close the 3V4 breaker.
0 Cross tie buses 8 and 9 Recognize and report the failure of the 3V4 breaker to close
ADDendiX D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 9 Page - Of Event
Description:
HPCl Inverter Failure and Failure of RClC to auto start Indications and Alarms Monitored:
HPCl INVERT CIRCUIT FAILURE (3-U-5) 0 HPCl Inverter Light 9-3 lower panel 0 RClC system valves and indications 0 RPV Water Level 0 RX WATER LEVEL LO-LO (5-E-3)
Critical Task Standard:
With the reactor shutdown and RPV level approaching +6 inches, restart available high pressure feed systems and maintain RPV level above +6 inches RPV level maintained above +6 inches; RPV-ED NOT required due to RPV low level Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize and report HPCl inverter failure Recognize and report failure of RClC to automatically start on low low water level I I CRS Direct RPV Water Level 127-177 by manually starting RClC - CRITICAL TASK Direct RPV Pressure Control 800-1000 psig using SRVs/RCIC Control RPV Water Level 127-177 manually starting RCIC using OP 2121 Appendix C, MANUAL RClC INJECTION (See Attachment 2-1) CRITICAL CRO TASK Control RPV Pressure 800-1000 psig using SRVs/RCIC
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 10 Page of Event
Description:
Recirc Break - EOP-3 RPV-ED - Low RPV Water Level - EOP-5 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
HI DW Pressure alarms (5-L-3)
RHR DRYWELL PRESS HI (3-L-1)
DW Pressure RPV Water Level RX WATER LEVEL LO (5-K-2)
RX WATER LVL CH A/B LO-LO (5-H-2)/(5-J-2)
RX WATER LEVEL LO-LO (5-E-3)
ADS BLOWDOWN TIMER START (3-A-2)
Critical Task Standard:
Drywell Sprays Prior to RPV-ED, when torus pressure exceeds the suppression chamber spray initiation pressi initiate drywell containment spray while in the safe region of the drywell spray initiation limit Spray the drywell within 10 minutes of exceeding 10 psig torus pressure AND RPV level not an overriding priority. Decreasing level below 82.5 inches is considered and overriding priority RPV-ED With the reactor shutdown and reactor pressure greater than the shutoff head of the low pressL systems, initiate RPV-ED BEFORE RPV level reaches -19 inches Initiate RPV-ED (begin opening valves) BEFORE RPV level reaches -48 inches Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior CRO/BOP Recognize and report DW high pressure condition CRS Enter and direct actions in EOP-3 Restart all available DW RRUs Spray the torus using 8RHR Spray the DW using ByRHR not required for adequate core cooling CRITICAL TASK BOP Restart all available RRUs I I Initiate torus sprays using B RHR OP 2124 Appendix C (See Attachment 2-Initiate DW sprays using B RHR OP 2124 Appendix C (See Attachmen
- 2) CRITICAL TASK
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
~~
Direct verification of Table A, Initiations and Isolations for high DW pressure CRO/BOP Backup automatic actions for high DW pressure (RHR, CS pump starts)
Report lowering RPV water level and status of injection systems CRS I Direct CRDinjectionmaximized I Direct SLC injection
~~
CRO/BOP I Maximize CRD injection OP 21IISection Q (See Attachment 2-3)
I Inject SLC I Report ADS Timer Initiated CRS I Direct ADS inhibited CRO/BOP I Inhibit ADS CRS I Determine at least two systems are available for injection (B CS, B RHR)
I Direct B RHR lined up for injection Lineup BRHR for injection Open RHR-65B BOP Close DW/Torus spray and cooling Report RPV water level at +6 inches (TAF)
CRS Exit EOP-1pressure control and enteddirect actions in EOP-5 Direct 4 SRVs opened CRITICAL TASK Direct level recovery using RHR/CS to 127-177 CRO/BOP Open 4 SRVs - CRITICAL TASK Report lowering pressure Report ECCS injection valves opening on low pressure and injection Report RPV water level status for rising water level, -48, + 6 When RPV water level is >+6 remove/throttle injection systems as necessary to control RPV water level 127-177 CRS Classification (after scenario)
Alert (A-3-a or A-3-b)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachments 1 OP 2121 Appendix C Manual RClC Injection 2 OP 2124 Appendix C Containment Sprays (torus, drywell) 3 OP 21 11 Section Q Maximizing CRD flow
Armendix D Rewired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Simulator SetuplMalfunctions Malfunction Name Malfunction I Severity/ I Key Note RamplDelay B RFP Failure to Auto FW22 Preinsert Start.
Uncoupled Control Rod RD032643 Preinsert 26-43 Master Recirculation RRIO 71.54 Preinsert Check to ensure individual Controller Failure controllers remain in automatic Bus 2 Fail to Transfer ED12B Preinsert Breaker 23 failure ED21 Preinsert 3V4 Breaker failure ED18A Preinsert A D/G failure to start DG05A Preinsert RClC failure to start RC02 Preinsert RHR pump C RH13 OPEN Preinsert LRW 82/94 Valve failure PC2LR8294 I Enter when directed by lead examiner A D/G low starting air AN8G7 Spurious 2 Following insertion of AN8G8 uncoupled control rod Recirc Leak RROIA 0.01 3 Following tech spec determination for D/G CRFP Trip FWO8C 4 Enter after DW pressure has been stabilized following RRU starts Or When CRS directs transfer of house loads to the S/U transformers Loss of Bus 1 ED03A 5 Immediately after B RFP start HPCl inverter HPIO 6 Enter after RPV water level recovers to > I 30 Recirc Break RROIA 0.1* 6 Recirc Break RROIA 0.5/600* 7 Enter following DW sprays are initiated
- Increase severity of leak as directed by lead examiner to reach 10 psig torus pressure and/or RPV-ED criteria Simulator Setup 0 Ensure individual recirc controllers are in automatic 0 Provide OP 41I 1 paperwork 0 Tag C RHR pump in PTL - red tag 0 Ar APRM bypassed - yellow tag
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vermont Yankee Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.:
Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions:
75% power, ORAM Sentinel is GREEN, Rapid Shutdown Sequence is latched Turnover :
A APRM is bypassed due to inability to adjust gain - I&C troubleshooting is in progress Maintenance on A CRD Pump is complete, ready for retest. AOs have been briefed and ready to support CRD pump operations TSV Testing was just completed. After CRD pump swap, raise power to 100% using recirculation flow Scenario Summary:
Following turnover, the crew will transfer CRD pumps. After the CRD pump transfer, the A CRD pump will trip. Following the restart of 8 CRD pump using ON 3145, reactor power will be increased using recirculation. During the power ascension, C APRM will fail downscale. With two APRMs failed, Technical Specification actions will require a manual half scram to be inserted.
A seismic event will occur resulting in a SLC tank low level alarm and a Technical Specification required 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> cold shutdown. OP 3127 will be implemented to address the seismic event.
An aftershock will result in a turbine trip and an automatic scram signal; however, a scram will not occur until a manual scram is initiated. After stabilizing plant conditions, a torus leak will occur. Torus makeup will be initiated. With torus level continuing to lower, a cooldown will be initiated. The cooldown may be escalated to anticipate an RPV-ED by rapidly depressurizing the reactor through the bypass valves. With torus water level at 7 feet, an RPV-ED will be completed.
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Appendix D Reauired ODerator Actions Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks:
With the reactor at power and a scram signal required, manually scram the reactor Actuate the manual scram pushbuttons within 1 minute of reaching the Limiting Safety System Setting When torus level cannot be maintained above 7 ft, initiate an RPV-ED.
Initiate RPV-ED within 5 minutes of torus level reaching 7 feet Note: Actions to anticipate RPV-ED and reduce RPV pressure to <50 psig prior to reaching 7 feet will be evaluated as a substitute Critical Task.
Event Malf. No. Event Event Description No. Type* Scenario #3 I l l I N I CRD Pump Transfer B to A 2 RDOl A C A CRD Pump Trip - ON 3145 3 R Power increase with recirculation flow 4 NM05C I C APRM downscale failure Technical Specification 5 PP06 C Seismic Event - OP 3127 SL03 SLC tank leak Technical Specification 6 PPO6 M Aftershock - Turbine Trip TCO 1 7 RPO1A C I Auto Scram failure BChannel 8 PC10 M Torus Leak RPV-ED Low Torus Level
I AppendixD Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page of -
Event
Description:
CRD pump transfer from B to A - OP 21 11 Section U Indications and Alarms Monitored:
CRD A/B ammeters CRD system flow meter CRD Drive WaterD/P meter CRD Cooling Water D/P meter I I CRO I Start CRD pumpAI Check that operating parameters have stabilized and readjust as required.
Secure CRD pump 1B Check that operating parameters have stabilized and readjust as required Check charging header pressure at 1420-1470 psig (PI-3-234)
CRO Report CRD pump transfer complete
Amendix D Reauired Ooerator Actions Form ES-DQ Event
Description:
A CRD Pump Trip - ON 3145 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
CRD A/B ammeter CRD PUMP A TRIP (5-B-1)
CRD PUMP A OVLD (5-8-3)
CRD system flow meter CRD Drive Water D/P meter CRD Cooling Water D/P meter IF both CRD pumps are out of service for greater than 2 minutes, THEN secure recirc pump seal purge prior to re-starting CRD pump IF the inservice CRD pump has tripped OR cannot be operated due to low suction pressure, THEN start the alternate pump as follows CRO Placehheck the CRD SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL station in MANUAL I Adjust the flow controller to zero to cIos~CRDFCV-19A
~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~~
I Start the alternate CRD pump, P-38-1B Slowly adjust the CRD flow controller to establish 48-52gpm (+3 gpm for each reactor recirc pump seal purge in service).
Balance the CRD flow controller, then place in BAL or AUTO If required, throttle CRD-36B pump B Discharge Stop Check, to maintain charging header pressure at the flow control station at 1420 - 1470 psig (PI-3-234).
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Appendix D Reauired ODerator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page of -
Event
Description:
Power Increase with recirculation flow Indications and Alarms Monitored:
APRM recorders 9-5 Recirc speed reduction Recirc flow and core d/p reduction Reactor pressure reduction Reactor level response 0 ERFlS indications for reactor power and power generation three minutes I I I CRO I Contact and inform IS0 NENELCO of power increase Contact and inform plant personnel of power increase (Chemistry, RE)
Contact Rx Bldn A 0 to monitor recirc lube oil temperatures I I I Raise recirculation flow at 1% power even/ three minutes Monitor plant parameters (reactor power, reactor pressure, reactor level) and recirculation parameters (recirc MG speeds, recirc flow)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page of -
Event
Description:
C APRM Downscale Failure - Technical Specifications Indications and Alarms Monitored:
CAPRM recorder C APRM downscale panel light (9-5)
APRM DWNSCL (5-M-4)
ROD WITHDRW BLOCK (5-0-3)
MANUAL SCRAM CH A (5-K-7)
Recognize and report C APRM failed downscale Recognize and report rod block Monitor and report the status of the remaining APRMs CRS Suspend power increase Review and determine Technical Specification Table 3.1.1 Notes 2 and 3 action with both A and C APRM inoperable, requires a trip on A RPS 0 to insert a half scram on A RPS using the A manual scram
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page of -
Event
Description:
Seismic Event - SLC Tank Rupture - OP 3127, Technical Specifications Indications and Alarms Monitored:
SEISMIC MONITOR ALERT (7-M-7)
SLC TANK LVL HVLO (5-A-3)
SLC tank level (9-5)
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize and report actual seismic event
~~~~
Enter and direct actions in OP 3127 Check control rod display for rod drift.
~~~
If operating, shut down house heating boilers Check for indication of leaks by observing sump and tank levels and loss of instrument air pressure Check makeup water requirements (VYOPF 4152.02, Monthly Leakage Graph (drywell equipment and floor drain sumps), and WRPF 2185.01, Water Inventory (CST/DST))
Conduct a visual inspection of the following for possible damage: Containment, Fuel pool, Safety-Class portion of the West cooling tower (#1 Cell), New fuel pit, Outside water storage tanks Perform equipment walkdown using Appendix A.
Contact Wilder Dam at 802-291-8000 to obtain a status assessment of Vernon and Bellows Falls dams.
If not already performed, request I/C Engineering check the seismic monitor work station per Appendix A, Seismic Event Data Retrieval, of OP 4396, Seismic Monitoring System Functional Test, to determine if an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) was exceeded.
Report SLC Tank Low Level Alarm and lowering SLC tank level Direct an A 0 to investigate lowering SLC tank level Review and determine Technical Specification 3.4.D action applies, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> shutdown to COLD SHUTDOWN required
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DQ After determining the leak is downstream of SL-11, direct an A 0 to shut SL-11 to
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:
Event
Description:
Scenario No.:
Aftershock - Turbine Trip - EOP-1, OT 3100 3 Event No.:
- Page-of Indications and Alarms Monitored:
SEISMIC MONITORING (7-M-7)
TURB STOP VLV CLOSURE (5-K-4)
TURB CTRL VLV FAST CLOSURE (5-L-4) 0 RPV water level (9-5) 0 RPV pressure (9-5)
I 1 BOP I Recognize and report seismic event I I CRS I Enter and direct actions in OT 3100, SCRAM I I I Enter and direct actions in EOP-1, RPV Control I I I Direct verification of Table A, Initiations and Isolations
~~ - _ _ _ ~
-I 1 h, u p automatic actions PClS Groups 2, 3, 5 I
I I CRS 'I I
/heher and direct actions in OP 3127 for the seismic event 1 I
wA I Erect plant cooldown at < 9OFhr using MHC-TBVs V I BOP I Initiate plant cooldown using MHC-TBVs
Appendix D Reauired ODerator Actions Form ES-DQ Event
Description:
Auto Scram Failure B Channel Indications and Alarms Monitored:
TURB STOP VLV CLOSURE (5-K-4)
TURB CTRL VLV FAST CLOSURE (5-L-4)
RPS B White Lights remain lit AUTO SCRAM CH B (5-L-1) NOT alarming Control rod positions unchanged APRMs remain unchanged Critical Task Standard:
With the reactor at power and a scram signal required, manually scram the reactor Actuate the manual scram pushbuttons within 1 minute of reaching the Limiting Safety System Setting I i I I Initiate manual reactor scram - depressing manual channel B - CRITICAL TASK Verify all rods inserted CRS Direct manual scram backup I 1 I Verify all rods inserted using PSRP
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page of -
Event
Description:
Torus Leak - EOP-3, EOP-4 RPV-ED - Low Torus Water Level - EOP-5 Indications and Alarms Monitored:
RX BLDG EQMT DRN SUMP SOUTH LVL HI (4-L-4)
RX BLDG FLOOR DRN SUMP SOUTH LVL HI (4-L-6)
RX BLDG EQMT DRN SUMP NORTH LVL HI (4-M-4)
RX BLDG FLOOR DRN SUMP NORTH LVL HI (4-M-6)
TORUS TROUBLE (5-F-5)
Torus Water Level (ERFIS, 9-3)
Reactor pressure (9-5)
Reactor level (9-5)
Critical Task Standard:
When torus level cannot be maintained above 7 ft, initiate an RPV-ED.
Initiate RPV-ED within 5 minutes of torus level reaching 7 feet Note: Actions to anticipate RPV-ED and reduce RPV pressure to c50 psig prior to reaching 7 feet will be evaluated as a substitute Critical Task.
I I CRS I Enter and direct actions in ON 3158 I I I Determine the cause of the high level For high water level, attempt to determine the source of the leak and if required, enter EOP-4 Isolate the leaking system(s), except for those systems required to:
Shutdown the reactor, Ensure adequate core cooling, Suppress a fire, Maintain primary containment integrity Consider using the plant paging system to warn unnecessary personnel to stay away from the area
Appendix D Rewired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I I Enter and direct actions in EOP-4 I I Verify sump pump operation I Determine source of leakage is not from a primary source Monitor secondary containment water levels Enter and direct actions in EOP-3 Determine torus water level is lowering Initiate torus makeup systems from Table N Initiate torus makeup systems from Table N as directed (See Attachment 3-1,-2,-
39-41 Implement pressure leg override to anticipate RPV-ED exceeding cooldown CRS rates using TBVs due to lowering torus water level Direct CRO to anticipate RPV-ED using TBVs CRO Initiate actions to anticipate RPV-ED using TBVs Limit TBV operation controlling MS flow less than Group 1 isolation and controlling RPV water level CRS Determine Torus level cannot be maintained greater then 7 feet Inhibit HPCl if operating Exit EOP-1pressure control and enteddirect actions in EOP-5 Direct 4 SRVs opened CRITICAL TASK BOP Inhibit HPCl Open 4 SRVs CRO Control RPV water level 127-177 during RPV-ED
Amendix D Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Attachments:
- 1. OE 3107, Appendix T Torus Makeup from HPCl
- 3. OE 3107, Appendix W Torus Makeup from Core Spray
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Malfunctions Key Note Preinsert RDOlA 1 Following CRD pump transfer C APRM Downscale NM05C 0% 2 Enter during power increase Seismic Event PP06 3 Enter following manual half scram SLC Tank Rupture SL03 75%/120 3 Report leak is downstream of SL-11, Tank Isolation Delete after being directed to isolate the leak by shutting SL-11 Seismic Event PP06 4 Enter after Tech Spec determination Turbine Trip TCO 1 4415 4 15 second delay following seismic event Torus Rupture PC10 20 5 Enter after plant cooldown has been initiated