ML021230239
| ML021230239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/2002 |
| From: | Ted Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| JAFP-02-0098, NUREG-1433, Rev 1 | |
| Download: ML021230239 (149) | |
Text
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
e 301 APPLICABILITY:
According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.
-7 3.3-52 REVISION rcr P~hie)
,hannel.-
ýev,,
(:B:W::R/:4: ZSTS
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 avrTnLk
,.....f4n.,nAl CONDITUI*ON.un R
RL*uN T
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H.1 AND H.2 Be in MODE 3.
Be in MODE 4.
_ I J
As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.
I.1 Declare associated standby liquid control subsystem (SLC) inoperable.
OR 1.2 Isolate the Reactor Water Cleanup System.
1 17 As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.
0.1 OR J.2 Initiate action to restore channel to OPERABLE status.
Initiate action to isolate the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Shutdown Cooling System.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> I hour Immediately Immediately Rev 1, 04/07/95 REVISION
-/-
BWR/4 STS 3.3-54
.L
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation r~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1,-
"a.*
4
-7, S.........-NOTES ---------
1.Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.
,Aj,5C
- 2.
When a channel is placed in-an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillancesfentry into associated Conditions-and Required Actions may be delayed for-up to 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s6providd the associated Function maintains isolation capability.
SURVE ILILANCE FREQUENCY Ltq.1-0 (.]
SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
09-days TS
=3.3..
.*9.
Calibrate the trip uni days@:
=aibaether;
ý
ý
,=J
- ,r-f".
SR3*.3.6.1.
Perform CH EL FUNCTIONAL TF-.
[184 days AqR36 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
T.Z13\\
SR 3.3.6.1.7 Perform LOGIC SYSTEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.mots S,ý3, 3-~
~(
r*+/-L (continued)
BWR/4 STS 3.3-55 Rev 1, 04/07/95 REVISIONW,
INSERT Functions 2.d, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g CTJ.z- ((6)]
Cr-q, 1 (oi 32-
-1 L ~fe a]
{T 3.24Lt)
CTy it )]
[T3.
V r3-(.F-iWi Insert Page 3.3-58
- d.
Drywell Pressure -
1.2,3 2(c)
< 2.7 psig High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7
- e.
Reactor Vessel Water 1,2.3 2F SR 3.3.6.1.1 k 18 inches Level - Low Low Low SR 3.3.6.1.2 (Level 1)
SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7
- f.
Main Steam Line 1(b),
2 (b) 2 F
< 3 times Radiation - High SR 3.3.6.1.3 Normal Full SR 3.3.6.1.6 Power SR 3.3.6.1.7
Background
- g.
Reactor Vessel Water 1,2.3 2(c)
F SR 3.3.6.1.1 k 177 inches Level - Low (Level SR 3.3.6.1.2
- 3)
SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.7 I /J-
@p REVISION J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 TabLe 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 6)
Primary Containment IsoLation instrnmentation 3.1-1 (LOc APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM4 ACTION C-1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 4.
RCIC System,sotation I
(continued)
" RCIC EqUJipaeelti 7
1,2,3 F
3.3.6.1 S3.3.6.1.2 1,2,3 Temperature - High "c.Area VentilatiOn 1,2,3 DifferentiaL Temperature - H h F
e1 3.3.6.1.1 S
S 3.3.6.1.2Z sR* 31 33.6.1-6 j
F '7*
3.3.6.1.1/
SR: 3.3.6.1.8
tS 3.3.6.1 3 SsR 3.3.6.1 6 FSR 3.3.6..7 I,
A SR -3.3.6.1.$
inches SR 3.3.6.l.*
SR 3.3.6.1.W-il SR 3.3.6.1.7 CL's SSLC System Initiation onty inputs into on of the two trip sYSt B C Swam
- 61 ft I" BWR/4 STS
.3-61 e,0/79 REVISION,YJ it 1-SR 3.3.6.1.7 jL I r
roomq(
- '#l q "P Lt I 1-1((ý
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumenitationl 3.3.6.1 TabL* 3.3.6.1-1 (pe0 6 of 6)
Priiny Contsinftt Iscittain ZIMtrntittm G,." (~
[, 2,-2 f APPLICABLE CONDITIONS aliHER CatAMiLS FR URELANE ALOAL SPECIFIED PI TRIP REQUIRED WILN ALhAL FUNCTION CONDITIONS STU ACTION CA1 nREJIRENTS VALUE
- 6.
Sliutdmm COUWM 2"st" Is~aktior n F
ef 1
1,2,3PO P r w INIigoh, ý Rev 1, 04/07/95 REVIsION.Y S-J CA *1 BIR/4 STS 3.3-62
(?-Wý
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1433, REVISION 1 ITS: 3.3.6.1 -
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION PLANT-SPECIFIC WORDING PREFERENCE OR MINOR EDITORIAL IMPROVEMENT (PA)
PA4 An editorial change has been made to correct a typographical error.
PA5 Editorial change made to be consistent with other similar requirements in the ITS.
PLANT-SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE IN THE DESIGN (DB)
DB1 Four new Functions have been added to the Completion Times of ITS 3.3.6.1 Required Action A.1 since they are common to RPS.
DB2 The brackets have been removed from the Surveillance Frequency in ITS SR 3.3.6.1.5 (CHANNEL CALIBRATION) and extended from 18 months to 24 months consistent with the frequencies in CTS Table 4.2-1.
The Frequency is consistent with the setpoint calculation methodology for the associated Functions.
In addition, SR 3.3.6.1.6 has been added to calibrate the radiation detector of Functions 1.f and 2.f (Main Steam Line Radiation-High) consistent with the current allowances in CTS Table 4.2-1.
The remaining portions of the channels will be calibrated in accordance with SR 3.3.6.1.3 as indicated by the associated Note.
These allowances are also consistent with the setpoint calculation methodology for these functions.
DB3 The brackets have been removed from ITS Table 3.3.6.1-1 Function 4.f, RCIC Equipment Area Temperature-High and the Function has been retained consistent with the JAFNPP design and licensing basis.
DB4 The brackets have been removed and the proper number of channels included for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1.
The values are consistent with the current requirements in CTS Table 3.1-1 except for Functions 3.b, 3.c, 4.b, and 4.c.
The number of channels for these Functions have been changed consistent with the plant design and justified in M6.
DB5 The channels of ITS 3.3.6.1 Functions 1.b and 1.d include trip units, therefore, SR 3.3.6.1.4 and SR 3.3.6.1.5 have been added for these Functions.
The channels of ITS 3.3.6.1 Functions 5.b and 6.a include a switch (temperature or pressure).
These switches are calibrated every 3 months in accordance with the current setpoint methodology, therefore, the Surveillances associated with these Functions have been revised, as required.
DB6 The following ITS 3.3.6.1 Functions have been added since they are required by design and current licensing basis:
Main Steam Line Radiation-High (1.f and 2.f); Function 2.e, Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low (Level 1); Functions 3.f, 3.g, 3.h, 3.i, 3.j (Area Temperatures associated with HPCI Isolation); Function 4.d, RCIC Steam Page 3 of 5 JAFNPP Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation
- B 3.3.6.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND
)
The primary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs).
The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).
Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a DBA.
The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, relays, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of primary containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) isolation.
Most channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints.
When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a primary containment isolation signal to the isolation logic.
Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters.
The input parameters to the isolation loics artiao re orisato vessel-water
_ev 1, ()area ami*and different'* 1 temperatures, (
ain steam line
'viel&L) flow mea
- rement, (d) Standby e Ie id Control (SLC)
Sys ste m initiatn n,.
(e) condenser
- tacuum, (f) main i rmine presnt re, h
ga hi t
pressure coo ant injection (HPc ) and reactor/core isolao cooling (R Q) steam line flow (h) drywell fadiation d
pressure, yi) HPCl and RClC s eam line pres fre, (j) JJCl and RCIC urbine exhaust diaphragm pressur, ok"r~gt9/
water cl *anup (RW(CU) differ-' ntial flowad (IDreat_
S*tpam d~m r--_*
edndant sensor input signals from
.*(
each parameter are provided for initiation of isolation.
The only exception is SLC System initiation,.T, man of ielogics is pl vi :e.
Primary containment isolation instrumentation has inputs to the trip logic of the isolation functions listed below.
(continued)
B 3.3-152
!A7 yl (f"Eg!ýN JýD
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES
- 3. 4.
Hiah Pressure Coolant Inlection System Isolation and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolation (continued)
D* '*;C* nd R* E~tion tsate the Grou("3, 4, 8,.anr 9j.
The Reactor Vessel NaterLevel -Low 4iJ.Levelf*l,:
S ci~Sunc 0
receives input, fromý four
_____rre
- 57. Pa.~.
.~
channels.
The outputs from tfeldat channels are connected into two two-out-of-two tri
- M
,SLC System Inittat Funco-receive~nput from two channels, with dl
)
BACKGROUND n~oted 7__
CU uric
e i
1*j, INSERT ASA-2 In addition, the setting is low enough o allow the removal of heat from the reactor for a predetermined time following a scram, prevent isolation on a partial loss of feedwater and to reduce challenges tot he safety/relief valves (S/RVs).
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref. 13).
Revision J Insert Page B 3.3-158
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY
)
1.b.
Main Steam Line Pressure-Low (continued)
The Main Steam Line Pressure-Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 since this is when the assumed transient can occur (Ref. 2).-
._V__
t AACL This Function isolates the v~2~al~v s.
1.c.
Main Steam Line Flow-High Main Steam Line Flow-High is provided to detect a break of the MSL and to initiate closure of the MSIVs.
If the steam were allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor would depressurize and the core could uncover.
If the RPV water level decreases too far, fuel damage could occur.
Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow PS(
to prevent or minimize core damage.
The Main Steam Line Flow-High Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the main steam line break (MSLB)
(Ref. 2).
6 ne isolation
,-z.*
action, along with the scram function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS),
ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 and offsite doses do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 limits.
The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 transmitters that are connected to the four MSLs.
The transmitters are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to detect the high flow.
Four channels of Main Steam Line Flow-High Function for each unisolated MSL (two channels per trip system) are available and are required to be OPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual MSL.
The Allowable Value is chosen, to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded due to the break. ',
This Function isolates the valves.
1.d.
Condenser Vacuumg-Low The Condenser Vacuum-Low Function is provided to prevent overpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a loss of the main condenser vacuum.
Since the integrity of the condenser is an assumption in offsite dose calculations, the Condenser Vacuum-Low Function is assumed to be OPERABLE (continued)
Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS V -- T-1 I
i B 3.3-159
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 44)o 1.d.
Condenser Vacuum-Low (continued) and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs.
The closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.
Condenser vacuum pressure signals are derived from four pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the condenser.
Four channels of Condenser Vacuum-Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Value is chosen to prevent damage to the condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for offsite dose analysis.
As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 when all turbine stop valves (TSVs) are closed, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. 5wicha arrrvided tp Xwhen alI TSVs are closed.
This Function isolates the G-W ya
)
m ztemperature is provided to detect a'
/*.(alngý and provides diversity to the high floT instrumentation. C-The isolation occurs when a very small
'lleak has occurred.
If the small leak is allowed to continue
- Z..
without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached.
However, credit for these instruments is not taken in anyM transient or accident analysis in theXFSAR, since ounding ana-lyses are performed for large breaks, such.as.MSLBs.
(oa temperature signals are initiated from
-c u ocated in the area being monitored.
Sixteen channels of Main Steam Tunnel, Temperature--High Function a
avai able and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that noo single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
a c
on
, (
- b
- -*-**(continued)
Rev 1, 04/07/95 pot I BASES BWR/4 STS B 3.3-160
S3 INSERT Function 1.f 1.f.
Main Steam Line Radiation-High The Main Steam Line Radiation-High isolation signal has been removed from the MSIV isolation logic circuitry (Ref. 1); however, this isolation Function has been retained for the MSL drains valves (and other valves discussed under Function 2.f) to ensure that the assumptions utilized to determine that acceptable offsite doses resulting from a control rod drop accident (CRDA) are maintained.
Main Steam Line Radiation-High signals are generated from four radiation elements and associated monitors, which are located near the main steam lines in the steam tunnel.
Four instrumentation channels of the Main Steam Line Radiation-High Function are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Value was selected to be low enough that a high radiation trip results from the fission products released in the CRDA.
In addition, the setting is adjusted high enough above the background radiation level in the vicinity of the main steam lines so that spurious trips are avoided at rated power.
As noted (footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 with THERMAL POWER
- 10% RTP.
When THERMAL POWER is > 10% RTP, there is no possible control rod configuration that results in a control rod worth that could exceed the fuel damage limit during a CRDA (Refer to the Bases for Function 2 (Rod Worth Minimizer) of LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").
In MODES 3 and 4, all control rods are required to be inserted into the core; therefore, a CRDA cannot occur.
In MODE 5, since only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies, adequate SDM ensures that the consequences of a CRDA are acceptable, since the reactor will be subcritical.
This Function isolates the MSL drain valves.
Insert Page B 3.3-161 Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE
\\
SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPlI IARILTTY (continued)
Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products.
The isolation of the primary containment on.Level 3.supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Lo evel 3 Function
)
associated with isolation is implicit assume in the kFSAR 4*(PA2_
analysis as these leakage paths are ssumed to be isolated post LOCA.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low@
evel 3 signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual wate Slevel (variable leg) in the vessel,.
our channels of
{'
z /*.*Reactor Vessel Water Level-Lowo Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABL to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation
[ *
- Th sfunction.
?sl t st e
An
- vl ve-*
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Lo Level 3 Allowable Value D81 was,ýchomen to be the same as-the RP9 Level 3 scram Allowable High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment.
The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded.
The Drywell Pressure-High L.Function, associated with isolation of the primary
..4i m 1 oY i containment, is implicitly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths"are assume to be isolated post LOCA.
High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell
- our BWR/4 STS B 3.3-162 Rev 1, 04/07/95 X
-I
(
INSERT Function 2.g For Function 2.g, two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level -
Low (Level 3) are required to be OPERABLE for each hydrogen/oxygen and gaseous/particulate sample supply and return penetration to ensure these penetrations can be isolated.
00
)
Insert Function 2.a (2)
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref. 13).
Insert Page B 3.3-162 Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.b(
Drywell Pressure--High (continued)
PA SAFETY ANALYSES,
]*
LCO, and channels of Drywell Pressure--High are APPLICABILITY available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation 6-,
e o-cx' function.
-/
The Allowable Value was selected to be the same(a the DyelPressure-High Allowabl-e-Value (IC33p ) since 0Al this may beindicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.,
TO unto iolate& the 4F7
- Z1; valve e
radiation indicates possible gross failure of the fuel cladding.
Therefore, when r
(Ridiation-High is detected, an isolation is initiated to limit the release of fission products.
However, this Function is not assumed k) i....-,-
any accident or transient analysis in the A
ecause other leakage paths (e.g., MSIVs) are more limiting.
The@
radiation signals are initiated from radiation 9
- detectors that are located in the drywell.
Two channels of
-w fRadiation-High Function are available and are S4j required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument
,ýv cq failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Value is/,low enough to promptly detect gross failures in the fuel cladding.
This Function isolates the containment vent and purge valves.
e.. Reactor i d an Re *elinq Floor Exhaust Rd aion -H q\\
High s ondary containment exhaust rad tion is an indicati n of possible gross failure of he fuel cladding.
The relea may have originated from the rimary containment due to a b ak in the RCPB.
When:Exhaust adiation-High is detected, va es whose penetratiins communi ate with the primary contai ent atmosphere are isolated limit the release of fiss n products.
Additionally, th Refueling Floor Exhaust Ra *ation-High Function is assum to (continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.3-163 Rev 1, 04/07/95
ý1ýIA /J
INSERT Functions 2.e and 2.f 2.e.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low (Level 1)
Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result.
Therefore, isolation of the recirculation loop sample valves occurs to prevent offsite dose limits from being exceeded.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low (Level 1) Function is one of the many Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation signals.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low (Level 1) Function associated with isolation is assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 3).
The isolation of the recirculation loop sample valves on Level 1 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded for a DBA.
Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low (Level 1) Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low (Level 1) Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that the recirculation loop sample valves close on a potential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits.
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref. 13).
This Function isolates the recirculation loop sample valves.
Insert Page B 3.3-164a Revision J
INSERT Functions 2.e and 2.f (continued) 2.f.
Main Steam Line Radiation - High The Main Steam Line Radiation - High isolation signal has been removed from the MSIV isolation logic circuitry (Ref.
1): however, this isolation Function has been retained for the recirculation loop sample valves to ensure that the assumptions utilized to determine that acceptable offsite doses resulting from a CRDA are maintained.
Main Steam Line Radiation - High signals are generated from four radiation elements and associated monitors, which are located near the main steam lines in the steam tunnel.
Four instrumentation channels of the Main Steam Line Radiation - High Function are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Value was selected to be low enough that a high radiation trip results from the fission products released in the Design Basis CRDA.
In addition, the setting is adjusted high enough above the background radiation level in the vicinity of the main steam lines so that spurious trips are avoided at rated power.
As noted (footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 with THERMAL POWER
- 10% RTP.
When THERMAL POWER is > 10% RTP, there is no possible control rod configuration that results in a control rod worth that could exceed the fuel damage limit during a CRDA (Refer to the Bases for Function 2 (Rod Worth Minimizer) of LCO 3.3.2.1).
In MODES 3 and 4, all control rods are required to be inserted into the core: therefore, a CRDA cannot occur.
In MODE 5, since only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies, adequate SDM ensures that the consequences of a CRDA are acceptable, since the reactor will be subcritical.
This Function isolates the recirculation loop sample valves.
Insert Page B 3.3-164b Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation SAFETY ANALYSES, Cooling Systems Isolation
- LCO, and APPLICABILITY 4.a.
HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-Hiqh h/*
(continued)
Ln Steam Line Flow-High Functions are provided to detect a break of the RCIC or HPCI steam lines and initiate closure of the steam line isolation valves of the appropriate system.
If the steam is allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor will depressurize and the core can uncover.
Therefore, the isolations are initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage.
The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.
Specific credit for these Functions is not assumed in any frSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks.
However, these instruments prevent the RCIC or HPCI steam line breaks from becoming bounding.
The HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-High signals are initiated from transmitters (twofor HPCI and two for RCIC) that are connected to the system steam lines.
Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no D0 3 single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
th no The Allowable Values are chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintainst fe L
t,(o*
the MSLB event as the bo ing event.,--..
d These Functions isolate, e
alves,, as
- b, Le -
appro _J~ateF(
a
_ý.-
"t 3e516***
lI W..
HP.
PCI and RCIC Steam Supplv Line Pressure-Low
[1 M1 Low pressure indicates that the pressure of the steam in the HPCI or RCIC turbine may be too low to continue operation of the associated system's turbine.
These isolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed t
R*\\
in any transient or accident analysis in the FSARowever, they also provide a diverse signal to indicate a possible system break.
These instruments are included in Technical Specifications (TS) because of the potential for risk due to (continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.3-165 Rev 1, 04/07/95
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 3.j*...b, HPCI and RCIC Steam Sunoly Line Pressure-Low.
(continued) possible failure of the instrumtej;s preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref.
e X
The HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low signals are initiated from transmitters (four for HPCI and four for
/t17 RCIC) that are connected to the system steam line.
Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure c*an preclude the isolation function.
ek lo ewook +
A AA L The Allowable Values are selected to be high enough to prevent damage to the system's turbine.
These Functions isolate the CMUTif 3 valves, as c.ad C Turbine Exhaust Oiaohrac
!11m Pressure-High ca eseisolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR.
These instruments are included in the TS because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments prejyenting HPCI and RCIC initiations (e..
nn..o.
The HPCI and RCIC Turbine(-.haut'Diaphragm Pressure-High signals are initiated from')
(four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the area between the rupture diaphragms on each system's turbine exhaust line.
Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS g, I rsmj The Allowable Values are high enoughto prevent damage to gh enoughto prevent damage to K$ý(AM t0iyome
/n be w K"v Ott'?
continued, 0_ý (continued)
B 3.3-166
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.d.
- c.
HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm SAFETY ANALYSES, Prelsure--Hih (continued).
LCO, and APPLICABILITY These Functions isolate the
- i 3_aiif_42valves, as appropriate If4 44re-LV
- d. 4.-d.
r ell Pess re--Hi h,/
)
High drywell press e can indicate a br k in the RCPB.
The.
HPCI and RCIC isolation of the tuPbi exhaust is provided to prevent commun cation with the dry~kell1 when high drywell pressure exists./ A potential lea a9 path exists via the Iturbine exhaus.Th isolation is 6elayed until the systeml become uaviable for injection {i.e., low steam line pressue.Teislton of the lPCI and RCIC turbine
/
exhaust by D ell Pressure-Hi is indirectly assumed 'if the FSAR ac dent'analysis bec se the turbine exhaust leakage pat is not assumed t contribute to offsite ses.
High dryw I pressure signa s are initiated from pr ssure transmitt rs that sense th pressure in the drywe Two channels f both HPCI and CIC Drywell Pressure High Function are available d are required to be PERABLE to ensure at no single in trument failure can reclude the isolati n function.
The A owable Value wa selected to be t same as the ECCS this is indicative of a.LOCA inside pri ary containment.
pcrc PP--
T rea donffpna
_t temperatures are provided to detect a
'leak from the associated system steam piping.
The isolation
/
occurs when a very small leak has occurred and is diverse to the high flow instrumentation.
If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be OAPA2-I reached.
These Functions are not assumed in anyffSAW transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or 4SL breaks.
(continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.3-167 Rev 1, 04/07/95
Primary Containwt I lation Instrumentation
- 41)
B 3.
3.6.1 Area aTemperatqre_-High signalS ar-e initiated from 4that are appropriately located to protect the system that is being-monitored.
Two instruments mn ac are c nes for each HPCI aand RCIC Area ndnt a
emperature--High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation Eight thermocoup es provide input the Area Venti ion Vifferential T *perature-High Fu4tion.
The outpu of these thermoc ples is used to d ermine the diffe ntial temperature.
Each channel cons sts of a differe ial temperature nstrument that r eives inputs fro thermocoup es that are locat d in the inlet an outlet of the area ooling system for a total of four a ilable channels (two for RCIC an two for HPCI).
he AloM6wa~ble *Val ues are
< A_qufvite te E (continued)
Rev 1, 04/07/95 B 3.3-168 BWR/4 STS,
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY RWCU area qntlarea ven(
l itý temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the RWCt System.
The isolation occurs even when very small leaks have occurred
- f-o~~th~n-Sotin o
h
$C Sste Ifte small Ieak-continues without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached.
Credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the ISAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks _ uch as recirculation or KSL breaks.
1 fi 4-0 Ara rayn tn ni te e
m i p e rat u're sig~nals are initiated from temperature elements that are located in
\\........te hat is being monitored.
GDPAthermocouples provide input to the Area Temperature-High Function (two per are channels are required to be OPERABLE tensure that no Or cntINuWe (continued)
Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS B 3.3-170
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SAFETY ANALYSEr, Ne~h.rL!u~eI-ii (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
Twelve thermocoupi provide input to the Area Ventliatio Differential Temp rature-High Functi The output of these thermocoupes is used to dete ine the differentiaY temperature.
ach channel consis of a differential temperature strument that rece* es inputs from thermocoupl s that are located n the inlet and o et of the area yoling system and f a total of six a ilable channels (two per area).
Si, channels are requi red to be
/*
OPERABLE to ensure that no ingle instrument failure can_.
- j
~p~reclude the isoati~on fun tion.,
SThe Area 4 Area*,nti taio Temperature-High ova' Allowable Values are se ow enough to 4eek
-A "These Functions isolat vleR (is The isolation of the RWCU System is equire when the SLC
ý SSystem has been initiated to prevent il'tion and removal of V*.0%
b e
oron solutonl by the RWCU System (Re
. *). c" D
signal8[ aM. initiated r the ALC "There is no Allowa e a ue associated with this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the SLC System initiation switCh.
z Y
"/
Two channels
ýof the SLC Systemtt Initiation Functionare available and are required to be OPERABLE only in MODES 1 and 2, since these are the only MODES where the reactor can be critical, and these MODES are consistent with the Applicability-for the SLC S stem (LCO 3.1.7).
As noted (footnote (0) to Table 3.3.6.1-1 this Function is only required to close one of the RWCU isolation vallves a
doe since the signals only provide input into one of the two VI" trip systems.
(continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.3-171 Rev 1, 04/07/95
1 INSERT Function 5.e (2)
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref. 13).
0 INSERT Function 5.f 5.f.
Drywell Pressure-High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment.
The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded.
The Drywell Pressure-High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.
High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell.
Four channels of Drywell Pressure-High are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible without inducing spurious trips.
The Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the RPS Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.
This Function isolates both RWCU suction valves and one RWCU return valve.
Revision J Insert Page B 3.3-172
SFINSERT FUNCTION 6.b The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref. 13).
INSERT FUNCTION 7 Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation 7.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low(Level 3ý)L l
Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products.
The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-LovDo {evel 3Function associated with isolation is implicitly
>-*L*_&
assumed in thee Fas these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.
Reactor VlOseWater Level Low Level 3 signals are initiated from level D'
transmitters that sense the di fference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level a
leg) in the vessel.
Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water tLevel 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to 3-4A e instrument failure can a__
nisol ation The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in ne c penetration.
e i!3
(ýPe4&
I The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low YMievel Allowable Value was chosen to bel-9 the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Aflowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.
The AP I\\
Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the liT) lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref. 13).
This Function isolates the Qvalves.
Insert Page B 3.3-174a Revision J
Sj INSERT FUNCTION 7 (continued) 7.b. Drywell Pressure-High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment.
The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded.
The Drywell Pressure-High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in theFSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LA N
High drywe'pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell.
Two channels of Drywell Pressure-High per Function are available and are re uired to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can i-vren-Ctuati]
The isolation function is ensured b the manual shear in aq penetration.
The Allowable Value was selecte o
ene same as e
Dr ell Pressure-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.f.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.
Da This Function isolates the(;
x1* valves.
Insert Page B 3.3-174b Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS Reviewer's Note Certain LCO-Completi Times are base approved topi 1 reports.
In order r a licensee to e
the times, e licensee must just' the Completion iimes as required the staff Safety Ev uation Report (S ) for the i-P topical port.
a n I
"Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS felated to lylse-
- primary containment isolation instrumentation channels.
Section.1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a i#Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.
i/
Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.
However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels.
As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.
Because of the diversity of sensors available to provi 04V isolation signals and th redundancy of the sol ati on design, an allowable out of service ti 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for OVA Functions
^
a, 2.b.;'
6.ban 24 o s or Functions other th1,ian -unctions 2.6.b *a.
een shown to be acceptable ( efs.*6 an
.) to 0ermit restoration of any (2-1s
ý3 inopera e c annel to OPERABLE status.
This out of servicgý-ý
- *"time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases).
If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions.
Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation),
Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.
(continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.3-175 Rev 1, 04/07/95 REVISIONK'r
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 (associoe4re W1
/
BASES ACTIONS (continued)
Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, no erable, untrippedl channels within the same Function resul in redundant Ia isolation capability being lost for the associated penetration flow path(s).'
The MSL Isolation Function-are considered to be maintaining isolation capability wh sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip suc that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal.
- The other isolation functions
- are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the ive Function on a valid signal.
This ensures that one of the dt PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolationL i nal from the given Function.
For Functions l.a, 1.bXl.d*E B, this would require both
- 1-.ue40 trip systems to have one channe OPERABLE or in trip.
For 'eV*
Function l.c*, this would require both trip systems to have a l) one channel,massoci ha with ach L, OPERABLE or in tri For cr m c annels, hat Onitoaeve al /locations with n a giv*ae (e.g., different ocations within the main steam tunnel
]*
area).
Therefore, this would require both trip systems to; have one channel per location OP RABLE or in trlpj-For,*
-j
,1 Functions 2.a, 2.*
.. 2.e *3.b, 3.c, 4.b, 4.c, 5.e, 4 '*
nothis would r equire on trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip.
For Functions 2.c, 3.a,
- 2*Z)h5.a) 5.4*and 6.a, this would require one trip sMhave one channel OPERABLE or in trip.
For For each Function consists of channels thatr different locations.
Therefore, this wod e one channel per location to be OPERABLE or in trip (thei annels are not required to be in the same trip s
Tem.
s onim eave two niniation eaunctions (h Onctions 1.h, 2F, 3.j, 4.k,F 2
"-3-"
and 5.f),
ince theyare not assumedn any accide orip transient analysis.
Thus, a total.
css of manuacinitiatnon capabili for 24 urs (as allow by Required tction A.me ri The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.
The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes (continued)
Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS B 3.3-176
0 INSERT ACTION B.1-1 For Functions l.a, 1.b, 1.d, and 1.f (associated with MSL drain isolation) this would require one trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip.
For Function 1.c (associated with MSL drain isolation) this will require one trip system to have two channels, associated with each MSL, each OPERABLE or in trip.
For Function i.e this would require one trip system to have two channels, associated with each main steam tunnel area, each to be OPERABLE or in trip.
For Functions 2.g, 2.h and 2.i, as noted by footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1, there is only one trip system provided for each associated penetration.
For these penetrations (i.e., hydrogen/oxygen sample and return, and gaseous/particulate sample supply and return) and for Functions 2.g and 2.h, this will require both channels to be OPERABLE or in trip in order to close at least one valve.
For Function 2.i, this will require one channel to be OPERABLE or in trip in order to isolate at least one valve.
S)
INSERT ACTION B.1-2 For Function 5.d, this would require that with the SLC initiation switch in start system A or B the associated valve will close.
For Functions 7.a and 7.b the logic is arranged in one trip system, therefore this would require both channels to be OPERABLE or in trip, or the manual shear valves to be OPERABLE.
Insert Page B 3.3-176 Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 141and M4.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, or any Required Action of Condition F or G is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply.
This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
1.1 and 1.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status r
6i*XD within the allowed Completion Time, the associated, SLC subsystem(
isdeclared inoperable or the RWCU System is isolated. -Since this Function is required to ensure that the SLC System performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated SLC subsystems inoperable or isolating the RWCU System.
The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowingTsufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU'System.
(continued)
B 3.3-179 Rev 1, 04/07/95 REVISION,,'r
)
BWR/4 STS
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS J.1 and J.2 (continued)
If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed.
However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RIR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can be isolated).
Actions must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the RIR Shutdown Cooling System is isolated.
SURVEILLANCE viewer's tee:
Certain Fy quencles Zar ased on approv REQUIREMENTS opical r orts.
In orde for a lice e to use these T
requen es, the license must justfy the Frequenci as K*1L require by the staff S for the opical report.
As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Primary Containment Isolation iqstrumentation Function are "found in the SRs c~lumn of Table 3.3.6.1-1
~
q(lows$
~~ fc The Surveill1ances are, modi f ied by q3tNote(p idct thAt (A, 7~ ~
hwhen a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for
~' 9 ~
performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated 7,
Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to C6"ourprovided the associated Function maintains trip
'4-',
S b4er*'.441
.capability.
Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be
, returnedto OPERABLE status orthe a plicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken Ths No is based o the reliability analysis (Refs. IandX6) asspumpion of the average time required to perform channel surveillance:.
That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance'does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary.
Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.
A (continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.3-180 Rev 1, 04/07/95 REVISION F T
c INSERT SR Note For Functions 2.d and 2.g, this allowance is permitted since the associated
(*
penetration flow path(s) involve sample lines which form a closed system with the primary containment atmosphere.
For Functions 7.a and 7.b, this is permitted since the associated penetrations can be manually isolated if needed.
Revision J Insert Page B 3.3-180
i INSERT SR 3.3.6.1.2 A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay.
This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay.
This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
Insert Page B 3.3-181 Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at thee l month Frequency.
This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis.
Testing is performed only on channels where the assum response time does not correspond to the
,diesel generator{
)C) start time.
For channels assumed to respond within th*DG start time, sufficient margin exists In the-V10 second start time when compared to the typical channel response time (milliseconds) so as to assure SL quate response without a specific measurement test.
flW
-j*
-iWv ri1ncu virtually a ure aninstan, aneous respo e time; Re!Ponse c-1ar imes for r diatto detect r cha hels s iall be meas!
d f perector a ~put orthe in ut of *he ffir tt electro
/
omoent n the annel 2)Z r-ZZ3~
1&Ii0-To)JMM RESPONSE TIME tests are Conducte on 1~month STAGGERED TEST BASIS.FThe d)month Frequency is, consistent with the C
refueling cycle and is I
L*_
based upon plant opera ing erience that shows that rand failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
PA/
B 3.3-183
/
Rev on1,inu_/7 Rev 1, 04/07/95 REIIISIONjeFr BWR/4 STS
e INSERT SR 3.3.6.1.8-1 ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements.
However, the sensors for Functions l.a, 1.b, and 1.c are Z-'Z~
5:M excluded from specific ISOLATION SYSTM RESPONSE TIME
-T the conditions of Reference a-Fe satisfied.
noions s e sensor response time may be allocated based on Ca eiter assume desi n s e
onse time or the manufacturer's stated desiq rA ote eires STAG iErequirDeT*Et ReteArence btaroFbot satisnied
, sensc cneltime must bt hr adle quir*e cearen t e idnstrumen as a u e u s ý m r, me1 opSu resi nscmeFre for vals.ctions 1a,a and 1.
nnt ed-ifche
,,odiin e~fe~rence 9 aN satisfied, l
- -r -a~l ohrFunct ns, the ed
- test, while fo Funct hel must Ssal be ext tluded Io d t o s o -e e e c '8 are sa,sfi ed..*-_
INSERT SR 3.3.6.1.8-2 A Note requires STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency to be determined based on 2 channels.
This will ensure that all required channels are tested during two SurveillIance Frequency interval s.
For Functions 1.a and 1.b, two channels must be tested during each test, while for Function 1.c, eight channels must be tested.
Insert Page B 3.3-183 Revi si on /P
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation
\\
B 3.3.6.1 BASES (continued)
REFERENCEES
.*J*/A!.
(*VFSAR, Section e-F,.ee sr--D 3'6 6 (13 (Ve t"
1
(.
- NPEDO-31466,
- Technical Specification Screening TO.
Criteria Application and Risk Assessment, QV November -1987.
Asesmet,---*
9),9.
@FSAR, Section
(
k NEDC-31677P-A, #9Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, July 1990.
NEDC-30851P-upplement 2, $Technical Specifications Improvement M*ysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation, arch
., F t,o.
-r-- 71,
-7s Rev 1, 04/07/95
)
a DINSERT REF
- 10.
NEDO-32291-A, System Analyses For the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements, October 1995.
- 11.
NRC letter dated October 28, 1996, Issuance of Amendment 235 to Facility Operating License DPR-59 for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
- 12.
NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount, December 1992.
- 13.
Drawing 11825-5.01-15D, Rev. D, Reactor Assembly Nuclear Boiler, (GE Drawing 919D690BD).
Insert Page B 3.3-184 Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 APPLICABILITY:
The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.
NOTES OTES.....................
- 1.
Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
- 2.
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more required A.1 Place channel in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for channels inoperable, trip.
Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.d, 2.g, 5.e, 5.f, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.d, 2.g, 5.e, 5.f, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b B.
One or more Functions B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with isolation capability.
capability not maintained.
(continued)
Amendment (Rev.
J)
ACTIONS JAFNPP 3.3-47
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F or G not met.
OR As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.
H.1 AND H.2 Be in MODE 3.
Be in MODE 4.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 36 hours I.
As required by 1.1 Declare associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Required Action C.1 standby liquid and referenced in control subsystem Table 3.3.6.1-1.
(SLC) inoperable.
OR 1.2 Isolate the Reactor 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Water Cleanup System.
J.
As required by J.1 Initiate action to Immediately Required Action C.1 restore channel to and referenced in OPERABLE status.
Table 3.3.6.1-1.
OR J.2 Initiate action to Immediately isolate the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Shutdown Cooling System.
Amendment (Rev. J)
JAFNPP 3.3-49
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
NOTES -----------------------------------
- 1.
Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.
- 2.
When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Functions 2.d, 2.g, 7.a, and 7.b; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Functions other than 2.d, 2.g, 7.a, and 7.b provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
92 days SR 3.3.6.1.3 NOTE -----------------
For Functions 1.f and 2.f, radiation detectors are excluded.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
92 days SR 3.3.6.1.4 Calibrate the trip units.
184 days SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
24 months SR 3.3.6.1.6 Calibrate the radiation detectors.
24 months (continued)
Amendment (Rev.
J) 3.3-50 JAFNPP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.7 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.
24 months SR 3.3.6.1.8 NOTE ------------------
"n" equals 2 channels for the purpose of determining the STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency.
Verify the ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION 24 months on a RESPONSE TIME is within limits.
STAGGERED TEST BASIS Amendment (Rev.
J) 3.3-51 JAFNPP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND
- 5.
Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation (continued)
RWCU return penetration outboard valve.
The trip system associated with the SLC System Initiation Function is connected to the outboard RWCU suction valve and the outboard RWCU return penetration valve.
- 6.
Shutdown Cooling System Isolation The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (Level 3) Function (Function 6.b) receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels.
The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected to two two-out-of-two trip systems.
Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two valves on the RHR shutdown cooling pump suction penetration and on one of the two inboard LPCI injection valves if in shutdown cooling mode.
The Reactor Pressure-High Function (Function 6.a) receives input from two channels, with each channel providing input into each trip system using a one-out-of-two logic.
However, only one channel input is required to be OPERABLE for a trip system to be considered OPERABLE.
Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two valves on the shutdown cooling pump suction penetration.
- 7.
Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (Level 3) Isolation Function receives input from two reactor vessel water level channels.
The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected into one two-out-of-two logic trip system.
The Drywell Pressure-High Isolation function receives input from two drywell pressure channels.
The outputs from the drywell pressure channels are connected into one two-out-of-two logic trip system.
When either Isolation Function actuates, the TIP drive mechanisms will withdraw the TIPs, if inserted, and close the inboard TIP system isolation ball valves when the TIPs are fully withdrawn.
The outboard TIP system isolation valves are manual shear valves.
(continued)
B 3.3-153 JAFNPP Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABILITY 1.a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low (Level 1)
SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY that offsite dose limits are not exceeded for a DBA.
Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low (Level 1) Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low (Level 1)
Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that the MSLs isolate on a potential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits.
In addition, the setting is low enough to allow the removal of heat from the reactor for a predetermined time following a scram, prevent isolation on a partial loss of feedwater and to reduce challenges to the safety/relief valves (S/RVs).
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref. 13).
This Function isolates the MSIVs and MSL drain valves.
1.b.
Main Steam Line Pressure-Low Low MSL pressure indicates that there may be a problem with the turbine pressure regulation, which could result in a low reactor vessel water level condition and the RPV cooling down at a rate greater than 100°F/hr if the pressure loss is allowed to continue.
The Main Steam Line Pressure-Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the pressure regulator failure (Ref. 2).
For this event, the closure of the MSIVs ensures that the RPV temperature change limit (100°F/hr) is not reached.
In addition, this Function supports actions to ensure that Safety Limit 2.1.1.1 is not exceeded.
(This Function closes the MSIVs prior to pressure decreasing below 785 psig, which results in a scram due to MSIV closure, thus reducing reactor power to < 25% RTP.)
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-156
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 1.b.
Main Steam Line Pressure-Low (continued)
The MSL low pressure signals are initiated from four transmitters that are connected to the MSL pressure averaging manifold.
The transmitters are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, each transmitter is able to detect low MSL pressure.
Four channels of Main Steam Line Pressure-Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Value was selected to be high enough to detect a pressure regulator malfunction and prevent excessive RPV depressurization.
In addition, the setting is low enough to prevent spurious isolations.
The Main Steam Line Pressure-Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 since this is when the assumed transient can occur (Ref. 2).
The Function is automatically bypassed when the reactor mode switch is not in the run position.
This Function isolates the MSIVs and MSL drain valves.
1.c.
Main Steam Line Flow-High Main Steam Line Flow-High is provided to detect a break of the MSL and to initiate closure of the MSIVs.
If the steam were allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor would depressurize and the core could uncover.
If the RPV water level decreases too far, fuel damage could occur.
Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage.
The Main Steam Line Flow-High Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the main steam line break (MSLB)
(Ref. 3).
The isolation action, along with the scram function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS),
ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 and offsite doses do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 limits.
The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 transmitters that are connected to the four MSLs.
The transmitters are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to (continued)
B 3.3-157 JAFNPP Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.f.
Main Steam Line Radiation-High (continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES,
- LCO, and Function 2.f) to ensure that the assumptions utilized to APPLICABILITY determine that acceptable offsite doses resulting from a control rod drop accident (CRDA) are maintained.
Main Steam Line Radiation-High signals are generated from four radiation elements and associated monitors, which are located near the main steam lines in the steam tunnel.
Four instrumentation channels of the Main Steam Line Radiation-High Function are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Value was selected to be low enough that a high radiation trip results from the fission products released in the CRDA.
In addition, the setting is adjusted high enough above the background radiation level in the vicinity of the main steam lines so that spurious trips are avoided at rated power.
As noted (footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 with THERMAL POWER
- 10% RTP.
When THERMAL POWER is > 10% RTP, there is no possible control rod configuration that results in a control rod worth that could exceed the fuel damage limit during a CRDA (Refer to the Bases for Function 2 (Rod Worth Minimizer) of LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").
In MODES 3 and 4, all control rods are required to be inserted into the core; therefore, a CRDA cannot occur.
In MODE 5, since only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies, adequate SDM ensures that the consequences of a CRDA are acceptable, since the reactor will be subcritical.
This Function isolates the MSL drain valves.
Primary Containment Isolation 2.a, 2.g.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3)
Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products.
The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure (continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-160
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.a, 2.g.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3)
IN SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (Level 3) Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (Level 3) signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
For Function 2.a, four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (Level 3)
Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
For Function 2.g, two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (Level
- 3) are required to be OPERABLE for each hydrogen/oxygen and gaseous/particulate sample supply and return penetration to ensure these penetrations can be isolated.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (Level 3) Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref.
13).
This Function isolates the valves listed in Reference 1.
2.b, 2.d.
Drywell Pressure-High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment.
The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded.
The Drywell Pressure-High Function, associated with isolation of the primary (continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-161
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.b, 2.d.
Drywell Pressure-High (continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and containment, is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR accident APPLICABILITY analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.
High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell.
For Function 2.b, four channels of Drywell Pressure-High are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
For Function 2.d, two channels of Drywell Pressure-High are required to be OPERABLE for each hydrogen/oxygen and gaseous/particulate sample supply and return penetration to ensure these penetrations can be isolated.
The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible without inducing spurious trips.
The Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the RPS Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.
These Functions isolate the valves listed in Reference 1.
2.c.
Containment Radiation-High High containment radiation indicates possible gross failure of the fuel cladding.
Therefore, when Containment Radiation-High is detected, an isolation is initiated to limit the release of fission products.
However, this Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the UFSAR because other leakage paths (e.g.,
MSIVs) are more limiting.
The containment radiation signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located in the drywell.
Two channels of Containment Radiation-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Value is low enough to promptly detect gross failures in the fuel cladding.
However, the setting is high enough to avoid spurious isolation.
This Function isolates the containment vent and purge valves.
(continued)
B 3.3-162 JAFNPP Revision J
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 2.e.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low (Level 1)
Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result.
Therefore, isolation of the recirculation loop sample valves occurs to prevent offsite dose limits from being exceeded.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low (Level 1)
Function is one of the many Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation signals.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low (Level 1) Function associated with isolation is assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 3).
The isolation of the recirculation loop sample valves on Level 1 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded for a DBA.
Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low Low Low (Level 1) Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low (Level 1)
Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that the recirculation loop sample valves close on a potential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits.
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref.
13).
This Function isolates the recirculation loop sample valves.
2.f.
Main Steam Line Radiation-High The Main Steam Line Radiation-High isolation signal has been removed from the MSIV isolation logic circuitry (Ref.
1); however, this isolation Function has been retained for the recirculation loop sample valves to ensure that the assumptions utilized to determine that acceptable offsite doses resulting from a CRDA are maintained.
(continued)
B 3.3-163 Revision J JAFNPP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.f.
Main Steam Line Radiation-High (continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Main Steam Line Radiation-High signals are generated from APPLICABILITY four radiation elements and associated monitors, which are located near the main steam lines in the steam tunnel.
Four Instrumentation channels of the Main Steam Line Radiation-High Function are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Value was selected to be low enough that a high radiation trip results from the fission products released in the Design Basis CRDA.
In addition, the setting is adjusted high enough above the background radiation level in the vicinity of the main steam lines so that spurious trips are avoided at rated power.
As noted (footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 with THERMAL POWER ! 10% RTP.
When THERMAL POWER is > 10% RTP, there is no possible control rod configuration that results in a control rod worth that could exceed the fuel damage limit during a CRDA (Refer to the Bases for Function 2 (Rod Worth Minimizer) of LCO 3.3.2.1).
In MODES 3 and 4, all control rods are required to be inserted into the core; therefore, a CRDA cannot occur.
In MODE 5, since only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies, adequate SDM ensures that the consequences of a CRDA are acceptable, since the reactor will be subcritical.
This Function isolates the recirculation loop sample valves.
High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Systems Isolation 3.a, 4.a.
HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Steam Line Flow-High Functions are provided to detect a break of the RCIC or HPCI steam lines and initiate closure of the steam line isolation valves of the appropriate system.
If the steam is allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor will depressurize and the core can uncover.
Therefore, the isolations are initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage.
The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures (continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-164
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.a, 4.a.
HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-High (continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES,
- LCO, and that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the APPLICABILITY limits of 10 CFR 50.46.
Specific credit for these Functions is not assumed in any UFSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks.
However, these instruments prevent the RCIC or HPCI steam line breaks from becoming bounding.
The HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-High signals are initiated from transmitters (two for HPCI and two for RCIC) that are connected to the system steam lines.
Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Values are chosen to be low enough to ensure a timely detection of a turbine steam line break so that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as the bounding event.
The setting is adjusted high enough to avoid spurious isolations during HPCI and RCIC startups.
These Functions isolate the valves, as appropriate, as listed in Reference 1.
3.b, 4.b.
HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low Low steam pressure indicates that the pressure of the steam in the HPCI or RCIC turbine may be too low to continue operation of the associated system's turbine.
These isolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR.
However, they also provide a diverse signal to indicate a possible system break.
These instruments are included in Technical Specifications (TS) because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 5).
The HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low signals are initiated from transmitters (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the system steam line.
Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-165 JAFNPP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.b, 4.b.
HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
- LCO, and APPLICABILITY Pressure-Low Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Values are selected to be high enough to prevent damage to the system's turbine and low enough to ensure HPCI and RCIC Systems remain OPERABLE.
These Functions isolate the valves, as appropriate, as listed in Reference 1.
3.c, 4.c.
HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High High turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure could indicate that the turbine rotor is not turning, or there is a broken turbine blading or shrouding, thus allowing reactor pressure to act on the turbine exhaust line.
The system is isolated to prevent overpressurization of the turbine exhaust line.
These isolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR.
These instruments are included in the TS because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref.
5).
The HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High signals are initiated from switches (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the area between the rupture diaphragms on each system's turbine exhaust line.
Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Values are high enough to prevent damage to low pressure components in the turbine exhaust pathway.
The settings are adjusted low enough to avoid isolation of the system's turbine.
These Functions isolate the valves, as appropriate, as listed in Reference 1.
(continued)
Revision J B 3.3-166 JAFNPP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 3.d, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g, 3.h, 3.i, 3.j, 4.d, 4.e, 4.f.
HPCI and RCIC Area Temperature-High HPCI and RCIC Area temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the associated system steam piping.
The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred and is diverse to the high flow instrumentation.
If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached.
These Functions are not assumed in any UFSAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks.
Area Temperature-High signals are initiated from resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) that are appropriately located to protect the system that is being monitored.
Two instruments monitor each area for a total of 16 channels for HPCI and 8 channels for RCIC.
All channels for each HPCI and RCIC Area Temperature-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Values are set high enough above normal operating levels to avoid spurious operation but low enough to provide timely detection of a steam leak.
These Functions isolate the valves, as appropriate, as listed in Reference 1.
System Isolation 5.a, 5.b, 5.c.
RWCU Area Temperatures-High RWCU area temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the RWCU System.
The isolation occurs even when very small leaks have occurred.
If the small leak continues without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached.
Credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the UFSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks.
Area temperature signals are initiated from temperature elements that are located in the area that is being monitored.
Eight thermocouples provide input to the Area Temperature-High Functions (two per area or room).
Eight channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-167 JAFNPP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 5.a, 5.b, 5.c.
RWCU Area Temperatures-High (continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and function.
The Area Temperature-High Allowable Values are APPLICABILITY set high enough to avoid spurious isolation yet low enough to provide timely detection and isolation of a break in the RWCU System.
These Functions isolates both RWCU suction valves and the return valve.
5.d.
SLC System Initiation The isolation of the RWCU System is required when the SLC System has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of the boron solution by the RWCU System (Ref. 6).
The RWCU isolation signal is initiated when the control room SLC initiation switch is in any position other than stop.
There is no Allowable Value associated with this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the SLC System initiation switch.
Two channels (start system A or start system B) of the SLC System Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE only in MODES 1 and 2, since these are the only MODES where the reactor can be critical, and these MODES are consistent with the Applicability for the SLC System (LCO 3.1.7).
As noted (footnote (d) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), this Function is only required to close one of the RWCU suction isolation valves and one return isolation valve since the signals only provide input into one of the two trip systems.
5.e.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3)
Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result.
Therefore, isolation of some interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to isolate the potential sources of a break.
The isolation of the RWCU System on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-168 JAFNPP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 5.e.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3)
SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY 10 CFR 50.46.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3)
Function associated with RWCU isolation is not directly assumed in the UFSAR safety analyses because the RWCU System line break is bounded by breaks of larger systems (recirculation and MSL breaks are more limiting).
Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (Level 3) Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1),
since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref. 13).
This Function isolates both RWCU suction valves and the RWCU return valve.
5.f.
Drywell Pressure-High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment.
The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded.
The Drywell Pressure-High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-169
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,
- LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) 6.b.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3)
Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result.
Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Function associated with RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in safety analyses because a break of the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is bounded by breaks of the reactor water recirculation system and MSL.
The RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling System.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
As noted (footnote (e) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), only one trip system of the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5, provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained.
System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance or other activity is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1),
since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref.
13).
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-171
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 6.b.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3)
SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (Level 3) Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel.
In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Pressure-High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.
This Function isolates both RHR shutdown cooling pump suction valves and the inboard LPCI injection valves.
Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation 7.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3)
Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.
The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products.
The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level
- 3) signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref. 13).
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-172
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 7.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3)
(continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and This Function isolates the TIP System isolation ball valves.
APPLICABILITY 7.b. Drywell Pressure-High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment.
The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded.
The Drywell Pressure-High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.
High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell.
Two channels of Drywell Pressure-High are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.
The Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the RPS Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.
This Function isolates the TIP System isolation ball valves.
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes.
Note 1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control lb room.
In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.
Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to primary containment isolation instrumentation channels.
Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.
Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-173 JAFNPP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, (continued) with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.
However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels.
As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.
A.1 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.d, 2.g, 5.e, 5.f, 6.b, 7.a and 7.b (which have components common to RPS) and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.d, 2.g, 5.e, 5.f, 6.b, 7.a and 7.b has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 6 and 7) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status.
This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases).
If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions.
Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation),
Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.
B.1 Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant isolation capability being lost for the associated penetration flow path(s).
The MSL Isolation Functions I(
(associated with MSIV isolation) are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip), such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal.
The other (continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-174
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) isolation functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal.
This ensures that at least one of the PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolation signal from the given Function.
For Functions l.a, 1.b, and 1.d (associated with MSIV isolation), this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip.
For Function 1.c (associated with MSIV isolation), this would require both trip systems to have one channel, associated with each MSL, OPERABLE or in trip.
For Function i.e, four areas are monitored by four channels (e.g., different locations within the main steam tunnel area).
Therefore, this would require both trip systems to have one channel per location OPERABLE or in trip (associated with MSIV isolation).
For Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.d, and 1.f (associated with MSL drain isolation) this would require one trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip.
For Function 1.c (associated with MSL drain isolation) this will require one trip system to have two channels, associated with each MSL, each OPERABLE or in trip.
For Function i.e this would require one trip system to have two channels, associated with each main steam tunnel area, each to be OPERABLE or in trip.
For Functions 2.d and 2.g, as noted by footnote (c) to Table 3.3.6.1-1, there is only one trip system provided for each associated penetration.
For these penetrations (i.e., hydrogen/oxygen sample and return, and gaseous/particulate sample supply and return), this will require both channels to be OPERABLE or in trip in order to close at least one valve.
For Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.e, 2.f, 3.b, 3.c, 4.b, 4.c, 5.e, 5.f, and 6.b, this would require one trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip.
For Functions 2.c, 3.a, 3.d, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g, 3.h, 3.i, 4.a, 4.d, 4.e, 5.a, 5.c, and 6.a, this would require one trip system to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip.
For Functions 3.j, 4.f, and 5.b each Function consists of channels that monitor two different locations.
Therefore, this would require one channel per location to be OPERABLE or in trip (the channels are not required to be in the same trip system).
For Function 5.d, this would require that with the SLC initiation switch in start system A or B the associated valve will close.
For Function 7.a and 7.b the logic is arranged in one trip system, therefore this would require both channels to be OPERABLE or in trip, or the manual shear valves to be OPERABLE.
(continued)
Revision J B 3.3-175 JAFNPP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE As noted (Note 1) at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for REQUIREMENTS each Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1.
The Surveillances are modified by Note 2 to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> as follows: (a) for Functions 2.d, 2.g, 7.a, and 7.b; and (b) for Functions other than 2.d, 2.g, 7.a, and 7.b provided the associated Function maintains trip capability.
Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.
This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 7 and 8) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance.
That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary.
For Functions 2.d and 2.g, this allowance is permitted since the associated penetration flow path(s) involve sample lines which form a closed system with the primary containment atmosphere.
For Functions 7.a and 7.b, this is permitted since the associated penetrations can be manually isolated if needed.
SR 3.3.6.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.
A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels.
It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.
Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious.
A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
(continued)
Revision J B 3.3-179 JAFNPP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Channel agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability.
If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.
The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.6.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.
A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay.
This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay.
This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.2 is based on the reliability analysis described in References 7 and 8.
SR 3.3.6.1.3, SR 3.3.6.1.5, and SR 3.3.6.1.6 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor.
This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
SR 3.3.6.1.6 however is only a calibration of the radiation detectors using a standard radiation source.
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-180
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.8 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements.
However, the sensors for Functions l.a, l.b, and 1.c are excluded from specific ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME measurement since the conditions of Reference 10 are satisfied.
For Functions l.a, 1.b, and 1.c, sensor response time may be allocated based on either assumed design sensor response time or the manufacturer's stated design response time.
ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
A Note requires STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency to be determined based on 2 channels.
This will ensure that all required channels are tested during two Surveillance Frequency intervals.
For Functions l.a and 1.b, two channels must be tested during each test, while for Function 1.c, eight channels must be tested.
The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience (t
that shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
REFERENCES
- 1.
UFSAR, Table 7.3-1.
- 2.
UFSAR, Section 14.5.
- 3.
UFSAR, Section 14.6.
- 4.
- 5.
NEDO-31466, Technical Specification Screening Criteria Application and Risk Assessment, November 1987.
- 6.
UFSAR, Section 3.9.3.
- 7.
NEDC-31677P-A, Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, July 1990.
- 8.
NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 2, Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation, March 1989.
- 9.
UFSAR, Table 7.3-12.
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-183
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)
- 10.
NEDO-32291-A, System Analyses For the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements, October 1995.
- 11.
NRC letter dated October 28, 1996, Issuance of Amendment 235 to Facility Operating License DPR-59 for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
- 12.
NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount, December 1992.
- 13.
Drawing 11825-5.01-15D, Rev. D, Reactor Assembly Nuclear Boiler, (GE Drawing 919D690BD).
Revision J I LY' JAFNPP B 3.3-184
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: 3.3.6.2 - SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES A5 (continued) placed in the trip condition.
In this condition, the equipment is still inoperable but has accomplished the required safety function.
Therefore, the allowances in SR 3.0.1 and the associated actions provide adequate guidance with respect to when the associated surveillances are required to be performed and this explicit requirement is not retained.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1433, Revision 1.
A6 CTS Table 4.1-1 Note 4 and RETS Table 3.10-2 Note Mi),
specify that the instrumentation channels are excepted from the instrumentation channel test definition.
The instrumentation channel functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the instrument channels.
This explicit allowance is not retained in ITS 3.3.6.2 since it is duplicative of the current and proposed CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST definition in ITS Chapter 1.0.
Since this change does not change any technical requirements, it is considered administrative.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1433, Revision 1.
A7 Note 9 of Tables 4.2-1 through 4.2-5 and CTS RETS Table 3.10-2 Note (h) have been deleted.
These Notes state that the logic system functional tests shall include a calibration of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip systems.
Since the secondary containment isolation Functions do not include any time delay relays, this Note does not apply and its deletion is considered administrative.
A8 The quarterly Instrument Channel Functional Test required in CTS RETS Table 3.10-2 for the Refuel Area Exhaust and the Reactor Building Area Exhaust Monitors has been deleted since it is a duplication of the testing performed in accordance with the current and proposed quarterly Channel Calibration (ITS SR 3.3.6.2.3).
Since the proposed Calibration will perform the same testing that is currently performed this change is considered administrative.
This change is consistent with the format of NUREG-1433, Revision 1.
A9 The requirement in CTS Table 3.2-1 Note 1, "there shall be two operable or tripped trip systems for each Trip Function, except as provided below" has been deleted.
The current requirements in CTS Table 3.2-1 Notes provide sufficient guidance to take when channels are inoperable.
The ITS 3.3.6.2 LCO, the requirements in proposed Table 3.3.6.2-1, and the ACTIONS clearly define the appropriate requirements when channels are inoperable in the ITS.
Since there is no technical change in deleting this portion of the Note, this change is considered administrative.
Page 2 of 12 Revision J JAFNPP
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Table 3.3.6.2-1 (page 1 of 1)
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR REQUIRED OTHER (RASNEM SPECIFIEDPE CONITIONiS TRPSTE SURVEILLANCE A
REQUIREMENTS
{T&a 3,.1f
- 1. Rector VesselWte Jj Level - Low
ý*Leve.Lit FA 3
- 2.
Drywell Pressure-High (LO1t0 t
- 3. ReactoR Buiding Exhaust c-- Ll 71
- 74.
RefueLing Floar Exhaust Radiati on - High a&
1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.1 C--M inchesý SR 3.3.6.2.2 V
- 3.3.6.2.;Lnq SR 3.3.6.2.5 SR 3.3.6.2.6 SR 3.3.6.2.1
(
psig SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.5 SR 3.3.6.2.6 SR,* 3..../1 SR 3.3.6.2.6
)----
SR 3.3.6.2.1 SR 3.3.6.2.6 (a)
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
(b)
During \\CORE ALTERATIONS and duriiX movement of irradiated fuel meLies i onr4 containment.
r 3.3-66 Rev 1, 04/07/95
(PV(*(') I PuNCT IOU LLOWABLE VALUE (AMoi BWR/4 STS FUNCT I
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation BACKGROUND The secondary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate secondary containment isolation valves (SCIVs) and starts the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System.
The function of these systems, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs)
(Ref. 1).
.,Secondar contai ion and establishment of vacuum ee
ý witt e SGT System within the time limits ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, or are released outside primary containment, or are released during certain operations when primary containment is.not required to be OPERABLE are maintained within applicable limits.
-o The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors,*relays, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of secondary containment isolation.
Most channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints.
When PA the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, E *1 /
0o1 which then outputs a secondary containment isolation signal to the isolation logic.
Functional diversity is provided by
- t/**,_-
\\mnit ingmonitoring a wide range of independent parameters.
The
- Th I~'*°'
vess wa er level, (2) drywell-pressure, (3) reacr (vey,4 Sbuiid*ul inexhaus-l and (4) refueling floor exxhaust j*
radiation.
Redundant sensor input signals from each Paz-*
~~~parameter are provided for initiation of isolationo_.*n*
The outputs of the logic channells t
ss e-/ 6-i ran ed tno wo out-of-two trip system -logics.( One0 t$_C6O-w trip system initiates isolation of one auomac solation valve (damper).and starts one SGT subsystem while the other trip system initiates isolation of the other automatic isolation valve in the penetrationandstartstheotherSG subsystem.
Each logic closes one of the two valves on each penetration and starts one SGT subsystem, so that operation of either logic isolates the secondary containment and provides for the necessary filtration of fission products.
(continued)
B 3.3-185 e--1,'-L*4*
INSERT BKGD-1 trips the refuel floor exhaust fans, trips the tank and equipment drain sump exhaust fan, and places the reactor building ventilation system in the 16 recirculation mode of operation.
(p INSERT BKGD-2 The outputs of the logic channels for reactor building ventilation exhaust and refueling ventilation exhaust radiation are arranged into two one-out-of-one trip system logics.
Insert Page B 3.3-185 Revision J
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES (continued)
OV14yvo YOow'V APPLICABLE The isolation signals generated by the-secondary containment SAFETY ANALYSES, isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in thee LCO, and safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closr APPLICABILITY of valves and start the SGT System to limit offsite oses.
Refer to LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for mo.
detail of the safety analyses.
0 z
ec (aT (
2 The secondary containment solation insrumentato satisfies Criterion 3 of *T OMA rtain trumen ation-f unc ions are retainekfor other so s and L
are scribed beloin4 the individual ctions discuss n.
The OPERABILITY of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions.
Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels with
.their setpoints set within the specified-Allowable Values, as shown in Table 3.3.6.2-1.
The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.
A channel is inoperable if its actual tr'
ýetpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. *ach channel mu aso respond wit*n lts assum resnse time,.
where Jon iatew Allowable Values are specified for each Function specified in the Table.
Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.
The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.
Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.
Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place.
The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state.
The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process
.parameters obtained from the safety analysis.
ire)~lowabl*
(ff Values are deie rmLe aayilitscorcted foryL**
calibration, process and some of the instrument errors.
setpoints (re then determined accounti for nt (continued)
Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS B 3.3-186
00 3INSERT ASA The trip setpoints are derived from the analytical limits and account for all worst case instrumentation uncertainties as appropriate (e.g., drift, process effects, calibration uncertainties, and severe environmental errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49)).
The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because all expected uncertainties are accounted for.
The Allowable Values are then derived from the trip setpoints by accounting for normal effects that would be seen during periodic surveillance or calibration.
These effects are instrumentation uncertainties observed during normal operation (e.g., drift and calibration uncertainties).
INSERT Page B 3.3-186 Revision J
C Insert Function 1 The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Rev.
8).
Insert Page B 3.3-188 Revision J
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES (continued) co ACTIONSSectiewrson1.3 Ceti Ccomplet'on
- Times, spciie that onca approve pical reports.
In order or a licensee in t se dthe
- tioe, the licensee must justiipa the Completion imes as "wilntreuti seart entryint thepCondti(Eon.
th Sequiro by the staff Safety Eva quired Actons of the Condtionceontnet o appl fo eac addtinafilre A Note has been provided'to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels.
Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.
Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.
However, the Required Actions for inoperable secondary-containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels.
As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel.
Because oityhe diversity oftsensors available to provide plc the hanelitrip('.
si tecs hr isolation)signals anditio Cmust ancy of the isolationr Actions taken S1
- 1desigpn, anslallownble out of service time of 12 hourfo
)*
--*--F~unci-o
( and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for Functions ifftiE DaMn
)>
- ,has been shown to be acceptable (Refs.
an csa__-l to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status.
This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer-to Required Action B.1 Bases).
If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.
Alterniately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken.
(continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.3-191 Rev 1, 04/07/95
SJ INSERT SR 3.3.6.2.2 A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay.
This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay.
This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
INSERT Page B 3.3-194 Revision J
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.2.6 (continued)
Operating experience has shown that these corponents pass the Surveillance when performed at the Q1month Frequency.
This SR ensures that the i vidual channel response times are less than or equal t he maximum value assumed in the accident analysis.
Tel ing is performed only on channels where the assumed re ~onse time does not correspond to the diesel generator
)qstart time.
For channels assumed tohe respond within t, DG start time, sufficient margin exists in the [10] s gnd start time when compared to the typical
^
channel res ~se time (milliseconds) so as to assure
/
adequate seponse without a specific measurement test.
Th v
instrumn response times must be added to the SCIV/
osur*
- times, cobtain the ISOLATION. SYSTEM RESPONSE TI ISO ION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance crit ria are i
uded in Reference 7.
/A Note to the Surveillance states that t~e radiation]
detectors may be excluded from ISOLAT $N SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing.
This Note is necess~p because of the difficulty of generating an appr id~ate detector input signal and because the princip s of detector operation virtually ensure an instanta ous response time.
Response
time for radiation detecto *channels shall be measured from\\
detector output or the i lut of the first electronic componentinthechannt h
- ISOLATION SYSTEM FONSE TIME tests are conducted on.n 18 month STAGGERE DTEST BASIS.*The 18 month Freque y is consistent with/ he typical industry refueling c, k*e and is based on plan ;operating experience, whic hwthat random failures of *nstrumentat cmoents causin serious response ta degradation, but not cha l
ure, arels i n f r e q u e n o c c u r r e Rev 1, 04/07/95 usually I
fSR 3.3.6.2.7
ý BWR/4 STS B 3.3-196 4i-4ý, _ 3'
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES REFERENC (conti w
0).
NEDC-31677P-A, *Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation,"X..-
July 1990.
NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2, *Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation, March 1989.
FSK Sec;on [72.3]'
'112S
)
Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS B 3.3-197 nu C
+1 C56 W" (;1YJLxL&.Lj0LW.
(0- A 6.
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
92 days SR 3.3.6.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION 92 days SR 3.3.6.2.4 Calibrate the trip units.
184 days SR 3.3.6.2.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
24 months SR 3.3.6.2.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.
24 months Amendment (Rev. J)
JAFNPP 3.3-60
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The secondary containment isolation instrumentation automatically initiates closure of appropriate secondary containment isolation valves (SCIVs), trips the refuel floor exhaust fans, trips the tank and equipment drain sump exhaust fan, and places the reactor building ventilation system in the recirculation mode of operation and starts the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)
System.
The function of these systems, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs)
(Ref.
1).
Secondary containment isolation and establishment of vacuum with the SGT System within the required time limits ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, or are released outside primary containment, or are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE are maintained within applicable limits.
The isolation instrumentation includes the sensors, logic circuits, relays, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of secondary containment isolation.
Most channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints.
When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a secondary containment isolation signal to the isolation logic.
Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters.
The input parameters to the isolation logic are (1) reactor vessel water level, (2) drywell pressure, (3) reactor building ventilation exhaust radiation, and (4) refueling floor ventilation exhaust radiation.
Redundant sensor input signals from each parameter are provided for initiation of isolation.
The outputs of the logic channels for reactor water level and drywell pressure are arranged into two two-out-of-two trip system logics.
The outputs of the logic channels for reactor building ventilation exhaust and refueling ventilation exhaust radiation are arranged into two one-out of-one trip system logics.
One trip system initiates isolation of one automatic isolation valve (damper)
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-186
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,
- LCO, and APPLICABILITY and starts one SGT subsystem while the other trip system initiates isolation of the other automatic isolation valve in the penetration and starts the other SGT subsystem.
Each logic closes one of the two valves on each penetration and starts one SGT subsystem, so that operation of either logic isolates the secondary containment and provides for the necessary filtration of fission products.
The isolation signals generated by the secondary containment isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of valves and start the SGT System to limit offsite and control room doses.
Refer to LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safety analyses.
The secondary containment isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 3).
The OPERABILITY of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions.
Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints set within the specified Allowable Values, as shown in Table 3.3.6.2-1.
The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.
A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.
Allowable Values are specified for each Function specified in the Table.
Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.
The nominal setpoints are selected
(
to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.
Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP R 3-3-187
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY
- 1.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3)
(continued)
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.
Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low (Level 3) Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low (Level 3) Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS level scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation"), since this could indicate that the capability to cool the fuel is being threatened.
The Allowable Value is referenced from a level of water 352.56 inches above the lowest point in the inside bottom of the RPV and also corresponds to the top of a 144 inch fuel column (Ref. 8).
The Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low (Level 3) Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS); thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas.
In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, this Function is not required.
In addition, the Function is also required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) because the capability of isolating potential sources of leakage must be provided to ensure that offsite and control room dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs.
- 2.
Drywell Pressure-High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB).
An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite and control room release.
The Drywell Pressure-High (continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-189
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 3, 4.
Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation-High and Refueling Floor Ventilation (continued) exhaust piping coming from the reactor building and the refueling floor zones.
The signal from each detector is input to an individual monitor whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel.
Two channels of Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High Function and two channels of Refueling Floor Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.
The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding and are set in accordance with the ODCM.
The Reactor Building and Refueling Floor Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable RCS energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas.
In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required.
In addition, the Functions are also required to be OPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS, OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that offsite and control room dose limits are not exceeded.
ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels.
Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.
Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.
However, the Required Actions for inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels (continued)
B 3.3-191 JAFNPP Revision J
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES ACTIONS provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate (continued) inoperable channels.
As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel.
A.1 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for Functions 1 and 2 (which have components common to RPS),
and J _
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for Functions 3 and 4, has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 6 and 7) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status.
This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases).
If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.
Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken.
B.1 Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a loss of isolation capability for the associated penetration flow I/2 path(s) or a loss of initiation capability for the SGT System.
A Function is considered to be maintaining secondary containment isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal.
This ensures that one of the two SCIVs in the associated penetration flow path and one SGT subsystem can be initiated on an isolation signal from the given Function.
For the Functions with two two-out-of-two logic trip systems (Functions 1 and 2), this would require one trip system to (continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-192
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) have both channels OPERABLE or in trip.
For Functions 3 and 4, this would require one trip system to have one OPERABLE or tripped channel.
The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.
The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.
C.1.1, C.1.2, C.2.1, and C.2.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the ability to isolate the secondary containment and start the SGT System cannot be ensured.
Therefore, further actions must be performed to ensure the ability to maintain the secondary containment function.
Isolating the associated secondary containment penetration flow path(s) (closing the ventilation supply and exhaust automatic isolation dampers) and starting the associated SGT subsystem (Required Actions C.1.1 and C.2.1) performs the intended function of the instrumentation and allows operation to continue.
Alternately, declaring the associated SCIVs or SGT subsystem(s) inoperable (Required Actions C.1.2 and C.2.2) is also acceptable since the Required Actions of the respective LCOs (LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3) provide appropriate actions for the inoperable components.
One hour is sufficient for plant operations personnel to establish required plant conditions or to declare the associated components inoperable without unnecessarily challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each REQUIREMENTS Secondary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.2-1.
The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated (continued)
B 3.3-193 JAFNPP Revision J
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains secondary containment isolation capability.
Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.
This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 6 and 7) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance.
That analysis demonstrated the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the SCIVs will isolate the associated penetration flow paths and that the SGT System will initiate when necessary.
SR 3.3.6.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.
A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels.
It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.
Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious.
A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Channel agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability.
If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.
The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO.
(continued)
B 3.3-194 JAFNPP Revision J
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.6.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.
A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay.
This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay.
This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of References 6 and 7.
SR 3.3.6.2.3 and SR 3.3.6.2.5 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor.
This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequencies of SR 3.3.6.2.3 and SR 3.3.6.2.5 are based on the assumption of a 92 day and a 24 month calibration interval, respectively, in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.6.2.4 Calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints.
The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.6.2-1.
If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but (continued)
B 3.3-195 Revision J JAFNPP
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.2.4 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS is not beyond the Allowable Value, performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis.
Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.
The Frequency of 184 days is based on the reliability, accuracy and lower failure rates of the solid-state electronic Analog Transmitters/Trip System components.
SR 3.3.6.2.6 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel.
The system functional testing performed on SCIVs and the SGT System in LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3, respectively, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.
While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power for some Functions, the 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
REFERENCES
- 1.
UFSAR, Section 5.3.
- 2.
UFSAR, Chapter 14.
- 3.
- 4.
UFSAR, Section 14.6.1.3.
- 5.
UFSAR, Section 14.6.1.4.
- 6.
NEDC-31677P-A, Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, July 1990.
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-196
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES REFERENCES
- 7.
NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 2, Technical Specifications (continued)
Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation, March 1989.
- 8.
Drawing 11825-5.01-15D, Rev. D, Reactor Assembly Nuclear Boiler, (GE Drawing 919D690BD).
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-197
INSERT APPL MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
Insert Page 3.3-71 Revision J
~~~~ystem Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 Iecl are 1
ý
~subsystem -0 inoperable.
IDVFTI I AN(F RFOUIREMENTS
~~....
..- O--------
- 1. -Refer *o Table 3.E U to demeine-wnicl,-Ks a ppy tor e*T[CEL-"
- )When hannel is placed in an inoperable s
s olrely for performance of "
Z*
requie ~~ilcs ety into 4M
ýý,ondi~tiontO and Required.
Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />sjp'rt-assoc ea u o*--\\
t aitairs
~e~in aab~ t N lI.ýkt 1110D SR 3.3.7. 1.1 Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS jVF IC) 3.3-73
Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES APPLICABLE Theability of the dk iSystem to maintain the habitability ETY ANALYSES of the is explicitly assumed for certain accidents as h 1N an
-* discussedin the FSAR safety analyses (Refs:.Z-/3, and 4).ýýJ pI System operation ensures that the radiation exposure of control room personnel, through the duration of any one
//
of the postulated accidents, does not exceed the limits set epgVA 5 by GOC 19 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
04:
cF*
,3(),C System instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 oftbe
&he The OPERABILITY of the ystem instrumentation is 3z
~ bo" Ardependent upon the OPERABILITY of the iv ua C~
S-r tz.
,J'*/,.)
Junction'must have numi
(*ý
~ FAA.*
0 OPERABLE channe 0, with &MW/etoit w thi the---
7---ý specified Allowable ValUeo,;::*whereý ap*pit
-c f¢na-nfine 17s-\\,,ý inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.
The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.
C,1J.I f'.v, fi hid
-iowable Valueifr;specified
-'I
- J..
o*--*
3p Fcto ifed i hTa..
ominal trip setpointQA?
AFuncti 0 ec g_1'Li I ( 6* j Ipeci ied in he setpoint calculationo.
The nominal ap setpoint elected to ensure that the setpointE dcrot S-R 112.I,,-
exceed the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.
Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its p~Z.
Allowable Value, is acceptable.
Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place.
The setpoints are.compared to the actual process pa-rameter (eg,;*ec*vse~ae
_~~);and_
O h
when the measured output value of he process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.
Sry) cb0) changes state.
The analytic limit 3tderived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from S'--___-J-the safety analysis.
a s
uWerived Tdom ic I corrected for cali ation, process and someof-i-ent errors The t setpoints are hen determi edfaccoun ing for the remaining instrument err rs (e.g.,* ri).
rip set dints der ed in this man er provid adequate protection ec.ause in trumentation unce ainties, rocess effe s, calib tion tolerance h~~~l.j AIo4 ntr ment drfadsever envirn nt erors (for can eIs tat ust uci nhr rn
'5e$-
l I~ C 1
tF 50 tare accou tdf CO A xe.
r-00 0"
.'A (continued)
D 1A 4TM, B 3.3-208 Rev 1, 04/07/95
O0A4 INSERT ASA The trip setpoint is derived from the analytical limit and accounts for all worst case instrumentation uncertainties as appropriate (e.g., drift, process
(
effects, calibration uncertainties, and severe environmental errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49)).
The trip setpoint derived in this manner provides adequate protection because all expected uncertainties are accounted for.
The Allowable Values are then derived from the trip setpoints by accounting for normal effects that would be seen during periodic surveillance or calibration.
These effects are instrumentation uncertainties observed during normal operation (e.g., drift and calibration uncertainties).
Insert Page B 3.3-208 Revision J
BASES LIAL' 3*. Main steam mie Flow Hia (continued)/
SA Y ANAL ES, LC nd The Main Steam Line Fl w-High Function is required/to be PPLIC ILIT OPERABLE in MODES 1,
, and 3 to ensure that con ol room personnel are protec *ed during'a~main steam lind/break (MSLB) accident.
I) MODES 4 and 5, the reactor/is depressurized; thu, MSLB protection is not r uired.
- 4.
Refuelinq F oorArea Radiation--High High radiatio in the refueling fl oor are could be the result of a el handling accident.
A r ueling floor high radiation s nal will automatically init ate the MCREC System, si e this radiation release co d result in radiation xposure to control room per nnel.
The ref ling floor area radiation eq ipment consists of tw indepen ent monitors and channels lo ated in the refueling floor rea.
Two channels of Refuel g Floor Area Radia ion-High Function are availa le and are required to be 0 RABLE to ensure that no sing e instrument failure can pre ude MCREC System initiation.
The Allowable Value was sel cted to ensure that the Funct on will promptly detect hi h activity that could threate exposure to control room he Refueling Floor Area Radla ion-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MO S 1, 2, and 3 and durl movement of irradiated fuel semblies in the second y
containment, CORE ALTERATION, and operations with potential for draining the actor vessel (OPDRVs) to ensure that control room.p sonnel are protected uring a LOCA, fuel handling event, or vessel draindown e nt.
During MODES 4 and 5, whe these specified condi ions are not in progress (e.g.,
CO ALTERATIONS), the pr bability of a LOCA or fuel damage is ow; thus, the Functio is not required.
J1. CoYAr6 Room A r letRitin ih I
Av2.J The.-control room air inlet ra ation monitor measureT I
radiation levels Ql o.j a the inlet ductin of the_
A high radiation level may pose a threat to ersonne
- thus, (cniud
.1o0÷ e"
r '
(continued)
B 3.3-211 R
0 Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS
<1401 ytemInstrumentation B 3.3.7.1 1ASES SControl-m Ar nlet Radiatlo iqh (cont)* d
r rie aurc i n consis APPLir and a required to CO ne insree~n failure ca ectedBI o
tw o
i ndue proectimonios Tof ahel c
ofnt rol Room TheiControl Room Air Inlet Radiation-High Function is Srequired to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during CORE p*
ALTERATIONS.= OPDRVs, anid movement of, irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA, fuel handling event, or vessel draindown event.
During MODES 4 and 5, when these specified conditions are not in progress (e.g.; CORE ALTERATIONS),
the probability of a LOCA or fuel damage is low; thus, the Function is not required.
Ri ewer's Note:
Certain i CO Cor etion Times are basd o bCe RPECS the insure tm t
tin ihaneins.
t e
tiont i3 Completion Times, spe fies that once a Condieon has been entered, subsequent tvisions, subsystems, c ~ponents, or
~
2 variables expressed n the Condition, discon ered to be inoperable or not *thin limits, will not *esult in separate entry into the Co Iition.
Section 1.3 al-o specifies that Required Actions/of the Condition contiE e to apply for ea3dg additional fail re, with Completion Tins based on initi entry into th conditi on. o iweve Required Action for inoperable r
EC System instrumentati rin channels provi e appropriateeonmpensatory measures fow separate inopegMble channels.
ts such, a Note has been d
rovided that ai ows separate ondition entry for each i operable MCREC ystem instrume tation channel.
Co "
(continued)
BWR/I ST Bs.-1 Rev 1, 04/07/95 B 3.3-212 BWR/4 STS
,System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C. (continued)
The 6 h r Completion Times based on the consider io tmut e
p ac
-n ee_
that th p eurztion de. the primary signal totar thei instr hntaution (not eqied bIy Te hnial Speifi ties MCREC ystem; thus, ensur ng that the design basi of there
- Ali, Nix nyes equ i rea c
nd assotem_=nion Ti
- /*o*,
y..
5
(-t*asoit d
kcr
,h~tm*must De pigace in n
/
,.L p be mode of operation per Required Action
.1 to Thsure 1ht hou trol room personnel will be protectedw the o
event of a Design Basis Accident.al becaue It
-nimiu
- ri sk for
.Esusyso usstepro) in operationfor aut aiically re-initiaong the subsystem(rs i
u tnh subsestes no'ea toxic g protectiony S.
- ion is concu)7*rently inoperable, then the 1Ceh roncu(Continued)
A SsubsystemTs) should be aced in h
xic gas mode in ead
- /.
of the p *ssurization *(de.
This pr
~ides proper pro ection JOf the qfntrol room p rsonnel if bot) toxic gas
/
P1nsr3naio ntyeqte yTe3nclSpcfc'ios J~~~~~~~~~~~
cn tiato ont~
tto r
fnurnl noerb.
- / *, A3-
- k CR!C st em in t utation*
(n tAle yter hniat ly S eif i c i osno
) f '
The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Tti intede coallwteoeao
- t'*
,theh*;*u~-bsyte, noprtio n
and rwh ie
@l o ing ti e fr ret oation ar c rr n l if no e lab apliabe onitos ano Kq Ir /cios ro r s ' c A.r a e y f a F n c i n 3 c a
-i i n o p e r a ble
/a nds 1 tcontinuedI BsteR/4 STS Ba io3.3
-Z1 Rterel 1, if it is
/no
CREVAS System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE ------------------------------------
When the channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the Condition and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.7.1.2 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The 92 days Allowable Value shall be
- 4000 cpm.
Amendment (Rev. J)
JAFNPP 3.3-63
CREVAS System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Supply (CREVAS)
System Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The CREVAS System is designed to provide a radiologically controlled environment to ensure the habitability of the control room for the safety of control room operators under all plant conditions.
Two independent CREVAS subsystems are each capable of fulfilling the stated safety function.
The instrumentation for the CREVAS System provides an alarm so that manual action can be taken to place the CREVAS System in the isolate mode of operation to pressurize the control room to minimize the infiltration of radioactive material into the control room environment.
In the event of a Control Room Air Inlet Radiation-High signal, the CREVAS System is manually started in the isolate mode.
Air is then drawn in from the air intake source and passes through one of two special filter trains each consisting of a prefilter, a high efficiency (HEPA) filter, two charcoal filters and a second HEPA filter.
This air is then combined with recirculated air and directed to one of two control room ventilation fans and directed to the control room to maintain the control room slightly pressurized with respect to the adjacent areas.
The CREVAS System instrumentation consists of a single trip system with one Control Room Air Inlet Radiation-High channel.
The channel includes electronic equipment (e.g.,
detector, monitor and trip relay) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints.
When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs to an alarm in the control room.
The ability of the CREVAS System to maintain the habitability of the control room is explicitly assumed for certain accidents as discussed in the UFSAR safety analyses (Refs. 1, 2, 3, and 4) and further discussed in Reference 5 CREVAS System operation ensures that the radiation exposure of control room personnel, through the duration of any one of the postulated accidents, does not exceed the limits set by GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-198
CREVAS System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES APPLICABLE CREVAS System instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of SAFETY ANALYSES 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 6).
(continued)
LCO The OPERABILITY of the CREVAS System instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the Control Room Air Inlet Radiation-High Function.
This Function must have one OPERABLE channel, with its setpoint within the specified Allowable Value.
The channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.
The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.
An Allowable Value is specified for the Control Room Air Inlet Radiation-High Function in SR 3.3.7.1.2.
A nominal trip setpoint is specified in the setpoint calculation.
The nominal setpoint is selected to ensure that the setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.
Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.
Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place.
The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., control room air inlet radiation),
and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., output relay) changes state.
The analytic limit is derived from the limiting value of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis.
The trip setpoint is derived from the analytical limit and accounts for all worst case instrumentation uncertainties as appropriate (e.g., drift, process effects, calibration uncertainties, and severe environmental errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49)).
The trip setpoint derived in this manner provides adequate protection because all expected uncertainties are accounted for.
The Allowable Value is then derived from the trip setpoint by accounting for normal effects that would be seen during periodic surveillance or calibration.
These effects are instrumentation uncertainties observed during normal operation (e.g., drift and calibration uncertainties).
The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the control room personnel.
The control room air inlet radiation monitor measures radiation levels in the inlet ducting of the control room.
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-199
CREVAS System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES LCO (continued)
APPLICABILITY ACTIONS A high radiation level may pose a threat to control room personnel; thus, an alarm is provided in the control room so that the CREVAS System can be placed in the isolate mode of operation.
The Control Room Air Inlet Radiation-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during CORE ALTERATIONS,
- OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA, fuel handling event, or vessel draindown event.
During MODES 4 and 5, when these specified conditions are not in progress (e.g., CORE ALTERATIONS),
the probability of a LOCA or fuel damage is low; thus, the Function is not required.
A.1 and A.2 With the Control Room Air Inlet Radiation-High Function inoperable one CREVAS subsystem must be placed in the isolate mode of operation per Required Action A.1 to ensure that control room personnel will be protected in the event of a Design Basis Accident.
Alternately, if it is not desired to start a CREVAS subsystem, the CREVAS System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to place the CREVAS subsystem in operation.
The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the channel, for placing one CREVAS subsystem in operation, or for entering the applicable Conditions and Required Actions for two inoperable CREVAS subsystems.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration (continued)
Revision J 1
6ý2 JAFNPP B 3.3-200
<17r-N'S&E 3, 2 -7 y
- 1.
AiI Condenser Pump Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.7. JX 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
'AIr Rerw v&.
3.3.7.1 Condenser Q*
ib Pump Isolation Instrumentation Trr 3-2
-1 71 r.3,. -,
fo 3.9. -TELJ L
,,-t-, I.2 LCO 3.3.71 APPLICABILITY:
ACTIONS Four channels of the Main Steam S atio 1 n-High Function for the condenser 1 pump isolation shall be OPERABLE.
MODES 1 and 2 with W condenser* 1ljo pump
- ------------------------------------- NOTE ------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels inoperable.
W¥6k La.Z l, Ib.3
- 0--
/
A. 1 A.2 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.
Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable isolation valve.
Place channel or associated trip system in trip.
-
I 624 hour0.00722 days <br />0.173 hours <br />0.00103 weeks <br />2.37432e-4 months <br />sk 124 hour0.00144 days <br />0.0344 hours <br />2.050265e-4 weeks <br />4.7182e-5 months <br />st
- inued)
-7SýA..
3.3-0
/4
'&'
Ž-
CA Sj
r.
Condense
]Pump isolation Instrumentation SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
NOTE ------------------------------------
When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains condenser iiinump isolation capability.
v 3
(F-er5 3-5.OU-q 6L4 I
IT,- 6 ('t
?-
CgET5 7,,6(,- 3, 10
[,,T -r
-r aký, A 2 rT-ý 6L, 0-]
INSERT SR 3.3.7.2.2 Note
NOTE ---------------
Radiation detectors are excluded.
INSERT SR 3.3.7.2.2 The Allowable Value shall be < 3 times Normal Full Power Background.
Insert Page 3.3-74c Revision J
Condenser
- Pump Isolation Instrumentation B 3..
BASES (continued) d l
C (Ref. 2).
APPLICABLE condenser pump isolation s assumed in the safety SAFETY ANALYSES OaPnalysis for the CRDA.
The condenser vbw pum p isolation
\\ instrumentati on initi aes an isolation of the condenser hav are pump to limit offsite doses resulting from fuel scladding failure in a CRDA (Ref. 2).
VaThe condenserrm pump isolation satisfies Criterion 3 of LCO The OPERABILITY of the condenserppump isolation is Cdean1 on the OPERABILITY of in dvidual Main Steam AiL(e
-i (RadiatinHg isrmna ion annels, which must Shave a required nnber of OPERABLE channels in each trip System, witn thrsetpoints within the speciTied Allowable doalue oT Se d.3.7t The actual setpoint is calibrated with appilcable setpoint methodology assumptions.
Channel OPERABILITY also includes the associa valve.
0_min e
Ut*,i e. *
\\
,_f o otexee teAllowable Valueoý bfe twe forNL P
CALIBRATIONS.
Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is accept able.,Tri p setpoints are those *(1j77 predetemined values of output at which an action should take place.
The setpoints are tomparrL-o the actual t ts process parameter (i.e. Main Steam t'
igh)
"and when the measured output value of
=
process paraNmeter exceeds the setpoint, the assoiated e
unit) changes state.
The analytic limitb erivedi roit the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis.
ne *iwoeVie r
predeteied orrected for cali ration, procusl and some of the instrmnt errors.
The tri setpoints a e then detemined accouning for the remainin instrument e rors (e.g., drift).
e trip settoints der ved in this nner provide adequate. protection because i atrimentation uncertainties, rocess effects. calib ation toleran esf instrument dri
, and severe environ nt errors CfD determined 9 a r
cccountee for.
S/*
- )(continued)
[OYSTER CREEK]
B 3.3-(*
Rev.
2/28/94 io C a n 6 (0
Condenser
&g Pump Isolation Instrumentation r
)B 3.3.7.V BASES SURVEILLANCI REQUIREMENT.
REFERENCES E SR
.37. (cniud S.
- nth Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the montth Frequency.
- 1. cgSARSection )
-2.(
FSAR, Section,
°. NEDE-770 06-1. "Bases for Ch ges To Surveill nce*
Test Int rvals and Allowed 0 -of-Service Ti-s For/
Selecte Instrumentati on Teni cal Speci fi caions7 F*ebr'ua r199}.
- I tt
[OYSTER CREEK]
-316 7-:;t-P-ig Te r-k P-
ýqj oe- ýý r0e ike it Ow
/ITO 0
/-7 0 X
)6 V-B 3. 3- -
'lii Rev.
2/28/94
Condenser Air Removal Pump Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.
Condenser air removal B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> pump isolation capability.
capability not maintained.
C.
Required Action and C.1 Isolate the condenser 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion air removal pumps.
Time of Condition A or B not met.
OR C.2 Isolate the main 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> steam lines.
OR C.3 Be in MODE 3.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
NOTE -----------------------------------
When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains condenser air removal pump isolation capability.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (continued)
Amendment (Rev. J)
JAFNPP 3.3-65
Condenser Air Removal Pump Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.7.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.2.2 NOTE ------------------
Radiation detectors are excluded.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The 92 days Allowable Value shall be : 3 times Normal Full Power Background.
SR 3.3.7.2.3 Calibrate the radiation detectors.
24 months SR 3.3.7.2.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST 24 months including isolation valve actuation.
Amendment (Rev.
J)
JAFNPP 3.3-66
Condenser Air Removal Pump Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.7.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.7.2 Condenser Air Removal Pump Isolation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The condenser air removal pump isolation instrumentation initiates an isolation of the suction and discharge valves of the condenser air removal pumps following events in which main steam line radiation exceeds predetermined values.
Isolating the condenser air removal pump limits the offsite doses in the event of a control rod drop accident (CRDA).
The condenser air removal pump isolation instrumentation (Ref. 1) includes sensors, logic circuits, relays and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of the condenser air removal pumps isolation.
The channels include electronic equipment that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints.
When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs an isolation signal to the condenser air removal pump isolation logic.
The isolation logic consists of two trip systems, with two channels of Main Steam Line Radiation-High in each trip system.
Each trip system is a one-out-of-two logic for this Function.
Thus, either channel of Main Steam Line Radiation-High in each trip system are needed to trip a trip system.
The outputs of the channels in a trip system are combined in a logic so that both trip systems must trip to result in an isolation signal.
There are two isolation valves associated with this function.
APPLICABLE The condenser air removal pump isolation is assumed in the SAFETY ANALYSES safety analysis for the CRDA.
The condenser air removal pump isolation instrumentation initiates an isolation of the condenser air removal pump to limit offsite doses resulting from fuel cladding failure in a CRDA (Ref. 2).
The condenser air removal pump isolation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 3).
(continued)
B 3.3-203 Revision J JAFNPP
Condenser Air Removal Pump Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.7.2 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
C.1, C.2, and C.3 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply.
To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (Required Action C.3).
Alternately, the condenser air removal pumps may be isolated since this performs the intended function of the instrumentation (Required Action C.1).
An additional option is provided to isolate the main steam lines (Required Action C.2), which may allow operation to continue.
Isolating the main steam lines effectively provides an equivalent level of protection by precluding fission product transport to the condenser.
The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions, or to remove the condenser air removal pump from service, or to isolate the main steam lines, in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains condenser air removal pump isolation trip capability.
Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.
This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 4) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance.
That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the condenser air removal pumps will isolate when necessary.
SR 3.3.7.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.
A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-207 JAFNPP
Condenser Air Removal Pump Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.7.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.7.2.2 and SR 3.3.7.2.3 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS CALIBRATION of the remaining portions of the channel (SR 3.3.6.1.2) are performed using a standard current source.
The Frequency of SR 3.3.7.2.2 is based on the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
The Frequency of SR 3.3.7.2.3 is based on the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of detector drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.7.2.4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel.
The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as part of this Surveillance and overlaps the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.
Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel(s) would be inoperable.
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
REFERENCES
- 1.
UFSAR, Section 10.4.3.1.
- 2.
UFSAR, Section 14.6.1.2.
- 3.
- 4.
NEDC-31677P-A, Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, July 1990.
Revision J B 3.3-209 JAFNPP
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: 3.3.7.3 - EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW)
SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGES LESS RESTRICTIVE (SPECIFIC)
Li (continued)
(e.g., not within Allowable Value) will require entry into CTS LCO 3.0.C and the plant must be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The CTS Actions have been replaced by three ACTIONS in ITS 3.3.7.3 which allows operation to continue with inoperable channels if certain conditions are met.
ITS 3.3.7.3 ACTION A, will allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to place one or more channels in trip.
Placing a channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and thus allow operation to continue.
While placing a channel in trip could result in actuation of the logic (if sufficient channels are placed in trip), which further results in operation of the ESW System in parallel with the SW System, the ESW System would not be negatively affected by this operation such that it would not perform its safety function.
The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable due to the low probability of an additional failure during this time period.
This Completion Time is only acceptable provided at least one ESW instrumentation initiation logic system maintains initiation capability.
With initiation capability not maintained in both trip systems (ITS 3.3.7.3 ACTION B) an allowance of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is permitted to restore initiation capability.
This Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.
The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.
Finally, if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met, ITS 3.3.7.3 Required Action C.1 will require the associated ESW subsystem(s) to be declared inoperable.
Declaring the associated ESW subsystems(s) inoperable is acceptable since ITS 3.7.2 will only allow a short time period (7 days) with one ESW subsystem inoperable and will require a controlled shutdown with both ESW subsystems inoperable.
These changes are considered acceptable since redundant channels are provided, the equipment has been shown to be reliable, each channel is calibrated every 92 days, and since other Technical Specification currently allow these allowances for equipment with equivalent redundancy.
L2 A Note is added to CTS 4.11.D.1 (ITS 3.3.7.3 Surveillance Requirements) which allows placing a channel in an inoperable status solely for the performance of required Surveillances, without entering the associated Conditions and Required Actions for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains initiation capability.
This 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance has been shown to maintain an acceptable risk consistent with the methods used to evaluate other Technical Specification related instrumentation which have already been approved by the NRC.
These analyses demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the Technical Specification Page 3 of 5 Revision J JAFNPP
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: 3.3.7.3 -
EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW)
SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGES
- LESS RESTRICTIVE (SPECIFIC)
L2 (continued) instrumentation will trip or actuate when necessary.
JAFNPP has confirmed that the logic design of the ESW instrumentation is similar to other Technical Specification equipment designs and therefore the risk is bounded by that analyzed in those reliability analyses and the conclusions of the analyses are applicable to the JAFNPP ESW System design.
L3 CTS 4.11.D.1.e requires an ESW instrumentation check to be performed once a day.
This requirement has been deleted.
The ESW pressure instrumentation monitors the reactor building closed loop cooling water pump discharge pressure.
This instrumentation does not include any pressure indicators or recorders.
JAFNPP has interpreted this requirement to verify the ESW pump discharge pressure and flow once a day.
Since the pumps are not normally in operation, this instrumentation check does not provide any meaningful information concerning the OPERABILITY of the ESW System nor the system actuation instrumentation.
The Surveillances in ITS 3.7.2, and the Inservice Testing Program will ensure the system remains OPERABLE.
The Surveillances in ITS 3.3.7.3 will ensure the ESW pressure instrumentation and initiation logic systems remain OPERABLE to automatically open the ESW pump discharge header valves and close the minimum flow control valve.
Therefore the deletion of this requirement is acceptable.
L4 CTS 3.11.D.2 requires the operable Emergency Diesel Generator to be demonstrated to be Operable immediately and daily thereafter when it is determined that one Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System is inoperable.
This change deletes the explicit requirement to demonstrate the Operability of the Emergency Diesel Generator System (EDG) immediately and daily thereafter when the ESW instrumentation is found to be inoperable.
As indicated in Li three additional Actions have been added to CTS 3.11.D (ITS 3.3.7.3 ACTIONS A, B and C) which will ensure the time allowed with inoperable ESW pressure instrumentation channels is minimized.
Failure of any ESW instrumentation channel does not directly influence the Operability of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) components therefore these additional testing requirements have been determined to be excessive.
If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B of ITS 3.3.7.3 cannot be met Required Action C.1 will require the associated ESW subsystem(s) to be declared inoperable immediately.
This will require entry into ITS LCO 3.7.2 which in turn will require entry into ITS 3.8.1 for any EDG made inoperable. ITS 3.8.1 provides a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for ITS 3.8.1 Required Action B.3.1, to determine that the Operable EDG subsystem is not inoperable due to common cause failure or ITS 3.8.1 Page 4 of 5 Revision J JAFNPP
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: 3.3.7.3 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW)
SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGES
- LESS RESTRICTIVE (SPECIFIC)
L4 (continued)
Required Action B.3.2 will require a performance of SR 3.8.1.2 for the Operable EDG subsystem in the same time period.
This change is acceptable since it will allow the plant to concentrate its efforts in restoring inoperable instrumentation channels rather than performing unnecessary testing of EDG components.
The normal Surveillances requirements of the EDG are adequate to ensure this equipment remains Operable.
L5 CTS 3.11.D.2 requires the verification that the Emergency Diesel Generator System emergency loads are Operable immediately and daily thereafter when one Emergency Service Water system is found to be inoperable.
ITS 3.3.7.3 does not include this explicit requirement.
These verifications are an implicit part of using Technical Specifications and determining the appropriate Conditions to enter and Actions to take in the event of inoperability of Technical Specification equipment.
The Technical Specifications and ITS 5.5.12, "Safety Function Determination Program" (see Discussion of Changes in ITS Section 5.0) will require a continuous knowledge of all plant equipment.
Plant and equipment status is monitored by control room personnel.
The results of this monitoring process are documented in records/logs maintained by control room personnel.
The continuous monitoring process includes re-evaluating the status of compliance with Technical Specification requirements when Technical Specification equipment becomes inoperable using the control room records/logs as aids.
Therefore, the explicit requirement to periodically verify the Operability of the Operable Emergency Diesel Generator System emergency loads is considered to be unnecessary for ensuring compliance with the applicable Technical Specification actions.
In addition, the Safety Function Determination Program will require the necessary actions to be taken when a loss of function exists, therefore this change is considered acceptable.
TECHNICAL CHANGES - RELOCATIONS None Page 5 of 5 JAFNPP Revision J
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.3 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION D'
}"]-2 B 3.3.7.3 Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the ESW System instrumentation is to initiate appropriate responses from the system to ensure the ESW safe shutdown loads are cooled following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient coincident with a loss of preferred power.
The ESW safe shutdown loads are described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2, "Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)".
The ESW System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.
Upon receipt of a loss of power signal as described in the Bases of LCO 3.3.8.1, "Loss of Power (LOP)
Instrumentation," or an ECCS initiation signal as described in the Bases of LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation," the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) will start, which in turn starts the associated ESW pump.
Each ESW pump will automatically pump lake water to the associated EDG cooler.
The remaining ESW loads will be automatically cooled when the associated ESW supply header isolation valve opens and the associated ESW minimum flow valve closes.
This occurs when the ESW instrumentation initiation logic (known as the ESW lockout matrix) actuates upon low reactor building closed loop cooling water (RBCLCW) pump discharge pressure.
In addition, the ESW pumps will automatically start in response to the ESW instrumentation initiation logic.
ESW instrumentation are provided inputs by pressure switches that sense RBCLCW pump discharge pressure.
Four channels of ESW instrumentation are provided as input to two one-out-of-two twice initiation logics.
Each initiation logic system will open the associated ESW pump discharge header valve, close the minimum flow control valve to ensure cooling water is provided to supply the safe shutdown loads of the ESW System, start the associated ESW pump, and open the associated RBCLCW System discharge valves.
However, the opening of the RBCLCW System discharge valves are not required.
The opening of these RBCLCW System discharge valves are not necessary since RBCLCW does not cool any safe shutdown loads.
Each channel consists of a pressure sensor and switch, that compares measured input signals with pre established setpoints.
When the setpoint is exceeded, the (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-219k JAFNPP
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.3 BASES A
3-(U4jjk BACKGROUND channel outputs a RBCLCW pump discharge initiation (continued) signal to both ESW initiation logic circuits.
APPLICABLE The actions of the ESW System are implicitly assumed in the SAFETY ANALYSES safety analyses of References 1 and 2.
The ESW System instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE to support the ESW System.
Refer to LCO 3.7.2 for Applicable Safety Analyses Bases of ESW System.
The ESW System instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 3).
LCO The LCO requires four ESW instrumentation channels, which monitor the RBCLCW pump discharge header pressure, to be OPERABLE.
The four channels provide input to both logic systems to ensure that no single instrument failure will prevent ESW from supplying the safe shutdown loads.
Each channel must have its setpoint set within the specified Allowable Value of SR 3.3.7.3.1.
The Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure logic initiation during a complete loss of the RBCLCW System and low enough to avoid logic initiation during small RBCLCW System pressure transients.
The actual setpoint is calibrated to be consistent with the applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.
Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.
The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.
Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.
A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.
Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place.
The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (i.e., RBCLCW pump discharge header pressure), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., pressure switch) changes state.
The analytic limit is derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis or other appropriate documents.
The trip setpoint is derived (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-2191 JAFNPP
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)
Bases of LCO 3.5.1. "Emergency Core Cooling System-Operating".
This out of service time is only acceptable provided the ESW pressure channels are still maintaining actuation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases).
If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the Completion Time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions.
Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an ESW System initiation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.
B.1 Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for both ESW initiation logic systems.
The ESW initiation logic systems are considered to be maintaining initiation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that one logic system will generate an initiation signal from the given Function on a valid signal.
This will ensure that at least one ESW System will receive an initiation signal.
The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.
The Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing for restoration or tripping of channels.
C.1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the associated ESW subsystem(s) must be declared inoperable immediately.
This declaration also requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions for inoperable ESW subsystem(s) in LCO 3.7.2.
(continued)
Revision J B 3.3-219n JAFNPP
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.3 BASES (continued)
L3Pv*erf
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains ESW initiation capability.
Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.
This Note is based on a reliability analysis assumption that 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is the average time required to perform channel Surveillance.
That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ESW initiation will occur when necessary.
SR 3.3.7.3.1 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor.
This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.7.3.2 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.
The system functional test performed in LCO 3.7.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.
(continued)
B 3.3-219o Revision J JAFNPP
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.3 kY BASES
ý:[ J.3r
)e SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES SR 3.3.7.3.2 (continued)
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
- 1.
UFSAR, Chapter 5.
- 2.
UFSAR, Chapter 14.
- 3.
Revision J B 3.3-219p JAFNPP
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.3 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.7.3 Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the ESW System instrumentation is to initiate appropriate responses from the system to ensure the ESW safe shutdown loads are cooled following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient coincident with a loss of preferred power.
The ESW safe shutdown loads are described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2, "Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)".
The ESW System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.
Upon receipt of a loss of power signal as described in the Bases of LCO 3.3.8.1, "Loss of Power (LOP)
Instrumentation," or an ECCS initiation signal as described in the Bases of LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation," the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) will start, which in turn starts the associated ESW pump.
Each ESW pump will automatically pump lake water to the associated EDG cooler.
The remaining ESW loads will be automatically cooled when the associated ESW supply header isolation valve opens and the associated ESW minimum flow valve closes.
This occurs when the ESW instrumentation initiation logic (known as the ESW lockout matrix) actuates upon low reactor building closed loop cooling water (RBCLCW) pump discharge pressure.
In addition, the ESW pumps will automatically start in response to the ESW instrumentation initiation logic.
ESW instrumentation are provided inputs by pressure switches that sense RBCLCW pump discharge pressure.
Four channels of ESW instrumentation are provided as input to two one-out-of-two twice initiation logics.
Each initiation logic system will open the associated ESW pump discharge header valve, close the minimum flow control valve to ensure cooling water is provided to supply the safe shutdown loads of the ESW System, start the associated ESW pump, and open the associated RBCLCW System discharge valves.
However, the opening of the RBCLCW System discharge valves are not required.
The opening of these RBCLCW System discharge valves are not necessary since RBCLCW does not cool any safe shutdown loads.
Each channel consists of a pressure sensor and switch, that compares measured input signals with pre established setpoints.
When the setpoint is exceeded, (continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-210
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.3 BASES BACKGROUND the channel outputs a RBCLCW pump discharge initiation (continued) signal to both ESW initiation logic circuits.
APPLICABLE The actions of the ESW System are implicitly assumed in the SAFETY ANALYSES safety analyses of References 1 and 2.
The ESW System instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE to support the ESW System.
Refer to LCO 3.7.2 for Applicable Safety Analyses Bases of ESW System.
The ESW System instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 3).
LCO The LCO requires four ESW instrumentation channels, which monitor the RBCLCW pump discharge header pressure, to be OPERABLE.
The four channels provide input to both logic systems to ensure that no single instrument failure will prevent ESW from supplying the safe shutdown loads.
Each channel must have its setpoint set within the specified Allowable Value of SR 3.3.7.3.1.
The Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure logic initiation during a complete loss of the RBCLCW System and low enough to avoid logic initiation during small RBCLCW System pressure transients.
The actual setpoint is calibrated to be consistent with the applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.
Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.
The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.
Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable.
A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.
Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place.
The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (i.e., RBCLCW pump discharge header pressure), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., pressure switch) changes state.
The analytic limit is derived from the limiting values of (In the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis or other appropriate documents.
The trip setpoint is derived (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-211 JAFNPP
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)
Bases of LCO 3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System -Operating".
This out of service time is only acceptable provided the ESW pressure channels are still maintaining actuation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases).
If the inoperable OT channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the Completion Time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions.
Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an ESW System initiation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.
B.1 Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for both ESW initiation logic systems.
The ESW initiation logic systems are considered to be maintaining initiation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that one logic system will generate an initiation signal from the given Function on a valid signal.
This will ensure that at least one ESW System will receive an initiation signal.
The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.
The Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing for restoration or tripping of channels.
C.1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the associated ESW subsystem(s) must be declared inoperable immediately.
This declaration also requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions for inoperable ESW subsystem(s) in LCO 3.7.2.
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-213
Emergency Service Water (ESW)
System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.7.3.2 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
REFERENCES
- 1.
UFSAR, Chapter 5.
- 2.
UFSAR, Chapter 14.
- 3.
Revision J B 3.3-215 JAFNPP
LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP)
Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8.1 APPLICABILITY:
The LOP instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
MODES 1, 2, and 3, A
o d
When the associated diesel generator s required to be I
OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown."
ACTIONS
NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.
CONDITION Z 7-One or more channels 10 x4 inoperable.
L1iA J B. Required Action and V'/
associated Completion Time not met.
REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Place channel in tTip.
B.1 Declare associated (inoperable.
COMPLETION TIME I hour Immediately 3.3-75 BWR/4 STS Rev 1, 04/07/95 C3,
ý 6 D (r (SHID I
LOP Instrumentati on 3.3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
~------------------
NO*----------------------------------
Refer to Table 3.3.8.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each LOP cot
- 2. When a channel i placed in an inoperable stat solely for perfo ance of required Survei ances, entry into associated onditions and Requ ed Actions may bb delayed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> pro ded the associated unction
--- ntainsD--G nitiation capabillity...--
V q, 1-7 r( 7 SURVEILLANCE rR...
3.3.8.1.1 rform CHANNEL 1
s SR 3.3.8.1.2 rform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
SR 3.3.8.1.p Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
SR 3.3.8.1.0 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.
3.3-76 BWR/4 STS Rev 1, 04/07/95
... srnhIr&flJ II. I.al. I n i I* nil
-mo~nths
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP)
Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND Successful operation of the required safety functions of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) is dependent upon the availability of adequate power sources for energizing the WýWofdk various components such as pump motors, motor operated l
3q" I valves, and the associated control components.
The LOP instrumentation monitors the 4.16 kV emergency buses.
s15the preferred sourceSof power for the f_
4.16 kV emergency buses.
If the monitors determine that insufficient power is available, the buses are disconnected from teh110MM power sources and connected to the onsite diesel generator (DIG)power sources.
Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has its own independent LOP instrumentation and associated trip logic.
The voltage for eac us is monitored at twO levels, which can be consider as wo tifferent undervoltage Functions:
Loss of Voltage4(r and 9.lb I-'F-neroelicv S.U nerPVitanw Dearaded Voltaaw`% -
Each Vunction/ls monjitosted by ti06O undervoltage lelays o*
each/'emergep~y Pus, w)se outp s are arranged In a twot-out-ofw 1
u ait on i
Our Mett 1)rR e
.an*nel s
include electronic equipment (e.g.,
a
.5p~pmreC measured input signals with"Ir-e-tabhish d (
setpoints.
When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a LOP trip signal to the trip logic.
APPLICABLE The LOP instrumentation is required for Engineered Safef44 SAFETY ANALYSES,,t cto function in any accident with a loss of G]5I]1; LCO, and (19AM. The required channels of LOP instrumentation ensure APPLICABILITY that the ECCS and other assumed systems powered from the rt Gs, provide plant protection in the event of an of the
/
- ~~ Reference 2*-(j3* and @ analyze( accidents in w ic a loss *
-4.
A \\
l power,-a ssume.
The initiation of the DGs on loss "D *f*,*J'ofepowee, nd subseqe nitiation of the ECCS, Pu'4' I
I*
" ensure thale týh uelW peak cladding temperature remains below
&"'4" J-
9 INSERT BKGD-1 Each 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage Function and Degraded Voltage Function is monitored by two undervoltage relays for each emergency bus.
These relay outputs are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic configuration for each 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage Function.
The Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage Function signals provide input to their respective Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage-Time Delay Functions.
Each 4.16 kV Emergency Bus has one Loss of Voltage-Time Delay relay.
The Degraded Voltage Function utilizes two time delay relays, one time delay for a bus undervoltage (degraded voltage) in conjunction with a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal and the other for a bus undervoltage (degraded voltage) without a LOCA (non-LOCA).
When a voltage Function setpoint has been exceeded and the respective time delay completed, the time delay relay will start the associated EDG subsystem, trip the associated breakers providing normal, backfeed or reserve power, trip all associated 4.16 kV motor breakers (after EDG reaches 75% of rated voltage), initiate EDG breaker close permissive (in conjunction with 90% of rated voltage), and initiate sequential starting of the ECCS pumps if the LOCA signal is present.
The sequential starting of the ECCS pumps is not considered part of the LOP Instrumentation and is tested in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."
Insert Page B 3.3-220 Revision J
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and SAFETY ANALYSES, Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by
- LCO, and Function basis. Tht Lo Vv Hýolje.
ý AC i"
o A P P L I C A B I L I T Y f-W S let oI %,Ad,
^#r n.
.f P
(c o n t in u e d )
4.1 6,0*s 4 S
- 1.
kV Emerency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
Loss of voltage on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that 9EE t power may be completely lost to the respective emergency bus and is unable to supply sufficien power for e
proper operation of the applicable equipment.
Therefore,,-3Sov the ower supply to the bus is transferred from DG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Loss of Voltage Function Allowable Values (loss of h
o Wlee voltage with a short time delay).
This ensures that
'to.
adequate power will be available to the re ui red equipment.
Of
"'ft4 The Bus Undervoltage)Allowable Valued*,
ow enough to emir
-preevent a
lena power supply transfer, but high enough
- V1A 4,
fo ensure that power is available to the required equipment.
Thee Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough to providede S:t-, e-o* -time for the uCff'ttkpower supply to recover to normal voltages, but short enuh to ensure that power is available to the required equipment.&
tf P
..o;S eL V0U Two channels of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of,,-
-Voltage) Function* per associated emergency bus are required to be OPERABLE when the associatedsui is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure
/.
S) can preclude t-e
-WG function.
wp pl JhWW-Tn cq l
.:M e*,A
- Refer to LCO 3.8.1 an
.0.46 D5.ore-S w~
Appl cability ases1 he DGs.*A<
- 2.
4.16 kV Emeroencv Bus Undervoltaae (Deqraded Voltaqe)
A reduced voltage condition oni a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that, while t*]
)Jpower may not be completely lost to the respective emergency bus, available power may be insufficient for starting large ECCS motors without risking damage to the motors that could disable the ECCS function.
Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred from
- r L
to onsitejG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Degraded Voltage Function Allowable Val
/W.
o 4 V r-r
/e (continued)
BWR/4 STS.
B 3.3-222 Rev 1, 04/07/95 A'ýf:v* J-
LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP)
Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8.1 APPLICABILITY:
The LOP instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
MODES 1, 2, and 3, When the associated emergency diesel generator (EDG) subsystem is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."
ACTIONS
NOTE.....................................
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.
.. M-------- M---------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more channels A.1 Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable, trip.
B. Required Action and B.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion EDG(s) inoperable.
Time not met.
Amendment (Rev. J) 3.3-69 JAFNPP
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP)
Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND Successful operation of the required safety functions of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) is dependent upon the availability of adequate power sources for energizing the various components such as pump motors, motor operated valves, and the associated control components.
The LOP instrumentation monitors the 4.16 kV emergency buses.
The Main Generator (normal), the 115 kV transmission network (reserve), the 345 kV transmission network (backfeed) are the preferred sources of power for the 4.16 kV emergency buses.
If the monitors determine that insufficient power is available, the buses are disconnected from these power sources and connected to the onsite emergency diesel generator (EDG) power sources.
Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has its own independent LOP instrumentation and associated trip logic.
The voltage for each bus is monitored at two levels, which can be considered as two different types of undervoltage protection Functions:
Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage (Ref. 1).
Each 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage Function and Degraded Voltage Function is monitored by two undervoltage relays for each emergency bus.
These relay outputs are arranged in a two out-of-two logic configuration for each 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage Function.
The Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage Function signals provide input to their respective Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage-Time Delay Functions.
Each 4.16 kV Emergency Bus has one Loss of Voltage-Time Delay relay.
The Degraded Voltage Function utilizes two time delay relays, one time delay for a bus undervoltage (degraded voltage) in conjunction with a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal and the other for a bus undervoltage (degraded voltage) without a LOCA (non-LOCA).
When a voltage Function setpoint has been exceeded and the respective time delay completed, the time delay relay will start the associated EDG subsystem, trip the associated breakers providing normal, backfeed, or reserve power, trip all associated 4.16 kV motor breakers (after EDG reaches 75% of rated voltage),
initiate EDG breaker close permissive (in conjunction with 90% of rated voltage), and initiate sequential starting of (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-216 JAFNPP
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY the ECCS pumps if the LOCA signal is present.
The sequential starting of the ECCS pumps is not considered part of the LOP Instrumentation and is tested in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown."
The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., internal relay contacts, coils) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints.
When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a LOP trip signal to the trip logic.
The LOP instrumentation is required for Engineered Safeguards to function in any accident with a loss of the preferred power sources.
The required channels of LOP instrumentation ensure that the ECCS and other assumed systems powered from the EDGs, provide plant protection in the event of any of the Reference 2 and 3 analyzed accidents in which a loss of all the preferred power sources are assumed.
The initiation of the EDGs on loss of all the preferred power sources, and subsequent initiation of the ECCS, ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.
Accident analyses credit the loading of the EDGs based on the loss of the preferred power sources during a loss of coolant accident.
The emergency diesel starting and loading times have been included in the delay time associated with each safety system component requiring EDG supplied power following a loss of the preferred power sources.
The LOP instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 4).
The OPERABILITY of the LOP instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.8.1-1.
Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels per 4.16 kV emergency bus, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values.
A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.
The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.
(continued)
Revision J JAFNPP B 3.3-217
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE
- 1.
4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment.
The 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)
Allowable Value is low enough to prevent spurious power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that power is available to the required equipment.
The Allowable Value corresponds to approximately 71.5% of nominal emergency bus voltage.
The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough to provide time for the preferred power supply to recover to normal voltages, but short enough to ensure that power is available to the required equipment.
Two channels of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) Function and one channel of Loss of Voltage-Time Delay per associated emergency bus are required to be OPERABLE when the associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the EDG function.
Refer to LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2 for Applicability Bases for the EDGs.
- 2.
4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)
A reduced voltage condition on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that, while preferred power may not be completely lost to the respective emergency bus, available power may be insufficient for starting large ECCS motors without risking damage to the motors that could disable the ECCS function.
The Degraded Voltage Function is monitored via the secondary windings of two transformers associated with each emergency bus.
Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred from the preferred power source to onsite EDG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Degraded Voltage Function Allowable Values (degraded voltage with a time delay).
This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment.
The 4.16 kV Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage) Allowable Value is low enough to prevent spurious power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that sufficient power is (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-219 JAFNPP
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE
- 2.
4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)
(
SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY available to the required equipment.
The Allowable Value corresponds to approximately 93% of nominal emergency bus voltage.
The Time Delay Allowable Values are long enough to provide time for the preferred power supply to recover to normal voltages, but short enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the required equipment.
Two channels of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage) Function, one channel of Degraded Voltage-Time Delay (LOCA),
and one channel of Degraded Voltage-Time Delay (non-LOCA) per associated bus are required to be OPERABLE when the associated EDG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the EDG function.
Refer to LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2 for Applicability Bases for the EDGs.
ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to LOP instrumentation channels.
Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.
Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.
However, the Required Actions for inoperable LOP instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels.
As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable LOP instrumentation channel.
A.1 With one or more channels of a Function inoperable, the Function is not capable of performing the intended function.
Therefore, only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status.
If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-220 JAFNPP
RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring BASES BACKGROUND RPS Electric Power Monitoring System is provided to isolate the RPS-bus from the motor generator (MG) set or an alternate power supply in the event of overvoltage, undervoltage, or underfrequency.
This system protects the loads connected to the RPS bus against unacceptable voltage and frequency conditions (Ref. 1) and forms an important part of the primary success path of the essential safety circuits.
Some of the essential equipment powered from the RPS buses includes the RPS logic, scramsolenoids, and various valve isolation logic.
e
(.
k
(
Cto-S RPS electric power monitoring assembly will detect any J
~'( tk'- Is abnormal high or low voltage or low frequency condition in
$bw es deeh-1 7ze the outputs of the two MG sets or the alternate power supply
=o )and will de-energize its respective RPS bus, thereby causing all safety functions normally powered by this bus to de-energize.
In the event of fail r of an RPS Electric Power Monitoring System (e.g., both i eries electric power monitoring assemblies), the RPS loads may experience significant effects from the unregulated power supply.
Deviation from the nominal conditions can potentially cause damage to the scra solenoids and other Class 1E devices.
In the event of a low voltage condition for an extended perio o ti*e, the scram solenoids can chatter and potentially lose their pneumatic control capability, resulting in a loss of primary scram action.
\\ In the event of an overvolt tion, the RPS logic S
reays and scramsolenoids-in e
,aRfs*_
X3 1
Ve !
oleno
, may experience a voltage higher than their design voltage.
If the overvoltage condition persists for an extended time period, it may cause equipment degradation and the loss of plant safety function.
Two redundant Class 1E circuit breakers are connected in series between each RPS bus and its NG set, and between each RPS bus and its alternate power supply.
Each of these (continued)
BWR/4 STS B 3.3-227 Rev 1. 04/07/95
jý INSERT SR 3.3.8.2.1 A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay.
This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay.
This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
Insert Page B 3.3-232 Revision J
RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIRE1ENTS BASES Th I* month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant Soutage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the I.onth Frequency.
0 014 REFERENCES 1.OXFSAR, Section R(F n 6.
NRC Generic Letter 91-09, @4odification of Surveillance Interval for the Electricd Protective Assemblies in Power Supplies for the Reactor =
Protection System r
s-0 0
Rev 1, 04/07/95 B 3.3-233
_)
---a)
SR 3.3.8l2.2 (continued)
The Frequency is based on the assumption of month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpolnt analysis.
SR 3.3.8-2. F Performance of a system functional test demonstrates that, with a required system actuation (simulated or actual) signal, the logic of the system will automatic~ally trip open J the associatedpower monitoring ass-embly.- Only one siqja_/
per power monito Iasall is required-toobe tes ed.
This urve ance overlaps with the CHANNL *ALIBRATI to provide complete testing of the safety function.
The system functional test of the Class 1E circuit breakers is included as part of this test to provide complete testing of the safety function.
If the breakers are incapable of operating, the associated electric power monitoring assembly would be inoperable.
BWR/4 STS
RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring BASES BACKGROUND RPS Electric Power Monitoring System is provided to isolate the RPS bus from the motor generator (MG) set or an alternate power supply in the event of overvoltage, undervoltage, or underfrequency.
This system protects the loads connected to the RPS bus against unacceptable voltage and frequency conditions (Ref. 1) and forms an important part of the primary success path of the essential safety circuits.
Some of the essential equipment powered from the RPS buses includes the RPS logic, scram pilot valve solenoids, and various valve isolation logic.
RPS electric power monitoring assembly will detect any abnormal high or low voltage or low frequency condition in the outputs of the two MG sets or the alternate power supply and will de-energize its respective RPS bus, thereby causing all safety functions normally powered by this bus to de-energize.
(Safety functions powered by the RPS buses deenergize to actuate.)
In the event of failure of an RPS Electric Power Monitoring System (e.g., both in-series electric power monitoring assemblies), the RPS loads may experience significant effects from the unregulated power supply.
Deviation from the nominal conditions can potentially cause damage to the scram pilot valve solenoids and other Class 1E devices.
In the event of a low voltage condition for an extended period of time, the scram pilot valve solenoids can chatter and potentially lose their pneumatic control capability, resulting in a loss of primary scram action.
In the event of an overvoltage condition, the RPS logic relays and scram pilot valve solenoids may experience a voltage higher than their design voltage.
If the overvoltage condition persists for an extended time period, it may cause equipment degradation and the loss of plant safety function.
Two redundant Class 1E circuit breakers are connected in series between each RPS bus and its MG set, and between each RPS bus and its alternate power supply.
Each of these (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-223 JAFNPP
RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued) reactor core and ensures that the safety function of the RPS (e.g., scram of control rods) is not required.
All actions must continue until the applicable Required Actions are completed.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.2.1 REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each overvoltage, undervoltage, and underfrequency channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.
A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay.
This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay.
This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
As noted in the Surveillance, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is only required to be performed while the plant is in a condition in which the loss of the RPS bus will not jeopardize steady state power operation (the design of the system is such that the power source must be removed from service to conduct the Surveillance).
The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is intended to indicate an outage of sufficient duration to allow for scheduling and proper performance of the Surveillance.
The 184 day Frequency and the Note in the Surveillance are based on guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-09 (Ref. 3).
SR 3.3.8.2.2 and SR 3.3.8.2.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor.
This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel (continued)
Revision J B 3.3-228 JAFNPP
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES TO ITS SECTION 3.4 - REVISION J Page 1 Source of Change Summary of Change Affected Pages Retyped ITS typographical Minor typographical errors in the retyped ITS have been Specification 3.4.1 errors corrected to be consistent with the NUREG markup. (The word "and" has been deleted from LCO 3.4.1.b: and the Retyped ITS p 3.4-1 word "is" has been added to SR 3.4.9.5.)
Specification 3.4.9 Retyped ITS p 3.4-22 NUREG ITS markup error A minor NUREG markup error has been corrected to be Specification 3.4.9 consistent with the retyped ITS. (The word "Note" has been changed to "Not" in ITS 3.4.9 Insert Note 2.)
NUREG ITS markup p Insert page 3.4-25 Retyped ITS Bases Minor typographical errors in the retyped ITS Bases have Specification 3.4.1 typographical errors been corrected to be consistent with the NUREG Bases markup. (The words "Design Basis" have been changed to Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-2, "design basis" in the ITS 3.4.1 ASA section: the B 3.4-3, and B 3.4-5 incorrect spelling in the ASA header (Analysis) has been corrected; a long dash has been used in lieu of a short Specification 3.4.2 dash (two places) in the ASA and LCO Bases section of ITS 3.4.1 (in Function names): the term "Recirculation Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-10 Water System" has been changed to "Recirculation System" in the ITS 3.4.1 Applicability section: a comma has been Specification 3.4.3 added to the ITS 3.4.1 Actions B.1 section; the words "Design Basis" have been changed to "design basis" in Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-14 the ITS 3.4.2 Actions A.1 section; the short dash in the title "ECCS-Operating" of ITS 3.4.3 Background Bases Specification 3.4.5 section has been changed to a long dash: the word "pump" has been added to the ITS 3.4.5 Background section: the Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4 words "or indication" have been added to two places in 25, B 3.4-27, and B 3.4-28 ITS 3.4.5 ASA section: the word "of" has been changed to "for" in the ITS 3.4.5 ACTIONS B.1 section: the word Specification 3.4.7 "subsystems" has been changed to "subsystem" in the ITS 3.4.7 LCO section: a comma has been added to the SR Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-36 3.4.9.3, SR 3.4.9.4, and SR 3.4.9.5 section; the word "Of" has been decapitalized in ITS 3.4.9 Reference 5:
Specification 3.4.9 and the word "Alternate" has been changed to "Alternative" in ITS 3.4.9 Reference 12.)
Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-52 and B 3.4-54
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES TO ITS SECTION 3.4 - REVISION J Page 2 Source of Change Summary of Change Affected Pages NUREG Bases markup errors Minor NUREG Bases markup errors have been corrected to Specification 3.4.1 be consistent with the retyped ITS Bases. (The document number for ITS 3.4.1 Reference 7 has been changed from NUREG Bases markup p Insert "004" to "044"; a period has been added to the ITS 3.4.2 Page B 3.4-6 ASA section; a period has been added to ITS 3.4.2 Reference 2; a close parenthesis has been added to the Specification 3.4.2 ITS 3.4.3 LCO section; periods have been added to ITS 3.4.3 References 4 and 5; ITS 3.4.3 Reference 4 has been NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4-8 properly numbered: the word "the" has been added to ITS and B 3.4-11 3.4.4 Background section; a dash has been added to the ITS 3.4.5 Background section; a period has been added to Specification 3.4.3 ITS 3.4.7 Reference 1: a comma has been added to the ITS 3.4.8 LCO section; a period has been added to ITS 3.4.8 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 Reference 1: a period has been added to the ITS 3.4.9 13 and B 3.4-16 LCO section: and the word "without" has been capitalized in ITS 3.4.9 Reference 12)
Specification 3.4.4 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 17 Specification 3.4.5 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 28 Specification 3.4.7 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 41 Specification 3.4.8 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 42 and B 3.4-46 Specification 3.4.9 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 49 and Insert Page B 3.4-54
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES TO ITS SECTION 3.4 - REVISION J Page 3 Source of Change Summary of Change Affected Pages Typographical errors Minor typographical errors have been corrected in the Specification 3.4.1 Discussion of Changes, NUREG Bases markups, and the retyped ITS Bases. (A period has been added at the end NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 of a sentence in the ASA section (after "Specification
- 3. Insert Page B 3.4-3. and 5.6.5"): the second dash High in the APRM Neutron Flux -
Insert Page B 3.4-5 High (Flow Biased) Functions name and the dash between the words "Flow" and "Biased" have been deleted in ITS Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-4 3.4.1 LCO Bases: the word "surveillance" has been and B 3.4-7 capitalized in the SR 3.4.1.1 Bases: the date of ITS 3.4.2 Reference 3 has been changed from 1990 to 1980:
Specification 3.4.2 the words "All S/RVs" have been changed to "Each S/RV" for grammatical correctness; the word "includes" has NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 been changed to "include" in the ITS 3.4.3 LCO Bases 11 section and the term "safe lift settings" has been changed to "safety function lift settings": the words Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-13 "Table 3.2-6" have been changed to "Table 3.2-5" in ITS 3.4.5 DOC L5.)
Specification 3.4.3 NUREG Bases markup p Insert Page B 3.4-12. B 3.4-13. and B 3.4-15 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4 14, B 3.4-15, and B 3.4-17 Specification 3.4.5 DOC L5 (DOCs p 5 of 5)
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES TO ITS SECTION 3.4 - REVISION J Source of Change Summary of Change Affected Pages Consistency issues Minor consistency issue corrections have been made.
(The term "One or more recirculation loop(s)" has been changed to "One or more recirculation loops" in ITS 3.4.1 Condition A consistent with the usage throughout the ITS; the words "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)" in the ITS 3.4.1 ASA Bases section have been changed to "UFSAR" consistent with its usage throughout the ITS Bases: the term "APRM Neutron-Flux (Startup)
High" in SR 3.4.1.1 Bases has been changed to "APRM Neutron Flux - High (Startup), consistent with the title of the Function in ITS 3.3.1.1: the words "while in MODE 2" have been added to the last sentence of SR 3.4.1.1 Bases, since this is when the APRM Function is applicable; the title of LCO 3.4.1 has been deleted in the ITS 3.4.2 Applicability Bases section since it is defined earlier in the Bases: the value "9" (three places) in ITS 3.4.3 Bases has been changed to "nine";
the term 1" has been changed to 1 inch in the ITS 3.4.4 Background Bases section: quotation marks have been placed around the LCO 3.3.6.1 title in the ITS 3.4.7 LCO Bases section; the wording of SR 3.4.7.1 and SR 3.4.8.1 has been changed to be consistent with the wording of similar Surveillances, i.e.. SRs 3.1.7.6. 3.6.1.8.1.
3.6.1.9.1, 3.6.2.3.1, 3.6.3.2.2. and 3.7.1.1: the wording in the LCO 3.4.8 Bases section, with regard to the number of RHRSW pumps needed, has been modified to be consistent with the wording in the ITS 3.4.7 LCO Bases:
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
__I__
I Specification 3.4.1 NUREG ITS markup p Insert Page 3.4-1 NUREG Bases markup p Insert Page B 3.4-3 and Insert Page B 3.4-5 Retyped ITS p 3.4-2 Retyped ITS and B 3.4-7 Bases p B 3.4-3 Specification 3.4.2 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4-8 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-10 Specification 3.4.3 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 12 and B 3.4-13 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-15 Specification 3.4.4 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 17 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-19 Specification 3.4.7 NUREG ITS markup p 3.4-20 NUREG Bases 38 markup p B 3.4-Retyped ITS p 3.4-15 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-36 Specification 3.4.8 NUREG ITS markup p 3.4-22 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 43 Retyped ITS p 3.4-17 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-40 and B 3.4-41 Page 4
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES TO ITS SECTION 3.4 - REVISION J Source of Change Summary of Change Affected Pages Consistency issues a semicolon has replaced a period and the word "and" has Specification 3.4.9 (continued) been added to SR 3.4.9.1.a for consistency with the manner in which two part SRs are written: the word NUREG ITS markup p 3.4-24 "line" has been added to SR 3.4.9.3 Bases to be consistent with an LA DOC: the word "performed" has been NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 changed to "met" in two places in the SR 3.4.9.3/4/5
- 53. Insert Page B 3.4-53.
Bases to be consistent with the wording in the Notes of and B 3.4-54 the actual SRs; the words "ensures there is no stratification" in the SR 3.4.9.3/4/5 Bases have been Retyped ITS p 3.4-20 changed to "verifies the stratification limit is met" to be consistent with the actual purpose of SR 3.4.9.3: and Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-52 the words "head bolting" have been added to the SR and B 3.4-53 3.4.9.6/7/8 Bases (three places) to be consistent with plant terminology.)
Consistency issues The Bases for the Leakage and the Leakage Detection Specification 3.4.4 Instrumentation Technical Specification (ITS 3.4.4 and ITS 3.4.5) have been modified to be consistent with the NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 UFSAR and the current licensing basis.
Specifically, 18, Insert Page B 3.4-18, B JAFNPP specific references and descriptions have been 3.4-21, and Insert Page B included in lieu of the generic references and 3.4-21 descriptions in the NUREG.
For example, the NUREG uses Regulatory Guide 1.45 as a reference for certain Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4 requirements, but JAFNPP is not committed to RG 1.45.
20, B 3.4-23, and B 3.4-24 Specification 3.4.5 NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 27, Insert Page B 3.4-27, B 3.4-28, Insert Page B 3.4 28, B 3.4-29, and Insert Page B 3.4-32 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4 25, B 3.4-26, B 3.4-27. B 3.4-30, and B 3.4-31 Editorial The proper References have been provided for the ITS Specification 3.4.1 3.4.1 Bases and the References have been placed in the proper order. In addition, a period has been added at NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 the end of Reference 4.
3, Insert Page B 3.4-3.
Insert Page B 3.4-5, and Insert Page B 3.4-6 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-3, B 3.4-4, B 3.4-7, and B 3.4 8
Page 5
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES TO ITS SECTION 3.4 - REVISION J Page 6 Source of Change Summary of Change Affected Pages Editorial The proper References have been provided for the ITS Specification 3.4.3 3.4.3 Bases and the References have been placed in the proper order.
The proper References have been provided NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4 for the ITS 3.4.9 Bases.
13 and B 3.4-16 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-15 and B 3.4-18 Specification 3.4.9 NUREG Bases markup p Insert Page B 3.4-53 and B 3.4-54 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-53 and B 3.4-54 Technical The range of power generation that recirculation flow is Specification 3.4.1 varied to control reactor power without moving control rods has been modified to be consistent with the UFSAR.
NUREG Bases markup p B 3.4-2 Retyped ITS Bases p B 3.4-2 Technical The reactor vessel flange and head flange temperature Specification 3.4.9 surveillances in ITS 3.4.9 (SRs 3.4.9.6. 3.4.9.7, and 3.4.9.8) have been modified to exclude the 90 degree MUREG ITS markup p 3.4-25 limit when the reactor vessel head bolting studs are not and 3.4-26 under tension.
This is consistent with the CTS requirements.
JFD CLB1 (JFDs p 1 of 1)
Retyped ITS Bases p 3.4-22 and 3.4-23
Insert ACTION A CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or two A.1 Initiate action to Immediately recirculation loops in exit the Exclusion operation with core Region.
flow and THERMAL POWER conditions within the Exclusion Region of the power-to-flow map.
Insert Page 3.4-1
,ýD
-Revision J
Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES?
BACKGROUND (continued) is transferred to the coolant.
As it rises, the coolant begins to boil, creating steam voids within the fuel channel that continue until the coolant exits the core.
Because of reduced moderation, the steam voiding introduces negative reactivity that must be compensated for to maintain or to increase reactor power.
The recirculation flow control allows operators to increase recirculation flow and sweep some of the voids from the fuel channel, overcoming the k negative reactivitydo.ID effect.
Thus, the reason. for having variable recirculation flow is to compensate for reactivity effects of boiling over a wide range of power generation (i.e., "
to 100% of RTP) without having to move.
control rods anid tu~~e able flux patterns.
TV K, C,
Each recirculation cop is nually started from the control room.
The MG set provides regulation of individual recirculation loop drive flows.
The flow in each loop is manually controlled.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The operation of the Reactojt fflo Recirculation System is an initial condition assumed in the design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
(Ref. 1).
During a LOCA caused by a recirculation loop pipe break, the intact loop is assumed to provide coolant flow during the first few seconds of the accident.
The initial core flow decrease is rapid because the recirculation pump in the broken loop ceases to pump reactor coolant to the vessel almost immediately.
The pump in the intact loop coasts down relatively slowly.
This pump coastdown governs the care flow response for the next several seconds until the jet pump suction is uncovered (Ref. 1).
The analyses assume that both loops are operating at the same flow prior to the accident.
However, the LOCA analysis was reviewed for the case with a flow mismatch between the two loops, with the pipe break assumed to be in the loop with the higher flow.
While the flow coastdown and core response are potentially more severe in this assumed case (since the intact loop starts at a lower flow rate and the core response is the same as if both loops were operating at a lower flow rate), a small mismatch has been determined to be acceptable based on engineering judgement.
The recirculation system is also assumed to have sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during abnormal operational transients (Ref. 2),
which are analyzed in Chapter 4 of the FSAR gý (continued)
Rev 1, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS B 3.4-2
Recirculation Loops Operating 8 3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
A plant specific LOCA analysis has been performed assuming only one operating recirculation loop.
This analysis has demonstrated that, in the event of a LOCA caused by a pipe break in the operating recirculation loop, the Emergency Core Cooling System response will provide adequate core cooling, provided the APLHGR requirementi are modified accordingly (Ref. 3).
L rY The transient analyses of Chaptero of the 'SAR have also been performed for single recirculation loop operation (Ref. 3) and demonstrate sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during the abnormal operational transients analyzed provided the MCPR requirements are modified.
During single recirculatlon loo; operation, modification to the Reactor Protection System.,
average power range monitor (APR1) fE t
- e*
t aalso required to account for thdifferent relati 0
between recirculation drive flow an reactor (sleaJ=4 I a
-W%
o cor flow. The APLHGR and NCPR for sjglanp ojeration are spd in the COIR. The APRML lo-Z'Ias'ed)
'4MtMFW is in LCO 3.
3'1.1, 'Reactoi Protection System (RPS) Instrumentat!on.-,
Wda Recircul aton loops operating satisfies Criterion 2 of (
LCD -_
Two recirculation loops are required to be in operation with (P* ktheir flws matched within the limits specified in S" 9
'RT-4.1.Uto ensure that during a LOCA caused by a break of the piping of one recirculation loop the assumptions of the LOCA analysis are satisfied.
With'the limits specified i1 SR 3.4.L not met, the recirculation loop with the lower
- 2.,Jow m-st be considered not in operation.
Vith only one 3*
- irulation loop in operation, modifications to the requirdAT N
RAI Alimits (LCR 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)O), NCPR limits (LCO 31.2.2, AliN f
CR TICAL POWER RATIO (NCPR)'I), 4W APRM4 JITJA Sh d 14A
+A nw entinu aconsistent withl let_-
(continued)
B 3.4-3 RevIl, 04/07/95 BWR/4 STS 4'ýý 5'
0 Insert ASA Operation of the Reactor Water Recirculation System also ensures adequate core flow at higher power levels such that conditions conducive to the onset of thermal hydraulic instability are avoided.
The UFSAR Section 16.6 (Ref. 4) requires protection of fuel thermal safety limits from conditions caused by thermal hydraulic instability.
Thermal hydraulic instabilities can result in power oscillations which could result in exceeding the MCPR Safety Limit.
The MCPR Safety Limit is set such that 99.9% of the fuel rods avoid boiling transition if the limit is not violated (refer to the Bases for SL 2.1.1.2).
Implementation of operability requirements for avoidance of, and protection from thermal hydraulic instability, consistent with the BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solution Option I-D (Refs. 5 and 6) provides assurance that power oscillations are either prevented or can be readily detected and suppressed without exceeding the specified acceptable fuel design limits.
To minimize the likelihood of thermal-hydraulic instability which results in power oscillations, a power-to-flow "Exclusion Region" is calculated using the approved methodology specified in Specification 5.6.5.
The resulting "Exclusion Region" may change each fuel cycle and is therefore specified in the COLR.
Entries into the "Exclusion Region" may occur as a result of an abnormal event, such as a single recirculation pump trip, loss of feedwater heating, or be required to prevent equipment damage.
The core-wide mode of oscillation in the neutron flux is more readily detected (and suppressed) than the regional mode of oscillation due to the spatial averaging of the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM).
The Option I-D analysis for JAFNPP (Ref. 7) demonstrates that this protection is provided at a high statistical confidence level for regional mode oscillations.
Reference 7 also demonstrates that the core-wide mode of oscillation is more likely to occur rather than regional oscillations due to the large single-phase pressure drop associated with the small fuel inlet orifice diameters.
1:6D Insert LCO In addition, during two-loop and single-loop operation, the combination of core flow and THERMAL POWER must be outside the Exclusion Region of the power-to-flow map specified in the COLR to ensure core thermal hydraulic instability does not occur.
Insert Page B 3.4-3 Revision J
"Insert SR 3.4.1.1 SR 3.4.1.1 This SR ensures the combination of core flow and THERMAL POWER are within appropriate limits to prevent uncontrolled thermal-hydraulic oscillations.
At low recirculation flows and high reactor power, the reactor exhibits increased susceptibility to thermal-hydraulic instability.
The power-to-flow map specified in the COLR is based on guidance provided in Reference 7.
The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency is based on operating experience and the operator's knowledge of the reactor status, including significant changes in THERMAL POWER and core flow.
This SR is modified by a Note that requires this Surveillance to be performed only in MODE 1 because the APRM Neutron Flux-High (Startup)
Function in LCO 3.3.1.1 will prevent operation in the Exclusion Region while in MODE 2.
Insert Page B 3.4-5 Revision J
REFERENCES 3.
0 Insert Ref NEDO-24281, FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Single-Loop Operation, August 1980.
- 4.
UFSAR, Section 16.6.
- 5.
NEDO-31960-A, BWR Owners' Group Long Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology, June 1991.
- 6.
NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology, March 1992.
- 7.
GENE-637-044-0295, Application Of The "Regional Exclusion With Flow-Biased APRM Neutron Flux Scram" Stability Solution (Option I-D) To The James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, February 1995.
- 8.
Insert Page B 3.4-6 Revision J
Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating LCO 3.4.1 Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in operation and the reactor operating at core flow and THERMAL POWER conditions outside the Exclusion Region of the power to-flow map specified in the COLR.
OR One recirculation loop shall be in operation and the reactor operating at core flow and THERMAL POWER conditions outside the Exclusion Region of the power-to-flow map specified in the COLR with the following limits applied when the associated LCO is applicable:
- a.
COLR; "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE single loop operation limits specified in the
- b.
LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR),"
loop operation limits specified in the COLR; single
- c.
LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)
Instrumentation," Function 2.b (Average Power Range Monitors Neutron Flux-High (Flow Biased)), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation; and
- d.
LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation,"
Function 1.a (Rod Block Monitor-Upscale), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.2.1-1 is reset for single loop operation.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1 and 2.
Amendment (Rev. J) 3.4-1 JAFNPP
Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or two A.1 Initiate action to Immediately recirculation loops in exit the Exclusion operation with core Region.
flow and THERMAL POWER conditions within the Exclusion Region of the power-to-flow map.
B.
Requirements of the B.1 Satisfy the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO not met for requirements of the reasons other than LCO.
Condition A.
C.
Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.
OR No recirculation loops in operation.
Amendment (Rev. J) 3.4-2 JAFNPP
Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) is transferred to the coolant.
As it rises, the coolant begins to boil, creating steam voids within the fuel channel that continue until the coolant exits the core.
Because of reduced moderation, the steam voiding introduces negative reactivity that must be compensated for to maintain or to increase reactor power.
The recirculation flow control allows operators to increase recirculation flow and sweep some of the voids from the fuel channel, overcoming the void negative reactivity effect.
Thus, the reason for having variable recirculation flow is to compensate for reactivity effects of boiling over a wide range of power generation (i.e., 65% to 100% of RTP) without having to move control rods and disturb desirable flux patterns.
The recirculation flow also provides sufficient core flow to ensure thermal hydraulic stability of the core is maintained.
Each recirculation loop is manually started from the control room.
The MG set provides regulation of individual recirculation loop drive flows.
The flow in each loop is manually controlled.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The operation of the Reactor Water Recirculation System is an initial condition assumed in the design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
(Ref. 1).
During a LOCA caused by a recirculation loop pipe break, the intact loop is assumed to provide coolant flow during the first few seconds of the accident.
The initial core flow decrease is rapid because the recirculation pump in the broken loop ceases to pump reactor coolant to the vessel almost immediately.
The pump in the intact loop coasts down relatively slowly.
This pump coastdown governs the core flow response for the next several seconds until the jet pump suction is uncovered (Ref. 1).
The analyses assume that both loops are operating at the same flow prior to the accident.
However, the LOCA analysis was reviewed for the case with a flow mismatch between the two loops, with the pipe break assumed to be in the loop with the higher flow.
While the flow coastdown and core response are potentially more severe in this assumed case (since the intact loop starts at a lower flow rate and the core response is the same as if both loops were operating at a lower flow rate), a small mismatch has been determined to be acceptable based on engineering judgement.
The recirculation system is also assumed to have sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal (continued)
Revision J B 3.4-2 JAFNPP