ML022890083
| ML022890083 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/2002 |
| From: | Caniano R, Grobe J Division of Reactor Safety III |
| To: | Skolds J Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| 50-456/02301, 50-457/02301, ES-201-2, ES-301, ES-301-1, ES-301-2 | |
| Download: ML022890083 (58) | |
Text
EXAMINATION OUTLINES AND NRC COMMENTS FOR THE BRAIDWOOD INITIAL EXAMINATION - JULY 2002
Exelkn,.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC www.exeloncorp.com Nuclear Braidwood Station 35100 South Rt 53, Suite 84 Braceville, I L 60407-9619 Tel. 815-458-2801 March 21, 2002 BW020023 James E. Dyer Regional Administrator Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351 Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457
Subject:
Submittal of Integrated Initial License Training Examination Outline Enclosed are the examination outlines, supporting the Initial License Examination scheduled for the weeks of July 8, 2002, through July 19, 2002, at Braidwood Station.
This submittal includes all appropriate Examination Standard forms and outlines in accordance with NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards," Revision 8, Supplement 1.
In accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1, Section ES-201, "Initial Operator Licensing Examination Process," please ensure that these materials are withheld from public disclosure until after the examinations are complete.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Amy Ferko, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 417-2699. For questions concerning examination outlines, please contact Mark Olson at (815) 458-7829.
Respectfully, es D. von Suskil t Vice President Braidwood Station
March 21, 2002 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2
Enclosures:
(Hand delivered to Mike Bielby, Chief Examiner, NRC Region Ill)
Examination Security Agreements (Form ES-201-3)
Administrative Walk-Through Job Performance Measures Sample Plan (Form ES-301-1)
Control Room Systems and Facility Walk-Through Test Outline (Form ES-301-2)
SRO Written Exam Sample Plan (Forms ES-401-1 or ES-401-3 and ES-401-5)
RO Written Exam Sample Plan (Forms ES-401-2 or ES-401-4 and ES-401-5)
Operational Scenarios Sample Plan (Form ES-D-1)
Record of Rejected K/As (Form ES-401-10)
Completed Checklists:
Examination Outline Quality Checklist (Form ES-201-2)
Transient and Event Checklist (Form ES-301-5) cc:
(without attachments)
Chief, NRC Operator Licensing Branch NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Braidwood Station
ES-201 Examination Outline Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: BRAIDWOOD Date of Examination: 0718-19/02 Initials Item Task Description a
b*
c#
- 1.
- a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model per ES-401.
W R
- b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with
.f)
I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all KA categories are appropriately sampled.
T.
T c.Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
N
- d. Assess whether the justification for deselected or rejected'K/A statemr e'nts are appropriate.
-nD
- 2.
- a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, and major transients.
S I
- b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number and M
mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule without compromising exam integrity; ensure each applicant can be tested using at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s)*,
and scenarios will not be repeated over successive days.
- c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
- 3.
- a. Verify that:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks, W
(2) no more than 30% of the test material is repeated from the last NRC examination,
/
(3)* no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s), and P
T (4) no more than 80% of any operating test is taken directly from the licensee's exam banks.
- b. Verify that:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the safety function groupings as specified in ES-301, (2) one task is conducted in a low-power or shutdown condition, (3) 40% of the tasks require the applicant to implement an alternate path procedure, (4) one in-plant task tests the applicant's response to an emergency or abnormal condition, and (5) the in-plant walk-through requires the applicant to enter the RCA.
- c. Verify that the required administrative topics are covered, with emphasis on performance-based 1
- d. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on successive days.
- 4.
- a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam section.A&
P G
E
- b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
N E
- c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.
R A
- d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.
L r
- e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
A
!kO P inte Name/ Si Du te
- a. Author MARK G. OLSON /
- b. Facility Reviewer (*)
TERRY D'ORAZIO /
- c. NRC Chief Examiner(#)
01 w
akt/
/
- d. NRC Supervisor D
ý aa 7
l
_Z NOTE:
- Not applicable for NRC-developed examinations.
- Independent NRC Reviewer initial items in Column "c' chief examiner concurrence required.
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 ES-201
,'.,.t*', t :[.*i*t:i fL,...
23 of 24
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Braidwood Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination: 07108-19/02 Examination Level (circle one): SRO Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Describe method of evaluation:
Topic/Subject
- 2. TWO Administrative Questions A.1 Conduct of S-42 (Modified Simulator JPM)
Operations-K/A 2.1.7 Imp Factor '4.4 Review Calorimetric Conduct of (new) (Simulator JPM).
Operations-K/A 2.1.33 Imp Factor 4.0 Review QPTR Calculation A.2 Equipment (new) (Simulator JPM)
Control-K/A 2.2.13 Imp Factor 3.8 Review BDPS Out of Service A.3 Radiation S-41 (Modified Simulator JPM)
Control-K/A 2.3.6 Imp Factor 3.1 Review a Release Package A.4 Emergency S-05 (Simulator JPM)
Plan-K/A 2.4.30 Imp Factor 3.6 Classify and Screen Event for Reportability 21 of 26 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
ES-301 Control Room Systems and Facility Walk-Through Test Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Braidwood Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination: 07/08-19/02 Exam Level (circle one): SRO Operating Test Number: I B.1 Control Room Systems System / JPM Title Type Safety Code*
Function
- a. ECCS / Increase SI Accumulator Pressure D, S 3
N-03 K/A 006A4.02 4.0/3.8 L
N-84 K/A 064A4.09 3.2/3.3 L
- c. Emergency Boration / Perform Emergency Boration M, A 1
N-27C K/A 024AA1.17 3.9/3.9 S, L
- d. RCS / Excess Letdown Operations N, A 2
(new) K/A 002K1.06 3.7/4.0 S
N-118 K/A 008K1.04 3.3/3.3 S
- f. PRT/ Drain the Pressurizer Relief Tank D, S 5
N-119 K/A 007A1.01 2.9/3.1
- g. SG / AFW Check Valve Leakage N, A, 4p (new) K/A 035K1.01 4.2/4.5 S
B.2 Facility Walk-Through
- a. ESW / Align Fire Protection Cooling to CV Pump after loss of SX N, R 4s N-138 K/A 076AK3.03 4.0/4.2
- b. APE / Locally Align the Fire Hazzards Panel D, R 7
N-34 K/A 068AA1.03 4.1/4.3
2 N-91 K/A 013A4.02 4.3/4.4
- Type Codes: (D)irect from bank, (M)odified from bank, (N)ew, (A)Iternate path, (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, (L)ow Power, (R)CA 22 of 26 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Braidwood Units I and 2 Date of Examination: 07/08-19/02 Examination Level (circle one): RO Operating Test Number: I Administrative Describe method of evaluation:
Topic/Subject
- 2. TWO Administrative Questions A-.
Conduct of (new) (Simulator JPM)
Operations-K/A 2.1.18 Imp Factor 2.9 Perform Unit Common Shiftly Daily Rounds Conduct of N-18 (SimulatorJPM),
Operations-K/A 2.1.19 Im pFactor 3.0 Perform QPTR Calculation A.2 Equipment (new) (Simulator JPM)
Control-K/A 2.2.12 Imp Factor 3.0 Perform 1 CS007A Valve Stroke Surveillance A.3 Radiation N-32 (Simulator JPM)
Control-K/A 2.3.11 Imp Factor 2.7 Perform RM-1 1 Setpoint Change for Rad Release A.4 Emergency N-1 60 (Simulator JPM)
Plan-K/A 2.4.29 Imp Factor 2.6 Activate Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) 21 of 26 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
ES-301 Control Room Systems and Facility Walk-Through Test Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Braidwood Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination: 07/08-19102 Exam Level (circle one): RO Operating Test Number: 1 B.1 Control Room Systems System / JPM Title Type Safety Code*
Function
- a. ECCS / Increase SI Accumulator Pressure D, S 3
N-03 K/A 006A4.02 4.0/3.8 L
- b.
EDG / Synchronize a SAT to a bus being fed by a Diesel D, S 6
N-84 K/A 064A4.09 3.2/3.3 L
- c. Emergency Boration / Perform Emergency Boration M, A 1
N-27C K/A 024AA1.17 3.9/3.9 S, L
- d.
RCS / Excess Letdown Operations N, A 2
(new) K/A 002K1.06 3.7/4.0 S
N-118 K/A 008K1.04 3.3/3.3 S
- f. PRT/ Drain the Pressurizer Relief Tank D, S 5
N-119 K/A007A1.01 2.9/3.1
- g. SG / AFW Check Valve Leakage N, A, 4p (new) K/A 035K1.01 4.2/4.5 S
B.2 Facility Walk-Through
- a. ESW / Align Fire Protection Cooling to CV Pump after loss of SX N, R 4s N-138 K/A 076AK3.03 4.0/4.2
- b. APE / Locally Align the Fire Hazzards Panel D, R 7
N-34 K/A 068AA1.03 4.1/4.3
2 N-91 K/A 013A4.02 4.3/4.4
- Type Codes: (D)irect from bank, (M)odified from bank, (N)ew, (A)lternate path, (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, (L)ow Power, (R)CA 22 of 26 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Sfmtilation Facility Braidwood Scenario No. 1 Operating Test No. 2002 Examiners:
Applicant:
SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions:
, 90% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state Turnover: 90% power, steady state operating conditions. IA CS Pump is OOS for a motor bearing replacement.
1D CD/CB pump is OOS for an alignment and vibration problem. Load was reduced from 100% power due to CB pump suction strainer delta-p. Further load reduction is anticipated to allow isolating and flushing of the 1 C CB Pump suction strainer.
Event Malf. No.
Event Event No.
Type*
Description Preload RP01 M RO Failure of RTB A&B to auto AND manual open. (can be opened locally)
SRO IACSpump OOS CS01A BOP Failure of CS and Phase B to Actuate on Hi-3 Cnmt Press. Train B must be manually started from the MCR FW22D 1D CD/CB pump OOS Preload (preload note)
C RO 1 SI8801A will not auto open nor open from the MCB SRO 1 SI8801B will not open automatically. Will open manually from MCB 1
N BOP Ramp down turbine power to 900 Mwe at directed MW/min SRO R RO Lower reactor power using rods and/or boration.
SRO 2
NI09A I RO Power Range N-41 fails high.
SRO 3
FW22B C BOP Trip of 1 C CD/CB Pump. Standby CD/CB Pump not available SRO 4
RD09, 1 C RO Automatic rod motion fails at 1 step per minute.
SRO 5
RX03E, 4.8 I BOP Steam Flow Transmitter FT-532 (input to controlling channel) fails high.
SRO 6
RPO2A,B M RO Reactor Trip Breakers fail to open / ATWS BOP SRO 7
THO6 M RO Large Break LOCA inside containment. Leads to high-3 containment BOP pressure SRO 8
(OR) CS01B C BOP Failure of CS to auto actuate.
MRF RP63 RO SRO NT11t 1L1T)JTL C,
?)1p111t IfIIau I 1Ir ~
1 kr1)eactu v Ly Braidwood 2002 NRC Exam
-Sifrntlation Facility Braidwood Scenario No. 1 Operating Test No. 2002 k
ormU a
,ld k, I)nltruem kII*IL
- ,omIponIenIt, k
)aflJol ran 1
llllt Scenario 021-1
SCENARIO OVERVIEW The Unit I is at 90% power. 1D CD/CB pump is OOS for alignment and vibration problems. 1A CS Pump is OOS for a motor bearing replacement. Power was recently decreased from 100% due to CB Pump suction strainer delta-p problems.
'urther load decrease will be required to isolate the running CD/CB pump and flush the suction strainer.
Following clearly observable plant response from the reactivity changes, Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-41 will fail high causing a demand for inward rod motion. The crew will diagnose the PR failure and perform actions of 1 BwOA INST-1, "NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION FAILURE-Attachment A," to defeat the channel and restore Tave=Tref.
The SRO will review TS and direct tripping of the associated bistables.
After completion of the actions specified in 1BwOA INST-1 the I B CD/CD pump will trip on overcurrent. The Crew will enter 1 BwOA SEC-1, "SECONDARY PUMP TRIP", and commence a runback to reduce load to within the capacity of the remaining two CD/CB pumps (~700 Mwe). Rod Control is failed such that any auto rod motion will occur only at 1 step per minute, which is less than the expected minimum rod speed for the temperature transient in progress. The crew may elect to perform steps of 1 BwOA ROD-i, "UNCONTROLLED ROD MOTION", but it is NOT required. Rod Control will be shifted to manual to match Tave and Tref at the new lower value.
Following completion of actions for the CD/CB pump and rapid load reduction, the 1 C S/G selected steam flow channel will fail high, resulting in indications of increased steam flow and initial opening of 1 C S/G feed reg valve to attempt to match feed flow with steam flow. An equilibrium level should be reached if manual control of the feed reg valve is not expeditiously taken. The crew will perform the actions of 1BwOA INST-2, "FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL Attachment H".
After the unit is stablilzed following the SF channel malfunction, a large break LOCA of 50,000 gpm occurs, increasing to 400,000 gpm over 2 minutes. The size of the LOCA will result in an automatic SI actuation and lead to the discovery of the failure of the reactor to automatically trip. 1 BwFR S. 1, "RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION /
XTWS" will be entered. After dispatching an operator to locally trip Unit 1 reactor, the reactor trip breakers will be
"--Ibpened only after placing the steam dumps in Off/Reset per step 7 of BwFR S.1.
Following the safety injection actuation, cold leg injection valves 1SI8801A&B will fail to open. l SI8801B must be opened manually from the MCB.
CS will fail to automatically occur at the high-3 pressure setpoints. Manual action by the crew will be required to actuate train B of C S, either while performing the actions of IBwEP-0 or the SRO may elect to perform 1BwFR Z. 1, "RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE" The scenario ends with completion of step 6 in 1BwEP ES-1.3 Critical Tasks
- 1. FR-S. 1 Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before completing step 4 of FR-S.1:
- Manually insert RCCA's
- Emergency boration flow to the RCS established
- 2. EP-0--I Manually initiate high head injection flow via 1SI8801B before exiting 1BwEP-0
- 2. EP-0--E:
Manually actuate at least the minimum required compliment of containment cooling equipment before an extreme (red path) challenge develops to the containment CSF Braidwood 2002 NRC Exam2e I -
2 Sceniario 02-1
Scenario No.:
2 Operators:
Op-Test No.:
SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions:
IC-2 1; 100% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state, 1B Diesel Generator OOS, 1 C HD pump OOS, U-2 SAC OOS.
Turnover:
100% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state. The lB Diesel Generator is OOS for replacement of Turbo Charger. The DG has been OOS for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. IC Heater Drain Pump is OGS for motor bearing replacement. Unit 2 SAC is OOS for an oil change and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. The 1B CCW Pump is running for ASME testing. A tube leak being trended on the 1 C SG has increased over the last hour and has been confirmed at 5 gpm requiring a unit shutdown.
Event Malf.
Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description Preload RF EG09 1B DG OOS MAINT 0 Preload Preload -
RO Steam Generator IC Tube Leak (5 gpm)
BOP Reduce Turbine Load for Unit Shutdown due to SG leakage > Tech SRO Spec R
RO Lower reactor power using rods and/or boration 2
RX18A I
RO 1A RCS loop Tcold RTD failed High SRO 3
EG03 C
BOP Voltage Regulator malfunction Field Forcing SRO 4
RX06K I
BOP Steam Generator 1 C controlling level channel 1 LT539 Failed High on a SRO 3 sec ramp.
5 CV01A C
RO Centrifugal Charging Pump Trip SRO 6
TH63C M
RO Steam Generator 1 C Tube Rupture (460 gpm)
EDl IA C
RO Loss of Instrument Bus 111 coincident with Reactor Trip BOP SRO 8
RF RP84 C
RO lB SI Pump fails to start automatically, Manually start an SI pump and RPI 5D BOP Manually Align train A ECCS for Injection due to failure to auto start SRO from loss of instrument bus 111
- (N)ormal, (tR)eactlvlty (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor I ransient Braidwood 2002 NRC Exam Facility:
Examiners:
Braidwood Page I Scenario 02-2)
SCENARIO 02-2 OVERVIEW The unit is at 100% power, BOL, equilibrium Xenon, steady state. The 1B Diesel Generator is OOS for Turbo "Charger replacement. The Diesel Generator has been OOS for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. 1C Heater Drain Pump is OOS for motor bearing replacement. Unit 2 SAC is OOS for an oil change and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift.
A known steam generator tube leak on the 1 C S/G has just been confirmed to have increased beyond that allowed for continued plant operations and a unit shutdown has been ordered at 5 MW/min. A unit shutdown will be commenced in accordance with 1BwOA SEC-8 step 10 and Tech Spec 3.4.13, "Operational Leakage".
Once the ramp has been initiated a failure of the 1A Tcold narrow range RTD instrument high will occur. The US will enter BwOA INST-2 for the failed Nuclear Instruments. The crew should identify the failed Tcold instrument by abnonnal rod motion and place rod control in manual. The crew should identify bistables to be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for the failed RTD channel.
After an adequate power change is observed and the actions for failed RTD are completed, a Voltage Regulator malfunction will result in field forcing. The BwOP should take the Voltage Regulator to OFF and use the Base Adjuster to reduce Exciter field current to less than 100 amps. The Voltage Regulator should remain OFF and control will be manual operation of the Base Adjuster to control main generator voltage.
After the actions for the Voltage Regulator failure are complete, 1C Steam Generator Level Channel lLT-539 will fail high causing 1FW530 (IC FRV) to close. The BOP will take manual control of the IC FRV and restore feedwater flow to normal. The US will enter BwOA INST-2 and direct actions for failed SG Level channel and establish normal automatic steam generator level control.
After actions are complete for the level channel failure, the lA CV pump will trip. The operators will perform actions to isolate letdown, then restore charging and restore letdown IAW 1BwOA PRI-15, "LOSS OF NORMAL CHARGING" After the actions are complete for the CV pump trip, the 1 C S/G tube leak will increase to 460 gpm requiring a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. Coincident with the reactor trip and safety injection a fault of instrument bus 111 will result in de-energization of the bus. The crew will enter 1 BwEP-0 and manually align A train of ECCS due to the de-energized instrument bus. The lB Safety injection pump will fail to auto start and the crew will take actions to manually start 1A and lB SI pumps.
The US will transition to 1BwEP-3 at step 28 of 1BwEP-0. The crew should take actions of 1BwEP-3 to stabilize the plant by cooling down and depressurizing the RCS.
Completion criteria is the performance of I BwEP-3 through ECCS termination step 21.
Critical Tasks I. E-3--A: Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured S/G before transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.
- 2.
E-3--B: Establish/maintain RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because temperature is either of the following: Too high to maintain minimum required subcooling OR Below the RCS temperature that cause an extreme or severe challenge to the subcriticality and/or the integrity CSF.
Braidwood 2002 NRC Exam Page 2 Sceniario 02-2
i irrlation Facility Examiners:
Braidwood Scenario No. 3 Scenario No. 3 Applicant:
Braidwood Initial Conditions:
IC-18, 76% power MOL. Equil. Xe.
Turnover: Steady state with IA CS Pump OOS for motor bearing replacement and ID CD/CB pump OOS for an alignment and vibration problem. Electric Operations requests Bwd Unit-1 increase power to 1250 Mwe @ 5MW/min to meet grid demand.
Event Malf. No.
I Event Event No.
Type*
Description Preload SI12A C RO IA SI Pump fails to Auto start, can be manually started SIOIB BOP 1B SI Pump fails to Auto start, cannot be manually started SRO 1
N BOP Ramp up turbine power to 1250 MWe at directed MW/min.
SRO R RO Raise reactor power using rods and/or dilution SRO 2
RX05, 0 I BOP Main Steam Header Pressure controller (PT-507) fails low 5 min ramp SRO 3
CV17, 0 I
RO Volume Control Tank (VCT) level channel 1LT-1 12 fails high SRO 4
RX21A I
RO PT-455 Controlling Pressurizer Pressure channel fails high SRO 5
MSO4B, 100 C BOP IMSO18B, 1B Steam Generator PORV fails open SRO 6
MRF RP61 C RO All MSIV's fail closed at power SRO BOP 7
MS03B/F M RO Pressure surge causes Main Steam Safety valves (2) to stick open, Loop 100 SRO lB BOP 8
FWOO9B C RO FRV-520 fails to close as required on FWI signal. Cannot be manually BOP closed.
9 TH03B M RO S GTL occurs on 1B Steam Generator after Steam Generator has reached 600 gpm BOP dry out conditions.
- (N)ormal, 1
t I
(R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient Braidwood 2002 NRC Exam I,
J Operating Test No. 2002 SRO RO BOP Scenario 02-3
SCENARIO OVERVIEW The Unit is at 76% power, MOL, equilibrium xenon. ID CD/CB pump is OOS for alignment and vibration problems. lA CS Pump is OOS for a motor bearing replacement. Power is to be increased at direction of Electric Operations using iormal procedures. On-Line Risk is YELLOW because of the CS Pump OOS.
Following clearly observable plant response from the reactivity changes, the Main Steam Line pressure controller (PT 507) will fail low, resulting in decreased MFP speed and lowering main feedwater flow to the SGs. The crew should take manual control of MFP speed and adjust /increase MFW to the SGs. The Crew should match steam flow and feed flow and control MFP speed in manual.
After the secondary plant is stabilized, Volume Control Tank (VCT) Lever Controller (LT-112) with fail high. This will result in diverting letdown flow from the VCT to the Holdup Tank (HUT). The failure of 1 LT-112 level channel will result in the loss of automatic level control and makeup to the VCT.
After actions have been taken to restore normal letdown flow, the controlling Pzr Pressure channel (PT-455) will fail high, causing a Pzr PORV (1RY-455A) and Pzr Spray valves to open, decreasing actual RCS pressure. The RO will diagnose the pressure malfunction from alarms, meter indications, and decreasing Pzr pressure. The RO must close the PORV or PORV block valve to stop the pressure decrease. Manual action will also be required to close the Pzr spray valves which will open due to the master pressure controller demand. The SRO will enter and direct actions of 1 BwOP INST-2, Attachment B, "PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILURE", to select an operable controlling channel and restore automatic pressurizer pressure control, trip TS bistables, and identify TS Action requirements.
After actions have been completed for the failed Pzr Pressure channel, the lB SG PORV controller will cause the IB SG PORV to open. RCS Tave will decrease causing control rod motion in the outward direction. The crew will investigate the cause of the temperature decrease and diagnose the inadvertent PORV opening. Emergency closure of the PORV will be available. The PORV may be isolated locally by closure of the manual upstream isolation valve, 1 MSO19B.
After the unit is stablilzed following the open SG PORV, a failed capacitor in Instrument Inverter 111 will generate a spurious Main Steam Line Isolation signal (Bwd LER). All 4 MSIV's will automatically close at power, resulting in a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. The Crew will enter and perform the immediate actions of 1 BwEP-0, "REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION".
The resultant pressure increase following the spurious MSIV closure causes 2 Main Steam Line Safety valves on Loop I B to open and stick open. The Operators will diagnose a fault on the I B Steam Line while performing the actions of 1 BwEP-0 as a faulted steam generator and transition to 1 BwEP-2, "FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION",
and will take actions to isolate the lB Steam Generator. FRV-520 has failed to close following the Feedwater Isolation signal and the operators will have to take actions of step 4d RNO to manually close the upstream isolation valve, 1FW006B.
Once the faulted steam generator has been depressurized and dried out, the pressure delta P will cause a steam generator tube leak of 600gpm on the I B SG. The crew will diagnose this by increasing containment radiation levels and decreasing RCS pressure and inventory. They must perform the actions of 1 BwEP-3, "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE", and finally transition to 1BwCA-3.1, "SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED", when it is noted that the ruptured SG pressure is less than 320psig. The Scenario ends with the establishment of RCS Cooldown in IBwCA-3.1.
Critical Tasks
- 3. ECA-3.1-B Cooldown the RCS to cold shutdown conditions at the highest rate achievable but less than 100 degrees F per hour in all RCS cold legs.
Braidwood 2002 NRC Examn Scenario 02-3
Simu'ation Facility Examiners:
Braidwood Scenario No. 4 Operating Test No. 2002 Applicant:
SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions:
Turnover:
IC-7, 28% power, BOL 28% power, BOL. The lB Diesel Generator is OOS for replacement of Turbo Charger. The DG has been OOS for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. IC Heater Drain Pump is OOS for motor bearing replacement. Unit 2 SAC is OOS for an oil change and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. The lB CCW Pump is running for ASME testing.
Event Malf. No.
Event Event No.
Type*
Description Preload MF RP 15 C RO 1 A Emergency Diesel Generator Sequencer Failure RD12F SRO C-II Rod Stop Failure (Preload)
BOP 1
N BOP Ramp up Turbine Power to 620 Mwe at directed MW/min SRO R RO Raise Reactor Power using rods and/or dilution SRO 2
RX04A,0 I
BOP Main Feedwater Flow Transmitter (1 FT-5 I0A ) failure low (controlling SRO channel failure) 3 RX13A, 0 I
RO Controlling Pzr Level Channel (LT-459) failure low SRO 4
CC10A C BOP SRO Loss of ESF Bus 142. Failure of 1A CCW pump to auto start.
5 OR ZDIBKSEL C RO Rod Control fails in Automatic Mode - Manual Mode is not available (AUTO)
SRO Tref Programmer fails HIGH MF RX12,586 Uncontrolled Outward Rod Motion 6
THO0 M RO Manual Reactor Trip BOP Pzr Vapor Space Leak / RCS LOCA resulting from rod control transient.
SRO 7
ED15C C RO Loss of SAT feed to ESF Bus 141. EDG 1A load sequencer does not BOP function.
- (N)onnal, 4-4-
4-
+
+
(R)eactivity (I)nstruinent, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient Braidwood 2002 NRC Exam Scenario 02-4
SCENARIO OVERVIEW The unit is at 28% power, BOL. The 1 B Diesel Generator is OOS for Turbo Charger replacement. The Diesel Generator has been OOS for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. 1 C Heater Drain Pump is
)OS for motor bearing replacement. Unit 2 SAC is OOS for an oil change and is expected to be returned to service by the end of the shift. The 1B CCW Pump is running for ASME testing. Power is to be increased to 620 Mwe following 1BwGP 100-3, "POWER ASCENSION".
Following clearly observable plant response from the reactivity changes, the 1 A Steam Generator controlling feed water flow transmitter (1FT-510A) will fail low, resulting in lowering feed flow to the 1A SG and decreasing level. The crew will diagnose the feed flow, steam flow mismatch and take actions to restore normal feed flow, either by selection of an operable feed flow channel or taking manual control for FRV-5 10 and restoring normal flow. The SRO will enter and direct actions of lBwOA INST-2, Attachment G, "FEEDWATER FLOW CHANNEL FAILURE", and establish normal steam generator level control prior to reaching a lo-2 water level reactor trip condition in the 1A SG.
After actions for the feed flow failure are completed, a failure of the controlling channel of Pzr Level will occur causing letdown to isolate. The crew will respond by diagnosing the failure of the level channel and entering and performing the actions of 1BwOA INST-2, Attachment C, "PRESSURIZER LEVEL CHANNEL FAILURE." An alternate controlling channel will be selected, letdown will be manually restored, and the crew will take actions to restore Pzr level to program level. Bistable(s) will be tripped for the failed channel, and Tech Specs will be reviewed for applicability. LCO 3.3.1, Condition K will apply.
After the actions for the LT-459 failure are completed, an overcurrent condition on ESF Bus 142 will result in a loss of one ESF Bus. The Crew should diagnose the electrical failure and enter 1BwOA ELEC-3, "LOSS OF 4KV ESF BUS."
At the same time, the 1B CCW Pump that was running for an ASME test will be deenergized, and the IA CCW Pump will fail to automatically start on low discharge pressure. The crew must restore CCW flow to the unit by either manually starting the 1 A CCW pump or the common CCW pump. The SRO will identify that DC Crosstie is required within one tour for DC Bus 112, and Offsite AC Power Availability Surveillances must be performed within one hour.
After the actions are complete for the loss of an ESF bus, the Tref Programmer will fail to it's highest value at 586'F.
This will cause a Tref>Tave temperature mismatch and trigger rods to withdraw in automatic. Rod control will fail such that only automatic control is available (Manual will not function). Since the Tref program temperature cannot be defeated, this will result in a continuous, uncontrolled outward rod motion. The crew will recognize that no change in turbine loading has occurred and attempt to stop the outward rod motion by placing rod control in manual and taking the actions of 1BwOA ROD-l, "UNCONTROLLED ROD MOTION." When rod motion cannot be stopped the crew will manually trip Unit-1 reactor and perform the immediate actions of 1 BwEP-0, "REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION."
Immediately following the manual reactor trip, a Pressurizer Vapor Space Leak develops. The crew should diagnose the decreasing pressurizer pressure and manually initiate Safety Injection. An automatic Safety Injection will occur if not manually actuated by the operators.
Sixty seconds after the manual reactor trip is initiated, the Main Generator will trip as designed. Coincident with the generator trip, the SAT feed to ESF Bus 141 is lost. This will deenergize the remaining ESF Bus. Emergency Diesel Generator lA will close onto the bus as designed, but the SI and safe shutdown sequencers will fail to function correctly, resulting in an energized ESF Bus (141) but no ESF loads running. The crew will have to manually load/start safeguards equipment on Train A to restore one train of Safety Injection. 1 BwOA ELEC-3 may be entered to perform the bus loading. Once SI flow is restored the crew will continue the remaining actions of IBwEP-0 and transition to IBwEP-1, "LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT" to mitigate the Vapor Space LOCA in progress.
ompletion criteria is entry of I BwEP ES-1.2.
Braidwvood 2002 NRC Exam Sceniario 02-4 2
Critical Tasks E-0--A: Manually trip the reactor from the control room before exiting I BwOA ROD-1.
- 2.
E-0--D: Manually actuate at least one train of SIS actuated safeguards equipment before transition to 1BwEP-1
- 3. EO--H,I: Manually start the lB RH and lB SI Pump before transition out of IBwEP-0 Braidwood 2002 NRC Exam Scenario 02-4 3
ES-401 Facility:
Braidwood Units 1 and 2 WR RO Examination Outline Exam Date: 07/08/2002 Printed: 03/18/2002 Form ES-401-4 Exam Level: RO K/A Category Points Tier Group K I T
r K2 K(3 K4 K5I K16 1
5 3
2
- 1.
Emergency 2
1 4
5 Abnormal Plant 3
0 1
1 Evolutions Totals 6
8 8
Tier
- 2.
Plant Systems 1
3 2
2 2
2 2
Al 3
5 0
8 A2 A3 A4 G
1 1
1 1
4 2
2 0
2 2
Point Total 16 17 3
36 23 2
3 3
2 2
2 2
1 2
1 1
1 20 3
1 0
1 0
1 1
0 1
2 1
0 8
Tier Totals 7
5 5
4 5
5 3
5 5
4 3
51 Cat I Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4
- 3. Generic Knowledge And Abilities 3
4 3
3 13 Note:
I. Ensure that at least two topics firom every K/A category are sampled within each teir (i.e.. the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
- 2. Actual point totals must match those specified in the table.
- 3. Select topics from many systems; avoid selecting more than two or three K/A topics friom a given system unless they relate to plant-specific priorities.
- 4. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline.
- 5. The shaded areas are not applicable to the category /tier.
- 6. The generic K/As in Tiers I and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 ofthe K/A Catalog. but the topics Must be relevant to the applicable evolution or systern.
- 7. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings for the RO license level, and the point totals fbr each system and category. K/As below 2.5 should be justified on the basis of plant-speci ric priorites. Enter the tier totals for each categoir in the table aboxe.
2 2
I
Facility:
i5raidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR 1 xamination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 E/APE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function KI K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / I X
AK 1.01 - Axial power imbalance 3.1 1
017 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunctions (Loss of X
AA1.22 - RCP seal failure/malfunction 4.0 1
RC Flow) / 4 024 Emergency Boration / 1 X
AK1.04 - Low temperature limits for boron 2.8 1
concentration 024 Emergency Boration / 1 X
AA2.06 - When boron dilution is taking place 3.6 1
027 Pressurizer Pressure Control (PZR PCS) Malfunction X
AK1.03 - Latent heat of vaporization/condensation 2.6 1
/3 040 Steam Line Rupture / 4 X 2.4.4 - Ability to recognize abnormal indications for 4.0 1
system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
055 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)
X EA2.04 - Instruments and controls operable with only 3.7 1
6 dc battery power available 062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4 X
AA1.01 - Nuclear service water temperature indications 3.1 1
069 Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 X
AK1.01 - Effect of pressure on leak rate 2.6 1
ES - 401 Printed:
03 002 Form ES-401-4 I
(
Facility:
b~raidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR k
.xamination Outline Printed:
03(
)02 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 Form ES-401-4 K/A Category Totals:
5 3
2 3
2 1
Group Point Total:
ES - 401 E/APE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 074 Inadequate Core Cooling / 4 X
EK1.08 - Definition of subcooled liquid 2.8 1
074 Inadequate Core Cooling / 4 X
EK2.09 - Controllers and positioners 2.6*
1 LOS Pressurized Thermal Shock / 4 X
EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and emergency operating 3.6 1
procedures associated with Pressurized Thermal Shock E09 Natural Circulation Operations / 4 X
EK2.2 - Facility's heat removal systems, including 3.6 1
primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility F 10 Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel X
EA1.2 - Operating behavior characteristics of the 3.6 1
with/without RVLIS / 4 facility F 14 lligh Containment Pressure 5 X
EK2.2 - Facility's heat removal systems, including 3.4 1
primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility L 14 High Containment Pressure 5 X
EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and emergency operating 3.1 1
procedures associated with High Containment Pressure 16 2
(
Facility:
t3raidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR Ik
ýxamination Outline Printed:
03(
302 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2 Form ES-401-4 E/APE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function Ki K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal 1
X AA1.04 - Operating switch for emergency boration 3.8 1
motor-operated valve 003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 X
AA1.06 - RCS pressure and temperature 4.0 1
007 Reactor Trip / I X
EK2.03 - Reactor trip status panel 3.5 1
009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X
EK1.01 - Natural circulation and cooling, including 4.2 reflux boiling 011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X
EK3.03 - Starting auxiliary feed pumps and flow, 4.1 ED/G, and service water pumps 011 Large Break ILOCA / 3 X
EA2.10 - Verification of adequate core cooling 4.5 1
025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) / 4 X
AK2.03 - Service water or closed cooling water pumps 2.7 1
037 Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak / 3 X
AK3.09 - Maximum load change capability of facility 2.7*
1 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) / 3 X
EAI.24 - Safety injection pump ammeter and indicators 3.6*
1 054 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) / 4 X
AA1.04 - HPI, under total feedwater loss conditions 4.4 1
ES - 401 I
Facility:
Draidwood Units 1 and 2 ES - 401 PWR
,xamination Outline Printed:
03 002 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1!/ Grnii 2 E/APE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function KI K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X
AK3.02 - Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc 4.0 1
power 060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 X
AK2.02 - Auxiliary building ventilation system 2.7 1
060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 X
AK3.02 - Isolation of the auxiliary building ventilation 3.3*
1 061 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms X 2.1.27 - Knowledge of system purpose and or function.
2.8 7
101 Rediagnosis / 3 X
EK2.2 - Facility's heat removal systems, including 3.5 1
primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X
EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and emergency operating 3.4 1
procedures associated with LOCA Outside Containment E 16 High Containment Radiation / 9 X
EA1.1 - Components, and functions of control and 3.1 safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, tailure modes, and automatic and manual features K/A Category Totals:
1 4
5 5
1 1
Group Point Total:
17 2
l*nvm llqaN 1 _zl
Facility:
DLraidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR I(
,xamnination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Groun 3 E/APE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function KI K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 036 Fuel Handling Incidents / 8 X
AK3.02 - Interlocks associated with fuel handling 2.9 1
equipment E 13 Steam Generator Overpressure /4 X
EK2.2 - Facility's heat removal systems, including 3.0 1
primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility E 15 Containment Flooding / 5 X
EA2.1 - Facility conditions and selection of appropriate 2.7 1
procedures during abnormal and emergency operations K/A Category Totals:
0 1
1 0
1 0
ES - 401 Printed:
03x 002 17Arm l*,q-Afl l-A Group Point Total:
3 I
imination Outline lacilitv:
.1-401 trraidwood Units 1 and 2 Sys/Ev #
System / Evolution Name KI K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KATopic Imp.
Points 001 Control Rod Drive System / 1 X
K3.02 - RCS 3.4*
1 001 Control Rod Drive System 1/
-X K6.13 - Location and operation of RPIS 3.6 1
003 Reactor Coolant Pump System X
K4.04 - Adequate cooling of RCP motor and 2.8 1
(RCPS) / 4 seals 003 Reactor Coolant Pump System X
A2.05 - Effects of VCT pressure on RCP seal 2.5 1
(RCPS) / 4 leakoff flows 004 Chemical and Volume Control System X
A1.09 - RCS pressure and temperature 3.6 (CVCS) / 1 004 Chemical and Volume Control System X
K2.05 - MOVs 2.7 1
(CVCS) / 1 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X
K5.01 - Definitions of safety train and ESF 2.8 System (ESFAS) / 2 channel 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X
K2.01 - ESFAS/safeguards equipment control 3.6*
1 System (ESFAS) / 2 015 Nuclear Instrumentation System / 7 X
K6.04 - Bistables and logic circuits 3.1 1
015 Nuclear Instrumentation System / 7 X
A1.07 - Changes in boron concentration 3.3*
1 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM)
X KI.02 - RCS 3.3 System / 7 1
PWR Rq Printed:
(
/2002 r7*n UQ JAIl A
PJrnt Svitpni..
- Tipr / Crnnn 1
(
Facility:
oraidwood Units 1 and 2 ES - 401 PWR R(ý imination Outline Printed:
('
2002 lwnrm IFQAfiA Plant Svser
- Tier 2 / Grrnin 1 Sys /Ev #
System / Evolution Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM)
X 2.2.22 - Knowledge of limiting conditions for 3.4 1
System / 7 operations and safety limits.
022 Containment Cooling System (CCS) /-X A4.01 - CCS fans 3.6 1
5 022 Containment Cooling System (CCS) /
X 2.4.31 - Knowledge of annunciators alarms and 3.3 1
5 indications, and use of the response instructions.
059 Main Feedwater (MFW) System / 4 X
A2.12 - Failure of feedwater regulating valves 3.1*
1 059 Main Feedwater (MFW) System / 4 X
A3.02 - Programmed levels of the S/G 2.9 1
061 Auxiliary / Emcrgency Feedwater X
KI.04 - RCS 3.9 1
(AFW) System / 4 061 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater X
K1.01 - S/G system 4.1 1
(AFW) System / 4 068 Liquid Radwaste System (LRS) / 9 X
A4.04 - Automatic isolation 3.8 1
068 Liquid Radwaste System (LRS) / 9 X
K5.03 - Units of radiation, dose, and dose rate 2.6 1
071 Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)
X K3.05 - ARM and PRM systems 3.2 1
/9 072 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)
X K4.01 - Containment ventilation isolation 3.3*
1 System / 7 2
(
- mination Outline Printed:
'2002 Facility:
Lraidwood Units 1 and 2 ES - 4011 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 Form ES-401-4 Sys/Ev #
System I Evolution Name KI K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 072 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)
X A3.01 - Changes in ventilation alignment 2.9*
1 System / 7 K/A Category Totals:
3 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 Group Point Total:
23 3
Facility:
mination Outline lant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2 Printed:
(
12002 Sys/Ev#
System / Evolution Name KI K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) / 2 X
K3.03 - Containment 4.2 1
002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) / 2 X
K6.03 - Reactor vessel level indication 3.1 1
006 Emergency Core Cooling System X--------K4.17
- Safety Injection valve interlocks 3.8 1
(ECCS) / 2 011 Pressurizer Level Control System X
K4.03 - Density compensation of PZR level 2.6 1
(PZR LCS) / 2 M I Pressurizer Level Control System X
K6.05 - Function of PZR level gauges as 3.1 1
(PZR LCS) / 2 postaccident monitors 012 Reactor Protection System / 7 X
K3.03 - SDS 3.1*
1 0 12 Reactor Protection System / 7 x
K5.02 - Power density 3.1
- 1 014 Rod Position Indication System X
K1.02 - NIS 3.0 1
(RPIS) / 1 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System X
A4.02 - Recorders 2.7 1
(NNIS) / 7 026 Containment Spray System (CSS) / 5 X
K1.01 - ECCS 4.2 1
026 Containment Spray System (CSS) / 5
-X K2.02 - MOVs 2.7*
1 tiraidwood Units I and 2 Form EN-AO1-A I
Facility:
d~raidwood Units 1 and 2 ES -401 PWR Rq imination Outline Plant Sy'stems - Tier-2 / Gromm 2 K/A Category Totals:
3 3
2 2
2 2
1 2
1 1
1 Group Point Total:
Printed: (
/2002 Sys/Ev#
System / Evolution Name K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 029 Containment Purge System (CPS) / 8 X
A2.04 - Health physics sampling of 2.5*
1 containment atmosphere 029 Containment Purge System (CPS) / 8 X 2.4.49 - Ability to perform without reference to 4.0 1
procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.
033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System X
A2.03 - Abnormal spent fuel pool water level 3.1 1
(SFPCS) / 8 or loss of water level 062 A.C. Electrical Distribution System / 6 X
K2.01 - Major system loads 3.3 1
062 A.C. Electrical Distribution System / 6 X
A3.01 - Vital ac bus amperage 3.0 1
063 D.C. Electrical Distribution System / 6 X
K2.01 - Major DC loads 2.9*
1 064 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G)
X Al.08 - Maintaining minimum load on ED/G 3.1 System / 6 (to prevent reverse power) 086 Fire Protection System (FPS) / 8 X
K1.03 - AFW System 3.4*
I 086 Fire Protection System (FPS) / 8 X
K5.03 - Effect of water spray on electrical 3.1 components 20 2
17nrrn I(N-atl l.a
(
Facility:
ilraidwood Units 1 and 2 ES - 401 PWR Rq(
imination Outline PI2nt Svtm
- Tipr 7 / Crniin
Printed: (
/2002 Sys/Ev #
System / Evolution Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 005 Residual Heat Removal System X
K3.01 - RCS 3.9 1
(RHRS) / 4 005 Residual Heat Removal System X
K5.05 - Plant response during "solid plant":
2.7*
1 (RHRS) / 4 pressure change due to the relative incompressibility of water 007 Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank X
A3.01 - Components which discharge to the 2.7*
1 System (PRTS) / 5 PRT 008 Component Cooling Water System X
K1.03 - PRMS 2.8*
1 (CCWS) / 8 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge X
A4.03 - Location and operation of hydrogen 3.1 1
Control System (HRPS) / 5 sampling and analysis of containment atmosphere, including alarms and indications 014 Fuel Handling Equipment System X
K6.02 - Radiation monitoring systems 2.6 1
(FHES) / 8 034 Fuel Handling Equipment System X
A3.02 - Load limits 2.5*
1 (FHES) / 8 045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G)
A2.08 - Steam dumps are not cycling properly 2.8 1
System / 4 at low load, or stick open at higher load (isolate and use atmospheric reliefs when necessary)
K/A Category Totals:
1 0
1 0
1 1
0 1
2 1
0 Group Point Total:
8 I
llT*rm IP*_AA1 A
Generic Knowled¶ id Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
P PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:
03/18/ý'
Facility:
Braidwood Units I and 2 KA KA Topic Form ES-401-5 Imp.
Points Conduct of Operations 2.1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.
3.7 1
2.1.9 Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room.
2.5 1
2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.
3.4 1
Category Total:
3 lFquipment Control 2.2.1 Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those 3.7 1
controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.
2.2.3 (multi-unit) Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational differences between 3.1 1
units.
2.2.4 (multi-unit) Ability to explain the variations in control board layouts, systems, 2.8 1
instrumentation and procedural actions between units at a facility.
2.2.33 Knowledge of control rod programming.
2.5 1
Category Total:
4 Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and contamination control, including permissible 2.5 1
levels in excess of those authorized.
2.3.9 Knowledge of the process for performing a containment purge.
2.5 1
2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases.
2.7 1
Category Total:
3 ineer"gency Procedures/Plan 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are 4.0 1
entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
2.4.6 Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.
3.1 1
2.4.29 Knowledge of the emergency plan.
2.6 1
Category Total:
Generic Total:
(
Generic Category 3
13 I
PWR SRO Examination Outline Facility:
Braidwood Units I and 2 Exam Date: 07/08/2002 ES-401 7-!
I-K/A Category Points Tier Group K1 K2 K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 Al 4
4 4
- 1.
2 2
3 3
Emergency 3
0 1
0 Abnormal Plant Tier Evolutions Totals 6
8 7
- 2.
Plant Systems 2
2 4
3 0
7 2
2 A2 A3 4
G 4
3 2
1 I
7 1
2 8
2 Point Total 24 16 3
43 19 2
1 1
2 1
2 2
1 2
1 2
2 17 3
0 0
1 0
1 0
0 1
0 0
1 4
Tier Totals 3
3 5
3 4
4 3
4 2
4 5
40 Cat I Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4
- 3. Generic Knowledge And Abilities 4
5 4
4 17 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every K/A category are sampled within each teir (i.e., the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
- 2. Actual point totals must match those specified in the table.
- 3. Select topics from many systems; avoid selecting more than two or three K/A topics from a given system unless they relate to plant-specific priorities.
- 4. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline.
- 5. The shaded areas are not applicable to the category/tier.
- 6. The generic K/As in Tiers I and 2 shall be selected from.Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.
- 7. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brielfdescription of each topic, the topics' importance ratings foor the RO license level, and the point totals For each sxstem and catcgorx. K/As bclow 2.5 should be justi fied on the basis o1" plant-speci fic priorites.
inter the tier totals lor each category in the table abov c.
2 j
1 I
I I
Printed: 03/18/2002 Form ES-401-3 Exam Level: SRO
(
Facility:
Draidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR Sý Examination Outline Printed:
Oi 002 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 E/APE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function KI K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 X
AA1.04 - Operating switch for emergency boration 3.6 1
motor-operated valve 003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 X
AA1.06 - RCS pressure and temperature 4.1 1
005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 X
AK1.01 - Axial power imbalance 3.8 1
0il Large Break LOCA / 3 X
EK3.03 - Starting auxiliary feed pumps and flow, 4.3 1
ED/G, and service water pumps 017 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunctions (Loss of X
AA1.22 - RCP seal failure/malfunction 4.2 1
RC Flow) / 4 024 Emergency Boration / 1 X 2.4.4 - Ability to recognize abnormal indications for 4.3 1
system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
024 Emergency Boration / 1 X
AK1.04 - Low temperature limits for boron 3.6 1
concentration 026 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) / 8 X
AA2.04 - The normal values and upper limits for the 2.9*
1 temperatures of the components cooled by CCW 026 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) / 8 X 2.4.4 - Ability to recognize abnormal indications for 4.3 1
system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions tor emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
Facility:
Draidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR St' Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group I E/APE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 055 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout) /
X EA2.03 - Actions necessary to restore power 4.7 1
6 055 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout) /
X 2.4.30 - Knowledge of which events related to system 3.6 1
6 operations/status should be reported to outside agencies.
062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water /4 X
AA1.01 - Nuclear service water temperature indications 3.1 1
069 Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 X
AK1.01 - Effect of pressure on leak rate 3.1 1
074 Inadequate Core Cooling / 4 X
EK1.08 - Definition of subcooled liquid 3.1 1
074 Inadequate Core Cooling / 4 X
EK2.09 - Controllers and positioners 2.6*
1 E01 Rediagnosis / 3 X
EK2.2 - Facility's heat removal systems, including 3.8 1
primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility 1-04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X 2.1.14 - Knowledge of system status criteria which 3.3 1
require the notification of plant personnel.
E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X
EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and emergency operating 4.0 1
procedures associated with LOCA Outside Containment 2
ES - 401 Printed:
01(
002 Form ES-401-3
l Facility:
- ,raidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR S i Examination Outline Printed:
03' Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Groun 1 E/APE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points E08 Pressurized Thermal Shock / 4 X
EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate procedures and 4.1 1
operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments E08 Pressurized Thermal Shock / 4 X
EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and emergency operating 4.0 1
procedures associated with Pressurized Thermal Shock L-P09 Natural Circulation Operations / 4 X
EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate procedures and 3.8 1
operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments F09 Natural Circulation Operations / 4 X
EK2.2 - Facility's heat removal systems, including 3.9 1
primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility El4 High Containment Pressure / 5 X
EK2.2 - Facility's heat removal systems, including 3.8 1
primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility F 14 High Containment Pressure / 5 X
EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and emergency operating 3.7 1
procedures associated with High Containment Pressure K/A Category Totals:
4 4
4 4
4 4
Group Point Total:
ES - 401 302 24 3
FArm I*R-AOI-*
(
Facility:
L, iaidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR S
] xamination Outline Printed:
03(
ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Grrnin 2 F/APE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 007 Reactor Trip / 1 X
EK2.03 - Reactor trip status panel 3.6 1
008 Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief X
AA2.16 - RCS in-core thermocouple indicators; use of 4.1 1
Valve Stuck Open) / 3 plant computer for interpretation 008 Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief X 2.4.30 - Knowledge of which events related to system 3.6 1
Valve Stuck Open) / 3 operations/status should be reported to outside agencies.
009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X
EK1.01 - Natural circulation and cooling, including 4.7 1
reflux boiling 025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) / 4 X
AK2.03 - Service water or closed cooling water pumps 2.7 1
027 Pressurizer Pressure Control (PZR PCS) Malfunction X
AK1.03 - Latent heat of vaporization/condensation 2.9 1
/3 037 Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak / 3 X
AK3.09 - Maximum load change capability of facility 3.1*
1 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) / 3 X
EA2.11 - Local radiation reading on main steam lines 3.9*
1 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) / 3 X
EA1.24 - Safety injection pump ammeter and indicators 3.4 1
054 Ioss of Main Feedwater (MFW) / 4 X
AA1.04 - HPI, under total feedwater loss conditions 4.5 1
I
)02 17am1 ]h-'*_AO 1 _'*
Facility:
uiaidwood Units 1 and 2 ES -401 PWR Si, Lxamination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2 E/APE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X
AK3.02 - Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc 4.2 1
power 060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 X
AK2.02 - Auxiliary building ventilation system 3.1 1
060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 X
AK3.02 - Isolation of the auxiliary building ventilation 3.5*
1 061 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms X 2.1.27 - Knowledge of system purpose and or function.
2.9 1
7 065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X 2.4.49 - Ability to perform without reference to 4.0 1
procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.
E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 X
EA1.1 - Components, and functions of control and 3.2 1
safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, tailure modes, and automatic and manual features K/A Category Totals:
2 3
3 3
2 3
Group Point Total:
16 2
Printed:
03f
)02 Form ES-401-3
(
Facility:
D,raidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR Si
£xamination Outline Printed:
03 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / GrouD 3 EIAPE #
E/APE Name / Safety Function KI K2 K3 Al A2 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 036 Fuel Handling Incidents / 8 X
AA2.03 - Magnitude of potential radioactive release 4.2*
1 LI 3 Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 X 2.4.30 - Knowledge of which events related to system 3.6 1
operations/status should be reported to outside agencies.
E 13 Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 X
EK2.2 - Facility's heat removal systems, including 3.2 1
primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between thie proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility K/A Category Totals:
0 1
0 0
1 1
Group Point Total:
ES - 401 002 3
Form ES-401-3 I
tjraidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR SR*
amination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 Printed:
(
/2002 Facility: "
ES - 401 Svs/Ev #
System / Evolution Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KATopic Imp.
Points 001 Control Rod Drive System / I X
K3.02 - RCS 3.5 1
001 Control Rod Drive System / 1 X
K6.13 - Location and operation of RPIS 3.7 1
003 Reactor Coolant Pump System X
K4.04 - Adequate cooling of RCP motor and 3.1 1
(RCPS) / 4 seals 003 Reactor Coolant Pump System X
A2.05 - Effects of VCT pressure on RCP seal 2.8 1
(RCPS) / 4 leakoff flows 004 Chemical and Volume Control System X
A 1.09 - RCS pressure and temperature 3.8 1
(CVCS) / 1 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X 2.1.14 - Knowledge of system status criteria 3.3 1
System (ESFAS) / 2 which require the notification of plant personnel.
013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation X
K5.01 - Definitions of safety train and ESF 3.2 1
System (ESFAS) / 2 channel 014 Rod Position Indication System X
KI.02 - NIS 3.3 1
(RPIS) / 1 015 Nuclear Instrumentation System / 7 X
K6.04 - Bistables and logic circuits 3.2 1
015 Nuclear Instrumentation System / 7 X
A1.07 - Changes in boron concentration 3.4*
1 022 Containment Cooling System (CCS) /-X A4.01 - CCS fans 3.6 1
5 I
Form E.S-401-3
amination Outline
(
Facility:
ES - 401 t~raidwood Units 1 and 2 Pat Stes-Tier 2 / Groun 1 K/A Category Totals:
2 2
2 2
1 2
2 1
1 2
2 Group Point Total:
Printed:
(
/2002 PWR SRý Sys/Ev #
System / Evolution Name Ki K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KATopic Imp.
Points 026 Containment Spray System (CSS) / 5 X
K1.01 - ECCS 4.2 1
026 Containment Spray System (CSS) / 5 X
K2.02 - MOVs 2.9 1
059 Main Feedwater (MFW) System / 4 X 2.1.33 - Ability to recognize indications for 4.0 1
system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for technical specifications.
063 D.C. Electrical Distribution System / 6 X
K2.01 - Major DC loads 3.1" 1
068 Liquid Radwaste System (LRS) / 9 X
A4.04 - Automatic isolation 3.7 1
071 Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)
X K3.05 - ARM and PRM systems 3.2 1
/9 072 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)
X K4.01 - Containment ventilation isolation 3.6*
1 System / 7 072 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)
X A3.01 - Changes in ventilation alignment 3.1 1
System / 7 19 2
PWR SR(
amination Outline Printed:
(
tsraidwood Units 1 and 2
(
Facility:
ES - 401
'2002 Sys/Ev #
System / Evolution Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) / 2 X
K3.03 - Containment 4.6 1
002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) / 2 X
K6.03 - Reactor vessel level indication 3.6 1
006 Emergency Core Cooling System X
K4.17 - Safety Injection valve interlocks 4.1 1
(ECCS) / 2 012 Reactor Protection System / 7 X
K3.03 - SDS 3.3 1
012 Reactor Protection System / 7 X
K5.02 - Power density 3.3*
1 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System X
A4.02 - Recorders 2.6*
1 (NNIS) / 7 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge X
A4.03 - Location and operation of hydrogen 3.3 1
Control System (HRPS) / 5 sampling and analysis of containment atmosphere, including alarms and indications 029 Containment Purge System (CPS) / 8 X
A2.04 - Health physics sampling of 3.2*
1 containment atmosphere 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System X
A2.03 - Abnormal spent fuel pool water level 3.5 1
(SFPCS) / 8 or loss of water level 034 Fuel Handling Equipment System X
K6.02 - Radiation monitoring systems 3.3 1
(FHES) / 8 034 Fuel Handling Equipment System X
A3.02 - Load limits 3.1 1
(FHES) / 8 1
1__11 1__11 1__
I Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Grouo 2 Form ES-401-3
PWR SRýý Facility:
Draidwood Units 1 and 2 amination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 / GrouD 2 Sys/Ev #
System / Evolution Name KI K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp.
Points 039 Main and Reheat Steam System X 2.2.25 - Knowledge of bases in technical 3.7 1
(MRSS) / 4 specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
062 A.C. Electrical Distribution System / 6 X
K2.01 - Major system loads 3.4 1
064 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G)
X A1.08 - Maintaining minimum load on ED/G 3.4 1
System / 6 (to prevent reverse power) 075 Circulating Water System / 8 X 2.4.6 - Knowledge symptom based EOP 4.0 1
mitigation strategies.
086 Fire Protection System (FPS) / 8 X
K1.03 - AFW System 3.5*
1 086 Fire Protection System (FPS) / 8 X
K5.03 - Effect of water spray on electrical 3.4 1
1__
components K/A Category Totals:
1 1
2 1
2 2
1 2
1 2
2 Group Point Total:
ES - 401 Printed:
d2 2002 17 2
Form ES-Afil-3
(
Facility: " oraidwood Units 1 and 2 PWR SRO amination Outline Printed:
(
2002 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / G~rnii 3 K/A Category Totals:
0 0
1 0
1 0
0 1
0 0
1 Svs/Ev#
System / Evolution Name Ki K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G KATopic Imp.
Points 005 Residual Heat Removal System X
K3.01 - RCS 4.0 1
(RHRS) / 4 005 Residual Heat Removal System X
K5.05 - Plant response during "solid plant":
3.1
- 1 (RHRS) / 4 pressure change due to the relative incompressibility of water 045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G)
X 2.2.25 - Knowledge of bases in technical 3.7 1
System / 4 specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G)
A2.08 - Steam dumps are not cycling properly 3.1*
System / 4 at low load, or stick open at higher load (isolate and use atmospheric reliefs when necessary)
Group Point Total:
4 1
ES - 401 I*'A r rn 17*_Afil_*
(
Generic Knowled *i d Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
PWR SRO Examination Outline Facility:
Braidwood Units 1 and 2 Generic Category Printed:
03/18/2t Form ES-401-5 Imp.
Points KA KA Topic Conduct of Operations 2.1.4 Knowledge of shift staffing requirements.
3.4 1
2.1.9 Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room.
4.0 1
2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.
3.8 1
2.1.34 Ability to maintain primary and secondary plant chemistry within allowable limits.
2.9 1
Category Total:
4 Equipment Control 2.2.3 (multi-unit) Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational differences between 3.3 1
units.
2.2.25 Knowledge of bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operations and 3.7 1
safety limits.
2.2.28 Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures.
3.5 1
2.2.31 Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in initial core loading.
2.9*
1 2.2.33 Knowledge of control rod programming.
2.9 1
Category Total:
5 Radiation Control 2.3.1 Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility radiation control requirements.
3.0 1
2.3.3 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities for auxiliary systems that are outside the control 2.9 1
room (e.g., waste disposal and handling systems).
2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and contamination control, including permissible 3.1 1
levels in excess of those authorized.
2.3.9 Knowledge of the process for performing a containment purge.
3.4 1
Category Total:
4 1
Generic Knowlede -id Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:
03/18/*,,
Form ES-401-5 Imp.
Points KA KA Topic Category Total:
Generic Total:
Facility:
Braidwood Units 1 and 2 Generic Category Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.7 Knowledge of event based EOP mitigation strategies.
3.8 1
2.4.27 Knowledge of fire in the plant procedure.
3.5 1
2.4.29 Knowledge of the emergency plan.
4.0 1
2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators.
3.5 1
4 17 2
(
\\
(
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-10 Tier / Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Re ection 3o, ig" I~
I
- i-I -
I t
r I.
T r
t T
I1 t
T Ii
- 1*
I 1i f
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 46 of 46
(
Exelkn,,.'
I r
c' K(>mDK
'c'&ol(
u~Nuclear 13,ard',,vood Sain 35,00 South R, 53, Suite 8-1 1r(evle 6I¢0-107-9619 M 81-5 4 6280i March 8, 2002 BW020018 Michael Bielby Lead Examiner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351 Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457
Subject:
Submittal of Knowledge and Abilities (K/A) statements that will be suppressed from the random exam generation process In accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Braidwood Station is submitting for your review the list of K/A statements that will be suppressed from the random exam generation process in support of our July 8, 2002 license exam.
If there are any questions or comments regarding this submittal, please contact Amy Ferko, at (815) 417-2699.
Respectfully, y~on Sskil Site Vice President Braidwood Station
Enclosures:
Braidwood and Byron Suppressed K/A statements cc:
(without attachments)
Chief, NRC Operator Licensing Branch NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Braidwood Station 10 T
Braidwood and Byron Suppressed KAs Viewed KA Categomy Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis Continuous Rod Withdrawal AK1.14 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal emergency task:
)3 Dropped Control Rod AK1.13 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod emergency task:
AK2.03 Knowledge of the following components:
AK3.04 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:
5 Inopierable/Stuck Control Rod AA1.03 Ability to operate and monitor the following:
AA2.02 Ability to determine or interpret:
AK1.04 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the inoperable/stuck control rod emergency task:
AK2.03 Knowledge of the following components:
000009 EA1.03 EA1.18 EA2.09 EA2.35 EK3.25 EK3.27 000011 Small Break LOCA Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Ability to determine or interpret:
Ability to determine or interpret:
Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:
Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:
Large Break LOCA Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS Metroscope Actions contained in EOP for dropped control rod Metroscope Difference between jog and run rod speeds, effect on CRDM of stuck rod Definitions of axial imbalance, neutron error, power demand, actual power tracking mode, ICS tracking Metroscope Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Balancing of HPI loop flows Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling spray Monitoring of in-core T-cold Manual depressurization or HPI recirculation for sustained high pressure 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.8 3.4 2.5 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.4 2.8 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
4.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.4 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.4 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.3 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.2 3.2 3.3 4.1 3.9 3.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Frithaj', lmarch 01, 2002 000001 0000[
00000 Page I ofll1
Viewed KA Categmy Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis EA1.02 Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Reflux boiling sump level indicators 3.8 4.1 Not applicable to EA1.09 EA1.16 EA2.1 1 EA2.12 EK3.07 000015 AA1.04 AA1.19 AA2.09 Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Ability to determine or interpret:
Ability to determine or interpret:
Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) MaIfitnctio Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Ability to determine or interpret:
Core flood tank initiation Balancing of HPI loop flows Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling spray Stopping charging pump bypass flow lis RCP ventilation cooling fan run indicators Power transfer confirm lamp When to secure RCPs on high stator temperatures AK1.03 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as The basis for operating at a reduced power level they apply to the RCP malfunctions emergency when one RCP is out of service task:
AK3.04 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Reduction of power to below the steady state following:
power-to-flow limit 7
Reactor Coolant Puimp (RCP) Maljimctions (Loss of'RC Flow)
AA1.04 Ability to operate and monitor the following:
RCP ventilation cooling fan run indicators AA1.19 Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Power transfer confirm lamp AK1.03 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as The basis for operating at a reduced power level they apply to the RCP malfunctions emergency when one RCP is out of service task:
AK3.04 Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Reduction of power to below the steady state following:
power-to-flow limit 24 Emergency Boration AA1.08 Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Pump speed controlled to protect pump seals AA1.11 Ability to operate and monitor the following:
BIT suction and recirculation valves AA1.24 Ability to operate and monitor the following:
BIT inlet and outlet valve switches and indicators 4.3 3.5 3.9 3.6 3.5 2.5 2.9 3.4 3.0 3.1 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.9 3.2 4.3 3.5 4.3 3.8 3.6 Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.5 Braidwood and Byron have no procedural requirement to stop RCPs based on Stator Temperature.
4.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
4.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.0 2.7 3.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Page 2 of 11 00001 000021 Friday, March 01, 2002
Viewed KA Categoi, Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis 000025 AA1.05 AA1.22 AA2.05 AK2.04 000026 AA1.04 AK3.01 000029 EA1.04 EA1.05 EA2.10 EK3.03 EK3.04 EK3.05 000056 AA1.20 000057 AA2.02 000062 AA1.04 000068 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (R Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Ability to determine or interpret:
Knowledge of the following components:
Loss of/Component Cooling Water (CCW Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the following:
Raw water or sea water pumps Obtaining of water from BWST for LPI system Limitations on LPI flow and temperature rates of change Raw water or sea water pumps
)
CRDM high-temperature alarm system The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and closing of the SWS isolation valves to the CCW/nuclear service water coolers Anticipated Transient Without Scram (A TWS)
Ability to operate and monitor the following:
BIT inlet valve switches Ability to operate and monitor the following:
BIT outlet valve switches Ability to determine or interpret:
Positive displacement charging pumps Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Opening BIT inlet and outlet valves following:
Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Closing the normal charging header isolation following:
valves Knowledge of the bases or reasons for the Closing the centrifugal charging pump recirculation following:
valve Loss of O'/fite Power Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Speed switch room ventilation fan Loss of Vital A C Electrical Instrument Bu Ability to determine or interpret:
Loss of'Nuclear Service Water Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Core flood tank pressure and level indicators CRDM high-temperature alarm system 2.7 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.9 3.7 3.1 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.0 3.7 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.5 2.4 2.8 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Control Room Evacuation Fi-ilday, March 01, 2002 Page 3 of 11
Viewed KA Categomy Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis AA1.20 Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Indicators for operation of startup transformer 3.2 3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
000074 EA1.03 EA1.08 EA1.14 Inadequate Core Cooling Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Ability to operate and monitor the following:
Ability to operate and monitor the following:
0 Control Rod Drive System A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
A4.07 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CRDS and the following systems:
K4.04 Knowledge of CRDS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
K5.1 1 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the CRDS:
K5.12 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the CRDS:
0 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCS, including:
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
A4.05 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
K5.16 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the RCS:
The alternate control station for turbine bypass valve operation HPI System Alarm for loss of subcooling margin Controls for CCWS Part-length rod position Power source transfer check CCW 00100 3.9 4.2 4.1 3.1 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.5 3.1 3.4 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.2 2.9 3.6 3.3 3.2 2.8 3.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
4.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.8 2.6 2.7 4.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)
Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the RCPS will have on the following:
ICS 3.6 3.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
Friday, March 01, 2002 Circuitry and principle of operation for LVDT or reed switch Relationship between reactivity worth of power shaping control rod group and other control rod groups (power-shaping, or part-length, rods have much less reactivity than full-length control rods)
Effects on power of inserting axial shaping rods Containment sound-monitoring system The filling/draining of LPI pumps during refueling The HPI system when it is used to refill the refueling cavity Reason for automatic features of the Feedwater control system during total loss of reactor coolant flow 00200 003000 K3.05 004000 Page 4 of I1I
Viewed KA Categoiy Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis K1.09 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Relationship between CVCS and RPIS 2.2 2.7 Not applicable to cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems:
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Braidwood/Byron.
A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Transfer from boron storage tank to boron injection tank KI.07 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or MFW System cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems:
K1.10 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Safety injection tank heating system cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems:
K2.03 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
Heat tracing Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
PZR vent valve Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS Knowledge of PZR PCS design feature(s) and/or Prevention of uncovering PZR heaters interlock(s) which provide for the following:
3.5 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.6 3.0 2.6 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)
A2.08 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
K1.05 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PZR LCS and the following systems:
Loss of level compensation.
Reactor regulating system 3.4 Reactor Protection System K6.07 Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following RPS components:
K6.08 Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following RPS components:
K6.09 Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following RPS components:
Core protection calculator 2.9 COLSS CEAC 3.6 3.6 3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.3 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.4 prevention of uncovering pressurizer heaters is covered by level control circuitry and is addressed by K/A 01 1000K4.01 2.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3,7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Friday, March 01, 2002 006000 007000 010000 K4.02 011000 012000 Page 5 of 11
Viewed KA Categmy Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)
K4.14 Knowledge of ESFAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
K4.24 Knowledge of ESFAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Upper head injection accumulator isolation Reason for disabling of BIT so it will not function during ESF sequencer test 3.7 3.0 Rod Position Indication System (RPIS)
A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RPIS controls including:
A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPIS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPIS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
K6.03 Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following RPIS components:
0 Nuclear instrumentation System K1.05 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems:
K1.06 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems:
K3.04 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the NIS will have on the following:
K3.06 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the NIS will have on the following:
K4.04 Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
0 Containment Cooling System (CCS)
K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CCS and the following systems:
Metroscope reed switch display 2.9 2.6 Loss of LVDT Loss of reed switch 2.6 Metrosiboe6:.
ICS Reactor regulating systemi ICS Reactor regulating system Slow response time of SPNDs SEC/remote monitoring systems 3.9 3.1 3.4 2.9 3.4 3.7 014000 ice Condenser System Friday, March 01, 2002 013000 4.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.4 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
4.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
01500 02200 025000 S.
2.1 Page 6 of 11
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis Temperature chart recorders 3.0 3.0 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Ice Condenser System controls including:
A1.02 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Ice Condenser System controls including:
A1.03 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Ice Condenser System controls including:
A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Ice Condenser System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Ice Condenser System, including:
A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Ice Condenser System, including:
Abnormal glycol expansion tank level --
Decreasing ice condenser temperature Refrigerant system Isolation valves Glycol expansion tank level.
Glycol flow to ice condenser-air handling units Trip of glycol circulation pumps High/low floor cooling temperature Opening of ice condenser doors Containment isolation--
2.5 3.0 3.4 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.5 Page 7 of 11 2.2 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.5 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.5 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.2 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.2 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.0 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.4 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Fridlay, Mar-ch 01, 2002
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Ice condenser isolation valves 3.0 2.7 Braidwood and Bvron control room:
A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Ice Condenser System and the following systems:
K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Ice Condenser System and the following systems:
K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Ice Condenser System and the following systems:
K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
K2.03 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the Ice Condenser System will have on the following:
K4.01 Knowledge of Ice Condenser System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
K4.02 Knowledge of Ice Condenser System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
K5.01 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Ice Condenser System:
K5.02 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Ice Condenser System:
K5.03 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as they apply to the Ice Condenser System:
K6.01 Knowledge of the applicable performance and design attributes of the following Ice Condenser System components:
Friday, March 01, 2002 Containment vent fans Glycol circulation pumps Containment ventilation 2.7 2.2 2.7 Refrigerant systems_
Containment sump system Containment ventilation fans and dampers Refrigerant systems Isolation valves Containment Glycol expansion tank levels and ice condenser system containment isolation valves System control Relationships between pressure and temperature Heat transfer Gas laws Upper and lower doors of the ice condenser 2.7 3.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 3.8 2.2 2.8 3.0 2.6 2.4 3.4 do not have Ice Condensers 2.5 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.2 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.0 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.7 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.5 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.2 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.8 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.5 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.0 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.4 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.8 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 2.8 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers 3.6 Braidwood and Byron do not have Ice Condensers Page 8 of 11
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis Containment Spray System (CSS)
K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CSS and the following systems:
Cooling water 4.1 Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the MRSS will have on the following:
K4.07 Knowledge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Emergency feedwater pump turbines AFW pumps Reactor building isolation Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System K4.08 Knowledge of MT/G System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
The reactor bailey station and reactor diamond station in integrated control circuitry Main Feedwater (MFW) System A3.07 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW ICS System, including:
A4.10 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the ICS control room:
A4.12 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Initia control room:
K1.07 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or ICS cause-effect relationships between the MFW System and the following systems:
ition of automatic feedwater isolation 3.8 3.2 3.4 2.6 3.4 3.9 3.4 3.2 Auxiliary /Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following Loss of air to steam supply valve malfunctions or operations on the AFW System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
A3.04 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the AFW Automatic AFW isolation System, including:
K4.07 Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s)
Turbine trip,'including overspeed and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
K4.11 Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s)
Automatic level control and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
K4.14 Knowledge of AFW System design feature(s)
AFW automatic isolation and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
K5.04 Knowledge of the following theoretical concepts as Reason for warming up turbine prior to turbine they apply to the AFW System:
startup Friday, March 01, 2002 3.2 4.1 3.1 2.7 3.5 2.3 039000 Page 9 of 11 026000 4.1 Containment Spray pumps have no cooling water at Braidwood/Byron 3.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.5 Braidwood and Byron do not have turbine driven AFW pumps.
3.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.0 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.8 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
4.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.3 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
045000 059000 061000
Viewed KA Categaoy Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)
A4.16 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
076000 Waste gas decay tank shifts 2.5 Service Water System (SWS)
K1.09 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems:
K2.04 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a loss of the SWS will have on the following:
K4.01 Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
078000 Instrument Air System (IAS)
K1.05 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems:
K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
086000 Reactor building closed cooling water Reactor building closed cooling water Reactor building.closed cooling water Conditions initiating automatic closure of closed cooling waterauxiliary building header supply and return valves MSIV air Emergency air compressor 3.0 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.4 3.3 Fire Protection System (FPS)
A1.02 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the FPS controls including:
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the FPS and the following systems:
103000 Fire water storage tank level 3.0 3.4 3.0 Fire water storage tank makeup pumps High-pressure service water Containment System A4.09 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Containment System and the following systems:
Containment vacuum system,,.
Shield building vent system 3.1 3.1 2.2 Braidwood and Byron control rooms do not contain equipment or instrumentation to monitor or perform gas decay tank shifts.
3.1 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.6 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
2.9 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.2 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.3 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.4 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.7 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
3.5 Not applicable to Braidwood/Byron.
Friday, March 01, 2002 071000 Page 10 ofll1 I
Viewed KA Category Statement KA Statement RO Value SRO Value Suppress Basis K4.01 Knowledge of Containment System design Vacuum breaker protection 3.0 3.7 Not applicable to feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the Braidwood/Byron.
following:
BraiydwoExam Autgr BraidwoodFaeit RAa resentative Friday, March 01, 2002 Byron Exam Author Byron Facility Representative 1A J.o Page 11 of 11
Braidwood Outline Review NRC Comments/ LIC Response 3/29/02 WRITTEN:
- 1. NRC: What computer program do you use to randomly select KAs?
LIC: Skyscraper program same one used for last exam.
- 2. NRC: Were any KAs suppressed/rejected?
LIC: Yes. Suppressed KA list submitted.
(Not applicable questions: Were justification statements prepared? Were KAs suppressed/rejected/justified on a case-by-case basis? Which ones? Why? How many? We need to review the suppressed/rejected/justified KA information.)
ADMIN JPMs:
- 1. Make sure the admin JPMs have significant, verifiable consequences such that if they are performed incorrectly, the task cannot be successfully completed.
OPERATING JPMs:
General: Want alternate path JPMS to follow guidance in Appendix C, ie, procedurally driven (ARPs or ABNs are good), completes the task or mitigates the problem without reliance on actions by other control room operators...
- 1. I need to review a list of audit exam JPMs (to verify none of those JPMs are repeated on the NRC exam).
- 2. Make sure none of JPMs are performed in the scenarios. What about B.1.c (perform emergency boration) and B.1.d (place excess letdown in service)?
SCENARIOS:
- 1. Verify each scenario has Tech Specs Page 1 of 1