ML043550105

November 2004 - Draft Ro/Sro Operating Examination

ML043550105
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	11/18/2004
From:	Gody A Operations Branch IV
To:	Venable J Entergy Operations
References
50-382/04-301 50-382/04-301
Download: ML043550105 (157)

Text

PERFORM A SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALCULATION WITH ONE DROPPED CEA Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area CED Mode SURV Number 4 Revision 4 04/03/2000 Approval rfletch 11/27/2002 Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path No References NUMBER OP-903-090 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-2-12 3.1-001-A4.11 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS Plant is Mode 1, 70% power CEA 1 has dropped and is fully inserted Core Burnup is 330 EFPD RCS Tavg is 565?

RCS boron concentration is 560 ppm INITIATING CUE The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform a Shutdown Margin Calculation for one dropped CEA.

TERMINATING CUE Determine that adequate Shutdown Margin exists for the current power level.

STANDARD Existing power level determined to meet Shutdown Margin power level TOOLS

1. Copy of OP-903-090, Shutdown Margin

2. Copy of the Plant Data Book

3. Copy of Tech Specs

4. Calculator SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Unnecessary emergency boration HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-903-090 section 7.2. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Using current Cycle Burnup and 545oF temperature, determine Net Worth - Worst Rod Stuck Out CRIT (WRSO) from Figure 1.5.6.

CUES: § Cues required for this step are contained in the Initial Conditions STANDARDS: 1. Refer to PDB Figure 1.5.6.2.

2. Use 545°F as Moderator Temperature.

3. Determine Net WRSO CEA Worth = 7.4 to 7.6 %k/k.

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Determine Shutdown Margin required by COLR. CRIT CUES: § Cues required for this step are contained in the Initial Conditions STANDARDS: 1. Review COLR 3.1.1.1. (Not Critical)

2. Determine required SDM of 5.15 %K/K.

SAT______UNSAT______

3. Subtract step 7.2.1.2 from step 7.2.1.1 to determine Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Defect CRIT

%K/K.

CUES: § Cues required for this step are contained in the procedure STANDARDS: 1. Examinee determines the SDM Allowed Power Defect to be 2.25 to 2.45 %K/K SAT______UNSAT______

4. Record current Reactor Power on Attachment 10.2. CRIT CUES: § Cues required for this step are contained in the Initial Conditions STANDARDS: § Examinee records 70 percent from Initial Conditions SAT______UNSAT______

5. Using result from Step 7.2.1.3 and Power Defect vs. Power Level, Figure 1.2.1, Determine CRIT Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Level.

CUES: § Cues required for this step are contained in the procedure STANDARDS: 1. Refer to PDB Figure 1.2.1.1

- Using MOC curve, determine allowable power level of 100%

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

6. Verify Shutdown Margin is greater than or equal to that required by the COLR by verifying that CRIT current Reactor Power is less than or equal to the Shutdown Margin Allowed Power Level.

CUES: § Cues required for this step are contained in the procedure STANDARDS: Examinee determines that SDM is met and circles "Yes" on the data sheet.

SAT______UNSAT______

7. If Shutdown Margin does not meet requirements of Technical Specifications, then commence CRIT emergency boration and go to OP-901-103, Emergency Boration.

CUES: § Cues required for this step are contained in the procedure STANDARDS: Examinee determines that this step is not applicable.

SAT______UNSAT______

8. End of Task STOP TIME__________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS Plant is Mode 1, 70% power CEA 1 has dropped and is fully inserted Core Burnup is 330 EFPD RCS Tavg is 565?

RCS boron concentration is 560 ppm INITIATING CUE The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform a Shutdown Margin Calculation for one dropped CEA.

DETERMINE ALLOWABLE POWER ASCENSION RATE USING FUEL PRECONDITIONING GUIDELINES Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area PPN Mode NORM Number 1 Revision 4 04/03/2000 Approval rfletch2 Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path No References NUMBER OP-010-004 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-1.7 2-1-23 3.2-002-A1.06 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. On 11/17/2004 the plant was performing initial power ascension following a 15 day refueling outage.

2. Power was stabilized at 60% at 1600 11/17/2004 to perform startup of the second Main Feedwater Pump.

3. During the FWPT startup, speed control problems were experienced and the decision was made to hold power at 60% while repairing the pump.

4. At 2300 the reactor was manually tripped when the running FWPT tripped due to a self checking error by maintenance personnel.

5. The FWPT speed control was subsequently repaired and reached the POAH at 1600 on 11/18/2004

6. A power ascension to 100% is planned.

INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to review the Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines and determine the power ascension rate limits between the POAH and 100%.

TERMINATING CUE Recommendation given for Power ascension rates.

STANDARD Power ascension rate recommendation is in accordance with OP-010-004.

TOOLS OP-010-004, Att.9.6, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS None PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES

1. Possible fuel damage HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES None

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-010-004, Att. 9.6. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Candidate makes recommendation for power ascension rate limits in accordance with OP-010-004. CRIT CUES: § None STANDARDS: § Candidate determines the following power ascension rate limits:

o No limits per Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines between POAH and 50%

(Not Critical) o Between 50% and 60% power ascension rate limit is 30%/hr o Between 60%-90% power ascension rate limit is 3%/hr SAT______UNSAT______

2. End of Task STOP TIME_________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. On 11/17/2004 the plant was performing initial power ascension following a 15 day refueling outage.

2. Power was stabilized at 60% at 1600 11/17/2004 to perform startup of the second Main Feedwater Pump.

3. During the FWPT startup, speed control problems were experienced and the decision was made to hold power at 60% while repairing the pump.

4. At 2300 the reactor was manually tripped when the running FWPT tripped due to a self checking error by maintenance personnel.

5. The FWPT speed control was subsequently repaired and reached the POAH at 1600 on 11/18/2004

6. A power ascension to 100% is planned.

INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to review the Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines and determine the power ascension rate limits between the POAH and 100%.

PERFORM A REVIEW OF A TAGOUT Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area PPA Mode ADMIN Number 9 Revision 0 9/27/2004 Approval rfletch2 Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path No References NUMBER OP-102 UNT-005-003 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-2-13 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A tagout has been prepared for Emergency Feedwater Pump A and is ready for review INITIATING CUE A tagout has been prepared for Emergency Feedwater Pump A and is ready for review. You are directed by the Work Management Center Supervisor to review the tagout for adequacy.

TERMINATING CUE Tagout has been reviewed STANDARD Tagout has been reviewed. Four major errors are identified.

TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Damage to equipment or injury to plant personnel HUMAN INTERFACES SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-102 and UNT-005-003. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Reviews tagout for adequacy on plant operation. CRIT CUES: CRS acknowledges errors in tagout STANDARDS: § The following major errors are found o Tech Spec Impact Attribute answered as None o Minimum flow recirc valve position is incorrect o Power Supply breaker is the incorrect train o Placement sequence is incorrect SAT______UNSAT______

5. End of Task STOP TIME __________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A tagout has been prepared for Emergency Feedwater Pump A and is ready for review INITIATING CUE A tagout has been prepared for Emergency Feedwater Pump A and is ready for review. You are directed by the Work Management Center Supervisor to review the tagout for adequacy.

ACTIVATE THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS)

Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area SPD Mode EMERG Number 3 Revision 4 04/03/2000 Approval rfletch2 Estimated Time 5 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path No References NUMBER EP-001-020 EP-001-030 EP-001-040 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-4-43 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS An Alert has been declared.

INITIATING CUE The Emergency Coordinator (SM) has instructed you to activate ERDS. Steps prior to actual activation will be performed. Simulate Actuation step and expected indications.

TERMINATING CUE ERDS is activated STANDARD ERDS is activated TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES NONE HUMAN INTERFACES EC/SM SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with EP-001-020, Attachment 7.3. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. From the SDS press the ESC key to return to the Main Menu if applicable CUES: § SDS terminal Provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee locates Shift Manager SDS Terminal

§ Examinee depresses ESC key if Main Menu not displayed

§ Examinee verifies Main Menu is displayed Step critical if Main Menu is not displayed SAT______UNSAT______

2. From the Main Menu click once on NSSS touch area CRIT CUES: § SDS terminal provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee selects NSSS area

§ NSSS area is displayed SAT______UNSAT______

3. From the NSSS Menu click once on the ERDS touch area CRIT CUES: § SDS terminal provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee selects ERDS touch area SAT______UNSAT______

4. From the ERDS Password Menu, type ERDS, then press ENTER and then press F1 CRIT CUES: § SDS terminal provides visual cues Examiner Cue: All steps from this point forward will be simulated and discussed.

STANDARDS: § Examinee types ERDS in password Menu

§ Examinee presses ENTER

§ Examinee pressing F1

§ Examinee observes ERDS Communication Task is INACTIVE on STATUS menu SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

5. Click once on ACTIVATE under Actions CRIT CUES: § All expected messages are displayed STANDARDS: § Examinee simulates clicking on ACTIVATE, under actions

§ Examinee discusses the following expected indications

§ MODEM displays Disconnected

§ ERDS COMPUTER displays Terminated

§ COMMUNICATION TASK displays ACTIVE SAT______UNSAT______

6. When the NRC ERDS answers the phone call from the Waterford 3 computer, the MODEM communication sequence progress: With NO FAILURE as follows OK DIALING RINGING ANSWER CONNECT CUES:

• All expected messages are displayed STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies communication sequence with no failure is progressing by verifying expected messages SAT______UNSAT______

7. After a successful connection with the NRC ERDS computer, then a CONNECT will be displayed on the MODEM status and the COMMUNICATION TASK will change to LINK REQUESTED CUES: § All expected messages are displayed STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies successful connection with NRC computer by CONNECT displayed on MODEM status and COMMUNICATION TASK displays LINK REQUESTED SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

8. After the Link Request is accepted, then the ERDS COMPUTER status will change from TERMINATED to ACCEPT and the COMMUNICATION TASK status will change to TRANSMITTING, as shown below:

• MODEM Connect

• ERDS COMPUTER Accepted

• COMMUNICATION TASK Transmitting CUES: § All expected messages are displayed STANDARDS: Examinee verifies ERDS COMPUTER status changes from TERMINATED to ACCEPTED and the COMMUNICATION TASK status will change to TRANSMITTING, as shown below:

§ MODEM Connect

§ ERDS COMPUTER Accepted

§ COMMUNICATION TASK Transmitting SAT______UNSAT______

9. The ERDS link is now established. Press the ESC key to return to the PMC Main Menu CUES: § Emergency Coordinator acknowledges that ERDS is activated STANDARDS: § Examinee notifies Emergency Coordinator the ERDS is activated SAT______UNSAT______

10. End of Task STOP TIME __________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS An Alert has been declared.

INITIATING CUE The Emergency Coordinator (SM) has instructed you to activate ERDS. Steps prior to actual activation will be performed. Simulate and discuss Actuation step and expected indications.

REVIEW AN ESTIMATED CRITICAL CONFIGURATION Site W3 Job SRO System / Duty Area RCS Mode Surv Number 66 Revision 1 07/02/1995 Approval tbrown Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path No References NUMBER OP-004-019 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-2-12 3.1-001-A4.10 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A reactor startup will be performed.

2. An ECC has been calculated.

3. The reactor was shutdown at 1200 on 11/14/04 after 200 days at 100% RTP.

4. Estimated time of startup is 1200 on 11/16/04.

5. Current Cycle Burnup is 330 EFPD.

6. The reactor is planned to go critical at 75 on Group P (Papa).

7. Reactor Engineering has provided a Reactivity Bias Factor of -0.32 INITIATING CUE You are the Admin CRS, review the ECC for accuracy.

TERMINATING CUE The ECC has been reviewed STANDARD The ECC has been reviewed for accuracy, Inaccuracies are discovered.

TOOLS Plant Data Book OP-004-019, Estimated Critical Configuration SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS None PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Unexpected criticality HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-004-019, section 6.1and Attachment 11.1 Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Review logged data on the provided ECC. CRIT CUES: Supply examinee with copy of completed of OP-004-019, Attachment 11.1 for review STANDARDS: Examinee identifies the following 4 errors in the ECC.

• HZP Inverse Differential Boron Worth - Step 6.1.2.2 value should be 123-125 ppm/% k/k

• CEA Worth for CEA Position - Step 6.1.2.5.1 value should be 0.30-0.31 % k/k

• Reactivity Bias Factor - Step 6.1.2.5.2 value should be -0.32 % k/k

• Estimated Xenon Worth - Step 6.1.2.6 value should be 0.5-0.6 %?k/k NOTE: Other values on the ECC will be in error as a result of the above errors SAT______UNSAT______

3. End of Task STOP TIME____________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A reactor startup will be performed.

2. An ECC has been calculated.

3. The reactor was shutdown at 1200 on 11/14/04 after 200 days at 100% RTP.

4. Estimated time of startup is 1200 on 11/16/04.

5. Current Cycle Burnup is 330 EFPD.

6. The reactor is planned to go critical at 75 on Group P (Papa).

7. Reactor Engineering has provided a Reactivity Bias Factor of -0.32 INITIATING CUE You are the Admin CRS, review the ECC for accuracy.

DETERMINE SURVEILLANCES REQUIRED TO BE PERFORMED TO RECOMMENCE CORE ALTERATIONS Site W3 Job SRO System / Duty Area RF Mode ADMIN Number 1 Revision 4 04/03/2000 Approval rfletch 04/05/2000 Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path No References NUMBER RF-004-001 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-2-26 2-1-20 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The current date and time is 11/16/04 at 1200

2. The reactor was shutdown on 10/27/04 at 0433

3. A Precore Alteration Checklist was last completed on 11/14/04

4. Core Alterations were suspended today 0900 due to loss of communications

5. The Tech Spec LCO Action has since been exited

6. The Refueling Crew is scheduled to re-commence core alterations at 1600

7. OP-903-001, Tech Spec Logs Att. 11.2, Mode 5-6 Tech Spec Logs was completed at 0200 (all appropriate portions were completed SAT)

INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager directs you to review the remaining surveillances on the Precore Alterations Checklist and either sign-off the surveillances or determine which surveillances still need to be performed.

TERMINATING CUE Examinee has determined the surveillances that are required to be performed to meet the Precore Alteration Checklist.

STANDARD Examinee determines that the following surveillances are required OP-903-101 OP-903-072 OP-903-075 OP-903-001, Att. 11.2 (all Mode 6)

Communications check (within one hour prior to starting core alts)

Refueling Water level (within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of start)

TOOLS

1. Copy of RF-004-001 Attachment 9.5 partially filled out

2. Handout with completion dates, next due date, late date supplied by Tech Spec Surveillance Coordinator

3. OP-903-001, Att. 11.2, Mode 5-6,Tech Spec Logs with 0000 portion filled out.

4. OP-903-001, Att. 11.13, Refuel Tech Spec Addendum Logs filled out SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS None PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Potential to move irradiated fuel bundles without required protective barriers in place.

HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INSTRUCTOR NOTES None

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with RF-004-001 Attachment 7.5. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Review all of the completion dates for the surveillances listed in Attachment 7.5, Precore Alteration CRIT Checklist CUES: § Supply Examinee with a copies of:

§ Copy of RF-004-001 Attachment 9.5 partially filled out

§ Handout with completion dates, next due date, late date supplied by Tech Spec Surveillance Coordinator

§ OP-903-001, Att. 11.2, Mode 5-6,Tech Spec Logs with 0000 portion filled out.

§ OP-903-001, Att. 11.13, Refuel Tech Spec Addendum Logs filled out Examinee determines that the following surveillances and checks need to be performed STANDARDS:

at a minimum

a. Examinee determines that the following surveillances are required

1. OP-903-101

2. OP-903-072

3. OP-903-075

4. OP-903-001, Att. 11.2 (all Mode 6)

§ Communications check (within one hour prior to starting core alts)

§ Refueling Water level (within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of start)

SAT______UNSAT______

2. End of Task STOP TIME ________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The current date and time is 11/16/04 at 1200

2. The reactor was shutdown on 10/27/04 at 0433

3. A Precore Alteration Checklist was last completed on 11/14/04

4. Core Alterations were suspended today 0900 due to loss of communications

5. The Tech Spec LCO Action has since been exited

6. The Refueling Crew is scheduled to re-commence core alterations at 1600

7. OP-903-001, Tech Spec Logs Att. 11.2, Mode 5-6 Tech Spec Logs was completed at 0200 (all appropriate portions were completed SAT)

INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager directs you to review the remaining surveillances on the Precore Alterations Checklist and either sign-off the surveillances or determine which surveillances still need to be performed.

Review and Approve an EOS Site W3 Job SRO System / Duty Area PPA Mode ADMIN Number 1 Revision 3 06/28/03 Approval rfletch2 Estimated Time 15 Minutes Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path No References NUMBER OP-100-010 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-2-23 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. HPSI pump A tripped on overcurrent.

2. Reactor Power is 100 percent

3. Risk Assessment EOOS has been updated INITIATING CUE You are directed by the Shift Manager to review an EOS for HPSI pump A for accuracy TERMINATING CUE EOS checklist reviewed STANDARD 4 of 5 errors identified on EOS checklist TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES

1. TECH SPEC VIOLATION

2. PROCEDURE VIOLATION HUMAN INTERFACES SM SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES PROVIDE COMPLETED COPY OF OP-100 -010 ATTACHMENT 7.2 CONTAINING FIVE ERRORS

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-100 -010, Section 5.3. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_______

1. Review EOS Checklist for errors CUES: § None STANDARDS: § Examinee recognizes 4 of the following 5 errors CRIT

§ Examinee recognizes Mode in block 4 is incorrect, correct Mode is Mode 1.

§ Examinee recognizes Mode changes allowed in block 5 is incorrect, T.S. 3.0.4 applies.

§ Examinee recognizes justification in block 20 and TS/TRM entry guideline has incorrect action being entered, correct action is 3.5.2.b

§ Examinee recognizes Attachment 7.1 TS/TRM entry guideline for TS 3.3.2, Engineering Safeguards is not applicable, TS 3.3.2 is instrumentation.

§ Examinee recognizes T.S. 3.8.4.1 Overcurrent Protective Device checked incorrect, this is for containment penetrations SAT___UNSAT___

2. END OF TASK STOP TIME_______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. HPSI pump A tripped on overcurrent.

2. Reactor Power is 100 percent

3. Risk Assessment EOOS has been updated INITIATING CUE You are directed by the Shift Manager to review an EOS for HPSI pump A for accuracy

DETERMINE ACTIONS/RESTRICTIONS REQUIRED FOR CONTAINMENT ENTRY AT POWER Site W3 Job SRO System / Duty Area PPA Mode ADMIN Number 24 Revision 4 04/03/2000 Approval rletch2 Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path No References NUMBER HP-001-213 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-1-8 2-3-10 3.5-103-K3.02 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The plant is at 30 percent power and stable.

2. 1.5 gpm unidentified leakage has been confirmed by an RCS Leakrate Calculation.

3. An unplanned containment entry at power is required.

4. The Reactor Containment Building Power Entry/Exit Checklist and RP paperwork will be filled out following the initial containment entry.

5. Air samples have been taken and SCBAs are not required.

6. The following areas are to be inspected during the initial entry:

- -11, -4, +21, +35 areas outside the D-Rings

- +46 Walkways greater than 15 from the Refueling Cavity

- Above the +46 elevation on Main Steam Crossovers

- Pressurizer Cubicle

- Regenerative HX Room

- -11 elev of RCP 1A Pump Bay INITIATING CUE As Shift Manager determine stay times for OPS personnel, areas that should have RP superintendent authorization prior to entry, and areas that Operators shall not enter in Mode 1.

TERMINATING CUE Candidate has reviewed HP-001-213 and determined requested information.

STANDARD Determines stay times, restricted areas, and prohibited areas have been determined TOOLS HP-001-213, Control of Reactor Containment Building Power Entries SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS None PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Personnel Hazards - overexposure, heat stress HUMAN INTERFACES RP SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES None INSTRUCTOR NOTES None

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with HP-001-213. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Using the guidance in HP-001-213, the candidate determines stay times for OPS personnel. CRIT CUES: § Cues provided by Initial Conditions and procedure STANDARDS: § The examinee determines following stay times apply:

o 45 Minutes total stay time o 20 minutes total of 45 minute stay time spent in PZR cubicle and Regenerative Heat Exchanger Room SAT______UNSAT______

2. Using the guidance in HP-001-213, the candidate determines areas that should have RP CRIT superintendent authorization prior to entry.

CUES: § Cues provided by Initial Conditions and procedure STANDARDS: § The examinee determines the following areas require RP Superintendent or designee approval to enter unless mitigating accidents o -11 elevation areas outside the D-rings o -11 elevation RCP 1A Pump Bay o Regenerative Heat Exchanger Room SAT______UNSAT______

3. Using the guidance in HP-001-213, the candidate determines stay times for OPS personnel, areas CRIT that should have RP superintendent authorization prior to entry, and areas that Operators shall not enter in Mode 1 CUES: § Cues provided by procedure STANDARDS: § The Examinee determines that the following areas are forbidden to be entered in Mode 1

o Reactor Vessel Annulus o Hot and Cold Leg Penetration through D-Ring wall o Reactor Cavity SAT______UNSAT______

2. End of task.

STOP TIME ________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The plant is at 30 percent power and stable.

2. 1.5 gpm unidentified leakage has been confirmed by an RCS Leakrate Calculation.

3. An unplanned containment entry at power is required.

4. The Reactor Containment Building Power Entry/Exit Checklist and RP paperwork will be filled out following the initial containment entry.

5. Air samples have been taken and SCBAs are not required.

6. The following areas are to be inspected during the initial entry:

- -11, -4, +21, +35 areas outside the D-Rings

- +46 Walkways greater than 15 from the Refueling Cavity

- Above the +46 elevation on Main Steam Crossovers

- Pressurizer Cubicle

- Regenerative HX Room

- -11 elev of RCP 1A Pump Bay INITIATING CUE As Shift Manager determine stay times for OPS personnel, areas that should have RP superintendent authorization prior to entry, and areas that Operators shall not enter in Mode 1.

REVIEW AND APPROVE NOTIFICATION MESSAGE FORM Site W3 Job SRO System / Duty Area EP Mode EMERG Number 10 Revision 10 09/27/2004 Approval rfletch Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path No References NUMBER EP-002-210 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-4-30 2-4-40 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. An emergency event has occurred.

2. The reactor was tripped at 1350 on 11/16/04 due to inability to maintain Pzr level with all three charging pumps operating.

3. You declared a Site Area Emergency at 1400 11/16/04 under Tab B - B/SAE/I, RCS leakage > available Charging Pump capacity (LOCA or Steam Generator Tube Rupture).

4. A release is occurring through one failed open Steam Generator Safety Valve on the ruptured Steam Generator (SG 1).

5. MSL 1 Radiation Monitor Reading is 2.0E+01 mR/hr.

6. 15 Minute Met Data shows Wind Direction from 220 degrees at 4.5 miles/hr.33-199 Delta T is 3.0 ºC.

7. No precipitation is occurring at this time.

8. Initial Dose Assessment show no Protective Action Recommendations required.

9. A repair team is being dispatched to gag the faulty safety valve.

10. Total release duration is estimated to be approximately 1 hr.

INITIATING CUE Review and approve the Notification Message Form TERMINATING CUE The Notification Message Form has been reviewed STANDARD The candidate finds 4 errors on the Notification Message Form TOOLS None SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS None PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES

1. Inaccurate conditions given to the parishes to base protective actions for their citizens.

HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES None

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with EP-002-210 Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Candidate reviews provided Notification Message Form. CRIT CUES: § Provided in Initial Conditions STANDARDS: § Candidate finds at least 4 errors on form:

o Emergency Classification is checked off as an Alert vice Site Area Emergency in Step 3.

o Nothing is filled in for Step 5 0. No protective actions should be checked.

o Reactor Shutdown is checked off as No in Step 7.

o Wind Direction is filled in as 120 degrees vice 220 degrees in Step 8A.

This results in wrong sectors affected in Step 8B. The correct sectors are B, C, and D. Credit should be given for either the wind direction or the affected sectors but not both.

o Estimated release duration is listed as 2 hrs vice 1 hr in Step 9B.

2. End of Task STOP TIME_________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. An emergency event has occurred.

2. The reactor was tripped at 1350 on 11/16/04 due to inability to maintain Pzr level with all three charging pumps operating.

3. You declared a Site Area Emergency at 1400 11/16/04 under Tab B - B/SAE/I, RCS leakage > available Charging Pump capacity (LOCA or Steam Generator Tube Rupture).

4. A release is occurring through one failed open Steam Generator Safety Valve on the ruptured Steam Generator (SG 1).

5. MSL 1 Radiation Monitor Reading is 2.0E+01 mR/hr.

6. 15 Minute Met Data shows Wind Direction from 220 degrees at 4.5 miles/hr.33-199 Delta T is 3.0 ºC.

7. No precipitation is occurring at this time.

8. Initial Dose Assessment shows that no Protective Action Recommendations are required.

9. A repair team is being dispatched to gag the faulty safety valve.

10. Total release duration is estimated to be approximately 1 hr.

INITIATING CUE Review and approve the Notification Message Form.

MAKEUP TO THE VCT USING THE AUTO MAKEUP MODE Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area CVC Mode NORM Number 9 Revision 4 04/03/2000 Approval rfletch 04/05/2000 Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path Yes References NUMBER OP-002-005 NRC KA Number NUMBER 3.2-004-A3.01 3.2-004-A4.04 3.2-004-A4.07 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The plant is Shutdown

2. RCS boron concentration is 1346 ppm

3. BAMT A concentration is 5850 ppm

4. BAMT Pump A is selected for Makeup INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to perform an automatic makeup to the VCT using BAM Tank A TERMINATING CUE

1. VCT makeup has been restored to manual STANDARD

1. Automatic makeup to VCT performed and system restored to manual makeup mode TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES

1. ABNORMAL VCT LEVEL

2. INADVERTENT BORATION OR DILUTION OF RCS HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-002-005, Section 8.8 and Attachment 11.5. All components operated during the performance of this JPM are located on CP-4. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Inform SM/CRS prior to performing this section.

CUES: § When operator notifies SM/CRS, perform paraphrased repeatback STANDARDS: § The operator informs the CRS that he is commencing alignment for automatic makeup to the VCT.

SAT______UNSAT______

2. At SM/CRS discretion, calculate the boric acid flow rate to be used on att. 11.5, calculation of boric acid flow rate for VCT blended makeup.

CUES: § Cue the operator that blend rate has been calculated to be 50 gpm PMU to 15.0 gpm Boric Acid.

§ Hand the candidate the completed copy of OP-002-005, Att.11.5 STANDARDS: § Operator acknowledges given flowrates SAT______UNSAT______

3. Verify direct boration valve, BAM-143, control switch in CLOSE.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § The operator locates the control switch for BAM-143 on CP-4 and verifies it is positioned to CLOSE SAT______UNSAT______

4. Verify Boric Acid Makeup Pump Selector Switch aligned to desired Boric Acid Makeup Pump.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § The operator verifies that the BAM Pump Selector Switch is selected to BAMT A SAT______UNSAT______

5. Place Boric Acid Flow Controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, in AUTO. CRIT CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § The Operator depresses the auto pushbutton on controller BAM-IFIC-0210Y

§ Operator verifies that BAM-IFIC-0210Y red auto light illuminates.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

6. Set boric acid flow controller, BAM-IFIC-0210Y, setpoint potentiometer to > 3 gpm flow rate.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues CRIT STANDARDS: § The operator rotates the setpoint potentiometer on BAM-IFIC-0210Y to raise the Boric Acid flow setpoint to the value calculated in Att.11.5 of OP-002-005.

§ The operator observes BAM-IFR-0210Y green pen and observes setpoint at ~ 15 gpm

§ The operator ensures that setpoint is > 3 gpm.

SAT______UNSAT______

7. Place Primary Makeup Flow Controller PMU-IFIC-0210X in AUTO. CRIT CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § The Operator depresses the AUTO pushbutton on controller PMU-IFIC-0210X

§ Operator verifies that red AUTO light illuminates.

SAT______UNSAT______

8. Set primary makeup flow controller PMU-IFIC-0210X setpoint potentiometer to > 5 gpm flow rate. CRIT CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § The Operator rotates the setpoint potentiometer on PMU-IFIC-0210X to raise the PMU flow setpoint to the value used in att.11.5 of OP-002-005.

§ The operator observes PMU-IFR-0210X green pen and observes setpoint at ~ 50 gpm

§ The operator ensures that setpoint is > 10 gpm.

SAT______UNSAT______

9. Place makeup MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to AUTO. CRIT CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § The operator rotates the makeup MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to the AUTO position.

§ If makeup is initiated the Operator verifies the selected BAM A Pump starts, CVC-510 opens, and controllers are controlling flows at respective setpoints or takes manual control and adjusts flow to setpoint value.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

10. While VCT makeup is in the automatic mode, monitor the following for proper indications:

§ count rate,

§ Reactor Power,

§ VCT level and pressure,

§ primary makeup water flow rate,

§ and boric acid flow rate.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § The operator informs the CRS that automatic makeup to the VCT is aligned.

§ If VCT Makeup is in progress the Operator monitors listed parameters on CP-4 and CP-2 SAT______UNSAT______

11. (ALT) Check VCT level periodically to verify makeup system is maintaining proper VCT level. CRIT CUES: § Simulator provides cues; (ALT) BAM pump A trips STANDARDS: § The operator verifies that the auto makeup system controls VCT level between 37%

and 51%.

§ (ALT) Examinee determines need to secure auto makeup to prevent dilution.

SAT______UNSAT______

12. (ALT) When the Auto Makeup Mode to the VCT is no longer desired, then perform the following:

Place MAKEUP MODE SELECTOR SWITCH in MANUAL.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § The operator rotates the MAKEUP MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to the MANUAL CRIT position.

§ This step is NOT critical if Examinee places PMU-IFIC-0210X in manual and lowers output to zero. Either action prevents dilution SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

13. (ALT) Verify CVC-510 CLOSED.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues CRIT STANDARDS: § Examinee rotates switch for CVC-510 to CLOSED position

§ Examinee verifies CVC-510 green CLOSED light illuminated.

§ This step is NOT critical if examinee places PMU-IFIC-0210X in manual and lowers output to zero. Either action prevents dilution SAT______UNSAT______

14. (ALT) Places PMU-IFIC-0210X in MANUAL CRIT CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee depresses manual pushbutton PMU-IFIC-0210X

§ Examinee verifies red MAN light illuminated,

§ Examinee verifies red AUTO light extinguished

§ This step is NOT critical if Examinee places Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL and closes CVC-510. Either action prevents dilution SAT______UNSAT______

15. (ALT) Adjust PMU-IFIC-0210X setpoint to zero.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee rotates PMU-IFIC-0210X potentiometer to zero

§ Examinee verifies PMU-IFIC-0210X setpoint indicates zero.

SAT______UNSAT______

16. (ALT) Verify PMU-144 closed.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee lowers output of PMU-IFIC-0210X to zero.

§ Examinee verifies PMU-144 green CLOSED light illuminated,

§ Examinee verifies PMU-144 red OPEN light extinguished.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

17. (ALT) Place boric acid flow controller BAM-IFIC-0210Y in manual.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee depresses BAM-IFIC-0210Y MANUAL pushbutton

§ Examinee verifies red MAN light illuminated,

§ Examinee verifies red AUTO light extinguished.

SAT______UNSAT______

18. (ALT) Adjust BAM-IFIC-0210Y setpoint potentiometer to zero.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee rotates BAM-IFIC-0210Y potentiometer to zero

§ Examinee verifies BAM-IFIC-0210Y setpoint indicates zero.

SAT______UNSAT______

19. (ALT) Verify boric acid makeup control valve BAM-141 CLOSED.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues

§ (NOTE; Notify Operator that another Operator will align to flush MU line)

STANDARDS: § Examinee lowers output of BAM-IFIC-0210Y to zero.

§ Examinee verifies PMU-144 green CLOSED light illuminated,

§ Examinee verifies PMU-144 red OPEN light extinguished.

SAT______UNSAT______

20. End of task.

STOP TIME ________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The plant is Shutdown

2. RCS boron concentration is 1346 ppm

3. BAMT A concentration is 5850 ppm

4. BAMT Pump A is selected for Makeup INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to perform an automatic makeup to the VCT using BAM Tank A

Perform PNPO Immediate Actions on CR Evacuation Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area PPO Mode OFFNORM Number 4 Revision 4 04/03/2000 Approval rfletch 04/05/2000 Estimated Time 5 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path YES References NUMBER OP-901-502 NRC KA Number NUMBER 4.2-A68-AK3.12 4.2-A68-AA1.14 2.4.49 Evaluation Methods METHOD SIMULATE Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Reactor power is at 100 %

2. (ALT) A fire has occurred in Control Room Panel CP-1

3. Control Room Evacuation has been ordered INITIATING CUE Perform Immediate Operator Actions as Primary NPO for Control Room Evacuation per OP-901-502 TERMINATING CUE

1. IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS are taken

2. Exiting Control Room for + 21 RAB STANDARD

1. All IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS for PNPO are taken within 15 minutes TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES

1. Reactor not tripped - potential for fuel damage HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-901-502 Section D. 1.1-1.5. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Trip the Reactor.

CUES: § Cue: Reactor is tripped, Reactor Power is lowering, and Startup Rate is CRIT negative.

STANDARDS: § Examinee (Simulates) depresses 2 REACTOR TRIP pushbuttons on CP-2 or CP-8.

§ The examinee attempts to verify Startup Rate is negative on CP-2

§ The examinee attempts to verify Reactor Power is lowering on CP-2 SAT______UNSAT______

2. Verify ALL CEAs fully inserted.

CUES: § Cue: All CEAs fully inserted. CRIT STANDARDS: § The examinee (Simulates) attempts to verify ALL CEAs fully inserted by verifying at least one of the following:

o All Amber Rod Bottom lights LIT on CP-2, o All CEA lower Electrical Limit lights green on CEDMCS Control Panel on CP-2, o CEAC CRT shows all CEAs inserted on CP-2 SAT______UNSAT______

3. Verify Spray Valves selector switch in BOTH. CRIT CUES: § Cue: Spray Valves Selector Switch in BOTH.

STANDARDS: § The examinee (Simulates) verifies Spray Valves Selector switch in BOTH on CP-2 SAT______UNSAT______

4. (ALT) Trip ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps.

CUES: § Cue: All Reactor Coolant Pumps are tripped. CRIT STANDARDS: § The examinee simulates rotating at least one control switch for 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B RCP Oil Lift Pumps to START, verifies red START light lit, green TRIP light out.

(NOTE: Performance of this step is NOT Critical)

§ The examinee (Simulates) attempts to place control switches for 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B Reactor Coolant Pumps to STOP. Verifies green STOP lights lit red START lights out.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

5. (ALT) Simultaneously secure Charging AND Letdown by performing the following: Close CRIT CVC-101, Letdown Stop Valve.

CUES: § Cue: CVC-101, Letdown Stop Valve is closed.

STANDARDS: § The examinee (Simulates) attempts to rotate control switch for CVC-101, Letdown Stop Valve to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSED light lit and red OPEN light off on CP-4.

NOTE: This step is only CRITICAL if the candidate does not simulate closing CVC-103 SAT______UNSAT______

6. (ALT) Simultaneously secure Charging AND Letdown by performing the following: Close CRIT CVC-103, Letdown Inside Containment Isolation.

CUES: § CUE: CVC-103, Letdown Inside Containment Isolation is CLOSED.

STANDARDS: § The examinee (Simulates) attempts to rotate control switch for CVC-103, Letdown Inside Containment Isolation to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSED light lit and red OPEN light off on CP-4 NOTE: This step is only CRITICAL if the candidate does not simulate closing CVC-101 SAT______UNSAT______

7. (ALT) Simultaneously secure Charging AND Letdown by performing the following: Place ALL CRIT Charging Pumps in OFF.

CUES: § CUE: ALL Charging Pumps in OFF.

STANDARDS: § The examinee (Simulates) attempts to place control switches for all Charging Pumps to OFF, verifies green OFF light lit and red START light off on CP-4 SAT______UNSAT______

8. Obtain Operations Security Key Ring AND proceed to LCP-43. CRIT CUES: § Cue: Examinee has obtained required keys.

STANDARDS: § Examinee (Simulates) locates Security Keys from Shift Managers office and states he/she will enter the LCP-43 ROOM on +21 RAB.

§ ( NOTE; JPM may be terminated when examinee has obtained keys and states he/she will go to LCP-43)

SAT______UNSAT______

9. End of Task.

STOP TIME _________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Reactor power is at 100 %

2. A fire has occurred in Control Room Panel CP-1

3. Control Room Evacuation has been ordered INITIATING CUE Perform Immediate Operator Actions as Primary NPO for Control Room Evacuation per OP-901-502

Perform Anticipated Transient System Check Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area ATS Mode SURV Number 1 Revision 0 06/17/2003 Approval rfletch 06/17/2003 Estimated Time 15 Minutes Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path NO References NUMBER OP-904-017 NRC KA Number NUMBER 3.7-012-A4.04 3.7 012-A2.03 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The plant is in Mode 3 shutdown for refueling

2. Both CEA MG SETS are operating INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to perform a DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION TEST per OP-904-017, Section 7.3 TERMINATING CUE

1. Proper indication documented on OP-904-017, Attachment 10.3 STANDARD

1. DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION successfully completed TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES

1. DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION SYTEM INOPERABILITY HUMAN INTERFACES

1. CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES Copy of OP-904-017, Attachment 10.3 with SM/CRS signoff completed given to examinee.

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-904-017, Section 7.3. ALL Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME__________

1. Verify MG SET LOAD CONTACTOR indications CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies MG SET A LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55842 indicates closed

§ Examinee verifies MG SET B LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55843 indicates closed SAT_____ UNSAT______

2. If DRTS select switch is not in ENABLE, then perform the following:

§ Verify annunciator Diverse Reactor Trip Active/ Trouble K-4, Cabinet M clear

§ Verify annunciator Diverse Reactor Trip L-4, Cabinet M clear

§ Place Diverse Reactor Trip System Select Switch in ENABLE Verify Diverse Reactor Trip System Select Switch ENABLE Red light illuminated CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Candidate verifies annunciator DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE K-4, Cabinet M clear

§ Candidate verifies annunciator DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP L-4, Cabinet M clear

§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH in ENABLE

§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP red ENABLE light illuminated on CP-2 SAT_____ UNSAT______

3. Depress and release DRT 1 of 2 pushbutton CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee depresses and releases DRT 1 of 2 pushbutton on CP-2 SAT_____ UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

4. Verify :

§ DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE (K-4, cabinet M) in alarm

§ DRT white ACTIVE lights illuminated

§ AUX PANEL 4 terminal DH99 to DH108 voltage indicate approximately 120VAC

§ MG SET A and B load contactors closed CUES: § PMI informs examinee that voltage between Aux Panel 4 terminals DH99 and DH108 indicates 120VAC STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE (K-4, cabinet M) in alarm

§ Examinee verifies DRT white ACTIVE lights illuminated

§ Examinee calls PMI for AUX PANEL 4 terminal DH99-DH108 voltage readings

§ Examinee verifies MG SET A LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55842 indicates closed

§ Examinee verifies MG SET B LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55843 indicates closed SAT_____ UNSAT______

5. Document proper indications on attachment 10.3 CUES: § None STANDARDS: § Examinee initials steps for attachment 10.3 step 7.3.4.2 SAT_____ UNSAT______

6. Place DRTS switch to DISABLE CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee places DRTS switch on CP-2 to DISABLE SAT_____ UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

7. Verify:

§ DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE annunciator (K-4, cabinet M) clear

§ DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP (L-4, cabinet M) annunciator clear

§ DRT ACTIVE white lights extinguished

§ DRT DISABLE green light illuminated CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE annunciator K-4, cabinet M on CP-8 clear

§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP annunciator L-4, cabinet M on CP-8 clear

§ Examinee verifies DRT ACTIVE white lights on CP-2 extinguished

§ Examinee verifies DRT DISABLE green light on CP-2 illuminated SAT_____ UNSAT______

8. Document proper indications on attachment 10.3 CUES: § None STANDARDS: § Examinee initials steps for attachment 10.3 step 7.3.5.2 SAT_____ UNSAT______

9. Place DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH in ENABLE on CP-2 CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee places DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH in ENABLE

§ Examinee verifies red ENABLE light illuminated on CP-2 SAT_____ UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

10. Depress and release DRT 2 of 2 pushbutton CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee depresses and releases DRT 2 of 2 pushbutton SAT_____ UNSAT______

11. Verify:

§ DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE (K-4, CABINET M) in alarm,

§ DRT white active lights illuminated,

§ Aux panel 4 terminal DH101 to DH108 voltage indicate approximately 120VAC,

§ MG SET A and B load contactors closed CUES: § PMI informs examinee that voltages between Aux Panel 4 terminals DH101 and DH108 indicates 120VAC STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE (K-4, cabinet M) on CP-8 in alarm

§ Examinee verifies DRT white ACTIVE lights on CP-2 illuminated

§ Examinee calls PMI for AUX PANEL 4 terminal DH101-DH108 voltage readings

§ Examinee verifies MG SET A LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55842 indicates closed

§ Examinee verifies MG SET B LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55843 indicates closed SAT_____ UNSAT______

12. Document proper indications on attachment 10.3 CUES: § None STANDARDS: § Examinee initials steps for attachment 10.3 step 7.3.7.2 SAT_____ UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

13. Place DRT SWITCH to DISABLE CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee places DRTS SWITCH to DISABLE on CP-2 SAT_____ UNSAT______

14. Verify:

§ (K-4, cabinet M) DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE annunciator clear

§ (L-4, cabinet M) DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP annunciator clear

§ DRT active white lights extinguished CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:

§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE annunciator (K-4, cabinet M) on CP-8 clear

§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP annunciator (L-4, cabinet M) on CP-8 clear

§ Examinee verifies DRT ACTIVE white lights on CP-2 extinguished SAT_____ UNSAT______

Document proper indications on attachment 10.3 15.

CUES: § None STANDARDS: § Examinee initials steps for attachment 10.3 step 7.3.8.2 SAT_____ UNSAT______

16. Place DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH in ENABLE on CP-2 CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee places DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH to enable

§ Examinee verifies red ENABLE light illuminated on CP-2 SAT_____ UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

17. Simultaneously depress BOTH DRT pushbuttons THEN release BOTH pushbuttons CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee depresses both DRT pushbuttons on CP-2

§ Examinee releases both DRT pushbuttons.

§ Examinee verifies MG SET A LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55842 indicates NT CLOSED

§ Examinee verifies MG SET B LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55843 indicates NT CLOSED SAT_____ UNSAT______

18. Document proper indications on attachment 10.3 CUES: § None STANDARDS: § Examinee initials steps for attachment 10.3 step 7.3.10.2 SAT_____ UNSAT______

19. Document final status of DRTS on attachment 10.3 CUES: § CRS informs examinee to place DRTS switch to DISABLE and CEA MG sets will remain running unloaded for electrical testing.

STANDARDS: § Examinee places DRTS switch to DISABLE on CP-2

§ Examinee circles disabled status,

§ Examinee checks SAT for all acceptance criteria

§ Examinee signs performed by on step 7.3.12 SAT_____ UNSAT______

20. END OF TASK.

STOP TIME _________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The plant is in Mode 3 shutdown for refueling

2. Both CEA MG SETS are operating INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to perform a DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION TEST per OP-904-017, Section 7.3

Re-energize A3S from A2 with EDG A loaded Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area ED Mode EMERG Number 29 Revision 4 04/03/2000 Approval rfletch 04/05/2000 Estimated Time 10 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path YES References NUMBER OP-901-310 Step 11 NRC KA Number NUMBER 4.2-A56-AK3.02 4.2-A56-AA2.14 3.6-064-A4.07 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A loss of the A3 Bus occurred

2. Emergency Diesel Generator A is currently carrying the loads on the A3 bus

3. The cause of the loss of bus has been corrected

4. The A2 bus is energized

5. A2 Bus UV Lockout 86A2HR is reset INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to restore bus A3 to a normal lineup from offsite power in accordance with OP-901-310, Loss of Train A Safety Bus, Step 11 TERMINATING CUE

1. A3 Bus is powered from the offsite source STANDARD

1. A3 Safety Bus is energized from offsite power TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES

1. Loss of power to Safety Bus.

HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-901-310, step 11. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Verify BUS A3S to A2 TIE BKR open.

CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies that BUS A3S to A2 TIE BKR green OPEN light lit and red CLOSED light out on CP-1.

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Close BUS A2 TO A3S TIE BKR. CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee takes control switch for BUS A2 TO A3S TIE BKR to CLOSE, verifies red CLOSED light lit, green OPEN light out on CP-1.

SAT______UNSAT______

3. Place SYNCHRONIZER keyswitch in BUS TIE CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee Obtains key 208 from key locker inserts into EDG A SYNCHRONIZER keyswitch and rotates to BUS TIE on CP-1.

SAT______UNSAT______

4. Adjust EDG A voltage to equal system voltage.

CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies EDG A and System voltage are approximately equal or adjusts EDG A voltage to match System voltage on CP-1.

SAT______UNSAT______

5. Adjust engine speed until Synchroscope rotates slowly clockwise.

CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee adjusts EDG A speed until Synchroscope rotates slowly clockwise on CP-1

§ THIS STEP IS CRITICAL IF THE SYNCHROSCOPE IS ROTATING IN THE COUNTER-CLOCKWISE DIRECTION.

§ (ALT): After Synchroscope is rotating slowly in the clockwise direction the Booth Operator will insert Malfunction EG-10A, EDG A overspeed trip SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

6. (ALT) Examinee reports that EDG A has tripped CUES: CRS acknowledges EDG A tripped, CRS directs Operator to energize bus A3S from Offsite power in accordance with the applicable portions of step 7 in OP-901-310 STANDARDS: § Examinee notifies CRS that EDG A tripped on overspeed SAT______UNSAT______

7. Close BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR. CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS: § Examinee determines that 7.5 is the only applicable step and

§ Examinee takes control switch for BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR to CLOSE, verifies red CLOSED light lit, green OPEN light out on CP-1.

SAT______UNSAT______

8. End of task.

STOP TIME ________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A loss of the A3 Bus occurred

2. Emergency Diesel Generator A is currently carrying the loads on the A3 bus

3. The cause of the loss of bus has been corrected

4. The A2 bus is energized and the

5. A2 Bus UV Lockout 86A2HR is reset INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to restore bus A3 to a normal lineup from offsite power in accordance with OP-901-310, Loss of Train A Safety Bus, Step 11

RETURN EFW SYSTEM TO NORMAL FOLLOWING AN EFAS ACTUATION Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area EFW Mode NORM Number 6 Revision 5 08/23/2004 Approval rfletch 04/05/2000 Estimated Time 10 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path NO References NUMBER OP-009-003 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-1-20 3.4-061-A3.01 3.4-061-A3.04 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM SIMULATE Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A reactor trip occurred

2. Emergency Feedwater Actuation 1 and 2 actuated.

3. EFAS -1 was manually actuated

4. All S/G Level Lo trips are clear at PPS Remote Operating Module

5. Steam Generator levels are between 60 and 70% NR and being Maintained using Main Feedwater

6. Chemistry has been informed of the EFW actuation.

INITIATING CUE You are directed by SM/CRS to return the EFW system to normal alignment TERMINATING CUE The EFW system is lined up for automatic operation STANDARD The EFW system has been aligned for automatic operation TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Equipment Damage HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-009-003, section 8.1. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Notify Chemistry prior to using the Emergency Feedwater System to raise or maintain Steam Generator levels in non-emergency situations.

CUES: § CUE: If Examinee notifies Chemistry again, acknowledge Chemistry informed STANDARDS: § Examinee notifies Chemistry prior to using the Emergency Feedwater System to raise or maintain Steam Generator levels SAT______UNSAT______

2. Verify both Steam Generator levels in normal operating band (60% to 70% Narrow Range).

CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies both Steam Generator levels in normal operating band (60% to 70% Narrow Range) on CP-8 and/or CP-1.

SAT______UNSAT______

3. Verify EFAS-1 and EFAS-2 manual initiation switches on CP-7 and CP-8 are in NORM. CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee places all 4 EFAS-1 manual initiation switches in NORM on CP-7 and CP-8

§ Examine verifies all 4 EFAS manual initiation switches are in NORM on CP-7 and CP-8.

SAT______UNSAT______

4. Reset actuated Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) relay(s) on CP-33 as follows: CRIT Verify Steam Generator 1 level >27.4% Narrow Range. Depress both EFAS-1 Lockout Reset pushbuttons.

CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee Verifies Steam Generator 1 Level >27.4% Narrow Range

§ Examinee depresses both EFAS-1 lockout relays on CP-33 SAT______UNSAT______

5. Reset actuated Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) relay(s) on CP-33 as follows: CRIT Verify Steam Generator 2 level >27.4% Narrow Range. Depress both EFAS-2 Lockout Reset pushbuttons CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee Verifies Steam Generator 2 Level >27.4% Narrow Range

§ Examinee depresses both EFAS-2 lockout relays on CP-33 SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

6. At SM/CRS discretion Stop Emergency Feedwater Pumps A and B by placing the following CRIT control switches on CP-8 momentarily to OFF, then to neutral:

§ Emergency Feedwater Pump A

§ Emergency Feedwater Pump B CUES: § CUE: CRS directs EFW Pump A and B be secured.

§ Simulator will provide pump status cues STANDARDS: § Examinee places EFW Pump A Control Switch on CP-8 to OFF and returns to Normal (Mid-position), verifies green OFF light lit, red START light out.

§ Examinee places EFW Pump B Control Switch on CP-8 to OFF and returns to Normal (Mid-position), verifies green OFF light lit, red START light out.

SAT______UNSAT______

7. If EFW Pump AB is operating, then secure by Closing the following valves: CRIT

• MS-401A, EFW Pump AB Turbine Steam Supply Valve from S/G 1

• MS-401B, EFW Pump AB Turbine Steam Supply Valve from S/G 2 CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee places control switch for MS-401A, EFW Pump AB Turbine Steam Supply Valve from S/G 1 to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSED light lit, red OPEN light out

§ Examinee places control switch for MS-401B, EFW Pump AB Turbine Steam Supply Valve from S/G 2 to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSED light lit, red OPEN light out SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

8. At CP-8 place the following controllers in Automatic: CRIT

§ EFW-223A Emergency Feedwater Header A To SG1 Backup Flow Control Valve

§ EFW-224A Emergency Feedwater Header A To SG1 Primary Flow Control Valve

§ EFW-223B Emergency Feedwater Header A To SG2 Backup Flow Control Valve

§ EFW-224B Emergency Feedwater Header A To SG2 Primary Flow Control Valve CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee depresses AUTO pushbutton for EFW-223A Emergency Feedwater Header A To SG1 Backup Flow Control Valve, verifies AUTO light lit , MAN light out on CP-8

§ Examinee verifies EFW-224A Emergency Feedwater Header A To SG1 Primary Flow Control Valve AUTO light lit , MAN light out on CP-8

§ Examinee depresses AUTO pushbutton for EFW-223B Emergency Feedwater Header A To SG2 Backup Flow Control Valve, verifies AUTO light lit , MAN light out on CP-8

§ Examinee verifies EFW-224B Emergency Feedwater Header A To SG2 Primary Flow Control Valve AUTO light lit , MAN light out on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

9. Close the following Emergency Feedwater Isolation Valves: CRIT

• EFW-228A Emergency Feedwater To SG1 Primary Isolation

• EFW-229A Emergency Feedwater To SG1 Backup Isolation

• EFW-228B Emergency Feedwater To SG2 Primary Isolation

• EFW-229B Emergency Feedwater To SG2 Backup Isolation CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee places control switch for EFW-228A Emergency Feedwater To SG1 Primary Isolation to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSED light lit, red OPEN light out on CP-8

§ Examinee places control switch for EFW-229A Emergency Feedwater To SG1 Backup Isolation to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSED light lit, red OPEN light out on CP-8

§ Examinee places control switch for EFW-228B Emergency Feedwater To SG2 Primary Isolation to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSED light lit, red OPEN light out on CP-8

§ Examinee places control switch for EFW-229B Emergency Feedwater To SG2 Backup Isolation to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSED light lit, red OPEN light out on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

10. Verify the following Annunciators on CP-8 have Cleared:

• Emerg Feedwater Pump A Trip/Trouble (E-1, Cabinet M)

• Emerg Feedwater Pump A Unavailable (D-1, Cabinet M)

• Emerg Feedwater Pump A Unavailable (A10, Cabinet M)

• Emerg Feedwater Pump B Trip/Trouble (E-11, Cabinet N)

• Emerg Feedwater Pump B Unavailable (D-1, Cabinet N)

CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies Emerg Feedwater Pump A Trip/Trouble (E-1, Cabinet M) clear on CP-8

§ Examinee verifies Emerg Feedwater Pump A Unavailable (D-1, Cabinet M) clear on CP-8

§ Examinee verifies Emerg Feedwater Pump A Unavailable (A10, Cabinet M) clear on CP-8

§ Examinee verifies Emerg Feedwater Pump B Trip/Trouble (E-11, Cabinet N) clear on CP-8

§ Examinee verifies Emerg Feedwater Pump B Unavailable (D-1, Cabinet N) clear on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

11. Inform CRS EFW is returned to Normal CUES: § CUE: CRS acknowledges EFW is returned to Normal STANDARDS: § Examinee Informs CRS that EFW is returned to Normal SAT______UNSAT______

12. End of task.

STOP TIME __________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A reactor trip occurred

2. Emergency Feedwater Actuation 1 and 2 actuated.

3. EFAS -1 was manually actuated

4. All S/G Level Lo trips are clear at PPS Remote Operating Module

5. Steam Generator levels are between 60 and 70% NR and being Maintained using Main Feedwater

6. Chemistry has been informed of the EFW actuation.

INITIATING CUE You are directed by SM/CRS to return the EFW system to normal alignment

PERFORM ACTIONS ON A RECIRCULATION ACTUATION (LEAK ON SUCTION LINE)

Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area PPE Mode EMERG Number 1 Revision 8 08/20/2004 Approval rfletch Estimated Time 2 Min Time Critical NO Critical Time Alternate Path YES References NUMBER OP-902-002 OP-902-009 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-1-20 4.1-E11- EA1.11 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The reactor has tripped

2. A Loss of Coolant Accident inside containment is in progress

3. OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident is being implemented

4. RWSP level is 10% and a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) has occurred INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to perform the required actions to the Safety Injection System following a RAS TERMINATING CUE

1. All Safety Injection Pump Recirc Valves are closed

2. Both ESF Pump Suction Valves from the RWSP are closed

3. All Charging Pumps are in OFF and CVC 209 is shut.

STANDARD SI Recirc Isolations have been shut TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Release of Radioactivity through the RWSP Vent HUMAN INTERFACES SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-902-002 and OP-902-009. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Verify that BOTH LPSI Pumps are stopped.

CUES: § LPSI Pump A stopped

§ LPSI Pump B stopped STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies LPSI Pump A stopped, green OFF light lit, red START light out on CP-8

§ Examinee verifies LPSI Pump B stopped, green OFF light lit, red START light out on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

2. Verify that ESF PUMPS SUCTION SI valves are open.

• SI 602A

• SI 602B CUES: § SI 602A is OPEN

§ SI 602B is OPEN STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies SI 602A, green CLOSED light out, red OPEN light lit on CP-8

§ Examinee verifies SI 602B, green CLOSED light out, red OPEN light lit on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

3. Close the SI PUMPS RECIRC ISOL VALVES within two minutes of receipt of RAS: CRIT

• SI 120A

• SI 120B

• SI 121A

• SI 121B CUES: § SI 120A is CLOSED

§ SI 120B is CLOSED

§ SI 121A is CLOSED

§ SI 121B is CLOSED STANDARDS: § Examinee takes control switch for SI 120A to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out

§ Examinee takes control switch for SI 120B to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out

§ Examinee takes control switch for SI 121A to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out

§ Examinee takes control switch for SI 121B to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

4. Close the ESF PUMPS SUCTION RWSP: CRIT

• SI 106A

• SI 106B CUES: § SI 106A is CLOSED

§ SI 106B is CLOSED

§ (ALT) A repair team reports a large leak between SI-602B and SI-604B

§ (ALT) CRS orders you to secure HPSI Pump B and Containment Spray Pump B and implement OP-902-009, Attachment 30-B Override SI-602B.

§ (ALT) RAB Operator reports that he is at Aux Panel 1 and is ready to assist with override of SI-602B.

STANDARDS: § Examinee takes control switch for SI 106A to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out on CP-8

§ Examinee takes control switch for SI 106B to CLOSE verifies green CLOSED light lit red OPEN light out on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

5. (ALT) Place keyswitch for SI-602B, ESF PUMP SUCTION SI PUMP, located on side of Auxiliary CRIT Panel 1, to OVERRIDE CUES: § NAO reports SI-602B keyswitch on Auxiliary Panel 1 in OVERRIDE STANDARDS: § Examinee orders NAO to place SI-602B keyswitch in OVERRIDE on Auxiliary Panel 1

SAT______UNSAT______

6. (ALT) Close SI-602B, ESF PUMP SUCTION SI PUMP, by placing on CP-8 to CLOSE CRIT CUES: § SI-602B is CLOSED

§ (ALT) The other NPO has secured all charging pumps and closed CVC-209.

STANDARDS: § Examinee rotates control switch for SI-602B to CLOSE, verifies green CLOSE light lit, red OPEN light out SAT______UNSAT______

7. End of Task STOP TIME ________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. The reactor has tripped

2. A Loss of Coolant Accident inside containment is in progress

3. OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident is being implemented

4. RWSP level is 10% and a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) has occurred INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to perform the required actions to the Safety Injection System following a RAS

PLACE SDC TRAIN A IN SERVICE (SDC SUCTION VALVE CLOSES)

Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area SDC Mode NORM Number 5 Revision 2 09/13/1995 Approval tbrown 11/28/1995 Estimated Time 30 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path YES References NUMBER OP-009-005 OP-901-131 NRC KA Number NUMBER 3.4-005-A4.01 3.4-005-A4.01 Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Shutdown Cooling Entry Conditions are met

2. LTOPS are aligned for service

3. Shutdown Cooling train A aligned for standby condition

4. RCS boron concentration is 2050 ppm

5. Protected train is on the same side as SDC train to placed in service.

6. Sufficient Dry Cooling Tower Fans are running to accept increased heat load on CCW System.

7. All SDC instrumentation is operable INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to place Shutdown Cooling train A in service TERMINATING CUE The selected Shutdown Cooling train is secured, LPSI Pump A is in OFF STANDARD The selected Shutdown Cooling train is secured, LPSI Pump A is in OFF TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Equipment Damage HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-009-005, section 6.1 and OP-901-131, D.1.

Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Place Shutdown HX A CCW Flow Control, CC-963A, control switch to Open. CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee rotates Shutdown HX A CCW Flow Control, CC-963A, control switch to Open, verifies green CLOSED light out, red OPEN light lit SAT______UNSAT______

2. Unlock and Open RC Loop 2 SDC Suction Outside Containment Isol, SI-407A. CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee obtains key, unlocks and opens RC Loop 2 SDC Suction Outside Containment Isol, SI-407A on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

3. Notify Radiation Protection Department that Shutdown Cooling Train A is being placed in service CUES: § Radiation Protection Department acknowledges that Shutdown Cooling Train A is being placed in service STANDARDS: § Examinee notifies Radiation Protection Department that Shutdown Cooling Train A is being placed in service SAT______UNSAT______

4. Start LPSI Pump A. CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee rotates Control Switch for LPSI Pump A to START, verifies green OFF light out and red START light lit, amps, flow, and pressure on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

5. Raise Shutdown Cooling flow to 4100 GPM CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee manually adjusts LPSI Header Flow controller 2A/2B, SI-IFIC-0307, output until Shutdown Cooling Header A Flow, reads 4100 gpm, as on RC Loop 2 SHDN Line Flow Indicator, SI-IFI-1307-A1 on CP-8.

§ (ALT) Simulator Booth Operator will insert malfunction to close SI 405A while Examinee is raising SDC flow.

SAT______UNSAT______

6. (ALT) Secure LPSI Pump A CUES: § CRIT STANDARDS: § Examinee recognizes SI-405A has closed and rotates control switch for LPSI Pump A to OFF, verifies green OFF light lit, red START light out, amps, flow and pressure dropping on CP-8

§ (NOTE: Immediate Operator Action per OP-901-131, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction)

SAT______UNSAT______

7. End of task.

STOP TIME ________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Shutdown Cooling Entry Conditions are met

2. LTOPS are aligned for service

3. Shutdown Cooling train A aligned for standby condition

4. RCS boron concentration is 2050 ppm

5. Protected train is on the same side as SDC train to placed in service.

6. Sufficient Dry Cooling Tower Fans are running to accept increased heat load on CCW System.

7. All SDC instrumentation is operable INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to place Shutdown Cooling train A in service

PLACE SDC TRAIN A IN SERVICE (SDC SUCTION VALVE CLOSES)

Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area SDC Mode NORM Number 5 Revision 2 09/13/1995 Approval tbrown 11/28/1995 Estimated Time 30 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path YES References NUMBER OP-009-005 OP-901-131 NRC KA Number NUMBER 3.4-005-A4.01 3.4-005-A4.01 Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Shutdown Cooling Entry Conditions are met

2. LTOPS are aligned for service

3. Shutdown Cooling train A aligned for standby condition

4. RCS boron concentration is 2050 ppm

5. Protected train is on the same side as SDC train to placed in service.

6. Sufficient Dry Cooling Tower Fans are running to accept increased heat load on CCW System.

7. All SDC instrumentation is operable INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to place Shutdown Cooling train A in service TERMINATING CUE The selected Shutdown Cooling train is secured, LPSI Pump A is in OFF STANDARD The selected Shutdown Cooling train is secured, LPSI Pump A is in OFF TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Equipment Damage HUMAN INTERFACES

1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-009-005, section 6.1 and OP-901-131, D.1.

Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Place Shutdown HX A CCW Flow Control, CC-963A, control switch to Open. CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee rotates Shutdown HX A CCW Flow Control, CC-963A, control switch to Open, verifies green CLOSED light out, red OPEN light lit SAT______UNSAT______

2. Unlock and Open RC Loop 2 SDC Suction Outside Containment Isol, SI-407A. CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee obtains key, unlocks and opens RC Loop 2 SDC Suction Outside Containment Isol, SI-407A on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

3. Notify Radiation Protection Department that Shutdown Cooling Train A is being placed in service CUES: § Radiation Protection Department acknowledges that Shutdown Cooling Train A is being placed in service STANDARDS: § Examinee notifies Radiation Protection Department that Shutdown Cooling Train A is being placed in service SAT______UNSAT______

4. Start LPSI Pump A. CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee rotates Control Switch for LPSI Pump A to START, verifies green OFF light out and red START light lit, amps, flow, and pressure on CP-8 SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

5. Raise Shutdown Cooling flow to 4100 GPM CRIT CUES: § Simulator will provide cues STANDARDS: § Examinee manually adjusts LPSI Header Flow controller 2A/2B, SI-IFIC-0307, output until Shutdown Cooling Header A Flow, reads 4100 gpm, as on RC Loop 2 SHDN Line Flow Indicator, SI-IFI-1307-A1 on CP-8.

§ (ALT) Simulator Booth Operator will insert malfunction to close SI 405A while Examinee is raising SDC flow.

SAT______UNSAT______

6. (ALT) Secure LPSI Pump A CUES: § CRIT STANDARDS: § Examinee recognizes SI-405A has closed and rotates control switch for LPSI Pump A to OFF, verifies green OFF light lit, red START light out, amps, flow and pressure dropping on CP-8

§ (NOTE: Immediate Operator Action per OP-901-131, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction)

SAT______UNSAT______

7. End of task.

STOP TIME ________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Shutdown Cooling Entry Conditions are met

2. LTOPS are aligned for service

3. Shutdown Cooling train A aligned for standby condition

4. RCS boron concentration is 2050 ppm

5. Protected train is on the same side as SDC train to placed in service.

6. Sufficient Dry Cooling Tower Fans are running to accept increased heat load on CCW System.

7. All SDC instrumentation is operable INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to place Shutdown Cooling train A in service

ALIGN CARS FOR CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CONTROL Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area CAR Mode NORM Number 10 Revision 1 04/18/1995 Approval tbrown 09/06/1995 Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path NO References NUMBER OP-008-002 NRC KA Number NUMBER 3.5-028-A4.01 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Containment Purge Isolation Radiation Monitors are operable with alarm setpoints set as required

2. No power changes are in progress.

3. The RAB Operator is standing by to assist with the task.

INITIATING CUE The SM/CRS directs you to align CARS train B for Containment Pressure Control TERMINATING CUE

1. CARS train B has been aligned for Containment Pressure Control

2. Task may be terminated prior to filling out attachment 11.4 STANDARD The CAR system has been aligned for Containment Pressure Control.

TOOLS Copy of Att.11.4 OP-008-002 with selected steps filled in.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Unmonitored Release HUMAN INTERFACES SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-008-002, section 6.2. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

CUE: AFTER GIVING STUDENT PROCEDURE, INFORM STUDENT STEP 6.2.1 IS COMPLETE.

1. Verify CAR System Exhaust Header B Inlet, CAR-201B, Closed by indication on CP-18 or PID-D51512.

CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies CAR System Exhaust Header B Inlet, CAR-201B, Closed by indication on CP-18 or PMC computer point PID-D51512.

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Verify CAR System Exhaust Header B Downstream Isolation, CAR-203B, Locked Closed.

CUES: § NAO reports CAR-203B, Locked Closed STANDARDS: § Examinee directs NAO to verify CAR System Exhaust Header B Downstream Isolation, CAR-203B, Locked Closed SAT______UNSAT______

3. Unlock and Open CAR Containment Exhaust to Plant Stack, CAR-2020B. CRIT CUES: § NAO reports CAR-2020B, open STANDARDS: § Examinee directs NAO to Unlock and Open CAR Containment Exhaust to Plant Stack, CAR-2020B SAT______UNSAT______

4. Open CAR System Exhaust Header B Upstream Isolation, CAR-202B. CRIT CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee rotates Control Switch for CAR System Exhaust Header B Upstream Isolation, CAR-202B to OPEN, verifies green CLOSE light out, red OPEN light lit SAT______UNSAT______

5. Open CAR Exhaust Header B Inlet Isolation Valve, CAR-200B. CRIT CUES: § Simulator provides cues STANDARDS: § Examinee rotates Control Switch for CAR Exhaust Header B Inlet Isolation Valve, CAR-200B to OPEN, verifies green CLOSE light out, red OPEN light lit SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

6. Record system start date and time on Attachment 11.4, Containment Pressure Control Data.

NOTE Task may be terminated prior to filling out Attachment 11.4 CUES: § System start date and time filled in on Attachment 11.4 STANDARDS: § Examinee records System start date and time on Attachment 11.4, Containment Pressure Control Data.

§ SAT______UNSAT______

7. End of Task STOP TIME ________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Containment Purge Isolation Radiation Monitors are operable with alarm setpoints set as required

2. No power changes are in progress.

3. The RAB Operator is standing by to assist with the task.

INITIATING CUE The SM/CRS directs you to align CARS train B for Containment Pressure Control

PLACE GAS DECAY TANK A ON DECAY Site W3 Job NAO System / Duty Area GWM Mode NORM Number 4 Revision 0 8/25/2004 Approval rfletch Estimated Time 15 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path NO References NUMBER OP-007-003 NRC KA Number NUMBER 3.9-071-A4.05 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Gas Decay Tank B has been placed in service per Subsection 6.2 of OP-007-003 INITIATING CUE You are ordered by the CRS to place Gas Decay Tank A on decay in accordance with Section 6.3 of OP-008-003, Gaseous Waste Management TERMINATING CUE Gas Decay Tank A is lined up for decay STANDARD Gas Decay Tank A is placed on decay TOOLS Copy of Att. 11.8, OP-007-003 with step 1 filled in SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Unmonitored release of radioactivity HUMAN INTERFACES PNPO SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-007-003, Subsection 6.3. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

START TIME_________

1. Place CHARGE/OFF/RELEASE control switch for Gas Decay Tank (GDT) to be placed on decay to CRIT the OFF position.

CUES: § Control switch for Gas Decay Tank A is in OFF STANDARDS: § Examinee (simulates)rotates control switch for Gas Decay Tank A to OFF on LCP-42 in the -4 RAB inside CAA.

SAT______UNSAT______

2. Verify Gas Decay Tank A(B)(C) Inlet Isolation, GWM-206A(B)(C), Closed for GDT being placed on decay.

CUES: § GWM-206A is closed STANDARDS: § Examinee (simulates) verifies Gas Decay Tank A Inlet Isolation, GWM-206A closed On LCP-42 by verifying green light on and red light off on LCP-42.

SAT______UNSAT______

3. Close Gas Decay Tank A(B)(C) Inlet Manual Isolation, GWM-2055A(B)(C), for GDT being placed CRIT on decay.

CUES: § GWM-2055A is closed STANDARDS: § Examinee locates GWM-2055A in -35 RAB GDT Room A and (simulates) turns Gas Decay Tank A Inlet Manual Isolation, GWM-2055A in the clockwise direction.

SAT______UNSAT______

4. Contact Chemistry to transfer the Gas Analyzer sample point to the Gas Decay Tank (GDT) being placed in service.

CUES: § Chemistry states that Gas Analyzer sample point was transferred to Gas Decay Tank B when the Gas Decay Tank was placed in service.

STANDARDS: § Examinee notifies Chemistry to transfer the Gas Analyzer sample point to the Gas Decay Tank B SAT______UNSAT______

5. Complete Attachment 11.8, Gas Decay Tank Sample Verification.

CUES: § A copy of Attachment 11.8 has been given to Chemistry STANDARDS: § Examinee circles GDT A removed from service and initials and dates step SAT______UNSAT______

6. End of task.

STOP TIME ________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Gas Decay Tank B has been placed in service per Subsection 6.2 of OP-007-003 INITIATING CUE You are ordered by the CRS to place Gas Decay Tank A on decay in accordance with Section 6.3 of OP-008-003, Gaseous Waste Management

LINE UP POTABLE WATER TO INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSORS DURING CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION (NO FIRE)

Site W3 Job RO System / Duty Area IA Mode EMERG Number 1 Revision 4 04/03/2000 Approval rfletch 04/05/2000 Estimated Time 20 Min Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path NO References NUMBER OP-901-502 NRC KA Number NUMBER 3.8-078-A3.01 3.8-078-K1.04 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM SIMULATE Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A Control Room Evacuation is in progress

2. The Turbine Cooling Water system is not available INITIATING CUE You are directed by the Shift Manager to align Potable Water to Instrument air Compressor A TERMINATING CUE Instrument Air Compressor A started with Potable Water aligned for cooling STANDARD Instrument Air Compressor A is running with Potable Water cooling TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Extended loss of instrument air HUMAN INTERFACES SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance withOP-901-502, E1, step 18. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT. IA Air Compressor A and associated valves are located in the Turbine Building +15 level, southeast corner.

START TIME_________

1. Place IA Compressor A Control Switch to PULL TO LOCK.

CUES: § Control Switch for IA Compressor A to PULL TO LOCK. CRIT STANDARDS: § Examinee places Control Switch for IA Compressor A to PULL TO LOCK on IA compressor A Control Panel +15 TB SAT______UNSAT______

2. Close TCW to IA Compressor A (B), TC-230A(B). CRIT CUES: § TC-230A is closed STANDARDS: § Examinee (simulates) attempts to turn TCW to IA Compressor A, TC-230A in the clockwise direction at IA Compressor A+15 TB .

SAT______UNSAT______

3. Close IA Compressor A(B) TCW Outlet, TC-326A(B). CRIT CUES: § TC-326A is closed STANDARDS: § Examinee (simulates) attempts to turn IA Compressor A TCW Outlet, TC-326A in the clockwise direction at IA Compressor A+15 TB.

SAT______UNSAT______

4. Open Potable Water to IA Compressor A(B), PW-9017A(B). CRIT CUES: § PW-9017A. is open STANDARDS: § Examinee (simulates) attempts to turn Potable Water to IA Compressor A, PW-9017A in the counterclockwise direction at IA Compressor A+15 TB.

SAT______UNSAT______

5. Open Potable Water to IA Compressor A(B) HX Inlet, TC-231A(B). CRIT CUES: § TC-231A is open STANDARDS: § Examinee (simulates) attempts to turn Potable Water to IA Compressor A HX Inlet, TC-231A in the Counterclockwise direction at IA Compressor A+15 TB.

SAT______UNSAT______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

6. Open IA Compressor A(B) Potable Water Outlet, TC-325A(B). CRIT CUES: § TC-325A is open STANDARDS: § Examinee (simulates) attempts to turn IA Compressor A Potable Water Outlet, TC-325A in the Counterclockwise direction at IA Compressor A+15 TB.

SAT______UNSAT______

7. Verify Potable Water flow through IA Compressor A(B) HX by observing flow to respective drain.

CUES: § Water is flowing from IA Compressor HX drain STANDARDS: § Examinee verifies Potable Water flowing from IA Compressor HX drain at IA Compressor A+15 TB SAT______UNSAT______

8. Place IA Compressor A(B) Control Switch to AUTO AND start IF desired. CRIT CUES: § CRS orders IA Compressor placed in AUTO

§ IA Compressor A is running STANDARDS: § Examinee notifies CRS that Potable Water is aligned to IA Compressor

§ Examinee rotates IA Compressor A Control Switch to AUTO SAT______UNSAT______

9. End of task.

STOP TIME ________

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. A Control Room Evacuation is in progress

2. The Turbine Cooling Water system is not available INITIATING CUE You are directed by the Shift Manager to align Potable Water to Instrument air Compressor A

RETURNING A, B, OR AB BATTERY CHARGERS TO SERVICE Site W3 Job NAO System / Duty Area DC Mode NORM Number 7 Revision 6 8/3/00 Approval Estimated Time 15 Minutes Time Critical No Critical Time Alternate Path Yes References NUMBER OP-006-003 8.1 NRC KA Number NUMBER 2-1-20 4.3 4.2 3.6-063-A4.02 2.8* 2.9 3.6-063-K1.03 2.9 3.5 Evaluation Methods METHOD PERFORM SIMULATE Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Maintenance has been completed on BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A

2. The remote power supply breakers for BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A were left open after maintenance.

INITIATING CUE The NPO directs you to place BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A in service.

TERMINATING CUE 1 The battery charger is in service and operating normally.

2. Faulted: the battery charger is deenergized and the SM/CRS is Informed.

STANDARD

1. Battery charger DC-EBC-1A has been returned to service.

2. Faulted: the operator re-opens the AC and DC isolation breakers and Informs the SM/CRS.

TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS Energized Electrical Equipment PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES 1 Equipment damage

2. Personnel injury

3. Loss of vital instrumentation HUMAN INTERFACES 1 NPO

2. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with referenced procedure OP-006-003, section 8.1. All components are located in the RAB

+ 21 MSL, A Switchgear Room along the North wall.

NOTE: This JPM requires opening battery charger doors. Permission is required from the On-shift Shift Manager to open these doors (Ext. 3104).

START TIME ________ Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.

1. Verify Battery Charger AC isolation breakers for applicable Battery Charger OPEN.

CUES: § When the operator locates the applicable breaker at the selected Battery Charger cue the operator that the breaker is OPEN. (breakers are located inside front panel of the selected Battery Charger)

STANDARDS: § The Operator locates the 1A Battery Charger (DC-EBC-1A) in the RAB Switchgear Room A.

§ The Operator checks that the AC Isolation Breaker of the 1A Battery Charger is OPEN.

(DC-EBKR-1161-A1)

SAT____ UNSAT_____

2. Verify Battery Charger Isolation (DC) Breakers for applicable Battery Charger OPEN.

CUES: § When the operator locates the applicable breaker at the selected Battery Charger cue the operator that the breaker is OPEN. (breakers are located inside front panel of the selected Battery Charger)

STANDARDS: § The Operator checks that the DC Isolation Breaker of the 1A Battery Charger is Open (DC-EBKR-1A2)

SAT____ UNSAT_____

3. Verify remote AC Input Supply Breakers for applicable battery charger are closed. CRIT CUES: § When the operator locates the applicable breaker and demonstrates action to close the breaker, then cue the operator that the applicable breaker is closed.

STANDARDS: § The Operator locates the applicable 480vac Motor Control Center and (simulates) closes the correct breaker. (DC-EBKR-311A-14D) (EAST END OF MCC 311A, second row in, second breaker from top)

SAT____ UNSAT_____

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

4. Verify remote DC Input Supply Breakers for applicable battery charger are closed. CRIT CUES: § When the operator locates the applicable breaker and demonstrates action to close the breaker, then cue the operator that the applicable breaker is closed.

STANDARDS: § The Operator locates the applicable DC distribution panel and (simulates) closes the correct breaker. (DC-EBKR-A-34) (PDP A-DC, right hand section, third breaker from bottom on right facing panel)

SAT____ UNSAT_____

5. Set EQUALIZE/FLOAT switch (inside cabinet) to float position.

CUES: § When the operator locates the EQUALIZE/FLOAT switch inside The Battery Charger cabinet, cue the operator that the Switch is in FLOAT.

STANDARDS: § The Operator locates the EQUALIZE/FLOAT switch.

§ The Operator verifies the switch is in the FLOAT position.

SAT____ UNSAT_____

6. Place load sharing switch to Off.

CUES: § When the Operator locates the LOAD SHARING switch on the front panel of the Battery Charger, then cue the operator That the switch is in OFF.

STANDARDS: § The Operator locates the LOAD SHARING switch.

§ The Operator verifies the switch is in the OFF position.

SAT____ UNSAT_____

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

7. Close Battery Charger Isolation (DC) Breaker and check the following:

§ DC voltmeter equals battery potential

§ NO CHARGE lamp Illuminates

§ PHASE FAIL lamp illuminates CUES: § When the Operator demonstrates the action to close the DC breaker, then cue the CRIT Operator that the Battery Charger Isolation (DC) breaker is CLOSED.

§ When the Operator locates the DC voltmeter, then cue the Operator that the voltmeter indication equals battery Potential (~135 vdc).

§ When the Operator locates the NO CHARGE lamp on the Front panel of the Battery Charger, then cue the Operator That the NO CHARGE lamp is illuminated.

§ When the Operator locates the PHASE FAIL lamp, then cue The Operator that the PHASE FAIL lamp is ON.

STANDARDS: § The Operator locates and (simulates) closes the Battery Charger Isolation (DC) breaker.

§ The Operator verifies indication of DC voltage and lamp status.

SAT____ UNSAT_____

8. When 25 seconds have elapsed, then close Battery Charger AC isolation Breaker and check the following:

§ DC voltmeter remains at battery potential

§ NO CHARGE lamp extinguishes

§ PHASE FAIL lamp extinguishes CUES: § When the Operator locates the Battery charger AC isolation Breaker and demonstrates the CRIT action to close it, then cue the operator that the Battery Charger AC isolation breaker is CLOSED.

§ (Alternate path): when the operator locates the DC voltmeter, then cue the operator that the voltmeter read 148 vdc for a short period and then dropped down to battery potential

(~135 vdc).

§ (Alternate path): when the operator locates the NO CHARGE lamp, then cue the operator that the NO CHARGE lamp extinguished for a short period and then illuminated.

§ (Alternate path): when the operator locates the PHASE FAIL lamp, then cue the operator that the PHASE FAIL lamp is extinguished.

§ (Alternate path): when the operator locates the HI-V SHUTDOWN lamp, cue the operator that the HI-V SHUTDOWN lamp is illuminated.

STANDARDS: § The operator locates and (simulates) closes the battery charger ac Isolation breaker after waiting at least 25 seconds since closing the DC isolation breaker.

§ The operator verifies DC voltmeter indication and indicator Status.

SAT____ UNSAT_____

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure

9. (ALTERNATE PATH): IF HI-V SHUTDOWN lam p illuminates and output voltage is < 144 vdc, then depress the HIGH VOLTAGE RESET pushbutton located on HV SHUTDOWN CARD inside cabinet.

CUES: § When the operator locates and resets the HIGH VOLTAGE RESET pushbutton, then cue the operator that the HI-V SHUTDOWN lamp extinguished for a short period and then reilluminated.

STANDARDS: § Examinee Depresses HIGH VOLTAGE RESET pushbutton, CRIT

§ Examinee identifies that HI-V SHUTDOWN lamp is illuminated SAT____ UNSAT_____

10. (ALTERNATE PATH): IF output voltage > 144 VDC or HI-V SHUTDOWN lamp remains illuminated then perform the following:

• Open Battery Charger AC Isolation breaker

• Open Battery Charger DC Isolation breaker CUES:

• BATTERY CHARGER AC ISOLATION BREAKER is OPEN

• BATTERY CHARGER ISOLATION (DC) BREAKER is OPEN.

STANDARDS: § The operator (simulates) opens the BATTERY CHARGER AC ISOLATION BREAKER. CRIT

§ The operator (simulates) opens the BATTERY CHARGER ISOLATION (DC) BREAKER.

§ The operator notifies SM/CRS of condition.

SAT____ UNSAT_____

11. End of Task STOP TIME_______

Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Maintenance has been completed on BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A

2. The remote power supply breakers for BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A were left open after maintenance.

INITIATING CUE The NPO directs you to place BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A in service.

Simulator Scenario Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant Simulator Scenario Number: E-NRC04-1 Author: Arthur Vest Approval: Arvel J. Hall Revision Number: 0 Estimated Time: 60 Minutes Initial Conditions: 100%, EOC (IC-20)

Scenario

Description:

The plant is at 100% reactor power. A step change of RCP 1A ARRD temperature from 175 ºF to 195 ºF occurred two days ago. Charging Pump AB has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to replace the internal check valves.

CS pump A has been OOS for 74 hrs to replace the pump impeller.

After the crew takes the shift, the in-service PZR pressure control (PPC) channel fails low. The crew should implement OP-901-120, PZR Pressure Control Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1.

After transferring to the non-faulted PPC Channel, a SG1 Narrow Range control channel instrument fails low causing the controllers for Feedwater Control System (FWCS) 1 to shift to manual. The crew should implement OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction, and control S/G 1 level manually. The Main and Startup Feed Regulating Valves must be placed in a Reactor Trip Override (RTO) condition manually post-trip.

After the crew addresses OP-901-201, RCP 1A Anti Reverse Rotation Device (ARRD) temperature starts to rise. The crew should implement OP-901-130, RCP Malfunction, Subsections E0 and E6. The RCP ARRD failure requires the crew to perform a plant shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005.

After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, CEAs 1 and 2 drop into the core. The PNPO (RO) should manually trip the reactor per OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction. Tripping the reactor requires implementation of OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.

The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip on the reactor trip requiring the SNPO (BOP) to manually trip the Main Turbine. Failure to trip the turbine manually in a timely manner will result in a Main Steam Isolation signal (MSIS). The crew should diagnose to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery procedure.

After the crew enters OP-902-001, a Feedwater Line Break occurs on S/G 1. The crew should re-diagnose and implement OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery Procedure.

The scenario may be terminated when the crew has taken action to stabilize RCS temperature and pressure or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

Scenario Notes:

1. Reset Simulator to IC-20.

2. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loaded

a. Remotes and Overrides are as follows:

1. CS Pump A Bkr - CSR11 Rackout

2. Charging Pump A/B Breaker - CVR22 Rackout

3. CS117A -Shutdown HX A Outlet Valve - CSR04 Close

4. CS118A, SDC HX A Outlet Isol To RWSP - CSR05 Closed

5. CS101A & CS111A, CS Pump A Suct/Disc Isol Vlvs - CSR07 Closed

6. H_K08, CEA Disabled - Crywolf

b. Malfunctions

1. RC33A, RCP 1A ARRD Temperature - LOAD - 195°F

2. RP03, REACTOR TRIP WITH NO AUTO TURBINE TRIP - LOAD - TRUE

3. Malfunctions per Scenario Time Line (Continued Next Page)

E-NRC04-1 Page 1 of 17

3. Danger Tag and place in OFF:

a. CS Pump A C/S on CP-8

b. Chg Pump A/B C/S on CP-4

4. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.

5. Place B/U Charging Pump Selector Switch in A-B.

6. Ensure Large PTID computer point for RCP 1A ARRD Temp on CRT.

7. Ensure Containment Sump Isolation Valves, SP-105 and 106 are open on CP-8

8. Complete the simulator setup checklist.

EVENT 1 - Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel RC-IPT-0100X Fails Low

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 1.

2. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

EVENT 2 - Steam Generator 1 Narrow Range Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1105 Fails High

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 2.

2. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

EVENT 3 - RCP 1A Anti Reverse Rotation Device (ARRD) temperature rise

1. On Lead Examiner's cue modify RC33A to 215? ramp 1 min.

2. If Work Week Manager or I&C is called, inform the caller that a work package will be assembled and a team will be sent to the Control Room.

3. If System Engineer Duty Plant Manager is called inform Control Room you are monitoring RCP AARD and you recommend following the triggers and guidance in the procedure.

4. If System Engineer Duty Plant Manager is called and asked for guidance, tell the caller to follow the guidance in the procedure steps.

5. If the Turbine Building is contacted to control Condensate Polisher Differential Pressure during the down power inform the caller that you will removes polisher vessels from service as necessary to control DP.

Event 4 & 5- Two CEAs drop/Turbine Fails to Trip Automatically

1. On Lead Examiners cue initiate Event Trigger 3

2. Delete malfunction RC33 to prevent RCP 1A from turning backward if the crew secures it.

3. If RAB sent to CEDMCS Alley, report the CEA disconnects for CEA 1 and 2 are open, no other indications of problems are readily apparent.

4. If WWM or I&C called inform the caller, a team will be sent to CEDMCS Alley.

Event 6- Feedwater Line Break inside Containment

1. On Lead Examiners cue initiate Event Trigger 4

2. If asked to verify no safeties lifting, then inform the caller that no safeties are lifting.

E-NRC04-1 Page 2 of 17

Scenario Timeline:

Event Malfunction Time Severity Ramp TUA TRA Trigger (Min) HH:MM:SS 1 RX14A 1 0 NA NA NA 1 Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel RC-IPT-0100X Fails Low 2 SG05A 6 100 00:06:00 NA NA 2 Steam Generator 1 Narrow Range Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1105 Fails High 3 RC33A 15 195- 00:01:00 NA NA NA 215ºF RCP 1A ARRD Temperature Exceeds Plant Shutdown Criteria 4 RD02A01 35 TRUE NA NA NA 3 CEA 1 Drops 5 RD02A02 35 TRUE NA NA NA 3 CEA 2 Drops 6 FW38A 50 50-100% 00:02:00 NA NA 4 Feedwater Line Break Inside Containment - Steam Generator 1 E-NRC04-1 Page 3 of 17

OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 1- Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel X Fails Low Event

Description:

The in-service PZR pressure control (PPC) channel fails low. The crew should implement OP-901-120, PZR Pressure Control Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1.

Event Objectives:

1. Diagnose a failed PPCS Channel in accordance with OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction, Subsection E0.

2. Stabilize pressurizer pressure on alternate control channel in accordance with OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction, Subsection E1.

3. Restore pressurizer heaters to normal alignment.

Event Critical Tasks:

1 None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO Reports annunciators and indications to CRS.

- Pressurizer Pressure HI/LO annunciator (CP -2, Cabinet H, E1)

- Pressurizer Pressure Signal Deviation annunciator (CP-2, Cabinet H, F1)

- All pressurizer backup heaters energized (CP-2).

- Actual RCS pressure and trend. (CP-2 & CP-7)

CRS Enters OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction.

CRS Uses OP-901-120, Subsection E0 to diagnose to Subsection E1 PNPO/CRS Transfer Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel Selector Switch to Y on CP-2 PNPO/CRS Verify proper operation of Pressurizer Pressure controller, RC-IPIC-0100 (CP-2), and Pressurizer Pressure being restored to 2250 psia

- Monitors Pressurizer Pressure (CP -2, CP-7) to determine that RCS pressure is returning to or being controlled at setpoint (CP-2)

- Verify all Backup Heater Banks in AUTO de-energize (CP-2)

- Reset Proportional Heater Banks 1 and 2 if actual RCS pressure exceeded 2270 psia (CP -2). The Pressurizer Press Hi/Lo annunciator must be clear for this to be done.

E-NRC04-1 Page 4 of 17

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

CRS Refers to RCS Pressure Technical Specification 3.2.8.

- Enters Tech Spec if RCS Pressure is determined to have been outside of 2025 and 2275 psia.

Termination E-NRC04-1 Page 5 of 17

OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 2 - SG NR Range Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1105 Fails High Event

Description:

S/G 1 Narrow Range control channel instrument fails high causing FWCS 1 controllers to shift to manual. The crew should implement OP-901-201 and control S/G 1 level manually. The crew should place the Startup and Main Feed Reg valves in the RTO position after the Trip.

Event Objectives:

1. Verify feedwater control systems respond to level deviation.

2. Restore and maintain steam generator levels in accordance with OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control System Malfunction.

Event Critical Tasks:

1 None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO Reports alarms and indications

§ SG 1 FW Contl Lvl Dev/Pwr Lost on CP -1 Cabinet F, U14

§ SG 1 Lvl Hi/Lo on CP-1 Cabinet F, T15 (May be delayed)

§ SG 1 NR levels are ~ 68% and steady or slowly lowering (CP-1, CP-8)

§ SG 1 & 2 NR levels are ~ 68% and steady (CP-1, CP -8)

§ SG-ILR-1105 is rising or has failed high on CP-1 recorder

§ FWCS 1 controllers in MANUAL for FWPT A, Main Feed Reg Valve 1, and Startup Feed Reg Valve 1 on CP -1 (after 7% deviation between channels)

CRS Determines need to enter OP-902-201, Feedwater Control System Malfunction CRS If Reactor Trip occurs, go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.

SNPO/CRS Determine any FWCS controllers that are behaving erratically. Place any erratic controllers in manual and control S/G level.

§ Determines that no FWCS controllers on CP-1 are operating erratically

§ CRS should give a range to control SG 1 level between 50-70% NR SNPO/CRS Verify both SGFP discharge pressures are matched (CP -1) and greater than S/G pressure (CP -1).

§ Determines step is met E-NRC04-1 Page 6 of 17

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO/CRS Stop Turbine load changes except to match Tave and Tref.

§ Determines no load changes in progress SNPO/CRS Restore S/G level to 50 - 70% NR by:

§ Uses FWPT A speed controller (CP-1) in manual to adjust speed or Main Feed Reg Valve 1 controller (CP-1) in MANUAL SNPO/CRS Determine if control channel has failed by checking all of the control channel indications on CP-1.

§ Determines SG-ILR-1105 has failed high SNPO/CRS If control channel has been determined to have deviated by >7%, verify applicable controllers have shifted to manual.

§ Verifies FWPT A Speed Controller on CP -1 in MANUAL

§ Verifies Main Feed Reg Valve 1 Controller in MANUAL

§ Verifies Startup Feed Reg Valve 1 Controller in MANUAL CRS Determine and correct the cause of the malfunction.

§ Notifies I&C or Work Week Manager of instrument failure TERM At lead Examiners cue, modify RC33A to 215? with 1 min ramp E-NRC04-1 Page 7 of 17

OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 3 - RCP 1A Anti Reverse Rotation Device (ARRD) temperature rise Event

Description:

RCP 1A Anti Reverse Rotation Device (ARRD) temperature starts to rise from 195ºF to 215ºF. The crew should implement OP-901-130, RCP Malfunction, Subsections E0 and E6. The RCP ARRD failure requires the crew to perform a plant shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown.

Event Objectives:

1. Perform operator actions according to offnormal operating procedure OP-901-130 section E6 RCP anti reverse rotation device (ARRD) Temperature High.

2. Determine need to perform a controlled plant shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown Event Critical Tasks:

1 None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

CREW Notify Duty Plant Manager and System Engineer that RCP ARRD temperature is greater than or equal to 203?

SNPO If RCP ARRD temperature is greater than or equal to 203? and less than or equal to 210? then lower RCP ARRD temperature by either of the following:

§ Start Dry Cooling Tower fans (CP-33)

§ Start ACCW pumps and (associated Wet Cooling Tower Fans) lower ACC-126 A and B controller setpoints (CP -33)

NOTE: CCW Temperature should be changed at a rate of less than or equal to 10? in one hour to prevent degradation of the RCP seals NOTE: CCW Temperature of < 75? could lead to Essential Chiller trips on evaporator low refrigerant pressure E-NRC04-1 Page 8 of 17

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO If RCP ARRD temperature is > 210? and less than or equal to 225? then perform the following:

§ Start a RCP oil lift pump for RCP 1A on CP -2 to lower ARRD temperature to <210?

§ When ARRD temperature stabilizes below 210? or 5 minutes of lift oil pump operation has elapsed then secure the RCP 0il lift pump NOTE Do not allow the RCP Oil Lift Pump to exceed five minutes of continuous operation CREW If unable to stabilize ARRD temperature below 210? then commence a controlled Plant Shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown CRS Determines need to perform a controlled shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005.

CRS/PNPO Notifies Load Dispatcher prior to power reduction and announces power reduction over plant paging system.

PNPO Maintain Tcold 541-558°F during downpower estimate boron addition using Thumbrule or OP-002-005 (~1200 gals) borate to reduce power at rate specified by CRS Performs Direct Boration lineup in accordance with OP-002-005 PNPO Perform Boron Equalization per Att. 9.12.

§ Energizes all Pzr Backup Heaters on CP-2

§ Reduce Spray Valve Controller Setpoint by rotating potentiometer on Spray Valve Controller on CP-2 until Spray Valves open

§ Verifies PLCS maintains RCS pressure at ~ 2250 psia PNPO/CRS Maintains ASI using group 5, 6 or Group P control rods in accordance with Attachment 9.9, Axial Shape Control Guidelines.

§ CRS provides direction on ASI Control - Preferred groups and CEA insertion limits per TS 3.1.3.6 E-NRC04-1 Page 9 of 17

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO Reduces Generator load as required when Tave starts to drop to match reference temperature and Tave

§ SNPO lowers load reference and sets load rate per CRS or PNPO instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1 PNPO/SNPO Verify the value of C24648 [BSCAL SMOOTHING VAL. APPLD (DUMOUT17)], changes to 1.

Verify MSBSCAL out of service PNPO Reevaluate CEA Subgroups selected to drop on Reactor Power Cutback Between 90% and 80%

TERMINATION When Reactivity Manipulation complete at discretion of Lead Examiner initiate event 4 E-NRC04-1 Page 10 of 17

OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 4 / 5 - CEA 1 and 2 Drops/Manual Reactor Trip/Main Turbine Fails to Trip Automatically Event

Description:

After the reactivity manipulation is satisfied, CEAs 1 and 2 drop into the core which will require a manual reactor trip. The Main Turbine fails to trip on the reactor trip requiring the SNPO to manually trip the Main Turbine. The Crew should implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.

Event Objectives:

1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, in the event of a reactor trip.

2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to appropriate EOP recovery procedure.

Event Critical Tasks:

Establish Reactivity Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO manually trips the Reactor within one minute of recognizing two CEAs dropped.

Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/SNPO Recognize and report indications of Dropped CEA

§ CEA 1 and 2 Amber Rod Bottom Lights on CEA Rod Bottom Light Mimic on CP -2

§ CEA 1 and 2 Green Lower Electrical Limit Light illuminated on CEDMCS Control Panel on CP-2

§ CEAC CRT on CP-2 indicates CEA 1 and 2 inserted in core PNPO Manually Trip the Reactor using Manual Trip Pushbuttons on CP -2 NOTE: CRITICAL TASK PNPO/CRS Verify Reactivity Control

§ Check reactor power dropping on CP-2 or CP -7

§ Check startup rate is negative on CP -2 or CP-7

§ Check less than 2 CEAS not fully inserted using

§ CEAC CRT on CP-2

§ CEDMCS LEL Lights illuminated on CP-2

§ CEA Rod Bottom Lights illuminated on CP -2 E-NRC04-1 Page 11 of 17

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries by:

§ Checking the main turbine tripped by verifying all valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1

§ Manually Trip the main Turbine:

o Depress TURBINE TRIP and THINK Pushbuttons

§ Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP -1

§ Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:

§ Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1

§ Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1

§ A and B DC bus indicators on CP -1 read > 105 volts

§ Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 read ~ 120 volts PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Inventory Control by:

§ Checking PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2

§ Checks Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28 deg. on CP -2 PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Pressure Control by:

§ Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP -2, CP -7, PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2025 and 2275 psia or

§ If PZR pressure is less than 1684 psia, the operator verifies that SIAS and CIAS (CP-7) initiate or performs manual initiation (CP -7 or CP-8)

§ If PZR pressure is less than 1621 psia, the operator verifies no more than two RCPs are operating

§ Starts a lift oil pump for RCPs to be secured at CP-2

§ Secures a RCP in Loop 1 and Loop 2 at CP -2

§ If PZR pressure is less than minimum RCP NPSH of App. 2A (curve located on CP-6) the operator secures all RCPS.

§ Starts a lift oil pump for RCPs to be secured on CP -2

§ Secures all RCPs at CP-2 PNPO/CRS Verify Core Heat Removal by:

§ Checking at least one RCP operating on CP -2,

§ Operating loop delta-T less than 13 deg. F, and

§ RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28 deg. F.

(may be N/A for LOCA event)

E-NRC04-1 Page 12 of 17

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO/CRS Check RCS Heat Removal by:

§ Checking at least one S/G is both 15-80% NR (CP -1 or CP-8) and Main Feedwater is available to restore level or

§ Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G.

§ EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROM lights extinguished CP -7)

§ EFW pumps operating (CP -8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuated PNPO/SNPO/C Check RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 535-555 deg. F or

§ If Tc is > 555 deg. F verify level is being restored to at least one S/G (CP -1 or CP -8) and verify SBCS (CP-1) or ADVS (CP -8) are maintaining RCS temp 535-555 deg. F.

§ If Tc is < 535 deg. F then verify feed flow (MFW-CP-1 or EFW-CP -8) is not excessive and verify SBCS or ADVs are restoring RCS Tc 535-555 deg. F

§ If Tc is < 500 deg. F verify no more than 2 RCPs operating on CP-2 SNPO/CRS Check S/G pressure 925-1050 psia (CP-1 or CP-7) or

§ If S/G press < 925 psia verify steam bypass valves and ADVs are closed.

§ If S/G press less than or equal to 764 psia verify MSIS is initiated.

§ if S/G press > 1050 psia verify SBCs or ADVs are restoring S/G press to <

1050 psia SNPO/CRS Check FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1)by

§ Checking Main Feed Reg Valves are closed,

§ Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and

§ Operating Feed Pumps are 3800 to 4000 rpm or

§ Manually operate feedwater system to restore level in at least one S/G to 50-70% NR.(N/A if MSIS is initiated)

§ SNPO must manually place SG 1 FWCS Valves to the RTO Position due to the controllers being in manual SNPO/CRS Reset Moisture Separator Reheaters

§ Check the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP-1) (N/A if MSIS is initiated)

E-NRC04-1 Page 13 of 17

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Isolation by

§ Checking Containment pressure (CP -7 or CP-8) < 16.4 psia,

§ Check that no Cont ainment Area rad monitors (RMS CRT/CP-14/PMC) are in alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity, and

§ Check that no steam plant rad monitors (RMS CRT/CP-14/PMC) alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity.

§ If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.1 psia verify CIAS, SIAS, and MSIS (CP-7) initiate or manually initiate each actuation (CP-7 or CP-8).

SNPO/PNPO/C Verify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control And Containment Combustible Gas Control by

§ Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than or equal to 120 deg. F and Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia or

§ Verify at least 3 Containment Fan Coolers (CP -18) operating.

§ If Containment press is greater or equal to 17.1 psia verify all CFCs are operating in emergency mode.

o Verifies 4 CFCs operating in slow speed

§ If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.7 verify CSAS is initiated, all available CS pumps are delivering > 1750 gpm, and secure all RCPs.

CRS Determines whether all Safety Function Acceptance Criteria were met and no contingencies were taken:

§ If answer is Yes CRS goes to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery

§ If answer is NO then CRS performs diagnostics flowchart OP-902-009, Appendix 1 TERM Crew diagnoses a Reactor Trip Event and transitions to OP-902-001 E-NRC04-1 Page 14 of 17

OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 6 - Feedwater Break inside Containment Event

Description:

After the crew has transitioned to OP-902-001, a Feedwater Break occurs on S/G 1 inside containment. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to secure feeding SG 1 with EFW and take action to stabilize RCS temperature and pressure.

Event Objectives:

1 Verify the existence/location of an excess steam demand.

2 Ensure the reactor is maintained in a shutdown condition.

3 Ensure the conditions for pressurized thermal shock are minimized.

4 Mitigate the consequences of an excess steam demand by properly utilizing OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery Procedure.

Event Critical Tasks 1 Establish RCS Temperature Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The SNPO takes action to stabilize RCS temperature within the limits of the PT curve following blowdown of the affected SG.

2 Establish RCS Pressure Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO takes action to stabilize RCS pressure within the limits of the PT curve following blowdown of the affected SG. The pressure differential across the SG tubes will be

< 1600 psid.

3 Stop All RCPs The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO takes action to stop all RCPs within 3 minutes of a loss of CCW flow or loss of subcooled margin.

Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

CRS Confirm diagnosis

§ CRS directs STA to perform safety function status check list

§ CRS notifies Chemistry to sample both S/Gs for activity CREW Announce the event using plant page CRS Directs SM to Refer to Emergency Plan CRS Implements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip E-NRC04-1 Page 15 of 17

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/CRS If PZR pressure < 1684 psia verify SIAS initiated,

§ SIAS lights off on PPS ROM on CP -7

§ SIAS Initiation Alarms on CP-2 PNPO/SNPO/CRS If SIAS initiated,

§ LPSI and HPSI pumps started,

§ Injection flow is acceptable per OP-902-009, Appendix 2

§ available charging pumps (2) are running PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify MSIS actuation

§ MSIS lights off on PPS ROM on CP-7

§ MSIS Initiation Alarms on CP-2

§ Both Main Steam Isolation Valves indicate closed on CP -8

§ Both Main Feed Isolation Valves indicate closed on CP-8 PNPO/CRS If Pzr press < 1621 psi a and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs (CP-2) operating.

If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A secure all RCPs.

PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify RCP operating limits

§ Verify CCW available to RCPs (CP -2/CP -8) or secure affected RCPs if not restored within 3 minutes.

§ If a CSAS is initiated, then Stop ALL RCPs

§ if Tc >500 deg. F, verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.

Note: Critical Task SNPO Protect Main Condenser Only applicable if Loss of Offsite Power has occurred SNPO/CRS Verify proper CCW operation

§ Verify a CCW Pump (CP-8) is running for Train A and B PNPO/SNPO/CRS Determine most affected SG

§ Determines SG 1 is most affected SG

§ SG with lowest pressure (CP-8)

§ SG with Lowering or 0% WR level (CP-8)

§ SG with lowest RCS temperatures (CP -2/CP -7)

E-NRC04-1 Page 16 of 17

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO/CRS Isolate SG 1:

§ Verify MSIV 1 Closed on CP-8

§ Verify MFIV 1 Closed on CP-8

§ Verify ADV 1 is Closed by taking controller on CP -8 to MANUAL and verifying 0% output

§ Verify EFW-228A SG 1 Primary isolation valve closed on CP -8

§ Verify EFW-229A SG 1 Backup isolation valve closed on CP-8

§ Close MS-401A on CP -8

§ Verify MS-120A and MS-119A Main Steam Line 1 Drains are closed on CP-8

§ Verify SG 1 Blowdown Isolation Valves BD-102A and BD-103A are closed on CP -8

§ Notifies NAO to verify locally safeties not lifting on SG 1 PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify correct SG isolated

§ Isolated SG with lowest pressure (CP-8)

§ Isolated SG with Lowering or 0% WR level (CP -8)

§ Isolated SG with lowest RCS temperatures (CP-2/CP-7)

PNPO/SNPO/CRS Stabilize RCS temperature and pressure using SG 2 when RCS Pressure (CP-2/CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) starts to rise or CET Temperatures (CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) start to rise

§ SNPO depresses MANUAL pushbutton on ADV 2 controller on CP-8 and raises output to open ADV 2

§ SNPO manually initiates EFAS 2 by all EFAS 2 actuation switches on CP-7 and CP-8 to ACTUATE

§ SNPO depresses MANUAL pushbutton on Primary or Backup EFW Flow Controller for SG 2 on CP-8 and raise output to initiate EFW Flow to SG-2

§ PNPO uses Normal (CP-2) and/or Auxiliary Spray (CP-4) to stabilize RCS pressure (CP-2/CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) between 1500 and 1600 psia

§ SNPO throttles or stops HPSI flow if throttle criteria of Appendix 13 are met and CRS concurs NOTE: These Steps are Critical TERMINATION The scenario may be terminated when actions to stabilize RCS temperature and pressure have been addressed.

E-NRC04-1 Page 17 of 17

Simulator Scenario Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant Simulator Scenario Number: E-NRC04-2 Author: Arthur Vest Approval: Arvel J. Hall Revision Number: 0 Estimated Time: 60 Minutes Initial Conditions: 100%, EOC (IC-30)

Scenario

Description:

The plant is at 100% reactor power. A step change of RCP 1A ARRD temperature from 175 ºF to 195 ºF occurred two days ago. Charging Pump AB has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to replace the internal check valves.

CS pump A has been OOS for 74 hrs to replace the pump impeller.

After the crew takes the shift, SUT A fails requiring operability evaluation of AC offsite circuits. The crew should enter 3.8.1.1.a and 3.8.1.1.d, perform OP-903-066 within one hour and verify all required Train B components and EFW Pump AB operable.

After the crew has evaluated Tech Specs the in-service letdown flow control valve fails closed. The Crew should implement OP-901-112 and place the alternate flow control valve in service.

After the crew implements OP-901-112, Containment Fan Cooler A trips. The crew should start the idle Containment Fan Cooler IAW OP-008-003, Containment Cooling System Subsection 6.1 and evaluate TS 3.6.2.2, 3.6.1.5, and 3.4.5.1.

After the crew places the idle Containment Fan Cooler in service RCP 2B shaft seizure occurs. This results in generating automatic trip signals and a loss of the offsite power source to Train A Busses. The reactor fails to trip automatically or by manual push buttons, however Diverse Reactor Trip Pushbuttons work.

On the trip EDG A output breaker fails to close automatically. The BOP should manually close the EDG A output breaker. Startup Feed Reg Valve 1 fails closed on the trip requiring BOP to take manual control of Main Feed Reg Valve 1 to restore S/G 1 level. Charging Pump A fails to auto start post trip, requiring the RO to manually start Charging Pump A. The Crew should implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.

During the verification of Standard Post Trip Actions a Main steam line Break outside containment occurs on S/G 2. The Crew should diagnose to OP-902-004 Excess Steam Demand Recovery.

After the Crew diagnoses to OP-902-004 and S/G dryout occurs, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture occurs in S/G 2. The Crew should implement OP-902-008.

The scenario may be terminated when the crew has taken action to Stabilize RCS temperature and pressure or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

Scenario Notes:

1. Reset Simulator to IC-30.

2. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loaded

a. Remotes and Overrides are as follows:

1. CS Pump A Bkr - CSR11 Rackout

2. Charging Pump A/B Breaker - CVR22 Rackout

3. CS117A -Shutdown HX A Outlet Valve - CSR04 Close

4. CS118A, SDC HX A Outlet Isol To RWSP - CSR05 Closed

5. CS101A & CS111A, CS Pump A Suct/Disc Isol Vlvs - CSR07 Closed

b. Malfunctions

1. RC33A, RCP 1A ARRD Temperature - LOAD - 195°F

2. RP01A-D, RPS AUTO TRIP FAILURE - LOAD - TRUE

3. RP02A-D, RPS MANUAL PUSHBUTTON - LOAD - TRUE

4. Malfunctions per Scenario Time Line (Continued next page)

E-NRC04-2 Page 1 of 15

3. Danger Tag and place to OFF:

a. CS Pump A C/S on CP-8 control switch to OFF

b. Chg Pump A/B C/S on CP-4

4. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.

5. Place B/U Charging Pump Selector Switch in A-B.

6. Place computer point for RCP 1A ARRD Temp on CRT

7. Ensure CW Pumps B and D are running.

8. Ensure SP-105 and SP-106, Containment Sump Isolations are closed

9. Complete the simulator setup checklist.

EVENT 1 - Startup Transformer A Failure

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 1.

2. If TB watch sent to investigate SUT A alarms report flags on SUT A Differential Current, Transformer Ground, and SUT Sudden Pressure relays.

3. If TB watch sent to the Transformer report that there is evidence that the transformer relief lifted, but is not lifting at this time.

4. If Work Week Manager or Electrical Maintenance is contacted, inform the caller that a team will be sent to the SUT.

EVENT 2 - In-service Letdown flow Control Valve Fails Closed

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 2.

2. When called as RAB Place the Alternate flow Control Valve in service using the following remotes:

a. CVR02, CVC-111B LTDN FCV INLET ISOL - 100% @ 1 minute ramp

b. CVR01, CVC-111A LTDN FCV INLET ISOL - 0% @ 1 minute ramp EVENT 3- Containment Fan Cooler A Failure

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 3

2. If called as RAB to investigate Brkr 317A inform that CFC A breaker is in trip free condition.

3. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control room EVENT 4 - RCP 2B Shaft Seizure/Reactor Trip required

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 4.

2. If the TB watch is sent to verify MSR TCVs, report that all MSR TCVs are closed.

EVENT 5- Main Steam Line 2 Break Outside Containment

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 5

2. If called to verify Safeties not lifting on SG 2, report that no safeties are lifting but a steam plume is still issuing from the west MSIV area.

EVENT 6- Steam Generator Tube Rupture in SG 2 Concurrent with MSLB on SG 2 Outside Containment

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 6

2. If called as Chem to sample SG for activity and boron inform sample will be taken E-NRC04-2 Page 2 of 15

Scenario Timeline:

Event Malfunction Time Severity Ramp TUA TRA Trigger (Min) HH:MM:SS CV02A LOAD TRUE NA NA NA SETUP CHARGING PUMP A FAIL TO START 1 EG12A1 LOAD TRUE NA NA NA SETUP EDG A OUTPUT BREAKER FAILS TO CLOSE 2 ED02C 1 MIN TRUE 1 T3811 SUT A TRANSFORMER FAILURE 3 CV30A2 10 MIN TRUE 2 A112,e2 LETDOWN FLOW REGULATOR VALVE A FAILS CLOSED 4 CH01A 20 MIN TRUE 3 AR002, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER FAILS OFF 5 RC03D 25 MIN TRUE 4 E000 RCP 2B SHAFT SEIZURE 5 FW20A2A 25 TRUE 00:02:00 NA NA 4 A201,e5 STARTUP FEED REG VALVE FAILS CLOSED - STEAM GENERATOR 1 5 MS13B 35 10% NA NA NA 5 E004 MAIN STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT SG 2 6 SG01B 45 10% NA NA NA 6 E008,E0 SGTR STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE S/G 2 E-NRC04-2 Page 3 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 1 - Startup Transformer A Failure Event

Description:

After the crew takes the shift, SUT A fails requiring operability evaluation of AC offsite circuits. The crew should enter 3.8.1.1.a and 3.8.1.1.d, perform OP-903-066 within one hour and verify all required Train B components and EFW Pump AB operable.

Event Objectives:

1. Evaluate the effects of the transformer failure on plant operations.

2. Evaluate Technical Specifications to determine and implement required actions.

Event Critical Tasks:

None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO Identify Startup Transformer A failure by verifying annunciator response procedures and breaker indications on CP -1.

- SUT A to Bus A2 Feeder Breaker Open

- SUT A to Bus A1 Feeder Breaker Open

- SUT A Motor Operated Disconnect Open

- Generator Output Breaker A Open

- PMC alarms for SUT A Differential Current, Sudden Pressure, and Ground

- Switching Station Trouble Annunciator

- S/U XFMR A 86 Trip/Trouble CRS Review Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 and determine the following:

- 3.8.1.1.a applies

- OP-903-066 must be performed within one hour SNPO Perform OP-903-066, Electrical Breaker Alignment Check.

CRS Notify Electrical Maintenance or Work Week Manager of failure.

Termination Termination point for event E-NRC04-2 Page 4 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 2 - In-service Letdown flow Control Valve Fails Closed Event

Description:

When the crew evaluates Tech Specs, the in-service Letdown flow Control Valve fails closed. The crew should implement OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction and place the Alternate Letdown flow Control Valve in service and restore Letdown to automatic operation.

Event Objectives:

1. Adjust letdown flow in manual, in the event of a letdown malfunction.

2. Locate and isolate leaks and/or faulted letdown system components in accordance with OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction.

3. Place available standby components in service.

Event Critical Tasks:

None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO Reports alarms and indications to CRS.

- Letdown HX Outlet Pressure Lo annunciator on CP-4

- Letdown Flow Hi/Lo Annunciator on CP-4

- Flow output on Letdown Flow Controller RC-IHIC-0110 on CP-4 rising

- Letdown Flow indicator on CP -4 indicates 0 gpm

- In-service Letdown flow Control Valve CVC-113A shows closed (green) on CP-4 with output of the Letdown Back Pressure controller at 100%

CRS Determines need to implement OP-901-112, Charging Or Letdown Malfunction CRS Determines need to implement Subsection E2, Letdown Malfunction.

PNPO/CRS Operate Charging Pumps (CP-4) as necessary to maintain Pressurizer Level IAW Attachment 1.

- Determines minimum level for operation is between 43-47%

- If level falls below minimum level o Trip the reactor o Manually initiate SIAS o Go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions PNPO/CRS Determine no letdown leak exists.

E-NRC04-2 Page 5 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

If the in service Letdown Flow Control valve (CVC 113A) OR (CVC 113B) is PNPO/CRS NOT controlling, THEN place standby Letdown Flow Control valve in service as follows:

§ IF restoring Letdown, THEN verify at least one charging pump in operation.

§ IF necessary to maintain Letdown Backpressure, THEN Letdown Backpressure Controller (CVC-IPIC-0201) may be controlled in MAN.

§ Place Letdown Flow Control Valve Selector switch to BOTH.

§ Has local operator verify open standby Letdown Flow Cntrl Vlv A(B) Outlet Isolation (CVC 114A) OR (CVC 114B).

§ Has local operator slowly open standby Letdown Flow Control Valve Inlet Isolation (CVC 111A) OR (CVC 111B).

§ Has local operator slowly close in service Letdown Flow Control Valve Inlet Isolation (CVC 111A) OR (CVC 111B).

§ Has local operator close in service Letdown Flow Cntrl Vlv A (B) Outlet Isolation (CVC 114A) OR (CVC 114B).

§ Position Letdown Flow Control Valve Selector switch to select operable flow control valve placed in service.

§ IF letdown is still in service and Letdown Flow Control valve operates properly, THEN place Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110) in AUTO.

PNPO/CRS If Letdown has been secured and all malfunctions found and corrected, restore Charging and Letdown in accordance with OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control.

Termination This event may be terminated after The Alternate Letdown Flow Control Valve is placed in service or at the Lead Examiner's discretion.

E-NRC04-2 Page 6 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 3 - Containment Fan Cooler A Failure Event

Description:

After the crew implements OP-901-110 Containment Fan Cooler A trips. The crew should start the idle Containment Fan Cooler IAW OP-008-003, Containment Cooling System Subsection 6.1 and evaluate TS 3.6.2.2, 3.6.1.5, and 3.4.5.1.

Event Objectives:

1. Recognize failure of Containment Fan Cooler

2. Take action to start the standby Containment Fan Cooler.

3. Recognize and implement appropriate Technical Specification LCOs and action statements.

Event Critical Tasks:

None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO Report Annunciators and indications to CRS

§ Trn A Cntmt Cooler Power Lost on CP -33

§ CFC A/C Power Lost alarm on PMC

§ No lights illuminated on Containment Fan Cooler A C/S on CP -18 CREW Refer to the appropriate Annunciator Response Procedure

§ OP-500-002, Control Room Cabinet B SNPO Start the Standby Containment Fan Cooler (CFC C)

§ Refers to OP-008-003, Containment Cooling, Section 6.4

§ Momentarily place Containment Fan Cooler C/S on CP-18 to Start/Fast

§ Verify CC-807A and CC-823A indicate open (red) on CP-18

§ Check Containment Fan Cooler C differential pressure indicates between 5.0 and 8.0 INWC on CCS-IDPR-5154A on CP-18.

§ Check CCW flow is greater than or equal to 625 gpm on CC-IFI-7570A on CP-18.

CRS Send an NAO to CFC A Breaker at MCC 317A to investigate fault CRS Notify Maintenance of failure and request assistance CRS Refer to TS. 3.4.5.1, 3.6.1.5, and 3.6.2.2.

§ Determines requirements of 3.4.5.1, 3.6.1.5, and 3.6.2.2 are met TERM E vent may be terminated after Tech Specs evaluated or at Lead Examiner's discretion E-NRC04-2 Page 7 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 4 - RCP 2B Shaft Seizure/Reactor Trip/Loss of Power to Train A Buses/Emergency Boration Event

Description:

After the crew places the idle Containment Fan Cooler in service, RCP 2B shaft seizure occurs, resulting in an automatic reactor trip signal. The Reactor fails to trip automatically or by manual pushbuttons. The Crew should trip the Reactor using DRTS pushbuttons. The trip results in loss of the offsite power source to Train A busses. The Crew should implement OP-902-000 Standard Post Trip actions.

Event Objectives:

1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, in the event of a reactor trip.

2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to appropriate EOP recovery procedure.

Event Critical Tasks:

1 Establish Reactivity Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. Th e PNPO trips the reactor using the Diverse Reactor Trip System (DRTS) pushbuttons within one minute of automatic trips on PPS ROMs (CP-7)

Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/CRS Verify Reactivity Control

§ Check reactor power dropping on CP-2 or CP -7 o Trips reactor by depressing both DRTS Pushbuttons on CP-2

§ Check startup rate is negative on CP -2 or CP-7

§ Check less than 2 CEAS not fully inserted using

§ CEAC CRT on CP-2

§ CEDMCS LEL Lights illuminated on CP-2

§ CEA Rod Bottom Lights illuminated on CP -2 NOTE: CRITICAL TASK E-NRC04-2 Page 8 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries by:

§ Checking the main turbine tripped by verifying all valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1

§ Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP -1

§ Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:

§ Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1

§ Verify EDG A starts and output breaker closes. EDG A output breaker must be closed manually

§ Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1

§ A and B DC bus indicators on CP -1 read > 105 volts

§ Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 read ~ 120 volts PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Inventory Control by:

§ Checking PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2

§ PNPO notes that Charging Pump A did not start on level deviation and manually starts the Charging Pump

§ Checks Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28 deg. on CP -2 PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Pressure Control by:

§ Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP -2, CP -7, PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2025 and 2275 psia PNPO/CRS Verify Core Heat Removal by:

§ Checking at least one RCP operating on CP -2,

§ Operating loop delta-T less than 13 deg. F (CP-2, CP -7, QSPDS) and

§ RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28 deg. F.

SNPO/CRS Check RCS Heat Removal by:

§ Checking at least one S/G is both 15-80% NR (CP -1 or CP-8) and Main Feedwater is available to restore level or

§ Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G.

o EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROM lights extinguished CP-7) o EFW pumps operating (CP -8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuated PNPO/CRS Check RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 535-555 deg. F E-NRC04-2 Page 9 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO/CRS Check S/G pressure 925-1050 psia (CP-1 or CP-7)

SNPO/CRS Check FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1) by

§ Checking Main Feed Reg Valves are closed,

§ Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and

§ SNPO notes Startup Feed Reg Valve A is failed closed reports the failure to the CRS and takes action to feed SG 1 using Main Feed Reg Valve A

§ Operating Feed Pumps are 3800 to 4000 rpm SNPO/CRS Reset Moisture Separator Reheaters

§ Checks the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP -1)

PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Isolation by

§ Checking Containment pressure (CP -7 or CP-8) < 16.4 psia,

§ Check that no Cont ainment. Area rad monitors are in alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity, and

§ Check that no steam plant rad monitors alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity.

SNPO/PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control And Containment Combustible Gas Control by

§ Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than or equal to 120 deg. F

§ Verify Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia (CP-7 or CP -8)

CRS Determines whether all Safety Function Acceptance Criteria were met and no contingencies were taken:

§ If answer is Yes CRS goes to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery

§ If answer is NO then CRS performs diagnostics flowchart OP-902-009, Appendix 1 Termination Crew diagnoses a Reactor Trip Event and transitions to OP-902-004 E-NRC04-2 Page 10 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 5 - Unisolable MSLB Outside Containment Event

Description:

During the verification of Standard Post Trip Actions a Main steam line Break outside containment occurs on S/G 2. The event may be terminated after the crew takes action to secure feeding SG 1 with EFW and take action to stabilize RCS temperature and pressure.

Event Objectives:

1 Verify the existence/location of an excess steam demand.

2 Ensure the reactor is maintained in a shutdown condition.

3 Ensure the conditions for pressurized thermal shock are minimized.

4 Mitigate the consequences of an excess steam demand by properly utilizing OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery Procedure.

Event Critical Tasks 1 Establish RCS Temperature Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The SNPO takes action to stabilize RCS temperature within the limits of the PT curve following blowdown of the affected SG.

Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

CRS Confirm diagnosis

§ CRS directs STA to perform safety function status check list

§ CRS notifies Chemistry to sample both S/Gs for activity CREW Announce the event using plant page CRS Directs SM to Refer to Emergency Plan CRS Implements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip PNPO/CRS If PZR pressure < 1684 psia verify SIAS initiated,

§ SIAS lights off on PPS ROM on CP -7

§ SIAS Initiation Alarms on CP-2 PNPO/SNPO/CRS If SIAS initiated,

§ LPSI and HPSI pumps started,

§ Injection flow is acceptable per OP-902-009, Appendix 2

§ available charging pumps (2) are running E-NRC04-2 Page 11 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify MSIS actuation

§ MSIS lights off on PPS ROM on CP-7

§ MSIS Initiation Alarms on CP-2

§ Both Main Steam Isolation Valves indicate closed on CP -8

§ Both Main Feed Isolation Valves indicate closed on CP-8 PNPO/CRS If Pzr press < 1621 psi a and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs (CP-2) operating.

If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A secure all RCPs.

PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify RCP operating limits

§ Verify CCW available to RCPs (CP -2/CP -8) or secure affected RCPs if not restored within 3 minutes.

§ if Tc >500 deg. F, verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.

SNPO/CRS Verify proper CCW operation

§ Verify a CCW Pump (CP-8) is running for Train A and B PNPO/SNPO/CRS Determine most affected SG

§ Determines SG 1 is most affected SG

§ SG with lowest pressure (CP-8)

§ SG with Lowering or 0% WR level (CP-8)

§ SG with lowest RCS temperatures (CP -2/CP -7)

E-NRC04-2 Page 12 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO/CRS Isolate SG 1:

§ Verify MSIV 1 Closed on CP-8

§ Verify MFIV 1 Closed on CP-8

§ Verify ADV 1 is Closed by taking controller on CP -8 to MANUAL and verifying 0% output

§ Verify EFW-228A SG 1 Primary isolation valve closed on CP -8

§ Verify EFW-229A SG 1 Backup isolation valve closed on CP-8

§ Places SG 1 EFW Primary and Backup flow controllers in MANUAL and verify 0% output on CP-8

§ Close MS-401A on CP -8

§ Verify MS-120A and MS-119A Main Steam Line 1 Drains are closed on CP-8

§ Verify SG 1 Blowdown Isolation Valves BD-102A and BD-103A are closed on CP -8

§ Notifies NAO to verify locally safeties not lifting on SG 1 NOTE: Critical Task PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify correct SG isolated

§ Isolated SG with lowest pressure (CP-8)

§ Isolated SG with Lowering or 0% WR level (CP -8)

§ Isolated SG with lowest RCS temperatures (CP-2/CP-7)

PNPO/SNPO/CRS Stabilize RCS temperature and pressure using SG 2 when RCS Pressure (CP-2/CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) starts to rise or CET Temperatures (CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) start to rise

§ SNPO depresses MANUAL pushbutton on ADV 1 controller on CP-8 and raises output to 100%

§ SNPO manually initiates EFAS 1 by all EFAS 1 actuation sw itches on CP-7 and CP-8 to ACTUATE

§ SNPO depresses MANUAL pushbutton on Primary or Backup EFW Flow Controller for SG 1 on CP-8 and raise output to initiate EFW Flow to SG-2

§ PNPO takes action to stabilize RCS pressure between 1500-1600 psia using Auxiliary Spray Valves on CP -4 NOTE: These Steps are Critical TERMINATION After the SNPO takes action to stabilize RCS Temperature initiate event 6.

E-NRC04-2 Page 13 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event Number 6 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture in SG 2 Concurrent with MSLB on SG 2 Outside Containment Event

Description:

After the Crew diagnoses to OP-902-004 an S/G Dryout occurs a SGTR occurs in S/G 2 requiring the Crew to implement OP-902-008. The scenario may be terminated after the crew performs steps to isolate SG and commence depressurization Event Objectives:

1. Recognize entry criteria for the functional recovery procedure and take preliminary actions as required by OP-902-008.

2. Determine the safety function status and prioritize Safety Functions.

3. Respond to the identified safety functions in jeopardy by selecting the proper success paths and implementing them.

4. Respond to the containment isolation safety function not met by selecting the proper success path and implementing it.

Event Critical Tasks None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

CREW Announce event using plant page CRS Directs SM to Refer to Emergency Plan CRS Implements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip PNPO/CRS If Pzr press < 1621 psi a and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs (CP-2) operating.

If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A secure all RCPs.

PNPO/CRS Verify RCP operating limits

§ Stop all if CSAS/loss CCW

§ < 500 degrees, stop 2 RCPs CRS Direct chemistry to sample both SGs for activity and boron SNPO/CRS Place Hydrogen Analyzers A and B in service (CP -33)

§ Open Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valves

§ Start Hydrogen Analyzer sample Pumps CRS Identify Success Paths Using Resource Assessment Trees and Safety Function Tracking Sheet E-NRC04-2 Page 14 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

CRS Direct STA to perform Safety Function Status Checklist and independently prioritize safety functions CRS Prioritize success paths

§ Determines that CI-1 is first path to be implemented SNPO/CRS Determine most affected SG

§ High Rad Monitor readings (RMS CRT on CP -6)

§ SG level (CP -8) rise in SG 2 when not feeding

§ Determine need to go to HR-2 step 16 per step 2 of CI-1 PNPO/CRS Depressurize the RCS using Main or Aux. Spray to meet all of the following:

§ RCS pressure less than 1000 psia

§ RCS pressure within Appendix 2-A, "

§ If HPSI Throttle Criteria are met control Charging and Letdown flow and throttle HPSI flow SNPO/CRS When RCS T-hot is less than 520 degrees F isolate the most affected SG 2 by:

§ Place ADV 2 controller setpoint to 980 psig and ve rify the controller is in AUTO on CP-8

§ Verify MSIV 2 is CLOSED on CP -8

§ Verify MFIV 2 Closed on CP-8

§ If EFAS 2 is not initiated close EFW-228B and EFW-229B

§ place the EFW FCV controllers in manual and close EFW-224B and EFW-223B on CP-8 by verifying output of controller is )%

§ Close MS-401B on CP -8

§ Close the main steam line drains MS-120B and MS-119B

§ Direct an NAO to check Main Steam Safety Valves closed on SG 2 TERM Scenario can be terminated after the CRS and STA compare Safety Function prioritization.

E-NRC04-2 Page 15 of 15

Simulator Scenario Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant Simulator Scenario Number: E-NRC04-3 Author: Arthur Vest Approval: Arvel J. Hall Revision Number: 0 Estimated Time: 60 Minutes Initial Conditions: 100%, BOC (IC-10)

Scenario

Description:

The plant is at 100% reactor power. A step change of RCP 1A ARRD temperature from 175 ºF to 195 ºF occurred two days ago. Charging Pump AB has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to replace the internal check valves.

CS pump A has been OOS for 74 hrs to replace the pump impeller.

After the crew takes the shift, the PPS Channel B S/G 1 narrow range level instrument fails high. The Crew should evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and take required actions to bypass the S/G Level High, S/G level low and S/G Delta-P trips for S/G1 in PPS Channel B within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

After the crew bypasses the affected PPS bistables, CEA 20 drops into the core. The crew should implement OP-901-102 CEDMCS or CEA Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1 and OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable.

Within 15 minutes of the dropped CEA, the crew must begin a power reduction to less than 70% IAW OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.

After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, the in-service PZR pressure control channel fails high and Spray Valve B fails open. The crew should refer to OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction and implement Subsections E0, E1 and E3. The Crew should manually trip the reactor and secure RCP 1B.

The Crew should implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions in conjunction with OP-901-120. After the crew secures RCP 1B the Spray Valve recloses. The crew should diagnose to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery.

After the crew enters OP-902-001 a small break LOCA occurs. The crew should transition to OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. HPSI pump A will trip on overcurrent when SIAS actuates, HPSI Pump B fails to auto start requiring the BOP to perform a manual start The scenario may be terminated when the crew has taken action to stabilize RCS temperature and pressure or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

Scenario Notes:

1. Reset Simulator to IC-10.

2. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loaded

a. Remotes and Overrides are as follows:

1. CS Pump A Bkr - CSR11 Rackout

2. Charging Pump A/B Breaker - CVR22 Rackout

3. CS117A -Shutdown HX A Outlet Valve - CSR04 Close

4. CS118A, SDC HX A Outlet Isol To RWSP - CSR05 Closed

5. CS101A & CS111A, CS Pump A Suct/Disc Isol Vlvs - CSR07 Closed

6. H_K08, CEA Disabled - Crywolf

b. Malfunctions

1. RC33A, RCP 1A ARRD Temperature - LOAD - 195°F

2. Malfunctions per Scenario Time Line

3. Danger Tag and place to OFF:

a. CS Pump A C/S on CP-8

b. Chg Pump A/B C/S on CP-4 (Continued Next Page)

E-NRC04-3 Page 1 of 15

4. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.

5. Place B/U Charging Pump Selector Switch in A-B.

6. Place computer point for RCP 1A ARRD Temp on CRT

7. Place B/U Charging Pump Selector Switch in A-B.

8. Ensure Large PTID computer point for RCP 1A ARRD Temp on CRT.

9. Ensure Containment Sump Isolation Valves, SP-105 and 106 are open on CP-8 10.Complete the simulator setup checklist.

EVENT 1 - SG 1 NR Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1113B Fails High

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 1.

2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control room EVENT 2 - CEA 20 Drops

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 2.

2. If RAB sent to CEDMCS Alley, report the CEA disconnect for CEA 20 is open, no other indications of problem are readily apparent.

3. If WWM or I&C called inform the caller, a team will be sent to CEDMCS Alley.

EVENT 3- Rapid Power Reduction

1. If contacted as the Turbine Building operator to remove Polisher Vessels from report that you will monitor DP and remove vessels as necessary EVENT 4 - Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel X Fails High/Pressurizer Spray Valve RC-301B Fail s Open

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 4.

2. On Lead Examiner's cue or after RCP tripped delete RC14B1 to close Spray valve.

3. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control Room.

EVENT 5 - Small Break LOCA/HPSI Pump A trips on overcurrent/ HPSI Pump B fails to auto start

1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 5.

2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control Room.

3. If called as RAB to check HPSI Pump A breaker report OC flags on all phases.

4. If called as RCA to check HPSI Pump A report indication of overheating on motor vents but no fire at this time.

E-NRC04-3 Page 2 of 15

Scenario Timeline:

Event Malfunction Time Severity Ramp TUA TRA Trigger (Min) HH:MM:SS SI01A TRUE SETUP HPSI PUMP A TRIP SI02B TRUE SETUP HPSI PUMP B FAIL TO START 1 SG10B 1 100 % 1 T331 FAIL SG1 NR LVL XMTR SG-ILT-1113B - SG 1 NR LEVEL TRANSMITTER SG-ILT-1113B FAILS HIGH 2 RD02A20 10 TRUE 2 A102,e1 DROPPED CEA - CEA 20 DROPS 3 NA 25 A212 RAPID POWER REDUCTION 4 RX14A 30 100% 4 A120,e1 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL INSTRUMENT FAILURE HIGH 5 RC14B1 30 TRUE 4 A120,e3 PZR SPRAY VALVE FAILS OPEN/CLOSED 6 RC23D 45 .5% 5 E002 RCS COLD LEG RUPTURE (DBL-END 30" BREAK @100%)

E-NRC04-3 Page 3 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 1 - SG 1 NR Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1113B Fails High Event

Description:

After the crew takes the shift, PPS channel B S/G 1 narrow range level instrument fails high. The crew should evaluate TS 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3.5, and 3.3.3.6 and bypass S/G level high, low, and DP Bistables for S/G 1 in PPS channel B within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Event Objectives:

1. Recognize failed instrument and verify RPS/CPC bistable functions as expected.

2. Bypass affected bistable channel.

Event Critical Tasks:

None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/SNPO Recognize and report indications of failed channel

§ Channel B SG 1 NR Level Indication pegged high on CP-8

§ RPS Channel B Trouble Annunciator on CP-2

§ RPS Channel Trip SG 1 Level Hi annunciator on CP-2

§ SG 1 Level Hi Pretrip B/D annunciator on CP-2

§ Pretrip and Trip Lights illuminated for SG 1 Level Hi on Channel B PPS ROM on CP-7 PNPO/CRS Verify RPS/CPC function bistable respond as expected

§ Pretrip and Trip Lights illuminated for SG 1 Level Hi on Channel B PPS ROM on CP-7

§ No trips or pretrips on SG 1 Level Hi on other 3 channels of PPS ROMs on CP-7 CRS Review and/or implement actions required by technical specification section 3.3.1 (RPS), 3.3.3.5 (Remote Shutdown), and 3.3.3.6 (Accident Monitoring)

- Enters TS 3.3.1 Action 2

- Enters TS 3.3.2 Action 13

- Determines that following trip bistables in PPS Channel B must be bypassed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of time of failure:

o SG 1 Level Hi, o SG 1 Level Lo, o SG 1 Delta P Hi

- CRS reviews OP-903-013 and TS 3.3.3.5 and determines that minimum requirements are met

- CRS reviews OP-903-013 and TS 3.3.3.6 and determines that minimum requirements are met E-NRC04-3 Page 4 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

CRS Directs SNPO to bypass the following PPS Channel B trip bistables within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of failure:

- SG 1 Level Hi,

- SG 1 Level Lo,

- SG 1 Delta P Hi SNPO Bypasses affected bistable in PPS Channel B as follows:

- Obtains Key 222 from Key locker on side of SNPO Desk

- Unlocks and opens front access door at CP-10 Channel B

- Unlocks and opens the Bistable Control Panel door in PPS Channel B

- Depresses the bistable bypass pushbuttons for the following trip bistables in PPS Channel B and verifies associated bypass lights illuminate on CP-10:

o SG 1 Level Hi, o SG 1 Level Lo, o SG 1 Delta P Hi TERM Bypass lights illuminated on BCP and ROM for the desired bistable channels E-NRC04-3 Page 5 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 2 - CEA 20 Drops Event

Description:

After the crew bypasses the affected PPS bistable, CEA 20 drops into the core. The crew should implement OP-901-102 CEDMCS or CEA Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1 and OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable. Within 15 minutes of the dropped CEA, the crew must begin a power reduction to < 70% IAW OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.

Event Objectives:

1. Stabilize plant conditions following a dropped CEA.

2. Determine the cause and results of a dropped CEA.

3. Reduce reactor power and withdraw dropped CEA in accordance with Off-Normal Operating Procedure OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction.

Event Critical Tasks:

None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/SNPO Recognize and report indications of Dropped CEA

§ CEA 20 Amber Rod Bottom Light on CEA Rod Bottom Light Mimic on CP-2

§ CEA 20 Green Lower Electrical Limit Light illuminated on CEDMCS Control Panel on CP-2

§ CEAC CRT on CP-2 indicates CEA 20 inserted in core

§ RCS Tc, Th, and Tave lowering on indicators and recorders on CP -2, CP-7 and PMC

§ RCS Pressure slowly lowering on CP-2 and CP-7 indicators and recorders

§ CEA Disabled, CEA Group Minor Deviation, CEA Group Major Deviation Annunciators on CP-2

§ COLSS Master annunciator on CP-36 (SNPO)

§ SG pressure lowering on CP-1 and CP -8 (SNPO)

CRS Determines need to enter OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction.

PNPO Place CEDMCS Mode Select Switch to OFF on CEDMCS Control Panel on CP-2.

CRS CRS transitions to Section E1, CEA Misalignment Greater Than 7 Inches E-NRC04-3 Page 6 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

Crew Match TREF with TAVE

§ CRS directs the SNPO and PNPO to coordinate to match Tave and Tref

§ SNPO lowers load reference and sets load rate per CRS or PNPO instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1

§ PNPO instructs SNPO to place turbine in Hold when Tave and Tref are matched

§ Action is taken prior to reactor tripping on SG Pressure Lo CRS Notifies or directs notification of the Duty Plant Manager and Duty Engineer.

CRS/PNPO Record time of CEA misalignment.

CREW If > 19 inches then:

§ CRS determines need to commence power reduction by boration of 30%

and implement OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction

§ CRS determines need to start downpower within 15 minutes of CEA deviation

§ CRS declares COLSS inoperable and enters OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable

§ CRS directs STA or board operators to start COLSS offnormal 15 minute logs TERM Termination Point is entry into OP-901-212 to perform downpower E-NRC04-3 Page 7 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 3 - Rapid Power Reduction Event

Description:

Within 15 minutes of the dropped CEA, the crew must begin a power reduction IAW OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.

Event Objectives:

1. When plant conditions exist requiring a Rapid Plant Shutdown, implement the steps of OP-901-212 to establish the desi red final plant conditions.

2. During a Rapid Plant Downpower, coordinate boration and Main Turbine load reduction to control RCS Tcold B between 541and 558.

Event Critical Tasks:

None Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO Initiate RCS boration

§ Performs Direct Boration lineup in accordance with OP-002-005 or aligns for emergency boration at CP -4 per CRS direction.

§ Estimates ~ 600 gallons of boric acid to reduce power to 70% and sets up Boric Acid Batch Counter at CP -4 for desired amount of Boric Acid PNPO Calculate Spray Nozzle Delta T using:

§ Pressurizer Water Temperature on CP-2 or PMC

§ Spray Line Temperatures on CP -2 or PMC PNPO Establish Boron Equalization.

§ Place all available Pressurizer Backup Heater C/Ss to ON on CP-2.

§ Lower Potentiometer on Spray Valve Controller on CP-2 until Spray Valves indicate intermediate PNPO/CRS Maintain AS I

§ CRS provides direction on ASI Control - Preferred groups and CEA insertion limits per TS 3.1.3.6

§ PNPO uses CEAs in Manual Group in accordance with CRS direction and OP-004-004, Control Element Drive CRS Notify Dispatcher of load reduction SNPO Initiate MT load reduction to maintain RCS Tcold 541 to 558.

§ SNPO lowers load reference and sets load rate per CRS or PNPO instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1 Termination Terminate after reactivity manipulation is satisfied.

E-NRC04-3 Page 8 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 4 - Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel X Fails High/Pressurizer Spray Valve RC-301B Fails Open Event

Description:

After the reactivity manipulation is satisfied, the in-service PZR pressure control channel fails high and Spray Valve B fails open. The crew should refer to OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction and implement Subsections E0, E1 and E3 or perform actions per Standard Post Trip Actions. After the crew secures RCP 1B the Spray Valve will close.

Event Objectives:

1. Stabilize pressurizer pressure on alternate control channel according to off-normal operator procedure OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction.

2. Perform actions of OP-901-120, section E3 as necessary for a spray valve failed open.

3. Realign pressurizer spray components for failed closed spray valve(s).

Event Critical Tasks:

1 Establish RCS Pressure Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO takes action to secure Reactor Coolant Pump for affected Pressurizer Spray valve prior to subcooled margin dropping below 28 degrees F.

Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/CRS Verifies Pressurizer Pressure Instrument failure by checking X/Y recorder (CP-2)

- Determines Channel X is failed high PNPO/CRS Places Pressurizer Spray Controller to MANUAL and adjusts output to 0%

PNPO/CRS Transfer Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel Selector Switch to Y on CP-2 PNPO/CRS If Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel is failed high, then perform the following:

- Transfer Pressurizer Lo Level Cutout Selector Switch to Y (CP-2)

- Verify all available Backup Heater Banks energize if RCS Pressure < 2200 psia (CP -2)

- Reset Proportional Heater Banks 1 and 2 (CP-2)

PNPO/CRS If Spray Valve fails open, Selects Spray Valve A using Spray Valve Selector Switch on CP -2 E-NRC04-3 Page 9 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/CRS If Pressurizer Pressure still dropping:

- Verify Reactor tripped

- Stop Reactor Coolant Pump 1B o Start at least 1 Lift Oil Pump for RCP 1B (CP-2) o Momentarily place RCP 1B C/S to OFF (CP-2)

Note: Booth Operator remove malfunction RC14B1 after RCP 1A is secured PNPO/CRS Verify Reactivity Control

§ Check reactor power dropping on CP-2 or CP -7

§ Check startup rate is negative on CP -2 or CP-7

§ Check less than 2 CEAS not fully inserted using

§ CEAC CRT on CP-2

§ CEDMCS LEL Lights illuminated on CP-2

§ CEA Rod Bottom Lights illuminated on CP -2 SNPO/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries by:

§ Checking the main turbine tripped by verifying all valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1

§ Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP -1

§ Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:

§ Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1

§ Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1

§ A and B DC bus indicators on CP -1 read > 105 volts

§ Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 read ~ 120 volts PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Inventory Control by:

§ Checking PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2

§ Checks Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28 deg. on CP -2 PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Pressure Control by:

§ Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP -2, CP -7, PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2025 and 2275 psia or

§ If PZR pressure is less than 1684 psia, the operator verifies that SIAS and CIAS (CP-7) initiate or performs manual initiation (CP -7 or CP-8)

§ If PZR pressure is less than 1621 psia, the operator verifies no more than two RCPs are operating

§ Starts a lift oil pump for RCPs to be secured at CP-2 E-NRC04-3 Page 10 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

§ Secures a RCP in Loop 1 and Loop 2 at CP -2

§ If PZR pressure is less than minimum RCP NPSH of App. 2A (curve located on CP-6) the operator secures all RCPS.

§ Starts a lift oil pump for RCPs to be secured on CP -2

§ Secures all RCPs at CP-2 PNPO/CRS Verify Core Heat Removal by:

§ Checking at least one RCP operating on CP -2,

§ Operating loop delta-T less than 13 deg. F, and

§ RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28 deg. F.

(may be N/A for LOCA event)

SNPO/CRS Check RCS Heat Removal by:

§ Checking at least one S/G is both 15-80% NR (CP -1 or CP-8) and Main Feedwater is available to restore level or

§ Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G.

§ EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROM lights extinguished CP -7)

§ EFW pumps operating (CP -8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuated PNPO/SNPO/C Check RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 535-555 deg. F or

§ If Tc is > 555 deg. F verify level is being restored to at least one S/G (CP -1 or CP -8) and verify SBCS (CP-1) or ADVS (CP -8) are maintaining RCS temp 535-555 deg. F.

§ If Tc is < 535 deg. F then verify feed flow (MFW-CP-1 or EFW-CP -8) is not excessive and verify SBCS or ADVs are restoring RCS Tc 535-555 deg. F

§ If Tc is < 500 deg. F verify no more than 2 RCPs operating on CP-2 SNPO/CRS Check S/G pressure 925-1050 psia (CP-1 or CP-7) or

§ If S/G press < 925 psia verify steam bypass valves and ADVs are closed.

§ If S/G press less than or equal to 764 psia verify MSIS is initiated.

§ if S/G press > 1050 psia verify SBCs or ADVs are restoring S/G press to <

1050 psia SNPO/CRS Check FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1)by

§ Checking Main Feed Reg Valves are closed,

§ Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and

§ Operating Feed Pumps are 3800 to 4000 rpm or

§ Manually operate feedwater system to restore level in at least one S/G to 50-70% NR.(N/A if MSIS is initiated)

E-NRC04-3 Page 11 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

SNPO/CRS Reset Moisture Separator Reheaters

§ Check the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP-1) (N/A if MSIS is initiated)

PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Isolation by

§ Checking Containment pressure (CP -7 or CP-8) < 16.4 psia,

§ Check that no Cont ainment Area rad monitors (RMS CRT/CP-14/PMC) are in alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity, and

§ Check that no steam plant rad monitors (RMS CRT/CP-14/PMC) alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity.

§ If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.1 psia verify CIAS, SIAS, and MSIS (CP-7) initiate or manually initiate each actuation (CP-7 or CP-8).

SNPO/PNPO/C Verify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control And Containment Combustible Gas Control by

§ Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than or equal to 120 deg. F and Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia or

§ Verify at least 3 Containment Fan Coolers (CP -18) operating.

§ If Containment press is greater or equal to 17.1 psia verify all CFCs are operating in emergency mode.

o Verifies 4 CFCs operating in slow speed

§ If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.7 psia, verify CSAS is initiated, all available CS pumps are delivering > 1750 gpm, and secure all RCPs.

CRS Determines whether all Safety Function Acceptance Criteria were met and no contingencies were taken:

§ If answer is Yes CRS goes to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery

§ If answer is NO then CRS performs diagnostics flowchart OP-902-009, Appendix 1 TERM Crew diagnoses a Reactor Trip Event and transitions to OP-902-001 E-NRC04-3 Page 12 of 15

OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event Number 5 - Small Break LOCA Event

Description:

After the crew diagnoses to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery a small break LOCA occurs. The crew should transition to OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. HPSI pump A will trip on overcurrent when SIAS actuates and HPSI Pump B fails to auto start. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to commence an RCS cooldown.

Event Objectives:

1. Take appropriate actions to mitigate the consequences of a large break loss of coolant accident in accordance with OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.

2. Monitor RCS/Core conditions and verify all critical safety functions are being addressed.

3. Ensure Reactor coolant pumps are secured as required, and the automatic & manual actions required for recirc actuation take place with two minutes of signal.

Event Critical Tasks 1 Stop All RCPs The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO takes action to stop all RCPs within 3 minutes of a loss of CCW flow or loss of subcooled margin.

2 Establish RCS Inventory Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The SNPO starts HPSI Pump B prior to Reactor Vessel Plenum level dropping below 20%.

Event Action Steps:

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

STA/CRS Confirm diagnosis

§ CRS directs STA to perform safety function status check list

§ CRS notifies Chemistry to sample both S/Gs for activity CREW Announce the event using plant page CRS Directs SM to refer to Emergency Plan CRS Implements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip E-NRC04-3 Page 13 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/SNPO/CRS If PZR pressure < 1684 psia verify SIAS initiated,

§ LPSI and HPSI pumps started,

§ SNPO takes action to manually start HPSI Pump B NOTE: CRITICAL TASK

§ Injection flow is acceptable per OP-902-009, Appendix 2

§ available charging pumps (2) are running OR

§ perform any of the following:

§ Verify power to SI pumps.

§ Verify Cold Leg injection valves open.

§ Start additional SI pumps until flow is acceptable per app. 2.

§ Align HPSI AB to replace A or B PNPO/CRS If Pzr press < 1621 psi a and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.

If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A (Curve located on CP-6) secure all RCPs.

NOTE: CRITICAL TASK IF CONDITIONS REACHED BEFORE CSAS INITIATES PNPO/CRS Verify RCP operating limits

§ Verify CCW available to RCPs (CP -8 and CP -2) or secure affected RCPs if not restored within 3 minutes.

§ Secure all RCPs if CSAS is initiated.

§ If Tc < 500 deg. F, verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.

NOTE: CRITICAL TASK IF NOT PERFORMED IN PREVIOUS STEP SNPO/CRS Verify CCW operation by checking a CCW pump (CP-8) is operating for each energized 4 KV safety bus (CP-1) or

§ If AB bus aligned to same side as faulted CCW pump start the AB CCW pump

§ If AB bus aligned to opposite Side from faulted CCW pump start the AB CCW pump after the sequencer has timed out.

§ If CCW flow can not be restored, notify an NAO to pull the overspeed trip device on the affected EDG.

PNPO/SNPO/CRS Isolate the LOCA by:

§ Verifying letdown Containment isolations (CP-4) are closed.

§ Verifying RCS sampling isolations (CP-8) are closed.

§ Checking CCW AB rad monitor not in alarm (RMS CRT on CP-6) and no Abnormal rise in reading or stop all RCPs and close CCW Containment isolations.

E-NRC04-3 Page 14 of 15

Time: Position: Applicants Actions or Behavior:

PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify LOCA not outside Containment by checking

§ RAB rad monitors,

§ sump levels (CP -8 and PMC) , and waste tank levels (PMC).

§ If a leak is indicated, locate and isolate the leak and verify CIAS actuated per Appendix 4D.

SNPO/CRS Place Hydrogen Analyzers A and B in service (CP -33)

§ Open Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valves

§ Start Hydrogen Analyzer sample Pumps PNPO/SNPO/CRS IF Containment Pressure is > 17.1 psia (CP-7 or CP -8)or Containment area rad monitors are in hi alarm (RMS CRT CP-6 or CP -14),

§ Verify CIAS is initiated (CP-7 or CP -8)

§ Verify all available CFCs are in the EMERGENCY MODE (CP-18)

§ If any CFC is not operating and Containment pressure is > 17.1 psia notify a NAO to perform OP-902-009, Appendix 22B and close the associated CFC CCW isolation valves.

SNPO/PNPO/CRS If Containment pressure is > 17.7 psia:

§ Verify CSAS is initiated (CP-7 or CP-8)

§ Verify all operating CS pumps are delivering > 1750 gpm (CP-8).

§ If any CS pump is not operating and its associated CS-125 valve is open, perform OP-902-009, Appendix 22A and close the associated valve. (not required for CS Pump A - CS-117A and 118A tagged closed per initial conditions)

SNPO/CRS IF offsite power has been lost verify MSIVs and Blowdown Containment isolations are closed.

SNPO/CRS Restore IA

§ If a TCW pump and CW pump are not running notify NAO to align IA compressors to potable water

§ If IA pressure < 95 psi g dispatch an operator to start all available air compressors

§ If IA press > 95 psig ensure IA Containment isolation valve ia-909 is open.

PNPO/SNPO/CRS Commence RCS Cooldown to less than 350 degrees F Termination (after cooldown has been started the exam lead may terminate the scenario)

E-NRC04-3 Page 15 of 15