ML023240386
| ML023240386 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/27/2002 |
| From: | Pisano L Constellation Energy Group |
| To: | Caruso J, Miller H NRC Region 1 |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| 50-220/02-303, ES-D-1, NMP-97941 50-220/02-303 | |
| Download: ML023240386 (111) | |
Text
P.O. Box 63 Lycoming, New York 13093 0
Constellation Energy Group Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Mr. Hubert J. Miller Regional Administrator USNRC Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 ATTENTION: Mr. John Caruso
SUBJECT:
Mr. Miller:
NMP-97941 August 27, 2002 A:7/'
NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 INITIAL OPERATOR SIMULATOR OPERATING EXAMINATION SUBMITTAL In response to the NRC Corporate Notification Letter dated June 4, 2002, arrangements were made for the administration of licensing examinations at Nine Mile Point, Unit 1 during the week of September 30, 2002. The examinations are being prepared based on the guidelines in Revision 8, Supplement 1, of NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." To meet the examination schedule, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station is required to furnish the examination materials for review and approval. Enclosed are the scenarios, outlines and quality checklists for the Simulator Operating Examination.
Please withhold these examination materials from public disclosure until after the examinations have been completed.
If you have any questions regarding the examination outline submittal, please contact Mr. Jerry Bobka (Facility Contact) at 315-349-2569 or Mr. Ron Thurow (General Supervisor of Operations Training) at 315-349-1182.
Sincerely, Manager Nuclear Training LEP/crr
Scenario Outline Nine Mile Point I Scenario No. 1 Operating Test No. 1 Examiners:
Candidates:
Objectives:
Evaluate candidates ability to perform routine operating tasks, raise and/or lower reactor power and to respond to the following failures:
- 1.
APRM #f13 fails upscale,
- 2.
Electrical Pressure Regulator oscillation
- 3.
Mechanical Pressure Regulator failure
- 4.
Recirculation Pump Seal leak
- 5.
Fault on Power Bus 102
- 6.
LOCA with degraded High and Low Pressure injection systems
- 7.
Core Spray Pump 112 trip
- 8.
Core Spray Pump 122 Suction Strainer Clogged.
Evaluate the candidates' ability to execute normal, abnormal and emergency procedures while ensuring compliance with Technical Specifications.
This scenario will be classified as an Alert Initial Conditions:
- 1.
IC 24, at 100% power Turnover:
- 1.
Plant is operating at 100% Reactor Power.
- 2.
APRM # 14 out of service. Repair in progress and expected to be returned to service within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
- 3.
- 11 Feedwater Pump is out of service for seal repairs.
- 4.
Swap stabilizing valves from A and B to E and F.
Event Malf.
Type Event Description No.
No.
1 N
(BOP) Switching Stabilizing Valves - A and B to E and F.
(N1-OP-5, Section F.4.1) 2 NM19C I
(RO/SRO) APRM # 13 fails upscale results in half scram and Tech Spec entry.
Draft Exam Submittal Document Aug 2002 Scenario I Outline 1-02-030.doc Created on 08/19/02 12:43 PM Appendix D Form ES-D-I
Scenario Outline Draft Exam Submittal Document Aug 2002 Scenario 1 Outline 1-02-030.doc Created on 08/19/02 12:43 PM 3
RR33 &
C (BOP) Recirc Pump #11 Seal Leak (75% lower, 25% upper over 34 10 min) requires pump removal from service.
4 R
(BOP/SRO) Reduce power to remove and isolate Recirc pump.
Reactivity manipulation occurs during the pump shutdown.
5 TC06 C
(RO) Electrical Pressure Regulator (EPR) Oscillating. Requires removing EPR from service and control shifted to backup MPR.
6 TC08 C
(RO/BOP/SRO) Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR) fails, resulting in an automatic reactor scram.
7 ED07 C
(BOP) Fault on Power Board 4160 VAC Emergency Bus (PB 102). Diesel Generator 102 starts, but does not close in on the Bus. Requires manual shutdown of Diesel Generator, due to loss of diesel auxiliary. Downstream 600 VAC Emergency Power Board PB 1 6B is re-energized from alternate power source 8
FW03B C
9 RR29 M
(RO/BOP/SRO) LOCA (15% over 8 minutes), results in RPV water level approaching TAF (-84 inches) and need for initiating Containment Sprays 10 CS05D C
(BOP) Core Spray Pump 122 Suction Strainer Clogging (100%),
CSO1B results in reduced injection into RPV. Core Spray Pump 112 trips. RPV Blowdown and lineup of Firewater to the Feedwater System is required to recover water level above TAF.
Appendix D Form ES-D-1
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO Scenario 1 REV. 0 No. of Pages:
21 APRM FAILURE/RECIRC PUMP SEAL LEAK/EPR MPR FAILURE/LOCA WITH DEGRADED CORE SPRAY SYSTEMS PREPARER gRxhYIlk)h,
~
DATE VALIDATED GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER UNIT 1 CONFIGURATION CONTROL I
I I-U,,
tL_6L_
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DATE 7 [aL DATE 1/27 oZ DATE DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length:
75 minutes Crew assumes the shift with the plant at rated power, a failed #14 APRM out of service, and #11 FWP out of service for repairs. Crew is directed to swap CRD Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F. After this, #13 APRM will fail upscale, producing a half scram that cannot be reset. Crew will review Technical Specifications for the failed instrument.
After the Technical Specifications review, a seal leak develops on #11 Reactor Recirculation Pump. Crew will remove that pump from service, isolate it, and review Technical Specifications.
Reactor pressure will then begin to oscillate. Crew will recognize a failing EPR, place the MPR in control, move the EPR to its high stop, and review Technical Specifications for operation without a backup regulator. When the plant is stable, the MPR will fail, causing a reactor scram. Crew enters EOP-2 on low RPV water level.
After scram actions are complete, Powerboard 102 will develop a fault; EDG 102 will start, but its output breaker will not close. Crew will cross-tie PB 16B and PB 16A and restore loads. Shortly afterwards, #12 FWP will trip, leaving only CRD pumps and Liquid Poison pumps for high-pressure injection.
A medium break LOCA begins to develop inside Primary Containment. Crew enters EOP-4 on high drywell pressure. When Core Spray pumps start, one of the operable pumps will trip. Recognizing its inability to maintain level above TAF with high-pressure injection, the crew aligns alternate injection sources, and enters EOP-8 for blowdown.
Core Spray slowly begins to recover water level when suction strainer clogging occurs causing the running Core Spray Pump to trip. By this time, RPV pressure is low enough for firewater to inject. Crew will restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches.
Major Procedures:
N1-EOP-2, 4, and 8 EAL Classification:
Alert EAL 3.1.1 Termination Criteria:
RPV depressurized with level recovered above -109 inches Scenario 1 August 2002
I.
SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: 24 [100% Reactor Power]
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. NM21D, APRM #14 Failed
- b. NM19C, APRM #13 Fails Upscale
- c. RR33, Recirculation Pump Seal Leak (lower, 75% over 10 minutes)
- d. RR34, Recirculation Pump Seal Leak (upper, 25% over 10 minutes)
- e. TC06, Electrical Pressure Regulator (EPR) Oscillating
- f. TC08, Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR) Fails
- g. ED07, Fault On Power Board (PB 102)
- h. FW03B, Feedwater Pump 12 Trip (TUA=5 minutes)
- i.
CSO1B, Core Spray Pump 112 Trips
- j.
CS05D, Core Spray Pump 122 Suction Strainer Clogged (100% over 30 seconds)
- k. RR29, LOCA (15% over 8 minutes)
- 2. Remotes:
- a. FP04, Fire Wtr to FW Blocking Vlvs, 100%, TD 15 minutes Ma when directed in scenario
- 3.
Overrides:
None
- 4. Annunciators:
None C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. APRM #14
- 2. FWP #11 D. Support Documentation None E. Miscellaneous
- 1. Hang yellow tag for APRM #14
- 2. Hand red tag for FWP #11 (Queued)
(F3)
(F4)
(F4)
(F5)
(F6)
(F7)
(F7)
(Queued)
(F8)
(F9) nual Insert, Scenario 1 August 2002
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION SHIFT:
El N 11 D DATE:
PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART Ih:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
"* Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, SRO, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
"* CSO Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SSS, SRO, STA)
"* Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor Power = 100%
Loadline = 103%
- #14 APRM out of service. Repairs are in Droaress and APRM #14 is expected to be returned to service within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
FWP #11 Out of service for mechanical seal repairs. Day 2 of 15 day HPCI LCO, Technical Specification 3.1.8. Expected to be returned to service this later shift.
- All reauired log entries have been completed including Technical Specification references.
PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
"* Swap Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F.
"* Return FWP #11 to service (late in shift)
PART IV:
To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
"* Review new Clearances (SSS)
Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
"* Shift Crew Composition (SSS/SRO)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SSS CRE SRO E
STA E
CSO Other Scenario 1 August 2002 1I.
Scenario ID#: Scenario 1 INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened?__
What we did?
I Why? (Goals)
I Other Options?
Scenario 1 August 2002
III.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a primary system leak into the containment, when torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell air temperature exceeds 300'F, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays, while in the safe region of the Containment Spray Initiation Limit and prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit IAW N 1-EOP-4.
CT-2.0 Given degraded RPV injection sources the crew will depressurize the RPV and inject with Preferred and Alternate Injection Systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches IAW N1-EOP-2.
CT-3.0 Given a condition with Containment Sprays operating and a Drywell Pressure lowering, the Crew will secure Containment Sprays within 3 minutes of Drywell Pressure dropping below 3.5 psig in accordance with Ni-EOP-4.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Transfer CRD Stabilizing Valves with the plant at power in accordance with N I-OP-5.
PO-2.0 Recognize and respond to a failed APRM in accordance with Nl-ARP-F2 (F2-1-6) and NI-OP-38C with the plant at power.
PO-3.0 Identify limitations imposed by Technical Specifications due to multiple failed APRM instruments in the same channel (TS 3.6.2.a and 3.6.2.g).
PO-4.0 Recognize and respond to a failure of automatic pressure control system (EPR) in accordance with N 1 -ARP-A2 (A2-4-4) and N 1-OP-3 1.
PO-5.0 Identify limitations imposed by Technical Specifications as the result of operating without a backup pressure regulator.
PO-6.0 Diagnose and respond to failure of Reactor Recirculation Pump mechanical seals in accordance with NI-ARP-F2 (F2-1-1) and NI-OP-1.
PO-7.0 Identify limitations imposed by Technical Specifications for 4-Loop Operations (TS 3.1.7).
PO-8.0 Respond to an automatic reactor scram in accordance with NI-SOP-1.
Scenario 1 August 2002
PO-9.0 Recognize and respond to a loss of PB 102 in accordance with N1-ARP-A4 (A4-1-6).
PO-10.0 Correctly identify Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) entry conditions.
PO-11.0 Given an event requiring activation of the Emergency Plan, the SRO will correctly classify the event per the EAL Matrix.
Scenario 1 August 2002
IV.
SCENARIO INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing.
Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels.
As directed by Lead Evaluator Role Play: As Operator, when requested, report:
BV-44-175 is OPEN BV-44-184 is OPEN After Stabilizing Valve Transfer Switch selected to E and F and requested by Control Room, report:
BV-44-176 is CLOSED BV-44-183 is CLOSED When requested to confirm exhaust flow report:
EXHAUST FLOW 6.0 GPM OPERATOR ACTIONS CREW
"* Walks down panels
"* Performs annunciator checks
"* Conducts shift turnover brief
"* Assumes shift, continues power operations SRO Directs RO to swap Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F IAW N1-OP 5, Section F.4.1.
RO-BOP
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO.
"* Performs N1-OP-5, Section F.4.1, Switching Stabilizing Valves from A and B to E and F.
Directs NAO to perform valve lineups for transfer.
Places Stabilizing Solenoid Valves Transfer Switch to "E and F" position.
Directs NAO to confirm stabilizing exhaust line flow between 5.5 and 6.5 gpm.
Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS As directed by Lead Evaluator When Stabilizing Valve switching evolution has been completed, insert Malfunction:
NM19C = TRUE (F3)
"* Recognizes/reports RPS Channel 11 Half SCRAM.
"* Reports APRM #13 upscale SRO
"* Acknowledges report from RO.
"* Directs RO to follow ARPs for failed APRM and Half SCRAM.
"* Informs WEC/Management of failed APRM.
"* Reviews TSs 3.6.2a and 3.6.2.g.
"* Acknowledges direction of SRO.
"* Take actions required of ARP and OP-38C (RO-BOP) Confirms condition on "G" panel (RO-CSO) Confirms compliance with power-flow limitations Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: When contacted by SRO/CREW, report "that you will investigate APRM failure.
As directed by Lead Evaluator When TSs have been reviewed, insert the following Malfunctions:
RR33 @ 75% (10 minute ramp time) (F4)
RR34 @ 25% (10 minute ramp time) (F4)
- 11 Reactor Recirculation Pump Upper/Lower Seal Leakage SRO
"* Determines that conditions for APRM are met as long as channel is tripped.
"* Briefs crew on APRM status and continued operation with RPS Chanpel 11 tripped.--*r RO/CSO
"* Responds to Annunciator F2-1-1, REACT RECIRC PUMP-MOTOR 11.
"* Recognizes/reports seal failures on #11 Recirculation Pump.
Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Note: SRO may consult Engineering regarding status of #11 Reactor Recirculation Pump. If guidance is requested, recommend that the pump be removed from service and loop isolated SRO
"* Acknowledges report from RO/CSO.
"* Reviews TSs for RCS leakage and Recirculation loop operation.
"* Determines TS 3.1.7 applies.
"* Determines TS 3.2.5 applies until seal is isolated.
"* Conduct pre-evolution/reactivity brief of crew for removal of #11 RRP from service.
"* Directs shutdown and isolation of #11 Recirculation Pump IAW N1-OP-1.
RO-BOP
"* Removes #11 RRP from Service Place RRP #11 M/A station in Manual Reduce #11 RRP flow Close #11 RRP Discharge Valve Trip #11 RRP MG
"* Isolate #11 RRP Close #11 RRP Suction Valve Close #11 RRP Discharge Bypass valve.
"* Monitors Drywell leakage and reports trend.
RO-CSO
- Verify proper power-flow ratio using power to flow map on "E" panel Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS As directed by Lead Evaluator When Reactor power has been reduced and preparations have been made to remove Recirculation Pump #11 from service, insert Malfunction:
TC06 = TRUE (F5)
EPR Fails - Oscillates Role Play: As WEC/Management acknowledge report of failed EPR and request for assistance NOTE EPR will not be repaired during the scenario.
- Reports malfunction with pressure regulator (Annunciator A2-4-4, TURBINE MECHANICAL PRESS REG IN CONTROL)
CREW diagnose failure and determine that EPR is faulty (oscillating)
- Acknowledges report, directs actions of ARP be completed.
CREW
- Determine that EPR is malfunctioning and should be removed from service.
"* Contacts WEC/Management and reports failed EPR
"* Directs RO-CSO to remove EPR from service IAW Ni -OP-31 CSO
- Acknowledges direction from SRO Lowers MPR setpoint until pressure has stabilized Raises EPR setpoint to the maximum value Restores RPV pressure to normal band.
Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: Acknowledge report from SRO. If requested, as Reactor engineering acknowledge that you will perform required 3D-Monicore cases.
As directed by Lead Evaluator When MPR has been placed in service, insert Malfunction:
TC08 = TRUE (F6)
MPR Fails Note: CREW may identify cause of scram to be failed MPR.
"* Reviews Technical Specifications for limitations associated with operation without Backup Pressure Regulator (Tech. Spec. 3.1.7.c)
"* Contact WEC/Management/Reactor Engineering regarding continued operation.
RO-CSO
"* Recognizes/reports Reactor SCRAM
"* Provides SCRAM report:
Mode Switch position RPV pressure (value and trend)
RPV level (value and trend)
Reactor power and control rod position Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS As directed by Lead Evaluator When SCRAM actions have been completed and the plant has stabilized, insert Malfunctions:
ED07 = TRUE (F7)
FW03B = TRUE (TUA=5 minutes) (F7)
Electrical Fault On Power Board PB 102 Feedwater Pump #12 Trip SRO
"* Acknowledges report of Reactor SCRAM.
"* Enters N1-EOP-2 due to RPV Level Assign RPV level control band (and method)
Assign RPV pressure control band (and method)
RO (BOP/CSO)
"* Acknowledge assignment from SRO
"* Monitor and control assigned parameters RO
- Recognizes/reports fault on powerboard PB 102.
- Reports DG 102 started but did not close in on PB 102
- Recognizes fault on PB 102.
- Responds to Annunciator A4-1-6, POWER BD 102 BUS VOLTAGE LOW.
Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
"* DG 102 will start and run unloaded
"* RBCLC Pump #13 will be lost.
"* CRD Pump #11 will be lost.
"* DG 102 auxiliaries will be lost SRO
"* Acknowledges report of PB 102 fault.
"* Directs response JAW ARP.
RO-BOP
- Acknowledges direction of SRO.
Places breaker R1012 in PTL.
Places ED 102 control switch in EMERGENCY STOP.
Verifies #12 CRD Pump in-service.
Verifies RBCLC header pressure
Ž 40 psig.
Resets 86-16.
Verifies R1043 is OPEN.
Informs SRO that PB 16B will be re-energized.
"* Acknowledges report from RO.
"* Directs station announcement prior to re-energizing PB 16B.
"* Directs RO to re-energize PB 16B.
Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: As WEC/Management, acknowledge report and inform SRO that you will assist with the PB 102 problem Role Play: As NAO, respond that you will check PB 102 for problems and assist Electrical Maintenance
.On activation of FW03B, Feedpump #12 Trip Role Play: If directed, as NAO respond that you will investigate the cause of # 12 Feed Pump trip.
Wait 10 minutes and report that the pump has tripped on electrical overload.
Scenario 1 RO-BOP
- Acknowledges direction of SRO.
Closes A-B Tie Breaker R1042.
Re-energizes loads on PB 16B not to exceed 962 amps on PB 16A as directed by SRO.
Notifies SRO that breaker RO 12 needs to be marked up.
"* Acknowledges reports from RO as ARP actions are completed.
Contacts WEC/Management and informs them of PB 102 problem.
- Contacts NAO and directs Operator to inspect PB 102 for any signs of a problem.
- Recognize/report trip of #12 Feed pump CREW Recognize that only HP injection sources are CRD and Liquid Poison
- Directs NAO to investigate cause of loss of feed pump #12 August 2002 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS As directed by Lead Evaluator Insert malfunction:
RR29=TRUE (15% in 8 minutes)
(F9)
LOCA Drywell pressure exceeds 3.5 PSIG Core Spray Pump 112 trips leaving only Core Spray Pump 122 operating.
Note: SRO may direct that Alternate Injection Systems be lined up on reevaluation of EOP-2 conditions.
CREW
"* May recognize rising trend in containment parameters prior to receipt of K2-4-3.
"* Recognize/report Annunciator K2-4-3, Drywell Pressure High-Low
"* Report Drywell pressure and temperature rising.
"* Acknowledges report of drywell pressure and temperature
"* Direct action to identify potential leaks into containment.
RO 0
Report drywell pressure exceeds 3.5 PSIG
- Recognize and report that only one Core Spray pump has started.
"* Acknowledge report from RO on drywell pressure and Core Spray Pump status
"* Enter EOP-4 and re-enter EOP-2 on high drywell pressure
"* Direct lock out of Containment Spray Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Reactor vessel level continues to lower below +5 inches NOTE. When containment parameters warrant, the SRO will direct initiation of Containment Sprays.
"* Acknowledge direction from SRO
"* Lock out all Containment spray pumps CREW
- Recognize/report containment isolation SRO
- Acknowledge report of containment and system isolation SRO
"* Determine that level cannot be maintained above -84 inches Direct ADS placed in bypass
"* Determine only 1 Core Spray pump running Direct Alternate Injection Systems be lined up CREW
- Report when Torus pressure exceeds 13 PSIG or before Drywell Temperature reaches 300 degrees F.
Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO CT-1.0
"* Verify below the CSIL
"* Direct initiation of containment sprays Direct all recirculation pumps verified tripped Direct trip of all drywell cooling fans Direct RO to initiate Containment Sprays IAW EOP-1 7 Direct RO to secure Containment Spray when Drywell pressure < 3.5 PSIG RO CT-1.0, 3.0
- Acknowledge direction from SRO Verifies all recirculation pumps tripped Verifies all drywell cooling fans tripped Initiates Containment Sprays IAW EOP-1 Attachment 17 Secures Containment Spray when Drywell pressure < 3.5 PSIG Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS As directed by Lead Evaluator Insert the following Malfunctions:
CS05D, 0 to 100% at 30 seconds (F8)
Core Spray Pump 122 Suction Strainer Clogged When directed by RO to lineup firewater to the feed system, insert remote:
FP04, FIRE WTR TO FW BLOCKING VLVS TUA=15 minutes, 100%, Ramp=0 Reactor vessel level drops below -84 inches RO CT-2.0
- Acknowledge direction from SRO Bypass ADS Direct NAO to commence lineup of alternate injection systems CREW
- Determines that only firewater to feed system option available.
pressure leg)
Direct both ECs into service Direct opening 3 ERVs Acknowledge SRO direction Verify both ECs in service Open3 ERVs Report both ECs in service Report 3 ERVs are open Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO
"* Monitor RPV pressure and level
"* Observe pressure lower to <365 PSIG Observe/report Core Spray injection Monitor RPV level
"* Observe/report Core Spray Pump #122 cavitation
"* Report Core Spray #122 cavitation to SRO SRO
- Acknowledge report of Core Spray pump cavitation RO CT-2.0
"* Observe/report that RPV level continues to lower
"* Observe/report when RPV pressure <
Firewater Header pressure
"* Observe/report rising RPV level
"* Observe/report when RPV level
> -109 inches and rising.
Scenario 1 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE TERMINATING CUE
"* RPV Blowdown complete
"* RPV water level> -109 inches and rising
"* Containment parameters controlled per EOP-4 SRO Candidate Evaluator:
After the simulator is placed in FREEZE, direct the SRO Candidate to classify the event OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Classify the event as an AIedEA-L-3A.J Scenario 1 August 2002
Scenario Outline Nine Mile Point 1 Scenario No. 2 Operating Test No. 1 Examiners:
Candidates:
Objectives:
Evaluate candidates ability to perform routine operating tasks, raise and/or lower reactor power and to respond to the following failures:
- 1.
Feedwater Booster Pump #11 trip,
- 2.
Circulating Water Pump #11 trip,
- 3.
Emergency Power reduction with failed Feedwater Pump 13 Valve controller
- 4.
Steam line rupture in Turbine Building,
- 5.
- 6.
RWCU fails to isolate when Liquid Poison is initiated Evaluate the candidates' ability to execute normal, abnormal and emergency procedures while ensuring compliance with Technical Specifications.
This scenario will be classified as Site Area Emergency 2.2.2 Initial Conditions:
- 1.
IC 24, 80% Reactor Power Turnover:
- 1.
Plant is operating at 80% Reactor Power.
- 2.
11 Feedwater Booster Pump (FWBP) is to be placed in service. 12 FWBP is to be shutdown for an inspection, later in the shift
- 3.
ERV 112 acoustic monitor channel failed background noise channel check. Tech Spec 3.6.11-2 action is in effect Event Malf.
Type Event Description No.
No.
I N
(BOP) Place #11 Feedwater Booster Pump in service and remove
- 12.
(N1-OP-16, Section F.2.0)
Draft Exam Submittal Document Aug 2002 NM Log # 1-02-031 Scenario 2 Outline 1-02-03.doc Created on 08/19/02 7:12 AM Appendix D Form ES-D3-1
Scenario Outline Draft Exam Submittal Document Aug 2002 NM Log # 1-02-031 Scenario 2 Outline 1-02-031.doc Created on 08/19/02 7:12 AM 2
FW02A C
(BOP/SRO) 11 Feedwater Booster Pump trips. Requires Tech Spec entry for inoperable HPCI component 3
CW06A C
(BOP/RO/SRO) 11 Circulating Water Pump trip results in lowering condenser vacuum and Emergency Power Reduction 4
R (RO/SRO) Emergency Power Reduction due to lowering condenser vacuum.
5 FW13 I
BOP/SRO Feedwater Pump 13 Flow Controller Fails As Is during power reduction, requiring manual control of feedwater to prevent a high level feed pump trip.
6 MS12 M
(BOP/RO/SRO) Steam line rupture in Turbine Building (20% over 8 min). Post trip, severity level of 100% is inserted to automatically close MSIVs 7
RP5A C
(BOP/RO/SRO) RPS failure to scram (electric) due to failure of RP09 RPS Channel 11 to trip. MSIVs closure results in pressure control on ERVs and heat addition to containment 8
CU13 C
(BOP) RWCU failure to isolate on Liquid Poison initiation requiring manual isolation t
Appendix D Form ES-D3-1
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO Scenario 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages:
20 FEEDWATER BOOSTER PUMP TRIP/CIRC WATER PUMP TRIP/TB STEAM LEAK WITH ATWS PREPARER
__--_DATE VALIDATED GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER UNIT 1 CONFIGURATION CONTROL Alqr DATE
?1'9)0 DATE 071,o DATE DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length:
50 minutes The scenario begins with the crew assuming the shift at 80% power. The crew will place #11 Feedwater Booster Pump in service and remove #12 Feedwater Booster Pump from service per N1-OP-16. When this evolution is completed, #11 Feedwater Booster Pump will trip on motor overload. The crew will review Technical Specifications and place the plant in a 15 day LCO for loss of a HPCI component.
Once the T.S. determination has been made, #11 Circulating Pump trips resulting in a lowering of Condenser vacuum. The crew will be required to perform an Emergency Power Reduction to prevent an automatic plant trip on low vacuum. During the power reduction, a failure of Feedwater Pump 13 valve controller requires the operator to take manual control to prevent a high water level turbine trip.
When conditions have stabilized, a Main Steam Line leak develops in the Turbine Building. As area radiation monitors alarm, the crew will implement EPIP-EPP-21 and directs evacuation of personnel from the Turbine Building. As radiation levels continue to rise, the crew will insert a manual scram.
RPS Channel 11 fails to trip and the crew will enter EOP-3, Failure To Scram. Control Rods will be inserted by implementing a combination of pulling the RPS power fuses and/or venting the scram air header per EOP-3.1. The MSIVs will automatically close on high steam flow. The crew will operate ERVs to control post ATWS pressure.
The Liquid Poison system will be initiated before Torus temperature reaches 11 0IF. The RWCU system will fail to automatically isolate, requiring the crew to manually isolate the RWCU system.
Control rods can be inserted by removing the RPS fuses, venting the scram air header and/or driving control rods until all rods are fully inserted. N1-EOP-3 will be exited and N1-EOP-2, RPV Control is entered and RPV water level is recovered to the normal band of 53 inches to 95 inches.
Major Procedures:
EAL Classification:
Termination Criteria:
N1-OP-16, NI-SOP-1 &4, N1-EOP-2, 3, & 3.1 Site Area Emergency, EAL 2.2.2 All rods full in. EOP-3 exited, EOP-2 entered and RPV level being recovered.
Scenario 2 August 2002
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number:
IC-24 or equivalent (IC-56). Power at 80% with Recirc Flow. Ensure #12 Feedwater Booster Pump is in service.
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. RP09, ARI/ATWS Air Header Exhaust Port Blocked (Queued)
- b. RP05A, Reactor Protection System Failure To Scram Channel 11 (Queued)
- c. CU13, RWCU Failure To Isolate On Liquid Poison Initiation (Queued)
- d. FW02A, Feedwater Booster Pump Trip 11, True (F3)
- e. CW06A, Circ Water Pump Trip 11, True (F4)
- f. FW13, Feedwater Control Valve 13 Controller Fail As-Is (F4)
- g. MS 12, Steam Line Rupture In Turbine Building, 20% Ramp 8 minutes (F5)
- h. RD34, Loss Of CRD Air Pressure, 100%, Ramp 4 minutes (F6)
- i. MS12, Steam Line Rupture In Turbine Building, 100% Remain Active 5 sec (F9)
- 2. Remotes:
- a. RP05, Rx Trip Bus 131/CKT 1 Fuses, Pulled TUA 45 sec (F7)
- b. RP06, Rx Trip Bus 13 1/CKT 2 Fuses, Pulled TUA 50 sec (F7)
- c. RP07, Rx Trip Bus 131/CKT 3 Fuses, Pulled TUA 55 sec (F7)
- d. FW24, Removal Of HPCI Fuses FU8/FU9 (F8)
- e. MC01, OG-1,3 11 Side Pri Jet Suct Vlvs, Closed (F10)
- f. MC03, MS-15,17 11 Side Pri Jet Stm Vlvs, Closed (F10)
- 3. Overrides:
- a. 05DS402-LO-R-041-03, ERV 112 Red Acoustic Alarm, OFF [80, 91] (Queued)
(F5 Panel, Lamp, 80 of 91)
- 4. Annunciators:
None C. Equipment Out of Service None D. Support Documentation None E. Miscellaneous None Scenario 2 August 2002
II.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION SHIFT:
ED N D D DATE:
PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
"* Shift Supervisor Log (SRO, SRO, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
"* CSO Log (CSO)
"* Lit Control Room Annunciators 0
Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
"* Reactor Power = 80%
Loadline =
103%
"* ERV 112 acoustic monitor failed background noise channel check yesterday at 10:00 am (N1-ISP-001-004 greater than 9g background noise). ACR has been initiated.
- TS 3.6.11-2 Table Action la - "restore next cold shutdown" in effect
- 12 Feedwater Booster Pump is to be removed from service, so that an inspection can be performed later in the shift PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Place #11 Feedwater Booster Pump in service and remove #12 Feedwater Booster Pump from service.
PART IV:
To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
"* Review new Clearances (SRO)
Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
"* Shift Crew Composition (SRO/SRO)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO CRE SRO E
STA E
CSO Other Scenario 2 August 2002
Scenario ID#: Scenario 2 1
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened?
What we did?
Why? (Goals)
Other Options?
Scenario 2 August 2002
III.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given the plant during an ATWS with conditions met to pefeorm_
power/level control, terminate and prevent injection, with exception of boron and CRD, into the RPV until conditions are met to re-establish injection in accordance with N 1-EOP-3.
CT-2.0 Given the plant with a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by inserting control rods and/or injecting boron to prevent exceeding the heat..capaci-y temperature limit IAW N1-EOP-3.
CT-3.0 When conditions are met to re-establish injection, operate injection systems to maintain RPV water level above -109" and at or below the level to which it was lowered in accordance with Ni -EOP-3.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will transfer operating Feedwater Booster Pumps (FWBPs) per N1-OP-16.
PO-2.0 Given a trip of the 11 FWBP the SRO will enter and comply with Tech Specs for an inoperable HPCI component.
PO-3.0 Given a trip of 11 Circulating Water Pump the crew will perform an Emergency Power Reduction, per N1-OP-43B by reducing Recirc Flow and inserting Cram Rods, if necessary, to prevent an automatic turbine trip on low vacuum.
PO-4.0 Given the plant, with an Emergency Power Reduction in progress and Feedwater Pump 13 Flow Controller failed, the crew will take manual control of Feedwater Pump 13 Flow Controller to control RPV water level above the low water level scram setpoint (53 inches) and the high water level feedwater pump trip setpoint (95 inches).
PO-5.0 Given a Main Steam Leak in the Turbine Building, the crew will perform a manual reactor scram.
Scenario 2 August 2002
PO-6.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram and failure of Reactor Water Cleanup system to isolate after injecting liquid Poison, the crew will manually isolate the system.
PO-7.0 Given an event requiring activation of the Emergency Plan, the SRO will correctly classify the event per the EAL Matrix Scenario 2 August 2002
IV.
SCENARIO INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing.
T = 0 minutes Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels.
T = 6 minutes Role Play: As AO, Report cooling water is available and lubrication is at the high level for 11 FWBP.
OPERATOR ACTIONS CREW
"* Walkdown panels
"* Perform annunciator checks
"* Conduct shift turnover brief
"* Assume shift, continue power operations SRO Directs RO/CSO to place #11 Feedwater Booster Pump (FWBP) in service and remove #12 FWBP from service per N1-OP-16, Section F.9.0.
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO
"* Places #11 FWBP in service per NI OP-16, Section F.9.0.
Confirm adequate Booster Pump suction pressure for 11 FWBP Dispatches AO to check cooling water and pump oil status for 11 FWBP Scenario 2 August 2002
IV.
SCENARIO INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 11 FWBP starts Role Play: As AO, report all local actions for aligning HWC system for 11 FWBP operation are complete 12 FWBP stops When directed by the Lead Evaluator, insert malfunction by depressing F3 key:
FW02A, Feedwater Booster Pump Trip 11 F3 11 FWBP trips Annunciator H3-1-6, REACTOR FW BOOSTER P1] TRIP OL SUCTION alarms.
Annunciator H3-3-7 for 13 Feedwater Pump suction alarms, then clears OPERATOR ACTIONS Places FWTR BOOSTER PUMP 11 control switch to start Dispatches AO to perform local steps for Hydrogen Water Chemistry system for 11 FWBP start BOP RO
"* Secures 12 FWBPperN1-OP-16 Places FWTR BOOSTER PUMP 12 control switch to Normal After Stop
"* Reports 11 FWBP is in service and 12 FWBP is shutdown BOP RO PO-2.0
"* Recognizes/reports #11 FWBP trip.
"* Responds to Annunciator H3-1-6 Verifies automatic start of 12 FWBP (starts pump if required).
Dispatches AO to realign HWC system for 12 FWBP running and 11 FWBP stopped.
"* Monitors reactor water level
"* Reports status to SRO Scenario 2 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: As AO, when contacted, report #11 Feedwater Booster Pump breaker tripped on overload. Can smell burnt insulation in the vicinity of the motor.
When Crew Brief is complete, insert malfunction by depressing F4 key:
CW06A, Circ Water Pump Trip 11 F4 11 Circ Water Pump trips Annunciator H2-1-4 CIRCULATING WTR PUMP 11 TRIP OVERLOAD alarms Condenser Vacuum begins to degrade SRO
"* Acknowledges reports
"* Enters Tech Spec 3.1.8 Specification
- b. for inoperable 11 FWBP. HPCI is considered operable as long as 11 FWBP is restored to operable within 15 days and the redundant component (13 FWBP) is verified operable per Surveillance Requirement c.
"* Notifies Ops Management and WEC of 11 FWBP status and Tech Spec entry
"* Report 11 Circ Water pump tripped.
"* Refers to Annunciator H2-1-4 Informs SRO that a power reduction is directed to maintain condenser back pressure < 5 inches HG Directs AO to close 11 Side SJAE valves Monitors condenser vacuum Scenario 2 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When directed to close 11 SJAE valves, activate Remotes by depressing F 10 key:
MC01, OG-1,3 11 Side Pri Jet Suct VIvs, Closed MC03, MS-15,17 11 Side Pri Jet Stm Vlvs, Closed (F10)
Role Play: As AO dispatched, report 11 Side SJAE valves are closed.
Annunciator A 1-3-4 Condenser Vacuum Below 24 inches HG alarms.
As Recirc Flow is reduced, reactor power lowers.
Cram Rod insertion may be necessary to stop the degradation of condenser vacuum. Condenser Vacuum stabilizes above the automatic Turbine Trip setpoint Feedwater Pump 13 Flow Control Valve fails as is.
Water level rises above the high level alarm setpoint.
SRO PO-3.0
- Directs Recirc Flow lowered per Ni OP-43B, H. 1.0, Emergency Power Reduction (target of 40 Mlbm/hr)
RO CSO
"* Lowers Recirc Flow using RECIRC MASTER CONTROLLER, as directed.
"* Reports when Recirc Flow is at the directed value
"* If directed, inserts the Cram Rods identified in the Core Reactivity Control (CRC) Book Places Control Rod Power Switch to ON Inserts cram rods to full in 00 position.
- If necessary to further reduce power, directs Cram Rods inserted per the CRC Book Scenario 2 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Vacuum stabilizes above 23 inches. Reactor power stabilizes between 70% to 75%, following the Emergency Power Reduction. (65% to 70%, if Cram rods are inserted).
Annunciator(s) F1-4-3 (F4-4-6) RPS CH 11(12)
Reactor Level High alarms When directed by the Lead Evaluator, insert malfunction by depressing F5 key MS12, Steam Line Rupture in Turbine Building, 20% Ramp time 8 minutes (F5)
"* Monitors and reports RPV water level during the power reduction
"* Identifies and reports Feedwater Pump 13 Flow Control Valve failed
"* Places FWP 13 Valve in MAN and controls RPV water level
"* Monitors and reports Condenser Vacuum stabilizing.
- When conditions are stable:
Notifies Ops Management and WEC of 11 Circ Water Pump trip, Emergency Power Reduction and Feedwater Control Valve 13 in manual due to controller failure.
Notifies Reactor Engineering of power reduction and Cram Rod insertion, if performed.
Performs Crew Brief Scenario 2 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Main Steam Leak In The Turbine Building Condenser Area Annunciator L1-3-3 CONTINUOUS AIR RAD MONITOR alarms Annunciator HI-4-8, AREA RADIATION MONITORS Role Play After 2 to 3 minutes, report back as Radiation Protection that Condenser Area is all steam and inaccessible, recommend evacuating Turbine Building.
Additional Turbine Building Area Rad Monitors will alarm as conditions deteriorate.
TURB BLDG 261 LOCAL PNL NO. I FIRE alarm actuates on Control Room Fire Panel.
Scenario 2 August 2002 OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP RO Responds to and reports Radiation Monitor annunciators Determines Turbine Building is effected., COND PMP VLVs, Condensate Bay TB 261 NE (7)
Informs SRO/CSO to verify TB Roof vents and exterior doors are closed Notifies Rad Protection SRO/CSO RO Enters and executes EPIP-EPP-21 Radiation Emergencies and EPP-05A Local Area Evacuation.
SRO Directs Turbine Building evacuation.
CSO RO
"* Makes evacuation of Turbine Building announcement per EPP-05A.
"* Notifies Fire Chief of fire alarm and radiation hazards in the Turbine Building.
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Annunciator F1-4-8 STEAM LEAK DETECTION SYS FLOW OFF NORM alarms Role Play: (Prior to TB evacuation) If dispatched as Fire Brigade, Rad Protection or as an Operators, report a large steam leak in the Condenser Area.
NOTE: Failure to Scram occurs because malfunctions RP09, ARI/ATWS Air Header Exhaust Port Blocked and RP05A, Reactor Protection System Failure To Scram Channel 11 are queued.
RPS Channel 12 Scram Solenoid lights extinguish and RPS Channel 11 Scram Solenoid lights remain on, due to failure of RPS Channel 11 to trip. The reactor remains at power.
"* Determines conditions warrant a manual scram
"* Performs Crew Brief
"* Directs manual scram RO/CSO PO-5.0
"* Places the Mode Switch to Shutdown
"* Identifies and reports RPS Channel 11 has failed to trip
"* Depresses Reactor Trip 11 Manual Scram pushbutton Provides scram report:
Mode Switch in Shutdown RPV pressure (value and trend)
RPV level (value and trend)
Reactor power above 6% and rods are not fully inserted Scenario 2 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Booth Operator If directed to remove HPCI fuses, activate Remote by depressing F8 key:
FW24, Removal Of HPCI Fuses FU8/FU9 (F8)
SRO CT-1.0, 2.0, 3.0 Enters N1-EOP-3, Failure To Scram and directs the following actions:
"* ADS bypassed
"* Core Spray injection prevented
"* ARI initiated
"* Level and pressure control bands
"* Recirc pumps tripped
"* Terminate and prevent RPV injection to lower level below -41 inches. (CT-1.0)
"* Expected to direct a band -84 to -41 inches uncorrected. Actual band to be corrected for power per N1-EOP-3. (CT-3.0)
"* Alternate Control Rod Insertion per N1-EOP-3.1 (CT-2.0)
Scenario 2 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Booth Operator When all Recirc Pumps have been tripped, insert malfunction by depressing F9 key:
MS12, Steam Line Rupture In Turbine Building, 100%, remains active for 5 seconds.
(F9)
MSIVs automatically close. Power and pressure rise.
ERVs cycle Torus temperature rises above 85 °F BOP RO
- Performs actions as directed:
Places both ADS Inhibit keylock switches in BYPASS Depress MANUAL ARI initiation pushbutton Trips all operating Recirc Pumps Installs Core Spray jumpers BOP RO CT-1.0, 3.0
- When directed to terminate and prevent RPV injection: (CT-2.0)
Closes both Feedwater Isolation 11 and 12 valves May place Feedwater Pump control switches in P-T-L May direct HPCI fuses pulled If HPCI fuses are pulled may close FW level control valves and reopen Feedwater Isolation 11 and 12 valves When directed to establish RPV injection, controls water level in directed band with Feedwater Pump level control valves. (CT-3.0)
Scenario 2 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
"* Directs RPV pressure band below 1080 psig ERVs and ECs
"* Directs injecting Liquid Poison prior to Torus temperature of llOoF BOP RO
"* Maintains pressure in directed band using ERVs and ECs, as directed
"* If Torus temeperature rises above 85'F informs SRO
"* If directed, places Torus Cooling in service.
- When Torus temperature exceeds 85°F enters Primary Containment Control Directs Torus Cooling placed in service Scenario 2 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Booth Operator Note: Only 3 fuses will be pulled to allow insertion of 3 of 4 rod groups. A role play will be provided to inform control room that the circuit 4 and 5 fuses could not be removed. This will force crew to insert rods using another method, such as venting the scram air header.
When requested to pull SCRAM fuses, activate Remotes by depressing F7 key:
RP05, Rx Trip Bus 131/CKT 1 Fuses, Pulled TUA 45 sec RP06, Rx Trip Bus 131/CKT 2 Fuses, Pulled TUA 50 sec RP07, Rx Trip Bus 131/CKT 3 Fuses, Pulled TUA 55 see)
As RPSpowerfuses are removes some control rods will insert to position 00. RPS Channel 11 group solenoid lights will extinguish for Group 1, 2 and 3 RO/CSO
- Executes EOP-3.1 and attempts one or more of the following:
Scramming rods electrically Scramming rods by venting the scram air header When directed starts Liquid Poison pump RO/CSO IF scramming rods electrically (EOP 3.1)
Dispatches operator to removes RPS fuses.
Reports control rods inserted, but not all rods are full in. (31 rods remain out)
Scenario 2 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS The Channel 11 BU SCRAM SDV VENT & DRAIN red light and RPS Channel 11 Group 4 white solenoid light will remain lit.
Role Play: As operators removing RPS fuses, inform RO that circuit 4 and 5 fuses on RPS Channel 11 could not be pulled. The fuses would not come out of their fuse holders.
Booth Operator When dispatched to vent the scram air header, activate malfunction by depressing F6 key:
RD34, Loss Of CRD Air Pressure, 100%,
Ramp 4 minutes (F6)
Role Play: Report Scram Air Header is bleeding down very slowly.
Scram Air header depressurizes. Remaining control Rods fully insert.
RO CSO
"* Acknowledge report of inability to remove all RPS fuses
"* Inform SRO
"* Continue implementing EOP-3.1 to insert remaining control rods. If venting scram air:
Verify ARI is initiated Dispatches operators to isolate and vent the air header per EOP-3.1, step 2.2 Observe and report all rods are full in Scenario 2 August 2002 OPERAT R ACTI NS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE All control rods inserted to or beyond position 02.
RP V water level rises and is restored to 53 inches to 95 inches.
Scenario 2 August 2002 OPERATOR ACTIONS RO CSO If driving control rods per EOP-3.1 Verify at least one operating CRD pump Places Mode Switch to Refuel Observes scram solenoid lights for Channel 11 Group 4 are lit Drives rods using EMER ROD IN RO BOP/CSO PO-6.0
- Recognizes RWCU system did not isolate when required.
Manually isolates RWCU system.
Informs SRO RWCU system had to be manually isolated SRO
BOP RO Establishes injection with Feedwater and raises RPV level as directed.
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Terminating Cues:
"* All rods fully inserted.
"* RPV level is being restored to 53 inches to 95 inches SRO Candidate Evaluator After simulator is placed in FREEZE, direct the SRO candidate to classify the event.
Directs establishment of a 1 000F/hr cooldown rate using ECs.
RO/CSO
- Takes appropriate actions to establish prescribed cooldown rate.
SRO PO-7.0 Classify the event as a Site Area Emergency per EAL 2.2.2.
Scenario 2 August 2002
Scenario Outline Nine Mile Point I Scenario No. 3 Operating Test No. 1 Examiners:
Candidates:
Objectives:
Evaluate candidates ability to perform routine operating tasks, raise and/or lower reactor power and to respond to the following failures:
- 1.
Channel 12 backup scram and SDV Vent and Drain Valves fail to reset,
- 2.
Power Board 17B electric fault trip,
- 3.
ERV 111 fails open and cannot be closed,
- 4.
Failure to scram with power remaining above 6%,
- 5.
Liquid Poison Pump 11 trips after start.
Evaluate the candidates' ability to execute normal, abnormal and emergency procedures while ensuring compliance with Technical Specifications.
This scenario will be classified as Site Area Emergency EAL 2.2.2 Initial Conditions:
- 1.
IC 24, 100% Reactor Power Turnover:
- 1.
Plant is operating at 100% Reactor Power.
- 2.
Manual Scram Instrument Channel test, N1-ST-W15, Sections 8.1 & 8.2 to be completed during this shift Event Malf.
Type Event Description No.
No.
1 N
(RO) Manual Scram Instrument Channel test, NI -ST-W1 5, Sections 8.1 & 8.2.
2 Overrides I
(SRO) During performance of this test Channel 12 backup scram F-5, and SDV Vent and Drain Valves fail to reset, requiring Tech
- Lamps, page 65, Spec entry.
R-031-09 3
ED21 C
(BOP/RO/SRO) Power Board 17B electric fault trip.
4 AD05 C
(RO/BOP/SRO) ERV 111 fails open and cannot be closed.
&AD06 Requires a power reduction and manual scram before Torus temperature exceeds 110 F. ERV continues to add heat to the Containment following the scram failure.
Exam 1st Submittal Document August 2002 NM Log # 1-02-032 Scenario 3 Outline 1-02-032.doc Created on 05/02/02 2:33 PM Appendix D Form ES-D-1
Scenario Outline Exam 1st Submittal Document August 2002 NM Log # 1-02-032 Scenario 3 Outline 1-02-032.doc Created on 05/02/02 2:33 PM 5
R (RO/SRO) Emergency Power Reduction and manual scram to prevent exceeding 11 0°F in the Torus.
6
- RD33A, M
(RO/BOP/SRO) Failure to scram, with all rods stuck at position B, C & E
- 20. Reactor power remains above 6% (downscale) 7 C
(RO) Manually inserts control rods using Alternate Control Rod insertion methods per N1-EOP-3.1 LPO1A C
(BOP/SRO) Liquid Poison Pump 1 trips after start.
Appendix D Form ES-D-1
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO No. of Pages:
23 PREPARER VALIDATED GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER UNIT 1 CONFIGURATION CONTROL LOSS OF VITAL POWER BOARD - ATWS U
PAUWv cFrLýtp 6ZAm DATE
- i2- -.
DATE 2_ 2- -_ "t-DATE PAl 7*
DATE DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length:
50 minutes The Crew will assume the shift with Reactor Power at 100%. The weekly surveillance, NI -ST-W 15, Sections 8.1 and 8.2, are to be done on this shift. At step 8.2.3, the Crew will recognize the Channel 12 "Red" BU SCRAM/SDV VENT AND DRAIN VALVE" light does not illuminate as required. This will cause the Crew to enter Technical Specifications and determine any LCO actions required.
Following the Technical Specification determination, Power Control will contact the Control Room to inform them of a Severe Thunderstorm Warning for the area for the next hour. An electrical transient will occur, resulting in a trip of the normal supply breaker for Power Board 103 (RI013) and simultaneous trip of supply breaker for Power Board 17B (R1053) due to a failure of selective tripping. This will cause EDG103 to auto-start and pick up load on Power Board 103. An electrical fault on Power Board 17B will prevent re-energizing this board via the crosstie to PB 17A (R1052). If the crew attempts to close R1052, it will trip due to the fault on PB 17B. Following completion of the applicable Annunciator Response Procedures, Power Board 17Bwill remain unavailable. Due to the loss of critical redundant equipment (e.g., CRD Pump # 12, EDG Auxiliaries, RBEVS
- 12, etc.) the SRO must evaluate Technical Specifications and determine LCO actions required.
Then ERV 111 will inadvertently open. The crew will respond to the ERV Open alarm (F2-4-1) and will enter N1-OP-I to close ERV #111. All attempts to close the valve will be unsuccessful requiring a manual reactor SCRAM. Torus water temperature will be monitored and the crew may be required to place Torus cooling in service. The reactor SCRAM may be initiated as a result of Torus water temperature approaching 11 0°F.
When the SCRAM is initiated, the control rods will fail to fully insert due to a hydraulic lock. Due to the challenge to containment the crew will be expected to inject Liquid Poison. Due to the fault on PB 103, LP Pump #12 is not available, LP Pump #11 will trip shortly after it is started requiring alternate injection of Liquid Poison. The CREW will enter EOP-3.1 in an attempt to insert control rods. Due to the hydraulic lock, the second attempt to insert control rods by manual scram (following reset) will result in all rods being fully inserted. The crew will be forced to terminate and prevent injection to lower Reactor power. RPV pressure must be maintained below the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) curve. The Crew will have success inserting control rods lAW EOP 3.1.
Major Procedures:
EAL Classification:
Termination Criteria:
NI-OP-01; NI-EOP-2, 3 & 4 Site Area Emergency EAL 2.2.2 All control rods fully inserted, RPV level and pressure being maintained in prescribed bands per EOP-3with Torus cooling in progress.
Scenario 3 August 2002 Scenario 3 REV. 0
SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number:
24 B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. RD33A - Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1 Position 20
- b. RD33B - Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1 Position 20
- c. RD33C - Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1 Position 20
- d. RD33D - Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1 Position 20
- e. ED021 - PB 17B Electrical Fault
- f. AD05 - ERV #111 Fails Open
- g. AD06 - ERV #111 Stuck Open
- h. LPO1A - Liquid Poison Pump Trip, TUA=15 sec.
- i.
RD33A - Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1 Position 0, TRA=3 sec.
- j.
RD33B - Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1 Position 0, TRA=3 sec.
- k. RD33C - Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1 Position 0, TRA=3 sec.
- 1. RD33D - Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1 Position 0, TRA=3 sec.
Queued Queued Queued Queued (F3)
(F4)
(Queued)
(ET02)
(ET03)
(ET03)
(ET03)
(ET03)
- 2. Remotes:
- a. FW24 - HPCI Fuses FU8/FU9 (PULLED), TUA=2 min.
(F10)
- b. RP14-Reactor Trip Bus 141/CKT5 Fuse (PULLED)
(ET01)
- c. AD01 - ERV 111 Control Power Fuses F1/F2 (PULLED), TUA=4 minutes (F8)
- 3. Overrides:
- a. 02A001S011-DI-005-13, Breaker R1013 Control, POSI, TRA=I sec.
(F3)
- 4. Event Triggers
- a. ETO1 - CH12 RPS Manual Scram Pushbutton Pressed, ZDRP12PB(1) EQ TRUE
- b. ET02 - Liquid Poison Pump #11 Start, ZLLPMPAR(1) EQ TRUE
- c. ET03 - RPS Jumpers/SCRAM Reset, ZDRPJB 11(5) EQ TRUE AND ZDRPREST(1) EQ TRUE This Boolean will allow the trigger to fire after the RPS jumpers are installed and the operator resets the SCRAM from "E".
Scenario 3 August 2002
- 5. Annunciators:
- a. None C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. None D. Support Documentation
- 1. N1-ST-W15, Manual and Automatic SCRAM Instrument Channel Test E. Miscellaneous
- 1. None Scenario 3 August 2002
II.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION SHIFT:
PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SSS, ASSS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
"* Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, ASSS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
"* CSO Log (CSO) 9 LCO Status (SSS, ASSS, STA)
"* Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
"* Reactor Power = 100%
Loadline =
103%
"* None PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
- Perform Sections 8.1 (Channel 11 Manual Scram) and 8.2 (Channel 12 Manual Scram) of N1-ST-W15, Manual And Automatic Scram Instrument Channel Test.
PART IV:
To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
"* Review new Clearances (SSS)
Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
"* Shift Crew Composition (SSS/ASSS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SSS CRE ASSS E
STA E
CSO Other Scenario 3 August 2002
Scenario ID#: Scenario 3 1
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened?
What we did?
Why? (Goals)
F Other Options?
Scenario 3 August 2002
I. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks CT-1.0 Given the plant operating at power with a stuck open ERV that cannot be closed, scram the reactor before JTrus temperature exceeds 11 0°F, in accordance with Technical Specifications.
CT-2.0 Given the plant with a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by inserting control rods to prevent exceeding the heat capacity temperature limit IAW N1 -EOP--1 CT-3.0 Given the plant during an ATWS with conditions met to perform power/level control, terminate and prevent injection, with exception of boron and CRD, into the RPV until conditions are met to re-establish injection in accordance with N1-EOP-3.
CT-4.0 Given the plant during an ATWS with conditions met to re-establish injection, "7 operate injection systems to maintain RPV water level above -109" and at or below the level to which it was lowered in accordance with N1-EOP-3.
B.
Performance Objectives PO-1.0 Identify the implications to plant safety/continued plant operation of the failure of Reactor Protection System surveillance. (N1-ST-W15)
PO-2.0 Recognize and respond to a loss of a safety related power board in accordance with applicable annunciator response procedures. (N1-ARP-A5)
PO-3.0 Take action to prevent damage to the Emergency Diesel Generator due to a loss of EDG auxiliaries. (N1-OP-45)
PO-4.0 Recognize the impact of Technical Specifications on continued plant operation and take action required to remain within the bounds of limiting conditions for operation when a safety related power board is lost.
PO-5.0 Recognize and respond to the inadvertent opening / failure of an ERV in accordance with N1-OP-I and H3-4-5.
PO-6.0 Monitor and control containment parameters in accordance with N1-EOP-4 to remain within design linmitations.
Scenario 3 August 2002
PO-7.0 Perform an emergency power reduction using recirculation flow and control rods prior to reaching 11 0°F in the Torus following a failed open ERV.
(TS 3.3.2.e, N1-OP-43B)
PO-8.0 Supervise reactivity manipulations during an emergency power reduction.
(GAP-OPS-05)
PO-9.0 Recognize and identify entry conditions for Emergency Operating Procedures.
PO-10.0 Carry out the actions of N I-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, when required/directed.
PO-11.0 Recognize the need for and direct alternate Boron injection. N1 -EOP-3, N1-EOP-3.1)
PO-12.0 Under failure to scram conditions, with power greater than 6%, accurately determine and provide power-corrected level control bands. (N1 -EOP-3)
PO-13.0 With level lowered to reduce reactor power and feed system injection restored, maintain RPV water level within directed bounds to prevent exceeding the Minimum Steam Cooling Water Level. (N1-EOP-3)
PO-14.0 Identify the appropriate method for inserting control rods when hydraulic block is suspected under failure to scram conditions. (N1-EOP-3.1)
PO-15.0 Given an event requiring activation of the Emergency Plan, the SRO will correctly classify the event per the EAL Matrix.
Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walk down and briefing.
As directed by Lead Evaluator Allow no more than 5 minutes to walk down the panels.
As directed by Lead Evaluator OPERATOR ACTIONS CREW
"* Walkdown panels
"* Perform annunciator checks
"* Conduct shift turnover brief Assume shift, continue power operations SRO
"* Conduct pre-evolution brief of N1-ST-W15
"* Directs performance of surveillance Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR AflTIONS Verify that remote RP 14 is activated when the "Channel 12 RPS Manual Trip pushbutton is depressed.
NOTE:
When step 8.2.3 is performed, the BU SCRAM SOLENOID (RED) light on Panel "F" fails to illuminate.
Role Play:
As WEC/Management, acknowledge information from SRO and inform that you will provide whatever assistance is required.
Note: If SRO requests the fuse be checked/replaced advise him that this will be done as soon as I&C has been contacted The fuse will NOT be replaced during the scenario.
RO-CSO/RO-BOP
" Acknowledge direction from SRO
"* Perform surveillance.
Depress manual trip pushbutton on "E" panel and verify scram function processed (SCRAM solenoid lights extinguish)
Depress manual reset pushbutton on "E" panel and verify SCRAM solenoid lights illuminate Report to SRO the failure of CKT5 light on RPS Channel 12 to illuminate.
SRO PO-1.0
"* Acknowledge report from RO-CSO
"* Contact WEC and inform management of problem
"* Consult Technical Specifications to determine if an LCO is being violated.
Scenario 3 August 2002 OPERATOR ACTIONS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS As directed by Lead Evaluator Role Play: As Regional Power Control, advise the Control Room that a Severe Thunderstorm Warning has been issued by the National Weather Service for Oswego County for the next hour.
As directed by Lead Evaluator After the crew has been informed of the Thunderstorm Warning, insert malfunctions:
Breaker R1013 Trip (F3)
ED21, PB17B Fault (F3)
{Note: These malfunctions will allow the EDG to auto-start andpick up load on PB103. The loss of PB1 7B on fault requires that EDGI 03 be shut down and declared inoperable (loss of EDG Raw Water Pump). This will also affect RFP #12, CRD Pump #12 and other components.}
RO PO-2.0
- Recognize that the normal feeder to PB 103 (R1013) has tripped open and that PB 17B feeder (R1053) has tripped on fault Recognize / report EDG103 has started and is carrying PB 103 SRO
"* Acknowledge report from RO
"* Direct RO carry out actions for associated ARP's RO-BOP Execute applicable ARP actions A5-1-2
- Verify R1013 OPEN, R1032 CLOSED with EDG103 running Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: If RO calls WECiNAO to check PB17B clear of faults report that Breaker R1053 has tripped on overload. As WEC inform CREW that Electrical Maintenance will be dispatched to troubleshoot the problem.
(Note: If the operator does not verify that PBI 7B is clear offaults then R1052 will trip when it is closed.)
Role Play: As WEC/NAO inform RO that you will verify Roll-up doors are open and the EDG shutdown if contacted.
[Note: It is necessary to shutdown EDGJ03 due to loss of EDG Raw Water Pump. When EDGI03 is shutdown, A5-4-3 will alarm. This requires operator to recognize that PB] 03 is not and can not be re-energized Operator will execute steps 5.a through 5.g ofA5-4-3. PB17B and PB]03 will remain deenergized throughout the remainder of the scenario. Possible actions would be to have clearances installed preventing auto-start of EDGJ 03 then closing PB1 03 normal supply R1013.}
A5-3-7
"* Verify RI 053 OPEN
"* Verify 11 CRD in service, RBCLC Header >40 PSIG
"* Verify PB 1 7B clear of faults
"* Close A-B Tie, R1052 Inform SRO that Power Board 17B cannot be re-energized.
"* Acknowledge report from RO
"* Direct RO to shut down EDG103 using A5-4-3 or N1-OP-45 Section G.7.0 RO-BOP PO-3.0
"* Acknowledge direction from SRO
"* Shutdown EDG103 Place R1013 inPull-to-Lock Position DIESEL GEN control switch to EM STOP Verify EDG103 stops Observe output voltage and frequency lower
"* Report actions complete to SRO
"* Execute ARP A5-4-3 Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Role Play: As WEC, when contacted by SRO advise him that you will provide requested assistance. If requested to advise upper management of Technical Specification LCO and imminent shutdown acknowledge the request.
(Note: Multiple technical specifications apply.
These include: 3.1.4, 3.1.6.b, 3.3.7, 3.6.3.c, 3.1.5.6 and 3.6.2. a(6). These require that the plant be shutdown <110 PSIG within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> due to loss of equipment powered from PB103.]
OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO PO-4.0 Acknowledge report from RO Contact WEC/Management and inform them of loss of EDG 103 and PB 103.
"* Review Technical Specifications for applicable LCO Identify multiple technical specification LCOs Recognize that plant must be shutdown and less than 110 PSIG within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> Contact management and advise of imminent shutdown to satisfy LCO requirements.
"* Brief CREW on status of plant and imminent shutdown.
"* Direct RO-CSO to obtain and review N1-OP-43C section on ten hour shutdown.
Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE As Directed by Lead Evaluator Insert the following malfunction when the SRO completes briefing the crew on imminent shutdown but prior to beginning the shutdown actions:
AD05, ERV #111 Opens (F4)
AD06, ERV #111 Sticks Open (Queued)
(Note: The ER V will remain OPEN the remainder of the scenario.)
Role Play:
As WEC/Management, acknowledge report and tell SRO you will provide requested assistance for open ERV.
(Note: Depending on rate of Torus water temperature rise, the SRO may elect to insert a manual SCRAM at this point.)
OPERATOR ACTIONS CREW PO-5.0
- Recognize / report inadvertent opening of ERV #111 Report Annunciator H3-4-5 Report Reactor Power, Pressure and Level (status/trend)
SRO CT-1.O
"* Acknowledge report from RO
"* Direct RO-BOP to execute ARP H3-4-5 and carry out the actions of Ni-OP-1, Section H for Open ERV
"* Contact WEC/Management and inform them of open ERV.
"* Direct RO to monitor Torus water temperature
"* Direct RO-CSO to begin an Emergency Power Reduction per NI-OP-43B Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Role Play:
As WEC/NAO:
"* When requested to confirm ERV status, wait 2 minutes and inform RO that ERV #111 is confirmed open (NAO may be requested to check ERV status periodically).
When requested to remove fuses F1/F2, RB 237, insert remote:
AD01, ERV 111 Control Power Fuses, PULLED, TUA=4 minutes (F8)
(Note: The actions to close ER V #111 and the Emergency Power Reduction are performed concurrently. CREW may SCRAM the reactor before completing the Emergency Power Reduction on either Torus water temperature
(>110 'F) or when all attempts to close ER Vfail.}
OPERATOR ACTIONS RO-BOP PO-6.0
"* Acknowledge direction from SRO Complete ARP H3-4-5 and enter N I-OP-I for open ERV.
Confirm ERV open with NAO (check acoustic monitor)
Cycle ERV control switch on "F" panel Depress ADS timer resets Remove control power fuses in "F" panel Direct removal of fuses in panel ERV OP CH 11, RB 237 West, Fuses F l/F2 Advise SRO that all attempts to close ERV 111 are unsuccessful PO-9.0
"* Monitor Torus water temperature Advise SRO when temperature exceeds 85'F Advise SRO if temperature exceeds 110 F Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RO-CSO PO-7.0 Acknowledge direction to commence Emergency Power Reduction Obtain Emergency Power Reduction sheet from CRC Verify SRO provides reactivity oversight Adjust Master Recirculation Flow Controller to obtain 40 Mlbm/HR recirculation flowrate 0 Monitor plant response SRO PO-8.0
"* Provide reactivity oversight during emergency power reduction
"* Acknowledge report of Torus temperature
"* Enter EOP-4, Primary Containment Control Direct that all Containment Spray Pumps be locked out
" Acknowledge report that ERV #111 cannot be closed Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Scenario 3 August 2002 OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO
"* Update CREW that a manual SCRAM will be inserted Provide assignments to RO BOP and RO-CSO
"* Direct RO-CSO to insert a manual SCRAM RO-CSO PO-10.0
"* Acknowledge direction and place the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN
"* Report the Failure to Scram Depress CH ll/CH12 Reactor Trip pushbuttons Confirm RO-BOP verifies ARI initiated Provide SCRAM report
"* Reactor power/trend
"* Reactor Water Level / trend
"* Reactor Pressure, method of control and trend
"* Status of control rods
"* Status of main turbine
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (Note: At this point, the SRO is in EOP-4 and EOP-3. With the expected rod pattern achieved, power will be near 6% once RRP are tripped. The failed open ER V makes pressure control not possible. Efforts to S/D are challenged by depressurization. Priority on executing EOP-3.1 may be over-shadowed by concerns for containment (HCTL).}
RO-BOP PO-10.0
"* When Failure to Scram is announced:
Depress Manual ARI Pushbutton on "F" Panel Monitor reactor pressure, level, feed system status
"* After scram report inform SRO that ARI has been verified SRO
"* Acknowledge SCRAM report
"* Acknowledge Failure to Scram
"* Exit EOP-2, enter EOP-3, Failure to Scram SRO o
EOP-3 actions:
Direct RO-BOP to bypass ADS Determine MSIV status Verify ARI Initiated Direct Recirc flow to minimum prior to trip of pumps if turbine on line Scenario 3 August 2002 PERATOR ACTIONS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (Note. If MSIV close due to RPVLo-Lo level, they may be reopened by the CREW after installation of jumpers.}
SRO CT-2.0 Direct installation of Core Spray and MSIV (RPV-Lo2) jumpers Direct RO-CSO to execute EOP-3.1 to insert control rods Direct RO to inject Liquid Poison using LP Pump #11 Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play:
As WEC dispatch requested NAO. As NAO, when directed, wait two minutes and insert remote:
FW24, PULL HPCI FUSES (F10)
Report to RO-BOP that HPCI fuses are removed.
{Note: #12 FWP will not restart after the actions of EOP-1, Attachment 24 are completed This is due to the loss of the auxiliary oil pump. CREW may have discussed this when EDGJ 03/PB] 03 loss was addressed Pumps must be placed in PTL as power for FW IV#] 2 was lost with PBJ03/17B.}
RO CT-3.0
"* Trip all recirculation pumps
"* Maintain RPV pressure within prescribed band using EC and TBV Recognize that RPV pressure will continue to lower due to failed ERV.
Terminate and prevent injection from Condensate and Feed by executing EOP-1, Attachment 24 Place #11 and #12 FWP in Pull-To-Lock Direct NAO to pull HPCI Fuses FCV 11/12 to MAN and close Close FWP 13 BV When HPCI fuses removed, reopen FW HDR IV Report to SRO when Terminate &
Prevent is completed.
Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Note: Target level will be power-corrected level for -41 inches. When -41" reached, power is re evaluated and new level band equating to -41 " to
-84" will be provided. As level lowers, power is expected to lower. Once conditions of EOP-3 L 7 are satisfied, new level band is assigned from -41" to -109" or -84" to -109 ". Final level band will be assigned when level at -84" or reactor power less than 6% or all ER V closed with Drywell pressure < 3.5 PSIG. Given the conditions of the scenario, it is expected that level will be lowered to
-84" (TAF).
When RO starts Liquid Poison Pump #11 ensure that trigger ET02 initiates. LP Pump #11 will trip approximately 15 seconds later.
Malfunction: LP01A (ET02)
(Note: RWCU may already be isolated due to RPV Lo 2 isolations.)
Role Play:
As WEC, if contacted to lineup Alternate Liquid Poison injection inform the SRO that this will be accomplished. (Alternate LP Injection will NOT be performed.)
SRO PO-12.0
"* Acknowledge report from RO
"* Provide target level for level lowering and level control band for RO-BOP based on power correction (Table X, EOP-3)
"* Provide pressure control band /
method RO
"* When starting Liquid Poison Pump
- 11, report initial tank level and status of Clean-up isolation.
Recognize / report when LP Pump
- 11 trips SRO PO-11.0
" Acknowledge report from RO
" Contact WEC and direct that Alternate Liquid Poison Injection be lined up and trouble shooting begun on LP pump #11 Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RO-BOP CT-4.0
"* Inform SRO when target level is reached.
As directed by SRO, re-establish feed to the RPV and maintain level within provided level band.
"* Recognize / report that #12 FWP did/will not start due to loss of power to Aux Oil Pump.
"* Acknowledge report from operators Based on reported parameters, direct RO to initiate Torus Cooling in accordance with EOP-1, 6.
RO-BOP PO-6.0 Note: Loop #111 is preferred to loop #112 due to potential for "short-cycling". Loops #121/122 are
- Initiate Torus Cooling not available due to power board loss.
Due to loss of PB 103, use Containment Spray/Raw Water pumps in loop #111 or #112 Containment Spray Raw Water pump is to be started prior to the associated Containment Spray pump.
Report to SRO that Torus Cooling is in service.
Scenario 3 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR A flTIONS When the SCRAM is reset insert malfunction:
RD33A, 0, TRA=3 SEC RD33B, 0, TRA=3 SEC RD33C, 0, TRA=3 SEC RD33D, 0, TRA=3 SEC (ET03)
(ET03)
(ET03)
(ET03)
This will permit all rods to be inserted to position "00" and provide appropriate indication of a successful SCRAM "Black-Black" RO-CSO 0
E)
CT-2.0, PO-14.0 cecute EOP-3.1 Drive Rods
"* Insert RPS jumpers per Table Nl-EOP-3.1-1
"* Place the Mode Switch in REFUEL
"* Override ARI on "F" Panel
"* Raise drive pressure
"* Drive rods using EMER ROD IN Inform SRO of ability to drive control rods.
Manual SCRAM
"* Reset the SCRAM
"- When Fl-1-8, F3-1-4 and F4-1-1 clear
"* Insert a manual SCRAM Inform SRO of successful SCRAM Scenario 3 August 2002 OPERAT R ACTIONS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE TERMINATING CUE All control rods inserted to position 04 or beyond.
Primary containment parameters being controlled per EOP-4. Torus Cooling in service SRO Candidate Evaluator:
After the simulator is placed in FREEZE, direct the SRO Candidate to classify the event OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO
- Acknowledge reports from RO
- Direct RO to monitor Primary Containment Parameters When all rods are inserted, exit EOP-3, enter EOP-2 Provide RPV water level control band to RO-BOP Direct Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN Direct WEC to stop lining up for Alternate Boron Injection SRO Classify the event as an Site Area Emergency EAL 2.2.2 Scenario 3 August 2002
Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Nine Mile Point 1 Scenario No. 4 Operating Test No. 1 Examiners:
Candidates:
Objectives:
Evaluate candidates ability to perform routine operating tasks, raise and/or lower reactor power and to respond to the following failures:
- 1.
Failure Emergency Condenser 11 Steam Valve to reopen during testing.
- 2.
RPV Level transmitters fails downscale with RPS Channel 11 failure to trip
- 3.
Steam Leak in Primary Containment.
- 4.
Feedwater Flow Control Valve failures
- 5.
el instruments lock up
- 6.
ý R
l a~l Evaluate the candidates' ability to execute normal, abnormal and emergency procedures while ensuring compliance with Technical Specifications.
This scenario will be classified as an Alert, EAL 3.1.1.
Initial Conditions:
- 1.
IC 24, 100% power / 103% Rod line
- 2.
Containment Spray Pump #111 and RAW Water Pump out of service for PM's.
Turnover:
- 1.
The Plant is operating at 100% power.
- 2.
Equipment out of service:
- a. #111 Containment Spray Pump for PM.
- 3.
Complete N 1-ST-Q4 Section 8.1, Quarterly Surveillance of the Emergency Condenser isolation valves.
- 4.
All appropriate Equipment Log entries have been made.
Event Malf.
Type Event Description No.
No.
1 N
(BOP/SRO) Complete Ni-ST-Q4 Section 8.4, Quarterly Surveillance of the Emergency Condenser isolation valves.
Draft Exam Submittal Document Aug 2002 Scenario 4 Outline 1-02-033.doc NM Log # 1-02-033 Created on 08/23/02 8:24 PM Appendix D
Scenario Outline Draft Exam Submittal Document Aug 2002 Scenario 4 Outline 1-02-033.doc NM Log # 1-02-033 Created on 08/23/02 8:24 PM 2
Overrides C
(BOP) Emergency Condenser 11 Steam Supply Valve 111 fails to re-open during surveillance, requiring entry into Tech Specs.
3 RR52 I
(RO/SRO) RPS Channel #11 Hi/Lo Rosemount fails downscale RP04A with Failure of RPS Channel #11 to trip on the failure of the Rosemount Instrument. Requires manual trip of RPS Channel 11 to comply with Tech Specs.
4 EC01 C
(BOP/RO) Reactor Coolant System Leak in Containment (10%
RR29 over 8 minutes)
R (RO) Emergency Power Reduction due to leak.
6 M
(BOP/RO/SRO) Manual Scram due to rising Drywell Pressure.
7 Remotes C
Feedwater Level Control failure results in mispositioned FW FW25 flow control valves and degraded RPV injection.
FW26 8
Overrides I
(BOP/SRO) Fuel Zone Level Instruments lockup resulting in unknown RPV water level and entry into EOP-7, RPV Flooding.
9 AD07C C
(RO/SRO) ERV 113 fails to open during RPV Depressurization requiring an additional ERV to be opened.
Appendix D Form ES-D-1
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO Scenario 4 REV. 0 No. of Pages:
16 LEAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT - LOSS OF LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION RPV FLOODING PREPARER VALIDATED GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER UNIT 1 CONFIGURATION CONTROL 6?yAir/ i-2I141f211CVttA a- &'7aLýA uJh EXA-iA SECA4 S DATE DATE Th.-_.
DATE
,PI*a)*-1 -Z DATE DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length:
50 minutes The Crew assumes the shift with the plant operating at 100% power, with Containment Spray Pump #111 out of service for maintenance. The Crew performs Section 8.1 of Nl-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test. EC Steam Supply Isolation Valve 111 fails to-reopen requiring the crew to consult Technical Specifications.
Following the EC surveillance, #11 Hi/Lo Rosemount fails downscale with a failure of RPS Channel #11 to trip. The Crew consults Technical Specifications and directs the manual insertion of a SCRAM on RPS Channel #11.
After inserting the half scram, a small leak develops in the containment causing containment pressure, temperature and humidity to rise. The SRO directs a power reduction to slow the rise in the containment parameters. Upon completion of the power reduction, the leak rate increases, requiring the crew to SCRAM the Reactor. Lowering RPV water level and rising Drywell pressure force entry into EOP-2, RPV Control and EOP-4, Primary Containment Control.
When the reactor SCRAM is inserted a failure of the FWLCS occurs reducing the RPV high pressure feed sources to less than the size of the leak. This requires the crew to reduce RPV pressure to allow Core Spray to inject.
The crew will lower containment pressure / temperature by initiating Containment Sprays.
The Fuel Zone level instruments fail as all other instruments trend downscale. EOP-7, RPV FLOODING is entered.
When opening three ERV's, ERV-113 fails to open. The crew will open another ERV ensuring Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure is achieved. As RPV level is restored, level indication will become available. The crew may assess the validity of the available RPV level instrumentation, exit EOP-7 returning to EOP-2 and entering EOP-8.
Major Procedures:
EAL Classification:
Termination Criteria:
Ni-EOP-02; N1-EOP-04; N1-EOP-7; NI-EOP-08 Alert, EAL 3.1.1 The reactor is shutdown with the vessel depressurized, level being controlled with Core Spray and #12 Reactor Feed Pump, and containment parameters controlled per EOP-4.
Scenario 4 August 2002
SIMULATOR SET UP A.
IC Number:
24 B.
Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1.
Malfunctions:
- a.
RP04A - RPS Channel 11 Failure to Trip
- b.
AD07C - ERV 113 Fails to Open
- c.
RR52 - Channel 11 Hi/Lo Rosemont Fails downscale (F3)
- d.
ECO 1 - Steam Leak in Containment (10%)
(ET04)
- e.
ECO 1 - Steam Leak in Containment (0%)
(ET06)
- f.
RR29 - Recirculation Loop Rupture (LOCA), (0-21% in 3 minutes)
(ET06)
- 2.
Remotes:
- a.
FW25, Local/Manual Position of FCV #11, 15 (ET02)
- b.
FW26, Local/Manual Position of FCV #12, 15 (ET02)
- 3.
Overrides:
- a.
9S1 (EC Steam Supply Isolation Valve 111) (INOP) TUA=00:00:30 (ET03)
- b.
5A76P1 (Channel 11 Fuel Zone) (44.0)
(ET01)
- c.
5A77P1 (Channel 12 Fuel Zone) (45.0)
(ET01)
- 4.
- a.
None
- 5.
Event Triggers
- a.
ET01 - Fuel Zone equals -14, RRLFZ1 M(l) LE -14 AND RRLFZ12M(1) LE -14
- b.
ET02 - Mode Switch to Shutdown, ZDRPRUNM(2) EQ TRUE
- c.
ET03 - EC-11 Steam IV Closed, ZLECMOVG(1) EQ TRUE
- d.
ET04 - CH 11 RPS Pushbutton, ZLRP1 1F4(l) EQ FALSE
- e.
ET06 -,Containment Spray #122 Started ZDCTPMPL(5) EQ TRUE C.
Equipment Out of Service Scenario 4 August 2002
- 1.
- 111 Containment Spray Pump for Preventive Maintenance D.
Support Documentation
- 1.
Surveillance N1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves Operability Test E.
Miscellaneous
- 1.
RED DANGER Clearance Tag for #111 Containment Spray Pump (PTL)
Scenario 4 August 2002
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION 0 N
[] D DATE:
PART I:
0 Control To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SSS, SRO, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
"* Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, SRO, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
"* CSO Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SSS, SRO, STA)
"* Lit Control Room Annunciators 0
Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
0 Reactor Power = 100%
0 Loadline = 103%
Containment Spray Pump #111 Out of Service (TS 3.3.7.b)
PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
0 Complete N1-ST-Q4, Quarterly Surveillance Of The Emergency Condenser Loop 11 Isolation Valves Operability Test, Section 8.1.
PART IV:
To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
"* Review new Clearances (SSS)
Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
"* Shift Crew Composition (SSS/SRO)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SSS CRE SRO E
STA E
CSO Other Scenario 4 August 2002 II.
SHIFT:
I Scenario ID#: Scenario 4 INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened?
What we did?
Why? (Goals)
Other Options?
Scenario 4 August 2002
III.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a primary system leak into the containment, when torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell air temperature exceeds 300'F, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays, while in the safe region of the Containment Spray Initiation Limit and prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit IAW N 1-EOP-4.
CT-2.0 Given a condition with Containment Sprays operating and a Drywell Pressure lowering, the Crew will secure Containment Sprays within 3 minutes of Drywell Pressure dropping below 3.5 psig in accordance with Ni-EOP-4.
CT-3.0 Given RPV level is unknown, establish adequate core cooling by either X.
establishing RPV pressure above Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure (72
'/
psig above Torus pressure per N1-EOP-7) or restoring RPV level above TAF (-84 in per N1-EOP-2).
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Identify non-compliance with acceptance criteria for performance of N1 ST-Q4 PO-2.0 Identify limitations imposed by Technical Specifications on continued operation with an Emergency Condenser inoperable. (TS 3.1.3, 3.3.4)
PO-3.0 Recognize and respond to low reactor water level conditions / indications PO-4.0 Identify components/trip functions associated with Vessel Level Instruments (HI/LO Rosemount) and limitations imposed by Technical Specifications on continued operation with instrument(s) out of service.
(TS 3.6.2)
PO-5.0 Recognize a failure of automatic protective functions associated with the Reactor Protection System and take appropriate actions to correct /
compensate for this failure.
PO-6.0 Identify conditions requiring NRC notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72.
Scenario 4 August 2002
PO-7.0 Recognize and respond to rising pressure/temperature in the Primary Containment. (N 1-ARP-L 1, N 1-ARP-K2)
PO-8.0 Correctly identify EOP entry conditions.
PO-9.0 Assess primary containment parameters to determine if reactor coolant leakage exceeds Technical Specification limits.
PO-10.0 Recognize failure of Fuel Zone Level Instrument to provide accurate indication of RPV water level.
PO-11.0 Assess the usability / validity of RPV water level instrumentation following a RPV depressurization. (Ni -EOP-2)
PO-12.0 Assess the usability / validity of RPV water level instrumentation under varying Primary Containment conditions. (N1-EOP-2)
PO-13.0 Recognize the failure of ERV to operate as desired and take action required to establish Minimum RPV Flood Pressure during RPV Flooding.
PO-14.0 Control RPV Pressure and Level in accordance with N1-EOP-2.
PO-15.0 Recognize the need for and direct the installation ofjumpers to support Emergency Operating Procedures. (EOP-1, Attachment 4 CSIV Jumpers)
PO-16.0 Control Primary Containment Pressure and Temperature in accordance with N1-EOP-4.
PO-17.0 Given an event requiring activation of the Emergency Plan, the SRO will correctly classify the event per the EAL Matrix.
Scenario 4 August 2002
IV.
SCENARIO INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing.
As directed by Lead Evaluator Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels.
As directed by Lead Evaluator OPERATOR ACTIONS CREW
"* Walkdown panels
"* Perform annunciator checks
"* Conduct shift turnover brief
"* Assume shift, continue power operations SRO Conducts pre-evolution brief of N1-ST-Q4, Section 8.1.
- Directs performance of Nl-ST-Q4, Section 8.1.
RO PO-1.0
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO.
"* Performs Section 8.1.ofN1-ST-Q4, Reactor Coolant Isolation Valves Operability Test.
Recognizes/reports EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 111 fails to re open after being closed.
Scenario 4 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: As WEC/Management, acknowledge report from SRO and inform him that you will provide required assistance.
As directed by Lead Evaluator When TS actions have been determined for failure of EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 111 to re-open, insert Malfunction:
RR52 = TRUE (F3)
Channel 11 Hi/Lo Rosemont Fails Downscale SRO PO-2.0
"* Informs WEC/Management that EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 111 failed to re-open during surveillance.
"* References Tech Specs (TS 3.1.3 and 3.3.4) to determine appropriate action
"* Declares EC #11 inoperable RO PO-3.0
"* Responds to Annunciators Fl-1-3 and F11-2-1.
Determines Channel 11 Hi/Lo Rosemont has failed downscale.
Looks at Computer Point - W006.
"* Informs SRO of Channel 11 Hi/Lo Rosemont failure.
SRO PO-4.0
- Acknowledges report from RO
- Consults TS Table 3.6.2.a NOTE 4 for SCRAM.
Consults TS Table 3.6.2.k (1) HPCI Low Level Setpoint Consults TS Table 3.6.2.k (2) Auto Turbine Trip - only need one channel.
Directs RO to insert a half scram on RPS Channel "A" Scenario 4 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify ET04 malfunction inserts when half-scram inserted.
EC Steam Leak Inside Containment, 0 - 10% over 8 minutes Role Play: As WEC, inform SRO that I&C will investigate the failure of 36-03A.
As directed by Lead Evaluator RO PO-5.0
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO.
"* Inserts half scram on RPS Channel "A".
SRO PO-6.0
"* Requests WEC contact I&C for assistance in determining cause/
corrective action for instrument.
"* Inform Management of failed instrument.
RO/CSO PO-7.0
"* Recognizes/reports Annunciator L 1-4-4, Drywell-Torus Temp Hi.
"* Recognizes/reports Annunciator K2-4-3, Drywell Press Hi.
"* Informs SRO of rising Drywell temperature and pressure.
SRO PO-8.0 Acknowledges report from RO.
Directs RO to conduct an emergency power reduction with Recirculation flow.
Provides oversight for reactivity change.
Scenario 4 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: The Reactor may automatically scram on high Drywell pressure (Note: SRO may enter EOP-4 at this point depending on actual Drywell pressure/temperature conditions.)
Verify remotes:
FW25, #11 FCV, 15%
FW26, #12 FCV, 15%
(ET02)
(ET02)
(Note: This remote simulates a failure of the FWLCS level/flow setpoint controller. )
RO-CSO
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO.
"* Reduces Recirculation flow to approximately 40x1 06 ibm/hr.
RO PO-8.0
- Recognizes/reports continued rise in Drywell parameters (temperature and pressure).
SRO PO-8.0 PO-9.0
"* Acknowledges report from RO.
"* Directs RO to manually SCRAM the reactor due to rate of Drywell temperature/pressure rise.
RO-CSO
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO.
"* Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
"* Provides SCRAM report:
Mode Switch position RPV pressure (value and trend)
RPV level (value and trend)
Reactor power and control rod position
"* Performs appropriate actions from NI-SOP-1 and N1-SOP-4 Scenario 4 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When Drywell pressure reaches 3.5 PSIG enters EOP-4 and reenters EOP-2 on High Drywell Pressure.
"* Report failure of #11 and #12 Flow Control Valves
"* Recognize / report High Drywell Pressure containment isolations SRO
"* Enters EOP-2 and directs control of RPV level and pressure.
Directs RPV level control band and method.
Directs RPV pressure control band and method.
"* Acknowledges report of FCV failure.
"* Enters EOP-4 and directs that Containment Spray pumps be placed in "Pull-to-Lock"
"* Contact WEC and requests operators assigned to take manual control of FCV.
RO PO-14.0
"* Takes appropriate actions to maintain RPV level within assigned band.
"* Takes appropriate actions to maintain RPV pressure in assigned band.
"* Places Containment Spray pumps in "Pull-to-Lock" Scenario 4 August 2002 OPERATOR ACTIONS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When Torus Pressure > 13 PSIG or prior to Drywell temperature reaching 300'F Verify Malfunctions:
ECO1, 0%
RR29, 21% over 3 mins.
(ET06)
(ET06)
These malfunctions to be active when Containment Spray initiates.
SRO CT-1.0
- Direct initiation of Containment Sprays IAW EOP-1, Attachment 17 Verifies plant within CSIL Directs verification that recirculation pumps are tripped Directs verification that all Drywell cooling fans are tripped Directs RO to spray the containment Directs RO to secure Containment Sprays when Drywell pressure reaches 3.5 PSIG RO CT-1.0
"* Verifies RRP are tripped
"* Verifies Drywell Cooling Fans tripped
"* Operates Containment Sprays lAW EOP-1, Attachment 17 RO O
RO CT-2.0 Secures Containment Sprays when Drywell pressure reaches 3.5 PSIG Recognize / report that level continues to lower Scenario 4 August 2002 OPERAT R ACTI NS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (As FZWLI reach -14 inches, both FZWLI channels will 'freeze" at approximately -15 inches.)
Verify Malfunction/Override:
5A76P1, 44.0, Channel 11 Fuel Zone 5A77P1, 44.0, Channel 12 Fuel Zone (ETO1)
"* Acknowledges report from RO
"* Recognizes that leak is greater than capacity of available makeup sources
"* Directs RO to monitor level and report when RPV Level is -84 inches by Fuel Zone Level Indication RO PO-10.0
"* Recognize / report failure of Fuel Zone Level Instruments
"* Recognize / report loss of level indication SRO Acknowledge report from RO
"* Recognize override satisfied for entry to EOP-7, RPV Flooding Inform CREW of intent to enter EOP-7 Assign responsibilities for EOP-7 actions
"* Verifies Torus Water Level > 8.0 FT
"* Directs RO to open 3 ERV RO PO-13.0
"* Opens 3 - ERV using preferred sequence
"* Recognize / report that ERV #113 did not open
"* Opens a third ERV
"* Reports that 3 - ERV are open Scenario 4 August 2002 OPERAT R ACTIONS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (SRO may direct that Core Sprayjumpers per EOP 1, Attachment 4 be installed to permit throttling of Core Spray IV)
SRO 0
RO 0
CT-3.0 SRO PO-15.0 Direct RO to install Core Spray jumpers per EOP-1, Attachment 4 if required to maintain RPV Pressure 72 PSIG above Torus pressure.
Install Core Spray jumpers per EOP-1, 0 Monitor RPV pressure and ERV status RO PO-11.0
- Recognize / report when vessel level instrumentation begins to rise Scenario 4 August 2002 OPERAT R ACTIONS
"* Acknowledge report from RO
"* Directs RO to establish RPV pressure 72 PSIG above Torus pressure using:
3-ERVopen CRD, Condensate/Feed and Core Spray RO When RPV pressure < 365 PSIG, recognize / report that Core Spray begins to inject
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (If RP V level instrumentation is responding in uniform manner with no indication offlashing, it may be used to determine RPV water level. This will permit SRO to exit EOP-7 and return to EOP-2 and enter EOP-8.}
Role Play: If contacted as System Engineer, respond that level instruments may be used if tracking in uniform and expected manner.
Terminating Cues:
"* RPV depressurized.
"* RPV level being controlled with Core Spray, CRD and Condensate/Feed.
"* Containment sprays secured with parameters controlled per EOP-4 SRO Candidate Evaluator:
After the simulator is placed in FREEZE, direct the SRO Candidate to classify the event SRO PO-11 PO-12
"* Acknowledge report of vessel level instrumentation response
"* Assess validity of level instrumentation to determine RPV water level.
Determine if instrument response uniform/consistent SRO CT-3.0
"* If level instruments are determined to be valid, exit EOP-7, enter EOP-8 and return to EOP-2 at (
"* Restore and maintain RPV water level above TAF (above -84 inches).
SRO PO-17.0 0 Classify the event as an Alert EAL 3.1.1 Scenario 4 August 2002
Scenario Outline Nine Mile Point I Scenario No. 5 Operating Test No. 1 (Alternate)
Examiners:
Candidates:
Objectives:
Evaluate candidates ability to perform routine operating tasks, raise and/or lower reactor power and to respond to the following failures:
- 1.
Loss of #11 Reactor Building EVS fan, due to flow controller failure
- 2.
Emergency Condenser #12 Condensate Return Valve fails open,
- 3.
Fuel Failure,
- 4.
Earthquake that damages plant equipment,
- 5.
A RWCU leak,
- 6.
Core Spray inside IV's failure to open.
Evaluate the candidates' ability to execute normal, abnormal and emergency procedures while ensuring compliance with Technical Specifications.
This scenario will be classified as an Alert per EAL 3.1.1 and EAL 8.4.6 Initial Conditions:
- 1.
IC 8, 48% power during power ascension.
- 2.
EDG 102 OOS for oil change, clearance hung.
Turnover:
- 1.
EDG 102 is out of service under clearance for an oil change.
- 2.
Continue startup to raise power to 55% using recirculation flow.
- 3.
Once at 55% power perform N1-ST-M8 Section 8.1 RB EVS Operability for Loop
- 11.
- 4.
All appropriate Equipment Log entries have been made.
Event Malf. No.
Type Event Description No.
1 R
(RO/SRO) Raise Recirc flow to achieve 55% power (BOP) Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System 2
N (RBEVS) Operability, Nl-ST-M8, Section 8.1 for Loop #11.
Overrides C
(RO/SRO) #11 RBEVS Flow Controller Failure. System will be returned to standby lineup.
Draft Exam Submittal Document Aug 2002 Scenario 5 Outline 1-02-034.doc Created on 08/21/02 7:09 AM Appendix D Form ES-D-1
Scenario Outline Draft Exam Submittal Document Aug 2002 Scenario 5 Outline 1-02-034.doc Created on 08/21/02 7:09 AM EC03B (BOP/SRO) Emergency Condenser (EC) #12 Condensate 4
C Return Valve fails open, resulting in a power excursion.
Requires EC to be isolated and Tech Spec entry.
RX01 (RO/BOP) Fuel Failure (50% over 10 minutes) resulting from 5
C EC transient. Offgas and Main Steam Line radiation levels rise. Manual scram will be initiated.
PC05 (RO/BOP/SRO) Seismic Event results in Reactor Water 6
CU01 M
Cleanup leak (100% over 5 minutes) and a Feedwater line FW31 Break outside the Drywell, results in loss of Feedwater.
Overrides/
C (BOP/SRO) Core Spray inside IV's fail to open requiring 7
Jumpers manual action to open IV's to recover RPV water level above installed top of active fuel.
Appendix D Form ES-D-1
NMP 1 SIMULATOR SCENARIO Scenario 5 (Alternate)
REV. 0 No. of Pages:
20 FUEL FAILURE/RPV LEAK INTO CONTAINMENT REQUIRES USE OF DRYWELL SPRAY AND CORE SPRAY TO CONTROL RPV AND CONTAINMENT PARAMETERS PREPARER VALIDATED GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER UNIT 1 CONFIGURATION CONTROL 1~.yd)I
)t~!kYW C,-
."W DATE
__l__.-__i_
DATE
) 2-l2oZ.
DATE el; 7 DATE DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length:
75 minutes The crew assumes the shift with the plant operating at approximately 50% power, EDG 102 out of service for maintenance.
The crew raises power to 55% using Recirculation flow. Following the power rise, the crew performs Section 8.1, of N1 ST-M8, Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System Operability Test. The #11 RBEVS flow controller fails resulting in low loop flow. The crew will assess the condition and declare the loop inoperable per Technical Specification 3.4.4.
Following the RBEVS condition, the condensate return valve for EC #12 fails open causing an increase in reactor power and associated fuel damage. The crew will be unable to close the condensate return valve and will secure the EC using the steam isolation valve(s). Increased radiation levels from the fuel failure may result in the crew inserting a manual scram and vessel isolation.
A seismic event occurs causing a leak inside the primary containment (from Reactor Water Cleanup) and outside the primary containment (Feedwater Header rupture). The Feedwater rupture causes a loss of feed. Damage is also sustained by the Core Spray Isolation Valves preventing automatic operation.
A High Drywell Pressure condition forces entry into EOP-4, Primary Containment Control. Degrading conditions require the use of Containment Spray to control Drywell pressure and Core Spray to restore and maintain RPV water level. Level restoration is further complicated by the failure of the Core Spray IVs to automatically open. The crew is required to manually open these valves from the Control Room to restore/maintain RPV water level.
Major Procedures:
EAL Classification:
N1-ST-M8; N1-OP-13; Ni-SOP-1, 2 & 4; N1-EOP-2, 4 & 8 Alert, EAL 3.1.1 and/or EAL 8.4.6 Termination Criteria:
Reactor shutdown and depressurized with RPV level and Primary Containment parameters maintained within the proscribed bands.
Scenario 5 August 2002
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number:
8, 48% Power B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. EC03B - EC 12 Condensate Return Line IV Fails Open (F3)
- b. RX01 - Cladding Failure (0-50% in 10 minutes)
(F3)
- c. PC05 - Seismic Event Triggered (F4)
- d. CUO 1 - RWCU leak inside the Drywell (0-100% in 5 minutes)
(F4)
- e. FW31 - FW line break outside the Drywell (F4)
- 2. Remotes:
- a. IAO 1 - Instrument Air Supply to Breathing Air (OPEN)
Preset
- 3. Overrides:
- a.
11 A1OP1, 5L12/202-49C SETPT R1, Final=0.0, Ramp=00:00:03 (ET01)
- b.
1A4S24 - DIESEL GEN 102 CONTROL, POS_1 Preset
- c.
1A4S14 - DG OUTPUT BKR 1022 CTL SW OFF, POSi Preset
- f.
12BNJ1 18 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE, IN Preset
- i.
12BNJ125 - EOP JUMPER FOR CS VALVE, IN Preset
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. A4-12, A4-2-4, DSL-GEN 102 R1022 TRIP CONT. VOLT.
- 5. Event Triggers:
- a. ET01 - EVTRG "RBEVS Start", ZLHVF53R(1) EQ TRUE C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. EDG 102 for an oil change.
D. Support Documentation
- 1. N1-ST-M8, Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System Operability Test E. Miscellaneous Scenario 5 August 2002
- 1. RED Clearance/Danger Tag on EDG 102 Control Switch
- 2. RED Clearance/Danger Tag on EDG 102 Output Breaker, R1022
- 3. BREATHING AIR COMP in PTL with Yellow Clearance hung
- 4. Reactivity Manipulation Request (RMR) for raising power to 55% using Recirculation flow adjustment.
Scenario 5 August 2002
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION SHIFT:
[IN 11 D DATE:
PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
"* Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, SRO, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
"* CSO Log (CSO) 9 LCO Status (SSS, SRO, STA)
"* Lit Control Room Annunciators 9 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
"* Reactor Power = 48% during power ascension
"* Emergency Diesel Generator 102 out of service, under clearance, for oil an change.
"* All appropriate Equipment log entries have been made.
PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
"* Raise reactor power to 55% with Recirculation flow.
"* Perform Section 8.1. Operation Of RBEVS Loop 11, of N1-ST-M8, Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System Operability Test PART IV:
To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
"* Review new Clearances (SSS)
Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
"* Shift Crew Composition (SSS/SRO)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SSS CRE SRO E
STA E
CSO
_Other Scenario 5 August 2002 II.
Scenario ID#: Scenario 5 1
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
Scenario 5 August 2002 What Happened?
What we did?
Why? (Goals)
Other Options?
III.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a primary system leak into the containment, when torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell air temperature exceeds 300'F, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays, while in the safe region of the Containment Spray Initiation Limit and prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit IAW NI-EOP-4.
CT-2.0 Given degraded RPV injection sources the crew will depressurize the RPV and inject with Preferred and Alternate Injection Systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above -109 inches IAW N1-EOP-2.
CT-3.0 Given a condition with Containment Sprays operating and a Drywell Pressure lowering, the Crew will secure Containment Sprays within 3 minutes of Drywell Pressure dropping below 3.5 psig in accordance with N1 -EOP-4.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Raise reactor power using Recirculation flow adjustments while maintaining power and flow within proscribed limits in accordance with N1-OP-43B and N1-OP-1.
PO-2.0 Respond to an inadvertent initiation of an Emergency Condenser during power operations in accordance with N1-OP-13.
PO-3.0 Identify limitations imposed by Technical Specifications resulting from a failure of RBEVS Operability Surveillance NI-ST-M8. (TS 3.4.4)
PO-4.0 Recognize an unplanned change in reactor power in accordance with Ni-SOP-2.
PO-5.0 Identify the occurrence of Fuel Damage by monitoring process radiation instruments (Off-gas, MSL Radiation, etc.).
PO-6.0 Respond to High Main Steam Line radiation levels in accordance with NI-ARP-F1/F4 (F 1-2-7).
Scenario 5 August 2002
B. Performance Objectives: (cont.)
PO-7.0 Respond to a Seismic Event in accordance with NI-SOP-11.
PO-8.0 Recognize the failure of Core Spray isolation valves to automatically open at 365 PSIG.
PO-9.0 Identify Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) entry conditions.
PO-10.0 Given an event requiring activation of the Emergency Plan, the SRO will correctly classify the event per the EAL Matrix.
Scenario 5 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing.
Allow no more than 5 minutes to walk down the panels.
As directed by Lead Evaluator CREW
"* Walk down panels.
"* Perform Annunciator checks.
"* Conduct shift turnover brief.
"* Assume the shift and continue power operations.
SRO PO-1.0
"* Provides reactivity brief of intended power manipulation.
"* Directs RO/CSO to raise Reactor power to 55% by raising Recirculation flow (N1-OP-43B).
SRO provides reactivity oversight during the Recirculation Flow adjustment.
Scenario 5 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RO-CSO
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO.
"* Raises Reactor power to 60% by raising Recirculation flow.
Monitors computer point C875 using VAL DISP on SPDS monitor Verifies response of Recirculation Master Flow Controller, nuclear instrumentation and FWLCS Coordinates with RO-BOP the monitoring of RPV water level and individual Recirculation Pumps to power change.
Verifies power/flow conditions on 5-Loop Power to Flow Map on "E" panel As directed by Lead Evaluator SRO Power manipulation completed.
Directs performance of Nl-ST-M8, Section 8.1.
Scenario 5 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Three seconds after operator starts EVS #11 Fan, System #11 flow will degrade to 0 SCFM. This causes annunciator LI-1-6 to alarm. The fan will not trip on this malfunction. The operator is expected to recognize the failure to achieve desired flow and execute the ARP.
Event Trigger: ZLHVF53R(1)=TRUE Override: llA10P1, Value 0.0, Ramp 3 sec.
RBEVS System #11 Low Flow SRO may direct shutdown of EVS Fan #11 rather than execution of ARP.
Note: If required, provide computer point B 101, EMER VENT FAN 11/12 FLOW LOW Scenario 5 August 2002 OPERATOR ACTIONS RO PO-3.0
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO.
"* Performs Section 8.1 of Nl-ST-M8, Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System Operability Test.
Reviews procedure Establishes valve lineup Starts EVS Fan #11 Observes flow begin to rise on fan start then degrade to approximately 0 SCFM over 3 seconds.
Annunciator Ll-l-6, EMER VENT SYS EXH FLOW LOW FILTER AP, alarms Reports failure of EVS #11 to attain desired flow to SRO.
"* Acknowledges report from RO-BOP
"* Directs execution of ARP.
RO-BOP Executes L1-1-6 ARP Confirms alarm Determines that flow is low Places RBEVS flow controller in manual and attempts to establish 1600 CFM flow
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Role Play: If contacted by SRO, as WEC/Management, acknowledge the problem and inform the SRO that you will provide assistance.
As directed by Lead Evaluator Insert the following Malfunctions:
EC03B=TRUE RX01 (0 to 50% in 10 minutes)
(F3)
(F3)
EC 12Condensate Return Valve Fails Open, Fuel Damage Note: Power increase will exceed 2%
SRO may direct operator to close either/both EC
- 12 STEAM ISOL valve(s).
Role Play: As WEC/Management, acknowledge report from SRO and respond that you will provide assistance.
SRO may direct RO-BOP to monitor Off-gas/MSL Radiation levels on "G " or "J" panels SRO
"* Evaluates failure of flow controller to perform intended function
"* Reviews Technical Specification 3.4.4 and declares EVS loop #11 inoperable
"* Contacts WEC/Management and informs them of problem and requests assistance RO PO-2.0
- Report Annunciator K 1-1-5, EMER COND CONDEN RET ISOL VALVE 12 OPEN RO-CSO PO-4.0 Monitor Reactor Power (APRM) and observe/report rise in power to SRO SRO
"* Acknowledge report from operators
"* Direct execution of ARP Kl-1-5 or direct RO-BOP to secure EC #12
"* Direct RO-CSO to execute Nl-SOP-2 for Unplanned Power Change
"* Notify WEC/Management of initiation of EC #12 Scenario 5 August 2002 OPERATOR ACTIONS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Operators should observe rising trends in AE/OG and MSL radiation levels prior to receipt of annunciators F17-2-7/F4-2-2.
SRO may direct initiation of manual scram prior to annunciator F1 7/F4-2-2.
F1-2-7/F4-2-2 alarm RO-CSO
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO.
"* Enters and executes NI-SOP-2.
RO-BOP
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO.
"* Monitors Air Ejector/Off-gas and MSL radiation instruments on "G" and "J" panels.
RO PO-6.0
- Report receipt of MSL High Radiation annunciators to SRO RO-BOP
"* Confirm alarm(s) by computer point and MSL Radiation Monitor indications
"* Report confirmation to SRO SRO PO-5.0
"* Acknowledge report from crew of High MSL Radiation Levels
" Direct execution of ARP When alarm confirmed direct RO CSO to insert a manual SCRAM and manual Vessel Isolation Assign RO-BOP to monitor and maintain RPV level on SCRAM Scenario 5 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS As directed by Lead Evaluator After RO-CSO completes SCRAM report, insert the following Malfunctions:
PC05, Seismic Event (F4)
CU01, RWCU Leak (100%/10 minutes) (F4)
FW31, FW Line Break (F4)
RO-CSO
"* Acknowledge direction to SCRAM
"* Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
"* Provides SCRAM report:
Mode Switch position RPV pressure (value and trend)
RPV level (value and trend)
Reactor power and control rod position Performs appropriate actions from Ni-SOP-1 and N1-SOP-4.
SRO PO-10.0
- Based on reports from crew, enter EOP-2 on low RPV water level Provide level restoration band to RO-BOP Provide pressure control band and method to RO CREW PO-7.0 Report receipt of annunciator H2-1-6, SEISMIC DETECTION EQUIPMENT to SRO Scenario 5 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play:
As WEC, respond that you will provide required assistance
- As JAF/NMP2 confirm that seismic event has occurred If contacted as I&C or other plant departments respond in kind.
(Note: Due to the relativelyfast pace of Drywell and RPV issues, the actions of SOP-I 1 are not expected to be completed during this scenario.)
Note: RO-BOP actions may be done concurrently with RO-CSO.
Note: Drywell pressure rise may be sufficiently quick to reach EOP entry condition.
Turbine Building area fire alarms may be received due to the feed line rupture.
"* Acknowledge report from crew.
"* Direct execution of N1-SOP-1I RO-CSO
"* Acknowledge direction from SRO
"* Execute Ni-SOP-1I Contact JAF/NMP2 to confirm Contact WEC for assistance with operators, DER, I&C actions of SOP-11 Execute "A" path of SOP-11 RO-BOP
- Confirm Seismic Event on "J" panel RO 0
PO-10.0 Recognizes/reports Annunciator K2-4-3, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH-LOW.
Recognizes/reports rising Drywell pressure and temperature / EOP entry condition (PCP)
RO Recognize/report Fire Alarm Panel alarms.
Scenario 5 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (Fire zone involved is not a "Safe Shutdown" area.
Entry into SOP-9 may/may not be directed at this time.)
{The SRO may not accomplish this during the scenario.)
Note: IfARP for High-High MSL Radiation was executed, the MSIVs will already be Scenario 5 SRO
"* Acknowledge fire report from RO
"* Direct RO to identify fire zone involved Direct RO to contact Fire Chief and make plant announcement regarding fire alarm.
- Recognizes/reports the following:
Loss of Feed flow to RPV MSIV Closure on high Main Steam Tunnel temperature SRO PO-10.0
"* Acknowledges report from RO.
"* Enters N1-EOP-2 based on low RPV level.
"* Enters EOP-4 on High Drywell Pressure
"* Recognizes loss of adequate high pressure injection into RPV.
Assigns RPV pressure control with ECs.
Assigns RPV level control with Core Spray.
"* Acknowledge direction from SRO
"* Report degrading RPV level and lowering RPV pressure August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Report rising Drywell pressure /
temperature SRO CT-1.0
"* Acknowledge reports from CREW
"* Direct RO to monitor containment parameters
- Direct RO to initiate Containment Sprays IAW EOP-1, Attachment 17 when Torus pressure exceeds 13 PSIG or prior to Drywell temperature reaching 300oF
Direct RO to bypass ADS Direct RO to initiate EC Assess RPV level and trend to determine if lineup of alternate injection systems required.
RO CT-1.0
" Acknowledge direction from SRO Continue monitoring containment parameters Report Torus pressure / Drywell temperature When directed, initiate containment spray IAW EOP-1, 7 Scenario 5 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RO
"* Acknowledge direction from SRO Bypass ADS Verify initiation of EC's
"* Monitor RPV parameters Report continued lowering level SRO
"* Acknowledge reports from CREW
"* Assesses RPV level conditions and determines:
Core Spray availability /
operability Level trend When level reaches -84 inches that Core Spray system #11 and #12 are running Entry to EOP-8 is required to permit Core Spray to inject to restore level.
Scenario 5 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO PO-10.0
"* Update/brief crew on intent to Blowdown
"* Provides assignments
"* Directs RO to prepare to install Core Spray IV jumpers per EOP-1, Enter EOP-8, RPV Blowdown Assess Drywell pressure Direct EC Initiation Assess Torus water level Direct RO to open 3 - ERVs RO
"* Obtainjumpers and EOP-1,
"* When directed, install jumpers Scenario 5 August 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE The Core Spray IV will not automatically open due to the override on EOP jumpers.
RO CT-2.0
"* Acknowledge direction from SRO
"* Open 3 - ERVs Verify ERV open Monitor status of Core Spray Isolation Valves
"* Recognize / report failure of Core Spray IV to open when RPV pressure less than 365 PSIG "o Manually attempts to open Core Spray IV "o Reports successful injection of Core Spray to RPV SRO
"* Acknowledges report from RO
"* Directs RO to restore RPV level IAW EOP-1, Attachment 4 using Core Spray Assign level band and target level
"* When RPV level is > TAF, direct RO to install Core Spray IV jumpers per EOP-1, Attachment 4 RO
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO
"* Operates Core Spray IV per EOP-1, to restore level to prescribed band Scenario 5 August 2002 OPERATOR ACTIONS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Terminating Cue
"* Core Spray injecting to maintain RPV water level
"* RPV Depressurized
"* Containment parameters controlled per EOP-4 SRO Candidate Evaluator:
After the simulator is placed in FREEZE, direct the SRO Candidate to classify the event RO CT-3.0
"* Acknowledges direction from SRO
"* Installs Core Spray jumpers per EOP 1, Attachment 4
"* Terminates Containment Sprays when Drywell pressure reaches 3.5 PSIG SRO PO-10.0 Classify the event as an Alert, EAL 3.1.1 and/or EAL 8.4.6 Scenario 5 August 2002