ML020940451
| ML020940451 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/2002 |
| From: | Division of Nuclear Materials Safety II |
| To: | Duke Energy Corp |
| References | |
| 50-269/02301, 50-270/02301, 50-287/02301 | |
| Download: ML020940451 (32) | |
See also: IR 05000269/2002301
Text
Draft Submittal
(Pink Paper)
Operating Test Simulator Scenarios
OCONEE EXAM
50-269, 270, 287/2002-301
FEBRUARY 11 - 15, 2002
OCONEE
02/04/2002
OPERATING EXAM
(SIMULATOR)
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Facility: Oconee Scenario No.: 1R6 Op-Test No.:
Examiners: Operators: I -SRO (1-3)
R-OATC (1-3)
U-BOP (1-3)
Initial Conditions:
- 75% Reactor Power EOL, per dispatcher request (IC-42)
Turnover:
"* Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump OOS to repair Oil leak, expected returned this shift
"* SASS in manual for I&E testing
"* AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
"* NI-9 0OS, to be replaced next outage
"* Keowee Unit 2 OOS for unplanned reasons
"* Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground, operability test complete
"* PT/11A/0600/15 (Control Rod Movement) to be performed after turnover
Event Malfunction Event Type* Event
No. No. Description
Oa Pre-insert TD EFDW Pump Fails to Start
MSS330
0b Pre-Insert SASS in manual
Updater
Oc Pre-Insert AMSAC/DSS bypassed
Updater
Od Pre-Insert Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout
MEL180
Qe Pre-Insert NI-9 OOS
MN1082
1 N, BOP, SRO Perform Control Rod Movement
2 MCR021 C, OATC, SRO Drop CR Group 2 Rod 6, (pip 0-01-03316) (TS)
Override Diamond blocked from AUTO operation
3 R, OATC Power Reduction
4 MPS440 C, BOP, SRO 1A1 RCP High Vibration
(40-80%)
5 MP1281 I, OATC, SRO ATcfails HIGH when RCP secured
6 MCR022 C, OATC, SRO Second dropped control rod, requiring a manual reactor trip
7 MEL090 M,ALL CT-1 Lockout (Loss of Power)
8 MEL180 M, ALL Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout (blackout,
PRA)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 1 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: I Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Perform Control Rod Movement PT: (N, BOPISRO)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
BOP/SRO Perform PT/1/A/0600/15, Control Rod Movement
Conduct pre-job briefing
Review Limits and Precautions
Place SAFETY RODS OUT BYPASS Switch in Bypass.
Take manual control of reactor and feedwater
"* SG Master in Hand
"* Diamond in manual
Test CRD Group 1
"* Transfer CRD Group I to Aux power supply
OP/1 105/009 (Control Rod Drive System)
"* Insert CRD Group 1
"* Withdraw CRD Group 1
"* Transfer CRD Group I to DC Hold Power Supply
Test CRD Group 2
"* Transfer CRD Group 2 to Aux power supply per
OP/1 105/009 (Control Rod Drive System)
"* Insert CRD Group 2
"* Withdraw CRD Group 2
This event is completed when Group 2 Rod 6 drops into the
core (during Group 2 withdrawal) or as directed by the lead
evaluator.
__________________________________________________
J
Page 2 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3
Event Description: Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATC/SRO) (TS)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
When crew begins to withdraw CRD Group 2, rod #6 drops into the
core.
Plant response:
Statalarms
"* 1SA-2/B-10, CRD Position Error
Position Indicating Panel
"* API indication of dropped rod on individual meter
"* In limit (zero %) green light on respective dropped rod.
"* Loss of respective dropped rod out limit (100%) red light.
"* Amber 7" asymmetric lights on the dropped rod and the entire
group.
Diamond Panel indications
- 9" asymmetric lamp.
- Out inhibit lamp if NI Flux is above 60%.
- Group In Limit (green) lamp on respective group.
ALL Crew will use "plant stabilization process" to stabilize the plant.
1. The OATC will perform the following:
1.1 Acknowledge and verbalize to the SRO the most important
Statalarm received for the failure.
1.2 Verbalize to the SRO reactor power level and direction of
movement.
2. The BOP will perform the following:
2.1 Recognize that a valid runback should be occurring but is
not because the ICS is in manual.
3. The SRO should use the OAC to monitor unit status.
4. The crew should determine that the use of AP/1/Al1700/15,
Dropped Control Rods is required.
Page 3 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, Si)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 3
Event Description: Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATC/SRO) (TS)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
OATC/SRO SRO will direct actions per AP/1IA/1700/15, Dropped Control Rods.
1. Verify _<one dropped control rod.
2. Verify _one control rod misaligned > 9" (6%) from group average.
3. Verify Reactor is critical
4. Verify runback to 55% FP in progress.
- OATC should determine that a runback is not in progress
due to ICS in manual.
BOP 5. Initiate Enclosure 5.1 (Control of Plant Equipment During
Shutdown)
OATC/SRO 6. Notify I&E (SPOC) to perform the following:
"* Investigate cause of dropped rod
"* Prepare to reduce RPS Flux/Flow-Imbalance and RPS High
Flux setpoints.
7. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> verify > 1% SDM with the allowance for inoperable
control rod(s) by performing PT//A/1 103/15, Reactivity Balance
Calculations.
8. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, ensure reactor power is less than 60% of the
allowable power per the RCP combination.
Note: The crew may elect to place the Diamond in Auto to let the
unit runback. However going to Auto is blocked by a
malfunction of the auto/manual pushbutton.
9. The OATC should begin reducing reactor power to less than
60% with the ICS in manual.
Page 4 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, SI)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 3
Event Description: Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATC/SRO) (TS)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
SRO 10. The SRO should refer to TS 3.1.5 (Safety Rod Position Limits)
and determine Condition "A" applies.
"* Verify SDM within COLR limit in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
"* Declare the rod inoperable in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
11. The SRO should refer to TS 3.1.4 (Control Rod Group Alignment
Limits) and determine Condition "A" applies.
"* Verify SDM is within the limit specified in the COLR within 1
hour.
"* Reduce power to _60% of allowable thermal power within 2
hours.
"* Reduce overpower trip setpoints within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />
When power Is being reduced with the ICS in manual this
event is completed.
Page 5 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: I Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Power Reduction: (R, OATC)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
OATC/SRO The OATC will reduce reactor power with the ICS in manual.
"* Reduce FDW to reduce power
"* Insert control rods to control Tave.
Note: The crew may elect to put FDW back in AUTO. If so,
manually reducing FDW will not be required.
When power has been reduce by at least 5% or when directed
by the lead evaluator this event is completed.
Page 6 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: IA, RCP High Vibration: (C, BOP/SRO)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
BOP/SRO During the power reduction Statalarm 1SA-9/D-2, RC Pump
Vibration High, will alarm.
"* The BOP should refer to the ARG
"* Verify RCP vibration conditions by using RCP OAC Display
Group RCP
"* Refer to AP/1IA/1700/16, Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump
Operation.
SDetermine if RCP immediate trip criteria is met by referring
to Enclosure 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria).
> An immediate trip condition based on vibration is one of the
immediate trip criteria. Sustained actual Emergency High
Vibration as verified by Enclosure 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip
Criteria).
> Since immediate trip criteria is not met then notify the OSM
and request an evaluation of the RCP vibration condition by
the RCP Component Engineer.
Statalarm 1SA-9/E2 (RCP VIBRATION EMERG HIGH) will actuate.
"* The BOP should determine that the trip criteria are met based
on Enclosure 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria) and inform the
SRO.
"* The SRO should direct the BOP to trip the 1A1 RCP.
When crew has tripped the RCP this event is completed.
Page 7 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, Sl)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: I Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: AT, fails HIGH: (I, OATC/SRO)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
OATC/SRO When the 1A1 RCP is secured AT0 fails HIGH
"* Statalarm 1SA-02/B-5, RC Cold Leg Diff. Temperature High,
will actuate.
"* FDW flow will ratio based on the failure
"* "A" FDW flow will increase causing "A" loop Tc to decrease.
"* "B"FDW flow will decrease causing "B" loop Tc to increase.
"* This will cause actual AT. to increase
"* The OATC should diagnose the AT. failure by observing the AT,
meter on 1UB1. It should return to zero but is staying a + 3.5
degrees.
"* Take the Feedwater Masters to MANUAL and re-ratio
feedwater using the loop Tc meters to return actual ATl to near
zero.
When the OATC has re-ratioed FDW and returned Tc to near
zero or when directed by the lead examiner this event is
completed.
Page 8 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, Si)
Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Second dropped Control Rod (Manual Reactor Trip): (C, OATC/SRO)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
OATC/SRO After the plant is stable and when directed by the lead examiner a
second control rod will drop.
The OATC should determine that a second control rod has
dropped into the core by observing the CRD PI Panel and
manually trip the reactor. OATC will attempt to trip the reactor
by depressing the reactor trip pushbutton.
Note: The reactor will not trip when the button is depressed.
a SRO should ensure that a manual reactor trip is performed.
After the reactor pushbutton has been depressed this event is
completed.
Page 9 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: Scenario No.: I Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 3
Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (M,ALL)
When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an
ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will be tripped and
CT-1 (startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will
be restored from Keowee Unit I in approximately 35 seconds via the underground
path and CT-4.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
OATC Recognize that the Reactor should have tripped and begin
performing immediate manual actions.
The OATC should recognize that Power Range NIs are not < 5%
FP and perform Rule 1. (CT-E.1, CT-E.2)
"* Verify that at least one Power Range NI is _>5% FP.
"* Initiate manual control rod insertion to the IN LIMIT.
"* Ensure 1A or 1B HPIP is operating.
"* Start 1C HPIP.
"* Open 1HP-26 & 1HP-27 (1A and 1B HP Injection)
- Dispatch operators to the Cable Room and to the 600V Load
Centers 1X9 and 2X1 to de-energize the CRD System.
"* Notify the Procedure Director to GO TO UNPP tab.
SRO Transfer to the UNPP tab from IMAs.
- Ensure Rule 1 is in progress or complete.
"* Verify Main FDW available.
"* IAAT all power range NIs are <5% FP, THEN ensure the
turbine-generator is tripped.
>This action will result in a unit loss of power for ý 35
seconds due to CT-1 lockout. (refer to page 3 of event 7)
- Verify all wide range NIs Ž>1% FP.
"* Maximize letdown.
"* Verify Main FDW available.
"* Adjust Main FDW flow as necessary to control RCS
temperature.
"* Verify overcooling NOT in progress.
"* Ensure makeup to the LDST is secured.
"* WHEN all NIs are <1% FP, AND decreasing, THEN continue
in this tab.
Page 10 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, Sl)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: I Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 3
Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (M,ALL)
When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an
ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will trip and CT-1
(startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will be
restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground path
and CT-4.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
BOP Perform symptoms check and when asked report no other
symptoms.
When power is regained on the Main Feeder Buses perform AP/1 1,
Recovery from Loss of Power.
"* IAAT Pzr level > 80" [180" acc],
THEN ensure Pzr heaters in AUTO
"* Verify load shed is complete as indicated by LOAD SHED
COMPLETE on any ES Module (Channel 1 or 2).
- Dispatch an operator to perform End 5.2 (Restoring Loads
Outside the Control Room).
"* Dispatch an operator to perform Encl 5.4 (Actions to Restore
ESV System to Normal Operation).
"* Verify condenser vacuum maintained.
"* Verify IAheader pressures _ 90 psig:
OATC Determine the Main Feedwater Pumps have tripped as a result of
the loss of power and perform RULE 3 (Loss of Main or Emergency
FDW).
"* Ensure any EFDWP operating
"* Initiate Enclosure 5.9 (Extended EFDW Operation)
"* Throttle EFDW as necessary to prevent overcooling.
Page 11 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, Si)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 3 of 3
Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (M,ALL)
When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an
ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will trip and CT-1
(startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will be
restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground path
and CT-4.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
SRO When the turbine is tripped and power is lost:
Two possible paths
1. GO TO the "Blackout" tab per parallel actions page
- In the blackout tab, the crew will: verify power restored,
initiate AP/1 1(Recovery from Loss of Power) and transfer to
Subsequent Actions.
2. If power is restored prior to transferring to blackout tab, SRO
will complete UNPP tab.
- Determine that the reactor has tripped and power is _<1%
power.
if needed.
Emergency Operating Procedure)
3. When power is regained to the 4160-switchgear use a "Parallel
Actions" transfer from the yellow page to initiate
AP/1 1(Recovery from Loss of Power).
4. Transfer to Subsequent Actions
"* Verify all control rods are inserted
"* Verify all 4160V switchgear (1TC, 1TD, 1TE) energized.
"* Verify Main FDW is not operating and ensure SG level are
approaching 240" XSUR.
This event is completed when power is regained to 4160V
switchgear, reactor is shutdown, EOP Subsequent Actions are
in progress, and when directed by the lead examiner.
Page 12 of 13
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Keowee Unit I Emergency Lockout, Unit Blackout: (M, ALL)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
ALL When directed by the lead examiner Keowee Unit 1 Emergency
Lockout will occur.
Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout will result in a Unit Blackout.
Emergency Operating Procedure)
The SRO will make a "Parallel Actions" transfer to the Blackout tab.
"* Close 1HP-31 (RCP Seal Flow Control) and 1HP-21 (RCP Seal
Return).
"* Determine SGs are not being feed and dispatch operators to
the Atmospheric Dump Valves.
Note: Since the TD EFDW Pump is OOS no source of FDW is
available to the SGs until power is restored from CT - 5.
"* Notify SSF operators that feeding with SSF ASW is required.
"* Initiate Enclosure 5.39 (Restoration of Power) (CT-A.8)
BOP Perform Enclosure 5.39 (Restoration of Power)
- Determine CT-1 has no voltage
- Determine no Keowee Units operating
- Verify CT-5 indicates 4160 volts.
- Place various auto/manual transfer switches in manual
- Close SL1 and SL2 breakers
- Close S1 and S2 breakers
Note: This will power the Main Feeder Buses.
This event and the exam are complete when power has been
regained to the MFBs or when directed by the lead examiner.
Page 13 of 13
Scenario #1 Overview
Initial Conditions: Unit 1: 75% power-430 EFPD, Unit 2: 100%, Unit 3: 100%
Turnover:
- Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump OOS to repair Aux Oil Pump
- SASS in MANUAL for I&E testing
- AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
- NI-9 OOS, to be replace next outage
- Keowee Unit 2 00S for unplanned reasons
- Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground, operability test complete
- PT/1/A/0600/15 (Control Rod Movement) to be performed after turnover
1) Perform Control Rod Movement PT: (N, BOP)
a) The ICS is put in manual by placing the Diamond and the Steam Generator
Master in manual.
b) PT/i/A/0600/15, Control Rod Movement, will be used to exercise the control rods.
During the movement of group two control rods, Group 2 Rod 6 will drop into the core.
TIME = 20 minutes
2) Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATC) (TS)
a) The crew should utilize the "plant stabilization process" to stabilize the plant and
recognize that a runback is not in progress.
b) Perform actions per AP/1 5, Dropped Control Rods, including reducing reactor
power to less than 60% within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
c) The crew may try to return the ICS to AUTO. However, the Diamond will be
blocked from returning to AUTO requiring a manual power reduction.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 30 min.
3) Power Reduction: (R, OATC)
a) The CRSRO will direct the OATC with the help of the BOP to commence a unit
shutdown with the ICS in manual.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 40 min.
4) 1A1 RCP High Vibration: (C, BOP)
a) During the power reduction the 1A, RCP will experience High Vibration. This will
require entry into AP/16, Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation. RCP
vibration will increase and the decision will be made to secure the 1A, RCP.
TIME = 5 minutes, TOTAL 45 min.
Page 1 of 2
Scenario #1 Overview
5) ATc fails HIGH: (I, OATC)
a) When the 1A1 RCP is secured ATcfails HIGH requiring the OATC to manually re
ratio feedwater using the Feedwater Masters.
TIME = 3 minutes, TOTAL 48 min.
6) Second dropped Control Rod (Manual Reactor Trip): (C, OATC)
a) After the plant is stable a second control rod will drop. This will require a manual
TIME = 2 minutes, TOTAL 50 min.
7) CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (M, ALL; R, OATC)
a) The reactor will not trip and an ATWS will occur requiring utilization of the
Unanticipated Nuclear Power Production tab and RULE 2 from the EOP.
Manually inserting control rods, deenergizing control rod drives and Emergency
Boration will be required. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will be
tripped. This will cause a loss of power due to CT-1 (startup transformer)
lockout. Main Feeder Bus power will automatically be restored from Keowee via
CT-4 and the Standby Bus. This will require entering AP/1 1, Recovery From Loss
of Power, to restore plant loads and secondary equipment required for the
recovery of condenser vacuum. When NIs indicate less than 1% UNPP tab
directs transfer back to Subsequent Actions tab.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 60 min.
8) Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout, Unit Blackout: (M, ALL)
a) Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout will result in a Unit Blackout. This will cause
the CRSRO to transfer to the Blackout tab of the EOP for guidance on manually
restoring power to Unit l's Main Feeder Busses from Central Switchyard via
CT-5. After power is restored to the 4160 volt switchgear AP/11 will be restarted.
The scenario will be completed after power has been restored to the Main
Feeder Buses and AP/1 1 has been restarted.
TIME = 10 minutes. TOTAL 70 min.
Page 2 of 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S)
Facility: Oconee Scenario No.: 2R5 Op-Test No.:
Examiners: Operators: U-SRO (1-4)
I-OATC (1-3)
R-BOP (1-3)
Initial Conditions:
- 25% Reactor Power, startup in progress (IC-45)
Turnover:
- Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump OOS to repair oil leak
- SASS in MANUAL for I&E testing
- AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
- NI-9 OOS, to be replaced next outage
- Keowee Unit 2 OOS for unplanned reasons
"* Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground
"* Operability test of Keowee Unit 1 is to be performed per PT/620/009 (Keowee Hydro
Operation) after turnover and before startup continues, ONS to perform remote
Keowee start
Event Malfunction Event Type* Event
No. No. Description
Oa Pre-insert TD EFDW Pump Fails to Start
MSS330
Ob Pre-Insert SASS in manual
Oc Pre-Insert AMSAC/DSS bypassed
Od Pre-Insert NI-9 00S
MNI082
Oe Pre-Insert Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout
MEL180
1 Override N, BOP, SRO Operability test Keowee Unit 1
C, BOP, SRO Keowee Unit 1 Gen Field Flashing Breaker fails to
OPEN automatically
2 MPS090 C, OATC, SRO 1HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails closed
3 MN1032 I, OATC, SRO Controlling NI fails LOW
4 Override Seismic event (PRA)
C, BOP, SRO 1A RBCU rupture (TS)
5 MPSO20 C, ALL 1 B SG Tube leak (ramp 10 - 100 gpm over 30
5%-25% min) (TS)
6 R, OATC Unit Shutdown
7 MSS360,50 M, ALL 1A Main Steam line break in RB
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 1 of 10
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, Si)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Operability test Keowee Unit 1 (N, BOP/SRO)
Keowee Unit 1 Gen Field Flashing Breaker fails to OPEN
automatically (C, BOP/SRO)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
BOP/SRO PT/620/009 (Keowee Hydro Operation) is used to perform
operability test of unit 1
Use OP/1106/019 (Keowee Hydro At Oconee) to perform an
"Automatic Startup" of Keowee Unit 1
Initial Conditions
1. Verify applicable Statalarms and breaker positions
2. Notify Keowee operator to give Oconee control of Keowee # 1.
3. Review Limits and Precautions
Procedure
1. Place UNIT 1 LOCAL MASTER switch to "START" AND hold
until Keowee Unit starts.
2. Verify the following:
"* GEN 1 FIELD BREAKER closes
"* GEN 1 SUPPLY BREAKER closes
"* GEN 1 FIELD FLASHING BREAKER closes
3. Ensure GEN 1 FIELD FLASHING BREAKER trips.
"* Candidate should diagnose that the breaker did not open
automatically and should open the breaker manually and
initiate a work request or contact SPOC.
"* SRO should direct the BOP to continue with the startup.
Note: GEN FIELD FLASHING BREAKER automatically trips
< 45 seconds after receiving close signal. Failure of breaker to
trip automatically does NOT make the KHU inoperable.
Startup procedure may continue.
4. Verify ACB-1, Keowee 1 Generator Breaker, closed.
5. Verify Unit 1 EMER FDR ACB 3 closed
6. Verify z 4.16 KV on CT4 Volts (2AB3)
7. Close SK1 and SK2 (CT4 STBY BUS 1/2 FEEDER)
8. Shutdown Keowee #1.
Event is complete when operability test is complete or when
directed by the lead examiner.
Page 2 of 10
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: 1HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails closed (C, OATC/SRO)
Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior
OATC/SRO 1HP-120 fails closed during Keowee #1 operability test. This will
allow OATC diagnoses of failure.
1. Diagnose 1HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Failed closed:
"* RCS makeup flow goes to zero.
"* PZR level begins to decrease.
"* LDST level begins to increase.
"* Valve position demand for 1HP-120 begins to increase to
the 100% demand value and valve position indication will
indicate closed (green light).
2. Refer to AP/14 (Loss of Normal Makeup and/or RCP Seal
Injection.
"* Determine Seal Injection is not lost
"* Determine loss of suction to HPI pumps has not occurred.
"* Verify any HPI pump operating.
"* Verify RCP seal injection flow exists.
"* Verify RCP RCP seal injection or HPI makeup line leak is
not indicated.
"* Verify 1HP-120 has failed and GO TO Step 4.167.
"* Perform the following as necessary to maintain Pzr level >
200":
"* Close 1HP-6 (Letdown Orifice Stop)
"* Throttle 1HP-7 (Letdown Control)
"* Throttle 1HP-26 ((1A HP Injection)
3. Contact SPOC to repair 1HP-120.
Note: 1HP-120 will remain failed for the duration of the
scenario.
When PZR level is being controlled manually or when directed
by the lead examiner this event is completed.
Page 3 of 10
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, Si)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Controlling NI fails LOW (I, OATC/SRO)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
OATC/SRO When directed by the lead examiner the controlling NI will fail low.
Plant response:
1SA-02/A-12, ICS Tracking, will actuate. Diamond will transfer to
manual on NI flux < 1.5% and FDW will decrease due to reactor
cross limit. RCS pressure and temperature will increase.
Crew response:
1. When the ICS TRACKING alarm is received, the candidates
should utilize the "plant stabilization process" to stabilize the
plant and recognize that the controlling NI has failed.
2. Verify reactor power.
3. Place the FDW Masters in manual and stabilize the plant.
Adjust T.. using control rods and FDW and stabilize the plant
4. The SRO should direct the NCOs to check OAC and the
control board NI meters to determine the status of the NI
signals that can be used in the ICS.
"* Refer to AP/28, ICS Instrument Failures
"* SPOC should be contacted to repair NI-5.
Note: The ICS will remain in manual for the remainder of the
scenario.
When the plant is stable or when directed by the lead
examiner this event is completed.
Page 4 of 10
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Seismic event (PRA)
1A RBCU rupture (C, BOP/SRO) (TS)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
BOP/SRO 1. 1SA-9/B-9, LPSW RBCU A Cooler Rupture will actuate and RB
normal sump level will increase.
"* The BOP should refer to ARG
"* Verify alarm is valid by checking RBCU 1A Inlet Flow and
RBCU 1A delta flow.
"* Verify 1LPSW-18 (RBCU 1A Oultlet) open
"* Verify adequate LPSW flow is available; check LPSW pump
operation
"* Monitor RBNS Level for any unexplained increase (Notify
Chemistry to sample RBNS for boron to determine if a
cooler rupture has occurred.
"* Diagnose a Cooler Rupture is indicated and Isolate the 1A
RBCU Cooler.
2. The SRO should determine that isolation of LPSW to a RBCU
places the Unit in Tech Spec 3.0.3, which will require a unit
shutdown.
3. The control room will receive a phone call from security that
indicates that a tremor has been felt but no damage has been
noted.
4. The SRO should refer to AP/05, Earthquake.
- Dispatch operators to perform plant inspections
Note: No damage will be reported.
"* *Notify SPOC to develop the Strong Motion Accelerometer
tape.
"* *Verify NO fuel handling activities in progress.
- These items may not be completed depending on how soon
the next event is started.
Note: Team may decide at this time to begin a unit shutdown.
Refer to event 6.
When the Earthquake AP has been initiated, the RBCU has
been isolated, or at the direction of the Lead Examiner this
event is completed.
___________________________________________________
I
Page 5 of 10
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2
Event Description: 1B SG Tube leak (ramp 10 - 100 gpm over 30 min) (C, ALL) (TS)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
C, ALL 1B SG tube leak occurs following RBCU isolation and initiation of
AP/5, Earthquake, or when directed by the lead evaluator.
Plant response:
1. The following alarms actuate:
"* 1SA-8/B-9, RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH
"* 1SA-8/D-10, RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH
2. PZR level will decrease and RC makeup flow will increase.
Crew response:
1. Diagnose and take actions for a Tube leak in the 1B SG:
2. Refer to the ARG for the following alarms:
"* 1SA-8/B-9, RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH
"* iSA-8/D-10, RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH
3. Refer to AP/1i A/1700/31 (Primary to Secondary Leakage)
4. Open and Red Tag TB Sump pump breakers.
5. Monitor primary parameters; PZR Level and LDST level to
determine that gross leakage exist and transfer to step 4.65.
6. Determine OTSG tube leak size is initially less than 25 gpm.
Greater than 25 will require entering the EOP.
7. Log RIA readings (a rough log is adequate)
8. Initiate a Unit shutdown to met requirements of Encl. 5.1 (Unit
Shutdown Requirements).
Note: As the scenario develops the leak will increase to greater
than 25 gpm and transfer to the EOP will be required.
__________________ S
Page 6 of 10
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, $1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2
Event Description: 1B SG Tube leak (ramp 10 - 100 gpm over 30 min) (C, ALL) (TS)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
C, ALL 9. Primary inventory should be monitored and when the leak rate is
determined to be > 25 gpm transfer to the SGTR tab of the EOP.
10. EOP SGTR tab will perform the following:
- Determine that the Reactor is not tripped.
- Maintain PZR level > 220 inches using Enclosure 5.5 (Pzr
and LDST Level Control). (CT-D.1)
> Open HP-24 and 25 (1A and 1B BWST Suction)
identify all SGs with tube ruptures.
- Start the Outside Air Booster Fans on both Units 1 and 3.
11. The Procedure Director should direct the OATC to begin a unit
shutdown at a rate between 9.9% per hour and 20% per minute
(MAXIMUM RUNBACK).
Note: A shutdown with the ICS in manual is required.
Note: This event will remain in progress for the remainder of the
scenario.
Page 7 of 10
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, Si)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Unit Shutdown (R, OATC)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
BOP/SRO The BOP will utilize Enclosure 5.19 (Control of Plant Equipment
During Shutdown for SGTR).
Note: With the unit at z 25% power only applicable steps will be
performed.
"* Notify WCC SRO to make notifications
"* Transfer electrical auxiliaries
OATC/SRO The OATC will use the FDW Masters and the Diamond to reduce
power while monitoring Reactor Power, Tave, and other plant
parameters.
Ifthe reactor trips automatically the team must return to IMAs.
When a unit shutdown of > 5% has occurred or when directed
by the lead examiner this event is concluded.
Page 8 of 10
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2
Event Description: 1A Main Steam line break in RB (M, ALL)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
ALL 1A main steam line will occur following event 6 as directed by the
lead examiner.
Plant response:
1. Statalarm 1SA-02/A-9, MS Press High/Low, actuates
2. "A" and "B" main steam (MS) pressure decreases
3. Reactor trips.
"* "B"MS line pressure stops decreasing
"* "A" MS line pressure continues to decrease
4. Main FDW pumps trip
- EFDW initiates
Crew response:
1. The Crew should respond to the MSLB in the "IA" SG
2. The SRO will "Parallel Action" to transfer to the Excessive Heat
Transfer (EHT) tab and direct the Crew's actions as follows:
"* The Crew will perform IMAs.
"* The OATC will perform and verify the performance of IMAs
while the BOP performs a symptoms check.
"* The BOP will perform Rule #5 (Main Steam Line Break) after
receiving concurrence from the PD. (CT-B.1.3)
"* Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) will be performed.
3. Excessive Heat Transfer (EHT) tab will:
4. Verify excessive heat transfer stopped
5. Throttle HPI to stabilize RCS pressure and maintain PZR level >
80" (180" acc)
I i
_ 1_
I_ _ _ _ _ .
Page 9 of 10
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2
Event Description: 1A Main Steam line break in RB (M, ALL)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
ALL 6. Verify letdown in service
7. Feed and steam all intact SGs to stabilize RCS P/T. (CT-B.1.1)
8. Minimize SCM using the following methods as necessary:
(CT-B.1.2)
"* De-energizing all PZR heaters
"* Using PZR spray
"* Throttling HPI
9. Initiate Enclose 5.16 (SG Tube-to-Shell A T Control)
10. GO TO Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) tab.
When the SRO has transferred to the SGTR tab or when
directed by the Lead Examiner the event and scenario is
completed.
Page 10 of 10
Scenario #2 Overview
Initial Conditions: Unit 1:25% power - 430 EFPD, Unit 2: 100%, Unit 3: 100%
Turnover:
- Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump OOS to repair Aux Oil Pump
- SASS in manual for I&E testing
- AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
- NI-9 QOS, to be replaced next outage
- Keowee Unit 2 OOS for unplanned reasons
- Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground
- Operability test of Keowee Unit 1 is to be performed per PT/620/009, Keowee
Hydro Operation, after turnover
1) Operability test Keowee Unit I with failure of Gen Field Flashing Breaker:
a) Keowee Unit 1 will be started from the control room as part of the operability test.
During startup the Gen Field Flashing Breaker fails to open automatically. This
should be recognized and the breaker should be opened manually. This does not
make the Keowee unit inoperable.
TIME = 15 minutes
2) 1HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails CLOSED: (C, OATC)
a) 1HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails CLOSED due to a ruptured diaphragm. This
should be diagnosed and AP/14, Loss of Normal HPI Makeup and/or RCP Seal
Injection, should be followed. The AP will give guidance on maintaining PZR
level and instruct the crew to call SPOC to repair the valve. 1HP-120 (RC
Volume Control) will remain broken for the remainder of the scenario.
NOTE: Events 1 and 2 will occur at about the same time.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 25 min.
3) Controlling NI fails LOW: (I, OATC)
a) The crew should utilize the "plant stabilization process" to stabilize the plant and
recognize that the controlling NI has failed. The ICS will be placed in manual to
stabilize the unit. The ICS will remain in manual for the remainder of the
scenario.
TIME = 5 minutes, TOTAL 30 min.
4) Seismic event (PRA) and 1A RBCU rupture (TS): (C, BOP)
a) A seismic event will occur which will cause the 1A RBCU to rupture. AP/5,
Earthquake, will be entered. RBCU rupture should be diagnosed and
subsequently isolated to prevent diluting the RB sump.
TIME = 5 minutes, TOTAL 35 min.
Page 1 of 2
Scenario #2 Overview
5) 1B SG Tube leak (ramp 10 - 100 gpm over 30 min): (M, ALL) (TS)
a) The seismic event will also cause a tube leak in the 1B Steam Generator. This
leak will initially be small (about 10 gpm) and increase over the next 30 minutes
to about 100 gpm. This leakage will require entry into AP/31, Primary to
Secondary Leakage. After determining the leak is greater than TS limits, a unit
shutdown will be initiated. During the shut down the leak will continue to
increase requiring transfer to the Steam Generator Tube Rupture tab of the EOP.
TIME = 20 minutes, TOTAL 55 min.
6) Unit Shutdown: (R, OATC)
a) As a result of the previous instrument failure the unit shutdown will be conducted
with the ICS in manual. If the crew did not return 1HP-1 20 (RC Volume Control)
to auto, primary inventory will also require manual control during the shutdown.
The leak will increase beyond the capacity of normal HPI makeup requiring the
use of additional makeup and suction from the BWST.
TIME = 5 minutes, TOTAL 60 min.
7) 1A Main Steam line break in RB: (M, ALL)
a) A main steam line break will occur in the 1A main steam line. This will require
use of RULE 5, Main Steam Line Break, to isolate the leak. The CRSRO will
transfer to the Excessive Heat Transfer tab of the EOP to ensure excessive heat
transfer has been stopped and the plant stabilized. Transfer will then be made
back to the Steam Generator Tube Rupture tab of the EOP. The scenario will be
completed when the 1A main steam line has been isolated and a transfer to the
Steam Generator Tube Rupture tab of the EOP ahs been made.
TIME = 15 minutes, TOTAL 75 min.
Page 2 of 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
Facility: Oconee Scenario No.: SPARE Op-Test No.:
Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions:
. 100% Reactor Power EOL
Turnover:
"* Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump OOS to repair Aux Oil Pump
"* SASS in manual for I&E testing
"* AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
"* NI-9 OS, to be replace next outage
- Keowee Unit 2 OOS for unplanned reasons
- Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground, operability test complete
Event Malfunction Event Event
No. No. Type* Description
Oa Pre-Insert TD EFDW Pump Fails to Start
MSS330
Ob Updater SASS in manual
Oc Updater AMSAC/DSS bypassed
Od Pre-Insert NI-9 0OS
MNI082
Oe Pre-Insert Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout
MEL180
1 Override N, BOP Pressurize LDST with H2
C, BOP 1H-1, LDST Supply, fails OPEN
2 MS1051 I, OATC Turbine Header Pressure fails LOW
MSI061
3 MPS405, 50 C, ALL 40 gpm RCS leak in RB (TS)
4 R, OATC Unit Shut Down
MSS080 C, OATC 1FDW-41, 1B Main FDW Control, Failed "as is"
Override C, BOP 1CC-8, CC Return Outside Block, Fails CLOSED
(Requires Manual Reactor Trip)
5 MPS400, 5 M, ALL SBLOCA
6 MPS400, 100 M, ALL LBLOCA
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Spare Overview
Initial Conditions: Unit 1: 100% power-430 EFPD, Unit 2: 100%, Unit 3: 100%
Turnover:
- Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump OOS to repair Aux Oil Pump
- SASS in MANUAL for I&E testing
- AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
- NI-9 OOS, to be replace next outage
- Keowee Unit 2 QOS for unplanned reasons
- Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground, operability test complete
1) Pressurize the LDST with N2, 1H-1 fails OPEN: (N, ALL; C, BOP)
Statalarm will actuate indicating that LDST H2 pressure is low. Crew should refer to
the "LDST Pressure Vs Level" curve and add H2 to LDST. 1H-1 (LDST Supply) will
fail OPEN requiring the BOP to call the primary NLO to close the isolation valve to
stop the H 2 addition. Ifthis action is delayed BOTH trains of HPI must be declared
inoperable due to being outside of permissible Operating Region on the "LDST
Pressure Vs Level" curve.
TIME = 10 minutes
2) Turbine Header Pressure fails LOW: (I, OATC)
a) The crew should utilize the "plant stabilization process" and take Both FDW
Masters and the Diamond to manual to mitigate the transient and stabilize the
plant. The ICS will remain in manual.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 20 min.
3) 40 gpm RCS leak in Reactor Building (TS) (M, ALL)
a) A 40 gpm RCS leak in the RB will develop and the crew should refer to AP/2,
Excessive RCS Leakage, because leakage is greater than the TS limit. The
crew should determine a Unit shutdown is required.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 30 min.
4) Unit Shut Down with 1FDW-41 failed "as is": (R, OATC)
a) The CRSRO will direct the OATC with the help of the BOP to commence a unit
shutdown with the ICS in manual. In addition to manual control of control rods
and FDW, THP will also be manually controlled because the Turbine Master is in
manual. Feedwater flow in the "B" loop will stay the same and a ATc will develop.
The crew will not be able to manually control "B" loop FDW flow.
TIME = 15 minutes, TOTAL 45 min.
Page 1 of 2
Scenario Spare Overview
5) SBLOCA: (M, ALL)
a) The RCS leak will increase to a SBLOCA. This will cause a unit trip and entry
into the EOP. The BOP will complete RULE 2 when a loss of subcooling occurs.
The CRSRO will transfer to Loss of Subcooling Margin and the LOCA CD tabs.
TIME = 20 minutes, TOTAL 65 min.
6) LBLOCA: (M, ALL)
a) The RCS leak will increase into a LBLOCA. The CRSRO be required to "IfAt
Anytime" transfer based on LPI flow to mitigate a LBLOCA.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 75 min.
Page 2 of 2