ML042190061

Draft Section C Operating

ML042190061
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	07/19/2004
From:	Wilson M Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-423/04-301 50-423/04-301
Download: ML042190061 (195)

Text

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE APPROVAL SHEET I.

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario I II.

Ill.

Initiated:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Developer Reviewed :

Reviewer IV.

Approved:

Revision: 0 17 May 2004 Date Date Operations Manager Date Operator Training Supervisor

• AI 99-6848 G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Date Page 1 of53

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONS LISTED IN ORDER

1.

Exam Overview

2.

Instructor Guide

3.

Sequence of Events Summary

4.

Validation Checklist 5,

Reference and Critical Task Tracking Form

6.

Scenario Initial Conditions Sheet G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 2 of 53

SECTION 1 EXAM OVERVIEW

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0

1.

Exam Brief:

The plant is at 81 % power and returning to full power following a refueling outage.

However, CONVEX (IS0 New England), has ordered a rapid down power to 65%. The specific order is Reduce output to 650 MW-net, push 150 MVARS. The crew should recognize the need to reduce turbine-generator output to 700 MW and 150 MVARs out to comply with the order. Event 2 begins when the plant is stable at -65%.

Event 2 is pressurizer pressure transmitter, 3RCS*PT455, failure low. This causes all PZR heaters to energize. However, a significant RCS pressure rise is not expected before the crew recognizes the failure and responds per AOP 3571 ; including selection of an alternate control instrument. This event causes the RO to take manual control of normally automatic functions and the SRO to make Technical Specification action statement entries.

Event 3 is turbine impulse pressure transmitter, 3MSS-PT505, failure low. The indicated power mismatch will cause control rods to insert. The RO will have to take rod control to manual. The crew may have to maneuver the plant to bring Tave and Tref within 1 %OF. The alternate instrument, 3MSS-PT506, will have to be selected and compensatory measures dictated by AOP 3571 carried out. The SRO will have to refer to Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements. However, entry into action statements is not expected.

Event 4 is pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV), 3RCS*PCV456, leakage.

Ostensibly, the preceding transients cause the leak. The crew responds per OP 3353.MB4A 3-5 or AOP 3555 and blocks the affected PORV. The SRO refers to Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements and enters Tech Spec action statement 3.4.4.a. The event ends at the Examiners discretion.

Event 5 is main steam header pressure transmitter, 3MSS-PT507, failure low. The indicated differential pressure between main steam and main feed causes both turbine driven feedwater pumps to reduce speed. As the feedwater pumps slow down, steam generator water levels will lower. The steam generator water level control system will open the feedwater flow control valves in an attempt to raise levels to the programmed level. Operators should take feedwater pump speed control to manual before significant transients occur.

Event 6 is B feedwater flow control valve, 3FWC-FCV520, to failing open. Steam generator B water level will rise uncontrollably and the crew should trip the plant to prevent carryover to the turbine. Othetwise, an automatic turbine trip will occur on high steam generator water level.

Events 6 is five control rods failing to drop. The crew will perform the first four steps of E-0 and transition to ES-0.1. ES-0.1 will direct the crew to Immediate Borate per G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 3 of 53

operating procedure 3566.

Event 7 is a failure of the available auxiliary feedwater pumps, 3AFW*P1 B and 3AFW*P2, to start. ES-0.1 also directs the crew to start AFW pumps. The crew may enter FR-H.l or FR-H.2 if the heat sink critical safety function becomes red or orange.

Events 9 and 10 are a 340-gallon per minute steam generator tube rupture and failure of the standby-charging pump to start. Alternatively, if the standby charging pump was previously started, the pump will trip when SI initiates. At least four authorized procedure paths exist from this point. They are to respond to the radiation monitor alarms (AOP 3573), respond to the RCS leak (AOP 3553, respond to the steam generator tube leak (AOP 3576) or respond to the lowering pressurizer level (ES-0.1 Foldout Page). Nevertheless, all four paths inevitably require the Crew to trip the reactor, initiate SI and go to E-0. As the crew progresses through E-0, they should recognize the one of the charging pumps is not running and start or restart the offending pump. Step 25 of E-0 sends the crew to E-3, based on either abnormal radiation or uncontrollable level increase. The operators should isolate feed flow to the ruptured Steam Generator when the level increases to >8% NR or 65% WR. The crew should progress through E-3 to cooldown and depressurize the RCS; then to terminate SI and stop primary to secondary leakage. The scenario terminates when the second charging pump is secured or at the Chief Examiner's discretion.

Event 1 I is a scripted question for the SRO applicant to determine the appropriate emergency action level (EAL) - ALERT Charlie One based on leakage [RCB4].

During pre-validation, this scenario ran close to two hours. Reactor Coolant Pumps ran the entire scenario and RC-P trip criteria were never reached. The scenario kept the RO and BOP very busy and is good for testing Applicants on the consoles.

2.

Plant/Simulator differences that may affect the scenario are: None.

3.

Duration of Session:

1% hour G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 4 of 53

SECTION 2 INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario I Revision: 0 All Control Room Conduct, Operations and Communications shall be in accordance COP 200.1,Conduct of Operations, and OP 3260,Unit 3 Conduct of Operations.

"Review the Simulator Operating Limits(design limits of plant) and the Simulator Modeling Limitations and Anomalous Response List prior to performing this training scenario on the simulator. The instructor should be aware if any of these limitations may be exceeded." (NSEM 6.02)

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SIMULATOR PROBLEMS DURING EXAMS It is the responsibility of the Instructors in the simulator to insure that exam interruptions have a minimum negative impact on the Crew and the examinations we provide.

Be aware that at all times the Operators should treat the simulator as if it were the plant and you too should treat it as much like the plant as possible when they are in the simulator.

As soon as the Instructors are aware of a simulator problem that will adversely affect the exam in progress (computer fault, etc.) the Instructor should:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Place the simulator in FREEZE if possible.

Announce to the Crew that there is a simulator problem.

Request that the Crew leave the simulator control room. (The Crew should leave the simulator for problems which involve major switch alignments).

Deal with the problem (reboot, call STSB, etc.)

After the Instructors believe the simulator is restored to service, the Crew should be told how the exam will continue. If it is possible and felt to be acceptable to the evaluators, the examination can begin where it left off with an update on plant parameters and each Crew member is prepared to restart. If the examination will not begin where it left off, the crew should be told how and where the exam will begin again.

Once the Crew has been told how and where the exam will begin, have the crew conduct a brief so that the Instructor and evaluators can insure that the crew has all the necessary information to continue with the scenario.

Once all Crew members, Instructors and evaluators are satisfied that they have the necessary information to continue the scenario, place the simulator in RUN and announce to the Crew that you have continued the evaluation session.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 6 of 53

EVENT #O TITLE:

INITIAL SETUP Setup Instructions:

Enter IDT as follows :

e e

e e

e e

e 0

e e

e a

a a

e e

At any XTERM window, type <id+

When the SUN asks for an executive type: UEXEC or RTEXEC? enter <P: this will bring up a blank idt page.

To go to a previously saved idt file type <read> at the prompt When the SUN asks for a file name of the file you wish to view type in the appropriate file name:

The old "Landon" files are as follows:

Old ISD pages 1-8 are idt file OPS Old ISD pages 9-16 are idt file OPSI Old ISD pages 17-19 are idt file OPS2 IF the step counters are athear 000, THEN REMOVE the STEP COUNTER OVERRIDE, allow the counters to step out during the IC reset, Reset to IC-I2 REINSTATE the step counter OVERRIDE Adjust the various pot settings to the valued specified by the chart located in the sim booth for the selected IC.

Place Simulator to RUN Set the STEP COUNTERS PLACE the Main Turbine on the LOAD LIMITER Verify annunciator, "COMPUTER FAILURE" (MB4C, 1-1 I),

is NOT LIT.

Place MOL Curve Book in Shelf for Operator use. Remove other Curve Books from the floor.

Clear the DCS Alarms PLACE THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT IN PTL or align as needed:

Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 3AFW*PlA Equipment 00s: O 3AFW*PlA 0

Synchronize the MONITOR Time Display with digital time display on MB4.

G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 7 of 53

Initial Malfunctions

/IOs/lDAs:

T=O RD16 FW20A FW20B FW2OC

???

I/OS Rxo9 Rx16 RC07B Rx1 5 FW08B SGOl B 2 minutes).

Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert.

Failure of Auto Start on MDAFW "A" Failure of Auto Start on MDAFW "B" Failure of Auto Start on TDAFW Pump Failure or Trip of STBY Charging Pump.

Severity = 0%

Severity = 0%

Severity 1%

Severity = 0%

Severity = 100%

Severity = 38%

3RCS*PT455 fails low 3MSS-PT505 fails low 3RCS*PCV456 leakage 3MSS-PT507 fails low 3FWC-FCV520 fails open SGTR of 340 gpm (ramp from I00 to 340 over Post Exam Data Collection Reactor Power trend data Turbine Generator Load trend data Pressurizer Pressure trend data (PT455 & PT456)

SG Levels (all SGs, both NR & WR)

Rod Positions Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate trend data (all SGs)

All console and panel strip charts or recorded digital data (may be collected at end of day for all crews.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 8 of 53

Position Load reduction is 5%/min reduction to 65% Dower us RO us 81% to 65% is 16% over 15 minutes or I.I

% per minute

(<5%/min)

I I

I I

I BOP I

I Turbine Operating Mode s/b I

I MANUAL Crew Crew Not required to regain stability us OP3204 / AOP3575 Actions A CONVEX requested em erg en cy gene rat ion reduction should be completed within 15 minutes of notification.

If a unit shutdown is required, the final desired power level should be between 20% and 25% reactor power.

If at any time ROD CONTROL 4-9) annunciator is received, DO NOT go to AOP 3566, Immediate Boration.

Immediately perform step 9.

BANKS LIMIT LO-LO (MB4C Determine Power Reduction Rate (%/min)

Check desired power reduction rate - EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN 5%/min Check power reduction -

CONVEX REQUESTED Perform load reduction at 5%/min and Proceed to step 2.

Check Rod Control - IN AUTO Align EHC Panel Check turbine OPERATING MODE - MANUAL Proceed to NOTE prior to step 4 If at any time the power reduction rate or final desired power level must be changed, Return to step 1.

Verify Power Reduction Rate Check power reduction rate -

5%/MIN Check turbine load reduction -

REQUIRED TO STABILIZE PLANT Proc Step 3575, NOTE preceding Step I.

3575, Step 1 3575, Step I

.a 3575, Step I

.b 3575, Step I

.c 3575. SteD 2 3575, Step 3.a 3575, Step 3.a, RNO NOTE preceding 3575, Step 4 3575, Step 4 3575, Step 4.a 3575, Step

4. b G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 9 of 53

Comments Record the time.

Check the Calculation (16 + 85)

• 15 = 2.8 minutes BA Flow Rate = 85 gpm based on pre-validation Position I OP3204 / AOP3575 Actions I Proc Ster, 3575, Step 4.b, RNO us Proceed to step 5.

RO-MB3 Initiate Rapid Boration 3575, Step 5 Verify RCS makeup system in - 3575, Step Ro I AUTO I 5.a START one boric acid transfer 3575, Step Ro I

I 5.b OPEN emergency boration 3575, Step valve (3CHS*MV81041 I 5.c Verify direct boric acid flow I 3575, Step Ro I (3CHS-FI 183A1-INDICATED 5.c RO RO Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 1 IC-I 2 Time I Crew conducts rar,id load reduction to 65% power I

I

e. OPEN charging line flow control valve, to match boric acid flow (3CHS-FI 183A)

Record time boration started Time 3575, Step 5.d 3575, Step 5.e RO RO Energize all PZR heaters Using formula, Determine boration time (If gravity borating, use net charging flow for BA flow rate):

3575, Step 5.f 3575, Step 5 4 RO Boration Time (minutes) = (Total Power Change) + (BA Flow Rate) X I 5 Forumula of 3575, Step 5 4 RO During power decrease, Modify boration time as necessary to maintain:

Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit

1.

Tavg within f 5-F of Tref I

I AFD within COLR limits I

3575, Step 5.i us Check turbine load decrease -

IN PROGRESS OR COMPLETED 3575, Step 5.j G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 10 of 53

~

us Maintain initial MVAR loading during power reduction, unless directed otherwise 3575, Step 7.f The following step places one TD FW pump in manual while allowing the other TD FW pump to automatically unload during the downpower.

Align One Feedwater Pump For Automatic Unloadina NOTE preceding 3575, Step 8 3575, Step 8 us Verify removing a feedwater pump from service during the downpower - DESIRED 3575, Step 8.a Check ROD CONTROL BANKS annunciator - LIT LIMIT LO-LO (MB4C 4-9) 3575, Step 9.a

~~

~~~

Proceed to step 9.e. and, IF at any time, the annunciator is received, THEN Perform steps 9.b., 9.c. and 9.d.

3575, Step 9.a, RNO I OmTest No.: I Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: I

~~~~

I Crewconducts rapid loa IC-1 2 1 reduction to 65% power Time Comments step 7.

3575, Step 5.j, RNO us NOTE preceding 3575, Step If a unit shutdown is being performed, the final Mwe load should be approximately 230 Mwe.

us CRS Direction to BOP:

Decrease Turbine Load Set to 700 MW.

BOP Initiate Load Reduction 3575, Step 7 Check turbine OPERATING 3575, Step MODE - MANUAL 1 7.a BOP Check power reduction -

CONVEX REQUESTED 3575, Step I 7.e us Remember, CONVEX ordered 150 MVAR out.

BOP Check boration - IN PROGRESS 3575, Step I 7.a us Reduction to 65% Power should not prompt US to secure Feedwater Pump us us US 1 Proceed to step 9.

3575, Step 8.a. RNO If RIL Lo-Lo or Lo is received, the procedure directs Crew to raise Boration flow rate. If required flow rate can NOT be established, procedure directs Crew to trip and go to E-0.

RO I Verifv Rod Position I 3575. Step 9 RO G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 1 \\Scenario 1.doc Page 11 of 53

Proceed to step 10. and, IF the annunciator is received, THEN Perform step 9.f. and 9.g.

3575, Step 9.e, RNO Reduce Steam Supply To The 1 MSRs 3575, Step OD-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: I

~

I I

I Check ROD CONTROL BANKS annunciator - LIT LIMIT LO (MB4C 3-9) 3575, Step 9.e RO us 3575, Step I O Restore From Rapid Or Gravity Boration RO RO 3575, Step 10.a Check rapid OR gravity boration Check boration performed for the time determined in steps 5.h. and 5.i.

- IN PROGRESS 3575, Step 1O.b RO

~

~~

3575, Step 1o.c Check rapid boration - IN PROGRESS RO 3575, Step 1O.d CLOSE emergency boration valve (3CHS*MV8104)

RO 3575, Step RO 1 STOP boric acid transfer pump I 3575, Step 10.f Restore PZR level to program value and Place charging line flow control valve in AUTO Using normal makeup, Adjust RCS boron concentration as necessary to maintain:

Rods above the RIL Tavg within k 5-F of Tref a AFD within COLR limits RO 3575, Step lo.g RO 3575, Step 1l.a Check reheat steam flow controllers - IN AUTOMATIC BOP BOP

~

~~

Using the MSR Startup Pressure Display on the Foxboro DCS, Verify symmetrical operation of the MSR reheaters during power decrease 3575, Step 1l.b G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 12 of 53

I I OD-Test No.: I Scenario uo.: 1 Event No.: 1 IC-I 2 I Crew conducts rapid load reduction to 65% Dower I

Position Proc SteD ITime I Comments OP3204 / AOP3575 Actions Check If RCS Sample Required Verify change in Reactor Power Verify change in Reactor Power ONE HOUR

- GREATER THAN 15%

- GREATER THAN 15% IN us 3575, Step 12 3575, Step 12.a us 3575, Step 12.b us Request Chemistry sample the RCS for iodine (between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after the power change)

Request Chemistry Department perform gaseous effluent samples and analysis (between 24 and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the power change) for the following process monitors:

3HVR-REIOB 3HVR-REl9B 3HVQ-RE49 Verify Final Desired Power Level - LESS THAN 50%

Continue power reduction to the final desired power level and, WHEN Final desired power level is reached, THEN Proceed to step 21.

3575, Step 12.c us Booth Operator When CRS requests chemistry samples, merely acknowledge the request.

3575, Step 12.d us us 3575, Step 13 3575, Step 13,a, RNO us us 3575. Step 21 Check Plant Status Verify - AT FINAL DESIRED POWER LEVEL Borate or Dilute as necessary to maintain AFD as close to the target value as possible while maintaining rods above the Rod Insertion Limit 3575, Step 21.a us 3575, Step 21.b RO Request Chemistry obtain RCS boron samples 3575, Step 21.c us Using GA-9, Align for auto makeuD 3575, Step 21.d RO G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 13 of 53

Op-Test No.: I Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 IC-I2 I Crew conducts ratid load reduction to 65% Dower Shutdown NOT desired.

Therefore, follow Step 23.a.,

Response Not Obtained.

ITime I Comments I Position I OP3204 / AOP3575 Actions I Proc Ster, 3575, Step 23 3575, Step 3575, Step 23.a, RNO Check If Plant Should Be Shutdown Verify plant shutdown -

DESIRED 23.a us us us Proceed to step 24.

Continue With Normal Plant Plant Procedures us Operations Using Applicable 3575, Step 24 US order is Reset C-7 Select RESET on the steam dump mode selector switch (If required) 3575, Step 21.e BOP I

/

Report Unit Status And Power Reduction 3575, step 22 I

I I us I Notify CONVEX 3575, Step I 22.a us 3575, Step 22.b Check power reduction -

GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 100 Mwe us Using MP-01-SM-GDLOI.Ol, Power Change and Outage Notifications, Update the Millstone Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) 3575, Step 22.c 3575, Step 22.d us Notify the U3 Duty Officer Initiate Event Number 2 when Chief Examiner is satisfied with the Plant Maneuver G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 14 of 53

During pre-validation, it took about I minute after inserting the failure to receive MB4A 4-4 and 5-3.

All instruments and controls are on the left side of the MB4 console and Panel.

RO Determines that PT-455 has failed low (Low Pressure ALARM Annunciator). Places all PZR Heaters in OFF.

US goes to Attachment B.

4larms received during validation D PRESSURIZER PRESSURE DEVIATION MB4A 4-4 MB4A 5-4 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LO p PRESSURIZER SI CHANNEL PRESSURE LO MB4A 5-3 us RO us Crew Determine The Initiating Parameter And Place The Affected Controller In MANUAL Stabilize The Plant Parameters It is desired that I&C personnel trip the bistables specified in this procedure. If, during off-hours, I&C personnel are not able to trip the necessary bistables within the time limitations required by the Technical Specifications, Operations Department personnel may trip the bistables using the guidance provided with in this Droced u re.

Perform Corrective Actions Using Appropriate

Attachment:

Attachment B - Pressurizer Pressure Channel Failure The following annunciators are symptoms of a PZR pressure instrument failure:

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HI MB4A 3 4 PRESSURIZER PORV CHANNEL PRESSURE HI MB4A 4-3 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE DEVIATION MB4A4-4 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LO MB4A 54 PZR RELIEF VALVE DIS TEMP HI MB4A 3-5 PRESSURIZER SI CHANNEL PRESSURE LO MB4A 5-3 PZR REL TK TEMP HI MB4A 2-2 PZR REL TK LEVEL HI-HIIHIILO MB4A 2-3 PZR REL TK PRESSURE HI MB4A 2 4 PZR PRES LO MB4F 1,2,3,4 - 3 PZR PRES HI MB4F 1,2,3,4 - 4 LOOP 1,2,3,4 OVR TEMPAT MB4F 1,2,3,4 - 5 LOOP 1,2,3,4 OVR TEMPAT MB4F 1,2,3,4 - 7 PZR PORV PRESS HI MB4F 1,2,3,4 - 13 PZR PRES HI MBPD 1,2,3 - 6 PZR PRES LO MBPD 1,2,3,4 - 5 3571, 1.

3571,2.

NOTE preceding AOP 3571, Step 3.

3571,3 NOTE p reced in g AOP 3571, Attachment B, Step I.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 1 \\Scenario 1.doc Page 15 of 53

RO, AT us DIRECTION, ROTATES THE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SELECTOR SWITCH TO POSITION 3-4 RO RETURNS PZR HEATERS TO AUTOMATIC.

US CHECKS PT 455 PROTECTION SET 1 ON PAGE 3 OF 4 OFATT. B.

3.3.1, Action 6 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to trip, 3.3.2, Action 20 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to

trip, 3.3.3.5 - No. of Op. Chnls met.

3.3.2.1 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to trip.

us RO RO us us us Pressurizer Press Select -

Control 3RCS-PS455F Pressurizer Press Select -

Record 3RCS-PS455G OT/OP AT Record Select RCS-TS41 I E

Restore RCS pressure to normal, then Place PZR pressure control in automatic.

When conditions have stabilized, Observe MB annunciators and parameters.

Immediately report any unexpected or unexplained conditions to the Shift Manaaer.

Trip the associated Reactor Protection System bistable(s):

Place a check mark in the box above the appropriate channel that requires tripping on pages 3 or 4 of this Attachment.

Refer to Technical Specification 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3.5.

Refer to Technical Requirement 3.3.2.1.

stable and they have 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to AOP 3571, Attachment B, Step 1 AOP 3571, Attachment B, Step 2 AOP 3571, Attachment B, Step 3 AOP 3571, Attachment B, Step 4 AOP 3571, Attachment B, Step 4.a AOP 3571, Attachment B, Step 4.b AOP 3571, Attachment B, Stee 4.c G:VIRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario l.doc Page 16 of 53

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 17 of 53

RO-ATC Examiner: Discretely record initial Rod Index and Tave Deviation:

Rod Index:

Tave Deviation:

Places the First Stage Steam Pressure Channel Selector Switch (3MSS-PS505Z) to Pi506 - MB7 RO places Rod Control in Manual.

The US may direct the BOP to take Train A TBVs to OFF Rod Control is the affected parameter.

Reduce Turbine load to bring Tref and Tave within I%O CREW us RO CREW BOP US Goes to Attachment G Defeat the failed channel by selecting the alternate channel on first stage steam pressure channel selector switch (3MSS-PS505ZI.

us AOP 3571 Att. G step 1

~~

C-7 should NOT be actuated

~~

ROI BOP If C-7 is actuated, select RESET on the steam dump mode selector.

AOP 3571 Att. G step 2 BOP Should already be set at 1092.

Respond to the failed instrument AOP 3571 by placing rod control in manual. step I Caution BOP Determine the initiating AOP 3571 parameter and place the affected controller in MANUAL.

Stabilize the plant parameters.

step 1 AOP 3571 step 2 Set steam generator pressure controller (3MSS-PK507) to 1092 Dsia.

Perform Corrective Actions AOP 3571 Using Appropriate Attachment step 3 G - Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel Failure AOP 3571 Att. G step 3 US may have already directed I

I this in resoonse to the failure.

BOP Place the steam dump mode selector in the STEAM PRESSURE mode.

Place one condenser interlock selector switch to OFF.

AOP 3571 Att. G step 5 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 18 of 53

Skill of the Craft / Good Prax BOP should check steam dump demand before placing the condenser interlock selector switches to ON.

BOP 4

-=

2-,

5 a, 3 a

15 steps during pre-validation RO Continued Operation us permissible with best efforts to repair.

Place both condenser interlock selector switches to ON.

Crew us us AOP 3571 Att. G step 6 When conditions have stabilized, observe MB annunciators and parameters. Immediately report any unexpected or unexplained conditions to the SM.

If the interlock (permission annunciator window) is in the required state for the existing plant conditions), no further actions are required (e.g.,

tripping of bistables).

Within one hour, perform the following:

Restore TAVE - TREF error to within 1 O F and place rod control in AUTO.

AOP 3571 Att. G step 7 I

I Using OP 3350, ATWS Mitigation System Actuation

, Place AMSAC in Refer to 3TRM-7.2 Additional Requirements, AM SAC.

AOP 3571 Attachment G Step 8

~

AOP 3571 Att.

G step 9 AOP 3571 Att. G step I O AOP 3571 Att.

G NOTE prior to step 11 AOP 3571 Att. G step 11 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 1 \\Scenario 1.doc Page 19 of 53

K 0

cn a,

-s-Should be in the required state, otherwise TS 3.0.3 5

-0 P

$2 applies.

.- 2 Initiate Event 4 when 1 us us us Determine if the interlock is in plant conditions.

Rx or turb not at power P-7 Turbine not at power P-13 the required state for the existing (MB4D 5-3)

(MB4D 6-3)

Refer to Technical Specification 3.3.1, Action 8.

AOP 3571 Att. G, step 1l.b G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Request I&C Department AOP 3571 perform corrective maintenance Att. G step on failed instrument.

12 Corrective Maintenance by I&C Page 20 of 53

There is a time delay between malfunction insertion and first alarms.

I Top row on MB7,7" from Left.

PRT Press = 16 psia PRT Temp = 70°F RO RO RO us BOP us RO IF "PORV OPEN" (MB4B 4-9) is lit, Go to OP 3353.MB4B 4-9, "PORV OPEN."

IF "PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HI" (MB4A 3-4) is lit, Go To PRESSURE HI."

CONFIRM high PORV outlet temperature on 3RCS-TI 463, "PORV OUTLET TEMPS" (MB4).

MB4A 3-4, "PRESSURIZER

~

IF 3RCS*PCV455A or 3RCS*PCV456, PORV, (MB4),

is not fully closed, CLOSE PORVs.

IF 3RCS*PCV455A or RCS*PCV456, "PORV", (MB4),

fail to close, CLOSE associated PORV block (MB4):

IF pressurizer pressure is not high AND both pressurizer power relief valves are closed, PERFORM the following to determine leaking PORV:

MONITOR PORV outlet temperatures on data logger.

IF data logger indicates RCS*PCV456, "PORV" is leaking, TEST RCS*PCV456, "PORV.I1 as follows:

CLOSE 3RCS-MV8000B, "PORV BLOCK" (MB4).

3353.MB4 3-5 Ster, I 3353.MB4 3-5 Step 2 3353.MB4 3-5 SteD 3 3353.MB4 3-5 Step 4 3353.MB4 3-5 Step 5 3353.MB4 3-5 Step 6 3353.MB4 3-5 Step 6.1 3353.MB4 3-5 Step 6.3 3353.MB4 3-5 Stet, 6.3.1 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 21 of 53

US Enters:

3.4.4, Action A 3.4.6.2 - leakage Blocked 3.4.9.3 -Applies to Mode 4 3.4.1 I, Action C defers to TS 3.4.4.

Event 5 when Examiners are RO us G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario l.doc MONITOR 3RCS-TI 463, "PORV" "OUTLET TEMPS" (MB4).

"OUTLET TEMPS" (MB4),

decreases, Refer To the following Technical Specifications/TRMs and DETERMINE Limiting Condition for Operation:

. T/S 3.4.4, "Relief Valves"

. T/S 3.4.6.2, "Operational Leakage"

. T/S 3.4.9.3, "Overpressure Protection Systems"

. TRM 3.4.1 1, "Reactor Coolant Svstem Vents" IF 3RCS-TI 463, "PORV"

.h US'S Tech Spec calls.

3353.MB4 3-5 Step 6.3.2 3353.MB4 3-5 Step 6.3.3 Page 22 of 53

BOP Determines that PT-507 failed low. Probable alarm:

MB5A, B, C light up Take Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller to HAND.

Alternatively, takes individual DumDs to HAND.

If Crew g MB5C 4-1 Alarm Response us BOP BOP Crew us Determine The Initiating Parameter And Place The Affected Controller In MANUAL Stabilize The Plant Parameters

1. VERIFY 3FWS-P1, "MD FW PP," running (MB5).

2. THROTTLE open 3FWS-PV590, "MDFW START-UP W CNTL MAIN," to maintain 40 to 140 psid on program 507).

3. IF a TDFW pump is operating erratically in "AUTO," PLACE affected pump in "MANUAL."

4. IF a TDFW pump is operating erratically in "MANUAL," EVALUATE the need to reduce plant power and remove affected TDFW pump from service.

It is desired that I&C personnel trip the bistables specified in this procedure. If, during off-hours, I&C personnel are not able to trip the necessary bistables within the time limitations required by the Technical Specifications, Operations Department personnel may trip the bistables using the guidance provided within this procedure.

Perform Corrective Actions (3FWS-PI 508 - 3MSS-PI Using Appropriate

Attachment:

Attachment J - Main Steam Header Pressure Channel Failure 3571, I.

3571,z.

3353.MB5C 4-1 FEE DWATE R DIS MFLD PRESSURE LO NOTE preceding AOP 3571, Step 3.

~

3571,3 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 23 of 53

The following annunciators are symptoms of a failed main steam header pressure instrument (3MSS-PT507): None Verify feedwater pump A and B master speed control (3FWS-SK509A) in MANUAL and Restore feed pump differential pressure to normal operating band (Proaram: 40 to 140 mid).

Place steam generator pressure controller (3MSS-PK507) in MANUAL and reduce the output to minimum. (The steam dump STEAM PRESSURE mode is inoperable until the channel is restored.)

When conditions have stabilized, Observe MB annunciators and parameters and immediately report any unexpected or unexplained conditions to the Shift Manager.

There are no Technical Specifications or bistables associated with 3MSS-PT507.

Request I&C Department perform corrective maintenance on failed instrument.

NOTE preceding AOP 3571, Attachment J, Step 1 AOP 3571, Attachment J, Step 1 AOP 3571, Attachment J, Step 2 AOP 3571, Attachment J, Step 3 NOTE:

preceding AOP 3571, Attachment J, Step 4 AOP 3571, Attachment J, Step 4 G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 24 of 53

BOP Operator should start non-running AFW pumps BEFORE the US reaches the appropriate step in E-0.

Check If SI Is Actuated Verify SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION annunciator (MB4D 1-6 or MB2B 5-9) - LIT IF SI is NOT required, THEN Initiate monitoring of CSF Status Trees and Go to ES-0.1,

Reactor Trir, ResPonse.

Crew will set 15 minute timer to remind them to check status trees every 15 minutes.

E-0, Step 4 Step 4.a.

E-0 step 4.a, RNO Column us If SI actuation occurs during this procedure, immediately GO to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO CAUTION preceding ES-0.1, Step I

BOP BOP BOP Foldout page must be open.

BOP preceding ES-0.1, Step RO RO us us Foldout page must be open.

ADVERSE CTMT is defined as GREATER THAN 180-F or GREATER THAN 105 Whr in NOTE containment.

preceding E-The reactor can be interpreted 0, Step 1 as "tripped" when any two of the three bulleted substeps of step 1. are satisfied.

Verify Reactor Trip Check reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN Check rod bottom lights - LIT Check neutron flux -

DECREASING Verify Turbine Trip E-o, Step E-0. SteD 2 E-0, Step 2.a.

E-0, Step 3 Busses Check AC emergency busses 34C and 34D - BOTH ENERGIZED E-0, Step 3.a I NOTE I 1 G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 1 \\Scenario 1. doc Page 25 of 53

1 Ro us US may direct closing FWS-MOV35B for additional isolation / margin.

BOP Check RCS Temperature Verify RCS cold leg WR temperature - BETWEEN 550-F AND560 F Proceed to step 2.

Check FW Status Check reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN Verify annunciator FW ISOLATION BY RX TRIP AND Verify FW isolation Check SG feed regulating valves - CLOSED Check SG feed regulating bypass valves - CLOSED Check FW isolation trip valves Check SG chemical feed LO T AVG (MB5C 2-1) - LIT

- CLOSED isolation valves - CLOSED Verify total AFW flow to SGs -

GREATER THAN 530 gpm

d. Perform the following:

I)

START MD AFW pumps.

2) START TD AFW pump by opening steam supply valves, if necessary.

3) Verify proper emergency AFW valve alignment.

4) Maintain AFW flow GREATER-THAN 530 gpm until NR level is GREATER THAN 8%

in at least one SG.

G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc ES-0.1, Step I

ES-0. I Step 1.a.

ES-0.1, Step 1.b.

ES-0.1, Step 2

ES-0.1, Step 2.a.

ES-0.1, Step 2.b.

ES-0.1, Step 2.c.

ES-0.1, Step 2.d.

ES-0. I, Step 2.d.

RNO Column Page 26 of 53

RO will have to close these valves. Same signal that starts AFW closes these valves.

That signal is failed in the scenario.

RO BOP us BOP us BOP us RO RO RO RO RO us RO RO Check SG blowdown isolation Verify SG blowdown isolation valves - CLOSED Verify SG blowdown sample isolation valves - CLOSED Check Status Of AC Busses Verify AC emergency busses -

BOTH ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER Proceed to step 3.j.

Check-busses 34A AND 34B -

BOTH ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER Proceed to step 4.

Check PZR Level Control Verify charging pump operation -

AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Verify PZR level - GREATER THAN 22%

Verify charging and letdown flow

- ESTABLISHED Verify PZR level - TRENDING TO 28%

Check PZR Pressure Control Verify PZR pressure -

GREATER THAN 1890 psia Verify PZR pressure - STABLE 4T OR TRENDING TO 2250 x i a ES-0.1, Step 2.e.

ES-0. I, Step 3.

Stec, 3.a.

ES-0.1, ES-0.1, Step 3.b.

ES-0.1, Step 3.j.

ES-0.1, Step 3.k.

Step 4.

Ster, 4.a.

ES-0.1, ES-0.1, ES-0.1, Ster, 4.b.

ES-0.1, Step 4.c.

ES-0. I, Ster, 4.d.

ES-0.1, Step 5.

Stec, 5.a.

ES-0.1, ES-0.1, Step 5.b.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 27 of 53

r I us RO Reports that NOT all Important CAUTION in view of next event (SGTR).

I Ro I Ro Proceed to step 6.

Verify All Control Rods - FULLY INSERTED IF two or more control rods are NOT fully inserted, THEN Using AOP 3566, Immediate Boration, Immediate borate until one of the following conditions is met:.

Increase of 200 ppm for each control rod NOT verified fully inserted OR Increase of 1200 ppm in RCS boron concentration OR Increase of RCS boron concentration to 2600 ppm FULLY INSERTED If SI actuation occurs during this procedure, Go to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Infection, and restore from immediate boration linem.

Initiate Immediate Boration Of RCS Check one charging pump -

RUNNING Align boration path:

START at least one boric acid transfer c,u m p OPEN emergency boration valve (3CHS*MVS104)

ES-0.1,

SteD 5.c.

ES-0.1, Stec, 6.

ES-0.1, Step 6.

RNO Column CAUTION preceding AOP 3566, Step 1.

AOP 3566, Step 1.

AOP 3566, Ster, 1.a.

AOP 3566, Ster, 1.b.

AOP 3566, Step 1.b.l)

AOP 3566, Step l.b.2)

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 28 of 53

Initiate Event Number 9 at Chief Examiners Cue.

M RO RO RO RO RO Check normal charging flow path I aligned Charging flow control valve -

CAPABLE OF BEING THROTTLED Charging header loop isolation salve (3CHS*AV8146 or 3CHS*AV8147) - OPEN Charging header isolation valves (3CHS*MV81 Ob and CHS*MV$105) - OPEN AOP 3566, Step 1.c.

Proceed to step 3.

I AOP 3566, Step 1.d.

AOP 3566, Verify Boration Flow LESS THAN 2350 psia AOP 3566, Step 3.a.

Check normal charging flow path - ALIGNED AOP 3566, Step 3.b.

Place charging flow control valve in MANUAL Adjust boration flow to the AOP 3566, Step 3.c.

AOP 3566, Step 3.d.

RCS -- EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN 33 gpm G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 1 \\Scenario 1.doc Page 29 of 53

After SGTR is initiated, the crew may perform this step pursuant to the CAUTION preceding step 1. However, limited staff resources may cause US to direct RO activities elsewhere.

Boration

a. Align systems for normal

b. Request Chemistry sample

c. Adjust boric acid makeup operation the RCS for boron concentration flow controller pot setpoint for current RCS boron con centra tio n

d. Check boration flow accomplished through - AN SI COLD LEG INJECTION PATH AOP 3566, Step 7 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 30 of 53

Probable RMS ALERTS on MB2B MSS76-I, SG "B" Stm Relief Line.

MSS79-I, 3AFW*P2 Turbine Exahust (TDAFW Pump)

SSR08-1, B/D Eff from any S/G..

ARC21 -1, Condenser Air Ejector Disch to Rad Gaseous Waste.

MSS80B, N16 Monitors.

Crew may enter:

AOP 3573, Rad Mon AOP 3555, RCS Leak E-0 (required if PZR Level

Response

<9%

NOTE: Procedural flow path is not predictable. ES-0.1 Foldout Page requires SI actuation and return to E-0 if PZR level 9%.

Reactor is already TRIPPED with 5 rods stuck out.

Immediate Boration in RO RO RO RO RO RO us RO

heck PZR Level -

3 ECREAS I NG ncrease charging Flow and Minimize Letdown START a second Charging

'ump Jerify PZR level - STABLE OR NCREASI NG hip the Reactor nitiate SI 5 0 TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

/erify Reactor Trip Check reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN 3555, Step 1 3576, Step I

.a.

3555, Step 2 3576, Step I 3555, Step 2.a 3576, Step 1.e.

3555, Step 2.d 3576, step 6 3NO Cols:

3555, Step 6 3576, Step 1.f 5-0, Step 1 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 31 of 53

Crew should perform a short brief and come out of Master Silence at the completion of step 6.

RO Check rod bottom lights - LIT to terminate Immediate Boration once SI is initiated.

Check neutron flux -

DECREASING Verify Turbine Trip Check all turbine stop valves -

CLOSED I

I E-0, Step 2 BOP E-0, Step 2.a E-0, Step 3 I

I I BOP Verify Power to AC Emergency Busses Check busses 34C and 34D -

BOTH ENERGIZED E-0, Step 3.b E-0, Step 4 E-0, Step 4.a I

I Crew manually actuated SI I US Check If SI Is Actuated I Ro Verify Safety Injection Actuation annunciator - LIT

~

~~

E-0, Step 4.b I Ro By observation of ESF Group 2 Status Panel lights, Verify both trains of SI - ACTUATED Check reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN E-0, Step 4.c

~

~

E-0, Step 5 Verify Service Water Pumps -

AT LEAST ONE PER TRAIN RUNNING Verify Two RPCCW Pumps -

ONE PER TRAIN RUNNING E-0, Step 6 E-0, Step 7 Verify ECCS Pumps Running Check SI pumps - RUNNING RO Check RHR pumps - RUNNING Check two charging pumps -

RUNNING E-0, Step 7 RNO START second SI Pump Page 32 of 53 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc

Should still be running after Manual Start following the trip above.

1 BOP I BOP Valves closed on Hi Radiation RO BOP I

I RO Verify AFW Pumps Running I E-0, Step 8 Check MD pumps - RUNNING I E-0, Step 8.a Check turbine - driven pump -

RUNNING, IF NECESSARY E-O, Step 8.b Verify FW Isolation Check SG feed regulating valves - CLOSED Check SG feed regulating bypass valves - CLOSED Check FW isolation trip valves -

CLOSED Check MD FW pump -

STOPPED I E-0, step 9 Check TD FW pumps -

TRIPPED Check SG blowdown isolation valves - CLOSED Check SG blowdown sample isolation valves - CLOSED Check SG chemical feed isolation valves - CLOSED Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated E-O, Step Check Ctmt pressure GREATER THAN 18 psia I

any SG pressure LESS THAN 660 psig Proceed to step 1 I E-0, Step 10.a, RNO I

Check if CDA Required I E-0, Step 11 Check Ctmt pressure is GREATER THAN 23 psia E-0, Step 1 I t a Ctmt spray is initiated I

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 33 of 53

I I

I BOP Stops the C CAR fan. I RO Proceed to step 12.

Verify CAR Fans Operating In Emergency Mode Check CAR fan status:

CAR fans A and B -

RUNNING CAR fan C - STOPPED STARTKTOP CAR fans as necessary Verify RPCCW Ctmt supply and return header isolations - OPEN Verify Train A and B RPCCW supply and return to chill water valves - OPEN Verify CIA Check ESF Group 2 status columns 2 through 10 - LIT Verify Proper ESF Status Panel Indication Verify ESF Group I lights -

Verify ESF Group 2 lights -

OFF LIT Align component(s) as necessary for minimum safety function.

Determine If ADVERSE CTMT Conditions Exist Ctmt temperature GREATER THAN 180°F Ctmt radiation GREATER THAN 1 o5 R/h, DO NOT use ADVERSE CTMT parameters.

E-0,

Step1 I

.a, RNO E-0, Step 12 E-0, Step 12.a.

E-0, Step 12.a. RNO Column E-0, Step 12.b E-0, Step 12.c E-0, Step 13 E-0, Step 13.a E-0, Step 14 E-0, Step 14, RNO E-0, Step 15 E-0, Step 15, RNO G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 34 of 53

Crew may perform short brief and come out of Master Silence.

Verify AFW Valve Alignment -

PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT RO E-0, Step I 8 RO Verify ECCS Valve Alignment -

PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT RO E-0, Step 19 RO RO us us BOP BOP us BOP RO Verify ECCS Flow E-0, Step 1 6 Check charging pump flow E-0, indicator - FLOW INDICATED Check RCS pressure -

GREATER THAN 1650 psia (1 950 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

Step 16.a Ste;, 16.b E-0 Check PORV block valves -

E-0, OPEN Step 16.c Proceed to Step 17:

Verify Adequate Heat Sink Check NR level in at least one SG - GREATER THAN 8%.

Control feed flow to maintain NR level between 8% and 50%.

(42% and 50% adverse).E-0, 17.b Step 17.a, RNO E-0, Step 17 E-0, Step 17.a E-0, Step Proceed to Step 18 E-0, Step I 17.c Check Plant Status I E-0, Step 20 E-0, Step Verify SLCRS doors - CLOSED I 20.a Check if CBI actuated E-0, Step I20.b Verify ESF Group 2 CBI lights -

E-0, Step LIT I20.c Control Building purge supply fan and purge exhaust fan -

E-0, Step I20.d G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 1 \\Scenario 1.doc Page 35 of 53

I 1 r e 2 to Step 24 even if RCP /RO Trip Criteria is reached.

I I

I Ro NOT RUNNING I

E-0, Step 20.e Control building air bank isolation valves - OPEN (after 60 seconds)

STOP kitchen exhaust fan I E-0, Step 20.f Close and Dog (as applicable)

Control Building pressure boundary doors.

E-O, Step 20.9 Check RCS Temperature 1 E-0, Step 21 E-0, Step 21.a Verify RCS cold leg WR temperature - BETWEEN 550°F and 560°F.

Perform the applicable action:

e-IF temperature is GREATER THAN 560°F THEN dump steam to atmosphere. Proceed to step 21.c THAN 550" THEN Proceed to step 21.e e-IF the temperature is LESS E-0, Step 21.a, RNO Proceed to step 22..

E-0, Step 121.b Check PZR Valves I E-0, Step 22 Verify PORVs - CLOSED E-0, Step I 22.a Verify normal PZR spray valves

- CLOSED 122.b E-0, Step Verify PZR safety valves -

E-0, Step CLOSED I22.c To prevent damage to the RCP seal(s), seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

E-0, Step 23, CAUTION I E-0, Step 23 Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped 1 Ei:p23.a Verify RCPs -ANY RUNNING G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 36 of 53

I BoP/RO RO If samples are requested, ensure they request HP cove rage Verify RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1500 psia (1 800 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

Proceed to step 24 Check If SG Secondary Boundaries Are Intact Check pressure in all SGs NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED

~~

Check If SG Tubes Are Intact Sampe all SGs for activity RESET SG blowdown sample isolation OPEN SG blowdown sample isolation valves(s)

Request Chemistry obtain activity samples using HP coverage.

Check steam generator levels-NO SG LEVEL INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

~~

Initiate monitoring of CSF Status Trees and Go to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Verify trend history and alarm status of radiation monitors Main steam line - NORMAL Condenser air ejector -

NORMAL SG blowdown - NORMAL Initiate monitoring of CSF Status Trees and Go to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

E-0, Step

23. b E-0, Step 24 I E-0, Step 24.a E-0, Step 25 E-0, Step 25.a.

~

E-0, Step

25. b

~

E-0, Step 25.b, RNO E-0, Step 25.c.

E-0, Step 25.c, RNO G:VIRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 37 of 53

The US should direct the Board Operator to open and review their Fold Out Page Books NOTE: Crew should identify SG "A" as ruptured based on rad levels and/or increasing level.

If Crew does not recognize " A t-is ruptured, they will GO TO step 7 and return to step 3 when the ruptured S/G is identified.

I BOP To prevent damage to the RCP seal(s), seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Foldout page must be open Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped Verify RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1500 psia (1800 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

Proceed to step 2 Identify Ruptured SGs High radiation from any SG steam line as indicated by the trend history or alarm status High radiation from any SG OR sample OR.

Unexpected increase in any SG level If the TD AFWpump is the only available source for feed flow, steam supply to the TD AFWpump must be maintained from at least one SG.

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldo wn Isolate Flow From Each Ruptured SG Verify each ruptured SG atmospheric dump valve controller - IN AUTO AT 1125 Psig G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc E-3, Step I, CAUTION E-3, Step I, NOTE E-3, step 1 E-3, Step 1.a E-3, Step l.a, RNO E-3, step 2 E-3, Step 3, CAUTION E-3, Step 3, CAUTION E-3, Step 3 E-3, Step 3.a Page 38 of 53

BOP I

I I Ro RO RO 3DTM*AOV29B 3DTM*AOV61 B 3DTM*AOV63B 3DTM*AOV64B BOP I

I I BOP I

I I us Check each ruptured SG atmospheric dump valve -

CLOSED E-3, Step 3.b Check each ruptured SG atmospheric dump bypass valve

- CLOSED E-3, Step 3.c CLOSE each ruptured SG steam supply isolation valve to TD AFW pump 3MSS*MOV17A 3MSS*MOVl7B 3MSS*MOV17C E-3, Step 3.d Verify each ruptured SG blowdown isolation valve -

CLOSED

~~~

E-3, Step 3.e Verify each ruptured SG blowdown sample isolation valve

- CLOSED E-3, Step 3.f Verify each ruptured SG chemical feed isolation valve -

CLOSED E-3, Step 3.g Using table, CLOSE the main steam line drains upstream of MSlVs and TD AFW pump for the ruptured SG(s)

E-3, Step 3.h CLOSE each ruptured SG MSlV and MSlV bypass valve.

E-3, Step 3.i If any ruptured SG is faulted, feed flow to that SG should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless the SG is needed for RCS cooldown.

E-3, Step 4, CAUTION Check Ruptured SG Level I E-3, step 4 Verify one of the following is Ruptured SG WR level -

E-3, Step 4.a G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario Mcenario 1.doc Page 39 of 53

RO ADVERSE CTMT)

Ruptured SG NR level -

GREATER THAN 8% (42%

ADVERSE CTMT)

Isolate feed flow to ruptured SGs.

Steps 3.d and 3.i for isolating the ruptured SG must be completed prior to continuing to step 5.

Check Ruptured SGs Pressure

- GREATER THAN 530 psig If RCPs are NOT running, the following steps may cause a false entry into the INTEGRITY Status Tree for the affected loop. Disregard the affected loop Tc indication until after performance of step 27.

To allow steam dump operation to continue during a controlled cooldown, ensure the Low-Low Tavg interlock is bypassed at 553°F.

Ensure Low Steam Line Pressure SI is blocked when pressurizer pressure is LESS THAN 2000 psia.

After the Low Steam Line Pressure SI signal is blocked, MSI will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoin is exceeded.

Initiate RCS Cooldown Check RCPs -ANY RUNNING E-3, Step 4.b E-3, Step 5 CAUTION E-3, Step 5 E-3, Step 6 CAUTION E-3, Step 6 NOTE E-3, Step 6 E-3, Step 6.a G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc I-Page 40 of 53

51 5°F during pre-validation Adjust steam pressure controller to obtain zero output in MANUAL I BOP E-3, Step 6.d.2)

The crew should take approx.

1 min to establish full demand to minimize the chance of receiving a MSI based on Low Steam Line Pressure rate compensated.

Dump steam to atmosphere at maximum rate from intact SGs using SG atmospheric dump valves or SG atmospheric dump bypass valves (MB or locally).

The RNO would only be used if the crew receives a MSI signal.

E-3, Step 6.d, RNO us Verify cores exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE The BOP will have to increase AFW flow while dumping E-3, Step 6.e steam.

The RO will need to restart the I BOP second charging pump when Pzr level is 15%.

Locally, Place the eight RCP overcurrent trip switches (43PP and 43PB) in the COLD position using CO Key Locker Key #7.

E-3, Step 6.b Determine required core exit temperature without interpolating E-3, Step 6.c (use lower pressure).

I E-3, Step 6.d Dump steam to condenser from intact SGs at maximum rate.

Verify the following Intact SG MSlVs - OPSN Verify annunciator 6.d.l)

CONDENSER AVAIL FOR E-3, Step STM DUMP C-9 (MB4D 5-6) dumps to Steam Pressure Mode I 6.d.3)

E-37 Step Transfer condenser steam Place both condenser interlock selector switches - ON I6.d.4)

E-3, Step Adjust steam pressure controller E-3, Step to dump steam to condenser.

16.d.5)

Stop RCS cooldown E-3, Step 6.f G:V)RS\\OsbUBalian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 41 of 53

BOP Verify PORV block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN RO E-3, Step 8.b I

Maintain core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE E-3, Step 6.g Check Intact SG Levels I E-3, step 7 Verify NR level - GREATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE CTMT)

E-3, Step 7.a Control feed flow to maintain NR level between 30% and 50%

(42% and 50% ADVERSE CTMT)

E-3, Step 7.b IF NR level in any intact SG continues to increase in an uncontrolled manner, THEN Stop RCS cooldown and Return to CAUTION prior to step 1.

E-3, Step 7.b, RNO If any PZR PORV opens because of high PZR pressure, step 5a should be repeated when pressure decreases to LESS THAN 2350 psia.

E-3, Step 8, CAUTION Check PZR PORVs And Block Valves E-3, step Verify PORVs - CLOSED I E-3, Step 8.a If offsite power is lost aRer SI reset, manual action to restart safeguards equipment may be required.

E-3, Step 9, CAUTION Do not reset CDA if recirculation spray pumps are required and have not automatically started.

E-3, Step 9, CAUTION 1

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenano 1 \\Scenario 1.doc RESET ESF Actuation Signals If Required e SI CDA I I E-3y Step Page 42 of 53

CIA CIB LOP Establish Instrument Air to Ctmt RO E-3, Step 10 Check instrument air compressors - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING E-3, Step 10.a OPEN instrument air Ctmt isolation valves E-3, Step 10.b Restore MCC 32-3T E-3, Step I 1 Check emergency buss 34C -

ENERGIZED E-3, Step 1l.a Using GA-1, Energize MCC 32-3T E-3, Step 1l.b To provide adequate ECCS flow, RCS pressure should be monitored to ensure that the RHR pumps are manually restarted if pressure decreases to LESS THAN 300 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT) 2, E-3, Step CAUTION Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped E-3, Step 12 us Verify RCS pressure -

GREATER THAN 300 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

E-3, Step 12.a RO I Ro E-3, Step 12.b STOP RHR pumps and Place in AUTO Check If Cooldown Should Be Stotmed I us E-3, Step 13 E-3, Step 13.a Check Cooldown - IN PROGRESS I

I RO Check core eat TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE E-3, Step 13.b Stop RCS cooldown E-3, Step 13.c I

I Ro G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 43 of 53

TEMP:

CRITI(

STOF RO 1 ROIBoP us I us Horse-race between:

SG Pressure RCS Pressure as demonstrated by SG Pressure or PZR level reaching 73%

I Maintain core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE Check Ruptured SGs Pressure

- STABLE OR INCREASING Check RCS Subcooling Based on Core Exist TCs - GREATER THAN 52°F (135°F ADVERSE CTMT)

Depressurize RCS To Minimize Break Flow and Refill PZR Verify normal PZR spray -

AVAILABLE Spray PZR with maximum available spray until one of the following occur RCS pressure - LESS THAN ruptured SGs pressure AND PZR level is GREATER THAN 16% (50% ADVERSE CTMT)

PZR level - GREATER THAN 73% (63% ADVERSE CTMT)

OR.

RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - LESS THAN 32°F (1 15°F ADVERSE CTMT)

CLOSE normal PZR spray valves E-3, Step 13.d E-3, Step 14 E-3, Step 15 E-3, step 16 E-3, Step 16.a E-3, Step 16.b E-3, Step 16.e G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 44 of 53

Proceed to CAUTION prior to step 19.

E-3, Step 16.f Voiding in the upper head region shall not preclude SI termination. SI MUST be terminated when termination criteria are satisfied to preveni overfilling of the ruptured SGs.

E-3, Step 19, CAUTION I us Check If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated E-3, Step 19 Verify RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN 32°F (I 15°F ADVERSE CTMT)

E-3, Step 19.a RO I BOP Verify secondary heat sink:

Total feed flow to SGs -

GREATER THAN 530 gpm AVAILABLE NR level in at least one intact (42% ADVERSE CTMT)

SG - GREATER THAN 8%

E-3, Step 19.b I Ro RCS pressure - STABLE OR I NC REAS I N G E-3, Step 19.c I Ro PZR level - GREATER THAN 16% (50% ADVERSE CTMT)

E-3, Step 19.d STOP ECCS Pumps E-3, Step 20 STOP SI pumps and Place in AUTO STOP all but one charging pump and Place in AUTO Establish Normal Charging Flow Path E-3, Step 21 E-3, Step 21 Establish Normal Charging Flow Path I

I Chief Examiner can end the Scenario when Sati pressure lowers (Ea, Step 16.b.)

'fied. Typically, they will end wl zn SG Question to SRO Applicant: What Emergency Action Level should be declared for this scenario?

Answer: ALERT Charlie One based RCB4.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 1 \\Scenario 1.doc Page 45 of 53

Technical Specification LCOs or action statements were in effect?

Answer: 3.3.1, Action 6 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to trip, 3.3.2, Action 20 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to trip, 3.3.3.5 - No. of Op. Chnls met, 3.3.2.1 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to trip.

Question to SRO Applicant: When Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter 3MSS-PT505 failed low, what Tech Spec LCOs or action statements were in effect?

Answer: 3TRM-7.2 (best efforts but continue to operate), 3.3.1 action 8 (check P-7 & P-13 in the required state or 3.0.3)

Question to SRO Applicant: When the Pressurizer PORV, 3RCS-PCV456, was leaking, what Tech Spec LCOs or action statements were in effect?

Answer: 3.4.4, Action A, 3.4.6.2 - leakage Blocked, 3.4.9.3 -Applies to Mode 4, 3.4.1 I

, Action C defers to TS 3.4.4.

G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 46 of 53

SECTION 3 SIMULATOR EXAM SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Title:

ID Number: NRC Scenario I NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 Revision: 0 TIME *QA INSTRUCTOR AIDS DESCRIPTION T=O RD16 Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert.

MALF, RF, IO FW20A Failure of Auto Start on MDAFW "A" FW20B Failure of Auto Start on MDAFW "B" FW2OC Failure of Auto Start on TDAFW Pump S107B Failure of Auto Start on SI Pump Examiner Initiated

1.

RXOSA Severity = 0%

3RCS*PT455 fails low

2.

RX1 6A Severity = 0%

3MSS-PT505 fails low

3.

RC07B Severity 1%

3RCS*PCV456 leakage

4.

RXI 5 Severity = 0%

3MSS-Pi507 fails low

5.

FW08B Severity = 100%

3FWC-FCV520 fails open

6.

SGOl B Severity = 38%

SGTR of 340 gpm (ramp from 100 to 340 over 2 minutes).

Summary of Simulator Booth Operator Cues I. During the rapid downpower, respond to request for Chemistry Samples.

2.

During the Crew's Response to a leaking PZR PORV, disable AMSAC

3.

Following the Reactor Trip, during the SGTR, respond to request to Close and Dog Control Building Pressure Boundary doors.

4.

Before cooldown per E-3, place all 8 Reactor Coolant Pump overcurrent switches to COLD

5.

During E-3, reset 32-3T.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 47 of 53

SECTION 4 VAL1 DATlO N CHECKLIST

Title:

ID Number: NRC Scenario I NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 Remote functions:

All remote functions contained in the guide are certified.

Malfunctions:

All malfunctions contained in the guide are certified.

Initial Conditions:

The initial condition(s) contained in the guide are certified or have been developed from certified IC's in accordance with NSEM-4.02.

Simulator Operating Limits:

The simulator guide has been evaluated for operating limits and/or anomalous response.

Test Run:

The scenario contained in the guide has been test run and validated (validation sheet completed, next page)on the simulator. Simulator response is reasonable and as expected.

Examination Scenario Review The dynamic examination review checklist is complete.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Revision: -

0 Verified by Page 48 of 53

SECTION 5 REFERENCES AND CRITICAL TASK TRACKING

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 4 I.

References:

TS* MP3 TRM OP 3272 OP 3204 OP 3353 AOP 3566 AOP 3555 AOP 3573 AOP 3576 AOP 3571 OP 3353.MB4A 2-1 EOP*35 E-0 ES-0.1 EOP*35 E-3 EPIP*EPIP 4400 NUREG 1021 Technical Specifications Technical Requirements Manual EOP User's Guide At Power Operation Main Board Annunciator Response Procedures Immediate Boration Reactor Coolant System Leak Radiation Monitor Alarm Response Steam Generator Tube Leak RCS WIDE RANGE TEMP LOW COLD LEG Instrument Failure Response Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Reactor Trip Response Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event Assessment, Classification and Reportability Examiners Standards G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 49 of 53

II.

Critical Tasks Covered in this Test:

The following Critical Tasks are covered in this exercise:

LL I 4 W

m 3

I W

to the SGs before transition out of E-0, unless the transition is to FR-H.l, in which case the task must be initiated before RCPs are manually tripped in accordance with step 3 of FR-H. 1 Establishlmaintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either of the following conditions:

Too high to maintain

[minimum requ ired subc~oling]~

OR.

Below [the RCS temperature that causes an extreme (red-path) or a severe (orange-path) challenge to the su bcriticality andlor the integrity CSFI4 061 000 A3.01 4.214.2 000-038 EA1.16 4.414.3 EA1.36 4.314.5 SGA.06 3.814.0 SGA. 12 3.8/4.0 BASIS FOR SELECTION Failure to establish the minimum required AFV P

flow rate, under the postulated plant conditions results in "adverse consequence(s) or a significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant." In this case, the minimum required AFW flow rate can be established by performing the appropriate manual action. Therefore, failure to manually establish the minimum required AFW flow rate also represents a "demonstrated inability by thc crew to:

Take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety Effectively directlmanipulate ESF controls Recognize a failurelincorrect auto actuation o an ESF system or component" Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that 'I... necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy...."

G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 50 of 53

0 I

3 W

3 W

I n

3 W

CRITICAL TASK Description -

Depressurize RCS to meet [SI termination criteriaI2 before

[plant-specific criteria exceededI3 Isolate FeedwaterlAuxiliary Feedwater flow into the ruptured SG with Steam Generator Level >8% NR

(>65% WR) upon AFW isolation but less than 20% NR.

Terminate SI before plant specific criteria are exceeded as listed below:

Complete mitigation strategy to terminate SI and have only one CHS Pump running within a total OPERATOR ACTION TIME of 5 30.5 mins from event initiation.(ADD 5 minutes to the time if CT E3--AAM is completed successfully) 000-038 EAI.04 4.314.1 SGA.06 3.814.0 SGA. 12 3.814.O 000-038 EA1.16 4.4 14.3 0 0 0 - 0 3 8 EA1.30 4.0 I 3.8 BASIS FOR SELECTION Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a "significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario."

Failure to isolate AFW flow into the ruptured SG in a timely fashion results in a higher level in the ruptured SG. With an Unnecessary higher level, the time calculated to terminate SI and prevent SG overfill condition significantly drops and can lead to an unnecessary radioactive release to the environment. Either of these actions results in the crewlunit taking compensating actions which complicates the mitigation strategy.

Failure to terminate SI and make-up flow into a ruptured SG needlessly complicates the event mitigation strategy. It also constitutes a "significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario."

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ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0 Note:

The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes 7

13.

3

14.

2

15.

1.5

16.

2

17.

0

18.

19.

20.

5

21.

Yes COMMENTS:

22.

Total malfunctions inserted: 4-8/10-14 (3RCS*PT455,3MSS-PT505,3RCS*PCV456,3MSS*PT505)

Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: I

-4/3-6 (5 Rods Out, AFW Auto Start Failure, Charging Pump Failure on SI)

Abnormal Events: 1 -2/2-3 (Immediate Boration, 3 Instrument Failures, Tube Leak)

Major Transients: 1 -2/2-3 (Reactor Trip, Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: I

-3/3-5 (ES-0.1, E-3)

EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-3/1-3 Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes)

EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/58 (E-0-F, E - S B, E-3-C, E-3-AAM, E-SDM)

Technical Specifications are exercised during the test G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 1 \\Scenario 1.doc Page 52 of 53

SECTION 6 SCENARIO INITIAL CONDITIONS Reactor Power:

81 %

Operating History:

3 days on line RCS Boron:

1524 ppm Core Burnup:

I

.3 MWD/MTU Condensate Demins:

7 IN SERVICE Evolutions in Progress:

Raising reactor power.

Major Equipment 00s:

Motor Driven AFW Pump 3AFW*PlA Crew I n st ru ct ions:

The plant is at 81% power and returning to full power following a refueling outage. The crew was to continue the power escalation at 3% per hour per OP 3204. However, CONVEX has just ordered a rapid power reduction to 65%.

Motor drive auxiliary feedwater pump, 3AFW*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance. 3AFW*PlA was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago and expected return to operability is 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> from now. Limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2, action a. has been entered.

PlantlSimulator Differences:

0 If not using the speed dial option, dial 3333 or 3334 to reach the desired person (s).

The following PPC programs do not function on the simulator:

0 11 Samarium Follow Xenon Follow 11 11 Sequence of Events G:VIRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario l\\Scenario 1.doc Page 53 of 53

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE APPROVAL SHEET I.

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 2 II.

Initiated:

Nuclear Regulatow Commission Developer I I I.

Reviewed:

Reviewer IV.

Approved:

Operations Manager Revision: 0 28 May 2004 Date Date Date 0 pe rator Training Supervisor

• AI 99-6848 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario Z\\Scenario 2.doc Date Page 1 of

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONS LISTED IN ORDER I. Exam Overview

2.

Instructor Guide

3.

Sequence of Events Summary

4.

Validation Checklist

5.

Reference and Critical Task Tracking Form

6.

Scenario Initial Conditions Sheet G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE Page 2 of

SECTION 1 EXAM OVERVIEW

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario 2 Revision: 0 I. Exam Brief:

The Crew takes the shift at 100% power with no significant evolutions in progress.

Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 3AFW*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance. This has no impact on the scenario.

Event number 1 opens the scenario opens when power range nuclear instrument failure NI-41 fails high. The Crew responds per AOP 3571 and trips the associated bistables. The SRO Applicant refers to Technical Specifications and determines that continued operation is permissible. Note the PRNI-41 bistables are Protection Set I.

Event number 2 is a tube failure in low-pressure feedwater heater E3B. This forces a power reduction to *95% reactor power. This event gives the applicants an opportunity to demonstrate proficiency at maneuvering the plant and making reactivity/power adjustments. The event is written to include isolation of the B low-pressure heater string. However, the Chief Examiner may terminate any time after the power reduction is complete.

Event number 3 is a leak in the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). The Applicants should respond per alarm response OP 3353.MB2A 2-2, RWST LEVEL LO and refill the RWST per OP 3304C, Primary Makeup and Chemical Addition.

The SRO Applicant should refer to Technical Specifications and may or may not enter an action statement depending on the severity and speed of response. Once the crew has initiated refilling, the next event can proceed.

Event number 4 is a loss of service water pump 3SWP*P1 C due to breaker failure.

3SWP*PlA fails to automatically start but can be manually started per AOP 3560.

This is a simple component malfunction for the Crew to respond to before initiating the major event.

Event number 5 is a reactor coolant pump, 3RCS-PI D, trip followed by an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). Event number 6, failure of the turbine to automatically trip, accompanies this. The crew enters E-0 and is directed to functional recovery guide FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power GeneratiodATWS.

The crew returns to E-0, FR-Z.l and FR-P.1 when FR-S.l is completed.

Events 7 is the major event - a large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA). The event initiates while the Applicants are performing FR-S.1. They should recognize that FR-S.l is the higher precedent procedure and remain with FR-S.l to completion G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 3 of

before transitioning to FR-P.1, FR-Z.l and returning to E-0, Step 15. The Crew will continue through E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection), into E-I (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant) and into ES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation). The scenario ends when satisfied that the Crew has or can successfully establish cold leg recirculation.

2.

PlantlSimulator differences that may affect the scenario are: None.

3.

Duration of Session:

1% hour G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 4 of

SECTION 2 INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario 2 Revision: 4 All Control Room Conduct, Operations and Communications shall be in accordance COP 200.1,Conduct of Operations, and OP 3260,Unit 3 Conduct of Operations.

"Review the Simulator Operating Limits(design limits of plant) and the Simulator Modeling Limitations and Anomalous Response List prior to performing this training scenario on the simulator. The instructor should be aware if any of these limitations may be exceeded." (NSEM 6.02)

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 5 of

SIMULATOR PROBLEMS DURING EXAMS It is the responsibility of the Instructors in the simulator to insure that exam interruptions have a minimum negative impact on the Crew and the examinations we provide.

Be aware that at all times the Operators should treat the simulator as if it were the plant and you too should treat it as much like the plant as possible when they are in the simulator.

As soon as the Instructors are aware of a simulator problem that will adversely affect the exam in progress (computer fault, etc.) the Instructor should:

I. Place the simulator in FREEZE if possible.

2.

Announce to the Crew that there is a simulator problem.

3.

Request that the Crew leave the simulator control room. (The Crew should leave the simulator for problems which involve major switch alignments).

4.

Deal with the problem (reboot, call STSB, etc.)

5.

After the Instructors believe the simulator is restored to service, the Crew should be told how the exam will continue. If it is possible and felt to be acceptable to the evaluators, the examination can begin where it left off with an update on plant parameters and each Crew member is prepared to restart.

If the examination will not begin where it left off, the crew should be told how and where the exam will begin again.

6.

Once the Crew has been told how and where the exam will begin, have the crew conduct a brief so that the Instructor and evaluators can insure that the crew has all the necessary information to continue with the scenario.

7.

Once all Crew members, Instructors and evaluators are satisfied that they have the necessary information to continue the scenario, place the simulator in RUN and announce to the Crew that you have continued the evaluation session.

G:VIRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario Z\\Scenario 2.doc Page 6 of

EVENT #O TITLE:

INITIAL SETUP Setup Instructions:

Enter IDT as follows :

At any XTERM window, type <idt>

When the SUN asks for an executive type: UEXEC or RTEXEC? enter <r>: this will bring up a blank idt page.

To go to a previously saved idt file type <read> at the prompt When the SUN asks for a file name of the file you wish to view type in the appropriate file name:

The old "Landon" files are as follows:

Old ISD pages 1-8 are idt file OPS Old ISD pages 9-16 are idt file OPSl Old ISD pages 17-19 are idt file OPS2 IF the step counters are athear 000, THEN REMOVE the STEP COUNTER OVERRIDE, allow the counters to step out during the IC reset, Reset to IC48 REINSTATE the step counter OVERRIDE Adjust the various pot settings to the valued specified by the chart located in the sim booth for the selected IC.

Place Simulator to RUN Set the STEP COUNTERS PLACE the Main Turbine on the LOAD LIMITER Verify annunciator, "COMPUTER FAILURE" (MB4C, 1-1 I), is NOT LIT.

Place MOL Curve Book in Shelf for Operator use. Remove other Curve Books from the floor.

Clear the DCS Alarms PLACE THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT IN PTL or align as needed:

Motor drive auxiliary feedwater Pump 3AFW*PlA Equipment 00s: O 3AFW*PlA 0

Synchronize the MONITOR Time Display with digital time display on MB4.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 7 of

Initial Malfunctions/lOs/lDAs:

T=O RPOSA RPOSB RPIOA RPIOB EDISNJSACB-BF ED1 -3NNSACB-BF SWOZA TC03 Manual Reactor Trip Failure at MB4 Manual Reactor Trip Failure at MB7 Train A Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train B Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Unable to deenergize 32B and 32N Unable to deenergize 32B and 32N SW Pp Fails to Auto Start.

Turbine Fails to Trip I/Os N107A Severity = 100%

PRNl 41 Fails High FW13E Severity = 100% 5 min ramp Feed Heater E3B Tube Failure CS05 Severity = 5%

SWOI c RCIID RC03D Severity = 100%

Refueling Water Storage Tank Leak SW Pp CY Trips.

3RCS-PI D Rotor Locks Up.

RCS Cold Leg D Rupture.

Post Exam Data Collection Reactor Power trend data Turbine Generator Load trend data Pressurizer Pressure trend data (PT455 & PT456)

SG Levels (all SGs, both NR & WR)

Rod Positions Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate trend data (all SGs)

All console and panel strip charts or recorded digital data (may be collected at end of day for all crews.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 8 of

Rod Control will be the affected controller.

Appropriate Attachment D RO Crew 10 Do not leave the rod selector switch in AUTO while diagnosing a related instrument failure unless the reason for rod movement is a turbine runback.

If a reactor trip occurs, immediately go to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safetv Iniection.

Determine The Initiating Parameter And Place The Affected Controller In MANUAL.

Stabilize The Plant Parameters.

It is desired that 1&C personnel trip the bistables specified in this procedure. If, during off-hours, I&C personnel are not able to trip the necessary bistables within the time limitations required by the Technical Specifications, Operations Department personnel may trip the bistables using the guidance Drovided within this Drocedure.

Perform Corrective Actions Usina ADDroDriate Attachment Defeat the failed channel input.

Proc Step 3571 Step 1 CAUTION 3571 Step I NOTE 3571 Step I 3571 Step2 3571 Step3 NOTE 3571 Step 3 3571 Att.D step I G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 9 of 63

RO will perform these actions.

US will Peer Check these actions Need to wait -5 minutes for the rate of change to die off RO RO RO CREW us us I

3.3.1 actions 6 & 2 applies.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario Z\\Scenario 2.doc At the detector current comparator drawer, turn the following switches to the failed channel:

I. Rod Stop Bypass,

2. Upper Section,

3. Lower Section,

4. Power Mismatch Bypass.

At the comparator and rate drawer, turn the following switch to the failed channel:

Comparator Channel Defeat.

Restore TAVE - TREF error to within I O F and place rod control in automatic.

If the plant calorimetric source is Nls, the failure of one NI channel will disable the calorimetric Dronram.

When conditions have stabilized, observe MB board annunciators and parameters and immediately report any unexpected or unexplained conditions to the Shift Manager.

Trip the associated Reactor Protection System bistable(s):

Place a check mark in the box above the appropriate channel that requires tripping on the last Daae of this Attachment.

Refer to Technical SDecification Proc Step 3571 Att.D step l a 3571 Att.D step l b 3571 Att.D step 2 3571 Attachment D Step 3 NOTE 3571 Att.D step 3 3571 Att.D step 4 3571 Att.D step 4a 3571 Att.D Page 10 of 63

hrs and bypass for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for testing US will peer check this.

AOP is more restrictive than Tech Specs. Tech Specs requires action 8 only if less than the minimum # of instruments RO RO us RO us 2

2 4

0.0.

I.

Check the existing bistable status to ensure a reactor trip will not occur when the failed channel is trimed.

Remove the appropriate control power fuses for the affected channel.

Request the I&C Department trip the appropriate bistables using Attachment D and Attachment S.

Verify the appropriate bistable status lights are lit.

Within one hour, determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the following interlocks are in their required state for the existing plant condition (Tech, Spec. 3.3.1, Action 8):

Rx or turbine not at power P-7 Three loop permissive P-8 NIS power range P-9 Reactor at power P-10 (MB4D (MB4D 5-3)

(MB4D 3-3) permissive (MB4D 6-1) 4-3).

2 Proc Step step 4b 3571 Att.D step 4c 3571 Att.D step 4d 3571 Att.D step 4e 3571 Att.D step 4f 3571 Att.D step 5 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 11 of 63

The following step for removing the failed PR channel from Program 3R5 restores OPERABILITY to the AFD Monitor Alarm and must be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.2.1.I.I

.b must be performed.

The following step for removing the failed PR channel from Program 3R5 does NOT restore OPERABILITY to the QPTR Alarm Monitor; therefore, and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.4.1.b and 4.2.4.2 are in effect.

TABLE 3.3-1, ACTION 2.c Perform the following to remove the affected power range input to the AFD and QPTR monitor alarm (Program 3R5):

On the plant process computer, Select the NSSS menu, page 2.

At the NSSS menu, Select Tilting Factors (F9).

Press the key (F5 through F8) that corresponds to the channel to be removed.

Proc,Step 3571 Attachment D Step 6 NOTES 357 1 4ttachment D Step 6 357 I 4ttachment D Step 6a 3571 4ttachment D Step 6b 3571 4ttachment D Step 6c G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 12 of 63

I I

Initiate Event 2 at Chief Examiners Discretion G:VIRS\\OsbUBalian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Refer to the following Technical Specifications and Perform any required actions:

Surveillance Requirement 4.2.1.I.I

.b TABLE 3.3-1, ACTION 2.c Surveillance Requirement 4.2.4.1.b Su rveilla nce Requirement 4.2.4.2 Request I&C Department perform corrective maintenance on failed instrument.

357 I Attachment D Step 7 3571 Attachment D Ster, 8 Page 13 of 63

BOP Using Feedwater Heater Level display, CHECK feedwater heater levels (Foxboro DCS) to confirm alarm.

US dispatches PEO to investinate.

us SEND Operator to check feedwater heater level.

CHECK for feedwater heater tube leak as follows:

BOP COMPARE affected feedwater heater outlet temperature to corresponding feedwater heater outlet temperatures on other trains (tube leak results in lower outlet temperature).

COMPARE affected feedwater heater normal drain valve position to corresponding feedwater heater normal drain valve positions on other trains (tube leak results in more open normal drain valve position).

IF feedwater heater tu be leak is indicated, Refer To AOP 3567, Operation With One Feedwater Heater String Isolated, I and CONSIDER isolating affected feedwater heater.

Check If the Standby Condensate Pump Should Be Started jr Reduction Proc Step 3353.MB6AY Step 1 3353.MB6A, Ster, 2 3353. M B6A, Ster, 3 3353. MBGA, Step 3.1 3353. M B6A, Step 3.2 3353.MB6A, Step 3.3 3567 Step 1 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario Z\\Scenario 2.doc Page 14 of 63

Op-Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 I

I FWl3N (ram0 to 100% over 5 minutes)

Time Comments NOTES:

RNO Columns not all reproduced here for brevity.

During pre-validation, 3rd CO-P was not required here. Was required later.

The HD-P trips early in the scenario.

This scenario moves FAST.

ReactivitylPower Maneuver US may refer to OP 3204 NOTE: The leak is in LP Feedwater Heater E3B (3rd Point, B Train)

NOTE: If PEO dispatched, report abnormal noise and vi bration SREW SREW Verify feedwater pump suction pressure - GREATER THAN 300 Psig 3CNM-Pl76A 3CNM-Pl76B 3CNM-P176C START the standby condensate mmtx Decrease Reactor Power To EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN 95%

Identify Faulted Feedwater Heater String Check LP feedwater heater bypass valve (3CNM-MOV88) -

CLOSED Proceed to step 9.

Determine affected feedwater heatedheater string

. Any feedwater heater high level (with proper LCV operation)

. Noise and vibration in any feedwater heater

. Any feedwater heater indicating degraded performance 3567 Step 1.a 3567 Step 1.a RNO 3567 Step 2 3567 Step 3 3567 Step 3.a 3567 Step 3.a RNO 3567 Step

3. b G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 15 of 63

Op-Test No.: 4 Scenario No.: 2 I

FWl3N (ramp to 100% over 5 minutes) I LP F Position I MB7 BOP BOP us BOP

. Any condensate or feedwater svstem leakaae When removing a feedwater heater from service during turbine operation, closely monitor turbine vibration, differential expansion, nuclear power, and feedwater heater temperatures and Dressures.

Bypass The Affected Feedwater Heaters Check the affected feedwater heater or heater string -

IDENTIFIED Return to step 2.

Check the affected heater a 1' POINT FEEDWATER HEATER Perform the following:

I.

OPEN the low pressure heater bypass valve (3CNM-MOV88)

2. Proceed to step 9.

Isolate Extraction Steam to Affected LP Feedwater Heaters Check affected low pressure feedwater heater string extraction steam supply valves - CLOSED For String B 3ESS-MOV29B (E2B) 3ESS-MOV38B (E3B) 3ESS-MOV47B (E4B) 3567 Step 4 CAUTION 3567 Step 4 3567 Step 4.a 3567 Step 4.a RNO 3567 Step

4. b 3567 Step 4.b RNO 3567 Step 9 3567 Step 9.a.

G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 16 of 63 c

Op-Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 I FWl3N (ramp to 100% over 5 minute Comments BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP Check affected low pressure feedwater heater string extraction steam drain valves - OPEN For String B 3DTM-MOV46B (E2B) 3 DTM -MOV47B (E3B) 3 DTM -MOV49B (E4B)

Verify SG Blowdown Tank Vent - To Affected Feedwater Heater - CLOSED For heater E4B 3BDG-MOV21 B If a heater drain tank pump is stopped with the Main Feed System in operation, closely monitor the main feed pump suction pressure, discharge pressure, and flow rate for abnormalities.

Verify Affected 4th Point Heater Drain Pump - TRIPPED Isolate Condensate To Affected LP Feedwater Heaters Check affected heater outlet isolation valve - CLOSED For string B Check affected heater inlet isolation valve - CLOSED For string B 3CNM-MOV70B a 3CNM-MOV49B 3567 Step 9.b.

3567 Step I O 3567 Step I 1 NOTE 3567 Step 11 3567 Step 12 3567 Step 12.a 3567 Step 12.b G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 17 of 63

Op-Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 I

Perform Local Isolation of Affected LP Feedwater Heaters 3567 Step 13 Using Attachment B, Perform the local actions to isolate the affected LP feedwater heater 13.a strina 3567 Step Check local actions of Attachment B - COMPLETED 3567 Step I 13.b WHEN Local actions comdeted.

3567 Step 13.b RNO THEN Proceed to NOTE prior to steD 14.

I G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 18 of 63

rime I

IF Containment Depressurization Actuation or Safety Injection Signal is not actuated, Refer To OP 3304C, "Primary Makeup and Chemical Addition," and INITIATE RWST makeup.

IF the BARS Unit is in operation, Refer To SPROC EN00-3-04, "RWST Silica Cleanup Using Reverse Osmosis," and PERFORM Emergency Shutdown of the BARS Unit.

us CHECK for leakage to Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification Svstem.

CHECK for leaks from RWST and associated piping.

Refer To the following TRM's and Technical Specifications and DETERMINE Limiting Condition for Operation:

TRM 3.1.2.5, "Boration Systems - Borated Water us Source - Shutdown" TRM 3.1.2.6, "Boration Systems - Borated Water Sources - Operating" T/S 3.5.4, "Refueling Water Storaae Tank" G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc 3353.MB2A 2-2, Step I 3353. M B2A 2-2, Step 2 3353.MB2A 2-2, Step 3 3353.MB2A 2-2, Step 4 3353.MB2A 2-2, Step 5 Page 19 of 63

RO RO RO RO RO

1. Makeup to the VCT is not available during manual makeup to the RWST.

2. Main Board components identified in this section are located on MB3.

IF desired, PERFORM makeup to the VCT to ensure adequate level during makeuD to the RWST.

PLACE "REAC CLNT MAKEUP START SW," in "STOP.'I PLACE "REAC CLNT MAKEUP SELECT SW," in "MANUAL."

VERIFY 3CHS-FKIII, "TOTAL MAKEUP FLOW CONT," set at 80 gpm.

DETERMINE required boric acid flow rate, based on current RWST and in-service Boric Acid Storage Tank boron concentrations, by performing one of the following:

OBTAIN flow rate from, Boric Acid Flow Rate Based on 80 gpm Blended Makeup" CALCULATE required boric acid flow rate by applying the following formula:

FR=(RWST Cn+BAST Cn\\X8O NOTE p reced in g 3304C, 4.4.1 3304C, 4.4.1 3304C, 4.4.2 3304C, 4.4.3 3304C, 4.4.4 3304C, 4.4.5 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 20 of 63

RO RO RO RO pot setting for the flow rate from step 4.4.5 by applying the following formula:

Pot = FR x ( I O + 40)

ADJUST 3CHS-FK1 I O,

"BORIC ACID BLEND FLOW CONT," to provide pot setting determined in step 4.4.6.

AC I D" "BATCH" cou n te r, PERFORM the following:

a. PRESS and HOLD

b. b. OPEN cover.

c. Using thumbwheels, SET preset quantity to at least "900000.

d. CLOSE cover.

e. RELEASE "RESET" and VERIFY the counter is reset to "000000."

At 3CHS-FYI 1 OB, "BORIC "RESET".

At 3CHS-FYI I 1 By "PRI WTRI "BATCH" counter, PERFORM the following:

a. PRESS and HOLD "RES ET".

b. OPEN cover.

c. Using thumbwheels, SET preset quantity to at least "900000."

d. CLOSE cover.

e. RELEASE "RESET" and VERIFY the counter is reset to "000000."

33O4Cy4.4.6

~~

3304C, 4.4.7 33046,4.4.8 3304C, 4.4.9 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 21 of 63

RO I

Ro RO RO RO PLACE the following valves in CLOSE and VERIFY closed:

3CHS*FCVI I I B, MAKE-UP TO VCT 3CHS*FCV1 IOB, MAKE-UP TO CHG OPEN the following valves (Aux Bldg 43):

isolation 3CHS*V314, RWST fill 3CHSV316, RWST fill isolation To prevent transferring acid to the off-line boric acid tank, PERFORM one of the following:

. IF using 3CHS*P2A, CLOSE 3CHS*V297, boric acid transfer pump 2B to filter 4 isolation

. IF using 3CHS*P2B, CLOSE 3CHS*V295, boric acid transfer pump 2A to filter 4 isolation To commence RWST fill, PLACE REAC CLNT MAKEUP START SW, in START.

VERIFY proper flows on indicating recorder 3CHS-FRI 10, MAKEUP TO VCT.

Do not exceed I,I 89,000 gallons in the RWST.

MONITOR the RWST level closely during the manual makeuD.

3304C, 4.4.1 0 3304C, 4.4.1 1 3304C, 4.4.12 3304C. 4.4.1 3 3304C, 4.4.14 CAUTION preceding 33046.4.4.15 3304C,4.4.15 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 22 of 63

RO RO RO G:U>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario

?\\Scenario 2.doc WHEN desired RWST level is reached, PLACE "REAC CLNT MAKEUP START SW,"

in "STOP."

Refer To Attachment 1 and "BORIC ACID BLEND FLOW CONT," to provide required boric acid flow rate based on RCS boron concentration.

IF desired, PERFORM the following to flush lines to RWST with blended flow based on RCS boron concentration:

a. PRESS "RESET" on ACI DBATCH" and VERIFY the counter is reset to "000000."

b. PRESS "RESET" on WTR "BATCH" and VERIFY the counter is reset to "000000."

c. PLACE "REAC CLNT MAKEUP START SW," in "START. 'I

d. VERIFY proper flows on indicating recorder 3CHS-FRI 10, "MAKEUP TO VCT."

e. WHEN five minutes has elapsed or as desired, PLACE "REAC CLNT MAKEUP START SW," in "STOP."

ADJUST 3CHS-FK1 I O,

3CHS-FYI I OB, "BORIC 3CHS-FY I 1 I B, "PRI 3304C, 4.4.1 6 3304C, 4.4.1 7 3304C, 4.4.1 8 have demonstrated proficienl Page 23 of 63

G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 24 of 63

Annunciators:

Trip/OC)

MBIC 5-3 (SWP Other MBI C alarms VP-IA/C 3-3 made due to a loss of service water, use the guidance in Attachments A and B of this wocedure as reauired.

No pressure/flow indicated:

RO 3SWP-P126A 3SWP-PI26B 3SWP-FI43A

- 3SWP-FI43B 3560, Step 2, Note I Ro Check Status Of Service Water Svstem RO 3560, Step RO RO RO RO RO RO Recognize the Trip Service Water Pump and report to BOP 1

Transition to AOP 3560, 3560 Entry Loss of Service Water Conditions Verify at least one SW pump 3560, Step 2,a

- RUNNING Verify at least one SW pump in each Train - RUNNING Proceed to Step 2.d.

3560, Step 2.b 3560, Step 2.b, RNO Check affected Train's SW pumps - IN PULL-TO-ISOLABLE SW LEAK Perform the following:

1) START a SW pump in the affected Train. IF one SW pump can NOT be started in the affected Train, THEN Proceed to step 2.e.

2) Proceed to step 2.i.

LOCK DUE TO A NON-3560, Step 2.d 3560, Step 2.d RNO Column G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 25 of 63

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Verify service water supply valves to TPCCW (3SWP*MOV71A and Verify RPCCW heat exchanger SW inlet isolation valves 3SWP*M4V50A and 3SWP*MOV71 B) - OPEN 3SWP*MOVSOB) - OPEN Determine Additional Actions

• • Refer to the following Technical Specifications for applicability and any required actions:. T/S 3.7.4 TIS 3.8.1.1 TIS 3.8.1.2 Check Plant Conditions Stabilized.

Verify only one SW pump in each train - RUNNING START/STOP pumps as necessary.

Refer to OP 3326, "Service Water," and remove air from MCC/Rod Control ACUs, as necessary Verify MB annunciators and parameters are as expected Continue with normal plant operations using applicable plant procedures 3560, Step 2.i.

3560, Step 2.j.

3560, Step 3 3560, Step 4 3560, Step 4.a.

3560, Step 4.a.

RNO Column 3560, Step 4.b.

3560, Step 4.c.

3560, Step 4.d Page 26 of 63

RC11 D Comments RO G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Foldout page must be open ADVERSE CTMT defined as GREATER THAN 180°F or GREATER THAN 1 o5 R/h, in containment.

The reactor can be interpreted as "tripped" when any two of the three bullet substeps of step 1 are satisfied.

Verify Reactor Trip Check reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN Check rod bottom lights -

LIT.

Check neutron flux -

DECREASING E-0, Step 1, NOTE E-0, Step I Page 27 of 63

I RO us RO RO BOP BOP TRIP the reactor.

IF reactor will NOT trip, THEN

a. TRIP Bus 32B and 32N.

b. IF the rod bottom lights are lit OR neutron flux is decreasing, THEN Proceed to step 2.

IF reactor trip can NOT be verified, THEN Go to FR-S.l, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS If RHR is in service, all references to AFW are NOT applicable.

Verify Reactor Trip Check reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN Check rod bottom lights -

LIT.

Check neutron flux -

DECREASING TRIP the reactor. IF the reactor will NOT trip, THEN Drive rods in (AUTO or MANUAL).

Verify Turbine Trip Check all turbine stop valves

- CLOSED E-0, Step 1 RNO Column MOTE preceding FR-S.l, Step 1

=R-S.l, Step 1

=R-S.1, Step 1,

?NO

=R-S.1, Step 2

=R-S.I, Step 2.a G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario ;?\\Scenario 2.doc Page 28 of 63

3FWA*PlA is 00s BOP I RO/BoP I

I RO/BoP RO/BoP RO/BoP IF the turbine will NOT trip, THEN Runback the turbine to close the control valves.

IF the turbine can NOT be runback, THEN CLOSE MSlVs and MSlV bypass valves.

Verify AFW Pumps Running Check MD pumps -

RUNNING CheckTD pump -

RUNNING, IF NECESSARY Initiate Immediate Boration of RCS Check SI - NOT ACTUATED Check one charging pump -

RUNNING Align boration path:

1 ) START at least one boric acid transfer pump

2) OPEN emergency boration valve (3CHS*MV8104)

FR-S.1, Step 2.a, RNO FR-S.l, Step 3 FR-S.1, Step 4 FR-S.1, Step 4.a FR-S.1, Step 4.b FR-S.1, Step 4.c G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 29 of 63

RCI 1 D Check PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2350 psia RO/BoP FR-s.I, step 6.a I us Check normal charging flow path - ALIGNED I RO/BoP FR-S.l Step 6.b RO/BoP Place charging flow control valve in MANUAL 1 RO/BoP FR-S.I Step GmC ROlBoP Check The Following Trips Have Occurred Crew may direct local opening of RTBs before reaching this step.

FR-S.l Step RO/BoP Verify reactor trip breakers -

OPEN I crew I

FR-s.l, Step 7.a Check normal charging flow path aligned Charging flow control valve - CAPABLE OF BEING THROTTLED Charging header loop isolation valve (3CHS*AV8146 or 3CHS*AV8147) - OPEN Charging header isolation valves - OPEN 3CHS*MV8106 3CHS*MV8105

~~

Verify turbine - TRIPPED I

FR-S.l Step 7.b FR-S.l Step 4.d Proceed to step 6.

I FR-S.1, Step 4.e Verify Boration Flow I FR-S.l, Step 6 Adjust boration flow to the GREATER THAN 35 gpm RCS - EQUAL TO OR FR-S.1, Step 6.d

~

Locally TRIP the reactor trip and bypass breakers.

FR-S.1, Step 7.a, RNO G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 30 of 63

RCI I D

Crew Check if SI is Actuated.

FR-S.1, Step 8 Verify SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION annunciator (MB4D 1-6 or MB2B 5-9) -

LIT FR-S.l, Step 8.a RO us Proceed to step 9. and IF SI occurs, THEN Perform steps 3-14 of E-0, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.

FR-S.l, Step 8.a, RNO US hands this off to BOP Check AFW Suction Source FR-S.l, Step 9 BOP Check DWST level - LESS THAN 80,000 gal FR-S.l, Step 9.a BOP Proceed to step IO. and, IF DWST level decreases LESS THAN 80,000 gal, THEN Perform step 9.b.

FR-S.l, Step 9,a, RNO BOP FR-S. 1, Step 10 BOP Check SG Levels Verify NR level in at least one SG - GREATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE CTMT)

FR-S.l, Step 10.a BOP Control feed flow to maintain NR level between 8% and 50% (42% and 50%

ADVERSE CTMT)

FR-S.1, Step 10.b BOP Page 31 of 63 G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc

RO RO BOP BOP BOP Isolated Check primary makeup water to blender CLOSED Locally check chemical mix tank outlet isolation valve (3CHS*V317) -

CLOSED Locally check manual dilution valve (3CHS*FCV11 IA) -

(3CHS*V305) - CLOSED Check For Reactivity Insertion From Uncontrolled RCS Cooldown RCS temperature -

DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR Any SG pressure -

DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER Veri3 Main Steam Lines Isolated Check MSlVs and MSlV Bypass Valves - CLOSED Check ESF Group 3 status lights - LIT Initiate MSI.

FR-SI, Step I 1 F R-S. Step

=R-S.1, Step 13

-R-S.I, Step 13, 3NO G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 32 of 63

BOP us RO RO us us us us Crew Check pressures in all SGs:

DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR DEPRESSURIZED ANY SG PRESSURE ANY SG COMPLETELY Proceed to step 16.

Check Core Exit TCs -

LESS THAN 1200-F Verify Reactor Subcritical Check power range channels - LESS THAN 5%.

Check intermediate range channels - NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE Verify No Fuel Damage Request Chemistry obtain RCS activity samples Request Chemistry obtain RCS activity samples Verify SLCRS Doors -

CLOSED Boration should continue to obtain adequate shutdown margin during subsequent actions.

5and6

, i Proc Step FR-S.1, Step 14 FR-S.l, Step 14, RNO FR-S.1, Step 16 FR-S.l, Step 17 FR-S.1, Step 18 FR-S.1, Step 18.a FR-S.l, Step 18.b FR-S.1, Step 19 CAUTION Dreceding FR-3.1, Step 20 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 33 of 63

Initiate Monitorin CSF Status Trees To Procedure And Step In Enters FR-P.1 G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 34 of 63

FR-P.1 FR-Z.1 Containment Pressure (Crew needs to perform this FR)

FR-Z.3 Thermal Shock (first step returns to E-O cause RHR flow > 1,000 gpm)

Containment Radiation (second step returns to Ea; not reprinted below).

These are not written into this scenario guide.

RCS Press will be 500 RHR flow will be > 1,000.

Crew should go to FR-Z.1 us RO us RO RO

. If RWST level decreases to LESS THAN 520,000 gal, Go to ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, to align the ECCS system.

. If DWST level decreases to LESS THAN 80,000 gal, Shift AFW pump suction to the CST using GA-4.

Check RCS Pressure -

GREATER THAN 300 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

Perform the applicable action:

" IF RHR pump flow is LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO I000 gpm, THEN Proceed to step 2.

. "IF RHR pump flow is GREATER THAN 1000 gpm, THEN Go to procedure and step in effect.

Check If CDA Required

a. Check Ctmt pressure -

b. Verify annunciator GREATER THAN 23 psia "CONTAINMENT DEPRES LIT Verify CIA

a. Check ESF Group 2, columns 2 though I O - LIT ACTUATION" (MB2B 5-5) -

CAUTIO N preceding FR-P.1, Step 1 FR-P.1, Step 1 FR-P.1, Step I RNO FR-Z.1, Step 1 FR-Z.l, Step 2 G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 35 of 63

RO RO BOP BOP

. Check RPCCW CTMT supply and return header isolation valves - CLOSED

. Check RPCCW pumps -

STOPPED STOP all RCPs If ECA-1.I

, LOSS of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, is in progress, Ctmt spray should be operated as directed in ECA-I.I.

Verify Quench Spray System 0 pe rat ion

a. Check annunciator RWST EMPTY QSS PP OFF

b. (69,331 gal) (MB2A 5-2) -

NOT LIT

c. Verify quench spray pumps

d. Verify quench spray pump

- RUNNING discharge valves - OPEN

.3QSS*MOV34A 3QSS*MOV34B STOP All Main Circulating Water Pumps Check Containment Ventilation

. Verify CAR fans -

. Verify CRDM fans -

STOPPED STOPPED FR-Z.1, Step 3 CAUTIO N preceding FR-Z.1, Step 4 FR-Z.l, Step 4

=R-Z.I, Step 5

=R-Z.I, Step 6 G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 36 of 63

NOTE: RSS starts -1 1.5 minutes after CDA in it ia tes. P roced u re directs manual starting IF sump level supports it.

RO RO RO RO Verify Recirculation Spray System Operation

a. Check recirculation spray pump suction isolation valves - OPEN 3RSS*MOV23A 3RSS*MOV23B 3RSS*MOV23C 3RSS*MOV23D

b. Check annunciator CTMT RECIRC PUMP AUTO START SIGNAL (MB2B 1-

8) - LIT

c. Check recirculation spray pumps -ANY RUNNING

d. Proceed to step 7.g.

Verify recirculation spray pump spray header isolation valves -

OPEN ON RUNNING PUMP(S)

ForpumpA-ForpumpB-ForpumpC-3RSS*MOV20A 3RSS*MOV20B 3RSS*MOV20C ForpumpD-3RSS*MOV20D Check recirculation spray -

FLOW INDICATED IN AT LEAST ONE TRAIN IF running pump amps, flow, or discharge pressure oscillate THEN

1) RESET SI and CDA

2) STOP affected pump(s)

3) Proceed to ECA-I.I, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation FR-Z.1, Step 7 FR-Z.1, Step 7.g FR-Z.l, Step 7.h FR-Z.1, Step 7.i G:UIRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 37 of 63

us Crew BOP BOP RO Proceed to step 9.

Verify ESF Group 4 Lights -

LIT Verify Main Steam Line Isolation

. Check MSlVs and MSlV bypass valves - CLOSED

. Check ESF Group 3 lights Verify Main Feedwater Isolation

- LIT Verify MD FW pump -

TRIPPED Verify TD FW pumps -

TRIPPED Verify FW isolation trip valves - CLOSED Verify SG feed regulating valves - CLOSED Verify SG feed regulating bypass valves - CLOSED Verify SG chemical feed isolation valves - CLOSED At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

If all SGs are faulted, at least I00 gpm feed flow should be maintained to each SG.

17and8 FR-Z.l, Step 7.j FR-Z.l, Step 9 FR-Z. I

, Step 10 FR-Z.1, Step I 1

CAUTION preceding FR-Z.1, Step 12 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2Bcenario 2.doc Page 38 of 63

Returns to E-0, Step 15 BOP us RO RO RO us RO Check If Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Should Continue To All SGs

a. Check pressure in all SGs-NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED Go To Procedure And Step In Effect Determine If ADVERSE CTMT Conditions Exist Ctmt temperature GREATER THAN 180°F Ctmt radiation GREATER THAN 105R/hr Verifv ECCS Flow Check charging pumps -

FLOW INDICATED Check RCS pressure -

GREATER THAN 1650 psia (1 950 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

Proceed to Step 16.e Check SI pumps - FLOW I N D I CATED FR-Z.1, Step 12 FR-Z.1, Step 13 E-0, Step 15 E-0, Step I 6 E-0, Step 16.a E-0, Step 16.b E-0, Step 16.b, RNO E-0, Step 16.e G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 39 of 63

Check RCS pressure - LESS THAN 300 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

E-0, Step 16.f RO RO Check RHR pumps - FLOW INDICATED.

E-0, Step 16.g.

BOP Verify Adequate Heat Sink E-0, Step I 7 Check NR level in at least one (42% ADVERSE CTMT)

SG - GREATER THAN 8%

BOP 50, Step 17.a Control feed flow to maintain NR level - BETWEEN 8% and 50% (42% and 50%

ADVERSE CTMT)

BOP 5-0, Step 17.b us Proceed to step 18.

5-0, Step 17.c Verify AFW Valve Alignment ALIGNMENT

-PROPEREMERGENCY BOP E-0, Step 18 Verify ECCS Valve Alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT RO E-0, Step 19 us Check Plant Status 5-0, Step 20 Verify SLCRS doors -

CLOSED Security 3-0, Step 20.a Check CONTROL BUILDING ISOLATION annunciator Verify ESF Group 2 CBI lights -

LIT (MB4D 3-6) - LIT CBI Should be lit as crew manually actuated SI Crew i-0, Step 20.c RO G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 40 of 63

Verify Control Building purge supply fan and purge exhaust fan - NOT RUNNING BOP E-0, Step 20.d Verify Control building air bank isolation valves - OPEN BOP 1

E-0, Step 20.e BOP I STOP kitchen exhaust fan E-0, Step 20.f Close and Dog (as applicable)

Control Building pressure boundary doors.

PEO E-0, Step 20.g RO I Check RCS Temperature E-0, Step 21 Alternate paths through Step 21 - all lead to Step 22.

RO Check PZR Valves E-0, Step 22 RO Verify PORVs - CLOSED E-0, Step 22.a Verify normal PZR spray valves - CLOSED E-0, Step 22.b Verify PZR safety valves -

CLOSED E-0, Step 22.c To prevent damage to the RCP seal(s), seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

E-0, Step 23, CAUTION us The leak should be large enough to require the RCPs tripped us Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped E-0, Step 23 Verify RCPs - ANY RUNNING E-0, Step 23.a RO RO Verify RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1500 psia (1 800 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

RCPs were probably tripped in Step 11 above.

E-0, Step 23.b Page 41 of 63 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario ;?\\Scenario 2.doc

Ensure crew request activity samples with HP coverage RO us BOP/

RO BOP/

RO BOP RO RO BOP Verify charging or SI pumps -

AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Stop all RCPs Check If SG Secondary Boundaries Are Intact Check pressure in all SGs NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED Check If SG Tubes Are Intact SamDle all SGs for activitv I. RESET SG blowdown samDle isolation

2. OPEN SG blowdown sample isolation valve(s)

3. Request Chemistry obtain activity samples using HP cove rag e Check steam generator levels -

NO SG LEVEL INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER 7 and 8 Proc Step E-0, Step 23.c E-0, Step 23.d E-0, Step 24 E-0, Step 24.a E-0, Step 25 5-0. SteD 25.a 50, Step 25.b G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 42 of 63

CMS*RE22 pre-trip, not normal CTMT Histogram, not normal CTMT pressure, slowly increasing

~

~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

~

The US should ensure board operators open and review foldout page Crew us

~

us us Verify trend history and alarm status of radiation monitors Main steam line - NORMAL Condenser air ejector -

NORMAL SG blowdown - NORMAL Check If RCS Is Intact Verify Ctmt radiation using 3CMS*RE22 (pre-trip) -

NORMAL Verify Ctmt radiation using radiation monitoring group histogram (CTMT) -

NORMAL Verify Ctmt pressure -

Verify Ctmt recirculation Initiate monitoring of CSF Status Trees and Go to E-1,

Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

NORMAL sump level - NORMAL To prevent seal damage, seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Note: Foldout page must be open.

Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped ProcStep E-0, Step 25.c E-0, Step 26 E-0, Step 26 RNO E-I, Step I CAUTION E-I, Step 1 NOTE E-I, Step 1 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 43 of 63

Verify RCPs - ANY RUNNING Verify RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1500 psia (1 800 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

E-I Step 1.a E-I, Step I

.b RO RO Verify charging or safety injection pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING RO E-I, Step 1.c us STOP all RCPs E-I, Step 1.d Check If SG Secondary Boundaries Are Intact us E-I, Step 2 Check pressures in all SGs.

NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED BOP/

RO E-I, Step 2.a Check Intact SG Levels us BOP BOP E-I, Step 3 Verify NR level - GREATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE CTMT)

E-I, Step 3.a E-I, Step 3.b Control feed flow to maintain NR level between 8% and 50% (42% and 50%

ADVERSE CTMT) us Check Secondary Radiation E-I, Step 4 Done in E-0 w Sample all SGs for activity

1. RESET SG blowdown sample isolation E-I. Step 4.a RO Page 44 of 63 G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc

us us RO RO us

2. OPEN SG blowdown samde isolation valvels)

3. Request Chemistry obtain activity samples using HP coverage Verify trend history and alarm status of radiation monitors Main steam line - NORMAL Condenser air ejector -

NORMAL SG blowdown - NORMAL If any PZR PORV opens because of high PZR pressure, step 5a should be repeated after pressure decreases to LESS THAN 2350 psia.

Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves Verify PORVs - CLOSED Verify block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN Check If ECCS Flow Should Be Reduced E-I. Step 4.b E-I, Step 5 CAUTION E-I, Step 5 E-I, Step 5.a E-I, Step 5.b E-I, Step 6 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 45 of 63

RO BOP RO I

us Verify RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN 32°F (115°F ADVERSE CTMT)

Verify secondary heat sink Total feed flow to intact 530 gpm SGS - GREATER THAN Narrow range level in at least one intact SG -

GREATER THAN 8%

(42% ADVERSE CTMT)

Verify RCS pressure -

STABLE OR INCREASING Verify PZR level - GREATER THAN 16% (50% ADVERSE CTMT)

Go To ES-1.I I SI Termination E-I Step 6.a E-I Step 6.b E-I Step 6.c E-ly Step 6.d E-I I Step 6.e G:VIRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 46 of 63

RO RO RO us RO us RO now, DO NOT Stop any recirculation spray pumps used For core injection flow.

The recirculation spray pumps are sequenced to automatically start 11 minutes after a CDA.

Check If Ctmt Spray Should Be Stopped Verify quench spray pumps -

RUNNING Verify Ctmt pressure - LESS THAN 17.5 psia Proceed to CAUTION prior to step 8. and, WHEN Ctmt pressure is LESS THAN 17.5 psia, THEN Perform step 7.c.

c. Using GA-8, Stop Ctmt spray. If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual actions to restart safeguards equipment may be required.

To provide adequate ECCS flow, RCS pressure should be monitored to ensure that the RHR pumps are manually restarted if pressure decreases in an uncontrolled manner to LESS THAN 300 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT).

Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped Check RHR pumps - ANY RUNNING IN SI MODE 7 and 8 CAUTIO N preceding Step 7 NOTE preceding Step 7 E-I, Step 7 E-I, Step 7.a E-I, Step 7.b E-I, Step 7.b RNO Column E-I, Step 7.c CAUTION preceding Step 8 E-I, Step 8 E-I, Step 8.a G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario Z\\Scenario 2.doc Page 47 of 63

RC11 8

I I

RO us BOP BOP BOP RO BOP BOP

b. Check RCS pressure:

1) Verify pressure -

GREATER THAN 300 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

1) Proceed to CAUTION prior to step IO.

DO NOT reset CDA if the recirculation spray pumps are required and have NOT automatically started.

Check If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped Verify AC emergency busses - BOTH ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER Proceed to step 10.h.

RESET SI and CDA, if required Perform the following to energize MCC 32-3T:

1) Check emergency bus 34C -

ENERGIZED

2) Using GA-1, Energize MCC 32-3T Check emergency diesel generators - BOTH RUNNING UNLOADED STOP unloaded emergency diesel aenerator(s1 E-I, Step 8.a E-I, Step 8.a RNO Column CAUTION preceding Step I O E-I, Step 10 E-I, Step 10.a E-I, Step 1O.b E-I, Step 10.h E-I, Step 10.i E-I, Step 1O.j E-I, Step 10.k G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 48 of 63

During pre-validation, RHR tripped on low RWST level here. Crew transitions to ES-1.3 BOP us Locally Perform the following for unloaded emergency generator(s):

For EDG A, Place 3EGS*PNLIA control switch on MCC 32-IT-3H to START 3EGS*PNL1 B control switch on MCC 32-1 U-3H to START For EDG By Place Consult with the ADTS prior to performing any local inspections in the Auxiliary Building or ESF Building.

Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status Verify cold leg recirculation capability

1) Power to recirculation spray

2) Using Attachment A,Verify pumps - AVAILABLE power for cold leg recirculation valves -

AVAILABLE Check Auxiliary Building and ESF Building radiation (radiation monitoring group histograms)

Auxiliary Building (AUX) -

NORMAL ESF Building (ESF) -

NORMAL

. SLCRS Area (SLRW) -

NORMAL E-I Step 10.1 CAUTION preceding Step 11 E-I Step 11 E-I Step 11.a

-I Step 1 1.b G:U>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 49 of 63

or ESF Building flooding I)

Verify SUMP LEVEL HI lights (MBI) - NOT LIT

. AUX BLDG PIPE TNL

. ESFRHRCUB

. ESFRSSCUB

2) Verify Annunciator ECCS PIPE CUB SAFEGUARDS AREA NOT LIT FLOODING (MBIC 2-8) -

Check If RCS Cooldown And us Depressurization Is Required Verify RCS pressure -

(500 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

RO GREATER THAN 300 psia 7

rRo I us IF RHR pump flow is GREATER THAN 1000 gpm, THEN Proceed to step 13.

Check If Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation Is Required Verify RWST level - LESS THAN 520.000 aal Return to CAUTION prior to step 11.

Go to ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Lea Recirculation

7and8 E-I, Step 1l.c E-I, Step 12 E-I, Step 12.a.

E-I, Step 12.a RNO Column E-I, Step 13 E-I, Step 13.a E-I, Step 13.a RNO Column E-I, Step 13.b G:U>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 50 of 63

RCI 1 RO RO must be maintained at all times.

If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action to restart safeguards equipment may be required.

High radiation levels may be experienced in the Auxiliary and ESF buildings following the transfer to cold leg recirculation.

Functional Response procedures should not be implemented until completion of step 5.

RESET ESF Actuation Signals, If Required e SI CDA LOP CIA CIB STOP Both RHR Pumps And Place Control Switches In All ECCS pumps taking a suction from the RWST should be stopped if RWST level decreases to 100,000 gal.. Consult with the ADTS prior to dispatching personnel to locally operate RHR and Recirculation Spray System valves.

P U LL-TO-LOCK Either train of recirculation spray can supply water to the core.

7 and 8 Proc Step CAUTION preceding ES-1.3, Step 1 NOTE preceding ES-1.3, Step I ES-1.3, Step 1 ES-1.3, Step 2 CAUTION preceding ES-1.3, Step 3 NOTE preceding ES-I.3, Step 3 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 51 of 63

RO RO RO RO RO RO RO Recirculation Spray Systems For Cold Leg Recirculation Verify cold leg recirculation capability (if previously performed, proceed to step 3.b.)

I)

Power to recirculation spray

2) Using Attachment A, Verify pumps -AVAILABLE power for cold leg recirculation valves -

AVAl LABLE Verify recirculation spray heat exchanger SW inlet isolation valves - OPEN 3SWP*MOV54B Verify recirculation spray header isolation valves -OPEN 3RSS*MOV20A 3RSS*MOV20B

. 3SWP*MOV54A Verify recirculation spray pumps A AND B - RUNNING CLOSE RHR cold leg injection valves. 3SIL*MV8809A

. 3SIL*MV8809B CLOSE RWST/RHR pump suction valves

. 3SIL*MV8812A

. 3SIL*MV8812B CLOSE RHR pump cross-over valves. 3RHS*MV8716A 3RHS*MV8716B 7 and 8 Proc Step ES-1.3, Step 3 ES-I.3, Step 3.a ES-I.3, Step 3.b ES-1.3, Step 3.c ES-1.3, Step 3.d ES-1.3, Step 3.e ES-I.3, Step 3.f ES-I.3, Step 3.g G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 52 of 63

RCI 1 RO RO RO RO RO RO RO RO valves to RWST

. 3SIH*MV8813

. 3SIH*MV8814

. 3SIH*MV8920 CLOSE charging pump miniflow isolation valves to RWST. 3CHS*MV8511A 3CHS*MV8511 B 3CHS*MV8512A 3CHS*MV8512B Verify RSS pumps have been in operation - AT LEAST TWO MINUTES OPEN recirculation spray RHR isolation valves

. 3RSS*MV8837A 3RSS*MV8837B OPEN RHR to CHG and SI suction isolation valves

. 3SIL*MV8804A

. 3SIL*MV8804B OPEN SI/CHG pump cross-connect valves

. 3SIH*MV8807A

. 3SIH*MV8807B Verify a flow path from the Ctmt sump to the RCS - AT LEAST ONE ESTABLISHED Verify at least one charging AND one SI DumD - RUNNING ES-1.3, Step 3.h ES-I.3, Step 3.i ES-I.3, Step 3.j ES-1.3, Step 3.k ES-1.3, Step 3.1 ES-1.3, Step 3.m ES-I.3, Step 3.n ES-1.3, Step 3.0 G:U>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 53 of 63

I CRITICAL TASK ES-1. S A Transfer to cold leg recirculation and establish ECCS recirculation flow that at least meets the assumptions of the plant-spt :ific LOCA analyses P

us RO RO BOP us RO RO us occurs in the Recirculation Mode, the EDG sequencer automatically restarts cold leg recirculation components.

Complete Cold Leg Recirculation Alignment CLOSE RWST/SI pump suction (3SI H*MV8806)

CLOSE RWST/CHG pump suction valves 3CHS*LCV112D

. 3CHS*LCVI 12E Locally Place RWST/CHG pump suction valve breakers to OFF 32-1R-R4J (3CHS*LCV112D)

(3CHS*LCVl12E) 32-1W-R4J Verify Cold Leg Recirculation Check injection flow to RCS from charging pumps AND SI pumps - ESTABLISHED Verify at least one recirculation spray pump in each train -

ALIGNED FOR COLD LEG RECIRC AND RUNNING Functional Response procedures may now be implemented as necessarv.

of 'Scenario.

a 7 and 8 Proc Step NOTE preceding ES-1.3, Step 4

~~

ES-1.3, Step 4 ES-1.3, Step 4.a ES-1.3, Step 4.b ES-1.3, Step 4.c ES-I.3, Step 5 ES-1.3, Step 5.a ES-I.3, Step 5.b NOTE preceding ES-1.3, Step 6.

Question to SRO Applicant: What Emergency Action Level should be declared for this scenario?

4nswer: ALERT Charlie One based RCBZ.

TERMINATE EXAM G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 54 of 63

SECTION 3 SIMULATOR EXAM SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Title:

ID Number: NRC Scenario 2 Revision: 0 NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 TIME *QA INSTRUCTOR AIDS DES CR I PTI ON MALF, RF, IO T=O RPOSA RPOSB RPI OA RPI OB ED1 -3NJSACB-BF ED1 -3NNSACB-BF SWOZA TC03 Manual Reactor Trip Failure at MB4 Manual Reactor Trip Failure at MB7 Train A Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train B Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Unable to deenergize 32B and 32N Unable to deenergize 32B and 32N SW Pp Fails to Auto Start.

Turbine Fails to Trip Examiner I nit iated I. N107A Severity = 100%

PRNI 41 Fails High

2. FW13E Severity = 100%

Feed Heater E6B Tubes Fail over 5 minutes

3. CS05 Severity=5%

Refueling Water Storage Tank Leak.

4. SWOIC SW Pp C Trips.

5. RCIID 3RCS-PI D Locked Rotor

6. RC03D Severity = 100%

RCS Cold Leg D Rupture.

Summaw of Simulator Booth Operator Cues.

I

) Trip bistables and door alarms during Event 1

2) Report noise, vibes from E3B during Event 2

3) Report water leak from suction flange of RWST Recirc Pump B and Isolated.

4) Close and report 3CHS*V314, v316, v297, v295

5) Remove TC03 when Crew attempts to manually trip turbine to allow success.

6) Locally open RTBs 5 minutes after requested.

7) Initiate Event 7 during Event 6.

8) Report SLCRS and Control Building Doors closed...

9) Acknowledge requests for Chemistry Samples 1 0) Reset 32-3T.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 55 of 63

SECTION 4 VALIDATION CHECKLIST

Title:

ID Number: NRC Scenario 2 NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 Remote functions:

All remote functions contained in the guide are certified.

Malfunctions:

All malfunctions contained in the guide are certified.

Initial Conditions:

The initial condition(s) contained in the guide are certified or have been developed from certified IC's in accordance with NSEM-4.02.

Simulator Operating Limits:

The simulator guide has been evaluated for operating limits and/or anomalous response.

Test Run:

The scenario contained in the guide has been test run and validated (validation sheet completed, next page)on the simulator. Simulator response is reasonable and as expected.

Examination Scenario Review The dynamic examination review checklist is complete.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Revision: 0 Verified by Page 56 of 63

SECTION 5 REFERENCES AND CRITICAL TASK TRACKING

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0

1.

References:

TS* MP3 OP 3272 OP 3204 OP 3353 AOP 3571 AOP 3567 AOP 3569 EOP*35 E-0 EOP*FR-S.l EOP"35 E-I EOP"35 ES-I.3 ES-0.1 EPIP*EPIP 4400 NUREG 1021 Technical Specifications EOP User's Guide At Power Operation Main Board Annunciator Response Procedures Instrument Failure Response Operation with One Feedwater Heater String Isolated Loss of Service Water Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation Reactor Trip Response Event Assessment, Classification and Reporta bility Examiners Standards G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 57 of 63

II.

Critical Tasks Covered in this Test:

The following Critical Tasks are covered in this exercise:

DESCRIPTION 2

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 58 of 63

ES-1.3 -

A

\\DRS\\OsbU CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTION Transfer to cold leg recirculation and [establish ECCS recirculation flow

[that at least meets the assumptions of the plant-specific LOCA ana lyse^]^]'

lian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scena 000-01 1 EA1.I 1

4.214.2 000-01 1 EA1.I3 4.1J4.2 000-01 I EA2.02 3.313.7 000-009 EA1.02 3.8J3.8 006-030 A4.02 4.414.4 o 2.doc

'.,,' ' BASIS FOR SELECTION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Omission or incorrect performance of this task results in "adverse consequence(s) or a significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant."

Failure to transfer to cold leg recirculation before the RWST inventory is totally depleted results in the loss of all pumped safety injection and containment spray when the RWST empties.

Provided that transfer to cold leg recirculation is possible (as is postulated in the plant conditions), a failure to transfer resulting in loss of pumped injection and containment spray cons ti tu tes "mis-o pe ra tio n or in correct crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS... capacity." It also constitutes a "significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario."

Failure to transfer to cold leg recirculation under the postulated plant conditions can result in unnecessary challenges to the following CSFs:

0 Core cooling 0

Containment Thus, failure to transfer represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combinatiot@a@bpg3 that would prevent a challenge o plant safety."

I E-0 -- Q Manually trip the main turbine [before a severe.

(orange-path) challenge develops to either the subcriticality or the integrity CSFI5 or [before transition to ECA-2.11,' whichever happens first 045.01 0 A3.01 3.513.6 045-050 A I.01 3.814.1 A I.02 3 -313.7 A3.01 3.313.5 BASIS FOR SELECTION Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to Take an action... that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."

The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSlVs that cannot be closed in this case. This "effective steamline break" is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which can be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncon-trolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario Z\\Scenario 2.doc Page 60 of 63

OPERATIONAL EXAM VALIDATION SHEET Program

Title:

Examination Name: NRC Scenario Number 1 Exam ID Number: NRC I Revision: 0 NRC Initial License Training, NRC Scenario Number 1 By their signature below, the people acknowledge the confidentiality and validity of the material contained within and will not willfully disclose its contents to others enrolled in the Millstone Three Initial Licensed Operator Training Program.

Validated By:

Print SM us RO BOP SiQnature Date I

I I

I G:U>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 61 of 63

ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0 Note:

The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes 2

Yes COMMENTS:

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

Total malfunctions inserted: 4-8/10-I4 (PRNI-41, E3B, RWST, 3SWP*PlA & Cy)

Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1 -4/3-6 (ATWS, Turbine Trip)

Abnormal Events: I

-2/2-3 (1 Instrument Failures, LP Feedwater Tube Leak, Loss of 3s W P* P 1 A)

Major Transients: 1 -2/2-3 (LB LOCA)

EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: 1-3/36 (E-I, ES-I.3, FR-S.1, FR-Z.1, FR-P.l)

EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-311 -3 Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes)

EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/5-8 (Trip Turbine, Cold Leg Recirc)

Technical Specifications are exercised during the test G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 62 of 63

SECTION 6 SCENARIO INITIAL CONDITIONS Reactor Power:

100%

Operating History:

258 days on line RCS Boron:

953 ppm Core Burnup:

10,000 MWD/MTU Condensate Demins:

7 Intake structure:

Green PRA Status:

Green Protected train:

"B" Train protected Evolutions in Progress:

Millstone Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage Major Equipment 00s:

3AFW*PlA Crew Instructions:

Motor drive auxiliary feedwater pump, 3AFW*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance. 3AFW*PlA was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago and expected return to operability is 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> from now. Limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2, action a. has been entered.

Continue to operate at full power.

PlantEimulator Differences:

If not using the speed dial option, dial 3333 or 3334 to reach the desired person (s).

The following PPC programs do not function on the simulator:

0 0

If Samarium Follow 11 Xenon Follow I f Sequence of Events G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 2\\Scenario 2.doc Page 63 of 63

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE APPROVAL SHEET 1.

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 3 II.

I l l.

Initiated:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Developer Reviewed :

Reviewer IV.

Approved:

Operations Manager Operator Training Supervisor

• AI 99-6848 G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Revision: 2 3 June 2004 Date Date Date Date Page 1 of46

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONS LISTED IN ORDER

1.

Exam Overview

2.

Instructor Guide

3.

Sequence of Events Summary

4.

Validation Checklist

5.

Reference and Critical Task Tracking Form

6.

Scenario Initial Conditions Sheet G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 2 of 46

SECTION I EXAM OVERVIEW

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 3 Revision: 0

1.

Exam Brief:

The Crew takes the shift at 9% power during a startup following a planned refueling outage. Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3FWA*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance. The Crew is to raise reactor power per OP 3203, Step 4.3.10, using control rods. All preceding steps have been completed and the Crew should be briefed in advance of taking the shift. When power rises above I I%, the Crew will find that P-I 0 permissive annuciator has failed to energize. The SRO Applicant should refer to Technical Specifications and recognize that 3.0.3 applies.

Event 2 is a slow failure of Steam Generator B water level transmitter, 3FWS-LT529, to zero. The crew should respond by taking manual control of 3FWS-LK560 (SG B feedwater flow control bypass valve) and maintaining SG water level at 45%

to 55%. The crew will defeat affected instrumentation and trip bistables per AOP 3571.

Event 3 is a sudden failure of Letdown Pressure Transmitter, 3CHS-PTI 31. This causes the Letdown pressure control valve to open and letdown pressure to rise.

The Letdown line relief valve will open on high pressure. The crew responds per alarm response OP 3353.MB3A 4-5 and may refer to OP 3353.MB3A 4-6. They will take letdown pressure control, 3CHS*PK131 to Manual and maintain 300 psig to 350 psig. The Examiners may promptkue the Crew to bypass the pressure control valve through 3CHS*V14.

Event 4 is a Loss of Vital Instrument AC Power (WAC-I). This forces both the RO and BOP to respond by taking various controllers to HAND. The loss of VIAC-I also raises Technical Specification issues for the SRO Applicant to demonstrate proficiency with.

Event 5 is an oil leak from reactor coolant pump 3RCS-PIC upper oil reservoir. The crew should respond per OP 3353.MB4B 4-6B which will lead them to AOP 3554, RCP Trip or Stopping a RCP at Power. The event ends when 3RCS-PIB has been removed from service.

Event 6 is an inadvertent closing of Main Steam Isolation Valve 3MSS*ClV27A.

The Crew should respond per OP 3353.MB5C 2-7 and reopen the MSIV. The scenario is meant to promptly proceed to the major event once the Crew reopens the MSIV.

The major event consists of Events 7, 8, and 9. Event 7 is a Feedwater Line rupture G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 3 of 46

on the D Steam Generator downstream of the last check valve before the SG. The plant may automatically trip or the Crew may recognize the symptoms and manually trip and initiate SI. The event is complicated by no flow from 3FWA*P1 B (its discharge valve is closed).

Event 8 is the failure of SI to automatically initiate and it is a critical task for the crew to manually initiate SI. The train A failure is partly attributable to the loss of VIAC-

1. However, automatic actuation is defeated by simulated malfunction for both trains.

Event 9 is the failure of MSlVs 3MSS*CW27B, 3MSS*CTV27C and 3MSS*CTV27D to close. MSlV 3MSS*CTV27C can be closed from the control room. However, 3MSS*CW27B and 27D remain stuck open until closed locally.

2.

Plant/Simulator differences that may affect the scenario are: None.

3.

Duration of Session:

1% hour G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 4 of 46

SECTION 2 INSTRUCT0 R GUIDE

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario 3 Revision:

All Control Room Conduct, Operations and Communications shall be in accordance COP 200.1,Conduct of Operations, and OP 3260,Unit 3 Conduct of Operations.

"Review the Simulator Operating Limits(design limits of plant) and the Simulator Modeling Limitations and Anomalous Response List prior to performing this training scenario on the simulator. The instructor should be aware if any of these limitations may be exceeded." (NSEM 6.02)

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 5 of 46

SIMULATOR PROBLEMS DURING EXAMS It is the responsibility of the Instructors in the simulator to insure that exam interruptions have a minimum negative impact on the Crew and the examinations we provide.

Be aware that at all times the Operators should treat the simulator as if it were the plant and you too should treat it as much like the plant as possible when they are in the simulator.

As soon as the Instructors are aware of a simulator problem that will adversely affect the exam in progress (computer fault, etc.) the Instructor should:

I.

Place the simulator in FREEZE if possible.

2.

Announce to the Crew that there is a simulator problem.

3.

Request that the Crew leave the simulator control room. (The Crew should leave the simulator for problems which involve major switch alignments).

4.

Deal with the problem (reboot, call STSB, etc.)

5.

After the Instructors believe the simulator is restored to service, the Crew should be told how the exam will continue. If it is possible and felt to be acceptable to the evaluators, the examination can begin where it left off with an update on plant parameters and each Crew member is prepared to restart.

If the examination will not begin where it left off, the crew should be told how and where the exam will begin again.

6.

Once the Crew has been told how and where the exam will begin, have the crew conduct a brief so that the Instructor and evaluators can insure that the crew has all the necessary information to continue with the scenario.

7.

Once all Crew members, Instructors and evaluators are satisfied that they have the necessary information to continue the scenario, place the simulator in RUN and announce to the Crew that you have continued the evaluation session.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 6 of 46

EVENT #O TITLE:

INITIAL SETUP Setup Instructions:

Enter IDT as follows :

e e

e e

e e

e e

e e

e e

e e

e e

At any XTERM window, type 4dt>

When the SUN asks for an executive type: UEXEC or RTEXEC? enter <P: this will bring up a blank idt page.

To go to a previously saved idt file type <read> at the prompt When the SUN asks for a file name of the file you wish to view type in the appropriate file name:

The old "Landon" files are as follows:

Old ISD pages 1-8 are idt file OPS Old ISD pages 9-16 are idt file OPSI Old ISD pages 17-1 9 are idt file OPS2 IF the step counters are athear 000, THEN REMOVE the STEP COUNTER OVERRIDE, allow the counters to step out during the IC reset, Reset to IC-8 REINSTATE the step counter OVERRIDE Adjust the various pot settings to the valued specified by the cIiart located in ille s booth for the selected IC.

Place Simulator to RUN Set the STEP COUNTERS PLACE the Main Turbine on the LOAD LIMITER Verify annunciator, "COMPUTER FAILURE" (MB4C, 1-1 I), is NOT LIT.

m Place MOL Curve Book in Shelf for Operator use. Remove other Curve Books from the floor.

Clear the DCS Alarms PLACE THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT IN PTL or align as needed:

Equipment 00s:

O 3FWA*PlA 3FWA*PIA 0

Synchronize the MONITOR Time Display with digital time display on MB4.

G:VIRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 7 of 46

From IC-8, the following must be completed per OP3203

1.

Startup Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pump A

2.

Adjust IC-8 to Middle of Life (MOL), three days post trip.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 8 of 46

Initial Malfunctions/lOs/lDAs:

T=O NI-11 MB4G 01-04 MB4G 02-04 MB4G 03-04 MB4G 04-04 MSl2B MSl2C MSl2D RP07A RP07B FW21 B I/Os RX12F Severity = 0%

CV05 Severity = 0%

EDO8A RCl2C Severity = 100%

MSOGA FWIOD Severity = 100%

FWl8B P-IO Fails to Actuate P-IO Bistable fails to actuate P-10 Bistable fails to actuate P-10 Bistable fails to actuate P-10 Bistable fails to actuate MSlV (ClV27-B) Stuck Open MSlV (ClV27-C) Stuck Open MSlV (ClV27-D) Stuck Open SI Auto Actuation Failure Train A SI Auto Actuation Failure Train B 3FWA*V18 (3FWA*Pl B Disch Valve) Closed.

5 Min Ramp SG B Lvl Xmttr, LT529 fails to 0 over 5 mins.

Letdown Press. Xmttr, PT131 fails to 0 Loss of Instrument Buss VBI 3RCS-PI C Upper Reservoir Oil Leak Main Steam Isolation Valve A Trip 5 Min Ramp Feedwater Line Rupture Inside Containment 3FWA*Pl B Trips - if Crew attempts to cross-connect MDAFW Discharge G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 9 of 46

Post Exam Data Collection Reactor Power trend data Turbine Generator Load trend data Pressurizer Pressure trend data (PT455 & PT456)

SG Levels (all SGs, both NR & WR)

Rod Positions Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate trend data (all SGs)

All console and panel strip charts or recorded digital data (may be collected at end of day for all crews.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 10 of 46

Objective of this Event is to provide a Reactivity/Power Maneuver for the RO Applicant at the controls (A TC) and to provide a Technical Specification interpretation opportunity for the SRO Applicant. If scenario runs with a SRO Surrogate, waiting for the Crew to recognize the P-70 failure and make the us RO I Ro With the SG bypass level control valves in AUTO, reactor power should be increased slowly to avoid feed control instabilities.

INCREASE reactor power to between 15% and 19% by one of the following while continuing with this procedure:

WITHDRAW control rods at a rate not greater than approximately 2 steps/minute DILUTE RCS boron concentration at a rate not greater than approximately I O to I 5 Dcm/minute If reactor power is allowed to decrease below 9.2%

subsequent to blocking the intermediate and power range reactor trips, the trips will be reinstated.

WHEN reactor power increases above approximately I 1 %,

PERFORM the following:

CHECK the following permissive annunciators:

MB4D 4-3, REACTOR AT POWER P-I 0, lit MB4D 5-3, RX OR TURB NOT AT POWER P-7 not lit Recognize that P-IO is NOT lit and report this to the US CAUTION preceding OP 3203, Step 4.3.1 0 OP 3203, Step 4.3.1 0 CAUTION preceding OP 3203, Step 4.3.1 1 OP 3203, Step 4.3.1 1 OP 3203, Step 4.3.1 I

.a G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 11 of46

us Refers to Technical SDecification 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumention channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE Reactor Trip System Interlocks:

b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 (P-I 0 Input or P-I 3 Input). (Mode I)

P-IO. (Modes 1 & 2)

e. Power Range Neutron Flux, With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within I hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

Crew recognizes that Action 8 requires entry into TS 3.0.3 or Power Reduction to below 10%.

TS 3.3.1 TS Table 3.3-1, Line 17.

Both refer to Action 8.

Action 8 of TS Table 3.3-1.

Crew initiates Power Reduction or calls for assistance.

I Initiate Event 2 at Chief Examiner's Discretion.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 12 of 46

Identifies SG By LT529 Failed Low and takes 3FWS-FK520 to MANUAL (BvDass Valve)

Restores SG B Level to

-50%

First alarms:

MB5B 3-3 MB5B4-3 US goes to Attachment N.

Expect rise in SG B Level Will have to take Flow Control Valve Bypass to Manual.

BOP BOP us BOP BOP 30 Determine The Initiating Parameter And Place The Affected Controller In MANUAL Stabilize The Plant Parameters It is desired that I&C personnel trip the bistables specified in this procedure. If, during off-hours, I&C personnel are not able to trip the necessary bistables within the time limitations required by the Technical Specifications, Operations Department personnel may trip the bistables using the guidance provided within this procedure.

Perform Corrective Actions Using Appropriate

Attachment:

Attachment N - Narrow Range SG Level Channel Failure The following annunciators are symptoms of a failed NR SG level instrument:

SG B LEVEL DEVIATION MBSB 4-3 SG B LEVEL HI-HI MB5B 1-3 STM GEN B LEVEL HI-HI MB2D 1,2,3,4-10 If the failed NR level channel is selected as the input to SG level control, Perform the following:

Verify the affected SG feed regulating valve controller is in MANUAL.

Restore SG level to normal.

Defeat the failed channel input by selecting the alternate channel on the level selector.

3571, I.

3571,2.

NOTE preceding AOP 3571, Step 3.

3571,3 3571, Att N, Note preceding Step 1 3571, Att N, I 3571, Att N, 1.a 3571, Att N, 1.b 3571, Att N, I

.c G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 13 of 46

Proc Step When SG level is restored to normal and feedkteam flow are matched, Place the affected steam generator feed regulating valve controller in AUTO.

When conditions have stabilized, Observe MB annunciators and parameters. Immediately report any unexpected or unexplained conditions to the Shift Manager.

3571, Att N, 1.d BOP Returns 3FWS-FK520 to Automatic 3571, Att N, 1.e BOP Trip the associated Reactor Protection System bistable(s):

Good no SF positi

>lace to initiate next event if 1 Applicant in the SRO In.

3571, Att N, 2 Place a check mark in the box above the appropriate channel that requires tripping on the last Daaes of this Attachment.

3571, Att N, 2.a us Refer to Technical Specification 3.3.1,3.3.2, 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6.

3571, Att N,

2. b us Check the existing bistable status to ensure a reactor trip will not occur when the failed channel is tripped.

Request the I&C Department trip the appropriate bistables using Attachment N and Attachment S.

3571, Att N, 2.c RO 3571, Att N, 2.d us 3571, Att N, 2.e Verify the appropriate bistable status lights are lit.

If any two of the NR level channels which serve as inputs to AMSAC are failed (LT-551, LT-552, LT-538, or LT-547),

Perform the following:

1) Using OP 3350, AlWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitrv. Place AMSAC in RO Failed Transmitter is none of these.

n/a 3571, Att N, 3 3:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 14 of 46

n/a

2) Refer to 3TRM-7.2, AMSAC.

If either indicator 3FWS*LI 529A or 3FWS*LI 548A is failed, Refer to TRM Table 7.4.1, Fire Related G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc 3571, Att N, 4 Page 15 of 46

CV05 P

1TE: Two Alarm Response procedures apply. MB3A 4 6 Should be Priorit!

I CHECK 3CHS-PI 131, letdown I Ro RO Monitors 3RCS*TI 125 for lowering temperature.

RO Completed above by 4-5, Step 4 pressure (MB3), to confirm alarm.

PLACE 3CHS*PKl31, letdown pressure controller (MB3), in "MANUAL."

MA1 NTAl N letdown pressure 300 to 350 prig.

IF "LETDOWN RELIEF W TEMP HI" (MBA 4-6) is lit, CHECK 3RCS*TI 125, letdown relief valve temperature (MB3),

to check 3CHS*RV8117, letdown relief valve, seated.

IF directed by SM/US, PERFORM the following:

5.1 ADJUST 3CHS*Vl4, how pressure con troller bypass, and MAINTAIN letdown pressure 300 to 354 psig.

5.2 CLOSE 3CHS*VI2, low pressure controller inlet isolation.

IF directed by SM/US, Refer To OP 3304A, "Charging and Letdown," and REMOVE charging and letdown from service.

CHECK 3RCS*TI 125, letdown relief valve temperature (MB3),

to confirm alarm.

3CHS*RV8117, letdown relief valve, lifts at 600 psig.

CHECK 3CHS*PI 131, letdown pressure (MB3), 300 to 350 prig.

Completed above bv 4-5, SteD 3

Response

4-5, Step 1 4-5, Step 2 4-5, Step 3 4-5, Step 4 4-5, Step 5 4-5, Step 6 4-6, Step 1 NOTE preceding 4-6, Step 2 4-6, Step 2 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 16 of 46

L Completed above by 4-5, Step 2 Monitors 3RCS*TI 125 for lowering temperature.

RO 3CHS*PK131, letdown pressure controller, in "MANUAL," and MAINTAIN letdown pressure 300 4-6, Step 3 4-6, Step 4 NOTE: 3CHS-PK131 may be confusing. Operator should press the lower button to raise demand.

This Opens the valve and causes Pressure to rise.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 17 of 46

Boot1 Rep0 deem Alarm responses all send Crew to AOP 3564.

US may dispatch a PEO to the Inverter.

Important CAUTION RO BOP RO BOP IF power supply failure results in loss of 1 protective system channel, Go To AOP 3564, Loss of One Protective System C h a n ne1.

SEND Operator to 3VBA*INV-1, number 1 inverter panel, to determine cause of alarm.

IF 3VBA*INV-l, number I inverter panel, is deenergized, Go To AOP 3564, Loss of One Protective System Channel.

Loss of VlAC 1 or 2 deenergizes the associated EDG sequencer. If an ESF actuation takes place, the following will NOT occur automatically on the associated train:. EDG start (except on LOP)

. Emergency bus load stripping Load seauencina Check Control System Operation Verify rod control - OPERATING Verify SG level - OPERATING Verify PZR level - OPERATING Verify PZR pressure - OPERATING NORMALLY IN AUTO NORMALLY IN AUTO NORMALLY IN AUTO NORMALLY IN AUTO Perform the following:

a. Place the affected controller(s) in

b. Stabilize tiant Darameters.

MANUAL.

Verify Cold Overpressure Protection Svstem - BLOCKED Block the affected Train of Cold Overtxessure Protection Svstem.

3353. MB 4 c 1-1, Step 1 3353. MB Ster, 1 8A 1-5, 3353. M B Step 2 8A 1-5, CAUTIO N

preced i n g 3564, Step I 3564, I 3564,l RNO 3564,2 3564,2 RNO G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 18 of 46

Defeat The Failed Channel Input Check VlAC I

- DEENERGIZED 3564,3

3564, 3.a Using Table, Align switches to the required 3664, position

3. b Name Switch ID Position LOOP TEMP CUTOUT-AT (MB4)

PZR LEVEL SEL CNTL (MB4)

PZR PRES SEL CNTL (MB4) 3RCS-TS/411 F LOOP TEMP CUTOUT-Tavg (MB4) 3RCS-TS/412T 3RCS-LS459D 3RCS-PS455F LOOP A (pull out)

LOOP A (pull out)

CHAN 3-4 CHAN 3-2 STM FLOW SEL (MB5)

FW FLOW SEL (MB5)

LVL SEL (MB5) 3MSS-FS512C, 522C, 532C, 542C CHAN 2 3FWS-FS51OC, 520C, 530C, 540C CHAN 2 3FWS-LS519C, 529C, 539C, 549C CHAN 2 IST STG STM PRES CH SEL (MB7) 3MSS-PS505Z CHAN 2 RO RO BOP RO RO Proceed to steD 3.k.

Select an unaffected channel for the following recorders:

PZR level recorder (Select switch PZR pressure recorder (Select switch OP/OT AT recorder (Select switch 3RCS-LS459E) 3RCS-PS455G) 3RCS-IS411 E)

Return affected controllers to AUTO, when desired.

Verify Normal Letdown - IN SERVICE Using GA-13, Establish normal letdown.

Verify VCT Level (Using Computer Point NORMALLY CHS-L112) - CONTROLLING 3564. 3.c 3564, 3.k 3564, 3.1 3564,4 3564,4 RNO 3564,5 G:\\DRS\\OsbUBalian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 19 of 46

initiate Even Using GA-9, Perform the following:

a. Align for manual makeup.

b. Maintain VCT level between 40% and 3564,5 RNO 60%.

Restore Vital Instrument Bus Power I

Locally Establish Power To Affected Protective System Channel Refer To The Following Technical Specifications/TRM For Applicable Actions:

If in Mode 2 and LESS THAN 10-10 IR amps, 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation:

o Action 4 (FU 6.a) o Action 8 (FU 17.a) 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation:

o Action 8 (FU 17.b)

Instrumentation:

o Action 16 (FU 7.d) o Action 17 (FU 2.c & 3.b.3) o Action 18 (FU 7.e) o Action 20 (FU 8.a & 8.br

• entry into T/S 3.0.3 require(

If in Mode 5 or 6, o 3.3.2, ESF Actuation System If in Modes 4,5 or 6, o 3.4.9.3, Overpressure Protection 3.8.3.1 and 3.8.3.2, Onsite Power Distribution 3.3.2, ESF Actuation System Instrumentation: Action 26 (FU 3.c)

Systems bief Examiners Discretion G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 20 of 46

. I.\\-

Exam First alarm during pre-validation was MB4B 4-6B Power is below P-8 us us us N/a us RO CHECK RCS-L477A, RCP C upper oil reservoir level computer point, to confirm alarm.

MONITOR the following RCP C computer points:

RCS-T48lA, RCP C upper thrust bearing temperature RCS-T481B, RCP C lower thrust bearing temperature RCS-T485A, RCP C upper radial bearing temperature IF at any time any RCP C thrust bearing or radial bearing temperature computer point is greater than 195"F, PERFORM the following:

IF reactor power is greater than P-8 (37%), PERFORM the following:

3.1.I TRIP reactor.

3.1.2 STOP RCP C.

3.1.3 Go To E-0, "Reactor TriD or Safetv Iniection."

Refer To AOP 3554, "RCP Trip or Stopping an RCP at Power," and REMOVE RCP C from service.

Check RCP Status -ALL PUMPS RUNNING 3353.MB4BY 4-6B, Step 1 3353.MB4B, 4-6B, Step 2 3353.M B4B, 4-6B, Step 3 3353.MB4B, Step 3.1 3353.MB4BY Step 3.2 AOP 3554, Step I G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 21 of 46

RO RO N/a BOP RO RO RO RO RO RO Check Reactor Power Verify THREE LOOP annunciator (MB4D 3-3) - LIT PERMISSIVE P-8 Ifstopping the RCP due to No. I seal failure, steps 3.

through 5. should be completed as quickly as possible in order to isolate the affected pump No.1 seal within the recommended 5 minutes.

Feed Affected Loop SG NR Level To Between 65% And 70%

Defeat Affected Loops Tern Deratu re In Dut

~~~

Place loop temperature cutout switch for AT to the affected loop and Pull out Place loop temperature cutout switch for Tavg to the affected loop and Pull out Place OT/OP AT recorder select switch to an unaffected loot3 Remove Affected RCP From Service Check RCP status - ALL PUMPS RUNNING Proc Step AOP 3554, Step 2 AOP 3554, Step 2.a NOTE preceding AOP 3554, Step 3 AOP 3554, Step 3 AOP 3554, SteD 4 AOP 3554, Step 4.a AOP 3554, Step 4.b AOP 3554, Step 4.c AOP 3554, Step 5 AOP 3554, Step 5.a G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 22 of 46

RO RO RO RO us us BOP BOP BOP BOP Check the following conditions:

. Affected SG NR level -

GREATER THAN 65%T

. THREELOOP PERMISSIVE P-8 annunciator (MB4D 3-3) -

LIT STOP affected RCP Check RCP 1 and 2 - BOTH RUNNING Check If RCP Seal Leakoff Should Be Isolated Verify RCP - STOPPED AS A RESULT OF SEAL FAILURE REQUIRING IMMEDIATE SHUTDOWN Proceed to step 7.

Shift Affected SG To Main Feed Bypass Flow Close affected SG feed regulating valve CLOSE affected SG FW control isolation valve 3FWS-MOV35C Using the SG feed regulating bypass valve, Maintain the affected SG level between 45% and 55%

Proc Step AOP 3554, Step 5.b AOP 3554, Ster, 5.c AOP 3554, Ster, 5.d AOP 3554, Ster, 6 AOP 3554, Step 6.a AOP 3554, Step 6.a, RNO AOP 3554, SteD 7 AOP 3554, SteD 7.a AOP 3554, Step 7.b AOP 3554, Step 7.c G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 23 of 46

Using AOP 3571, Instrument Failure Response, Attachment A, step 6, Trip the associated temperature Proc Step AOP 3554, Step 8 AOP 3554, Step 8.a AOP 3554, Step 8.b AOP 3554, Step 8.c AOP 3554, Step 8.c, RNO G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 24 of 46

IF alarm is not expected, Refer To OP 3316A and OPEN affected main steam isolation valves:

MONITOR main steam isolation valve status for spurious operation.

3353.M B5C 2-7, Step 1 3353.MB5C 2-7, Step 1 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 25 of 46

FW Line Break (8E6 Ibm/hour) should cause:

. Feed header pressure decrease

. Feedwater Flowrate increase

. Steam Generator level decrease

. Containment Temperature, Pressure, Dewpoint increase

. Containment Sump Level increase

. Automatic Trip on LO-LO S/G Water Level This event may create Red or Orange paths on the PTS or Containment CSFs. If so, the crew will transition to the appropriate Functional Recovery Procedures:

FR-P.l Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition FR-P.2 Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition FR-Z.l Response to High :ontainmenl RO sressure Foldout page must be open ADVERSE CTMT defined as GREATER THAN 180°F or GREATER THAN I O5 R/hr in containment.

The reactor can be interpreted as "tripped" when any two of the three bullet substeps of step I are satisfied.

Verify Reactor Trip Check reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN Check rod bottom lights -

LIT Check neutron flux -

DECREASING E-0, Step I, NOTE E-0, Step 1 G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 26 of 46

I BOP I

1 BOP 1 BOP BOP I CREW I

Verify Turbine Trip Check all turbine stop valves -

CLOSED Verify Power to AC Emergency Busses Check busses 34C and 34D -

BOTH ENERGIZED Check If SI Is Actuated Verify SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION annunciator -

(MB4D 1-6 or MB2B 5-9) - LIT Check if SI is required:

CTMT pressure GREATER THAN 18 psia OR.

PZR pressure LESS THAN 1890 psia OR PZR level LESS THAN 9%

OR.

RCS subcooling LESS THAN 32-F OR SG pressure LESS THAN 660 psig IF SI is required, THEN Initiate SI and Proceed to step 4.c.

IF SI is NOT required, THEN Initiate monitoring of CSF Status Trees and Go to ES-0.1. Reactor TriD ResDonse.

E-0, Step 2 E-0, Step 2.a E-0, Step 3 E-0, Step 3.a E-0, Step 4 E-0, Step 4.a E-0, Step 4.a RNO Column G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 27 of 46

RO RO RO RO BOP BOP BOP Check Reactor trip and bvciass breakers - OPEN Verify Service Water Pumps TRAIN RUNNING

-AT LEAST ONE PER Verify Two RPCCW Pumps -

ONE PER TRAIN RUNNING Verify ECCS Pumps Running CheckSI pumps-Check RHR pumps -

Check two charging pumps RUNNING RUNNING

- RUNNING Verify AFW Pumps Running Check MD pumps -

RUNNING Check turbine - driven pump

- RUNNING, IF NECESSARY E-0, Step 4.c E-0, Step 5 E-0, Step 6

~

E-0, Step 7 E-0, Step 8 E-0, Step 8.a E-0, Step 8.b G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 28 of 46

BOP RO RO BOP RO Verify FW Isolation Check SG feed regulating valves - CLOSED Check SG feed regulating bypass valves - CLOSED Check FW isolation trip valves - CLOSED Check TDFW pumps -

TRIPPED Check MD FW pump -

STOPPED CheckSG blowdown isolation valves - CLOSED Check SG blowdown sample isolation valves -

CLOSED Check SG chemical feed isolation valves - CLOSED Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated Verify Ctmt pressure GREATER THAN 18 psia Any SG pressure LESS THAN 660 psig E-0, Step 9 E-0, Step 10 E-0, Step 10.a G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 29 of 46

I Required during pre-validation.

RO I Ro Verify MSlVs and MSlV bypass valves - CLOSED Initiate MSI. IF MSI will NOT actuate, THEN CLOSE the MSlVs and MSlV bypass valves.

Check ESF Group 3 lights -

LIT.

Check if CDA Required Verify Ctmt pressure -

GREATER THAN 23 psia Ctmt spray - INITIATED Verify quench spray initiated Check quench spray pumps - RUNNING Check quench spray pump discharge valves (3QSS*MOV34A and 3QSS*MOV34B) - OPEN Check RPCCW pumps -

STOPPED Check CAR fans - STOPPED Check CRDM fans -

STOPPED STOP all RCPs E-0, Step 1O.b E-0, Step 10.b RNO Column E-0, Step 1O.c E-0, Step I I E-0, Step 11.a E-0, Step 11.b E-0, Step I 1.c E-0, Step 1 I

.d E-0, Step 11.e E-0, Step 1l.f G:U)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 30 of 46

Time Proc Step STOP all main circulating water pumps BOP E-0, Step 11.g Verify ESF Group 4 lights -

LIT RO E-0, Step I 1.h us Proceed to step 13.

E-0, Step 1 I

.i RO Verify CIA E-0, Step 13 us RO Check ESF Group 2 status columns 2 through 10 - LIT EOP 35 E-0, Step 13.a Verify Proper ESF Status Panel Indication Verify ESF Group I lights

- OFF RO E-0, Step 14 Verify ESF Group 2 lights

- LIT Determine If ADVERSE CTMT Conditions Exist Ctmt temperature GREATER THAN 180°F RO E-0, Step 15 Ctmt radiation GREATER THAN 105R/hr RO Verifv ECCS Flow

~~

E-0. SteD 16 Check charging pumps -

FLOW INDICATED E-0,

Step 16.a G:U>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 3 1 of 46

RO Control feed flow to maintain NR level - BETWEEN 8% and 50% (42% and 50%

ADVERSE CTMT)

Check RCS pressure -

GREATER THAN 1650 psia E-0, (1 950 psia ADVERSE Step 16.b E-O, Step 17.b CTMT)

E-0, Verify AFW Valve Alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT I

us E-0, Step 18 1

Proceed to Step 16.e Verify ECCS Valve Alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT Step 16.b, 1 RNO E-0, Step 19 Check SI pumps - FLOW E-0, RO I N D I CATED Step 16.e RO LESS THAN 300 psia (500 E-0, Step 16.f Check RCS pressure -

psia ADVERSE CTMT)

Check RHR pumps - FLOW I N D I C ATE D.

E-0, Step 16.g.

RO BOP Verify Adequate Heat Sink E-0, Step 17 BOP Check NR level in at least one SG - GREATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE CTMT)

E-0, Step 17.a BOP I Proceed to step 18.

I E-0, Step 17.c I

I us BOP RO G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 32 of 46

When requested, report all SLCRS doors are closed Close and Dog (as applicable) Control Building pressure boundary doors.

CBI Should be lit as crew manually actuated SI E-0, Step 20.g us I Check Plant Status I E-0, Step 20 I Verify SLCRS doors -

SM/

Security E-0, Step 20.a Crew Check CONTROL BUILDING ISOLATION annunciator (MB4D 3-6) - LIT RO Verify ESF Group 2 CBI lights

- LIT BOP Verify Control Building purge supply fan and purge exhaust E-0, Step 20.d fan - NOT RUNNING E-0, Step 20.e Verify Control building air bank isolation valves - OPEN BOP 1

BOP I STOP kitchen exhaust fan 1 E-0, Step 20.f SMI PEO RO Check RCS Temperature I E-0, Step 21 RO RO Alternate paths through Step 21 - all lead to Step 22.

Check PZR Valves I E-0, Step22 Verify PORV~ - CLOSED I E-0, Step 22.a E-0, Step 22.b Verify normal PZR spray valves - CLOSED G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 33 of 46

I

/

I Ro us RO I

I I Ro I

I I us BOP/

RO BOP/

RO Verify PZR safety valves -

CLOSED To prevent damage to the RCP seal@), seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped Verify RCPs - ANY RUNNING Verify RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1500 psia (I 800 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

Verify charging or SI pumps -

AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Stop all RCPs Check If SG Secondary Boundaries Are Intact Check pressure in all SGs NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED E-0, Step 22.c E-0, Step 23, CAUTION E-0, Step 23 E-0, Step 23.a

~~

~

~~

E-0, Step 23.b E-0, Step 23.c E-0, Step 23.d E-0, Step 24 E-0, Step 24.a G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 34 of 46

us RO BOP BOP Initiate monitoring of CSF Status Trees and Go to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Any faulted SG or secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown or sampling is required.

If RWST level decreases to LESS THAN 520,000 gal, Go to ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, to align the ECCS system.

E-0, Step 24.a RNO Column CAUTION preceding E-2, Step 1 Check Main Steam Isolation And Bypass Valves -

E-2, Step 1 CLOSE valves. IF flow path(s) can NOT be isolated, THEN Using Attachment A for guidance, Locally Close valve(s)

E-2, Step 1 RNO Column Check At Least One SG Secondary Boundary Is Intact E-2, Step 2 Check pressures in all SGs -

AT LEAST ONE STABLE OR I NCREAS I N G E-2, Step 2.a G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 35 of 46

FW18B.

--l-Kz Rupture dol 3 Stuck OF

> Initiate

ailure Position Crew Crew Identify Faulted SGs Check pressure in all SGs -

ANY SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED.

If the TD AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, a steam supply to tie TD AFW pump must be maintained from at least one SG.

Proc Step E-2, Step 3 E-2, Step 3.a CAUTION preceding E-2, Step 4 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 36 of 46

Verify main feed line -

TRiP TD FW pumps Place MD FW pump in Isolate AFW flow path CLOSE steam supply ISOLATED PULL-TO-LOCK isolation valve to TD AFW Pump dump and bypass valves -

CLOSED isolation valve - CLOSED sample isolation valve -

CLOSED Verify SG chemical feed isolation valve - CLOSED Using table, Verify main steam dine drains upstream of MSlVs and TD A F W pump - CLOSED Verify SG atmospheric Verify SG blowdown Verify SG blowdown o 3DTM*AOV29B, C, D o 3DTM*A4V61 B, C, D o 3DTM*AOV63B, D o 3DTM*AOV64B, D E-2, Step 4 Duestion to SRO Applicant: What Emergency Action Level should be declared for this scenario?

4nswer: Not an EAL or Judgement.

G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc

..~

Page 37 of 46

SECTION 3 SIMULATOR EXAM SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 3 Revision: 0 TIME *QA INSTRUCTOR AIDS DESCRIPTION MALF, RF, IO T=O Nl-I 1 MB4G 01-04 MB4G 02-04 MB4G 03-04 MB4G 04-04 P-I 0 Fails to Actuate P-I 0 Bistable fails to actuate P-I 0 Bistable fails to actuate P-I 0 Bistable fails to actuate P-I 0 Bistable fails to actuate MSl2B MSlV (CTV27-B) Stuck Open MSl2C MSl2D MSlV (CTV27-D) Stuck Open MSlV (CTV27-C) Stuck Open Remove when BOP attempts to close RP07A RP07B SI Auto Actuation Failure Train A SI Auto Actuation Failure Train B FW21 B 3FWA*V18 (3FWA*Pl B Disch Valve) Closed.

Booth Operator or Examiner Initiated

1. RX12F Sev = 0%

5 Min Ramp SG B Lvl Xmtr fails to 0 over 5 mins.

2. CV05 Sev=O%

Letdown Press. Xmttr, PT131 fails to 0

3. ED08A Loss of Instrument Buss VBI

4. RCl2C Sev=100%

3RCS-PI C Upper Reservoir Oil Leak

5. MSOGA Main Steam Isolation Valve A Trip

6. FWIOD Sev = 100% 5 Min Ramp Feedwater Line Rupture Inside Containment

7. FWl8B 3FWA*Pl B Trips - if Crew attempts cross-connect MDAFW Disch Hdr.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 38 of 46

Summarv of Simulator Booth Operator Cues or Actions I.

Trip PT505 Bistables if Examiners allow Event 2 to run long enough.

2. Report to US that Inverter 1 is deenergized when dispatched as a PEO

3. Insert malfunction RCI2C when Crew begins returning controllers to AUTO following loss of VIAC-I

4. If Crew gets a FWlV when securing 3RCS-P1C, immediately initiate Event 6, wait 2 minutes and initiate Event 7.

5. Remove MSO6A to permit reopening of A MSlV should the crew elect to do that

6. Initiate Event 7 if the Crew elects to trip the plant in response to inadvertent MSlV closure.

7.. Trip 3FWA*Pl B if crew attempts to cross-connect MDAFW Pump Discharge Headers.

8. Pull MSlV control power fuses 5 minutes after requested.

9. Report that the Control Building Pressure Boundary doors are closed and dogged when requested.

I O. Locally close MSIVs: first valve closed I O minutes after requested. Remaining two valves in 10 minute intervals.

G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 39 of 46

SECTION 4 VALIDATION CHECKLIST

Title:

ID Number: NRC Scenario 3 NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 Remote functions:

All remote functions contained in the guide are certified.

Malfunctions:

All malfunctions contained in the guide are certified.

Initial Conditions:

The initial condition(s) contained in the guide are certified or have been developed from certified IC's in accordance with NSEM-4.02.

Simulator Operating Limits:

The simulator guide has been evaluated for operating limits and/or anomalous response.

Test Run:

The scenario contained in the guide has been test run and validated (validation sheet completed, next page)on the simulator. Simulator response is reasonable and as expected.

Examination Scenario Review The dynamic examination review checklist is complete.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Revision: 0 Verified by Page 40 of 46

SECTION 5 REFERENCES AND CRITICAL TASK TRACKING

Title:

ID Number: NRC Scenario I Revision:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I

1.

References:

TS* MP3 OP 3272 OP 3203 OP 3353 AOP 3562 AOP 3571 AOP 3554 EOP*35 E-0 EOP*35 E-2 EPIP*EPIP 4400 NUREG 1021 Technical Specifications EOP User's Guide Plant Startup Main Board Annunciator Response Procedures Loss of Instrument Air Instrument Failure Response RCP Trip or Stopping a RCP At Power Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Faulted Steam Generator Isolation Event Assessment, Classification and Reportability Examiners Standards G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 41 of 46

II.

Critical Tasks Covered in this Test:

The following Critical Tasks are covered in this exercise:

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 42 of 46

E-0 -- D CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTION

[Manually actuate]' at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards before any of the following:

0 Transition to any E-1 series, E-2 series, or E-3 series procedure or transition to any FRG Completion of [step 5.a Of ES-0.1]*

006-030 A2.01 4.5 1418 006-030 A4.01 4.4 14.4 01 3-000 AI.01 4.0 14.2 01 3-000 AI.02 3.9 14.2 01 3-000 AI.05 3.4 13.6 01 3-000 A3.02 4.1 14.2 0 1 3-000 SGA.14 4.2 I 4.2 Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity."

In this case, SI can be manually actuated from the control room.

Therefore, failure to manually actuate SI also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to:

0 Take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety 0 Effectively directlmanipulate ESF controls 0 Recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component" Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate SI (when it is possible to do so) results in a "significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." Finally, failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions is a "violation of the facility license condition."

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 43 of 46

CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTION

[Isolate the faulted SG]*

[before transition out of E-2I3 000-040 EA1.01 4.6 14.6 EA1.02 4.5 14.5 EA1.04 4.3 I 4.3 EA1.06 4.0 14.1 EA1.I 0

4.1 14.1 EA1.I I 3.2 13.1 EA1.13 4.2 14.2 EA2.04 4.5 14.7 BASIS FOR SELECTION Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the following CSFs:

0 Integrity 0

Subcriticality 0

Containment (if the break is inside containment)

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 44 of 46

ID Number: NRC Scenario I Revision: 0 Note:

The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes 1

0 90 2

Yes COMMENTS:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Total malfunctions inserted: 4-8/10-I4 (3FWS-LT529,3CHS-PT131, WAC-I,3RCS-P1 Cy 3MSS*CTV27A)

Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: I

-4/3-6 (Auto SI, MSlVs Open, 2FWA*P1 B)

Abnormal Events: 1 -2/2-3 (3FWS-LT529, WAC-I,3RCS-P1 C)

Major Transients: I

-2/2-3 (Faulted SG)

EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: 1 -3/3-5 (E-2)

EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-3/1-3 Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes)

EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/5-8 (E-O-D, E-2-A)

Technical Specifications are exercised during the test G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 45 of 46

Reactor Power:

Operating History:

RCS Boron:

Core Burnup:

Condensate Demins:

lnta ke structure:

PRA Status:

Protected train:

Evolutions in Progress:

Major Equipment 00s:

Crew Instructions:

SECTION 6 SCENARIO INITIAL CONDITIONS 9%

2 days on line 1453 ppm 0 MWD/MTU 5

Green Green B Train protected Millstone Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage 3AFWPlA Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump, 3FWA*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance. 3FWA*PIA was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago and expected return to operability is 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> from now. Limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2, action a. has been entered.

You are to continue the Plant Startup per OP 3203, Step 4.3.10. All preceding steps have been completed satisfactorily. Reactor Engineers reactivity plan directs you to use control rods to raise power.

L PI ant/Si mu I ator Differences:

If not using the speed dial option, dial 3333 or 3334 to reach the desired person( s).

The following PPC programs do not function on the simulator:

0 0

11 Samarium Follow Xenon Follow Sequence of Events 11 11 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 3\\Scenario 3.doc Page 46 of 46

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE APPROVAL SHEET I.

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 II.

111.

Initiated:

Nuclear Requlatory Commission Developer Reviewed:

Revision: 0 14June2004 Date Reviewer Date IV.

Approved:

Operations Manager Date Operator Training Supervisor G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Date Page 1 of 33

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONS LISTED IN ORDER I. Exam Overview

2.

instructor Guide

3.

Sequence of Events Summary

4.

Validation Checklist

5.

Reference and Critical Task Tracking Form

6.

Scenario initial Conditions Sheet G:V)RS\\OsbUBalian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Ulillstone Scenario $.doc Page 2 of 33

Title:

SECTION I EXAM OVERVIEW NRC Initial License Exam ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 Revision: 0

1.

Exam Brief:

The Crew takes the shift at 100% power with no significant evolutions in progress. The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (3FWA

• P2) is out of service for governor maintenance. The pump has been out of service for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and the maintenance is expected to take another 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />.

Event number 1 occurs as Pressurizer Level Channel (3RCS-LT459) fails high.

This will cause charging flow to reduce to minimum flow, and the Reactor Operator will have to control charging in manual to maintain programmed pressurizer level. The crew will enter AOP3571 to respond to the instrument failure. Technical Specification actions will need to be addressed, and the appropriate RPS bi-stables must be placed in the tripped condition.

Event number 2 is a failure of the Letdown Temperature Instrument low, such that cooling flow to the letdown heat exchanger lowers. Manual control of the Letdown Heat Exchanger flow controller will be required.

Event number 3 is a Loss of the 34C 4160VAC bus. A fault on the bus causes the annunciator "Bus 34C Bus Diff" on Main Board 8A to annunciate. Several other associated alarms come in as a result of the bus loss. Charging is lost since the running charging pump loses power. The crew takes actions in accordance with the Alarm Response Procedure OP-3353.MB8A. Charging if restored per EOP3506. Loss of 34C also causes a loss of SW and RPCCW.

These systems are realigned per AOPs 3560 (Loss of Service Water) and 3561 (Loss of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water).

Event number 4 is a Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum that begins slowly and progressively worsens until a Manual Reactor and Turbine Trip is required. The crew initially enters AOP 3559 to commence a rapid load reduction in accordance with AOP 3575. As load is lowered approximately 10% and with the concurrence of the lead examiner, the condenser vacuum loss worsens significantly such that a trip is required. Upon the Manual Reactor Trip, the Main Turbine fails to trip in all modes, causing Main Steam Line Isolation either Automatically or with operator intervention.

The crew proceeds with E-0, and may either stay in E-0 or transition to ES-0.1 depending on how fast the Main Steam Line Isolation is initiated and if a Safety Injection is warranted. At a predetermined point in the EOP network the 3 FWA

• G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 3 of 33

P I B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trips due to an electrical fault on the motor. The crew transitions to FR-H.1 Loss of All Feedwater. Attempts to restore Auxiliary Feedwater are not successful, and the Main Feedwater System is not available due to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum. The crew should transition to Bleed and Feed core cooling as required in FR-H.1. Once Bleed and Feed is established, FR-H.l directs the crew to establish a secondary heat sink by whatever means are available. The crew should recognize that feeding SGs from the Condensate system is their only available success path and return to FR-H.1, Step 7. The scenario is terminated once flow is established to a SG from the Condensate system.

2.

Plant/Simulator differences that may affect the scenario are: None.

3.

Duration of Session:

1.25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Page 4 of 33

SECTION 2 INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 Revision:

All Control Room Conduct, Operations and Communications shall be in accordance COP 200.1,Conduct of Operations, and OP 3260,Unit 3 Conduct of Operations.

"Review the Simulator Operating Limits (design limits of plant) and the Simulator Modeling Limitations and Anomalous Response List prior to performing this training scenario on the simulator. The instructor should be aware if any of these limitations may be exceeded." (NSEM 6.02)

G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 5 of 33

SIMULATOR PROBLEMS DURING EXAMS It is the responsibility of the Instructors in the simulator to insure that exam interruptions have a minimum negative impact on the Crew and the examinations we provide.

Be aware that at all times the Operators should treat the simulator as if it were the plant and you too should treat it as much like the plant as possible when they are in the simulator.

As soon as the Instructors are aware of a simulator problem that will adversely affect the exam in progress (computer fault, etc.) the Instructor should:

1.

Place the simulator in FREEZE if possible.

2.

Announce to the Crew that there is a simulator problem.

3.

Request that the Crew leave the simulator control room. (The Crew should leave the simulator for problems which involve major switch alignments).

4.

Deal with the problem (reboot, call STSB, etc.)

5.

After the Instructors believe the simulator is restored to service, the Crew should be told how the exam will continue. If it is possible and felt to be acceptable to the evaluators, the examination can begin where it left off with an update on plant parameters and each Crewmember is prepared to restart. If the examination will not begin where it left off, the crew should be told how and where the exam will begin again.

6.

Once the Crew has been told how and where the exam will begin, have the crew conduct a brief so that the Instructor and evaluators can insure that the crew has all the necessary information to continue with the scenario.

7.

Once all Crew members, Instructors and evaluators are satisfied that they have the necessary information to continue the scenario, place the simulator in RUN and announce to the Crew that you have continued the evaluation session.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4VMillstone Scenario 4.doc Page 6 of 33

EVENT #O TITLE:

INITIAL SETUP Setup Instructions:

Enter IDT as follows :

At any XTERM window, type 4dt>

When the SUN asks for an executive type: UEXEC or RTEXEC? enter <r>: this will bring up a blank idt page.

To go to a previously saved idt file type <read> at the prompt When the SUN asks for a file name of the file you wish to view type in the appropriate file name:

The old "Landon" files are as follows:

Old ISD pages 1-8 are idt file OPS Old ISD pages 9-16 are idt file OPSl Old ISD pages 17-19 are idt file OPS2 IF the step counters are at/near 000, THEN REMOVE the STEP COUNTER OVERRIDE, allow the counters to step out during the IC reset, Reset to IC-I8 REINSTATE the step counter OVERRIDE Adjust the various pot settings to the valued specified by the chart located in the sim booth for the selected IC.

Place Simulator to RUN Set the STEP COUNTERS PLACE the Main Turbine on the LOAD LIMITER Verify annunciator, "COMPUTER FAILURE" (MB4C, 1-1 I), is NOT LIT.

Place MOL Curve Book in Shelf for Operator use. Remove other Curve Books from the floor.

Clear the DCS Alarms PLACE THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT IN PTL or align as needed:

Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (3FWA *P2) - Tagged Out Equipment 00s:

0 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (3FWA *P2) 0 Synchronize the MONITOR Time Display with digital time display on MB4.

G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Page 7 of 33

Initial Malfunctions/lOsllDAs:

T=O FW19 TC03 TC04 TCOGA TCOGB TCOGC TCOGD TC07A Severity = 40%

TC07B Severity = 40%

TC07C Severity = 40%

TC07D Severity = 40%

Turbine Driven AFW Pump Tripped Turbine Fails to Trip Main Turbine Fails to Runback Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

Main Turbine Control Valve Failure Main Turbine Control Valve Failure Main Turbine Control Valve Failure Main Turbine Control Valve Failure I/OS RXIOA Severity = 100%

CV04B Severity = 100% 2 minute ramp ED04C FWOI Severity=30%

5 minute ramp FWOI Severity=lOO%

2 minute ramp FW18B LT459 Fails High Letdown TI Fails Low 34C 4160VAC Bus Fails Lowering Main Condenser Vacuum Lowering Main Condenser Vacuum 3FWA*P1 B Trips on Overcurrent Post Exam Data Collection Reactor Power trend data Turbine Generator Load trend data Pressurizer Pressure trend data (PT455 & PT456)

SG Levels (all SGs, both NR & WR)

Rod Positions Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate trend data (all SGs)

All console and panel strip charts or recorded digital data (may be collected at end of day for all crews.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Page 8 of 33

Pressurizer Level Master Controller Is The Affected Controller.

Appropriate Attachment "C" RO Crew Do not leave the rod selector switch in AUTO while diagnosing a related instrument failure unless the reason for rod movement is a turbine runback.

If a reactor trip occurs, immediately go to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safetv Iniection.

Determine The Initiating Parameter And Place The Affected Controller In MANUAL.

Stabilize The Plant Parameters.

It is desired that I&C personnel trip the bistables specified in this procedure. If, during off-hours, I&C personnel are not able to trip the necessary bistables within the time limitations required by the Technical Specifications, Operations Department personnel may trip the bistables using the guidance provided within this D roced u re.

Perform Corrective Actions Using Appropriate Attachment G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc 3571 Step 1 CAUTION 3571 Step I NOTE 3571 Step I 3571 Step2 3571 Step 3 NOTE 3571 Step3 Page 9 of 33

I RO RO RO RO RO CREW Event No.: I The following annunciators are symptoms of a PZR level instrument failure:

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI PRESSURIZER LEVEL MB4A 3-1 DEVIATION MB4A 4-1 PZR LVL LO HTR OFF AND LTDOWN SECURE MB4A 5-1 CHARG PP FLOW HVLO MB3A 4-9 VCT LEVEL HI/LO MB3A 4-1 0 a PZR LEVEL HI MB4F 1.2.3-2 Defeat the failed channel input.

Restore PZR level to normal If necessary, restore letdown per OP 3304A Place the PZR level controller into Auto Reset PZR heaters as necessarv When conditions have stabilized, observe MB board annunciators and parameters and immediately report any unexpected or unexplained conditions to the Shift Mananer.

Trip the associated Reactor Protection System bistable(s):

Proc Step 3571 Att.C step I 3571 Att.C step 2 step 3 3571 Att.D 3571 Att.C step 4 3571 AttC step 5 3571 Att.C step 6 3571 Att.C step 7 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 10 of 33

They have more than minimum number of channels TRM 7.4-1, Action a. in effect. 14 day / 30 day clocks.

Prc us RO us

~

RO Place a check mark in the box above the appropriate channel that requires tripping on the last page of this Attachment.

Refer to Technical Specification 3.3.1., 3.3.3.5,3.3.3.6 Check the existing bistable status to ensure a reactor trip will not occur when the failed channel is tripped.

3571 Att.C step 7a 3571 Att.C steD 7b 3571 Att.C step 7c Request the I&C Department trip the appropriate bistables using Attachment C and Attachment S.

3571 Att.C step 7d Verify the appropriate bistable 1 3571 Att.C I status liahts are lit.

step 7e If indicator 3RCS*LI 4596 is failed, Refer to TRM Table 7.4.1, Fire Related Safe Shutdown Components, Reactor Coolant System.

Request I&C perform corrective maintenance on failed instrument.

3571 Att.C step 7f 3571 Att.C step 7g I

nt Number 2 G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 11 of 33

This step should be ordered and will be successful in lowering letdown temperature If letdown temperature increases letdown orifice isolation valves8 1 49A.B. C to greater than 150F close the Should be N/A 3353.MB5A 5-5, Step 4 Should Be N/A Note: Crew can directly place 3 CHS*TK130 letdown heat exchanger component cooling water temperature controller in Auto per first two steps in AOP 3571, however from there no RO

~

RO RO RO RO attachment applies Check 3CHS

• TI 130, letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature 5, Step 1 to confirm alarm 3353.MB3A 5-If temperature is >134F verify that 3353.MB5A 5-3CHS

• TCV129 is in DIVERT

5. SteD 2 If directed, place 3CHS

• TK 130 letdown heat exchanger cooling water temperature controller in Manual and reduce temperature to 3353.MB5A 5-

,-, step

<115F If letdown temperature cannot be reduced to 4 3 4 F then remove 3353.MB5A 5-G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 12 of 33

34C is a 4kV ES buss that is not to be cross-connected with 34D in mode I.

RO RO RO RO us BOP

~

us RO us us BOP Refer to the following procedures and Stabilize the plant:

E-0, Reactor Trip, Safety Injection EOP 3505, Loss of SDC or RCS Inventory AOP 3506, Loss of All Charging AOP 3560, Loss of All Service Water AOP 3561, Loss of Rx Plant Component Cooling Water OP 3322, Aux Feed System If NSSA was supplying bus 34A, verify bus 34A Energized Refer To Tech Specs-3.8.1. I, 3.8.3. I Foldout page must be opened.

Verify Charging Pumps - NONE RUNNING Check If Standby Charging Pump Should Be Immediately Started Verify charging pump loss - DUE TO LOSS OF BUS 34C OR 34D Check all RCPs # I seal inlet temperatures - All LESS THAN 230°F (PPC, NSSS screen 15)

START standby charging pump Check procedure entered from - ES-0.1. REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE

~~

Go to AOP 3560, Loss of Service Water.

Check Busses 34C and 34D -

BOTH ENERGIZED Proc Step 3353.MB8A 4-12, Step I 3353.MB8A 4-12, Step 2 3353. M B8A 4-12, Step 3 NOTE preceding EOP3506.1 EOP3506, I EOP3506,2 EOP3506,Z.a EOP3506.2.b EOP3506.2.c EOP3506,Z.d

EOP3506, 2.d, RNO Column 3560, I G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 13 of 33

us I Event No.: 3 Energize affected bus from its I

emergency diesel generator. IF the bus can NOT be energized from its emergency diesel generator, THEN

a. RESET LOP from MB2.

b. Using OP 3343, "Station Electrical Service 4.1 6 Kv," Try restoring bus 34C or 34D to service.

3560,l RNO Check Status Of Service Water System

3560, 3

Check affected Train's SW pumps -

IN PULL-TO-LOCK DUE TO A Perform the following:

1) START a SW pump in the affected Train. IF one SW pump can NOT be started in the affected Train, THEN Proceed to step 2.e Check service water supply valve to TPCCW from affected train (3SWP*MOV71A or CLOSE valve.

START the second SW pump in the non-affected Train Verify service water supply valve to TPCCW from tie operating SW train (3SWP*MOV71A or 3560,2.d NON-ISOLABLE SW LEAK 3560,2.d, RNO 3560, 2.e 3560,2.e, RNO 3560, 2.f 35WP*MOV71 B) - CLOSED 3560, 2,g 3SWP*MOV71 B) - OPEN OPEN valve.

Go to AOP 3561, Loss of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water, ster, 2. and Open the Foldaut Page 3560,2.g, RNO

~

3560,2.h G:VIRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 14 of 33 I.

3.7.4 - 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock 3.8.1.1 - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> actions and 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> clock 3.8.1.2 - nla us RO RO

~

us RO OP3353.MB8A REACTOR /RCP TRIP CRITERIA If any of the following conditions occur, first trip the reactor, then trip the affected RCP:

" RCP bearing oil temperature is GREATER THAN 195"R I' RCP No. 1 seal inlet temperature can NOT be maintained LESS THAN 230°F (PPC, NSSS screen

15)

I' RPCCW System pressure can NOT be restored to BOTH containment headers.

'I RCS temperature is GREATER THAN 400°F AND VCT temperature is GREATER THAN 135 " F

'I VCT temperature is GREATER THAN 150°F Verify service water supply valves to TPCCW (3SWP*MOV71A and Verify RPCCW heat exchanger SW inlet isolation valves 3SWP*M4V50A and 3SWP*MOVSOB) - OPEN 3SWP*MOV71 B) - OPEN Determine Additional Actions Refer to the following Technical Specifications for applicability and any required actions:

T/S 3.7.4 TIS 3.8. 1.1 TIS 3.8.1.2 The Foldout page must be open.

Verify RPCCW System Alignment Check RPCCW pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Check RPCCW pumps - ONLY ONE RUNNING Proceed to step I.

h.

P roc' Step 3561 Foldout 3560,2.i 3560, 2.j 3560,3 NOTE preceding 3561,l 3561.1 3561, 1.a 3561, 1.b 3561, l.b, RNO G:V>RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 15 of 33

RO RO Check RPCCW containment supply and return header isolation valves -

OPEN Check RPCCW containment header cross-connect valves - CLOSED

. 3CCP*AOV179A 3CCP*AOVl79B 3CCP*AOV180A

. 3CCP*AOV180B Check Service Water To RPCCW Heat Exchangers Verify RPCCW heat exchanger SW inlet isolation valves (3SWP*MOVSOA and Verify service water flow to each operating RPCCW heat exchanger -

GREATER THAN 6200 gpm Proceed to Attachment B.

Verify Service Water Status Check one of the following conditions - MET No service water pump can be started on the affected train OR All service water pumps on the affected train in PULL-TO-LOCK due to a non-isolable service water leak OR Service water inlet isolation valve to the affected RPCCW heat exchanger (3SWP*MOVSOA or 3SWP*MOVSOB) closed due to a downstream service water pipe ruDture 3SWP*MOVSOB) - OPEN Cross-Connect RPCCW Containment Headers Verify the RPCCW containment supply and return header isolation valves in the non-affected train -

OPEN Proc Step 3561, I

.h 3561, 1.i 3561,2 3561,2.a 3561,2.b 3561,2.b, RNO 3561,

Attachment B, 1

3561, Attachment B, 2

3561,

Attachment B, 2.a G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Page 16 of 33

header cross-connect valves :

3CCP*AOVl79A 3CCP*AOV179B 3CCP*AOVl80A 3CCP*AOV180B I

CLOSE the RPCCW containment I 9E:c.,

3561, Attachment B,

2. b 3L)u I,

supply and return header isolation valves in the affected train I L.C;

3561, Attachment B, 3

Isolate Auxiliary Steam To Auxiliary Building CLOSE auxiliary steam isolation valves to the Auxiliary Building 3ASS *AOV 102A 3ASS*AOV102B

3561, Attachment B,

3561, Attachment B, 4

Remove Affected RPCCW Train From Service

3561, Attachment B, 4.a Check the affected RPCCW train -

TRAIN B G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Page 17 of 33

I GA-14 not reprinted here BOP

' I EventNo.:3 Perform the following:

1) Simultaneously Perform the following:

CLOSE the charging header flow control valve.

CLOSE the in-service letdown orifice isolation valve(s).

2) CLOSE the charging isolation valve (3CHS*MV8106).

3) Throttle RCP seal injection flow to maintain BETWEEN 8 and 13 gpm.

4) Using GA-14, Establish head vent letdown to the VCT IF head vent letdown to the VCT can NOT be established, THEN Using GA-14, Establish head vent letdown to the PRT

5) CLOSE Train A RPCCW heat exchanger SW inlet isolation valve (3SWP*MOVSOA).

6) Proceed to steD 4.f.

STOP the affected train RPCCW pump and Place in PULL-TO-LOCK Check the standby RPCCW pump -

ALIGNED TO THE AFFECTED TRAl N Proceed to step 4.i.

Locally Check RPCCW process radiation monitor (3CCP-RE31) -

TRAl N ALIGNED TO NON-AFFECTED Maintain Containment Pressure Using OP 331 3E, "Containment Vacuum," Maintain normal operating containment pressure - BETWEEN 13.7 Dsia and 13.9 Dsia

3561, Attachment B, 4.a, RNO

3561, Attachment B, 4.f

3561, Attachment B, 4 4

3561, Attachment B, 4.g, RNO

3561, Attachment B, 4.i

3561, Attachment B, 5

3561, 4ttachment B, 5.a

\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 18 of 33

OP3353.MB8A Check Charging Pump Cooling Alignment Verify charging pump cooling suction and discharge cross-tie valves -

OPEN. 3CCE*AOV26A

. 3CCE*AOV26B

. CCE*AOV30A 3CCE*AOV30B Verify Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Alignment Using RPCCW safety header flow indication and RHR HX RPCCW flow indication, Check RPCCW to the in-service spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger - FLOW INDICATED Verify Service Water Flow To The Operating Control Building Chiller Heat Exchanger For chiller A (HVK* CHLIA)

Check annunciator CONTROL BLDG CHLR CNDSR A SW For chiller B (HVK*CHLI B) Check annunciator CONTROL BLDG CHLR CNDSR A SW FLOW LO FLOW LO (VPIA 3-3) - NOT LIT (vP1 C 3-3) - NOT LIT

3561, Attachment B, 6

3561, Attachment B, 6.a

3561, Attachment B, 7

3561, Attachment B, 7.a

3561, Attachment B, 8

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 19 of 33

La 3.7.3 - 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock 3.7.4 - 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock 3.8.1.1 - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> actions and 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> clock 3.8.1.2 - n/a us us OP3353.MB8A Check Plant Conditions Stabilized

a. Verify MB annunciators and parameters are as expected

b. b. Refer to the following Technical Specifications for any additional required actions :

Component Cooling Water System T/S 3.7.4, Service Water System T/S 3.8.1.I, AC Sources -

Operating TIS 3.8.I

.2, AC Sources -

Shutdown Consult With Duty Officer And Determine Need To Commence A Plant Shutdown T/S 3.7.3, Reactor Plant s 34C Loads VTRM I Action el Name T

hAnAF\\A/ DI imn 3.7.1.2.a 1 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock K\\AlA*PI A 3HVK*CHLlA Cntrl Bldg Chiller 3.7.7.1.a 30 day clock (TRM) 32T 32s 32Y I

I I

3QSS*PlA I Quench SDrav Pumr, I

I 3RHS*PlA RHR Pump 3.5.2.a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock 3SIH*PIA Safety Injection Pump 3.5.2.a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock 3.7.3 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock 3CCP*P1A 3CCP*P1 c RPCCW Pumps

<SSI peeaer I

I I

3.7.4.b 30 day clock (TRM) 3SWP*P1A Service Water Pumps 3SWP*PI c 3RSS*P1A 3RSS*Pl C CTMT Recirc Pumps 3CHS*P3A 3CHS*P3C Charging Pumk-EDG A 3.5.2.a I

1 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock 3.5.2.a 3.5.:

clock

?.a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock La 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> clock IS I 3.5.:

3.8.1 -1.c I variou Proc Step

3561, Attachment B, 9

3561, Attachment B, I O I - -3 End Event 3, Initiate Event 4 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario $.doc Page 20 of 33

us Crew Commences Rapid Load Reduction Leak Is In Condenser, These Actions Will Not Be Effective BOP I

1 BOP I

1 BOP BOP 3559 Step Verify Backpressure ~ 7. 5 Absolute, If Load>360MWe, begin Rapid Downpower Per AOP 3575 Until Backpressure < 5, or Load at 360 MWe Check Circulating Water System Operation: 1 Circ Water Pump Running Per Condenser, Verify Waterbox Outlet Valves Open, Restore Circulating Pumps As Necessary Check Condenser Air Removal Alignment 3559 step 3559 SteP Check Gland Seal Pressure between 2 and 6 psig Step 4 3559 Check Condensate Surge Tank Level:

Qm=n UddC?

>18000gal. and not lowering in an unexpected I Step manner 3559 Step 6 3559 Step 7 Check Exhaust Hood Temperature Annunciators EXH Hood A,B,C Temp Hi-Not Lit Check For Condenser In-Leakage Crew recognizes vacuum problem worsening and orders a Manual Reactor Trip and a Transition to E-0, Reactor Trip and Safety Iniection G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Page 21 of 33

challenge develops to either the subcriticality Begin ES-0.1, Reactor Trip

Response

RO RO RO RO RO Verify Reactor Trip:

Check trip and bypass breakers Open, Check Rod Bottom Lights Lit, Check Neutron Flux Decreasing Verify Turbine Trip: Check all turbine stop valves Closed-Runback the Turbine to close Control Valves-Needs to close MSlVs Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses

~

Check if SI is Actuated: Checks Safety Injection Annunciator Not Lit, and the SI is not warranted: Transitions to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response Check RCS Temperature: Verify RCS cold leg WR temperature between 550F and 560F E-0 Step I E-0 Step 2 and RNO E-0 Step 3 E-0 Step 4 ES-0. I Step 1 G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 22 of 33

Note: Only 1 MDAFW Pump is running at this point and is supplying sufficient flow It should be recognized that there is no short path to restore S/G AFW flow.

BOP us BOP RO BOP RO Check FW Status: Check Reactor trip and bypass breakers Open, Verify Feedwater Isolation Completed, Verify total AFW flow to S/Gs > 530 gpm, Check S/G blowdown isolation complete Check Status of AC Buses: Verify both energized by offsite power: Will realize that Bus 34C can not be energized, Crew Meets Criteria for entry into FR-H.l, Transitions to FR-H.l Step 1 Check if secondary heat sink is required:

Verify RCS pressure > any non-faulted S/G pressure, and Verify RCS hot leg wide range >350F Check that at Least I charging pump is running Try to establish AFW flow to at least 1 S/G Stop All RCPs G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc ES-0.1 Step 2 Safety Functio n Status Trees FR-H.l Step I FR-H.l Step 2 FR-H. 1 Step 3 FR-H.1 Step 4 Page 23 of 33

I I

I Ro Check all RCPs stopped Initiate SI Verify RCS Feed Path - At least I SI or Charging Pump Running, Verify proper emergency valve alignment Establish RCS Bleed Path: Verify both Pzr PORV block valves are open, and open BOTH Pzr PORVs Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path: Check both PORVs open, and both Pzr PORV block valves Open.

Verify Steps 1-14 Of E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, - PERFORMED Maintain RCS Heat Removal Maintain SI flow Maintain PZR PORVs - BOTH OPEN CAUTION DO NOT reset CDA if the recirculation spray pumps are required and have not started in automatic.

FR-H.l Step 10 FR-H.1 Step 11 FR-H.1 Step 12 FR-H.l Step 13 FR-H.1 Step 14 FR-H.l, 15 FR-H.1, 16 FR-H.l, 17 G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Page 24 of 33

I RESET ESF Actuations If Required 0

SI CDA

. LOP CIA

. CIB CAUTION Ctmt spray actuation should be verified if the Ctmt pressure increases to GREATER THAN 23 psia.

If RWST level decreases to LESS THAN 520,000 gal, ECCS must be aligned for cold leg recirculation using ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

RHR heat exchanger inlet temperatures GREATER THAN 195" F without RPCCW flow to the heat exchangers.

To ensure adequate ECCS flow, DO NOT stop any recirculation spray pumps used for core injection flow.

DO NOT operate the RHR pumps with NOTE The recirculation spray pumps are sequenced to automatically start I 1 minutes after a CDA.

Check If Ctmt Spray Should Be Stopped Continue Attempts To Establish Secondary Heat Sink In At Least One SG Check a feedwater source AND path to at least one SG - ESTABLISHED FR-H.1, 17 FR-H.1, 18 FR-H.l, 18 FR-H.1, 18 FR-H.1, 19

~~~

FR-H. I, 19.c G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Page 25 of 33

I I

I I

End Scenario when Crew TERM Return to any desired step to restore feed flow:. Auxiliary feed (step 3.)

. Main feed (step 5.)

. Condensate (steps 5. and 7.)

. Other low pressure source (step 14.)

WHEN A feedwater source and path established, THEN Proceed to step 19.d.

Check all intact SG WR levels - LESS THAN 12% (42% ADVERSE CTMT)

Establish maximum feed flow rate to intact SG(s) with WR level GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 12%, and Proceed to step 20.

'eestores Feedwater Flow to SGs '42 1,

VAT EXAM FR-H.l, 19.c, RNO FR-H.1, 19.d FR-H. 1, 19.d, RNO G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 26 of 33

SECTION 3 SIMULATOR EXAM SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Title:

ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 Revision: 0 NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 TIME *QA T=O TC03 TC04 TCOGA TCOGB TCOGC TCOGD TCO7A TC07B TC07C TC07D INSTRUCTOR AIDS DESCRIPTION MALF, RF, IO Turbine Fails to Trip Main Turbine Fails to Runback Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

Main Turbine Control Valve Failure Main Turbine Control Valve Failure Main Turbine Control Valve Failure Main Turbine Control Valve Failure Severity = 40%

Severity = 40%

Severity = 40%

Severity = 40%

Examiner Initiated I.

RXIOA Severity = 100%

LT459 Fails High

2. CV04B Severity = 100%

Letdown Temperature Fails Low - 2 Minute Ramp

3. ED04C 34C 4160VAC Bus Fails

4. FWOI Severity = 30%

Lowering Condenser Vacuum - 5 Minute Ramp

5. FWOI Severity = 100%

Lowering Condenser Vacuum - 2 Minute Ramp

6. FWl8B 3FWA

• PI B AFW Pump Trips on Overcurrent Summary of Booth Operator Actions

1) Trip Pressurizer Level bistables during Event 1, LT459 failure.

2) Trip 3FWA*P1 B after Reactor Trip to cause a Loss of all Feed G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4doc Page 27 of 33

SECTION 4 VALIDATION CHECKLIST

Title:

ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 Remote functions:

All remote functions contained in the guide are certified.

Malfunctions:

All malfunctions contained in the guide are certified.

Initial Conditions:

The initial condition(s) contained in the guide are certified or have been developed from certified IC's in accordance with NSEM-4.02.

Simulator Operating Limits:

The simulator guide has been evaluated for operating limits and/or anomalous response.

Test Run:

The scenario contained in the guide has been test run and validated (validation sheet completed, next page)on the simulator. Simulator response is reasonable and as expected.

Examination Scenario Review The dynamic examination review checklist is complete.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Revision: -

0 Verified bv Page 28 of 33

SECTION 5 REFERENCES AND CRITICAL TASK TRACKING

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 Revision: 2 I.

References:

TS* MP3 OP 3272 OP 3204 OP 3353 AOP 3571 AOP 3559 EOP*35 E-0 EOP*35 E-S-0.1 FR-H.1 EPIP*EPIP 4400 NUREG 1021 Technical Specifications EOP User's Guide At Power Operation Main Board Annunciator Response Procedures Instrument Failure Response Loss of Condenser Vacuum Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Reactor Trip Response Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Event Assessment, Classification and Reportability Examiners Standards G:V)RS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 29 of 33

II.

Critical Tasks Covered in this Test:

The following Critical Tasks are covered in this exercise:

CRiTICAL TASK #

E-2 -- A CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTION Isolate the faulted SG By Shutting MSlV on Failure of Turbine To Trip Initiating Bleed and Feed Promptly When Conditions Are Met MA >I= 3.0 I Exams 'only RO-4.3 SRO-4.6 EPE007EA 2.02 RO-3.4 SRO-4.4 E05EA2.1 Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the following CSFs:

0 Integrity 0 Subcriticality 0 Containment (if the break is inside containment)

Allows for core cooling via Safety Injection and Bleeding flow out of the PORVs prior to RCS temperature rising to a point which Bleed and Feed would be ineffective to remove core heat.

G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Page 30 of 33

OPERATIONAL EXAM VALIDATION SHEET Program

Title:

Examination Name: NRC Scenario Number 4 NRC Initial License Training, NRC Scenario Number I Exam IDNumber: NRCI Revision: 0 By their signature below, the people acknowledge the confidentiality and validity of the material contained within and will not willfully disclose its contents to others enrolled in the Millstone Three Initial Licensed Operator Training Program.

Validated By:

Print us RO BOP Sianature Date I

I I

G:DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario $.doc Page 31 of 33

ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0 Note:

The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes 6

2 2

I I

1 60 50%

1 Yes COMMENTS:

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

Total malfunctions inserted: 4-8/10-I4 (Pzr Level Transmitter, Letdown Temp. Inst, Bus 34C Loss of Vacuum, Failure of Turbine Trip, Failure of All Feed)

Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-413-6 (Failure of Turbine Trip, Failure of All Feed)

Abnormal Events: I

-2/2-3 (Pzr Level Transmitter, Loss of Vacuum)

Major Transients: 1 -2/2-3 (Failure of All Feed)

EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: 1-3/34 (E-SO. 1, FR-H. I

)

EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-3/1-3 (FR-H. 1 )

Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes)

EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/5-8 Technical Specifications are exercised during the test G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Willstone Scenario 4.doc Page 32 of 33

Reactor Power:

Operating History:

RCS Boron:

Core Burnup:

Condensate Demins:

Intake structure:

PRA Status:

Protected train:

Evolutions in Progress:

Major Equipment 00s:

Crew Instructions:

SECTION 6 SCENARIO INITIAL CONDITIONS 100%

258 days on line 953 ppm 10,000 MWD/MTU 7

Green Yellow?

"B" Train protected Millstone Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage Turbine Driven AFW Pump 3FWA

• P2 00s The Turbine Driven AFW Pump (3FWA

• P2) is out of service for emergent maintenance. The Turbine Driven AFW Pump 3FWA

• P2 was taken out of service 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ago and expected return to operability is 1 I hours from now.

Limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2, action a. has been entered.

Continue to operate at full power.

Plant/Simulator Differences:

0 If not using the speed dial option, dial 3333 or 3334 to reach the desired person (s).

The following PPC programs do not function on the simulator:

0 I t Samarium Follow Xenon Follow tt tt Sequence of Events G:\\DRS\\Osb\\Balian\\Validation\\Scenario 4Millstone Scenario 4.doc Page 33 of 33