ML050460360
| ML050460360 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/2004 |
| From: | Roush K Susquehanna |
| To: | Caruso J NRC Region 1 |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| A14-13D, PLA-005848 | |
| Download: ML050460360 (121) | |
Text
Susquehanna Learning Center 707 Salem Boulevard P.O. Box 467 Berwick, PA 18603-0467 570-542-3353 December 17,2004 Mr. John Caruso USNRC Chief Examiner USNRC Region 1 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Susquehanna Learning Center Proposed Examination Materials PLA 005848 File AI 4-1 3D
Dear Mr. Caruso:
Enclosed for your review and approval are Proposed Examination Materials for the PPL Susquehanna, LLC Initial Licensed Operator Examination scheduled to begin Thursday, February 3, 2005. These materials are submitted in accordance with NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors Revision 9. The following materials are enclosed:
Form ES-201-3, Examination Security Agreement (Up-to-Date Copy)
Form ES-301-3, Operating Test Quality Checklist - Rev. 1 (Signed)
Form ES-301-4, Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist - Rev. 1 (Signed)
Form ES-301-5, Transient and Event Checklist - Rev. 1 (Signed)
Form ES-301-6, Competencies Checklist - Rev. 1 (Signed)
Form ES-D-1, Scenario Outline - Rev. 1 (Three - All Modified)
Examination Scenarios (Three - All Modified)
EOP Flowcharts (Hardcopy)
Alarm Response Procedures referenced in the Scenarios (Hardcopy)
Off-Normal, Normal, and General Operating Procedures referenced in the Scenarios (Electronic Copy)
Technical Specifications referenced in the Scenarios (Electronic Copy)
E-Plan Classification Matrix (Hardcopy)
All Proposed Examination Materials have been validated by licensed Operations personnel in accordance with the guidance provided within NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors Revision 9.
December 17,2004 Page 2 PIA 005848 File A1 4-1 3D We request these materials be withheld from public disclosure until after the completion of the exam. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at 570-542-3326 or Rich Brooks at 570-542-1 891.
Sincerely, Kenneth M. Roush Manager-Nuclear Training
Response
No
Enclosures:
Listed cc:
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Event No.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
SSES Scenario No.: ILO-503A (SRO )
Op-Test No.:
Malf.
Event No.
Type*
Examiners :
Operators:
/
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 at 69% Dower EOL, Unit 2 in Mode I.
I C
2 1
I R
I C
7 1
8 1
I C
9 1
I M
Event Description RRP B Lower Seal Failure Control Rod Drift OUT
~
~~
RRP B Upper Seal Failure LOCA Inside Drywell HPCl Auto Start Failurenrip D/G Start Failure Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP)
I N 0 1 Bus Lockout Rapid Depressurization
~
~~
LPCl Injection Valve HV-FO15B Fails to Auto-Open
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-I 021, Revision 9 2005 NRC RE-Exam Rev. 1 Susquehanna Facsimile
PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER SIMULATOR SCENARIO Scenario
Title:
ILO CERTIFICATION / NRC EXAM SCENARIO Scenario Duration:
90 Minutes Scenario Number:
ILO-503A Revision/Date:
Rev 1, 1211 0/2004 Course:
PCOO7/PCOO8, Initial License RO/SRO Certification Examination PCO17/PCO18, Initial License ROlSRO NRC Examination Operational Activities:
- 1. RRP 'B' # I (lower) Seal Failure
- 2. Control Rod Drift Out
- 3. RRP ' B #2 (upper) Seal Failure (28)
- 4. LOCA Inside Drywell
- 5. HPCl Auto Start Failure / Trip Prepared By:
Reviewed By:
Approved By:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 1 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1
- 6. Diesel Generator Fail to Start
- 7. Loss Of Offsite Power (25)
- 8. 1A201 Bus Lockout
- 9. Rapid Depressurization (11)
IO. LPCl Injection Valve HV-FOI5B Fails To I
Auto Open I
12/10/04 Instructor Date Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor Date Supervising ManagerIShift Supervisor I
Date File No. RII-3
Page 2 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004
'W Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 2 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev I THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. Rl l-3
Page 3 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 1211 0/2004 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The scenario begins with Unit 1 at 65% power, rod sequence B2/SU step 550 and RX Engineer is finalizing instructions for increasing power. Instrument Air compressor By is out of service for rebuild.
SRV R is leaking. Reactor Recirc Dump B is experiencing seal oscillations accompanied by seal stage Hi/Lo flow alarms. Unit 2 is at 100% power. Fuel handling is in progress in Unit I Spent Fuel Pool.
Shortly after the crew assumes shift responsibilities, the Reactor Recirc pump By #I (lower) seal failure will occur. The crew will monitor Seal Cavity Temperatures and pressures as well as any changes in leakage into the drywell equipment drain tank.
_c__
While the seal failure investigation is continuing, Control Rod 42-39 will drift out, resulting in a small power change. The crew will respond by implementing ON-I 55-001, CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS, and applying the appropriate Technical Specification Required Action(s)
After the Control Rod problem has been adequately addressed and dispositioned, the Reactor Recirc pump B #2 (upper) seal will fail, resulting in Drywell temperature and pressure increase. The crew will implement ON-164-003 REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP DUAL SEAL FAILURE. The crew will evaluate plant conditions and decide to trip Reactor Recirc pump B or perform an orderly shutdown of the pump. Once the pump is stopped the crew will isolate the pump to reduce leakage. When the crew attempts to close the suction valve F023B, it will fail to close. This will result in an unisolable leak and a continuation of the rise in Drywell temperature and pressure. The crew will be expected to perform ON-100-101 SCRAM, SCRAM IMMINENT and place the Mode Switch to Shutdown.
Condensate and Feedwater will initially be available to maintain RPV water level, but will become unavailable when Plant Auxiliary Load Shed logic is initiated concurrent with Hi Drywell Pressure. HPCl fails during initiation and cannot be recovered. RClC and CRD can be started for injection. D/G Cy will fail to auto start on Hi Drywell pressure and will not be available for the remainder of the scenario.
When RClC has been initiated to restore and maintain RPV water level, A LOOP occurs that results in loss of Division 1 RHR and Core Spray systems. Additionally, a Bus Lockout will occur on the 1A ESS Bus 1A201. Division 2 RHR and Core Spray systems will be available after D/Gs energize the remaining ESS buses. Containment Control will require use of Suppression Chamber Sprays for pressure and,.
temperature control. The leakage rate will eventually increase beyond RClC and CRD makeup capability and RPV level will decrease below TAF. Rapid Depressurization will be required to recover Adequate Core Cooling using Low Pressure ECCS systems.
RHR injection valve F015B will fail to auto open when the RPV low pressure permissive is satisfied. The Operator will be required to manually open the valve for injection.
The scenario will be terminated when the Reactor is depressurized, Reactor water level is restored to +I 3
to +54 inches, and EO-100-103 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL actions are being addressed.
i v
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 3 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 4 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 4 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3
Page 5 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 v
SCENARIO OBJECTIVES The objective of this scenario is to evaluate the licensed operator candidates ability to respond to the scenario events. These events will require each candidate to demonstrate the following:
0 Knowledge of integrated plant operations 0
0 0
Ability to diagnose abnormal plant conditions Ability to work together as a team Ability to mitigate plant transients that exercise their knowledge and use of ONs and EOPs Ability to utilize Technical Specifications (SRO Only)
To meet this objective, the licensed operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency in the following competencies:
Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. Interpret/diagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures, references, and Technical Specifications
- 3. Operate the control boards
- 4. Communicate and interact with other crew members
\\--
Senior Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. Interpretldiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures and references
- 3. Operate the control boards (N/A to upgrade candidates)
- 4. Communicate and interact with the crew and other personnel
- 5. Direct shift operations
- 6. Comply with and use Technical Specifications L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 5 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
\\/-
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 6 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 Page 6 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. RII-3
Page 7 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 CRITICAL TASKS
- Perform Rapid Depressurization when RPV level dram to -161 inches
- Manually open RHR FOI 5B valve to iniect to the RPV (Division 2 RHR is needed for injection and injection valve fails to auto open)
Safety Significance RPV leakage or loss of injection systems impacts the ability to provide continued adequate core cooling through core submergence based on inventory loss.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions will result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.
The following steps provide the operating crew guidance to line up injection systems as available to maintain level >-I 29. If these actions are unsuccessful, the crew receives additional direction when it is determined that level can not be maintained above TAF.
RC/L-4RESTORE AND MAINTAIN LVL BETWEEN
+13 AND +54 USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS RC/L-5 IF LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > +13 AUGMENTING AS DESIRED WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS MAINTAIN LVL > -129 USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS RC/L-10 IRRESPECTIVE OF VORTEX LIMITS WITH TABLE 3 SYSTEMS PERFORM ALL 1
LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2
STARTPUMPS 3
INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX RC/L-11 IF LESS THAN 2 TABLE 4 SUBSYSTEMS CAN BE LINED UP COMMENCE LINING UP AS MANY AS POSSIBLE TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS
.~
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 7 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. R11-3
Page 8 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 CRITICAL TASKS RC/L-13 WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS PERFORM ALL:
1 LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2
STARTPUMPS 3
INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX RC/L-16 WHEN LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > -161 GO TO RAPID DEPRESS Rapid Depressurization is not initiated until RPV water level has dropped to -161 I (TAF) because:
Adequate core cooling exists so long as RPV water level remains above -161 (TAF).
The time required for RPV water level to decrease to -161 (TAF) can best be used to line up and start pumps, attempting to reverse the decreasing RPV water level trend before Rapid Depressurization is required to assure continued adequate core cooling.
(
Reference:
SSES-EPG (21-4 and second override before C3-I)
Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Reactor water level trending downward, eventually indicating less than the top of active fuel height on the Fuel Zone Level Indicator.
Performance Criteria Perform a Rapid Depressurization per EO-100-112 when water level reaches the TAF -1 61 as read on the Fuel Zone Instrument.
Initiate ADS / Manually Open all 6 ADS valves Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise on the Fuel Zone and Wide Range level instruments.
Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure and rising reactor water level.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 8 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 9 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 1211 012004 CRITICAL TASKS jr Secure Suppression Chamber Spravs before Suppression Chamber pressure drops to 0 psig Safety Significance Operation of drywell / suppression chamber sprays is stopped before drywell / suppression chamber pressure decreases to 0 psig to assure that primary containment pressure is not reduced below atmospheric. A positive primary containment pressure precludes air from being drawn in through a primary containment path (which may have been opened for control of primary containment hydrogen and oxygen). It also assures that a margin to the negative design pressure of the primary containment exists.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Potential exists for air to be drawn in through a primary containment path (which may have been opened for control of primary containment hydrogen and oxygen). Could also exceed the negative design pressure of the primary containment.
Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Drywell / Suppression Chamber pressure decreasing toward 0 psig.
Performance Criteria Secures spray flow to the Drywell / Suppression Chamber IAW OP-149-004.
-L-Performance Feedback Drywell / Suppression Chamber spray isolation valves indicate closed.
Spray flow to the Drywell / Suppression Chamber indicates 0 gpm.
Drywell / Suppression Chamber pressure > 0 psig and no longer decreasing Denotes Simulator Critical Task L
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 9 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev I File No. RII-3
Page 10 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 10 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 11 Scenario i LO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO REFERENCES
- 1. RRP 'B' # I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE AR-102-GO5 ON-I 64-003 SO-I 00-006 RRP 'B' SEAL STAGE HVLO FLOW, REV. 23 RRP 'B' DUAL SEAL FAILURE, REV. 16 SHIFTLY SURVEILLANCE OPERATING LOG, REV. 44
- 2. CONTROL ROD 42-39 DRIFT AR-104-H05 ROD DRIFT REV. 21 ON-I 55-001 TS 3.1.3 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY AMMEND. 178 CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS REV. 22
- 3. RRP "B" #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE AR-102-GO4 GO-I 00-009 TS 3.4.4 TS 3.4.1 SEAL LEAKAGE HI/LO, REV. 23 SINGLE RECIRC LOOP OPERATION, REV. 14 RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE, AMMEND. 178 RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING, AMMEND. 178
- 4. RRP "B" # I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE ON-I 64-003 ON-I 00-1 01 EO-I 00-1 02 EO-I 00-1 03 RRP 'B' DUAL SEAL FAILURE, REV. 16 SCRAM, SCRAM IMMINENT, REV. 12 RPV CONTROL, REV. 2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 7
- 5. HPCl AUTO START FAILURE /TRIP OP-I 52-001 HPCl SYSTEM, REV. 32 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 11 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 12 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 I_
SCENARIO REFERENCES
- 6. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ON-I 04-001 UNIT I RESPONSE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, REV. 13
- 7. ON-104-201
- 9. RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION EO-I 00-1 12 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION, REV. 2 IO. LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-FOISB FAILS TO AUTO OPEN OP-149-001 RHR SYSTEM, REV. 30 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 12 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 13 Scenario I LO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 MALFS REMFS OVRDS 8: 8 2
4:4 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TRIGS 6
- 1. Initialize simulator to IC-17, 69% power.
- 2. Using Recirc flow, lower power to 65% on APRMs.
- 3. Snapshot to an available IC (currently IC-114).
- 4. Place a Pink Tag on IA Compressor B control switch.
- 5. Type restorepref YPPJLO-503A; verify the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments.
Verify the Environment window:
PROGRAM BUlTONS
[P-I] IMF RRl64003B (NONE 0 0) 5 45:45:00 0
[P-2] IMF RD1550054239
[P-31 DMF RD1550054239
[P-5] IMF RRl64004B 10 1O:OO 0
[P-61 MRF RR164041 CLOSE
[P-81 IMF DS104001A
[P-9] MMF RR164010 100 4:OO 1
[P4] MRF RD1550074239
--c
[P-7] bat DSB.LOOPT21
[P-231 bat FWB.1OIALARM
[P-241 bat FWB.102 ALARM
[P-25] bat FWB.103 ALARM Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 13 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 B #I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE CONTROL ROD 42-39 DRIFT OUT DELETE CONTROL ROD 42-39 DRIFT OUT HYDRAULICALLY DISARM HCU 42-39 B RECIRC PUMP #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE ISOLATE CRD SEAL PURGE TO B RECIRC PUMP LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER 1A ESS BUS LOCKOUT INCREASE BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAKAGE FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET File No. R I 1-3
Page 14 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
- 6. Add the CRC package to the shutdown section.
- 8. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:
Power ascension is on hold until repair of RWCU HX End Bell work completed.
When RWCU work completed, notify RE, and re-commence power ascension.
Reactor power at 69%.
Rod Sequence is B2/SU step 550.
6 RRP experiencing Seal Stage HI-LO Flow Alarms. System Engineer notified.
1 B Instrument Air Compressor O/S for rebuild.
E & R SRVs Tailpipe Temperatures are elevated.
Unit 2 is in MODE I at 100%
Common
- 9. A RW Chiller O/S
- 10. SCC D/G Over-temperature alarm received during manual run. Waiting on parts from procurement.
- 11. Fuel handling is in progress in Unit 1 Fuel Pool.
L-Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 14 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 15 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM Initial Conditions: Initialize the Simulator to IC-114. Place the Simulator to RUN. Ensure the Proqram Buttons are assigned as indicated on the Special Instructions sheet via the amrotxiate Preference File. Assiqn Shift positions; direct the start of the 5-minute panel walkdown.
Y Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 15 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 16 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 16 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. Rl l-3
Page 17 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 POSITION TIME SCENARIO EVENT FORM i--
Event No:
I Brief
Description:
RRP B #I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE STUDENT ACTIVITIES us I Recognizeslreports Recirc Pump B SEAL STAGE HI-LO FLOW; refers to AR-102-GO5 Monitors Containment radiation levels on Panel 1 C693 Directs continuous monitoring for changes in leakage rate and containment parameters Monitors seal cavity pressures on SIP PANEL IC652 and diagnoses #I (lower) seal failed Monitors seal cavity temperature for trend on IC614 Monitors DWEDT level recorder for a change in leakage rate on IC601 Refers to ON-164-003, RRP DUAL SEAL FAILURE, and briefs crew on actions if second stage seal failure and potential for single loop operations Notifies Work Week Manager and System Engineer of Recirc pump seal failure
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 17 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 18 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
1 Brief
Description:
RRP 'B' #I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the crew has assumed shift responsibilities, initiate the RRP 'B' #I (lower) seal failure malfunction by depressing:
[P-l]IMF RRl64003B (NONE 0 0) 5 45:OO 0 RRP 'B' #I (LOWER) SEAL FAILURE Monitor seal parameters on RR4.
ROLE PLAY:
As necessary
.~
-51.-
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 18 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 19 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM L-Event No:
2 Brief
Description:
Control Rod 42-39 Drift Out POSITION PCOM PCOM us PCOM/PCOP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Recognizes/reports ROD DRIFT alarm AR-104-H05 Monitors Reactor Power for power increase.
Restores power to previous level if necessary using Recirc Flow.
Performs ROD DRIFT AR-104-H05 Operator Actions:
Selects Display Rods Drifting to determine rod 42-39 is drifting.
0 Selects Control Rod 42-39 via Rod Select Matrix to determine rod is drifting out.
0 Promptly insert Rod to 00.
0 Recognizes and reports rod will not latch at 00.
0 Reports rod staying at position 00 after being hydraulically disarmed Direct performance of ON-1 55-001 CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS 0
Declares Control Rod Inoperable.
0 Notify Reactor Engineer 0
Refer to TS 3.1.3 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY (Condition C)
Contacts Work Week Manager for assistance/investigation
~
0 0
Perform ON-1 55-001, CONTROL ROD PROBLEMS Section 3.4.
Directs NPO to Hydraulically Disarm HCU 42-39.
-k Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 19 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 20 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L
Event No:
2 Brief
Description:
Control Rod 42-39 Drift Out INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When actions are complete for RRP seal failure, or upon Evaluator direction, cause Control Rod 42-39 to Drift out by depressing:
[P-2] IMF RD1550054239 CONTROL ROD 42-39 DRIFT OUT After PCOM has begun inserting that control rod, delete the malfunction by depressing:
[P-31 DMF RD1550054239 DELETE CONTROL ROD 42-39 DRIFT OUT When directed to hydraulically disarm HCU 42-39, depress:
[Pa] MRF RDI 550074239 HYDRAULICALLY DISARM HCU 42-39 ROLE PLAY:
I. As Work Week Manager/l&C dispatched to investigate, wait I O minutes and report as I&C:
There appears to be a failure in the HCU Transponder Card, and it will take at least an hour to get a replacement. After replacement well have to perform some checks before we can feel certain that the Transponder card is the only problem with the HCU.
As NPO dispatched to the HCU, report HCU Hydraulically Disarmed following activation of [P-41 Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 20 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 21 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 1211 0/2004 NOTES:
SCENARIO EVENT FORM (1) The crew should continue with isolation of RRP 'B as directed in ON-164-003.
Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
RRP 'By #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE I DUAL SEAL FAILURE POSITION PCOM us PCOM NOTE 1 NOTE 2 TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Recognizes/reports RECIRC PUMP B SEAL LEAKAGE HI FLOW Refers to AR-102-G04, reports RECIRC PUMP B SEAL LEAKAGE HI FLOW
~~
Refers to AR-102-G03, reports RECIRC PUMP MOTOR HI TEMPERATURE Directs implementation of ON-1 64-003, RRP DUAL SEAL FAILURE
~~
Directs PCOP to monitor drywell parameters
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~~
Directs PCOP to calculate RCS leakage
~~
Directs the shutdown and isolation of RRP 'B Refers to TS 3.4.4, RCS Operational Leakage Notifies Reactor Engineering and Plant Management of intent to S/D and isolate RRP 'B' Complies with COLR Section 8.0 Limits in TRM Complies with Tech Spec LCOs 3.4.1 Refers to ON-1 64-003, RRP DUAL SEAL FAILURE:
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Trips Recirculation Pump 1 P401A(B)
Plots position on Power/Flow Map, Form NDAP-QA-0338-10 Verifies operating pump speed to 80% rated pump speed (80% = 1344 rpm)
Isolates Recirc pump 1 P401A(B) by closing following valves in the specified order:
RECIRC PUMP B SUCT HV-143-FO23B RWCU SUCT LOOP B HV-144-F106 0
Place MOV OL BYPS to TEST RECIRC PUMP B DSCH HV-143-FO31B RECIRC PUMP B DSCH BYPS HV-143-FO32B 0
Recognizeslreports the loss of position indication on suction valve HV-143-FO23B After 2 minutes, returns MOV OL BYPS HV-143-FO31B keyswitch to NORMAL CRD WTR SUPPLY TO RRP B SEAL WATER IS0 VLV 143F008B
- Denotes Critical Task Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 21 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 22 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES 4
Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
RRP 'By #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE I DUAL SEAL FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
- 1. When the crew has completed the rod drift actions, insert the RRP 'B' #2 (upper) seal failure by depressing:
[P-5] IMF RR164004B 10 1O:OO 0' B' RECIRC PUMP #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE 10 GPM NOTE: Inserting the previous malfunction will slowly raise Drywell pressure and eventually require a manual reactor scram.
- 2. When the RO attempts to close Recirc suction valve HV-I43F023B, verify trigger E5 initiates:
MMF RRl64004B 50 1:OO IMF MVOI:HV143F023B (NONE 30 0)
RRP 'B' #2 (UPPER) SEAL FAILURE 50 GPM LOSS OF POWER TO 1 F023B MOV
i-
[P-61 MRF RR164041 CLOSE ISOLATE CRD SEAL PURGE TO 'B' RECIRC PUMP
- 4. Monitor Instructor Display RR4 for Seal Purge Valve position.
ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator sent to check the status of the Recirc suction valve breaker (1 B24601 I),
report the breaker is tripped. If directed to reset the breaker, report the breaker will not reset.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 22 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 23 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 POSITION SCENARIO EVENT FORM I
Event No:
496 Brief
Description:
LOCA INSIDE DRYWELL I HPCI AUTO START FAlLURE/TRIP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES L
us May Enter ON-100-101 SCRAM, SCRAM IMMINENT and directs scram imminent actions before scramming
_ _ _ ~ ~
PCOP I
PCOP us I Reports DW pressure is increasing at a faster rate Reports Drywell pressure >I.72 psig Recognizes/reports HPCl failed to start, attempts component by component start of HPCl and reports HPCl trips on start up and cannot be recovered.
Recognizes/reports D/G C has failed to start; selects lsoch and presses start pushbutton, recognizes reports D/G C starts then trips Verifies ESW cooling to D/Gs Initiates RClC injection to maintain +I 3 to +54 if Feed and Condensate trip on Plant Aux Load Shed Directs RPV water level control +13 to +54 with RClC and CRD I Directs manual Reactor scram before Drywell pressure reaches 1.72 I Enters EO-100-102, RPV CONTROL I
I PCOP I May Transfer Aux Buses 11 A and 11 B to Tie Bus if scram imminent actions were entered.
PCOM Manually scrams Reactor:
- 1. Places Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN
- 2. Verifies/reports all rods fully inserted I
I Aligns FW for Startup Level Control Directs RPV pressure control 4087 psig with Bypass Valves
-k Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 23 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 24 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
436 Brief
Description:
LOCA INSIDE DRYWELL I HPCl AUTO START FAlLURElTRlP INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
NOTE: After the reactor scram drywell pressure increases more rapidly as leakage rate increases.
- 1. When the Mode Switch is placed in shutdown, ensure trigger E6 actuates to insert the bottom head drain line leak:
IMF RR164010 1 30 BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAK
- 2. When HPCl is started component by component, ensure trigger E l actuates to insert a HPCl turbine trip when flow is greater than 2000 gpm:
IMF HP152015
- 3. IfNVhen requested to attempt a local start of 'C' D/G, wait =2 minutes then transfer DIG IC' to LOCAL by inserting IOR QD143CMC LOCAL D/G 'C' TO LOCAL L
ROLE PLAY:
- 1. As NPO sent to D/G 'C' to attempt a local start, after transferring to local call the control room and report the local start was not successful.
- 2. As Electrical Maintenance dispatched to D/G IC', wait =5 minutes and report no cause for the failure can be located and we will continue to investigate.
L-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 24 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 25 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 POSITION TIME us SCENARIO EVENT FORM L
Event No:
596 Brief
Description:
LOCA INSIDE DRYWELL I LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs local start of D/G 'C' Directs cooldown at 4 OO°F/hr I Enters EO-1 00-1 03, Primary Containment Control ir I Directs placing one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray ir I Contacts Work Week manager to investigate failure of DIG 'C' I
I PCOP I
I Dispatches NPO to attempt local start of D/G 'C' Recognizeslreports Loss of Offsite Power Recognizes 4KV Bus 1A201 BUS LOCKOUT Reports 4KV Buses 1 B and 1 D are energized Directs a IC601 walk down for Isolations, ECCS Initiations, and D/G starts Directs restarting CRD pump 'B
- Denotes Critical Task Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 25 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 26 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
5 6 Brief
Description:
LOCA INSIDE DRYWELL I LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
After Drywell pressure exceeds 1.72 psig and RClC has been initiated to restore and maintain RPV level, insert a LOOP and a 1A BUS LOCKOUT by depressing:
[P-71 bat DSB.LOOPT21
[P-81 IMF DS104001A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER 1A ESS BUS LOCKOUT When the crew completes the assessment of the electric plant lineup, increase the leakage from the RPV.
[P-91 MMF RR164010 100 4:OO 1 INCREASE BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN LINE LEAKAGE to 100%
ROLE PLAY:
~.__,
As TCC contacted for offsite power information, report a breaker failure in the Montour switchyard is responsible for loss of the 230 KV line.
The 230-500 KV tie line has Supervisory Information that indicates a fault on AutoTransformer T-21. Hazleton Dispatch reports sending a crew to the 230 KV switchyard to investigate why the 230 KV breakers I W and I T failed to auto re-close.
L Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 26 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 27 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 r
NOTES:
SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
7,8 Brief
Description:
RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION I LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-FOISB FAILS TO AUTO OPEN POSITION
- us
- PCOP TIME
- Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -161 inches.
- 1. Enters EO-100-1 12, RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION.
- 2.
Directs preventing uncontrolled Condensate injection.
- 3. Verifies Suppression Pool level > 5 feet.
Performs Rapid Depressurization by opening all ADS SRVs.
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
Arms and depresses Division 1 andlor Division 2 ADS manual pushbuttons and verifies 6 red lights lit for ADS solenoids, Places individual control switch to open for each ADS SRV (G, J, K, L, M, & N) and verifies red light lit and amber light not lit for each valve solenoid.
0 0
Observes RPV pressure decrease.
0 Verifies Core Spray and LPCl injection valves open when RPV pressure decreases to
<420 psig.
Recognizes/reports RHR FOI 5B failed to auto-open.
Manually opens RHR F015B to inject to the RPV.
Reports Core Spray and LPCl injection flow to the RPV.
Restores RPV level above -1 61" with low-pressure ECCS injection systems.
Observes 6 ADS SRVs open on acoustic monitor status light indication.
Observes elevated tail pipe temperatures on TRS-B21-1 R614.
Transfers to wide range level indication when fuel zone indication is >-1 I O "
Page 28 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
798 Brief
Description:
RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION I LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-F015B FAILS TO AUTO OPEN INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary 5.-r-Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 28 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 29 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM
\\ -
Event No:
738 Brief
Description:
RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION / LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-FO15B FAILS TO AUTO OPEN POSITION TIME pcop I
- PCOP us I I
-k Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs throttling injection to restore and maintain RPV level + I 3" to +54" Directs Core Spray injection for RPV level control Directs placing 'B' loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray Places one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray IAW OP-149-004, RHR CONTAINMENT SPRAY.
I. Places ESW in service.
- 2.
Places LOCA OVERRIDE MANUAL OVERRIDE switch to OVERRIDE.
- 3. Closes LPCl injection valve HV-151 -FO17B.
- 4. Opens Suppression Chamber test valve HV-151-FO28B.
- 5. Starts RHR pump 1 P202B(D).
- 6. Throttles open Suppression Chamber spray valve HV-151 -F027B to maintain I 500 gpm as indicated on FI-15120B.
Directs securing Suppression Chamber sprays before Suppression Chamber pressure drops to 0 psig.
Secures Suppression Chamber sprays before Suppression Chamber pressure drops to 0 psig.
Throttles closed Suppression Chamber spray valve HV-151 -F027B.
After the scenario is complete, classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY under EAL FSI due to a Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier and a Loss of the RCS Barrier.
NOTES:
%L Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 29 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 30 Scenario ILO-503A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 L...
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
738 Brief
Description:
RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION I LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-FO15B FAILS TO AUTO OPEN INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
N/A ROLE PLAY:
As necessary TERMINATION CUE:
The Reactor is depressurized, RPV level is restored +13 to +54, and containment control actions are being addressed in accordance with EO-1 00-1 03 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.
EVENT CLASSIFICATION:
.__ After the Scenario is complete, have the US classify the scenario for the HIGHEST EAL. Provide the US with any requested information needed to perform the classification.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 30 of 30 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
3 Scenario 50iA Alarm Response References
AR-102-001 Revision 23 Page 43 of a54 GO5 RECIRC PUMP B SEAL STAGE HI-LO FLOW (G05)
- 1.
- 2.
CI 0
0 o
L-0
- 3.
- 4.
v' PROBABLE CAUSE:
SETPOINT:
High 0.9 gpm Low 0.5 gpm ORIGIN:
FSHL-B31-1 N007B 1.1 1.2 1.3 Failure of Recirc Pump B first stage seal.
Plugged Recirc Pump B first stage seal.
Reactor at less than normal operating pressure.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 Determine whether alarm caused by high or low first stage seal flow as follows:
2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 Increase Monitoring of the following parameters for developing trends:
Monitor second stage seal cavity pressure.
E second stage seal cavity pressure high, failure of first stage seal indicated, causing high staging flow.
causing low staging flow.
E reactor at less than normal operating pressure and proper seal staging is indicated, no further action is required.
second stage seal cavity pressure low, blockage of first stage seal indicated, 2.2 0
Containment Radiation Levels. (RR15755A&B) 0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 Second Stage Seal Cavity Pressure. (PLB31-1 R602BA OR NRP03)
Second Stage Seal Cavity Temperature. (TRSH-B31-1 R601 Point #8)
First Stage Seal Cavity Pressure. (PI-B31-1 R602BA OR NRPO1)
First Stage Seal Cavity Temperature. (TRSH-B31-1 R601 Point #9)
Drywell Equipment Drain Tank Temperature. (RLT03)
Drywell Equipment Drain Tank Level. (LR/FR-16103)
"A" & "B" Drywell Floor Drain Sump Level. (LR/FR-16103 Drywell Temperature. (UR-15701A & UR-15701 B) QFJ MAA02)
Drywell Pressure. (PI-15702 QFJ MAPO1) 2.3 E
seal leakage develops and/or increases > 1 gpm AND second stage seal cavity pressure decreases indicating failure of both seals, Perform ON-1 64-003 Reactor Recirculation Pump Dual Seal Failure.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
None
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-323 Sh 32 4.2 M1 -B31-178(5) 4.3 IOM305
ROD DRIFT (H05)
- 1.
- 2.
cl I7
- 3.
cl cl 0
- 4.
(7 AR-104-001 Revision 21 Page 40 of a44 H 05 SETPOINT:
Rod in odd-numbered position ORIGIN:
RPlS (Rod Position Indication System)
PROBABLE CAUSE:
NOTE:
Rod Drift detected by rod moving through odd number position when not being moved by operator or not getting to next notch prior to timer timing out.
1.1 Excessive CRD seal leakage 1.2 Excessive cooling water pressure 1.3 Air in system 1.4 Scram valve leakage 1.5 Directional control valve malfunction 1.6 1.7 1.8 Collet mechanism failure to latch Depressing CONT INSERT ROD pushbutton.
Control rod friction due to channel bow and bulge.
0 P E RAT0 R ACT ION :
2.1 2 3 Control rods have drifted scrammed from their target position, Manually Scram Reactor IAW ON-1 00-1 01, Scram. ()
NOTE:
IF the Rod Drift alarm was received during the withdrawal of a Control Rod that is known or suspect to have friction problems, Evaluate entry into ON-155-001 for a Slow to Settle rod.
2.2 2.3 Perform ON-1 55-001, Control Rod Problems.
Evaluate entry into ON-081 -002.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
3.1 3.2 3.3 Rod Block may occur E rod(s) drifts out of proper latched position.
Rod Group display on RWM panel blinks WHEN rod has drifted and stops when condition corrected.
Activity Control Card and Core Fault Map LEDs will display solenoid on HCU.
problem with directional
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-323 SH 36 4.2 IOM305 4.3 4.4 4.5 CR 483148 SOER 84-2, Control Rod Mispositioning PL-NF-02-007, Channel Management Action Plan
RECIRC PUMP B SEAL LEAKAGE HI FLOW
((304)
AR-102-001 Revision 23 Page 42 of 5454 g04 SETPOINT:
0.1 gpm ORIGIN:
FSH-B31-1 n0026
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 Failure of Recirc Pump B second stage seal.
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
0 2.1 0
2.2 Monitor leakage to Drywell Equipment Drain Tank 1T218.
2.3 2.4 0
2.5 Determine leakage rates increased and within TS 3.4.4.
0 2.6 Monitor drywell temperature &JJ pressure.
Monitor Recirc Pump B second stage seal cavity pressure.
Monitor leakage to Drywell Floor Drain Sumps A and B.
seal leakage increases > 1 gpm and second stage seal cavity pressure decreases indicating failure of both seals, Perform ON-1 64-003 Reactor Recirculation Pump Dual Seal Failure.
L-
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
None
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-323 Sh 30 4.2 M1-631-178(5) 4.3 IOM 305
RECIRC PUMP B SEAL LEAKAGE HI FLOW (G04)
./
AR-102-001 Revision 23 Page 42 of 5454 G 04 SETPOINT:
0.1 gpm ORIGIN:
FSH-B31-1 N002B
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 Failure of Recirc Pump B second stage seal.
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Monitor Recirc Pump B second stage seal cavity pressure.
Monitor leakage to Drywell Equipment Drain Tank 1T218.
Monitor leakage to Drywell Floor Drain Sumps A and B.
IF seal leakage increases > 1 gpm and second stage seal cavity pressure decreases indicating failure of both seals, Perform ON-1 64-003 Reactor Recirculation Pump Dual Seal Failure.
Determine Monitor drywell temperature AND pressure.
leakage rates increased and within TS 3.4.4.
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
None
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-323 Sh 30 4.2 Ml-B31-178(5) 4.3 IOM 305
Event Type*
N R, N I
I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Description Transfer SUB 10 to SUT 10 Increase Reactor Power FW Flow Transmitter B Fails Low,
Steam Leak Detection Failure / HPCl Isolation A /
T
,' I/
11 Facility:
SSES Scenario No.: ILO-502A (ATC)
Op-Test No.:
8 9
10 Examiners:
Operators:
M Rapid Depressurization C
M RPV Flooding LPCl Injection Valve HV-FOI5B Fails to Auto-Open Initial Conditions: Unit 1 at 51% power EOL, Unit 2 is at 100% power..
Turnover: Startup Bus 10 is currently supplied from Startup Bus 20 with Tie Breaker OAlO502 closed The shift will be directed to restore the electric plant lineup to normal by transferring Startup Bus 10 to Startup Transformer I O. Following restoration of the electric plant lineup, the crew will continue with power ascension by pulling control rods and raise power 40%. Standby Liquid Control Pump 1B is inoperable while maintenance investiqates a high motor vibration.
Event No.
1 2
Malf.
No.
5 1
I C
I Loss of Instrument Air II I
I C, M I Recirc Loop B Suction Line Break
)I I
I C
I Auto ADS Logic Failure NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 NRC RE-Exam Rev. 1 Susquehanna Facsimile
PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER SIMULATOR SCENARIO I
Scenario
Title:
LO CERTIFICATION / NRC EXAM SCENARIO Scenario Duration:
90 Minutes Scenario Number:
ILO-502A Revision/Date:
Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 Course:
PCOO7/PCOO8, Initial License RO/SRO Certification Examination PCOl7/PCOl8, Initial License RO/SRO NRC Examination Operational Activities:
- 1. Transfer SUB 10 to SUT 10
- 6. Recirc Loop B Suction Line Break (7)
- 2. Increase Reactor Power (33)
- 7. Auto ADS Logic Failure
- 3. FW Flow Transmitter B Fails Low (18)
- 8. Rapid De pressurization
- 4. Steam Leak Detection Failure I HPCl
- 9. LPCl Injection Valve HV-F015B Fails to Isolation
- 5. Loss of Instrument Air (27)
Auto-Open
- 10. RPV Flooding Prepared By:
Instructor Reviewed By:
Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor Approved By:
Supervising Manager/Shift Supervisor 12/10/04 Date Date Date Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 1 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 2 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 2 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 3 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Unit I is approximately 51 % power and Unit 2 is at 100% power. Power ascension was suspended to allow Electrical Maintenance to perform an inspection of Startup Transformer 10 following a report of a small oil leak. Startup Bus 10 is currently supplied from Startup Bus 20 with Tie Breaker OAlO502 closed.
Electrical Maintenance has successfully completed the repair and inspection of Startup Transformer I O.
The shift will be directed to restore the electric plant lineup to normal by transferring Startup Bus 10 to Startup Transformer I O.
Standby Liquid Control Pump 1 B is inoperable while maintenance investigates a high motor vibration.
Following restoration of the electric plant lineup, the crew will continue with power ascension by pulling control rods and raise power 4 0%.
The B feedwater flow transmitter will fail low causing the feedwater level control system to raise RPV water level to =+44. The crew will perform Off-Normal procedures and transfer from 3 element to single element control with feedwater control being returned to automatic control. RPV water level will be restored to +35.
Following this, a failure in the Steam Leak Detection System causes the HPCl Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve HV-155-F003 to automatically close, making the HPCI system inoperable. HPCl will not be restored.
After the Steam Leak Detection problem, the Instrument Air header will develop a leak. The leak will be unisolable and worsen over time. The crew will implement the Loss of Instrument Air Off-Normal procedure and manually scram the reactor before instrument air header pressure reaches 65 psig.
Following the manual scram and stabilization of plant parameters, a small Recirc loop suction line break will occur requiring the crew to implement the Primary Containment Control procedure. Shortly after the crew initiates Suppression Chamber spray the leak will increase in size and will eventually require the crew to rapidly depressurize the RPV due to water level reaching TAF. The high Drywell temperature and depressurized plant conditions cause violation of the RPV saturation temperature curve, requiring the crew to perform RPV Flooding. Fuel Zone water level may decrease below the useable value limit of -290 which also requires entry into RPV Flooding. The injection valve on the B loop of RHR will fail to auto-open, requiring the crew to manually open the valve in order to achieve flooding pressure.
The scenario will be terminated when the crew has established RPV pressure 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 3 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 4 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 1211 0/2004 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 4 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. Rll-3
Page 5 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO OBJECTIVES The objective of this scenario is to evaluate the licensed operator candidates ability to respond to the scenario events. These events will require each candidate to demonstrate the following:
0 Knowledge of integrated plant operations 0
Ability to diagnose abnormal plant conditions 0
Ability to work together as a team 0
Ability to mitigate plant transients that exercise their knowledge and use of ONs and EOPs 0
Ability to utilize Technical Specifications (SRO Only)
To meet this objective, the licensed operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency in the following competencies:
Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. Interprevdiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures, references, and Technical Specifications
- 3. Operate the control boards
- 4. Communicate and interact with other crew members Senior Reactor ODerator Candidates:
- 1. Interprevdiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures and references
- 3. Operate the control boards (N/A to upgrade candidates)
- 4. Communicate and interact with the crew and other personnel
- 5. Direct shift operations
- 6. Comply with and use Technical Specifications Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 5 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 6 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 6 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 7 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 C RlTlCAL TASKS
- Perform Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -1 61 inches Safety Significance RPV leakage or loss of injection systems impacts the ability to provide continued adequate core cooling through core submergence based on inventory loss.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions will result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.
The following steps provide the operating crew guidance to line up injection systems as available to maintain level >-129. If these actions are unsuccessful, the crew receives additional direction when it is determined that level can not be maintained above TAF.
RC/L-4 RC/L-5 RC/L-10 RC/L-11 RC/L-13 RESTORE AND MAINTAIN LVL BETWEEN
+ I 3 AND +54 USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS IF LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > +13 MAINTAIN LVL > -129 USING TABLE 3 SYSTEMS AUGMENTING AS DESIRED WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS IRRESPECTIVE OF VORTEX LIMITS WITH TABLE 3 SYSTEMS PERFORM ALL 1
LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2
STARTPUMPS 3
INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX IF LESS THAN 2 TABLE 4 SUBSYSTEMS CAN BE LINED UP COMMENCE LINING UP AS MANY AS POSSIBLE TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS WITH TABLE 5 ALTERNATE SUBSYSTEMS PERFORM ALL:
1 LINE UP FOR INJECTION 2
STARTPUMPS 3
INCREASE INJECTION TO MAX Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 7 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 8 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004
- c.
CRITICAL TASKS RC/L-16 WHEN LVL CANNOT BE RESTORED AND MAINTAINED > -161" GO TO RAPID DEPRESS Rapid Depressurization is not initiated until RPV water level has dropped to -161" (TAF) because:
Adequate core cooling exists so long as RPV water level remains above -161" (TAF).
The time required for RPV water level to decrease to -161" (TAF) can best be used to line up and start pumps, attempting to reverse the decreasing RPV water level trend before Rapid Depressurization is required to assure continued adequate core cooling.
(
Reference:
SSES-EPG Cl-4 and second override before C3-7)
IndicationslCues for Event Requiring Critical Task Reactor water level trending downward, eventually indicating less than the top of active fuel height on the Fuel Zone Level Indicator.
Performance Criteria Perform a Rapid Depressurization per EO-I 00-1 12 when water level reaches the TAF -1 61 " as read on the Fuel Zone Instrument.
Initiate ADS / Manually Open all 6 ADS valves Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise on the Fuel Zone and Wide Range level instruments.
Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure and rising reactor water level.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 8 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 9 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004
-.---=
- Declare RPV level indication indeterminate due to violation of the RPV Saturation Curve Perform RPV Flooding when RPV level becomes indeterminate by increasing injection flowrate to raise RPV pressure to 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure
- Manually open RHR F015B valve to iniect to the RPV (Division 2 RHR is needed for injection and the injection valve fails to auto open)
Safety Significance Adequate core cooling may be challenged if core submergence can not be verified due to indeterminate RPV level indication.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions may result in uncovering the core and breach of the fuel clad due to over heating.
RC/L-2 IF LVL CANNOT BE DETERMINED GO TO RPV FLOODING If RPV water level cannot be determined, the actions specified in the subsequent [EO-IO21 steps cannot be performed since RPV water level and water level trend information is required for determining which actions to take. The transition to EO-100-114, RPV Flooding, is necessary to assure continued adequate core cooling under conditions where RPV water level cannot be determined.
RF-12 COMMENCE AND IRRESPECTIVE OF VORTEX LIMITS INCREASE INJECTION TO ESTABLISH:
RPV PRESS NOT DECREASING AND RPV PRESS 2 81 PSlD ABOVE SUPP CHMBR PRESS USING ANY:
0 CORESPRAY 0
COND 0
CRD MAXIMIZED LPCl WITH FLOW THROUGH HX ASAP FIRE SYSTEM IAW ES-013-001 RHRSW X-TIE FROM EITHER UNIT Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 9 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 10 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 CRITICAL TASKS ECCS KEEP-FILL CRD X-TIE TO OTHER UNIT 0
SLC BORON TANK SLC DEMIN X-TIE These systems consist of all motor-driven systems which are available to flood the RPV. As many of these systems as necessary must be used to establish and maintain the conditions required to verify RPV flooding. Establishing adequate core cooling conditions dictates that adherence to Vortex limits not be required.
Three conditions must be satisfied to verify RPV flooding without direct indication of RPV water level:
- 1. At least 4 SRVs must be open. This ensures that adequate steam flow will exist for cooling any un-submerged portion of the core when RPV pressure is 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
- 2. RPV pressure must not be decreasing. This ensures that the required steam flow will be maintained.
- 3. RPV pressure must be greater than Suppression Chamber pressure by at least 81 psid, the Minimum RP V Flooding Pressure (MRFP).
The MRFP is defined to be the lowest differential pressure between the RPV and the Suppression Chamber at which steam flow through 4 SRVs is sufficient to remove decay heat. The assumed decay heat generation rate is ten minutes after shutdown from full power. Since ten minutes is the earliest that RP V flooding could reasonably be expected to be needed, establishing and maintaining RPV pressure above the MRFP assures that more than enough steam flows through the SRVs to carry away all core decay heat.
This requires that a sufficient quantity of water reach the core to carry away decay heat by boiling, which in turn requires that RPV water level increase. Maintaining this above the minimum pressure (81 psid) assures that the RPV will ultimately flood to the main steam lines.
Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Violation of the RPV Saturation Curve is indicated by PlCSY format (RPVSAT) showing purple indication on the curve, plot on the unsafe side by the Crew and/or RPV level instrumentation failing in the upscale direction.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 10 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 11 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1. 12/10/2004 il CRITICAL TASKS L-Performance Criteria Recognize failure of RPV level indicators due to reaching saturation conditions on the instrument runs, initiate rapid depressurization by opening ADS valves and then increasing RPV injection until RPV pressure is NOT decreasing and is 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower to the shutoff head of the low pressure injection systems allowing water level to rise to the point that RPV pressure will increase to a value that is 81 psid above Suppression Chamber. At this point injection should be stabilized to maintain the DP.
Verify ADS valves are open using light red light indication, acoustic monitoring and lowering Reactor pressure.
Verify injection from available systems raises RPV pressure to a value that is 81 psid above Suppression Chamber.
Denotes Simulator Critical Task Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 11 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 12 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 II 11 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 12 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 13 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO REFERENCES I. TRANSFER STARTUP BUS I O TO STARTUP TRANSFORMER I O OP-003-001 13.8KV COMMON ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, REV. 6
- 2. INCREASE REACTOR POWER CORE REACTIVITY CONTROL BOOK GO-I 00-002 OP-AD-338 PLANT STARTUP, HEATUP AND POWER OPERATION, REV. 46 COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR REACTIVITY MANIPULATIONS, REV. 1
- 3. FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER B FAILS LOW AR-101 -B17 RX WATER HI-LO LEVEL, REV. 31 ON-145-001 RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, REV. 15
- 4. STEAM LEAK DETECTION FAILURE / HPCl ISOLATION AR-114-C02 AR-114-F05 AR-114-BO5 TS 3.3.6.1 HPCl TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID ENERGIZED, REV. 23 HPCl LEAK DETECT LOGIC B HI TEMP, REV. 23 HPCl OUT OF SERVICE, REV. 23 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION, AMMENDMENT 213 TS 3.5.1 ECCS OPERATING, AMMENDMENT 178
- 5. LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR AR-124-A01 AR-124-BO1 AR-124-EO1 ON-I 18-001 ON-100-1 01 SCRAM, REV. 12 INSTRUMENT AIR LOOP A LO PRESSURE, REV. 3 INSTRUMENT AIR HEADER LO PRESSURE, REV. 4 SERVICE AIR LO PRESSURE, REV. 4 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR, REV. 15
- 6. RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK / RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION / RPV FLOODING EO-I 00-1 02 EO-I 00-1 03 OP-149-004 RPV CONTROL, REV. 2 PRIMARY CONTRAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 7 RHR CONTAINMENT SPRAY, REV. 18 AR-112-DO3 AR-104-BO3 DRWUSUPP CHAMBER HI-LOW PRESS, REV. 26 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HI-LO PRESS, REV. 19 EO-I 00-1 12 EO-I 00-1 14 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION, REV. 2 RPV FLOODING, REV. 3 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 13 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 14 Scenario 110-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK L
11 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 14 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 15 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS I.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
MALFS Initialize the simulator to IC-16: Unit 1 at 51% power EOL, Unit 2 at 100% power EOL.
Set up the simulator for the scenario by performing the following:
- a. Remove SUT 10 from service.
- b. Perform GO-100-002 step 5.73.
- c. Withdraw rod 42-47 (Step 539) from 12 to 36.
Take a snapshot to an available IC (currently IC-102).
Insert Auto exercise file to install OPRM program.
Type restorepref YPP.IL0-502; verify the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments.
Verify the Environment window:
Supply SUB 10 from SUB 20 with the tie breaker OA10502 closed.
Open SUT 10 MOAB 1R105.
Transfer 4KV buses to SUB 20.
REMFS OVRDS TRIGS MALFUNCTIONS MVO6:HV151 FOI 5B RLOl :B21 C1 K5A RLOl:B21CIK5B REMOTE FUNCTIONS DB106723 OPEN OVERRIDES AN : AR106B 14 AN:AR106C15 TRIGGERS I ACTIONS El IL0502MTGLO El = MMF IAI 18002 20 RHR INJ F015B FAILS TO AUTO OPEN DIV 1 ADS AUTO LOGIC FAILURE DIV 2 ADS AUTO LOGIC FAILURE BKR FOR 1B SLC PUMP OPEN (Not associated with scenario setup)
(Not associated with scenario setup)
E l IS TRUE WHEN MTGLO PUMP STARTED INCREASES INSTRUMENT AIR LEAK RATE Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 15 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. R l l - 3
Page 16 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS L
PROGRAM BUlTONS
[P-I] IMF TR02:FTC321NOOZB 0 0 2.5 FW FLOW XMTR B FAILS LOW
[P-21 IMF TH02:TEE41 N24B 350 0 ASIS
[P-31 IMF IAl18002 5
[P-4] MMF IAlI8002 20
[P-5] IMF RRI 6401 I B 0.5 300
[P-61 MMF RR164011 B 40 300 0.5
[P-71 MMF RR164011B 5 120 40 TSH-E41-I N006B FAILS HIGH - HPCl AREA IA COMMON HEADER RUPTURE - 5%
IA COMMON HEADER RUPTURE - 20%
RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BRK - 0.5%
RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BRK - 40%
RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BRK - 5%
[P-231 bat FwB.IOIALARM
[P-241 bat FwB.102 ALARM
[P-25] bat FwB.103 ALARM FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET FEEDWATER HEATER PANEL ALARM RESET
- 7. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:
- a. Unit 1 is at 51% power; Unit 2 is at 100% power EOL.
- b. Power ascension on Unit 1 on hold to allow Electrical Maintenance to inspect Startup Transformer TI 0 following a report of a small oil leak.
- c. Startup Transformer T10 was removed from service IAW OP-003-001 section 2.7 approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ago.
- d. Maintenance has now completed the inspection of Startup Transformer T10. All Clearances are closed.
Restore the electric plant line up to normal by transferring Startup Bus 10 to Startup Transformer 10 IAW OP-003-001 Section 2.8. The pre-job brief has been completed, personnel are in place to support this restoration.
DO NOT transfer 4Kv buses to normal lineup until Maintenance calls back and concurs with that activity.
- e. When T10 is returned to service, continue with the power ascension starting at GO-100-002 step 5.74, Startup Sequence B2 at step 540. Reactor Engineering is on site and available if needed.
- f.
1 B SLC pump O/S for Maintenance to investigate high motor vibration.
L Common 0
A RW Chiller O/S 0
C&D Collection Tank Discharge Valve failed to open. Solenoid is to be replaced by FIN under 575842.
SCC D/G Generator Over Temperature alarm received during manual run. Waiting on procurement of parts.
- 8. Prepare an LCO sheet (TS 3.8.1) identifying that Startup Transformer 10 has been out of service for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and a Repetitive Required Action Completion Sheet.
- 9. Prepare an LCO sheet (TS 3.1.7 and 3.3.6.1, Table 3.3.6.1-1, Function 5.e) identifying that SBLC has been out of service for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
IO. Prepare a Loss of Safety Function Work Sheet for PClV Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 16 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 17 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 EVENT TIME 1
SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM u'
Initial Conditions: Initialize the Simulator to IC-102. Place the Simulator to RUN. Ensure the Proqram Buttons are assiqned as indicated on the SDecial Instructions sheet via the awropriate Preference File. Assiqn Shift positions; direct the start of the 5-minute Dane1 walkdown.
DESCRIPTION TRANSFER SUB 10 TO SUT I O 2
3 INCREASE REACTOR POWER FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER B FAILS LOW 4
STEAM LEAK DETECTION FAILURE / HPCl ISOLATION 8
I I RAPID DEPRESSUIRZATION 5
6 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK 9
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 17 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1
/
LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-B,FAILS TO AUTO-OPEN File No. Rl l-3 10
,/"
RPV FLOODING I
Page 18 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
192 Brief
Description:
TRANSFER SUB 10 TO SUT 10 / INCREASE REACTOR POWER POSITION us PCOP us PCOM PCOP TIME
- Denotes Critical Task STUDENT ACTIVITIES
~~
Directs PCOP to transfer Startup Bus 10 to Startup Transformer 10.
Implements OP-003-001, 13.8KV COMMON ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, Section 2.8.
- 1. Notifies Transmission Control Center.
- 2. Closes MOAB 1 R105.
- 3. Places SU XFMR 10 TO BUS 10 SYNC SEL HS-00014 to ON.
- 4. Verifies SUT 10 and SUB 10 voltages are matched and in phase.
- 5. Closes breaker OAl0301.
- 6. Verifies tie breaker OAOlO502 OPENS.
- 7.
Places SU XFMR 10 TO BUS 10 SYNC SEL HS-00014 to OFF.
- 8. Aligns all control switch flags to actual breaker position.
- 9. Notifies Transmission Control Center SUT 10 is in service.
Directs continuing the power ascension.
Briefs the crew for the upcoming power increase.
Directs implementation of Reactor Engineer Instruction in the CRC Book.
Directs the implementation of GO-100-102, PLANT STARTUP, HEATUP AND POWER OPERATION.
Increases reactor power as directed by the US and CRC Book.
Plots power change on the power-to-flow map.
Maintains LOAD SET =I 00 MWe above existing load.
Notifies GCC before the power increase begins.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 18 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 19 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L/
Event No:
192 Brief
Description:
TRANSFER SUB 10 TO SUT I O I INCREASE REACTOR POWER INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
Transmission Control Center: ready to re-energize Startup Transformer IO; all inspections in the Switchyard have been completed and power is available to Startup Transformer I O.
\\--
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0. (03/04)
Page 19 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 20 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM L,
EventNo:
3 Brief
Description:
FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER B FAILS LOW POSITION PCOM us PCOM TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports AR-101-Bl7, RX WATER HI-LO LEVEL.
Reports RPV level has increased and is now controlling at = +44.
Recognizes/reports By Feedwater Flow indication is zero.
Directs actions in ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION:
- 1. Directs placing FWLC in MAN.
- 2. Directs placing FWLC in Single Element.
- 3. Directs placing FWLC back to AUTO.
- 4. Directs returning RPV level to +35.
~
Contacts Work Week Manager to investigate B Feedwater Flow instrumentation failure.
~ _ _ _ _ _
Contacts Reactor Engineering to determine impact of B FW Flow instrument failure on Core Thermal Power Calculation.
~
Implements ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION:
- 1. Places FW LEVEL CTL\\DEMAND SIGNAL LIC-C32-1 R600 in MANUAL.
- 2. Places FWLC in Single Element by depressing Green pushbutton HS-106102.
- 3. Nulls FW LEVEL CTL\\DEMAND SIGNAL LIC-C32-1 R600 by adjusting tape setpoint.
- 4. Places FW LEVEL CTL\\DEMAND SIGNAL LIC-C32-1 R600 in AUTO.
- 5. Slowly adjusts LIC-C32-1 R600 to restore RPV level to +35.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 20 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 21 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES
--d Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER B FAILS LOW INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When reactor power is raised to = 60% or when directed by Lead Examiner, insert a 6 FW flow transmitter failure low; Depress P-I :
[P-I] IMF TR02:FTC321N0028 0 0 2.5 FW FLOW XMTR B FAILS LOW ROLE PLAY:
- 1. As Work Week Manager sent to investigate B FW Flow Instrumentation failure, wait 3 minutes and report the transmitter is failed and will require repair or replacement. I will provide a time estimate for repairs as soon as one is available.
- 2. As Reactor Engineering, report that I will run a Thermal Monitor and report the results as soon as they are available.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 21 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 22 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM 4
STEAM LEAK DETECTION FAILURE / HPCI ISOLATION
.- EventNo:
Brief
Description:
POSITION PCOP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports HPCI LEAK DETECT LOGIC B HI TEMP, refers to AR-I 14-FO5.
Reports HPCl TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID ENERGIZED, refers to AR-114-C02.
Reports HPCl OUT OF SERVICE, refers to AR-114-B05.
Reports HPCl STM SUPPLY OB IS0 valve HV-155-FO03 is CLOSED.
Determines TSH-E41-1 N600B is tripped and indicates 350°F.
Dispatches Plant Operator to HPCl Equipment Room to investigate potential high temperature condition, using appropriate safety precautions.
us Contacts I&C to investigate TSH-E41-1 N600B.
Declares HPCl System inoperable.
Refers to TS 3.5.1, ECCS-Operating; determines Condition D applies.
I Verifies RClC is OPERABLE by Administrative means.
Refers to TS 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation; determines Condition A applies.
- Denotes Critical Task Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 22 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 23 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. I, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
4 Brief
Description:
STEAM LEAK DETECTION FAILURE I HPCl ISOLATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the Master FW Controller is restored to AUTO, inert a Steam Leak Detection failure and HPCl auto isolation; Depress P-2:
[P-2] IMF TH02:TEE41N24B 350 0 ASlS TSH-E41-1 N006B FAILS HIGH - HPCl AREA ROLE PLAY:
- 1. As Plant Operator sent to investigate HPCl Equipment Area, wait 2 minutes and report all conditions in the HPCl room are normal.
- 2. A l&C sent to investigate TE-E41-1 N600B, acknowledge the direction to investigate; no further actions will be taken.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 23 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 24 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 PCOM SCENARIO EVENT FORM May Enter ON-100-101, SCRAM and direct Scram Imminent Actions as IA pressure lowers.
Ensures/Reduces Recirc flow to = 65 Mlbmlhr.
EventNo:
5 Brief
Description:
LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR I
POSITION Directs PCOM to scram the Reactor prior to IA header pressure reaching 65 psig.
us Enters EO-100-102, RPV CONTROL.
PCOP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports lowering Instrument Air pressure.
Reports SERVICE AIR LO PRESS; refers to AR-124-E01.
Reports INSTRUMENT AIR LOOP A LO PRESS; refers to AR-124-A01.
Dispatches a Plant Operator to investigate IA system.
lmdements ON-I 18-001, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
II us I
Enters ON-I 18-001, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR, briefs crew on plant response (Attachment A of ON-I 18-001) and methods of pressurellevel control due to loss of IA.
PCOP I
I Shifts Aux Buses 1 I N 1 1 B to S/U Buses.
II I
I Directs RPV level maintained + I 3 to +54 with available systems.
II I
I Directs RPV pressure stabilized 4087 psig II PCOM I
I Places Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN.
II I
I Performs actions of ON-100-101, SCRAM.
II I
~~
Trips Main Turbine at 150 MWe.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 24 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 25 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
5 Brief
Description:
LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
- 1. When the crew has completed addressing Steam Leak Detection System failure and HPCl Isolation, insert an instrument air leak; Depress P-3:
[P-31 IMF IAI 18002 5 IA COMMON HEADER RUPTURE - 5%
- 2. When the crew performs Scram Imminent Actions, verify trigger E l (TGOP pump started) fires to increase the severity of the IA leak, OR increase the severity of the rupture to 20% by Depressing P-4:
[P-4] MMF IA118002 20 IA COMMON HEADER RUPTURE - 20%
ROLE PLAY:
- 1. As Plant Operator sent to IA, wait 2 minutes and report that all IA and SA compressors are running, the SA cross tie appears to be operating normally but IA pressure is slowly decreasing. If asked, inform the crew that I will investigate the system for a possible leak.
- 2. As Plant Operator sent to IA, report I have located a large air leak at the common IA header piping just downstream of the receivers; I do not see any way to isolate the leak, and header pressure is dropping rapidly.
-v Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 25 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 26 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM
-1 Event No:
6, 7 Brief
Description:
RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK I AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE POSITION PCOP us PCOP us PCOP TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports increasing Drywell Pressure and Drywell Temperature.
Enters EO-100-1 03, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.
Directs one loop of RHR placed in Suppression Chamber Spray.
Places one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray IAW OP-149-004, RHR CONTAINMENT SPRAY.
- 1. Places ESW in service.
- 2.
Places LOCA OVERRIDE MANUAL OVERRIDE switch to OVERRIDE.
- 3. Closes LPCl injection valve HV-151 -F017A(B).
- 4. Opens Suppression Chamber test valve HV-151 -F028A(B).
- 5. Starts RHR pump 1 P202A(B)(C)(D).
- 6. Throttles open Suppression Chamber spray valve HV-151-F027A(B) to maintain I 500 gpm as indicated on FI-l5120A(B).
Reports rapidly decreasing RPV water level.
Re-enters EO-I 00-1 02 due to high Drywell pressure.
Directs injection with all available systems.
~~
Attempts to maintain RPV water level +13 to +54 with available systems.
Verifies isolations, ECCS initiations, and DG starts as directed.
Reports RPV water level is approaching/at -161, Recognizes and reports ADS did not auto initiate.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 26 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 27 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES W
Event No:
6Y7 Brief
Description:
RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK I AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the crew scrams the Reactor and RPV water level is stable at +13 to +54, initiate a small break inside the primary containment, Depress P-5:
[P-5] IMF RRI 6401 I B 0.5 300 RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK - 0.5%
After the crew has commenced Suppression Chamber Spray, increase the severity of the Recirc loop rupture to 40%; Depress P-6:
[P-6] MMF RR16401lB 40 300 0.5 RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK - 40%
ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 27 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 28 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM L-.
EventNo:
7, 8 Brief
Description:
AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE / RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION
-4 POSITION PCOP
- us
- 1. ARMS & DEPRESSES A & C or B & D switches.
0 0
RPV pressure decrease.
0 6 ADS SRVs open on acoustic monitor status light indication.
SRV Tailpipe temperatures rise on TRS-B21-1 R614.
Directs Rapid Depressurization when RPV level drops to -1 61 inches.
- 1. Enters EO-100-1 12, RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION.
- 2.
Directs preventing uncontrolled Condensate injection.
- 3. Verifies Suppression Pool level > 5 feet.
- 4.
Performs Rapid Depressurization by opening all ADS SRVs.
- 2.
Places individual control switch to open for each ADS SRV (G, J, K, L, M, & N) and verifies red light lit and amber light not lit for each valve solenoid.
0 0
RPV pressure decrease.
0 Suppression Pool Temperature rise.
0 6 ADS SRVs open on acoustic monitor status light indication.
SRV Tailpipe temperatures rise on TRS-B21-1 R614.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 28 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 29 Scenario I LO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES
\\-
Event No:
738 Brief
Description:
AUTO ADS LOGIC FAILURE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 29 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 30 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 NOTES:
SCENARIO EVENT FORM NOTE I:
Fuel Zone level may decrease <-290 requiring entry into RPV Flooding.
L Event No:
9,lO Brief
Description:
LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-FOISB FAILS TO AUTO-OPEN I RPV FLOODING POSITION us
- us (Note 1)
- us (Note 2)
TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Plots Drywell Instrument Run Temperature and RPV pressure on the SAT curve.
Declares RPV level indication indeterminate due to violation of the RPV Saturation Curve.
Performs EO-100-1 14, RPV FLOODING Directs increasing injection to RPV in order to raise RPV Pressure 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
Verifies:
0 MSlVs and MSL drains closed RCIC isolation valves HV-149-FO07 and HV-149-FO08 closed Manually opens RHR F015B to inject to the RPV after identifying RHR F015B failed to auto-open.
Increases injection to raise RPV pressure to 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
I. Ensures maximum injection from Core Spray and LPCl pumps.
- 2. Reports RPV pressure and Suppression Chamber pressure.
- 3. Controls injection flowrate to maintain RPV Flooding Pressure.
Determines RPV pressure 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber pressure.
Records time conditions are met.
Contacts TSC to enter EP-DS-003, RPV LEVEL DETERMINATION.
After the scenario is complete, classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY under EAL F S l due to a Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier and a Loss of the RCS Barrier.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTE 2: Crew must terminate containment sprays, if in progress, and direct all ECCS flow to the RPV in order to establish RPV Flooding Pressure.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 30 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 31 Scenario ILO-502A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES L
Event No:
9,lO Brief
Description:
LPCl INJECTION VALVE HV-FO15B FAILS TO AUTO-OPEN I RPV FLOODING INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the crew has commenced RPV flooding with RHR F015B open, decrease the size of the Recirc rupture to allow achieving flooding pressure, Depress P-7:
[P-71 MMF RR164011B 5 120 40 RECIRC LOOP B SUCTION LINE BREAK - 5%
ROLE PLAY:
As necessary TERMINATION CUE:
The crew has established injection to raise RPV Pressure 2 81 psid above Suppression Chamber Pressure.
EVENT CLASSIFICATION:
After the Scenario is complete, have the US classify the scenario for the HIGHEST EAL. Provide the US with any requested information needed to perform the classification.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 31 of 31 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Scenario 502A Alarm Response References
AR-101-001 Revision 31 Page 32 of 82 B17 7
SETPOINT:
High +39 inches RX WATER Low +30 inches HI-LO LEVEL ORIGIN:
LSHL-C32-1 K635 (PDT-C32-1 N004A,B )
(LY-14204)
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 1.2 Loss of Feedwater Pump.
1.3 Loss of Condensate Pump.
1.4 Feedwater level control systems malfunction.
Any transient that would change Reactor Vessel level.
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
0 Perform ON-1 45-001, RPV Level Control System Malfunction.
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 P&ID M-142 4.2 Ml-C32-6 4.3 E-323 4.4 J-406 Sh 15 4.5 GEK-73592 (IOM 305) 4.6 ON-1 45-001 RPV Level Control System Malfunction.
HPCl TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID ENERGIZED
( co2 )
SETPOINT:
ORIGIN:
AR-114-001 Revision 23 Page 14 of x3.7 c02 See Probable Cause HPCl Turbine Trip Solenoid Energized Annunciator Relay K12a
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 Any of following HPCl isolation cause HPCl turbine trip:
1.1.1 Hi Steam Line Flow at 370" H20 (3 sec TD).
1.1.2 Low Steam Pressure at 104 psig.
1.1.3 Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure at 10 pig.
1.1.4 Pipe Route Area Hi 167°F Temp at (15 min TD).
1.1.5 Pipe Route Area Hi dT at 89°F (15 min TD).
1.1.6 Equipment Room Temp High at 167°F.
1.1.7 Equipment Room High dT at 89°F.
1.1.8 Emergency Area Cooler Inlet Temp at 167°F.
Following signals cause direct HPCI turbine trip:
1.2.1 High Turbine Exhaust Pressure at 110 psig.
1.2.2 Low Pump Suction Pressure at 15" Hg Vac.
1.2.3 High Reactor Level at (Seal-in) 54" 1.2.4 Low Steam Pressure at 104 psig.
1.2.5 Manual Pushbutton.
1.2
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 ENSURE HPCl Turbine TRIPS.
2.2 When conditions permit, PERFORM following as applicable in accordance with OP-152-001, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System.
2.2.1 RESET Isolation.
2.2.2 RESET Turbine Trip.
2.2.3 RESTORE HPCl to service.
2.3 COMPLY with TS 3.5.1.
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
3.1 If HPCl Turbine tripped without isolation signal:
3.1.1 HPCl TURN STOP VLV FV-15612closes 3.1.2 HPCl INJECTION HV-155-FO06 closed if open.
3.1.3 HPCl L-0 CLG WTR HV-156-FO59 closes.
3.1.4 HPCI MIN FLOW TO SUPP POOL HV-155-FO12 closes.
If HPCl Turbine tripped with Division 1 isolation signal present:
3.2.1 STM SUPPLY IB IS0 HV-155-F002 closes.
3.2.2 WARM UP LINE IS0 HV-155-F100 closes.
If HPCI Turbine tripped with Division 2 isolation signal present:
3.3.1 STM SUPPLY OB IS0 HV-155-FO03 closes.
3.3.2 PUMP SUCT FROM SUPP POOL HV-155-F042 closes.
3.2 3.3
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-324 Sh 22 4.2 M1 -E41 -69(4) 4.3 M-156 4.4 IOM305
HPCl OUT OF SERVICE
( B05)
SETPOINT:
Not Applicable ORIGIN:
See Probable Cause
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
AR-114-001 Revision 23 Page 12 of X37 BO5 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Overload.
Any HPCl System MOV Overload or power failure.
STM SUPPLY IB IS0 HV-155-FO02 not fully open.
STM SUPPLY OB IS0 HV-155-F003 not fully open.
TURB EXH TO SUPP POOL HV-155-F066 not fully open.
HPCl Division 1 or 2 Auto Isolation Signal Initiated.
Loss of HPCl Leak Detection Logic A or B 125V DC power supply (1 D63401 or 1 D64401 respectively)
HPCl System in Test Status.
STM SUPPLY IB IS0 HV-155-F002 control switch in close position.
STM SUPPLY OB IS0 HV-155-F003 control switch in close position.
TURB EXH TO SUPP POOL HV-155-FO66 control switch in close position.
Division 1 or 2 MOV OL Byps switch in Test.
HPCl Div 1 or 2 Out of Service HS-E41-1S34A or B in hop.
HPCl Inverter power failure.
HPCl Logic Power Failure Bus A or Bus B.
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 2.2 2.3 COMPLY with TS 3.5.1.
DETERMINE if any condition above exists.
OBSERVE HPCl Trouble Status Display (BE) lights.
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
None
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-324 Sh 23 4.2 Ml-E41-69(2)(5)(11) 4.3 IOM305 4.4 Technical Specification Section 3.5.1
HPCl LEAK DETECT LOGIC B HI TEMP
( F05 1 AR-114-001 Revision 23 SETPOINT:
See Origin ORIGIN:
TSH-E41-1 N600B (1 67°F)
TSH-E41-1 N602B (1 67°F)
TSH-E41-1 N603D (167"F, 15 min TD)
Page 29 of x3?
F05 1.1 1.2 1.3 Instrumentation line break.
HPCl steam supply line leak or break.
Ventilation system malfunction which increases ambient temperature.
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 ENSURE following occur:
2.1.1 STM SUPPLY OB IS0 HV-155-F003 CLOSES.
2.1.2 2.1.3 HPCl Turbine TRIPS.
If HPCl STM SUPPLY OB IS0 HV-155-FO03 fails to close, NOTIFY Shift Supervision of potential for entry into Emergency Plan.
CHECK following on Panel 1 C614 to determine cause of alarm:
2.3.1 COMPLY with TS 3.5.1, 3.6.1.3, 3.3.6.1 and TRO 3.3.6 as applicable.
PUMP SUCT FROM SUPP POOL HV-155-F042 CLOSES, if open.
2.2 2.3 HPCl Steam Leak Detection System 2.3.2 URS-G33-1 N604 2.4
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
3.1 3.2 3.3 HPCl turbine trips.
STM SUPPLY OB IS0 HV-155-FO03 closes PUMP SUCT FROM SUPP POOL HV-155-FO42 closes if open.
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-324 Sh 23 4.2 M1 -E41 -69(5) 4.3 Ml-B21-98(1,2) 4.4 M-155 4.5 IOM305
AR-124-001 Revision 3 Page 3 o f 10 A01 SETPOINT:
80 psig ORIGIN :
PSL-12511A I
I 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 Compressor tripped.
1. 2 Compressor loading c i r c u i t malfunction.
1. 3 System breach.
1.4 Excessive a i r usage.
2.0 OPERATOR ACTION:
2. 1 2.2 A t Instrument A i r Compressor Skid PERFORM LA-1140-001, Instrument 2.3 If instrument a i r Lost, PERFORM ON-118-001, Loss o f Instrument OBSERVE pressure t o check alarm condition.
A i r Compressors and Dryers Alarm Response.
A i r.
3.0 AUTOMATIC ACTION:
3. 1 Com ressors auto load t o maintain system pressure.
3.2 7
I f 7 ead com ressor t r i p s, standby compressor assumes lead compressor oading sequence.
4.0 REFERENCE :
4.1 E-322 SH 14 4.2 M-125
AR-124-001 Revision 4 Page 4 o f 10 BO1 INSTRUMENT A I R HEADER LO PRESSURE c BO1 1 SETPOINT:
80 psig O R I G I N :
PSL-12 564 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 Compressor tri pped.
1. 2 Compressor loading c i r c u i t malfunction.
1. 3 System breach.
1.4 Excessive a i r usage.
2.0 OPERATOR ACTION:
2. 1 OBSERVE pressure t o check alarm condition a t INSTR A I R HDR PRESS 2.2 A t Instrument A i r Compressor Skid PERFORM LA-1140-001, Instrument A i r Compressors and Dryers Alarm Response.
2.3 I f instrument a i r Lost, PERFORM ON-118-001, Loss of Instrument A i r.
2.4 If Instrument A i r Header pressure decreases t o 65 psig, SCRAM reactor.
PI-12564, b
3.0 AUTOMATIC ACTION:
3. 1 Com ressors auto load t o maintain system pressure.
3.2 7
I f 7 ead com ressor t r i p s, standby compressor assumes lead compressor oading sequence.
4. 0 REFERENCE :
4.1 E-322 SH 14 4.2 M-125
SERVICE A I R LO PRESS
( E01 1 1.0 2.o 3.0 PROBABLE CAUSE:
AR-124-001 Revision 4 Page 7 o f 10 E01 SETPOINT:
105 psig O R I G I N :
PSL-12561 1.1 Compressors tripped.
1. 2 Compressor loading c i r c u i t malfunction.
1. 3 System breach 1.4 Excessive a i r usage.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2. 1 OBSERVE pressure t o check alarm condition.
2.2 CONTACT Health Physics t o remove a l l personnel from breathing a i r.
2.3 I f system pressure continues t o decrease, a t a prox. 90 psig, ANNOUNCE over PA system, "Service A i r Not Avai 7 able, a l l personnel using Service A i r terminate use and Contact the Control Room".
2.4 A t Service A i r Compressor Skid PERFORM LA-1141-001, Service A i r Compressors Alarm Response.
2.5 CROSS-CONNECT Service A i r i n accordance w i t h OP-119-001, Service A i r System, only on d i r e c t i o n o f S h i f t Supervisor.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
3. 1 Com ressors auto load t o maintain system pressure.
3.2 If ead com ressor t r i p s, standby compressor assumes lead compressor oading sequence.
7 7
4.0
REFERENCE:
4. 1 E-322 SH 14 4.2 M-125
DRWUSUPP CHAMBER HI-LO PRESS
- 1.
\\-.--
- 2.
0 0
0 0
- 3.
0
- 4.
AR-112-001 Revision 28 Page 16 of s33 DO3 SETPOINT:
+1.O, -1.O psig ORIGIN:
PSHL-15728 PSHL-15702 PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 1.2 1.3 Drywell inerting or m keup system malfunction.
Pipe or instrument line break inside the Containment.
Failure of the Drywell-Suppression Pool Vacuum Breakers to relieve pressure back to the Drywell.
NOTE:
~
~~
Each Suppression Pool to Drywell Vacuum Breaker has a set pressure to open at 0.5 psid (nominal). Due to their design in being in series, delta-P of greater than 1.O psid may be observed before both valves, in the pair are opened. This is acceptable because the design bases for the Containment requires that the vacuum breakers start to open at 2.81 psid and be full open by 4.48 psid (Ref.
FSAR 6.2.1.1.3.2). (')
1.4 Operation of Safety-Relief Valves, HPCl or RClC Systems.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Comply with TS 3.6.1.4 AUTOMATIC ACTION:
Compare Drywell and Suppression Chamber pressure.
Determine if a high or low pressure condition exists.
For high pressure, Ensure the Nitrogen lnerting or Makeup Lines are isolated and prepare to vent the Drywell using the Drywell Purge system.
For low pressure, Stop purging the Drywell.
3.1 open, the following valves close on PSHL-15728 high pressure, +1.O psig 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 HV15721, Contn N2 Purge OB Is0 Vlv SV15789, Drywell N2 Makeup Supply OB Is0 Vlv SV15738, Supp Chmbr N2 Makeup OB Is0
REFERENCE:
4.1 J-457 Sh 3B 4.2 E-171 Sh 9 4.3 E-324 Sh 16 4.4 M-157 4.5 TS 3.6.1.4 4.6 Condition Report 98-1038 Vacuum Breakers Did Not Actuate > 0.5 psid.
PRIMARY CONTAl N M ENT HI-LO PRESS (BO31
- 1.
- 2.
0 0
0 0
0 0
- 3.
- 4.
AR-104-001 Revision 21 Page 11 of BO3 SETPOINT:
l.WO.1 psig ORIGIN:
PSHL-C72-1 NO04 PROBABLE CAUSE:
Primary containment pressure above or below alarm setpoint due to:
1.1 Loss of coolant accident.
1.2 Containment cooling system trouble.
1.3 Containment inerting system trouble.
1.4 Normal leakage losses.
1.5 Barometric pressure changes due to local weather conditions.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 2.2 E
pressure low:
Observe Containment pressure to check alarm condition.
2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 Raise Containment pressure in accordance with OP-173-003, Primary Containment nitrogen Makeup and Venting, E conditions permit.
Evaluate Primary Containment Pressure trend.
(e.g., CIG drain traps leaking, etc.)
Vent Containment in accordance with OP-173-003, Primary Containment Nitrogen Makeup and Venting, Ensure Drywell Ventilation in operation in accordance with OP-160-001, Drywell Ventilation.
Check for indications of leaks into Drywell.
Abnormal leakage losses, Check for indications of leaks from Containment 2.3 E
pressure high:
2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 conditions permit.
AUTO MAT IC ACT I ON :
None
REFERENCE:
4.1 Ml-C72-22(13) 4.2 E-323 SH 35 4.3 IOM305
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No.
1 Facility:
SSES Scenario No.: ILO-302 (Backup)
Op-Test No.:
Malf.
Event Event No.
Type*
Description N
Shutdown 1 B Condensate Pump Examiners:
Operators:
3 4
5 Initial Conditions: Unit 1 at 75% power EOL, Unit 2 in Mode 4 I
C Fuel Clad Failure I
A Narrow Range Level Instrument Fails Upscale RPS A Failure to Trip (Momentary ATWS)
Turnover: CRD pump 1B is out of service for breaker maintenance and is not expected to return this shift.
Condensate pump 1 B has a possible ground, requirinq the crew to remove 1 B Condensate pump from service for inspection. No surveillance activities are planned or due during the shift. Chemistry and Reactor Enqineerinq are investiaatina a spike in Off-Gas activity durinq the last Control Rod Exercise Surveillance.
~
~~
~~
M Rapid Depressurization I
g 2
1 1
C I Condensate Minimum Flow Recirc Valve Failure 1
C 1 D Main Steam Line Failure to Isolate 6
1 II I
~
~~
~
I C,M I Main Steam Line Leak in Turbine Building ll I
~
~~
~
1 M
I Radioactivity Release (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-I 021, Revision 9 2005 NRC RE-Exam Rev. 1 Susquehanna Facsimile
PP&L-SUSQUEHANNA TRAINING CENTER Prepared By:
Instructor Reviewed By:
Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor Approved By:
Supervising ManagerlShift Supervisor SIMULATOR SCENARIO 12/10/2004 Date Date Date Scenario
Title:
ILO CERTIFICATION / NRC EXAM SCENARIO Scenario Duration:
90 Minutes Scenario Number:
ILO-302A
~~
Rev is io n/Date :
Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 Course:
PCOO7/PCOO8, Initial License RO/SRO Certification Examination PCOl7/PCOI 8, Initial License RO/SRO NRC Examination Operational Activities:
- 1. Shutdown 1B Condensate Pump
- 6. D MSL Failure to Isolate
- 2. Cond Min Flow Recirc Valve Failure
- 7. MSL Leak in Turbine Building (5)
- 3. A NR Level Instrument Fails Upscale (15)
- 8. Radioactivity Release (14)
- 4. Fuel Clad Failure (4)
- 9. Rapid Depressurization
- 5. RPS A Failure to Trip Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 1 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 2 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK i Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 2 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 3 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The scenario begins with Unit I at approximately 75% power EOL and Unit 2 in MODE 4. I B CRD pump is out of service for breaker maintenance. Condensate pump 1 B has a possible ground; the crew will shutdown Condensate pump 1 B for inspection. The crew will recognize the Condensate pump minimum flow recirc valve failed open and will manually close the valve to maintain proper condensate pump header pressure.
Following the shutdown of 1 B Condensate pump the A Narrow Range Level instrument will fail upscale.
Feedwater level control system response will stabilize RPV water level at = +23 in automatic. The crew will implement an Off-Normal procedure to transfer RPV water level control from averaged level control to selected level control and return RPV water level control to automatic.
Following the water level perturbation a fuel clad failure will result in Turbine Building area high radiation and increasing main steam line radiation. The crew will respond by decreasing Reactor power. Radiation levels will continue to rise requiring the crew to manually scram the Reactor and manually close the MSlVs and MSL drains. When the mode switch is placed to shutdown a failure to scram will occur when RPS A fails to trip. The control rods will insert when the crew initiates ARI.
Following the scram a main steam line break will occur in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel. The D MSL fails to isolate resulting in a sustained release to the Turbine Building. Release rates from the Turbine Building Vent Stack will increase above the ALERT level requiring entry into Radioactive Release Emergency Operating Procedure, EO-I 00-1 05. The crew will request performance of dose calculations and conduct a Reactor cooldown at <10O0F/hr. When off-site dose calculations exceed the General Emergency level the crew will rapidly depressurize the Reactor.
The scenario will be terminated when the crew has performed a Rapid Depressurization and restored RPV water level to +I 3 to +54.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 3 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 4 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004
--I Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 4 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK File No. Rl l-3
Page 5 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 i r SCENARIO OBJECTIVES II The objective of this scenario is to evaluate the licensed operator candidates ability to respond to the scenario events. These events will require each candidate to demonstrate the following:
Knowledge of integrated plant operations 0
Ability to diagnose abnormal plant conditions 0
Ability to work together as a team 0
Ability to mitigate plant transients that exercise their knowledge and use of ONs and EOPs Ability to utilize Technical Specifications (SRO Only)
To meet this objective, the licensed operator candidates must demonstrate proficiency in the following competencies:
Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. lnterpretldiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures, references, and Technical Specifications
- 3. Operate the control boards
\\--
- 4. Communicate and interact with other crew members Senior Reactor Operator Candidates:
- 1. Interpretldiagnose events and conditions based on alarms, signals, and readings
- 2. Comply with and use procedures and references
- 3. Operate the control boards (NIA to upgrade candidates)
- 4. Communicate and interact with the crew and other personnel
- 5. Direct shift operations
- 6. Comply with and use Technical Specifications Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 5 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 6 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 6 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 7 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 L-.
CRITICAL TASKS
- Recognize failure to scram and initiate ARI Safety Significance Initiation of ARI provides an independent and redundant means of depressurizing the reactor scram air header and operating the scram discharge volume vent and drain valves, causing rapid control rod insertion.
Rapid control rod insertion initiates an immediate power reduction and, in the case of a fuel clad failure, will quickly reduce the amount of radiation being released from the Reactor.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to insert control rods allows power to remain elevated with continued release of radiation from the Reactor and also increases the potential for additional fuel damage.
Also, OP-AD-055, Operations Procedure Program, Section 9, defines Immediate Operator Actions as: Actions required immediately after the start of an event to stop the degradation of and mitigate the consequences of conditions that threaten fuel, RPV, or primary containment...I. Attachment B of this procedure lists the following Immediate Operator Actions:
-4 MSL RAD Increasing but Reduce Reactor Power
< Trip Point (Fuel Clad Fai I u re)
- Manually Scram Reactor If Power Decrease did not stop RAD increase:
AND
- Isolate MSlVs and MSL Drains Existing Scram Condition PLACE Mode SW to S/D OBSERVE all-rods-in If More than 1 Rod > 00
- Arm and Depress Manual Scram PBs AND
- Initiate ARI Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 7 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 8 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 CRITICAL TASKS
.__i IndicationslCues for Event Requiring Critical Task Manual insertion of an RPS scram with NO control rod motion.
Performance Criteria Insert control rods by manually initiating ARI.
Performance Feedback Successful insertion of control rods will be indicated by rod position full-in indication following manual initiation of ARI.
- Perform Rapid Depressurization before EPB proiected dose / dose rates reach General Emergency declaration criteria Safety Significance In order to minimize radiation exposure to the public, Rapid Depressurization of the RPV is required if a primary system is discharging and the radioactivity release rate cannot be controlled below the release rate that requires a General Emergency.
Consequences for Failure to Perform Task Failure to take the EOP actions will result in increased dose and/or dose rates at the EPB.
RR-6 BEFORE EPB PROJECTED DOSE/DOSE RATE REACHES GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARATION CRITERIA RAPID DEPRESS IS REQ'D An offsite radioactivity release rate above the General Emergency action level represents a substantial increase in the severity of the offsite radioactivity release, relative to the entry condition, and accordingly presents a more immediate threat to the continued health and safety of the public.
Rapid depressurization is directed before the release rate reaches the General Emergency level to reduce the radioactivity release rate.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 8 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 9 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 v
CRITICAL TASKS Indications/Cues for Event Requiring Critical Task Offsite radiation exposures and radiation release rates are obtained from dose projections normally performed by NERO personnel. The results of these projections are then transmitted to the Control Room Crew. The Crew must determine that the calculated results exceed the limits for General Emergency level releases (1 R or 1 Whour TEDE or 5R or 5Whour Thyroid CDE at the EPB) as noted on EO-I 00-1 05 Table 13.
Performance Criteria Perform a Rapid Depressurization per EO-I 00-1 12 when EPB dose or dose rates are projected to exceed EO-I 00-1 05 Table 13 values.
Initiate ADS / Manually open all 6 ADS valves.
Performance Feedback Initiating a rapid depressurization causes Reactor pressure to lower which lowers the driving force of any primary system breach.
Verify ADS valves are open using red light indication, acoustic monitoring, lowering Reactor pressure and rising Reactor water level.
Denotes Simulator Critical Task.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 9 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 10 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I
11 Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 10 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 11 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO REFERENCES W
- 1. SHUTDOWN 1 B CONDENSATE PUMP / CONDENSATE MIN FLOW RECIRC VALVE FAILURE OP-144-001 CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM, REV. 32 PCAF 2004-3273
- 2. A NARROW RANGE INSTRUMENT FAILS UPSCALE AR-101 -AI 7 ON-145-001 TS 3.3.2.2 RX WATER HI LEVEL, REV. 31 RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, REV. 15 FEEDWATER / MAIN TURBINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP, AMENDMENT 178 AR-10 1 -B 17 RX WATER HI-LO LEVEL, REV. 31
- 3. FUEL CLAD FAILURE AR-101 -BO5 AR-101 -C05 AR-103-DO1 AR-111 -C03 ON-100-101 ON-159-002 ON-I 79-00 1 EO-I 00-1 02 EO-I 00-1 04 RX BLDG AREA PANEL IC605 HI RADIATION, REV. 31 TURB BLDG AREA PANEL IC605 HI RADIATION, REV. 31 MN STM LINE HI HI RADIATION, REV. 27 MN STM LINE RAD MONITOR HI RADIATION, REV. 29 SCRAM, SCRAM IMMINENT, REV. 12 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, REV. 22 INCREASING OFFGAS/MSL RAD LEVELS, REV. 0 RPV CONTROL, REV. I SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 1
- 4. RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP OP-AD-055 EO-I 00-1 13 OPERATIONS PROCEDURE PROGRAM, REV. 1 LEVEUPOWER CONTROL, REV. 2
- 5. D MSL FAILURE TO ISOLATE / MSL LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING AR-015-DO4 STACK MONITORING SYS OC63O/OC677 HI-HI RADIATION, REV. 29 AR-015-EO4 AR-111 -BO3 AR-112-BO3 ON-070-001 TS 3.6.1.3 STACK MONITORING SYS OC63O/OC677 HI RADIATION, REV. 29 MN STM LINE LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP, REV. 29 MN STM LINE LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP, REV. 28 ABNORMAL GASEOUS RADIATION RELEASEKAM ALARMS, REV. 13 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES, AMMEND. 195
- 6. RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE / RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION EO-I 00-1 05 EO-I 00-1 12 EO-I 00-1 03 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL, REV. 3 RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION, REV. 2 PRIMARY COMTAINMENT CONTROL, REV. 7 OP-149-005 RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING, REV. 21 PCAF 2004-1433 Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 11 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 12 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 12 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 13 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 MALFS 6 : 6 SC ENARlO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS v
REMFS OVRDS TRIG S 3
1 : l 3
- 1. Initialize the simulator to IC-18: Unit 1 at 100% power EOL, Unit 2 in MODE 4.
- 2. Reduce Recirc flow to achieve -75% reactor power.
- 3. Snapshot to an available IC (currently IC-106).
- 4. Type restorepref YPP.IL0-302; verify the following pre-inserts and Program Button assignments.
Verify the Environment window:
MALFUNCTIONS RPI 58007A AV06:HVl41 F022D 100 AV06: HV141 F028D I00 TR02:XlT03701 2 TR02:XlT03730 2 TR03:XTT03701 REMOTE FUNCTIONS EN100002 2 EN1 00009 0.3 PM131Pl32B OUT 4
OVERRIDES ZAOXR03705A TRIGGERS / ACTIONS E l BAAA26409 E l = IMF MS183008 0.9 E2 IL0302CONDPP E2 = IMF AV04:FV10508 10 E3 IL0302COND E3 = DMF AVO4:FVO1508 PROGRAM BUTTONS
[P-I] IMF TR02zPDTC321 N004A 60 0 ASIS
[P-2] IMF RR179003 90 1500
[ P-31 bat YPB.1 LO-302A RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP MSlV F022D BIND DURING MOTION MSlV F028D BIND DURING MOTION SET WIND SPEED AT 60 M @ 2MPH SET WIND SPEED AT B/U TWR @ 2MPH SET WIND SPEED AT 60 M OFFSET SET WIND SPEED AT 2 M @ 2 MPH SET WIND SPEED VARlABLlLlTY @ 0.3 MPH 16 CRD PUMP BKR RACKED OUT SET WIND SPEED AT 10 M @ 2 MPH EVENT TRIGGER MODE SWITCH IN SHUTDOWN D MSL LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING B COND PUMP STOP SWITCH STICK MIN FLOW VALVE AT 10% OPEN MIN FLOW CONTROLLER IN MANUAL REMOVE MIN FLOW VALVE MALFUNCTION NR LEVEL A FAILURE UPSCALE FUEL FAILURE 90 PINS RAMP TB SPING RELEASE RATES Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 13 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 14 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
- 5. Verify all simulator tasks are running properly (type sus and then 01s on xis-2)
- 7. Prepare a Reactor Engineering Instructions package.
- 8. Prepare/markup GO-100-012 Rev. 20 up through step 5.1 1.
- 9. Prepare a turnover sheet indicating:
- a. Unit 1 is at 75% power EOL.
- b. CRD pump 1 B is out of service for breaker maintenance, it is not expected to return this shift,
- c. Condensate pump 1 B has a possible ground; shutdown Condensate pump 1 B for inspection immediately after shift turnover.
- d. No surveillance activities are planned or due during the shift.
- e. Chemistry and RX Engineering still investigating spike in Off-gas activity during the last Control Rod Exercise Surveillance.
- f.
Unit 2 is in MODE 4.
- 10. Prepare a MIDAS DOSE
SUMMARY
REPORT form.
- 11. Make a copy of shift assignments.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 14 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 15 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION FORM L-Initial Conditions: Initialize the Simulator to IC-106. Place the Simulator to RUN. Ensure the Program Buttons are assigned as indicated on the Special Instructions sheet via the appropriate Preference File. Assign shift positions; direct the start of the 5-minute panel walkdown.
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 15 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 DESCRIPTION SHUTDOWN 1 B CONDENSATE PUMP CONDENSATE MIN FLOW RECIRC VALVE FAILURE
~~
A NR LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILS UPSCALE FUEL CLAD FAILURE RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP D MSL FAILURE TO ISOLATE MSL LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION File No. RII-3
Page 16 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM L.
Event No:
192 Brief
Description:
SHUTDOWN 1B CONDENSATE PUMP I MINIMUM FLOW RECIRC VALVE FAILURE I
P O Y O N I TIME I
PCOP I us STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs shutdown of 1 B Condensate pump IAW OP-144-001, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM Rev. 32.
Implements OP-144-001, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM Section 3.2
- 1. Depresses STOP pushbutton for I B Condensate pump.
Implements OP-144-001, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM.
- 1. Ensures 1 B Condensate pump discharge valve (HVI 05028) closes.
- 2. Observes Condensate header pressure to ensure greater than 530 psig.
Recognizes Condensate header pressure is less than 530 psig on PlCSY format.
Determines Condensate recirc valve FV-10508 is not fully closed.
~
Places Condensate recirc valve controller FIC-10508 in MANUAL and closes the valve due to mis-operation in automatic.
Dispatches Plant ODerator to investinate problem with FV-10508.
Notifies Work Week ManaaedMaintenance 1 B Condensate DumD is shutdown.
Notifies Work Week ManagerIMaintenance of problem with Condensate recirc valve FV-10508.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 16 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 17 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTOR'S PERSONAL NOTES u-Event No:
152 Brief
Description:
SHUTDOWN 1B CONDENSATE PUMP I MINIMUM FLOW RECIRC VALVE FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When Condensate pump 1 B stopped, ensure event trigger E2 (IL0302CONDPP) actuates to fail recirc valve FV-10508 at 10% open (IMF AVO4:FVIO508 IO).
When Condensate recirc valve controller FIC-10508 placed in MANUAL, ensure event trigger E3 (IL0302COND) actuates to remove recirc valve FV-10508 malfunction (DMF AV04:FV10508).
Monitor the condensate system on W 7.
ROLE PLAY:
As Plant Operator dispatched to investigate Condensate recirc valve FV-10508, wait - 2 minutes and IF the valve has not yet been closed from the control room, report it sounds like there is flow in the recirc line. IF the valve has already been closed, report there is no indication on any problems associated with the valve.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 17 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 18 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 NOTES:
SCENARIO EVENT FORM (1) If level not restored to - 35 inches (> 30 inches) prior to transfer to B SELECTED Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
A NR LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILS UPSCALE v-POSITION PCOM us PCOM NOTE 1 TIME us STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports alarms RX WATER HI-LO LEVEL and RX WATER HI LEVEL.
Reports A NR level reading +60.
Observes FWLC response to stabilize RPV water level.
Reports B and C NR level indication stabilizes at -22.5 Reports A Hi Water Level Trip green status light is ON.
Refers to AR-101-B17, RX WATER HI-LO LEVEL.
Refers to AR-101 -A1 7, RX WATER HI LEVEL.
Directs implementation of ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.
Implements ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.
- 1. Places FW LEVEL CTUDEMAND SIGNAL LIC-C32-1 R600 controller in MAN.
- 2. Adjusts LIC-C32-1 R600 to restore RPV water level to -+ 35.
- 3. Selects By NR level signal input.
- 4. Transfers from AVERAGED to SELECTED level.
- 5. Nulls FW LEVEL CTUDEMAND LIC-C32-1 R600 controller.
- 6. Places FW LEVEL CTUDEMAND LIC-C32-1 R600 controller in AUTO.
Contacts WWM to investigate A NR level instrument failure.
Refers to TS 3.3.2.2; declares A NR level channel inoperable, enters Condition A.
- Denotes Critical Task Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 18 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 19 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004
~-
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
3 Brief
Description:
A NR LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILS UPSCALE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the actions are complete for the Condensate recirc valve failure, insert A NR level instrument failure upscale; Depress P-I :
[P-I] IMF TR02:PDTC321N004A 60 0 ASlS NR LEVEL A FAILURE UPSCALE ROLE PLAY:
As WWM sent to investigate A NR level problem, wait 5 minutes, and report the differential pressure transmitter is failed and must be replaced and calibrated. The repairs are expected to take approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 19 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 20 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 POSITION PCOM SCENARIO EVENT FORM TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Reports alarm TURB BLDG AREA PANEL 1C605 HI RADIATION.
EventNo:
4 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE PCOM Reports alarm RX BLDG AREA PANEL 1C605 HI RADIATION.
Observes Turbine building area radiation reading on PICSY.
Reports increasing radiation levels: TURBINE FRONT END, SJAE RM and FEEDWATER HEATER AREA.
Refers to AR-101-CO5, TURB BLDG AREA PANEL 1 C605 HI RADIATION.
Evacuates Unit 1 TB of all non-essential personnel.
Contacts HP to perform HP-TP-441.
Refers to AR-101-B05, RX BLDG AREA PANEL 1C605 HI RADIATION.
- Denotes Critical Task NOTES:
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 20 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 21 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
4 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When FWLC master controller is restored to auto insert a fuel clad failure, Depress P-2:
[P-2] IMF RR179003 90 15:OO FUEL FAILURE 90 PINS NOTE:
Turbine building area high radiation alarm is received in 00.
Form NTP-QA31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 22 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 23 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
4?5 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE I RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the crew places the Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN, verify trigger El activates to initiate a steam leak in the Steam Tunnel.
El (BAAA26409) = IMF MS183008 0.9 ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 23 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rl l-3
Page 24 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 POSITION SCENARIO EVENT FORM TIME
-- EventNo:
4,5,6,7 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE I RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP / D MSL FAILURE TO ISOLATE / MSL NOTES:
LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING (1) A common error is Rapid Depressurization when the radiation levels on elevations
+-
PCOP I
I us NOTE1 I
PCOP I
STUDENT ACTIVITIES Exits EO-100-113 and re-enters EO-100-102, Directs closure of MSlVs and drains IAW ON-I 59-002, Attachment F.
Directs RPV water level maintained + I 3 to +54 with RCIC and CRD.
Directs RPV pressure maintained 4087 psig with SRVs.
Directs PCOM to reset main generator lockouts.
Manually closes MSlVs and drains.
Reports D MSL failed to isolate.
Verifies D MSL flow indication on 1 C652 indication FI-C32-1 R603D.
Enters EO-100-104, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.
Contacts maintenance for the MSIV failures in D MSL.
Reports alarm STACK MONITORING SYS OC63O/OC677 HI RADIATION.
Refers to AR-015-E04, STACK MONITORING SYS OC63O/OC677 HI RADIATION.
Checks SPING, reports increasing TB Stack Noble Gas.
Reports alarms MN STM LINE LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP DIV 1 / 2.
Verifies 1 C614 temperature readings; reports high temperature in TB Steam Tunnel.
- Denotes Critical Task I Containment area throughout this scenario.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 24 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. Rll-3
Page 25 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES
-v Event No:
4,5967 Brief
Description:
FUEL CLAD FAILURE I RPS A FAILURE TO TRIP I D MSL FAILURE TO ISOLATE I MSL LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
When the MSlVs and drains are closed increase TB release rates, Depress P-3:
[P-31 bat YPB.IL0-302A RAMP TB SPING RELEASE RATES ROLE PLAY:
As necessary Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 25 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. R11-3
Page 26 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 1211 0/2004 POSITION TIME SCENARIO EVENT FORM STUDENT ACTIVITIES L-Event No:
899 Brief
Description:
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE / RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION
- 1. Arms and depresses Division 2 ADS manual pushbuttons and verifies 6 red lights lit for ADS solenoids,
- 2.
Places individual control switch to open for each ADS SRV (G, J, K, L, M, & N) and verifies red light lit and amber light not lit for each valve solenoid.
0 0
Observes RPV pressure decrease.
0 Observes 6 ADS SRVs open on acoustic monitor status light indication.
Observes elevated tail pipe temperatures on TRS-B21-1 R614.
Enters EO-100-105, RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE, when TB Iodine or NG release rate exceeds ALERT Level.
NOTES:
I I Requests Off-Site Dose Calculations.
(1) GE declaration criteria can be obtained from either the Offsite Dose Calculations I
I Directs Reactor cooldown c 1 OO"F/hr with SRVs.
PCOP I
I Initiates cooldown < 100"Flhr using SRVs.
- us NOTE 1 Directs Rapid Depressurization before EPB projected doseldose rate reaches the General Emergency declaration criteria.
- 1. Enters EO-100-1 12, RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION.
- 2.
Directs preventing uncontrolled Condensate injection.
- 3. Verifies Suppression Pool level > 5 feet.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03104)
Page 26 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. R l l - 3
Page 27 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
8Y9 Brief
Description:
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
Approximately 10 minutes after the crew enters EO-I 00-1 05 and Off-Site Dose Calculations have been requested, report to the Control Room as the TSC Dose Calculator and provide the crew the attached MIDAS report.
NOTE:
Off-Site dose is projected to reach 1.6 Rem TEDE based on existing release rate and plant conditions.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 27 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 28 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 SCENARIO EVENT FORM Event No:
899 Brief
Description:
L RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION POSITION us PCOM PCOP us us TIME STUDENT ACTIVITIES Directs RPV level restored and maintained +I 3 to +54 with Condensate.
Enters EO-I 00-1 03, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, due to Suppression Pool temperature > 90°F.
Directs placing both loops of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling.
Restores and maintains RPV level at + I 3 to +54 with Condensate.
Places both loops of Suppression Pool Cooling in service IAW OP-149-005, RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING.
- 1. Places ESW in service.
- 2.
Places RHRSW in service to RHR heat exchanger A / B.
- 3. Opens Suppression Chamber test shutoff valve HV-151-FO28A / B.
- 4. Starts RHR pump 1 P202A(C) / B(D).
- 5. Throttles open test line control valve HV-F024A / B to achieve ~10,000 gpm on
- 6. Observes minimum flow valve HV-151-FO07A / B closes at - 3000 gpm.
- 7. Closes heat exchanger bypass HV-151 -F048A / B.
- 8. Checks RHR pump room coolers 1V21OA(C) / B (D) started.
FI-Ell-1 R603 A / B.
Aeer the scenario is complete, determines TS 3.6.1.3 RA B.l is applicable for the failure of both MSlVs in D main steam line. If RA B. I not completed within I hour, the unit must be in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
After the scenario is complete, classifies the event as a GENERAL EMERGENCY under EAL RG7 due to projected dose rates exceeding the limits at the EPB.
- Denotes Critical Task I1 I
I1 NOTES: I Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 28 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. RII-3
Page 29 Scenario ILO-302A Rev. 1, 12/10/2004 INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITIES, ROLE PLAY, AND INSTRUCTORS PERSONAL NOTES Event No:
4 9 Brief
Description:
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE I RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY:
As necessary ROLE PLAY:
As necessary TERMINATION CUE:
Rapid depressurization has been performed and RPV water level has been restored to +I 3 to +54.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DETERMINATION:
After the scenario is complete, have the US determine any Technical Specification requirements due to the failure to isolate the D Main Steam Line.
EVENT CLASSIFICATION:
After the Scenario is complete, have the US classify the scenario for the HIGHEST EAL. Provide the US with any requested information needed to perform the classification.
Form NTP-QA-31.7A Rev. 0, (03/04)
Page 29 of 29 Murphy NRC RE-Exam Rev 1 File No. R11-3
Scenario 302A Alarm Response References
RX WATER HI LEVEL (A1 7)
AR-101-001 Revision 31 Page 16 of 82 A1 7 SETPOINT:
+54 inches ORIGIN:
C32-K624A,B,C (PT-C32-1 N004A,B,C )
1, PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 1.2 Feedwater level control system malfunction.
HPCl or RClC Systems injection to Reactor Vessel.
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 Ensure Automatic Actions.
2.2 Check all level indicators to determine actual conditions.
c]
2.3 E level control malfunction is indicated, THEN Perform ON-145-001 RPV Level Control System Malfunction.
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
3.1 3.2 If 2 out of 3 instruments reach their trip levels, Main and RFP Turbines will trip.
At +54 inches as sensed by different level switches, HPCl and RClC will trip.
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 P&ID M-142 4.2 M1 -C32-6(4) 4.3 E-323 4.4 IOM 305
L-,
RX WATER HI-LO LEVEL (B17)
AR-101-001 Revision 31 Page 32 of 82 B17 SETPOINT:
High +39 inches Low +30 inches ORIGIN:
LSHL-'232-1 K635 (PDT-C32-1 N004A,B )
(LY-14204)
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 1.2 Loss of Feedwater Pump.
1.3 Loss of Condensate Pump.
1.4 Feedwater level control systems malfunction.
Any transient that would change Reactor Vessel level.
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
0 Perform ON-145-001, RPV Level Control System Malfunction.
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
None
\\-
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 P&ID M-142 4.2 Ml-C32-6 4.3 E-323 4.4 J-406 Sh 15 4.5 GEK-73592 (IOM 305) 4.6 ON-1 45-001 RPV Level Control System Malfunction.
RX BLDG AREA PANEL 1C605 HI RADIATION (805)
SETPOINT:
See Origin ORIGIN:
I
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
High radiation in any of following areas:
1.1 RHR B&D PP Room(')
1.2 RClC PP&Turb Room")
1.3 HPCl PP&Turb Room(')
1.4 RB/RW Sump Area(')
1.5 CRD North")
1.6 CRD South")
1.7 RWCU Recirc PP Access 1.8 CRD Repair Room
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
I7 0
0 0
0 0
- 3.
- 4.
(') RIT-13701
(') RIT-13702
(') RIT-13704
(') RIT-13706
(') RIT-13708
(') RIT-13703
(') RIT-13705 RIT-13709 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 (200 mR/hr)
( 90mR/hr)
( 90 mR/hr)
(200 mR/hr)
(100 mR/hr)
(100 mR/hr)
( 5 mR/hr)
( 15 mR/hr)
(') RIT-13710 RIT-13711 RIT-13712 RIT-13713
(') RIT-13716
(') RIT-13725 RIT-13726 RIT-13741 Fuel Pool Pp Area(')
RB Sample Station RB Recirc Fan Room New Fuel Crit Mon Rem Shdn Room Access(')
RHR A&C PP Room("
TIP Drive Mech Area TIP Chamber Shield 2.1 2.2 2.3 Check PMS Formats RADRX, RXBE to determine area causing alarm.
Check applicable system operating status.
Check actual Hi Rad Alarm exists. If conditions warrant, PERFORM the following:
2.3.1 Evacuate non-essential personnel from affected area(s).
2.3.2 Notify Health Physics to perform HP-TP-441, ARM Alarm Response and Setpoint Adjustment Requests, for affected area.
Check available area temperature indication for possible pipe line break.'*'
Evaluate EO-1 00-1 04, Secondary Containment Control, for entry conditions.
Evaluate ON-081 -001, Fuel Handling Accident, for entry conditions.
2.4 2.5 2.6 AUTOMATIC ACTION:
Local alarm sounds.
REFERENCE:
(100 mR/hr)
( 15 mR/hr)
( 15 mR/hr)
( 15 mR/hr)
( 5 mR/hr)
(200 mR/hr)
(200 mR/hr)
(300 R/hr) 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 E-323 Sh 10 Schematic Diagram - Annunciator, Unit Operating Benchboard 1 C651 EO-1 00-1 04, Secondary Containment Control IOM 305 Vol IV Part 2, GEK-73599B, Area Radiation Monitoring System J-437 Sh 13-20,22, 28, 37 NSSS Loop Diagram, Area Radiation Monitoring System Ml-D21-3(1) Area Radiation Mon Sys Memo PLA-3279, H. W. Keiser to W. R. Butler, "Proposed Amendment No. 126 to NPF-14 and Proposed Amendment No. 77 to NPF-22 (Emergency Changes)," October 19, 1989.
AR-101-001 Revision 31 Page 35 of 82 C05 TURB BLDG AREA PANEL 1C605 HI RADIATION (C05)
SETPOINT:
Various ORIGIN:
RIT-13707 RIT-13717 RIT-13718 RIT-13719 RIT-13720 RIT-13721 RIT-13722 RIT-13723 R IT-1 3724 RIT-03713
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
High 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 radiation in any of following areas:
TB Offgas Byp Area Condensate Pumps Area RFPT at RB Access SJAE Room Feedwater Heater Area Recirc MG-Set Area Generator Bay Area TB HVAC Equip Room Turbine Front End S&A Bldg TB Acc 729'
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
[7 0
2.2 Check applicable system operating status.
0 2.3.1 Evacuate non-essential personnel from affected area(s).
0 2.1 Check PlCSY Format; Area Radiation Monitoring TB-Bldg (RADTB) to determine area causing alarm.
Check actual Hi Rad Alarm exists. If conditions warrant, perform the following:
2.3.2 2.3 Notify Health Physics to perform HP-TP-441, ARM Alarm Response and Setpoint Adjustment Requests, for affected area.
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
Local alarm sounds.
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 E-323 Sh 10 Schematic Diagram - Annunciator, Unit Operating Benchboard 1C651 IOM 305 Vol IV Part 2, GEK-73599B, Area Radiation Monitoring System J-437 Sh 17, 23-27, 29 NSSS Loop Diagram, Area Radiation Monitoring System M1 -D21-3(1) Area Radiation Mon Sys
MN STM LINE HI HI RADIATION (Dol)
- 1.
- 2.
0
- 3.
- 4.
AR-103-001 Revision 27 Page 18 of 4444 DO1 SETPOINT:
15 times Normal ORIGIN:
RPS Relays 1K7A, C PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 1.2 High-high radiation condition monitored by Channel A or C.
hop condition for Channel A or C instruments (1C606, URR).
1.2.1 Loss of high voltage.
1.2.2 Loss of power to RPS Channel A.
Mode switch not in operate.
1.3 1.4 Faulty or failed instrument.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 2.2 2.3 Validate alarm by observing indication at RR-D12-1 R603, Panel 1C600.
Check Trip Auxiliary Units at SRM/IRM Radiation Monitor Panel 1 C606, Upper Relay Room, to determine which unit(s) caused the alarm.
Radiation increase:
2.3.1 Manually Scram the Reactor.
2.3.2 Confirm automatic actions occurred per ON-1 59-002 Containment Isolation.
Compare reading with other units to determine operability AND Comply with:
actual high radiation condition exists and if power reduction did not stop MSL Manually Close the MSIVs and MSL drains.
2.4 2.5 2.6 cause was RPS power loss, Perform ON-1 58-001, LOSS OF RPS.
2.6.1 TRO 3.3.6 2.6.2 TRO 3.3.1 1 AUTOMATIC ACTION:
None
REFERENCE:
4.1 M1 -C72-22(6) 4.2 E-323 SH 35 4.3 IOM 305
AR-111-001 Revision 29 Page 12 of 3134 C03 MN STM LINE RAD MONITOR HI RADIATION GO31
- 1.
- 2.
0 0
- 3.
- 4.
SETPOINT:
7.5 times Normal Full Power Background ORIGIN:
RIS-D12-1 K603A RIS-D12-1 K603B RIS-D12-1 K603C RIS-D12-1 K603D PROBABLE CAUSE:
Increased radiation levels due to higher power levels and/or fuel cladding failures resulting in releasing fission products.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 2.2 2.3 Observe Main Steam Lines Radiation Monitor RR-D12-1 R603 on Area Proc Rad Recorder Panel 1 C600 to check alarm and trend.
Evaluate entry into ON-179-001, Increasing Offgas/MSL Rad Levels.
IF normal reset does not reset the alarm, the cause may be the MSL Radiation Monitor output is above the reset value. Perform the following to clear this condition.
2.3.1 ComplywithTR3.3.6, 3.3.8, and3.3.11 2.3.2 2.3.3 2.3.4 2.3.5 2.3.6 2.3.7 2.3.8 2.3.9 At RIS-D12-1 K603A(B)(C)(D), Pull out drawer Inside the drawer, Depress the hop Inhibit switch S3 and Keep it depressed through 2.3.7.
Turn Mode switch to the ZERO position Turn Trip Reset switch and Release Turn Mode switch to the OPERATE position Release hop Inhibit switch S3 Turn Trip Reset switch and Release Restore the drawer to the permanent position AUT0,AATIC STION:
None
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-324 Sh 14 4.2 M1 -B21-131(7) 4.3 M1 -D12-2(4) 4.4 M1 -C72-22(11) 4.5 P&ID M-141 4.6 IOM305
STACK MONITORING SYS OC630 / OC677 HI-HI RADIATION AR-015-001 Revision 29 Page 49 of m+Q?
DO4 SETPOINT:
Various and can be obtained from parameter file on a Control Terminal.
ORIGIN:
Control Terminal OC669 or OC677 "High" Alarm
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 1.2 Radiation channel 5 exceeding "Hi Alarm" alarm setpoint listed in parameter files for any Stack Monitor Unit.
Flow Channel(s) 10 (Vent flow) or 11 (Sample flow) exceeding the "Hi Limit" or "Lo Limit" listed in parameter files for any Stack Monitoring Unit.
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 If previous communication with 818 activities identified a high rad movement is to occur on the floor, confirm High rad transfer is in progress. Monitor activity and ensure it returns to normal levels at completion of transfer.
ACKNOWLEDGE "Hi Alarm" at Control Terminal by DEPRESSING green High Alarm indicator.
DETERMINE Alarm validity as follows:
2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 2.2 2.3 IDENTIFY Unit(s) and channel(s) in alarm.
VALIDATE the alarm per OP-179-002 Attachment B.
REVIEW the other Radiation Monitoring instrumentation such as ARMS, Linear and Log Offgas Pretreatment Rad Monitors, Main Steam Line Rad Monitors, and Leak Detection Systems.
EVALUATE ongoing work /plant conditions, particularly work on 818', for its effect on the SPING Field Units, AND VALIDATE with Rad Background readings (FORM OP-179-002 Attachment B).
If the review of Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, other than identified in Step 2.2.4, shows a change in the plant radiological conditions, CONSIDER the alarm VALID.
2.3.6 If Alarm Valid:
2.3.4 2.3.5
- a.
PERFORM ON-070-001.
- b.
C.
- d.
For Reactor Building or SGTS Field Units: EVALUATE Condition for EO-000-1 04 Entry.
EVALUATE data for Entry Conditions into EO-000-1 05.
EVALUATE data for E-plan entry in accordance with EP-PS-100.
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
None
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-331 SH 2 4.2 M-165 4.3 CH-ON-001 SPING Alarm Response 4.4 IOM 599 Eberline System Manual 4.5 TR 3.3.4, 3.11.2.1 & 3.11.2.6 4.6 CH-TP-057 SPING Control Terminal Ops.
AR-015-001 Revision 29 Page 64 of 1024-02 E04 V'
STACK MONITOR I NG SYS OC630 / OC677 HI RADIATION SETPOINT:
Various and can be obtained from parameter file on a Control Terminal ORIGIN:
Control Terminal 06669 or OC677 "Alert" alarm
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 Radiation channel 5 exceeding "Alert" alarm setpoint listed in parameter files for any Stack Monitor Unit.
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 If previous communication with 818 activities identified a high rad movement is to occur on the floor, confirm High rad transfer is in progress. Monitor activity and ensure it returns to normal levels at completion of transfer.
DETERMINE Alarm validity as follows:
2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 2.2.5 2.2.6 IDENTIFY Unit(s) and channel(s) in alarm and.
VALIDATE the alarm per OP-179-002 Attachment B.
REVIEW other Monitoring instrumentation such as ARMS, Linear and Log Offgas Pretreatment Rad Monitors, Main Steam Line Rad Monitors and Leak Detection S ys tern s.
EVALUATE ongoing worklplant conditions particularly work on 81 8', for its effect on the SPING Field Units, AND VALIDATE with Rad Background readings (OP-179-002 Attachment 6).
If review of Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, other than identified in Step 2.1.4, shows a change in the plant radiological conditions, CONSIDER alarm Valid If Alarm Valid:
- b.
C.
- d.
- a.
PERFORM ON-070-001.
For Reactor Building or SGTS Field Units: EVALUATE Condition for EO-000-1 04 Entry.
EVALUATE data for Entry Conditions into EO-000-1 05.
EVALUATE data for E-plan entry in accordance with EP-PS-100.
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
None
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-331 SH 2 4.2 M-165 4.3 CH-ON-001 SPING Alarm Response 4.4 4.5 TR 3.3.4, 3.11.2.1 &3.11.2.6 4.6 IOM 599 Eberline System Manual CH-TP-057 SPING Control Terminal Ops.
MN STEAM LINE LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP (BO31 I
I
- 1.
- 2.
0
- 3.
El
- 4.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
AR-111-001 Revision 29 Page 9 of 3134 b03 SETPOINT:
High T - 174°F (TSH-B21-1 N6OONB)
High AT - 96°F (TDSH-B21-1 N603NB)
High T - 191°F (TSH-101OONB)
ORIGIN:
TSH-B21-1 N600A TSH-B21-1 N600B TDSH-B21-1 N603A TDSH-B21-1 N603B TSH-10100A TSH-IOIOOB 1.1 Break in Main Steam Line in Steam Tunnel.
1.2 Instrument line break on Main Steam Line in Steam Tunnel.
1.3 Ventilation System malfunction.
1.4 Loss of power to 1 Y216.
OPERATOR ACTION:
2.1 2.2 2.3 Check Panel 1C614 to determine source of high temperature or high differential temperature.
Check temperature module for proper operation and alarm setpoint.
E cause was Steam Tunnel High Temperature, and Isolation occurred, Perform ON-1 84-001, Main Steam Line Isolation and Quick Recovery.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
Half of total Leak Detection logic needed to isolate Main Steam Isolation valves and drains is energized. Note: E Loss of power, MSlV Leak Detection channel A and B are disabled.
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-324 Sh 14 4.2 M1 -B21-98(3) 4.3 M1 -C72-22(11) 4.4 M1 -B21-131(7) 4.5 P&ID M-141 4.6 IOM305
AR-112-001 Revision 28 Page 8 of 5s BO3 MN STEAM LINE LEAK DETECTION HI TEMP (BO31 SETPOINT:
High T - 174°F (TSH-B21-1 N6OOC/D)
High AT - 96°F (TDSH-B21-1 N603C/D)
High T - 191°F (TSH-lOlOOC/D)
ORIGIN:
TSH-B21-1 N600C TSH-B21-1 N600D TDSH-B21-1 N603C TDSH-B21-1 N603D TSH-B21-101 OOC TSH-B21-101 OOD
- 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
1.1 1.2 1.3 Ventilation System malfunction.
1.4 Break in Main Steam Line in Steam Tunnel.
Instrument line break on Main Steam Line in Steam Tunnel.
Loss of power to RPS System B.
- 2.
OPERATOR ACTION:
0 0
0 0
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Check Panel 1C614 to determine source of high temperature or high differential temperature.
Check temperature module for proper operation and alarm setpoint.
IF cause was Steam Tunnel High Temperature, and Isolation occurred, Perform ON-1 84-001, Main Steam Line Isolation and Quick Recovery.
IF cause was RPS power loss, PERFORM ON-1 58-001, LOSS OF RPS.
- 3.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
Half of total Leak Detection logic picked up needed to isolate Main Steam Isolation Valves and drains is energized. Note: If loss of power, MSlV Channels C and D are disabled.
- 4.
REFERENCE:
4.1 E-324 Sh 16 4.2 M1 -B21-98(6) 4.3 M1 -B21-131(8) 4.4 Ml-C72-22(11) 4.5 P&ID M-141 4.6 IOM305