ML020460398
| ML020460398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/2002 |
| From: | Chaset L State of CA, California Public Utilities Commission |
| To: | NRC/OCM |
| Byrdsong A | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML020500489 | List: |
| References | |
| +adjud/rulemjr200506, 50-275-LT, 50-323-LT, RAS 3882 | |
| Download: ML020460398 (249) | |
Text
4.0
SUMMARY
OF MAJOR DCISC REVIEW TOPICS Independent Safety Committee This section of the Diablo Canyon past and current period report summarizes, by major topic, performed by the DCISC.
review and fact finding activities fact finding meetings and Mcre detailed reviews (i.e., DCISC are contained in Volume II as public meetings) of the topics referenced below.
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4.1 Plant Aging Management 4.1.1 Overview and Previous Activities Aging-related degradation is the gradual degradation in the physical characteristics of a system, structure, or component (SSC) which occurs over time and use, and which could impair the ability to perform its design functions. The purpose of the Aging Management Program (AMP) is to ensure that the plant continues to operate safely and within its design and licensing bases throughout its life through the process of involving engineering, operations, and maintenance in activities to control age-related degradations or failures of SSCs to within acceptable limits.
The PG&E AMP includes a number of existing programs such as the steam generator strategic plan, reactor pressure vessel embrittlement program, erosion/corrosion program, intake structure concrete inspection activities, electrical cable aging, buried commodities, and concrete/steel structures, to name a few. The scope of the systems, structures and components to be covered by the program continues to evolve and expand.
In 1998 the Aging Management Program was transferred from San Francisco to the station Steam Generator Engineering Group.
More reliance was being placed on support from EPRI, DOE Guidelines, and Westinghouse Owners' Group (WOG) Life Cycle Management (LCM) and License Renewal (LR) programs.
As a part of Aging Management, the plant has developed System Long Term Plans (SLTP) which specify needs and actions for systems for the next five years. The DCISC Team reviews and reports on the SLTPs when it reviews a system with the System Engineer at most fact-finding meetings.
In the last reporting period, the DCISC concluded that (1) the overall DCPP Aging Management Program management appears to have lost its momentum and become relatively inactive since 1998 and (2) there was no apparent improvement in some implementation problems. The DCISC was concerned that this period of inactivity would lead to future problems and recommended that PG&E take steps to augment the program.
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4.1.2 Current Period Activities period, there was one During the current reporting DCPP to obtain an update on the fact finding meeting held Exhibit D.2, Section Program (Volume II, Aging Management initiative, a new aging management 3.15) and another to review II, Generation Vulnerability Investigation Team (Volume the are The results of these reviews Exhibit D.7, Section 3.9).
summarized below.
Aging Management Program review and revision to the PG&E had completed a comprehensive (see below) which described Aging Management Program procedure the role of the System Long management's vision and included with the Maintenance Rule Term Plans (LTPs) and interactions of components of AMP. (See Section 4.5 for a review as major actions appeared satisfactory System Long-Term Plans.) These reporting period.
to the DCISC during the current the an individual to take over PG&E also committed to identify could Program Director and who position of Aging Management ownership to ensure proper commit the amount of time necessary and direction.
an Aging Management Program Nuclear Quality Services performed following findings of which resulted in the assessment, management procedures:
failures to follow the aging Group has not been
"* The Plant Aging Management Working meeting.
Manager was not a full-time
" The Aging Management Program position.
"training and awareness" had been
" No aging management support engineers, for system engineers, conducted and operations.
maintenance foremen, mechanics, the Aging Management Program
"* Management's expectations for were not clear.
date of July 22, 2000 was A corrective action completion was revised to September initially established; however, this in August AMP procedure was revised 12, 2000. The controlling 2000 to accomplish the following:
and titles consistent with
- Updated organizational structure the present organization.
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"* Changed responsibility for Aging Management from Regulatory and Design Services to Engineering Services.
"* Changed full-time Aging Management Program Manager to part time Aging Management Program Coordinator (AMPC).
"* Eliminated the Plant Aging Management Working Group (the AMPC will call in resources as needed).
"* Revised the requirement from an annual to a periodic assessment report.
In addition to the above procedure changes, the following management expectations and actions were identified:
"* Continue to rely on and develop the System Long-Term Plan process. The assigned System Engineer has the responsibility for taking the lead in each area.
"* Consider undertaking an effort to identify "gaps" in the maintenance program for age-related failures (e.g.,
equipment failures, such as expansion joint, bus bar, and control board lamp socket failures) of components not previously included in the Aging Management Program. (This is similar to DCISC Recommendation ROO-6 from the previous DCISC reporting period (se Volume II, Exhibit H)).
"* Involve the Asset Teams to provide feedback on equipment condition. (Asset Teams are already included in the System Long Term Plan Process).
"* Investigate what other STARS partners are doing to address aging management.
The newly named Aging Management Program Manager was to prepare a document identifying possible future directions for aging management. PG&E anticipated employing a consultant to perform a gap analysis in order to have a comprehensive, systematic approach. The document would be reviewed by the Manager of Engineering Services and then presented to management for concurrence. Additionally, PG&E plans to complete all system long term plans in 2001. Following Outage 1R10, DCPP planned to implement an Integrated Problem Resolution Team.
NQS closed all above items except the future directions document and will track it with the AR.
PG&E satisfactorily addressed the NQS aging management assessment findings. Management appears to be making progress in identifying the future direction of aging management, although progress has been slower than expected.
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and aging management directions The DCISC plans to review it is expectations in the gap analysis study after management the effectiveness of the Integrated approved and follow up on Problem Resolution Team.
Team Generation Vulnerability Identification failures of had seven or eight aging-related DCPP has equipment in the last year that impacted planned outages, of All were caused by balance generation or forced outages. failures and plant equipment. The DCISC had reviewed these annual report, and, although not reported on them in the last did safety, some of the failures directly related to plant safety systems. An Integrated produce transients and challenge the approach was sanctioned by Problem Response Team (IPRT) DCPP address the lost generation.
DCPP Management Team to Team Vulnerability Identification established the Generation by of 12 members and sponsored (GVIT) in late 2000 consisting The original and Maintenance.
the Director of Engineering scope of the work was:
losses from
"* Focus on identifying potential generation day of equipment failures that can exceed one full more than than 10% derate for generation, or a greater one day.
longer-term reliability or
" Enhance/create a process for merit funding.
aging management issues that solutions to management on
"* Provide recommendations and changes.
resources, tools, and process about aging This is phase one. PG&E will make a decision phase of recommendations based on management after completion and the The majority of the work has been completed, one. plans to June 30, 2001. The DCISC final report will be out by reporting period.
review the report in the next a positive approach in appears that DCPP is taking It aging on loss of generation from addressing their problems the final Generation The DCISC will review equipment. it is Team (GVIT) report after Vulnerability Identification issued.
Investigation Passive Device Aging Management new initiative, Passive Device Aging The DCISC learned about a begun in late 2000.
Investigation, which was Management 4-5
Completion was expected in June 2001. The DCISC plans to review the program results in the next reporting period.
4.1.3 Conclusions PG&E appears to be taking positive steps in reviving neglected portions of its Aging Management Program with new leadership, augmented management support, and several new initiatives (the latter due in large part to aging-related failures of plant components) . The DCISC has had concerns about the program in the last several reporting periods and is pleased to see progress towards improvement. A major element of DCPP aging management is the system long-term planning process in which system engineers are responsible for monitoring, measuring and planning for aging-related effects.
The DCISC will continue to follow PG&E's progress with aging management, including review of the Generation Vulnerability Identification Team report and the Passive Device Aging Management Investigation Team report.
4.2 Conduct of Maintenance 4.2.1 Overview and Previous Activities has been substantially The DCPP maintenance program high of the DCPP. The initially improved since the startup Operating Capacity Factor, from 86% in 1985 to and increasing for unit 2 in 2000, demonstrates 93.3% for Unit 1 and 96.2% The program has been effective.
that the DCPP maintenance program, or key DCPP maintenance DCISC has reviewed the Meetings.
elements of it, at public meetings and fact-finding issued in 1991, (10 CFR 50.65)
The NRC Maintenance Rule plant licensees monitor the required that commercial nuclear or provide effective preventative performance or condition, systems and maintenance of all risk significant structures, PG&E licensee established goals.
components (SSCs) against on all SSCs, as Rule requirements implemented the Maintenance a basis for its Maintenance Program.
outages requires that some PG&E's drive for shorter refueling maintenance that had been of the preventative and corrective in be performed while at power done during refueling outages as opposed to outage Mode i. Because on-line maintenance, the the plant at greater risk, maintenance, potentially places entered risk considerations are DCISC has investigated how maintenance.
into the decisions to do on-line Asset Maintenance Department into PG&E had reorganized the the established as a result of Teams. The Asset Teams were and the process of maintaining Work Control team to improve while maintaining or improving modifying DCPP to reduce costs teams, been reorganized into four quality. The five Teams have NSSS Team, 3)
Building Team, 2) which are now: 1) Turbine Team.
and 4) Maintenance Support Control Room/Electrical Team, periods that the Maintenance The DCISC concluded in previous Program appeared satisfactory.
4.2.2 Current Period Activities of the DCISC reviewed conduct During the current period, (Volume maintenance activities at three fact-finding meetings II, Exhibit D.2, D.5 & D.6) and one Public Meeting (Volume II, were as follows:
Exhibit B.9). These activities 4-7
- Discussion with Maintenance Manager
- Asset Team Review
- On-Line Maintenance Meeting with Manager of Maintenance Services The newest DCISC Member and a consultant met with the Manager of Maintenance Services (Volume II, Exhibit D.2) for an informational briefing. The Manager reported on the Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing (STARS) activities that affected Maintenance. He described the change from functional maintenance teams (e.g., electrical, mechanical) to multi disciplinary Asset Teams, which has worked out well for the plant. In the area of human performance, the Manager stresses proper tailboards, communication and self-verification.
Maintenance supervisors did not believe craft training was time well-spent; however, the craft believed otherwise.
Maintenance Services is now performing a self-assessment of its training programs.
Asset Team Update The Asset Team Leader (ATL) for the Turbine Team presented the overall update for all the Asset Teams (Volume II, Exhibit D.5) . The Asset Teams complete about 190 Action Requests per month and if they can keep rework to under 10 per month, that has been considered acceptable by PG&E. In the Human Performance area, there has been a big push in midsummer for supervisors to talk to workers, for tailboards and for reverse (feedback) tailboards about human performance issues.
DCPP recently had four events involving work on the wrong piece of equipment or wrong unit. PG&E believes that part of the cause for these events is stress on the workers from PG&E workers moving in from other plants and alignment with other utilities. DCPP management talks to employees explaining that keeping focused on doing work safely is more important than worrying about outside events.
The Asset Team Leader discussed Industrial Safety and the 1R10 outage schedule. In 1R10 PG&E many meetings with employees emphasizing that safety was the focus and that, even though they had a short outage schedule, safety came first. PG&E made a big push on ALARA in 1R10 but did not meet the goal; however, they performed better than for any other Unit 1 outage.
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backlog and schedule adherence The corrective maintenance (CM) present CM backlog is 556 with for the year were reviewed. The Maintenance are doing well in a goal of 425. Operations and to be worked on schedule.
prioritizing the jobs that need described. DCPP needs to make The issues facing the ATLs were has added more work to the ATL, the ATLs' jobs easier as DCPP The ATLs are not which is one of the hardest jobs on site.
are expected to do. The NSSS able to do everything that they use the ATL. They have one ATL Team is changing the way they the other ATL is planning work direct the work one week while The be directing the jobs.
for the next week when he will Teams have been successful.
Team Leader feels that the Asset and workers are sharing Work is getting done more effectively lot of ownership into the work work better. This is building a force, though it can still be improved.
if The ATLs were given tests in all disciplines to determine and system training.
they needed cross discipline training in January 2001.
Resultant training was completed Asset Teams have been making It appears that the Maintenance of the group. They progress in improving overall performance safety and ALARA in IRI0.
have made improvements in industrial necessary for the Asset They have also determined the training and the resultant Team Leaders in each of the disciplines, training has been completed.
On-Line Maintenance and Supervisor of the The DCISC met with the Outage Director the Risk Assessment (PRA) Group to discuss Probabilistic Exhibit (OLM) (Volume II, status of DCPP on-line maintenance concluded that DCISC review in December 1999 D.6). The last reduce outage scope and was DCPP was using OLM more often to tools to and updating its risk assessment developing of removing control the resultant risk appropriately operation.
components from service during had become mandatory in It was reported that NRC Regulations requirement 2000 in that the risk assessment November Regulatory Guide Also, NRC "shoulds" were changed to "shalls".
93-01 "Industry Guidelines for 1.182 which embraces NUMARC Maintenance at Nuclear Power Monitoring the Effectiveness of the calculated Plants", is more closely focused on managing DCPP had revised its risk associated with maintenance.
the new requirements.
maintenance program to implement 4-9
A self-assessment was performed in September 2000 to determine the readiness of DCPP to implement the new requirements. The team consisted of several DCPP personnel and a Maintenance Rule representative from Callaway Nuclear Plant, a STARS member. The results showed that many of the necessary elements were in place in the existing PRA and On-Line Maintenance Programs, but four recommendations were made, and DCPP made these changes prior to the November 28, 2000 implementation date.
These changes require the Operations Work Week Managers to ensure that risk management actions are completed for planned work. This includes expected plant conditions and expected external conditions due to seasonal effects. The Control Room Shift Foremen are required to evaluate and manage risk of all activities or conditions based on the current plant state prior to implementation of maintenance activities. The procedure also requires an assessment of the plant trip risk with a checklist for both pre-planned and emergent activities.
Formal classroom training has been provided to Maintenance and Operations personnel on the new requirements. Additionally, just-in-time (JIT) tailboards are provided prior to performance of maintenance activities.
Additionally, with the move to Standard Technical Specifications, the On-Line Maintenance Program (OLM) (used to assess risk) , can take advantage of the 7-day component outage-window rather than the previous 72-hour window.
An NRC inspection was performed in February 2001 of various plant activities, including maintenance risk assessment. The NRC inspectors concluded that DCPP had exhibited good use of the Maintenance Rule. They noted that DCPP had provided good, effective compensatory measures during a California Grid Stage 3 alert conditions (i.e., possible increased electrical grid instability) . DCPP had developed a special risk management guidance statement identifying additional reactor trip risk classifications for two risk-significant systems, the 500 kV electrical system and the 230 kV start-up power system, during Grid Stage 3 alerts in which there could be increased grid instability.
The California electricity supply shortage and increasing grid alerts have caused DCPP to defer some equipment maintenance during these periods to reduce the risk of plant trips. DCPP 4-10
to a later maintenance practice was to move the equipment would be they did not believe reliability window when larger scope affected; however, possible effects could be noted from summer to winter. DCPP outages and a shift in focus debt been lowered due to PG&E's that the capital budget had plans for spending were under problems and that revised item due to The DCISC will follow up this development. if spending is and reliability, concerns of long-term safety significantly lowered or delayed.
of the on-line maintenance The DCISC received an update Exhibit Meeting (Volume II, program at the June 2001 Public performance adherence trends B.9) . PG&E reviewed the schedule Their goal is 90% to meeting from July 2000 through present. their goal the schedule. It appears that they are meeting have forced outages or curtailments except for times when they NRC work. DCPP implemented the and need to reschedule the 2000. They revised on-line Maintenance Rule A (4) in November include plant trip maintenance risk management process to Senior (weather, fire, etc.) . The hazards and external risks Managers) and schedulers manage Reactor Operators (Work Week process.
risk via daily work coordination 1 & 2 listing monthly average The cycle risk profile for units was Damage Frequency (CDF) contribution from maintenance Core maintenance examples reviewed. Noteworthy on-line also expanded pre-outage maintenance discussed were: Unit 2 diesel ASW FCV diesel outage work scope; significantly reduced 2R10 main annunciator upgrade units 601 motor/actuator change-out; check valve inspection saved 1 & 2; and Unit 2 radiographic 2R10 exposure.
800 person Rem in predicted that have occurred were Some of the major challenges chemical cleaning was discussed. Unit 1 on-line stator coil DCPP initially curtailed capacity performed in February, 2001. The chemical generator stator temperatures.
due to high forced outage.
and avoided a cleaning restored full capacity in California, of Stage 3 grid emergencies As a result policies were plant trip risk management comprehensive due to System developed. A listing of the work scope impacts reviewed.
electrical demands was also in new 10CFR50.59 implementation Upcoming efforts for DCPP are evaluation tool maintenance risk July 2001 and ORAM-Sentinel which the DCISC will review.
development by November, 2001, on-line maintenance well, appears that DCPP is managing It 4-11
using risk assessment as tool and has benefited from the results. DCISC will continue to follow DCPP use of on-line maintenance.
4.2.3 Conclusions The DCPP Maintenance Program appears to be functioning satisfactorily and implemented properly to meet NRC Maintenance Rule requirements. The Maintenance organization is functionally aligned to the work scope, and the On-Line Maintenance Program is soundly PRA-based. The DCISC will follow up on the possible effects on safety of lowered/delayed plant capital spending.
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4.3 Conduct Of Operations 4.3.1 Overview and Previous Activities items the DCISC The following are operations-related periods:
has reviewed in previous reporting Guidelines (SAMG) - SAMG
"* Severe Accident Management to manage a severe low provide guidance on how the risk to the plant probability occurrence to minimize SAMG are complete. Training and public. All DCPP specific SAMG has been completed.
of the identified people for the SPDS was Parameter Display System (SPDS)
"* Safety TMI-2 incident as part of developed in response to the based" to "symptom based" the change over from "event The objective of the SPDS emergency operating procedures. plant status of critical is to allow monitoring of the by the Shift Technical characteristics for use primarily scenarios.
Advisor (STA) during accident
- PG&E has placed increased
"* Operations Tailboards tailboards, and a emphasis on improving Operations has been implemented.
process of observing tailboards review of the
"* Clearance Process - DCISC continued to the clearance process which improvements that PG&E has in improved performance.
has resulted in significantly includes temporary
"* Jumper Program - The Jumper Program such as electrical jumpers, changes made to the plant, jumpers/bypasses, lifted electrical leads, mechanical and installation of bypasses of safety functions, (MT&E). The goals of the measuring and test equipment configuration control, keep program are to maintain plant up-to-date, and and the System Engineer Operations have an PG&E appeared to minimize the number of jumpers. for controlling effective, tightly controlled process jumpers.
temporary electrical and mechanical the DCISC has found that the In previous reporting periods satisfactory.
conduct of Operations appeared 4-13
4.3.2 Current Period Activities The following operations-related items were reviewed by the DCISC during the current reporting period:
Meeting with Manager of Operations Services The DCISC met with the Manager of Operations Services at the October, 2000 Fact-Finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.2)
The following topics were discussed:
"* Outage 1R10 - the outage was going well with low dose rates and "pretty good" human performance.
"* Operations culture changes - improvements were needed in initial operator training, communications with management was more frequent, and they were working on better explaining the merit rating and pay system to operators.
- Staffing - a new operator class was being formed.
- Training - supervisory/management training was being developed for Operations.
- Human Performance - this indicator seems to be leveling off even though managers believe there is still room for improvement, so more emphasis may be needed.
Observe Control Room Shift Manager Turnover The DCISC observed at the October Fact-Finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.2) the afternoon turnover between the departing day shift manager and the oncoming night shift manager. The two managers used the Shift Manager Turnover Report, which included all major conditions and activities for both units.
It was noted that the first winter storm of the year was approaching with moderate ocean swells and kelp. The managers also used a Technical Specification Summary Sheet which listed component or train non-availability, compensatory actions and alternate line-ups. The Shift Foremen were separately performing the turnover and control board walkdown.
A Shift Brief was also observed for the departing and on coming shifts for the Unit 1 outage. The on-coming Shift Manager coordinated the brief. A similar shift brief was to be performed later for the operating Unit 2.
The Outage IRIO Operations shift turnovers and briefs appeared satisfactory.
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Control Room Tour Services at the Manager of Operations The DCISC met with the the recently 2001 Fact-Finding Meeting for a tour of March, new Control DCPP had implemented a re-configured Control Room. Control Room formality policy and had re-arranged the Access Room distractions to the operators.
complex to provide fewer operators was restricted solely to Control Room to the room All non required for anyone else to enter.
with permission (e.g., clerks and Shift personnel A control-room-operator offices.
Advisor) were moved outside to adjoining Technical that briefings room was provided such new, adjacent briefing A safety on going operator duties.
would not interfere with comes first, sign provided a reminder that safety priority or schedule.
before generation, cost to provide Control Room and access policy appeared The updated atmosphere for the control a quieter, less distracting operators than before.
for Operators Establishment of Priorities discussed and Day Shift Supervisor The DCPP Operations Manager for the the DCISC Team the establishment of priorities the with has been meeting with operators. Operations management these priorities.
August 2000 to present operating crews since priority safety is the most important Nuclear and personnel employees in plant, and this is being stressed to all for the has visited other plant Operations. The Operations Manager operations rooms to observe professionalism of the control the operating has also taken some of crews. The Shift Manager operations. Operations other plants to observe crew to to improve is working with the operating crews management improvement the in the control room including professionalism Policy on The Operations Section dress of the employees. was also for Nuclear Operator Watchstanders"
",,Expectations on this All Shift Managers have agreed to sign off discussed.
policy.
was reviewed. The Asset Teams and The scheduling of work the work.
have been working together to prioritize Operations 90% of the time.
meeting schedule about Maintenance has been Procedures 12-week schedule for Surveillance Test The rolling well.
has also been working reasonable cost.
tries to make schedule within Operations 4-15
Shift Manager and Shift Supervisors make the decision whether work can be deferred. As an example, the last storm season led to bringing both units down to 20% power. The decision to bring the units down was based on what was best for plant safety, not what State power load was, energy needs, cost or anything else.
DCPP stated that the PG&E bankruptcy has not had any impact on employees. They continue to communicate all information to the employees on PG&E financial status. They also feel that morale in Operations and the leadership team has improved in the last year.
By making nuclear safety the highest priority, it appears that DCPP continues to stress the proper priorities to the operating crews and is working on improving professionalism in the control room.
Improved Technical Specifications PG&E reported at the September 2000 Public Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit B.3) that the program to transition DCPP to the Improved Technical Specification (ITS) had recently been completed. DCISC had reviewed the DCPP ITS at previous fact finding and public meetings. The ITS were developed beginning in 1995, with DCPP working in conjunction with the Wolf Creek, Callaway and Comanche Peak nuclear plants which partnered with DCPP in that effort. The Licensee Amendment Request (LAR) was submitted to the NRC in June 1997, and all Plants received and responded to requests for additional information. The NRC issued the License Amendment (LA) in May, 1999.
The new set of Technical Specifications (TS) themselves is somewhat less lengthy than before; however, the basis for the TS has expanded considerably. The implementation of the TS was originally scheduled for the end of May 2000. However, that date was changed and an emergency LAR submitted to the NRC to permit postponement of implementation of the ITS until the end of June, 2000 due to PG&E's concern over implementing the ITS during the restart of both Units because of the 12 kV bus outage which had occurred.
An ITS Implementation Project Manager was created, and a Team was formed to identify all required changes resulting from the ITS. DCPP submitted a clean-up LAR to the NRC during March, 2000 which addressed the changes resulting from the 4-16
for the ITS. A Management Program (IP)
Implementation of the IP. A to monitor progress Oversight Team was formed DCPP's utilizing personnel from self-assessment was performed as well as and Quality Assurance organizations Licensing This self-assessment utilities.
personnel from the partnering but no enhancements to the implementation efforts identified would hamper the process.
major issues were found which efforts made to adequately PG&E reviewed the comprehensive necessary DCPP operators and other train the licensed review efforts included a detailed personnel to the ITS. These TS.
the changes made to the of TS rules of usage and all or identified from had been no errors reported There where a have been some instances application of the ITS. There or to been relocated to the FSAR TS, or a portion of a TS, has a specific (ECG) to address the Equipment Control Guidelines a surveillance requirement or to better licensing commitment, form of for a system. The ECG is a define operability criteria prior NRC may be altered without administrative TS which of IOCFR50.59.
approval under the provisions successful in preparing and It appears that PG&E has been Specifications (ITS). They implementing the Improved Technical and their training of operators were also successful with on the ITS.
other necessary DCPP personnel 4.3.3 Conclusions appeared satisfactory, DCPP Conduct of Operations policies and activities; Control Room including outage and preparation and implementation demeanor, and priorities; Specifications.
of the Improved Technical 4-17
4.4 Emergency Preparedness 4.4.1 Overview and Previous Activities An Emergency Preparedness Program has been in-place since the beginning of the nuclear power industry; however, the accident at Three Mile Island brought substantial changes.
Prior to Three Mile Island, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) were primarily event-based, requiring the operator to know which event was taking place. Afterward, the EOPs became symptom-based, making it easier for the operator to decide what actions to take. The three major facilities used in an emergency drill include (1) the simulator which is used where operators responded to the accident, (2) the Technical Support Center (TSC) where the Recovery Manager, engineering, computer, radiological assessment, NRC, and operations, as well as documents and procedures, are located and (3) the offsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). An Operations Support Center (OSC) provides a location to stage and dispatch operations, maintenance, firefighting and radiation protection personnel.
The DCISC reviews Emergency Preparedness at DCPP on a regular basis. Past reviews have included the following:
"* Review of a full emergency exercise in October 1990
"* Tour of Off-Site Emergency Operations Center in August 1994
"* A tour of the Technical Support Center (TSC) in April 1995
"* Observation of the November 28-29, 1995 annual emergency exercise.
"* Review of the status of the emergency offsite communication capability at DCPP.
"* Observation of the July 30, 1999 Emergency Drill
"* Observation of the November 4, 1998 annual graded emergency exercise
"* Observation of the December 3, 1999 Emergency Drill designed to test the UDAC dose assessment and projection function
"* Observation of the annual graded emergency exercise on May 10, 2000. The exercise included participation by DCPP, San Luis Obispo County, State of California, NRC and FEMA personnel as players. The NRC and FEMA observed and graded the exercise.
"* Resolution of problems with the Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC), the joint DCPP/County radiation dose calculation and assessment function.
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DCPP has performed well in its The DCISC had concluded that as needed, emergency drills and exercises, making improvements dose calculation and reporting especially in radiation release activities.
4.4.2 Current Period Activities the following Emergency The DCISC reviewed current period:
preparedness items during the Alternate Source Terms use of alternate source The DCISC reviewed DCPP's potential A "source term" terms (Volume II, Exhibit D.5, Section 3.3) .
magnitude, and chemical form that is the assumed timing, it is used to calculate radiation radiation releases take, and The original source term was releases from nuclear accidents. 14844.
Information Document (TID) contained in NRC Technical this TID accident analyses using The results of design basis Source Term (AST) is an NRC are conservative. The Alternate based on significant alternative to TID 14844, accepted of the generation and behavior improvements in understanding plant fission product releases from severe nuclear power of TID-14844. The AST is accidents since the publication by itself as a basis for nuclear emergency insufficient in however, the potential benefits preparedness requirements; implementing the AST are:
leak rates
- Increase in allowable containment system by changing SSimplify the control room filtration the number and/or types of filters stroke times for containment
- Increase in allowable valve isolation valves leakage
- Increase post-LOCA recirculation requirements by reducing EQ
- Relax equipment qualification the required to be operable in concerns for the equipment short-term requirements
- Relax containment isolation or limit containment spray additives,
- Eliminate or containment pressure.
improve operating margin for dispersion factors(x/Q)
- Update plant accident atmospheric data.
using current meteorological 4-19
Currently, DCPP has sufficient margin in all of the design basis accidents except Steam Generator Tube Rupture, which is being reanalyzed by Westinghouse using TID 14844. PG&E believes there are no immediate needs for reanalysis using AST at this time but will continue to monitor other utilities' progress in their implementations of the AST.
Observe Multi-Facility Table Top Emergency Exercise The DCISC observed two "table top" emergency drills of two emergency organizations on Friday March 16, 2001 (Volume II, Exhibit D.6, Section 3.4). The Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) [and associated Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC)] were exercised independently with participants playing their roles around tables in their respective facilities without outside participation, hence the term "table top". Each organization participated in two separate predetermined scenarios. Each scenario included objectives for evaluation.
The initial events for Scenario #1 at the TSC were typical for a drill, i.e., loss of essential equipment, in this case, Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) Pumps (during a winter ocean storm) and additional equipment such as Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. The scenario proceeded through all emergency action levels (EALs) to a General Emergency (GE).
The TSC facility had been rearranged since the last DCISC visit and exhibited improved utilization of space, thus benefiting communications. The TSC was staffed in a timely manner and proceeded to establish communications and plant status information flow. Support teams represented were engineering, radiological assessment, and government liaisons.
Status and prioritized action boards were maintained. Regular status reports were made. Emergency Action Levels (EALs) were decided and announced in an accurate and timely manner. The demeanor in the TSC appeared to be organized and professional.
There was good use of three-way communication.
The critique received good participation, and it appeared to be on target. There were no major problems, and areas for improvement included improved information flow and shorter tailboards. The participants and monitors agreed that all objectives were met.
Scenario #2 was observed at the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) . The EOF was partially staffed with representatives from 4-20
ERO radiological assessment/monitoring, engineering, This scenario was and government liaisons.
management, all offsite by an earthquake resulting in loss of initiated in small steam leak from a steam generator power and a failed to start, containment. An emergency diesel generator loss of feedwater pumps tripped, resulting in and auxiliary conditions. The players the ability to maintain hot shutdown Emergency.
the conditions and proceeded to General recognized and notifications appeared accurate and Protective actions were controlled monitoring teams timely. Radiological communication good input. Three-way appropriately and provided by UDAC appeared to was apparent. Radiological assessment assessments.
provide timely and accurate action levels productive. Emergency The EOF critique appeared were protective action correctly, as were identified and to the point.
recommendations. Status briefs were short were was effective, and government notifications a Engineering (in what was considered UDAC performed well done well. were met.
challenging scenario) . All objectives particularly
& Tools Radiological Processes Emergency Preparedness calculation radiation dose projection The DCISC reviewed DCPP (Volume II, and assessments used in emergency planning methods 3.4). DCPP utilizes two computer programs D.8, Section Exhibit (Emergency Assessment to perform its dose projections: EARS and System) and MIDAS (Meteorological Information and Response data by System). EARS is supplied radiological Dose Assessment 80 radiation Monitoring System comprised of to the Radiation It uses these data surrounding the plant. to monitors release rates, which are input calculate time-dependent data from the Meteorological MIDAS, along with meteorological MIDAS is a terrain-specific Data Acquisition System. resultant model, which calculates atmospheric dispersion locations dose rates and doses at onsite and offsite downwind of DCPP.
within a 50-mile radius unusually complex programs have been adapted to the The These ocean, land and mountains.
surrounding DCPP, e.g.,
terrain performed have been verified by dye tests and have programs The results of the calculations well in emergency exercises. action levels to recommend protective in the programs are used the public San Luis Obispo County to advise (PALs) to following a plant and/or evacuation regarding sheltering of EARS and DCPP has been pleased with the performance event.
MIDAS.
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Communicating Radiological Information to the Public The DCISC reviewed some problems PG&E has had with conveying accurate radiation release information to the public during its May 2000 unusual event and during the May 10, 2000 emergency exercise (Volume II, Exhibit D.8, Section 3.5).
The unusual event included a fire which caused the plant to shut down, utilizing its main steam safety relief valves to relieve steam pressure. The NRC had made a news statement that radioactive steam had been released, resulting in confusion about what constituted a radiological "release" above and beyond normal approved releases.
The problems in the emergency exercise occurred at the mock public/news media briefing at the Joint Media Center. The county and PG&E plant spokespersons did not provide readily understandable radiological information for the public regarding calculated/actual dose levels and their effects and information on sheltering.
DCPP was working on the definition of a radiological "release" specifically attributable to an event. NRC is also working on their definition. DCPP is selecting the appropriately skilled persons with radiological knowledge to be added in the EOF.
Such a person will hear first-hand plant and radiological conditions resulting from an event and will be the DCPP spokesperson to the news media and public. Specialized speaker training will be provided. It is anticipated that the improvements will be completed by the end of 2001.
4.4.3 Conclusions It appeared that DCPP has performed well in its emergency drills and exercises and has been working on improving its communication of accurate and understandable radiation release information to the public. The DCISC plans to follow this item.
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4.5 Engineering Program 4.5.1 Overview and Previous Activities had a number of Public Meeting The DCISC has fact-finding meetings with presentations by PG&E and several aspects of the to investigate the following PG&E engineering/design program:
"* Design Change Process Improvement
"* Proactive Engineering Program
"* Engineering Reorganization and Self-Assessment
"* System Engineering Responsibilities/Walkdowns
"* NTS Performance Indicators and Timeliness
"* Management of Engineering Workload Design Basis (Configu
"* Operation & Maintenance within ration Management)
- Results of the NRC A&E Inspection
- Decreasing Vendor Support Program (LDBAP)
- Licensing and Design Basis Affirmation
- Engineering Transition
- 10CFR50.59 Major Modifications DCISC had concluded that PG&E In previous annual reports, the had a strong engineering program.
4.5.2 Current Period Activities number of Engineering The DCISC has investigated a Exhibit (Volume II, activities at three fact-finding meetings reporting period.
D.2, D.5 & D.6) during the current Services Meeting with Manager of Engineering of Engineering Services to The DCISC met with the Manager II, discuss the activities of the Engineering group (Volume transition in Exhibit D.2). He described the engineering in moved from PG&E Headquarters which the engineering function He also described the System San Francisco to the plant.
For Outage IR10, Engineering had formed Engineer Program.
with Operations, which had been local leak rate testing teams ten recent graduate engineers effective. Engineering had hired training and going through a structured who were (now familiarization process. The average age of employees 4-23
about 47) was increasing steadily, and an increase in retirements was expected, prompting the need for new hires.
Engineering Work Load Performance Indicator The Manager, Engineering Services (ES) presented the ES workload and the indicators used to monitor their performance (Volume II, Exhibit D.5). They track Engineering Services Action Requests (ARs) and Action Evaluations (AEs).
Their goal for total ARs and AEs is to be down to 2000. In 2000 they trended down to less than 2000 and then up to about 2300 to 2400 and are now down to about 2000. Design Engineering spends about 80-90% of its time on ARs and AEs.
Not all Engineers are doing things that can be tracked. It appears that PG&E does not have the ability to track all the work that is not covered by ARs and AEs and does not know if DCPP is doing everything that needs to be done.
DCPP measures how System Engineers are doing by how they are performing system walkdowns. In Design Engineering, they do not have enough manpower to do all the work that needs to be performed and some work has to be sent out to contractors (outsourcing) . The Engineering Group did meet their deadline to get all the design packages to the outage group to support 2R10 refueling outage.
DCISC suggested that DCPP should have some method to identify the entire Engineering Workload to determine if they have enough resources to perform the work without getting behind.
It appears that DCPP has methods to track performance and workload of ARs and AEs and looks at the performance of System Engineers. However, they do not appear to have a method for tracking everything that is not covered by either ARs or AEs.
They also do not have a method to identify the entire the Engineering Work Load to determine if they have enough resources to perform the work without getting behind.
The DCISC believes that DCPP should investigate a method to identify the entire Engineering Workload to assure that the necessary work is performed to effectively support safe operation of the plant.
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Configuration Management Program Management Program The DCISC Team met with the Configuration Control. The (CMP) Manager for an update on Configuration to assure Management (CM) is purpose of Configuration design requirements, physical consistency between configuration information (i.e.,
configuration and facility PG&E described the as-built documents, including procedures). directive and CMP referring to the controlling current CM is implemented through described recent program changes. to the plant procedures, which conform more than 200 of Changes consisted primarily controlling directive.
to include CM guidance augmenting the implementing procedures for assuring that the and a checklist and better instructions reflected in all related documents.
impact of any change is by the CM Index.
Effectiveness of CM is measured related to the maintenance of The only adverse trend has been an Non-Conformance Report (NCR) the Component Data Base where actions to improve the had just been cleared with corrective database. Self-assessments are consistency of updating the the issue has been resolved.
being used to determine whether of Violation of CM in the last There have been no NRC Notices of CM is planned for July two years. The next self-assessment from other (STARS)
- August 2001 and will include personnel plants.
Identification Team has been A Generation Vulnerability by losses initiated to identify probable future generation and aging management, evaluating the preventive maintenance, current DCPP internal and decision making process against This report is planned to industry expert states-of-knowledge.
recommendations implemented be complete by June 30, 2001 and by year-end.
Program at DCPP appeared The Configuration Management in place to gauge the ongoing satisfactory with measures DCISC should review annually.
program effectiveness, which the the Generation review the results of The DCISC should report following its release Vulnerability Identification Team in June 2001.
Equipment Qualification Program of the Equipment Qualification The DCISC met with the head of the program. In the last Program (EQP) to obtain the status in the EQP had been a 1998 NCR several years the only problem 4-25
for a valve that had been tentatively identified as unqualified, and which had been resolved. The valve had been properly qualified, but the qualification documentation had been misinterpreted. There had been no other problems.
Currently, the only major EQP group initiative was updating its records, from handwritten files into a computer database.
NQS has performed audits every two years, and one was underway at the time of the DCISC visit. A self-assessment was performed in 2000 by a contractor using a "vertical slice" approach; there were five EQ files needing category changes but no significant findings.
The documentation and updating of accident environmental conditions are controlled as design basis information and updated as necessary.
The Equipment Qualification Program appeared to be functioning well with no significant outstanding issues.
4.5.3 Conclusions and Recommendations The PG&E engineering programs, including Configuration Management and Equipment Qualification, continue to be satisfactory for supporting safe operations at DCPP.
Although DCPP has methods to track performance and work load of ARs and AEs and System Engineers, they do not appear to have a method for tracking work that is not covered by either ARs or AEs nor to identify the entire Engineering Workload to determine if they have enough resources to perform the work without getting behind.
R01-1 It is recommended that DCPP develop and implement a method to identify and monitor the entire Engineering Work Load to assure that the necessary work is performed to effectively support safe operation of the plant and to help in ensuring adequate engineering resources are available.
The DCISC will continue to monitor PG&E's engineering performance, including workload management and a review of the results of the new Generation Vulnerability Identification Team report following its release in June 2001.
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Action 4.6 Event/Problem Analysis and Corrective 4.6.1 Overview and Previous Activities year, the DCISC fact During the previous reporting events at DCPP and analyses finding team reviewed numerous of these events and/or performed in support of the resolution to improve safety margins. The events, analyses, and programs reviewed included the following:
debris to block the
"* The potential for containment a LOCA for which PG&E's recirculation sump following adequate.
program for assuring sump flow appeared reviews each trip in fact
"* DCPP Unit trips - the DCISC finding and public meetings.
(EDGs) starts - the DCISC
"* Emergency diesel generator other engineered safety feature reviews these and activations.
the DCISC has
"* Operating Experience Assessment Program -
for reviewing and reviewed PG&E's program and organization DCPP. The program applying industry event experience to appeared satisfactory.
"* Corrective Action Program - the NQS Audit/self-assessment (CAP) found that overall of the Corrective Action Program INPO also looked at the the CAP has been very effective. were CAP as part of their recent INPO evaluation and The NRC performed a CAP pleased with what they found.
was satisfactory. The DCISC inspection in early 2000, which to look at ways to believed that PG&E should continue taken was effective at determine if the corrective action solving the problem.
and Strategy - the
"* Recent Ocean Storm Response Experience PG&E's plans and DCISC reviewed and found satisfactory responses to ocean storm surges.
industry
"* ECCS Voiding - gas accumulation or voiding is an to render ECCS pumps concern due to the potential basis accidents. Although inoperable during certain design solve the voiding concerns in PG&E did not investigate and taken a timely manner, it now appears that they have problem for the future.
appropriate action to solve this 4-27
"* Expansion Joint Failures - the corrective action following the catastrophic failure of two non-safety-related elastomeric piping expansion joints appeared to adequately address expansion joints. The cause was lack of an effective inspection and replacement program for such joints. The DCISC considers this to have been a programmatic weakness at DCPP and categorizes it as a concern.
"* Spent Fuel Cooling Events - DCPP had experienced two loss of spent fuel cooling events caused by inadequate clearances during maintenance activity. PG&E appeared to have taken appropriate actions by adding additional instrumentation and alarms..
The DCISC has found the DCPP Corrective Action Program satisfactory in previous periods.
4.6.2 Current Period Activities Follow-up on Corrective Action from September 22, 1999 Reactor Trip The cause of the September 22, 1999 reactor trip was a lightning strike in the 500 kV switchyard. Although the reactor trip was handled well by operators, there were some weaknesses noted: Operations and Chemistry were not aligned on planned condenser tube leak searches, more PA announcements were needed, there were some problems in securing the AFW pump, the four-hour emergency report to NRC was late, communication between the control room and 500 kV switchyard was less than optimal, and the Spent Fuel Pump was not noted to have tripped until regular rounds on the next shift.
Later, when attempting to restart the reactor, the reactor was manually tripped due to an inadvertent transfer from auxiliary power (backfeed) to start-up power. The transfer resulted from switchyard operators not advising the Control Room when resetting the overvoltage trip relay, contrary to the requirements of restart policy. This was considered non cognitive personnel error on the part of the switchyard operator.
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system changes appeared to be The physical electrical control up on the adequate; however, the DCISC plans to follow Room and switchyard.
problems between the Control INPO SOERs 98-1 and 98-2 to Significant Operating The DCISC reviewed the DCPP response System Status Control, Experience Reports (SOERs) 98-1 (Safety Reliability, 17, 1998) and 98-2 (Circuit Breaker August September 18, 1998).
and review of the DCPP completed its implementation, indicated that the implementation implementation summary PG&E had taken a very proactive appeared satisfactory and that role in looking into these problems.
May 15, 2000 Fire and Unusual Event 12kV electrical bus overload The event had begun with an pieces of causing a fire which caused the loss of various and led to a turbine trip electrical equipment and ultimately trip in accordance with the plant an automatic Unit 1 reactor the plant design. Steam relief following the trip was through atmosphere.
main steam safety valves to the reactor trip and main steam safety valve During the fire, and operators shut down opening, the plant responded normally, correctly used Emergency the plant satisfactorily. Operators the event as an Unusual Event Operating Procedures to classify to NRC, San Luis Obispo County and to perform notifications and State of California officials.
the steam released The initial NRC press release warned that While contained small amounts of radioactivity.
probably release failed to explain until technically accurate, the news around the plant could later that radiation monitors in and background and that any release not detect any radiation above news a public safety threat. The was so small as to not pose calls.
and many phone release led to much public confusion alarmed the public into The NRC admitted that it unnecessarily and is looking at ways to do thinking it was being irradiated technical aspects of radiation a better job of explaining the at the plant. PG&E is pursuing communications improvements problems at the May based on this event and on commun-ications following The DCISC is 10, 2000 annual emergency exercise. initiatives.
PG&E's actions on emergency communications 4-29
Corrective Action Program In the previous reporting period the DCISC had recommended that DCPP benchmark other plants with strong CAP effectiveness processes. DCPP had reviewed DCPP actions. PG&E reported on several external reviews/assessments of DCPP CAP. These were
"* NEI Benchmarking, which found that (1) the DCPP Plant Information Management System (PIMS) is usable but not up to industry best practices and (2) DCPP is just beginning to develop leading indicators of the effectiveness of its CAP.
"* INPO reviews found that (1) DCPP was not reporting or learning enough from low-level Action Requests (ARs) and (2) the AR Review Team was a strength.
The DCISC Team reviewed the current three-year plan (CAP/HP Programmatic Upgrade Action Plan) The plan appeared comprehensive, and most actions had been completed. The remaining items were to be completed by early 2002.
NSOC has been reviewing the CAP and is carrying it as an open item. NSOC has established a CAP Subcommittee, which began to review CAP following Outage 2R10. The DCISC plans to review this at the next NSOC meeting it observes (see Section 4.11.2).
DCPP is developing leading and lagging CAP effectiveness indicators. The DCISC reviewed the lagging and leading indicators developed to date. Lagging indicators had been formulated for the following areas:
"* Problem identification (trend of numbers of ARs initiated)
"* Problem review (six measures of timeliness of reviews and numbers of QEs and NCRs)
"* Problem analysis (four measures, including cause analysis average age, NCR rejection rate, and quality grade of QEs and NCRs)
"* Timeliness of corrective actions (seven measures, including various corrective action document average ages, actions overdue, etc.)
"* Effectiveness of corrective actions (three indicators:
percent NCRs and QEs evaluated as effective and number of recurring events in last year from previous QEs and NCRs) 4-30
the most are appropriate measures, The DCISC believes these of corrective action being the evaluations important recurring events.
effectiveness and number of Leading indicators included:
(ETRs) generated
"* Numbers of Event Trend Records
"* Trends of management observations
"* Adverse trend identification (e.g., "good catches")
"* Proactive culture acknowledged still in stages of early leading indicators were The development.
that human skills play an important role in The DCISC believes and developing effective corrective analyzing for root causes Program that the Human Performance action. It was not apparent prudent tied at DCPP. This would seem and the CAP were closely cause code.
the most prevalent event given that human error is should corrective action processes Training of personnel in in that much of include such skills as effective interviewing involved the information utilized is obtained from personnel which are primarily in the event. Personnel analyzing events, be knowledgeable in human cause caused by human error, should system and characteristics in addition to the traditional equipment cause characteristics.
been Program appeared to have The DCPP Corrective Action external evaluations improved as a result of self-assessments, Measures of program of other plant CAPs.
and reviews headed in effectiveness were just being developed and appeared will review the CAP in early the right direction. The DCISC and the following completion of improvement action items 2002, next self-assessment.
the of events is human error, Because the predominant cause the should more closely coordinate DCISC believes that DCPP Performance Programs and utilize Corrective Action and Human and skills (e.g.,
training in human characteristics characteristics) for skills, human error interviewing and corrective root cause analyses personnel preparing actions.
Winter Storm Experience/Procedures a safe condition DCPP's policy is to maintain the plant in reviews of reactor power level. From while maintaining a low 4-31
the program, it appeared that DCPP had developed an effective tool and process for responding to winter storms without having to shut down the plant.
The plant storm response had been based on the "P9" plant protection level of 15% power for the most severe storms. In this case PG&E could take the plant down to approximately 15%
power (with a turbine trip but without need for the condenser circulating pumps, the component most affected by the storm) and ride out the storm without having to scram the reactor.
DCPP had raised the limit of the P9 protection level from 15%
to 50% along with the new Standard Technical Specifications; however, procedurally DCPP would now normally run back to 20%
(maximum limit of 25%). This decision (and a decision to shut down) is made with the aid of a prepared storm evaluation chart and a plant simulator run. The evaluation sheet includes such parameters as swell strength, wind direction and strength, kelp loading, etc. If a storm is severe enough, the plant will be fully shut down.
During the December 22, 2000 storm, the plant was taken to 50%
power, but lost a circulating pump due to a high kelp loading and was taken to 20% to ride out the storm. It then returned to full power upon return of the second circulating pump. A January 2001 storm was very severe but with low kelp loading, and the plant rode it out at 20% power for two days before returning to full power. DCPP analyzes each storm for improvement of both procedures and equipment.
Upgrades were being considered to the components most affected by storms, e.g., the intake traveling screens. Larger motors are planned for installation during outage 2R10, and a new bar rack cleaning device is being evaluated.
DCPP appears to have satisfactory plans and equipment for responding to winter storms with the ability to maintain the plant in a safe condition. The DCISC will continue to monitor DCPP winter storm plans and experience.
4.6.3 Conclusions and Recommendations PG&E appears to have taken appropriate actions in response to plant off-normal operating events and system and equipment problems during this period and has applied appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The 4-32
this area as part of its normal DCISC will continue to review activities.
(CAP) appears to have been The DCPP Corrective Action Program external evaluations improved as a result of self-assessments, of program of other plant CAPs. Measures and reviews in effectiveness were just being developed and appeared headed will review the CAP in early the right direction. The DCISC action items and the 2002, following completion of improvement next self-assessment.
of events is human R01-2 Because the predominant cause recommended that DCPP more closely error, it is Corrective Action and Human coordinate the training in human Performance Programs and utilize and skills (e.g., interviewing characteristics personnel skills, human error characteristics) for cause analyses and corrective preparing root actions.
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4.7 Environmental 4.7.1 Overview and Previous Activities The DCISC's responsibility is reviewing DCPP operational nuclear safety; however, some of those activities and items reviewed have related non-radiological environmental aspects. Where this is the case, the DCISC reviews the environmental areas as well. (Radiological matters, including radioactive releases, are reported in other sections of this report). Environmental concerns DCISC has reviewed in previous periods include:
- Underground Diesel Fuel Oil Tank Replacement
- Auxiliary Transformer 1-1 Failure
- Intake Screen Fouling by Kelp during Storms
- Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs)
- Elimination of BioLab
- Annual Summary Report on Discharge Monitoring The DCISC had previously concluded that the DCPP environmental program was satisfactory.
4.7.2 Current Period Activities During the current period, DCISC reviewed the Environmental Program for 1999 and first half of 2000 at the July 6 & 7, 2000 Fact-Finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.1) and at the March 14-16, 2001 Fact-Finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.6) for the year 2000.
PG&E reported the following results for 1999:
"* All required regulatory submittals and correspondence were completed on-time
"* One reportable release to the environment:
approximately one ounce of hydraulic fluid was released from the kelp harvester and cleaned up
"* One exceedance of the NPDES effluent permit limitation at an intermittent point: a contractor left an oil residue in an empty container
"* Three environmental agency inspections.
"* No unusual or important environmental events related to plant operation 4-34
violations for 2000 There had been no violations or potential at the time of the fact-finding.
findings reported in the There were no significant at environmental audits and inspections that were performed DCPP.
submittal of the non The DCISC reviewed PG&E's 1999 annual The report to the NRC.
radiological environmental operating several activities were routine, and with reports and were no unusual or exceptions (Volume II, Exhibit D.1), there important events or violations.
The inspection During 2000, there were two agency inspections. on the waste resulted in one minor issue of hazardous control between storage pallets and separation distance action is methods for satellite accumulation areas. Corrective a problem.
planned, and neither is expected to be There was one minor spill during the year 2000. This was the fluid into the intake bay loss of about one ounce of hydraulic in severity, the event from a kelp harvester. Although trivial was reportable because it produced a sheen on the water. The spill was cleaned up quickly.
in March 2000 to the An entrainment study report was submitted The Board had issued a Regional Water Quality Control Board.
outstanding issues. The draft report, and PG&E was resolving primary resolution to settle impingement and thermal effects conservation. This was not issues was to set aside land for expected to affect plant systems or operation.
4.7.3 Conclusion performance appeared DCPP environmental program appeared to satisfactory, and the DCPP environmental continue to meet applicable requirements. The DCISC will program as part of its normal review the environmental activities.
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4.8 Fire Protection 4.8.1 Overview and Previous Activities Fire protection requirements are contained in NRC's regulations in 10CFR50 Appendix R. Appendix R specifies the minimum requirements for safe shutdown systems and equipment, fire hazards analysis, prevention, detection and mitigation, fire brigades and training, emergency lighting, fire barrier and penetration qualifications, and fire doors. PG&E has committed to implementing these requirements, utilizing interpretations and deviations approved by NRC. The NRC periodically performs inspections of the DCPP fire protection program implementation.
The DCISC has looked into the following aspects of DCPP fire protection:
"* Public comments and concerns about discrepancies identified in NRC inspection reports - these concerns were being addressed satisfactorily.
"* NRC inspection reports and PG&E LERs on fire protection, along with PG&E's responses and corrective actions responses and corrective actions were adequate.
"* Failures of Thermo-Lag 330 insulation - fire watches were established, and these deficient materials were replaced satisfactorily.
"* Risk of using highly combustible gases in vital areas this matter was satisfactorily addressed.
"* Erosion/corrosion and microbiological impact on the fire water system - PG&E has an effective program to monitor and address potential problems.
"* Pyrocrete insulation inadequacies - satisfactory fire watches and corrective actions have been applied.
"* Penetration Seal Project - a large number of deficient penetration fire seals was compensated by fire watches and a major long-term program of replacement seals. The program was expanded to include High Energy Line Break (HELD) and Medium Energy Line Break (MELB) seals and building gap seals. PG&E completed the program in mid-2000.
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the DCISC met with the Fire
"* Fire Protection Water System -
Engineer to review the design, Protection Water System on the system. The major problems and current activities being adequately corrosion, which was problem was satisfactory, and the System addressed. The system appeared Engineer appeared knowledgeable.
- in April 2000 the NRC
"* NRC Fire Protection Inspection protection performed a comprehensive triennial fire The NRC did not identify any baseline inspection of DCPP.
that the overall measure of discrepancies and determined was "Green", the best the Mitigating System Cornerstone rating.
periods that the DCPP Fire The DCISC concluded in previous adequate.
Protection Program appeared 4.8.2 Current Period Activities any reviews of the DCPP The DCISC did not perform on this reporting period, based Fire Protection System during period and on reviews in the previous its satisfactory in NRC's comprehensive satisfactory results and conclusions The DCISC in April 2000 (above).
fire protection inspection period.
plans a fire protection review in the next 4.8.3 Conclusions and NRC reviews and Based on satisfactory DCISC did in the previous reporting period, the DCISC inspections period. A not review fire protection in the current reporting protection is planned for the next DCISC review of fire period.
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4.9 Human Performance 4.9.1 Overview and Previous Activities The goal of the human performance program is to reduce the number of human errors and improve the safety of plant operations by improving human performance. In past reporting periods the DCISC has reviewed the following aspects of human performance at DCPP:
"* The Human Performance Fundamentals Course
"* The Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES)
"* Human Performance Improvement Program (HPIP)
"* Effect of rotating shift-work on performance of Control Room Operators'
"* Physical fitness of Control Room Operators (CROs)
"* Stress Intervention classes
"* The implementation of Asset Teams During the previous period (July 1, 1999 - June 30, 2000), the DCISC reviewed the following Human Performance items/programs:
"* Operator Health and fitness: DCISC recommended that PG&E augment its programs for operator health and aging to consider such areas as "operator aging management", to include physical fitness, and mental alertness (especially on night shift) to further improve operator human performance. PG&E responded with the following actions:
- 1. Classes on health-related topics were held for Operations crews every other five-week training cycle.
- 2. PG&E was providing additional break time and encouraging use of the fitness facility for watch licensed personnel.
- 3. The DCPP medical staff was further evaluating its operator fitness levels.
The DCISC accepted this response and continued to monitor this issue.
"* "Centers of Excellence": In early 2000, six Centers of Excellence replaced the SPARK Team. They act as coaching resources to provide a pool of expertise in support of the various processes.
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Program (EAP):
"* Fitness for Duty and Employee Assistance in The substance abuse program revealed a slight increase over 1998. The two EAP positive results in random testing their duties appear to be fulfilling contractors adequately.
follows
"* The Medical Center provided routine physicals, health problems, and provides plant-wide health employees' reduction. With programs, such as stress and fitness be capable of incorporating sufficient support, they would (stress self-regulation more specific programs addressing prevention/
attention enhancement), disease reduction, of aging on operators.
health maintenance, and effects that the DCPP Human appeared in previous periods It various Departments could be Performance Programs for the definitive reducing human errors, although effective in improvement has not been evident.
4.9.2 Current Period Activities performance at DCPP The DCISC reviewed the human described below.
during the current reporting as Human Performance (HP) Program with a steering HP has the full support of plant management, managers, and working committees committee of senior to They meet monthly representing the various departments. systems for error plant HP data, and provide review prevention.
(errors/10,000 workhours) has The monthly human error rate typically peaking years, fluctuated over the last several in July 2000 (non-outage) at during outages. The rate peaked and rose to 1.45 during outage about 1.5, dropped a little about 1.1 at year-end. In early 2R10 in October. It dropped to DCPP goal of 0.9 at about 0.7 2001 the rate had bettered the May.
but had an increasing trend through (at HP errors from outage 1R10 There was a 40% reduction in the lowest 2001. Outage 2R10 had 1.5) to 2R10 (at 0.9) in May The previous record was 3.
error rate yet -- only one error. 3 was that maintenance had gone Another dramatic improvement significant error.
successive outages without a 4-39
About 40-50% of the errors occurred in Maintenance and Operations. These groups represent the main sources of human error because they are hands-on, while other, more management type errors are less immediately detectable. The goal is to reduce the error rate consistently to earlier lower levels.
The following actions have been initiated:
"* An improved Management Observation Program (MOP) was introduced in August 2000 with more focus on behavior and less on results.
"* Maintenance began using EPRI's "Payoff," a database with input from front line workers and first line supervisors who answer a set of basic questions, allowing targeted self-assessments based on ATR reports
"* The HP Group began tracking observable behaviors in Operations, and will be picking the top 8-12 objectives to prevent errors. They have action plans to develop observable behaviors that will meet specific objectives.
"* As part of the transition from Work Function to Work Process, a new tailboard observation and feedback program was instituted in Maintenance Services to help shape future work procedures.
"* An increase in pre-work simulations was a large contributing factor to the low error rate during the 2R10 outage. This included classroom work with maintenance mock ups, providing an opportunity to practice and become familiar with equipment and procedures and to anticipate possible error situations.
"* Supervisor communications training is an important component, as well, and is discussed in Section 4.20 (Training).
Personnel Accountability Policy DCPP is using an Personnel Accountability Policy (AP) based on creating an environment in which errors are routinely reported, and individual consequences, both positive and negative, are aligned with individual performance. Errors can be reduced by minimizing contributing factors, and by applying corrective actions in order to prevent more significant 4-40
(Volume II, Exhibit D.1, Section occurrences in the future. factors into of 3.3). It appears to take a complete range HP and and provides a useful tool for tracking
- account, correcting errors.
Engineering (Latent Errors)
Human Performance Measures for with 10 sub There is a separate Engineering HP Committee, on meets twice a year and reports process owners. It event trend records (ETRs).
performance, including evaluating among engineering, operations, A higher level of coordination Specific HP and vendors is required for optimal results.
Spring 2001. The DCISC plans training for engineers began in HP.
to continue to follow engineering to Discuss HP Issues Informal Meeting With Supervisors between a DCISC Member and An informal meeting was held various departments and 16 supervisors from consultant including Engineering, NQS, Chemistry, Radiation Protection, The purpose was to gain Operations, Security, and Maintenance.
at the work group level.
an understanding of human performance discussed:
Following are some of the issues downsized, leaving workers Chemistry/Environmental has been to the and with some resistance feeling overburdened, an HP program.
additional responsibilities of Safety Group:
maintenance, AR's are now
"* Due to efforts of engineering and 130 days, as opposed to the handled on average within previous average of 600 days.
increased from 30% to
"* Documented ETRs (event trend records) engineering in done in 75%. Seven self-assessments were processes to observe next 2000, and then used to identify year.
Maintenance:
data is being used, and
" Craft wanted feedback about how used only for even if it's what is being done as a result, trending.
data collected, is the
" More important than the actual in the supervisors present worker's desire to have the field.
experience. Being
" Operations appears to have the opposite To more independent, they resent feeling under scrutiny.
4-41
improve the situation, they request that critiques be oriented toward acknowledgment for what is being done correctly, and not just what is wrong.
"* Behavioral observation class in Operations has an accompanying video which works well as a teaching tool. The training department plans on a similar one for Maintenance.
"* Department-specific observation cards were instituted by HP.
"* After initial resistance, craft is now more enrolled in the HP process. Successful implementation of the "we culture" was reflected during the 2R10 outage, with excellent interdepartmental cooperation.
DCPP supervisors seemed very open in their discussion of Human Performance. Issues have been recognized and are being acted upon.
Meeting with Human Resources Director The DCISC met with the Human Resources Director who described the Culture Transition Initiative, which was developed following concerns identified by the Synergy Safety Culture Survey. The Initiative is being taken to improve trust in management and create an improved safety conscious workforce.
The Initiative is based on developing the five following behaviors:
- 1. Understand others
- 2. Embrace feedback
- 3. Provide face time
- 4. Develop and support common goals
- 5. Create a positive work environment She described the series of training sessions which have taken place with top management, middle management and employees.
She also described the bi-monthly meetings held with supervisory levels at the plant and the 360-degree personnel performance feedback process for each manager/supervisor. The DCISC has been following this initiative since its inception.
Employee Assistance Program EAP duties are shared by two part-time counselors, each working 15 hours per week. Based in the administration building, office hours are from 8:30 AM to 3:00 PM except during outages, when they are from 2:00 PM to 9:00 PM, with 24/7 availability by phone for emergencies. The EAP staff also 4-42
and trainings in San attends Fitness for Duty meetings, crisis, overall morale appears Francisco. Despite the energy Exhibit D.9, Section 3.4).
to be stable. (Volume II, behavior observation class, EAP counselors teach the monthly and provide for Duty (FFD) program, monitor the Fitness other problems, on job-related issues. For counseling psychiatrists, therapists and employees are referred to local which an immediate 10 visits where prior authorization allows insurance plan.
are covered by the company health counseling and offering more EAP plans on doing more team aging parents, parents of classes and affinity groups (e.g.,
to share information, teenagers) which allows the employees resources, and overall mutual support.
two informative quarterly publications, EAP distributes by Value Options, one for the entire published under contract plant and one geared to supervisors.
is carrying out its EAP appears to be well utilized, and has creative plans for the responsibilities appropriately, future.
Attention Enhancement, and Stress Operators' Physical Fitness, Management of Operations to discuss The DCISC met with the new Director attention for increased physical fitness, incentives concern of the an ongoing enhancement, and stress management, Exhibit D.4, (Volume II, DCISC and of the medical center.
Section 3.6).
Conduct of Routine Operations, PG&E Policy OPl.DC12, that enhance alertness, recognizes the need for activities breaks, a rest period, or such as a nutrition or exercise breaks per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shift taking a shower. Two thirty-minute adequate coverage while the are allowed, as long as there is then be is relieved from duty, and s/he must operator Exhibit D.9, (Volume II, available by phone, pager, or radio.
Section 3.1).
to as the Sleep, HP is considering a program referred (SAFTE) model. A Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness computer program, The Fatigue Avoidance questionnaire-based an individual's pattern of Scheduling Tool (FAST) calculates on the alertness/fatigue, and allows team scheduling based 4-43
individual findings. Based on the timing and amount of sleep an individual or team receives prior to and during the period, effectiveness predictions provided by FAST enable planners to optimize work/rest schedules for up to 3 weeks.
Operator fitness continues to be an issue. The current Operations Director's appreciation of its importance, and his background as an operator are both positive influences in this area. Human Performance issues are being addressed appropriately as well.
Meeting with DCPP Medical Director The Medical Director is concerned, as has been the DCISC, about Operators' health and fitness (Volume II, Exhibit D.4, Section 3.11). He discussed the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) requirements for Aerobic Fitness.
PG&E's medical form has a "no solo" category for licensed operators who do not meet the required 7.14 mets (a measure of physical fitness). They are then not allowed to be the sole licensed operator in or out of the control room. The ultimate decision is left to the discretion of the supervising physician. Because there are four licensees in the control room at all times, this is unlikely to be a significant problem; however, the issue arises as to how many "no-solos" can one have at a time on a shift, especially during an emergency.
Most of the "no-solos" are simply out of shape. There is an upward trend in weight gain, which is a marker of lifestyle.
Old statistics on non-solos, from 1994-1998, indicate that 20%
were under 7.2 mets. Updated statistics will be available after chart review in preparation for an NRC audit in April.
The medical center continues to work diligently at screening, treating, and counseling employees. The lack of specific incentives makes their job more difficult in terms of compliance. Incentives for fitness would likely provide more motivation, as it did in security.
Safety Class On Cardiac Health The Medical Director taught a one-hour class on cardiac health, part of the health series,, previously discussed by the DCISC (Volume II, Exhibit D.4, Section 3.10). The class credits each attending employee with one Safety meeting.
4-44
tests, treatments, preventive He explained new diagnostic age, These factors increase with measures, and risk factors. poor diet, high and include smoking, lack of exercise, He described the various cholesterol, and high blood pressure.
screening procedures, symptoms of a heart attack, treatment, and follow-up lifestyle changes and medications.
an health was well attended, with The safety class on cardiac Covering complex material in enthusiastic, involved audience. an excellent way, the class made an understandable employees and their families.
contribution to the health of have a close and trusting It was clear that the employees personnel, with many staying relationship with medical center the or otherwise touch base with afterwards to ask questions doctor.
4.9.3 Conclusions and Recommendation is doing an adequate job of The Human Performance Program toward evaluating the data, and working error trending, Human error and enhancing safety.
increasing performance although cause of problems, and, continues to be the largest yet are small, the trends are not the numbers of human errors The DCISC will continue to showing sustained improvement.
at DCPP.
actively review human performance Program appears to be well The DCPP Employee Assistance its responsibilities and is carrying out utilized, area as part of its review this appropriately. The DCISC will normal activities.
which to be an issue of concern, Operator fitness continues track. Indicators point to a the DCISC will continue to fitness, and it was not apparent growing problem with operator to deal with the problem.
that DCPP had measures in place continue to augment its R01-3 It is recommended that PG&E and aging to consider programs for operator health physical management",
such areas as operator "aging further on shift to fitness, and mental alertness improve operator human performance.
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4.10 Nuclear Fuel Performance/Fuel Cycles/Storage 4.10.1 Overview and Previous Activities The DCISC has been following performance of nuclear fuel and fuel-related matters at DCPP since its beginning in 1990. The Committee receives regular reports on nuclear fuel performance and any problems from PG&E both in fact-finding and public meetings and as input to the annual report. DCISC follows-up on problems and activities in its fact-finding meetings at DCPP and PG&E Headquarters.
DCPP fuel reliability is the most important fuel attribute monitored during operation. It is important to assure that the fuel integrity is preserved to avoid fission product leakage into the reactor coolant system (RCS) and ultimately into RCS cleanup and support systems resulting in increased personnel dose, radioactive waste and potential off-site releases.
Since DCISC was formed in 1990, fuel reliability had been excellent until November 1994 when Unit 2 fuel began to show signs of leakage and experienced localized fuel damage. Leakage is measured by the amount of radioactivity in RCS samples, with a current goal of less than 5.0 x 10-4 microCuries (iiCi) of Iodine-131 per gram of coolant. The following depicts the measured (and corrected) radioactivity trend for a five-year period:
Unit 1 Unit 2 Period Goal Actual Actual 96-97 5.0 x 10-4 pci/gm 1.47 x 10-5 .Ci/gm 1.0 x 10-6 pCi/gm 97-98 5.0 x 10-4 5.75 x 10-5 1.0 x 10-6 98-99 5.0 x 10-4 3.14 x 10-5 3.06 x 10-4 99-00 5.0 x 10-4 1.0 x 10-6 9.06 x 10-4 00-01 5.0 x 10-4 1.0 x 10-6 5.41 x 10-4 In addition to regular fuel performance updates, DCISC has investigated the following fuel-related topics:
"* Spent fuel pool safety issues - as a result of a public concern, the DCISC met with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) System Engineer to discuss the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and related issues. PG&E had performed an adequate assessment of these items and concluded there was not a concern at DCPP.
"* Future plans for additional spent fuel storage - without the Department of Energy spent fuel storage facility, DCPP must have a solution to its spent fuel storage problem in place 4-46
activities have been initiated by 2006. Plans and long-lead DCISC continues to follow for on-site dry cask storage. The this matter.
is leaching out of Boraflex Boraflex Degradation - boron and potentially the spent fuel pool racks sleeves in ability of the Boraflex compromising the neutron absorption spent plans to revise its to maintain subcriticality. DCPP soluble fuel pool criticality analysis taking credit for pool water and submit a Boron in the spent fuel change to NRC. Three corresponding license application received NRC approval on similar other stations have applications.
rods, or incomplete rod
" Stuck Control Rods - stuck control reactors, insertion, first appeared in high-burnup French would not fully insert. The in which control rods bowed and DCISC affect DCPP, and the problem has been shown to not considers the issue closed
- Axial flux offset anomaly
"* Axial Flux Axial Offset Anomaly the actual reactor core axial is an unexpected deviation of It was not a problem flux offset compared to predictions.
at DCPP, and the issue was closed.
problem in high exposure fuel
"* Fuel Pellet-Gap Re-opening - a fuel pellet and clad gap re in which the normally closed The fuel manufacturer opens, potentially causing corrosion. a safety issue.
the condition is not has determined NRC's review of their Westinghouse and PG&E are awaiting which should to begin a new fuel design, fuel model eliminate the re-opening problem.
Coefficient - DCPP was
"* ATWS Moderator Core Temperature temperature with a 5% positive moderator licensed reviewing the (PMTC). NRC has been coefficient (AMSAC) with mitigating system effectiveness of plant ATWS Analyses have been performed, coefficients this positive.
an open NRC issue, and the DCISC plans but this is NRC's review.
additional reviews following first
- PG&E began seeing the
"* Unit 2 Fuel Leakage on August 20, 1998. Upon indications of Unit 2 fuel leakage two leakage spent fuel in Outage 2R9, inspection of was a pinhole leak in an problems were found. The first The leak was believed to have internal assembly fuel rod.
or a material defect. The been caused by either core debris up after opening. The second area of leak had closed itself baffle jetting the first occurrence of damage was action was to add corner experienced at DCPP. Corrective assemblies. Baffle-jetting fuel clips to susceptible corner 4-47
effects were also found on Unit 2, cycle 8 fuel upon a review of fuel inspection videotapes.
"* Nuclear Fuels Group Transition - the transition of the nuclear fuels group from San Francisco to DCPP appeared to have been performed effectively
"* Fuel Assembly Top Nozzle Leaf Spring Problem - during inspection of spent fuel removed from the core in outage 2R9, a problem was discovered with the Top Nozzle Leaf Springs in several fuel assemblies; however, no fuel damage resulted. Root cause analysis indicated the cause was over torquing of the bolts in a specific batch of Westinghouse fuel. DCPP performed a justification for continued operation and did not allow any susceptible assemblies back into the core. Unit 1 did not contain assemblies from this batch of fuel.
The DCISC concluded that PG&E appeared to be handling fuel or fuel-related problems appropriately in previous periods.
4.10.2 Current Period Activities The DCISC has investigated the following items during the current reporting period:
Spent Fuel Storage Status PG&E has selected dry cask storage and has a letter of intent with the contractor, Holtec. A project team has been formed at an off-site location and consists of Engineering, Licensing, QA, Community Affairs, Environmental, Legal, Contracts, and Land Use Permitting.
The two license applications will be submitted to the NRC in August (10CFR72) and September 2001 (10CFR50) for the 138 storage cask facility. This will accommodate all spent fuel and complete off-load for the 40 year license life. The land use permit will also be for full storage. The building permit will be in two stages, first phase for one half storage and second phase for the other half in 2017. DCPP will license both 32 and 24 assembly storage canisters. The storage cask system will be anchored because of seismic conditions.
The facility needs to be completed by 2006. The preliminary engineering design was completed by 12/2000 and final design by 3/2001. They are also working on security requirements and radiation monitoring. A Project Oversight committee has been 4-48
will be reviewed by PSRC.
formed and the License Application with Operations, The facility work has also been coordinated Maintenance and Environmental.
to County Supervisors, Government PG&E has sent letters Intervenor Groups. They have Agencies, Concerned Citizens, and and Local Reporters as also called State Elected Officials Officials and County well as holding meetings with County for Supervisors. A web site has been developed Planning public project information. They also plan on having small meetings to give out information.
It appears that PG&E is taking appropriate action to design facilities in a timely and license on-site spent fuel storage plant generated spent fuel.
manner to safely accommodate all Officials and the They are also informing the Government Public in a timely manner.
IRlO Nuclear Fuel Performance/Inspection of leaking fuel during the DCPP did not have any indications not find any during the past Unit 1 fuel cycle and did leaking fuel in Unit 1 but inspection. DCPP has never had any of the top nozzle spring did find a large number of failures assemblies. The screws are screws with the twice-burned fuel Westinghouse but there were no loose parts.
breaking, at other plants and DCPP identified this problem after 1R9 Fuel inspections conducted found this problem in 2R9 and 1R10.
spring screw failures than during 1R10 showed fewer top nozzle 2R9 inspections.
Evaluation to document the DCPP prepared an Operability Westinghouse fuel operability of Units 1 & 2 utilizing fractured top nozzle spring assemblies with potentially demonstrated that plant operation screws. The evaluation fractured top nozzle hold down utilizing fuel assemblies with effect on the integrity spring screws will not have an adverse coolant system or connecting of the components of the reactor of material for the systems. The fix will be a different type for fuel to be installed screws. DCPP will go to a new design have this problem through during 1R11 and 2R11, but may still cycle 1R12 and 2R12.
actions dealing with the PG&E appears to be taking appropriate prepared an spring screw failure and has top nozzle the issue.
operability Evaluation addressing 4-49
Gap Re-Opening Nuclear fuel is designed with a gap between the nuclear fuel pellets and the surrounding zircaloy cladding. During operation the fuel pellets swell, closing the gap. Operating models assume the gap remains closed; however, it has been determined that the gap can re-open in some fuel locations, adversely affecting heat transfer from the pellet through the clad. This condition can cause excessive corrosion of the clad. PG&E and Westinghouse had determined that, although DCPP did not achieve desired margins with then current fuel designs, safe operation was not affected. DCPP has recently revised its Operability Evaluation (OE) for fuel with pellet clad gap re-opening and clad oxidation concerns.
Westinghouse has completed a gap re-opening and clad oxidation assessment for Unit 1 Cycle 11 that shows that gap re-opening will not occur and that clad oxidation will remain within limits. Based on this assessment and conclusions, the OE can be closed for Unit 1.
Westinghouse has also completed a gap re-opening and clad oxidation assessment for Unit 2 Cycle 11. This assessment shows that gap re-opening is predicted to occur first in the Region 9A center assembly and in Region 11A and liB fuel.
Based on the Westinghouse analysis for Unit 2 condition of the fuel pellet clad gap re-opening, the core is operable within license conditions. Also, the 10 CFR 50.46 limit of 17% total localized oxidation is met. The OE will be reviewed with the PRSC prior to the Unit 2 restart from 2R10.
PG&E appears to be taking appropriate actions to deal with the fuel pellet gap re-opening problems and has resolved the issue on Unit 1. This issue should be resolved in Unit 2 when a new fuel design in installed in 2R10. The DCISC should review the status of gap re-opening in 2001 when Westinghouse has resolved the issue.
Extended Fuel Cycle The fuel cycles for DCPP were originally designed for 12 months and DCPP has been moving toward a 24-month cycle.
However, because of potential technical problems, they have settled on a 21-month fuel cycle. DCPP continues to evaluate cycle lengths as economics may change and as they participate in the STARS Initiative, whose members favor an 18-month cycle.
4-50
length again in late 2001, if The DCISC will review fuel cycle PG&E has changed their plans.
Boraflex the Boraflex degradation issue There has been no change in (see Section 4.10.1 above).
since the last reporting period 4.10.3 Conclusions or fuel-related PG&E appears to be handling fuel Unit 1 core has been reliable problems appropriately. The DCPP experienced a small amount of and clean; however, Unit 2 has and debris or a fuel defect.
fuel damage due to baffle jetting to the repaired and returned The assembly was removed, maintain its 19-21 month fuel reactor. It appears PG&E will cycle or move to an 18-month cycle.
on-going problems such as The DCISC will continue to follow fuel pool poison spent expansion of spent fuel storage, fuel problems or issues that (Boraflex), and any fuel-related arise.
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4.11 Nuclear Safety Oversiqht and Review 4.11.1 Overview and Previous Activities Nuclear Safety Oversight and Review (NSOR) is an important function in the safe operation of nuclear power plants. NSOR represents an independent, higher and/or broader level of review of operations, events, occurrences, etc. than can be obtained from the organizations performing the day-to day plant, technical and quality functions. NRC regulations require, and DCPP Technical Specifications (TS) provide for, a high level of oversight in the form of the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC).
PG&E has in-place the following review and oversight organizations/functions:
- President's Nuclear Advisory Committee (PNAC)
- Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC)
- Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG)
- Technical Review Groups (TRG) for Specific Issues
- Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC)
In addition, PG&E has procedures to establish, on an ad hoc basis, Event Investigation Teams for significant events.
Additionally, the nuclear industry seeks operational safety and excellence with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) which performs periodic performance evaluations of each operating nuclear plant; coordinates the collection, review and dissemination of operating event information; issues good practice guidelines; provides specific event, technical and functional reviews; and issues and monitors performance goals for the industry. PG&E is a member of INPO and participates in their programs.
Finally, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is charged by law to regulate the nuclear industry. In carrying out this responsibility the NRC issues regulations and guides for nuclear safety and performs inspections at facilities to assure regulations are met. NRC's role at DCPP is discussed in Chapter 3.0 NRC Assessments and Issues.
The Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) provides an additional level of nuclear safety review and oversight. As stated in Chapter 1.0, DCISC is charged to "
4-52
for the purpose of review Diablo Canyon operations suggesting any safety of operations and assessing the its In carrying out recommendations for safe operations". and and reviews DCPP operating responsibilities DCISC receives performs fact-findings at DCPP technical and NRC documents; each year to hear PG&E and holds several public meetings and receive public input.
reports on plant operational safety the operation As part of its program, the DCISC has monitored and effectiveness of all levels of PG&E review and oversight inception in 1990. Since 1990, DCISC has reviewed since its functions:
the following organizations and operating experience
"* Review of PG&E safety committee and evaluation activities. The DCISC looked at the entire organizations.
interfacing structure of review safety
"* PG&E overviews of the structure of independent meetings - PG&E has review groups to the DCISC at public Committee the President's Nuclear Advisory described (NSOC),
Committee (PNAC), the Nuclear Safety Oversight (PSRC) and the Nuclear the Plant Staff Review Committee Quality Services (NQS) Department.
(NQAL) includes (1)
"* Nuclear Quality, Analysis & Licensing Services, (2) Nuclear Quality Services Regulatory (3)
Operations, Plant Support and Corrective Action,
- Engineering, Procurement &
Nuclear Quality Services (4) Licensing Projects, (5) Nuclear Safety Maintenance, Concerns Program, (6) System Transient Analysis Employee and (7) Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
(PSRC). The PSRC was
"* Plant Staff Review Committee overall plant operating and established to review changes and tests, the maintenance experience, proposed protection, procedures, security, fire adequacy of subjects which have a environmental matters and other bearing on nuclear safety.
and Consultants periodically attended
"* DCISC Members of the President's Nuclear regularly scheduled meetings Oversight (PNAC), Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee and Plant Staff Review Committee Committee (NSOC),
(PSRC).
Public Meetings, PG&E gives a
"* At each of the DCISC 4-53
summary of the activities of the NSOC and PNAC meetings held since the last DCISC Public Meeting.
In previous periods the DCISC has concluded that the Nuclear Safety Oversight function has been carried out satisfactorily.
4.11.2 Current Period Activities During this period, PG&E gave presentations at DCISC Public Meetings on September 14 & 15, 2000, February 7 & 8, 2001 and June 20 & 21, 2001 (Volume II, Exhibits B.3, B.6 and B.9) on the NSOC meetings held prior to each of these public meetings. PG&E reviewed the major topics discussed at the meeting and any conclusions, recommendations made and problems noted at the meetings. DCISC fact-finding teams reviewed the following President's Nuclear Advisory Committee (PNAC) and Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) activities at fact finding meetings:
Observation of NSOC/PNAC Meetings November 14, 2000 - Joint NSOC/PNAC Meeting DCISC representatives attended the regularly scheduled meeting of the NSOC/PNAC held at DCPP on November 14, 2000 (Volume II, Exhibit D.3).
The DCPP NSOC/PNAC held one of its regular, scheduled meetings on November 14, 2000 at DCPP. The following items were discussed:
- 1. License Amendment Requests (LARs)
- 2. System Engineering Program and Management Expectations of System Engineers - A summary of the roles and responsibilities of system engineers was presented.
- 3. Subcommittee Reports:
A. Plant status and performance indicators: two human performance errors, one unplanned automatic reactor trip, the Unit 1 refueling outage were also discussed.
B. PSRC Summary: A summary of issues discussed at the PSRC meetings were reviewed.
C. LER and NOV summary: A summary of four recent licensee event reports (LERs) that were submitted to the NRC 4-54
during the last was reviewed. Three NCVs that were issued is The trend of NCVs at DCPP period were also reviewed. Region IV to the average number received at other comparable NCVs are Members pointed out that plants. One of the External management of performance and that no longer the best measure trends at the to monitoring problem needs to be sensitive plant.
Twenty LBIE reviews were D. LBIE Assessment:
period. There were no completed during the assessment related to LBIEs.
significant issues identified Three NCRs that E. NCR and NQS interest items:
The External were initiated during this period were discussed.
and that additional Members felt two of the NCRs were weak, the NCRs and the root cause action is warranted to improve they felt that the number of NCRs analyses. Additionally, performing plant.
generated is low for a good and the projected 2001 audit schedule for DCPP NQS reviewed is integrated with self-assessment stated that the audit plan an audit of the self-assessment plans. They also stated that quality as part to the audit of the program will be performed assurance program for 2001.
Status: The third
- 4. QPAR and Performance Indicator of NPG is QPAR was reviewed. The overall performance quarter window Services received a yellow satisfactory. Maintenance continued human for this quarter. Part of the reason is problems with the lubrication performance problems, continued the maintenance training program.
program, and weaknesses in are green this quarter.
All NRC performance indicators sink and for loss of normal heat However, the indicator for for performance are near the threshold ERO drill/exercise being white.
Report: The integrated
- 5. Integrated Assessment of the to evaluate performance assessment report is intended The not addressed by specific performance indicators.
plant from licensing, quality report is developed based on input trends in senior management regarding assurance and the areas were identified in performance. Five key performance Section D.3) . The (Volume II, report as needing attention as the owner of this report.
Plant Manager has been assigned Performance Issues: The
- 6. Strategy to Address Human 4-55
human performance program is being revised to add more formality. The new program is based on the formation of a human performance steering committee. The purpose of the steering committee is to develop a common philosophy and strategy to address human performance improvement and champion human performance at DCPP.
- 7. RP and ALARA Program Strategies: This presentation included an overview of current RP and ALARA programs, and future direction and strategies. Both units are in the middle of the third quartile for RP performance in the industry.
Although neither unit has ever had less than 100 person-Rem per outage, 1R10 was the lowest Unit 1 collective dose outage. Much of the reduced dose was due to good shutdown chemistry control and zinc injection over the last two years.
PG&E stated that DCPP intends to focus on being a top industry performer in this area. Dose is an indicator of efficiency of work processes. Shutdown chemistry initiatives need to be continued. Planning and scheduling of work needs to be improved.
- 8. Other Items: The Chairman of NSOC reported on his visit to the offsite review committee meeting of another nuclear utility. The Chairman is considering moving to a more formal subcommittee process and will continue to share observations of operation of other committees.
Overall, the PNAC/NSOC meeting was well planned, well organized and attended, and PNAC/NSOC appears to have fulfilled their required duties. There was an exchange of observations, opinions, and suggestions at the PNAC/NSOC meeting and good participation by the outside Members. It also appears to be very beneficial to have the joint PNAC/NSOC meetings, since each committee covers much of the same agenda.
DCISC should continue to monitor some PNAC and NSOC meetings to observe their review of plant safety issues.
May 1 & 2, 2001 - NSOC Meeting The following topics were discussed:
- 1. INPO Results - INPO evaluation reports and a summary of the evaluation results were reviewed. A description of corrective actions was also presented.
- 2. Bankruptcy Impact - DCPP considers the bankruptcy 4-56
operations and management.
"business as usual" regarding plant expects the The plant has its full 2001 authorized budget and provides daily and weekly same in 2002. Management to keep employees current.
communications within the plant NRC, and there have been no There are weekly updates for the the adverse safety effects. There had been pressure from power during ocean storms; Governor's office to not reduce PG&E will follow their procedures to reduce power
- however, safety.
when necessary to maintain plant
- The Chairman of NSOC
- 3. NSOC Re-organization of NSOC. The Oversight and discussed potential re-organization would remain. Human Performance Corrective Action Subcommittee are up for Equipment Performance Subcommittee and consideration and discussion.
have a Nuclear Safety Review Most significantly, STARS will will lead.
Board initiative team, which the DCPP NSOC Chairman review the regulatory compliance The STARS Team will the requirement for NSOC requirements to attempt to eliminate for STARS the function and combine resources but retain a proposal for the STARS Chief plants. They anticipate having months but maintain the status Nuclear Officers in about six quo for one year.
Action Oversight and Assessment
- 4. Corrective NSOC items for this new Subcommittee - The following subcommittee were reviewed:
the first quarter A. NQS Audits and Assessments -
Two audits were considered 2001 work products were reviewed.
was considered excellent.
particularly good and one audit reviewed the B. Self-Assessment - the subcommittee two quarters.
self-assessments for the last Program (CAP) - the CAP C. Corrective Action especially with updates being appeared sound and appropriate, implemented to improve trend analysis.
Summary - The subcommittee D. Subcommittee that self-assessment, corrective believed and recommended Event Trend Records (ETR) action, management observations, an integrated be considered as trends, and human performance action was well whole. (The DCISC believed this subcommittee other NSOC actions.)
researched and a good model for 4-57
- 5. NSOC Summary Reports A. Plant Performance Indicators - plant performance indicators were presented. NRC indicators were all green. The human performance trend was flat and barely making INPO top quartile. Event-free days were at 33, below the goal of 60 days. An outside Member stated that the plant needed to lower human errors through trending, cause-code analysis and benchmarking.
B. Plant Staff Review Committee Summary - there was nothing significant to report.
C. Safety Evaluations - there were no significant problems. Safety evaluation reviews indicated that the quality of some Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations (LBIEs) had degraded in that they needed amplifying/clarifying comments as a basis for answers.
- 6. License Amendment Request - a request was presented for the elimination of the Post-Accident Sample System (PASS).
NSOC approved the request.
- 7. Synergy Survey Results - results of the 2000 Synergy Comprehensive Cultural Assessment were presented. (Volume II, Exhibit D.7)
- 8. Integrated Assessment Report - the Vice-President &
Manager of DCPP presented the results of the Integrated Assessment Report. Key performance areas were as follows:
Human performance error rate had increased Personal safety practices had improved Equipment failures had increased Plant standards and management expectations had not been consistently met or enforced NSOC Members asked questions for clarification and provided helpful suggestions about methods to improve and about other plants which have good programs.
- 9. Human Performance - The Station Manager provided an update on human performance. Based on analysis of error causes, the Human Performance Steering Committee (HPSC) believed that there were three key behaviors, which would have prevented many human errors at DCPP. These were (1) 3-way communication, (2) effective tailboards, and (3) self-4-58
verification. This was substantiated by INPO.
improvement in early 2000 Human performance error rate showed have quarter 2000. There but has degraded beginning in third more "clock resets" due to a been four recent Event-Free Day been self-verification has frequent error rate. Lack of proper the primary cause of human error.
in March 2001 with an A self-assessment was conducted expert.
interdisciplinary team and an industry a one-year plan with the following The HPSC established aspects:
for Operations, Augmented human performance training and Engineering Maintenance, Radiation Protection Goal-setting Self-assessment Communications Observations Days Rewards for successful Event-Free correct actions, and they were NSOC agreed that these were the high priority.
- 10. 2R10 Outage Plans - The Station Manager presented had just begun. The motto DCPP's plans for Outage 2R10, which the Sea of Uncertainty".
for the outage was "Rising Above were as follows:
High-level goals for the outage ALARA Goal - 109 person-Rem Safety Goal - no disabling injuries Duration Goal - 25 days, 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> Cost Goal - $29.1 million or comments.
There were no significant NSOC questions each agenda item. Much of The DCISC observed discussion around information/education and it appeared to be questioning for or improvement. With few helpful suggestions for benchmarking in the there was little exceptions from one outside Member, This thinking and processes.
way of challenges to current of two outside Members. An could have been due to the newness analysis and expectation by example of good investigation, Oversight and Assessment NSOC was the new Corrective Action follow NSOC The DCISC will continue to Subcommittee. the next year.
activities and monitor the planned changes over 4-59
The DCISC believes both internal and external Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee members should express higher expectations of DCPP and take a more aggressive stance in challenging problem solving and the status quo.
Results of INPO Evaluation PG&E reviewed the results of the 2001 INPO evaluation with the DCISC. This was the eighth INPO evaluation of DCPP. DCISC has reviewed these evaluations at previous fact-finding meetings.
INPO identified 10 strengths and 11 areas for improvement, with no repeat areas for improvement. The two most significant areas for improvement were discussed.
DCPP had performed a pre INPO self-assessment and identified most of the same areas for improvement. They let INPO review this self-assessment.
INPO also reviewed 6 operator-training programs for accreditation. PG&E will meet with INPO accreditation board in June, 2001 to get the results of these programs. INPO will review the other 6 training programs with the next DCPP evaluation.
The detailed results of the INPO evaluation were presented but are not included in this report as they are proprietary between INPO and PG&E.
The results of the recent INPO evaluation of DCPP appear to be favorable as DCPP continues to receive good reports from INPO.
Integrated Assessment Process Overview and Update DCISC reviewed the Integrated Assessment Process (IAP) at the September 2000 Public Meeting (Volume II, Sec. B.3) and received an update on the program at the June 2001 Public Meeting (Volume II, Sec. B.9).
PG&E stated that the purpose of the Integrated Assessment Process (IAP) is to use information obtained from various performance assessments to facilitate the early identification of declining or marginal performance. The IAP facilities communication to senior management and Plant staff of those recommendations which are made to enhance performance and it provides a means to evaluate DCPP performance against NRC criteria. The IAP does tend to focus on areas needing 4-60
than those demonstrating identified improvement, rather data from; 1) NQS Quality strengths. The IAP utilizes Report (QPAR), 2) Line Self Performance Assessment Indicators, 4) NRC Inspection Assessments, 3) NRC Performance and 6) Significance findings, 5) Assessment of NRC violations, Determination Evaluation.
the 'st Quarter 2001 IAP PG&E reported on the results of report. Key Performance Issues were:
- 1. Human Performance:
Error rate is above historical levels.
human DCPP has an 18-month plan to improve in th Qtr. 2001.
performance that was completed 4 includes establishment of HPSC, The plan of three phase training implementation model, program, development of accountability plan for and implementation of communications human performance issues.
completed phase I & II Human DCPP has training for all departments Performance including Engineering.
Performance There was a 40% reduction Human outage form 1R10 to 2R10, which errors in ever.
included the lowest outage error rate in 2R10. The best There was 1 human error before was 3 in an outage.
has gone 3 successive outages Maintenance without a significant human error.
Accountability model is fully implemented.
- 2. Personnel Safety Practices: adhering to Personnel are not consistently personnel safety practices. in Resolution requires overall improvements safety culture and associated behaviors.
include leadership team heightened Actions and field observations, periodic awareness and communications of safety issues/successes, with fewer and implementation of new program clearer requirements.
on the STARS Round-Robin Industrial Bases Safety Self-Assessment, DCPP has taken action to make improvements in the safety program.
- 3. Equipment Failures: the last failures in A number of equipment 4-61
two years have resulted in lengthy forced or extended refueling outages.
Engineering Services and Maintenance Services sponsoring the Generation Vulnerability Identification (GVIT) to help resolve this issue.
GVIT chartered to develop a process that integrates into existing processes to minimize/prevent unplanned capacity loss.
- 3. Management Expectations:
Plant standards/management expectations are not being consistently met nor evaluated/reinforced.
A focus area of the cultural work in 2001 will be to improve reinforcement of management expectations.
3 Qtr. 2001 training session for all supervisors will be held regarding how to set and monitor expectations, and dealing with conflict.
Areas being monitored that are of lesser significance are; 1) trending of low level errors, 2) ERO drill/exercise performance, 3) Maintenance training, 4) high radiation area violations, and 5) pre-outage milestones. The IAR report also listed five positive performance areas. These were; 10 CAP effectiveness, 2) operations and control room formality, 3)
Management communications to employees and external entities during ongoing financial/energy crisis, 4) Procurement Group interaction with suppliers during financial crisis, and 5) plant housekeeping and overall material condition.
It appears that the Integrated Assessment Report is a positive tool for management's use to assess the overall performance of the plant. It combines all of the information from the various reports on the plant performance into one very useful document.
4.11.3 Conclusions and Recommendations Nuclear safety oversight and review functions and organizations appear to be functioning satisfactorily at DCPP.
It also appears to be very beneficial to have the joint PNAC/NSOC meetings, since each committee covers much of the same agenda. The results of the 2001 INPO evaluation appear to 4-62
and be favorable. The DCISC will continue to monitor the PNAC review of plant safety issues.
NSOC meetings to observe their was constructive and The DCISC observed that although there there were limited helpful dialogue during the NSOC meetings, challenges to existing thinking and processes.
its R01-4 It is recommended that PG&E management raise of the Nuclear Safety Oversight expectations and external members to take a Committee internal stance in challenging problem more aggressive the status quo. Additionally, PG&E solving and members should consider adding independent external (not just from STARS plants).
Report is a positive It appears that the Integrated Assessment performance of tool for management's use to assess the overall the plant. It combines all of the information from the various the plant performance into one very useful reports on Integrated document. The DCISC will continue to review the Assessment Report.
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4.12 Outage Management 4.12.1 Overview and Previous Activities The DCISC monitors PG&E's outage plans, actions, and results in the following ways:
"* Regular fact-finding meetings to discuss planned major modifications, inspections, maintenance and activities
"* Regular reports from PG&E at DCISC Public Meetings on outage plans and outage performance, noting any special situations or problems affecting safety
"* Visits to DCPP during outages to monitor the Outage Coordination Center, Control Room and activities of interest
"* Reviews of documentation and reports of outage activities such as steam generator tube inspections, major equipment problems, overtime usage, and events affecting safety PG&E completed its ninth Unit 2 refueling outage. Outage management performance has steadily improved since the DCISC began review in 1990. Outage length, typically over one hundred days initially, had plateaued in the high fifty-day range through lR6. Outage 2R6 dropped to 34 days, 1R7 up to 57 days (with outage complications), 2R7 was 48 days, 1R8 at 44 days, 2R8 at 42 days, 1R9 at 35 days and finally 2R9 at 31.7 days. PG&E expects its outages can routinely run in the high twenty to low-thirty day range.
Other outage indicators also are showing continuous improvement. With exception of anomalous 1R9 radiation levels, radiation exposure and personnel injuries have been steadily declining in the last three outages as follows:
Personnel Radiation Safety Solid Exposure (recordable Radwaste (person-Rem) injuries) (cu.ft./lbs.)
Outage Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 1 Unit 2 R7 275 149 8 5 1032 893 R8 192 145 9 4 41099* 44323*
R9 314** 120 3 4 38945 34564 RI0 162 108 2 1 48485 38171
- This measure was changed to pounds in 1R8.
- Radiation exposure for 1R9 is discussed below.
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Hot Mid-Loop (HML) Operations is one of the most significant Hot mid-loop operation the the outage because it increases operations during higher the shutdown mode. This potential for fuel damage in outage risk configuration is necessary to maintain a short maintenance and steam generator while performing increased at options to reduce the inspection. PG&E has been looking risk assessment hot mid-loop operation. The risk during during outages.
control the risk program ORAM is used to help in the 2R8 outage.
Hot mid-loop operation was used risk resulting from HML The DCISC reviewed the increased calculations and prepared graphs operation. PG&E had performed boiling risk as a function of of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) HML up to, during and following time for the steps leading x risk for HML operation, 1.81 operation. The average boiling than that without HML operation, 10-6 per hour, was 14% higher DCISC found the increased risk 1.56 x 10-6 per hour. The planning, training, acceptable, considering the preparation, by PG&E.
and contingency analysis performed hot outage management, including PG&E had exhibited effective reporting periods.
mid-loop operations, during previous Outage 1R9 Radiation Exposures than normal radiation levels DCPP experienced much higher a significant problem in during Outage 1R9. DCPP encountered unusually high radiation dose outage 1R9 where it experienced System and Residual Heat rates from the Reactor Coolant of the high dose rates was Removal System. The root cause and a December 1998 plant trip.
believed to be plant chemistry RP were being taken to improve Appropriate corrective actions performance and practices.
has previous periods that PG&E The DCISC has concluded in effectively managed its refueling outages.
4.12.2 Current Period Activities during this reporting There were two outages performed
& 2R10 in May 2001).
period (1R10 in October 2000 DCISC reviewed the plans, observed Outage 1R10 - October 2000.
of the results of the outage the outage and had presentations 4-65
at three Fact-Finding Meetings (Volume II, Exhibits D.2, D.3,
& D.6) and PG&E made presentations at two Public Meetings September, 2000 and February, 2001 (Volume II, Exhibits B.3 &
B.6) .
The DCISC observed many of the outage events during the October 25 & 26, 2000 Fact-Finding Meeting. They attended the daily outage meeting for outage 1R9. This was the 1 7 th day of the outage. Overall progress to date was reported and the outage was about two days behind schedule. Radiation exposure to date was 104.3 person-Rem, compared to an estimated 119.9 person-Rem. There had been two recordable injuries to date, neither of which was rated as serious. There had been three reportable events in contrast to the Outage Safety Plan goal of zero. The schedule for the remaining outage activities was distributed and reviewed.
The IR10 Daily Outage Meeting appeared appropriate for tracking outage activities, planning, and coordination, as well as maintaining system status to protect personnel and nuclear safety The DCISC Team observed activities in the Outage Work Control Center (OWCC) . Operations had formed "super crews" to handle work control during the outage. Super crews consisted of two twelve-hour shifts comprised of operators who were not involved in running either unit during the outage. They primarily coordinated clearances, one of the more important operations-related functions at the plant, and assisted Operations with outage-related duties.
The Outage Safety Plan was reviewed. The DCISC has reviewed the Plan in the past and found it to be a good tool for safety awareness and guidance for maintaining plant safety status in conjunction with the defense-in-depth approach to nuclear safety. The Plan summarized the outage scope and goals, RCS inventory control and contingency plans. The Plan appeared comprehensive and on-target. In the outage coordination room there was a useful chart on the wall showing Reactor Vessel and Cavity water level and heat removal modes during various plant states and operational activities. The DCISC believes this chart helps keep personnel aware of the conditions that apply during each mode.
Hot mid-loop operation was the most successful to date. It was performed in the shortest time on record at Diablo Canyon, and with no challenges.
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out in Outage IRl0 was also The main turbine work carried an inspection of No. 3 Low reviewed. The plant had performed the rotor with a refurbished Pressure Turbine and replaced outage. The inspection revealed spare as it normally does each been of the connected shroud had that part of a blade and part next outage.
prior to the lost. The rotor will be repaired to be the cause. A tour of the High cycle fatigue was believed Unit 1 turbine area was performed.
a tour of the Unit 1 The DCISC Team also performed fuel movement, installation of Containment. The group observed radiation protection activities, the new sump debris racks, The refueling equipment and other miscellaneous activities.
appeared to work well.
inside containment appeared Radiation protection practices more personnel in appropriate, although there seemed to be exiting the containment, the containment than necessary. Upon Radiation Protection effectively processed by group was personnel.
being events, the IRIO outage was Except for three reportable with plans and goals.
performed safely in accordance Radiation Protection, Outage IR10 RP Results - the Director, of the Radiation Protection presented a summary of performance 2000 Fact-Finding Meeting.
Dept. during IR10 at the November made was 162.5 person-Rem which The official exposure for 1R10 Unit in unit one's outage history.
IR10 the lowest dose outage the seen a radiation dosage in one outages have generally exposure (IR9 had an official range of 200 to 300 person-Rem good the reduced dose was due to of 314 person-Rem) . Much of last and zinc injection over the shutdown chemistry control two years.
incidents for exposure There were 77 personnel contamination good which PG&E stated was a of both clothing and skin, where their Director discussed examples performance. The potential improvements to reduce observations have identified One example involves the number of radiation contaminations. Canyon. There are new at Diablo the shoe covers that are use to wear and avoid some repeating designs that are easier contamination problems.
from License Event Reports (LERs)
The DCISC reviewed the NRC outage.
total of eight LERs for the outage IR10. There were a 4-67
Four were caused by personnel error, and the remaining by equipment failure (3) and poor contractor culture (1). None of the errors were considered system- induced. PG&E determined that the majority of these errors were preventable through the use of good self-verification, concurrent independent verification, and the practice of STAR (Stop, Think, Act, &
Review).
DCPP appeared to take a reasonable approach to the analysis of causes of reportable events during Outage lRl0. The predominant cause was human error, and they are taking additional steps to improve human performance with new programs and organization and training focused more on human behavior.
Overall, with the exception of meeting the schedule, it appears that lRI0 was a very successful outage from personnel and nuclear safety and cost.
Outage 2R10 - May 2001. DCISC reviewed the plans and had presentation of the results of the outage at one Fact-Finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibits D.8) and PG&E made presentations at two Public Meetings in February 2001 and June 2001 (Volume II, Exhibits B.6 & B.9).
Radiation Protection (RP) Planning for Outage 2R10 The DCISC Team discussed RP plans for Outage 2R10 with the DCPP Manager of RP. In addition to the normal plans, there were the following changes:
" Simplified Radiological Posting - previous signs identifying High Radiation Areas (HRAs) were too confusing because the layout was not standardized and contained many different instructions and labels. The revised signage consisted of three easy-to-comprehend pieces of information, always in the same order. Each of the labels is color-coded for quick identification and understanding.
"* Work briefings moved outside of Containment - previous in-Containment briefings were adding to doses, and moving them to low-dose areas will help to lower doses.
"* Hot Particle Control emphasis changed - the previous high emphasis on Hot Particle Control was changed to overall Contamination Control, which includes all radioactive 4-68
contamination.
footwear - a change
- Improvements in protective clothing bootie to a separate nylon from the integral nylon/rubber will be safer on slippery bootie and rubber overshoe contaminations.
surfaces and will help reduce for radiation protection planning In addition to the normal logical what appear to be simple, Outage 2R10, DCPP has made lower-dose radiological postings, and effective changes to control, and protective work planning locations, contamination clothing.
2R10 and Safety Plans Plans for Refueling Outage with the for 2R10 refueling outage PG&E presented the plans II, 2001 Public Meeting (Volume safety plans at the February scope of the outage Exhibit B.6). The major maintenance fuel repair, steam generator include: refueling and and 480 main turbine generator maintenance, 4 kv maintenance, and surveillance valve maintenance v bus H maintenance, of fuel damage have been found testing. Chemistry indications one open rod on one fuel assembly for unit 2 which may involve sipping of the and consequently, PG&E will be doing in-mast will assemblies removed to locate any fuel damage. They fuel fuel place to deal with any damaged have contingency plans in spent fuel pool.
discovered once it is in the for 2R10 include:
The major projects identified
"* Main feedwater piping replacement Screen modifications
"* Containment Recirculating Sump replacement
"* Reactor Coolant Pump Motor cable dismounting
"* Main Generator Current Transformer Level Indication System
"* Reactor Vessel Refueling upgrade System
"* Reactor Coolant System Vacuum Refill of goals for 2R10 include achieving an exposure goal Personnel safety incidents, errors or
<=109 person-Rem with no personnel Nuclear safety goals include disabling or reportable injuries. event the core in any location, no loss of core cooling with no equipment damage.
free mid-loop operations and and cost is for a 35-day outage The budget for outage duration for a 30-day million, the goal is at a direct cost of $31 achieve
$30 million. The plan is to outage at a direct cost of 4-69
the outage in 26-27 days at a direct cost of no more than $28 million. PG&E reviewed the schedule for 2R10 major milestones in outage preplanning including work order preparation, issuance of the Rev. 0 Schedule, completion and issuance of work instructions.
The Outage Safety Plan would be very similar to that for IRI0.
There have been no unusual activities or risks identified and the overall risk will be about the same as recent DCPP outages. The higher risk evolutions will be the two mid-loop operations, before core offload and following core reload.
PG&E presented the focus areas for improvement during 2R10 including expanded use of pre-outage milestones, top priorities for safety and quality and attention to human performance fundamentals through use of tailboards briefings, self-verification and use of three-way communications. PG&E is also working to improve the Lessons Learned Program to encourage personnel to make immediate comment and offer suggestions to the Program in a timely fashion so they may be evaluated and if appropriate, incorporated and implemented during the next refueling outage.
Results of 2R10 PG&E presented the results of 2R10 at the June 2001 Public Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit B.9). 2R10 was one of DCPP's best outages from nuclear and personnel safety and schedule standpoints. In the area of personnel safety, they had no disabling injuries (DI) and only one recordable injury (RI) vs. no Di and 4 RI at previous best outage. The exposure was 107.6 person Rem vs. 120.4 person Rem at previous best outage and a 2R10 goal of 109 person Rem. There was one human performance significant event vs. two in the previous best outage and 26 security events vs. 24 in the previous best outage. The outage was 29 days and 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> vs. 31 days and 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> in the previous best outage resulting in a cost of $30 million vs. $25.5 million for the previous best outage.
The human performance significant event was the start up feeder breaker inadvertently left in "Test" position during performance of STP. The schedule was delayed 3 days and 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> because of generator core tightening/inspection. All the major routine scope work was completed as well as the major project scope work. Significant emergent scope included 1) generator through bolt/building bolt torque and 2) CRDM canopy seal weld repair (Volume II, Exhibit B.9) . Areas identified 4 -70
Pre-Outage Planning and improvement included 1) for and 3) cost Forecasting and Preparation, 2) Schedule Adherence Control.
was one of the reasons the dose Excellent shutdown chemistry for any outage. The posting of 107.6 person Rem was the lowest were no high radiation area program was changed and there new RCA turnstiles before boundary violations. DCPP instituted functional had no RCA entries without the outage and generator protective clothing electronic dosimeter. New steam mobility. The overall results improved preparation time and bowl dose rates ever, 2) low were; 1) lowest steam generator
- 3) low dose for outage and 4) dose for steam generator work, good success with RHR system flushes.
the 2R10 outage very effectively It appeared that PG&E managed measures except at DCPP in all to achieve the best outage review the performance of each cost. DCISC will continue to refueling outage.
4.12.3 Conclusions 2R10 It appears that PG&E managed the IRIO and achieve the best outages at DCPP outages very effectively to measures except cost and schedule. DCISC will continue in all each refueling outage.
to review the performance of 4-71
4.13 Overtime Control 4.13.1 Overview and Previous Activities The DCISC has been following overtime control at DCPP for a number of years. There had been problems with personnel exceeding plant overtime guidance and requirements; however, it appears PG&E has solved overtime problems and has good controls in-place. The DCISC will continue to monitor overtime performance but not report it separately, unless problems occur, such as that described below.
In its Inspection Report 50-275/323/00-05 the NRC identified a non-cited violation for failure of Maintenance management to review monthly overtime reports. Because of the difficulties in obtaining overtime records and the number of errors observed with the records, the NRC inspectors concluded that inadequate controls existed in the Maintenance organization for routine oversight of overtime usage. Several Maintenance craftsmen exceeded Technical Specifications (TS) limits for overtime usage.
A DCPP Maintenance Services investigation showed that none of the 103 potential occurrences were actually unapproved TS overtime exceedences, but a number of record-keeping errors were identified, and Maintenance Services had not performed the required monthly reviews. The problem was put into the Corrective Action Program for correction.
NQS also performed an audit of personnel errors during the time frame of the potential overtime exceedences. No cases were found where overtime contributed to personnel error. A NQS review of Operations overtime records found that review and approval requirements were being met.
It appears that the failure of management to perform Technical Specification required monthly review of overtime reports was isolated to Maintenance Services, and there were no unapproved no unapproved overtime exceedences; however, there were a number of errors in overtime records.
4.13.2 Current Period Activities Based on satisfactory overtime controls and performance, the DCISC did not perform a review of overtime during the current reporting period. The DCISC will continue 4-72
of problems.
to monitor overtime usage and indications 4.13.3 Conclusions Although no specific reviews were made of DCPP problems.
overtime activities, there did not appear to be any to overtime problems.
The DCISC will remain sensitive 4-73
4.14 Quality Programs 4.14.1 Overview and Previous Activities The DCISC has followed PG&E's quality programs continuously since 1990. The DCISC has looked at the following aspects of the quality programs in fact-finding meetings and public meetings in previous periods:
"* Overview of Quality at Diablo Canyon - PG&E has made presentations at DCISC public meetings on the quality program at DCPP.
"* Effectiveness of QPARs as a Source of Tracking Broken Barriers to Unsafe Operation - NQS is responsible for the collection of long-term data and issuance on a quarterly basis as the Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR).
The report provides input on broken barriers to unsafe operation, cause of barrier failure and trend data. The DCISC receives this report quarterly.
"* Utility Review of PG&E QA/QC Departments Audits - the PNAC requires an independent assessment be made of QA/QC annually. PG&E previously used the JUMA Audits to satisfy this requirement. The Region IV Utilities that participated in the JUMA Audits agreed to disband the current JUMA process and support the Independent Audit/Review by resource sharing on a given topical area. The DCISC regularly reviews these audits.
"* NPG Quality Plans - The Quality Plans, which are owned by each department manager, are designed to provide early detection of quality problems for the purpose of keeping the organization focused on the quality of their products.
The DCISC regularly reviews these plans.
"* Quality Assurance (QA) Self-Assessments - PG&E has made technical presentations at DCISC fact-finding meetings and public meetings to review their QA Self Assessments.
"* Quality Problems - DCPP has made significant progress in reducing the backlog of Quality Problems.
"* Operating Experience Activities - In the area of Operating Experience Activities (OEA), NQS has reduced the backlog.
The DCISC periodically reviews the OEA function.
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Audit Review Board (ARB) whose NQS has established an effective and efficient QA objectives are: 1) foster a strong, critical function, 2) ensure a consistent and aggressive programs, performance, and material evaluation of plant condition, and 3) serve as a forum for early identification may impede the conduct of and resolution of conditions that QPAR on how each department audits. NQS looks at the year-end overall assessment of yearly is doing for the year to give an performance.
has found that the quality In previous periods the DCISC assurance function appeared effective.
4.14.2 Current Period Activities DCISC had DCPP NQS During the current period, the at three Public Meeting presentations on Quality Programs (Volume II, Exhibits B.3, B.6 & B.9) and three Fact-Finding Meetings (Volume II, Exhibits D.2, D.5, & D.7).
and Licensing Meeting with Manager of Nuclear Quality Quality and Licensing The DCIS met with the Manager of Nuclear Meeting (Volume II, (NQAL) at the October, 2000 Fact-Finding which brought Exhibit D.2) . He described the recent changes (NSAL) and Nuclear Quality Nuclear Safety and Licensing organization, NQAL. Included Services (NQS) together into one Program, are the Corrective Action in the organization DCPP Risk Assessment.
Transient Analysis, and Probabilistic functions will work most management believes these related The transition to the effectively and efficiently together. the Specifications, specifically Improved Technical provided to Operations was preparation, training and support had been also described. He believed that the transition problems.
accomplished successfully with few Top Ten Quality Problems the NQS Quality Problem The DCPP NQS Supervisor discussed at the December, 2000 Action List for Aging Quality Problems The list (Volume II, Exhibit D.5).
Fact-Finding Meeting Reports (NCR), Quality Evaluations contains Nonconformance identifies the list (QE), and "A' Type Action Requests. The of the QP reporting methods.
oldest quality problems in each Quality problems on the list may not necessarily be old, but 4-75
may need attention by the line organization. He also reviewed three NCRs and two QEs, which they felt, were the most important quality problems.
The Corrective Action Program (CAP)/Human Performance (HP) programmatic upgrade action plan (current - 3 year plan) was also discussed. This included; 1) Cause analysis process improvements, 2) ETR process improvements, 3) Generic CAP improvements, and 4) Human Performance improvements.
It appears that the NQS group is doing a good job in monitoring the top quality problems and bringing them to the attention of line management.
Update on Self-Assessments DCISC reviewed the self-assessment program at two Fact-Finding Meetings (Volume II, Exhibits D.5 & D.7) and at one Public Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit B.3).
The current Self-Assessment Program was started at DCPP in late 1999. The program structure included a defined owner, a program guide, management oversight, and designated department self-assessment coordinators. PG&E stated that the program is doing very well, but still can be improved. The program should reach maturity by the end of 2001. The managers are continually encouraged to improve on their self-assessments.
DCPP performed 55 self-assessments during 2000. They have set a goal of about 40 self-assessments per year by the line organizations and have met or exceeded these goals. Overall, they have produced a large number of quality reports.
DCPP has generated 15 reports in the first quarter of 2001, but the quality of some of the reports has declined. Critiques are performed for every assessment and the results provided back to the team leader and the Self-Assessment Advisory Board. The critiques provide a performance measurement for the team leaders and may lead to continual improvement in report quality, schedule adherence, and team composition. They are working with other STARS plants on self-assessments to perform round-robin assessments between plants and share resources.
DCPP now has a new grading process for self-assessments, which they believe, will improve the quality of the self assessments. They have established a core group of 12-14 employees that meet monthly to review the reports. They reported that Operations continues to do self-assessments very 4 -76
on theirs. They still need well and Engineering has improved Each self to address generic items.
self-assessments action into the corrective assessment report result goes some self-assessments during program. DCPP plans on performing 2R10.
program well It appears that DCPP has the self-assessment the desired number of under way and are producing about assessments. They are also taking action to improve the the reports. They expect quality of the assessments, including by the end of 2001. It to have the program fully implemented to review the program and is recommended that DCISC continue at a fact-finding meeting some of the self-assessment reports in the 2nd Quarter 2002.
Audit Security Response/Reaction to QA Security reviewed with the DCISC Team The Security Services Manager, NQS audit of Security at the the Security response to the (Volume II, Sec. D.7).
April, 2001 Fact-Finding Meeting use the Plant Quality The NQS audit recommends that Security Program to identify and correct problems.
changes: 1) Security will Security has agreed to the following on all equipment problems and now write Action Requests (ARs)
Security will set certain use a trending program and 2) will write ARs, but will not threshold levels for which they Security will also do write them for every logged event.
trending on all the logged events.
eliminate the Security NQS also recommended that Security plant Corrective Action Review Group process and utilize Security is working Program with NCRs and QEs as applicable. it at this with NQS on this matter, but had not agreed to time.
NRC developments in the The Security Manager also discussed Working Group is working Security Area. The Utility Security with the NRC.
with NEI to resolve these issues responsive to most of NQS's It appears that Security has been and working with NQS to settle recommendations from the audit DCISC will follow up on these the final remaining issue. The Meeting.
issues at a future Fact-Finding 4-77
Nuclear Quality Services (NQS) - Status of Improvements from last Biennial Audit and NQS Self-Assessment The Manager - NQS Eng/Proc/Maint presented the status of improvements from the 1999 NQS Biennial Audit and the results of the 2000/2001 NQS Self-Assessment at the April, 2001 Fact Finding Meeting (Volume II, Sec. D.7) . Every two years, NQS performs a Self-Assessment of key NQS activities.
The corrective action for the three audit findings and the ten recommendations from the 1999 NQS Biennial Audit have been completed.
The 2000 self-assessment was started in December, 2000 and completed in April, 2001. The scope of the Self-Assessment included Internal Audit Performance, Personnel Qualifications, and QA Program.
The summary of the preliminary report results were: 1)
Internal audit process and implementation meet and in some cases exceed Regulatory Requirements, and overall performance is rated as good and very effective and 2) oversight qualifications meet requirements.
There were three findings, nine recommendations, and four strengths included in the report. NQS stated that the three findings were not significant ones. The report also noted that 1) audits were probing, performance-based, technically oriented, and monitored significant emergent issues and program changes, 2) audits contributed to plant performance by identifying significant issues and improved the performance of audited organizations, and 3) audit scopes were comprehensive and covered the appropriate regulatory requirements.
The role of the NSOC in selecting the scope of the NQS independent audit was also discussed. NSOC reviews the scope of these audits after NQS determines the scope, but has had little input into the process. The DCISC stated that they thought that NSOC should take a more active role in determining the scope of the biennial audit of NQS to give the audit more independence.
It appears that NQS is performing Self-Assessments in a timely manner and the scope of the audits seems to be satisfactory.
The DCISC believes that NSOC should take a more active role in determining the scope of the biennial audit of NQS to give the 4-78
had made a similar independence. The DCISC audit more Annual (Recommendation ROO-10) in the previous recornmendation reconsider its response of requests that PG&E Report and the audit plan.
having NSOC merely review responsibility to Basis: NQS has the Recommendation the Biennial areas to be inspected for determine the scope and the scope of NSOC reviews and approves any Audit/Self-Assessment.
that NSOC has not suggested the audit but NQS reports the Audit the audits. NQS also manages changes or additions to for the Audit. These the necessary inspectors and obtain effectiveness NSOC to determine the Audits are performed for Audit to be Program. The DCISC believes that for the of the QA and review and NSOC should specifically input on independent, they think should be audited.
comment on what areas (NQS) Review of year 2000 Nuclear Quality Services the Quality Performance reviewed and discussed PG&E 2000 at the Reports (QPARs) issued during the year Assessments Exhibit B.6).
(Volume II, February, 2001 Public Meeting strengths and positive stated that the identified on PG&E the increased focus in the QPARs were observations which contributed to the practices, radiation protection 1 outage, the accumulated dose during 1R10 for a unit lowest ever at of personnel contamination incidents lowest number contamination area personnel and the lowest non-surface DCPP at DCPP. The incidents for a non outage period contamination well to indicate that the DCPP organization responded and QPARs curtailments and shutdowns during 2000, plant transients, and use of self was noted in the quality improvement assessments performed.
was of the Improved Technical Specifications of Implementation to have been well coordinated and peer certification that judged Program ranked Assessment (PRA) the Probabilistic Risk PG&E among ten similar plants.
program as the best observed good use of self decision-making, stated that conservative were characteristics of innovation in design assessment and the Engineering Services performance by noteworthy focus and management during 2000. Increased organization of a Performance as evidenced by formation support of Human subcommittee Committee (HPSC) and Human Performance Steering were identified as Maintenance, and Engineering in Operations, was conducted One licensed operator training class strengths.
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and all candidates passed their NRC exams.
The 2000 QPARs identified certain areas for improvement including a number of equipment related problems, which highlight a need for a comprehensive program to address age related degradation of DCPP equipment. Use of Event Trend Records (ETRs) has had limited success in identifying adverse trends although that Program continues to show improvement.
There are, however, some organizations, which do not use the Program effectively. The QPARs identified less than effective use of the Operator Walkaround/Burden List and an increase in the numbers of Control Board Action Requests (ARs). PG&E stated that the QPARs and NQS assessments have identified many of the same issues and, together with Self-Assessments and the NRC PIs, they are used by PG&E to produce the Comprehensive Integrated Assessment Report for DCPP.
It appears that using the QPARs is a good method for DCPP management to identify the overall performance of DCPP for the year. The QPARs identify the adverse trends, the areas that need improvement, and the areas that are performing well.
DCISC receives the QPARs, which are issued quarterly. DCISC will continue to request NQS to review QPARs at fact-finding and public meetings.
4.14.3 Conclusions and Recommendations As in past years, the DCISC concludes that the quality program and self-assessment program have been effective in identifying strengths and weaknesses of the activities at DCPP and bringing about effective corrective action. It appears that the NQS group is doing a good job in monitoring the top quality problems and bringing them to the attention of line management. The DCISC will continue to review DCPP quality programs as part of its normal activities.
R01-5 It is recommended that NSOC take a more active role in determining the scope of the biennial audit of NQS to give the audit more independence. The DCISC had made a similar recommendation in the previous Annual Report and requests that PG&E reconsider its response of having NSOC only review the audit plan.
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4.15 Radiation Protection 4.15.1 Overview and Previous Activities requirements, DCPP Technical Specifications contain the details of their programs, and procedures to specify Although limits are specified, radiation protection programs.
of As Low As Reasonably plant operators use the philosophy exposures and (ALARA) to maintain radiation Achievable program; DCPP has a formal ALARA releases as low as they can.
exposure in the plant as well the program applies to personnel PG&E files reports as normal releases to the environment. exposures, and annually regarding personnel semi-annually soil, vegetation, water and releases outside DCPP and regular air samples taken around the plant.
of DCPP personnel exposure as one The DCISC regularly monitors It also reviews any radiation its performance indicators.
that are reported in LERs or protection events or incidents in radiation protection NRC violations. The DCPP performance has been satisfactory, and there have been few problems; not in the top quartile of the however, PG&E performance is industry.
occurs during refueling outages The major personnel exposure is Radiation Control Area (RCA) when most of the work in the annual goals for exposure, and performed. DCPP sets outage and DCPP also submits meeting.
reports these at each DCISC public any planned, normal radioactive a semi-annual report to NRC on Any reviews this report.
releases from the plant; DCISC in special reports, typically abnormal releases are reported none since the DCISC began in LERs, although there have been 1990.
following:
DCISC reviews in previous periods include the
"* Radiation Protection Events
"* Control of High Radiation Areas
"* Respirator Issue Problems
"* Control of Surface Contamination Areas and Plans
"* Personnel Contamination Experience
"* Radiation Protection Performance
"* Overview of the Radwaste Systems self Program, including
"* Overview of Radiation Protection NRC.
NQS, INPO and assessments and assessments by 4-81
"* Outage 1R9 Radiation Protection - DCPP encountered a significant problem in outage 1R9 where it experienced unusually high radiation dose rates. This resulted in accumulated exposures of 314 person-Rem. The root cause of the high dose rates was believed to be plant chemistry and a December 1998 plant trip. Appropriate corrective actions were being taken to improve RP performance and practices.
"* Radioactive Releases - Over the last five years, DCPP radioactive releases have been a small fraction of Technical Specification limits.
"* Refueling Outage 2R9 Radiation Protection Results - the station successfully met its 2R9 120 person-Rem goal.
Personnel contaminations were 128 compared to 209 in Outage 1R9 and a reduced number of radiological occurrence reports compared to recent outages.
The DCISC has judged the DCPP radiation protection program effective in the past.
4.15.2 Current Period Activities The DCISC regularly reviews DCPP radiation doses at its fact-finding and public meetings.
The five-year results through June, 2000 are as follows:
DCPP Radiation Doses (person-Rem)
Unit 1 Unit 2 Year Outage Outage Other Total 1997 193 - 26 219 1998 - 154 17 171 1999 314 120 19 453 2000 163 - 18 171 2001* - 108 6 114
- Through June, 2001 Through 1999 the best nuclear plants in the U.S. have doses below 80 person-Rem average per reactor per year for a rolling three-year average. The DCPP 2000 comparable was 267 person Rem. For 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 the DCPP averages were 176, 114, 281 and 268 person-Rem, respectively.
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Recent Outages Management of Radiation Exposure During experienced during the 1R9 The DCPP radiation dosage rate and outage resulted in a 314 person-Rem dose refueling set for lR9 of the dose goal exceeded by a considerable margin for upcoming 184 person-Rem. The DCISC reviewed RP plans Protection Manager. In Outage 2R10 with the Radiation plans, there were the following addition to the normal changes:
Posting - previous signs
"* simplified Radiological (HRAs) were too confusing identifying High Radiation Areas and contained many because the layout was not standardized and labels. The revised signage different instructions color-coded pieces consisted of three easy-to-comprehend, (contamination levels, airborne radiation of information in the same and radiation dose rates), always levels, order.
- previous in
" Work briefings moved outside of Containment to doses, and moving them Containment briefings were adding doses.
to low-dose areas will help to lower
- the previous high
"* Hot Particle Control emphasis changed was changed to overall emphasis on Hot Particle Control radioactive Control, which includes all Contamination contamination.
footwear - a change
"* Improvements in protective clothing bootie to a separate nylon from the integral nylon/rubber safer on slippery bootie and rubber overshoe will be surfaces and will help reduce contaminations.
person-Rem, to be achieved The goal for IR10 was set at 147.5 to those used during 2R9 using shutdown techniques similar Other during startup.
with the addition of an RHR flush spray/RHR on the 115-foot planned flushes included containment above the RHR sump.
level of containment and the RHR 162.5 Rem which made 1R10 the The radiation dose for 1R10 was U-1 outages history.
lowest dose outage in U-i's operational dosage in the range 200-300 have generally seen a radiation 10 Rem for a typical outage. The duration of 1R10 was 40 days contamination incidents hours and there were 77 personnel and skin, which Emergent (PCI) for exposure of both clothing the extended duration of the work contributed 12.9 Rem and outage added 1 Rem for a total additional dose of 13.9 Rem.
in the shutdown/RCS cleanup For outage 2R10 adjustments with a significant increase strategy were implemented to deal 4-83
in RCS contamination late in the operating cycle. As result, dose levels were reduced at many locations, including the lowest steam generator bowl dose rates in plant history. The overall exposure for 2R10 was 107.6 person-Rem. This represents a 10% reduction from DCPP's previous lowest value of 120.4 person-Rem in 2R9.
Changes in Radiation Protection Management, Philosophy, and Organization The DCISC met with the new DCPP Manager of Radiation Protection who came from another nuclear facility and possesses substantial radiation protection experience. He reported the following current organizational structure issues:
"* Diffuse supervisory accountability - there were too many direct reports to some supervisors (e.g., the General Foreman)
"* Rad Engineers (individual contributors) report directly to the Manager of RP
"* Rad Engineers not organizationally tied to plant process teams and production goals
"* High Impact Teams had been set up to follow processes but cross supervisory boundaries These issues and loosely defined program roles were leading to overlaps and knowledge disconnects between personnel in field implementation.
Organizational structure goals include:
"* Process-based organization aligned with Operations and Maintenance organizations
"* Supervisory accountability for process ownership
"* Clearly-defined, non-overlapping roles and responsibilities tied to Asset Teams such as
- Radwaste/Decon
- Maintenance Asset Team Support
- Operations Support
- RP Programs Support
"* Improved RP planning, e.g., Maintenance planning model and a full-time outage RP planner to help reduce dependency on contractors.
"* Implement new structure following Outage 2R10 4-84
would include improved supervisory The desired structure Quality Assurance (QA), Shift development with rotations into for Rad Engineers, possible Technical Advisor (STA) rotation rotation. The rotation, and RP supervisor RP Training performance would also include a better improvements supervisor contributor and evaluation system for individual these changes following advancement. DCPP planned to implement Outage 2R10.
Radiation Control Area Tour DCPP Radiation Control Area The DCISC toured portions of the Manager. The purpose of (RCA) with the Radiation Protection and improved radiation area the tour was to observe existing areas:
controls. The tour included the following Dose
"* Steam Generator (SG) Outage Primary Telemetry & Remote office with equipment to Monitoring Facility - a mobile and related SG inspection activities remotely monitor radiation fields.
RCA Access Control
"* 140-foot elevation Unit 2 Containment ingress and egress to the main access control point for Containment.
Access Control
" 85-foot elevation RCA Auxiliary Building for ingress and egress to Point - main access control point was processed in and out the Auxiliary building. The group access of the RCA here, including logging into the RCA RP instructions, receiving control system, receiving receiving hand and foot alarming dosimeters, and upon exiting. DCPP had added radiological screening to prevent personnel dosimetry-system-controlled turnstiles properly logging into the from entering the RCA without system.
Penetration Room
"* 85-foot elevation Unit 2 Containment
"* Several equipment rooms of the new radiological The DCISC observed numerous examples ALARA cold posting system, remote radiation monitoring and All aspects of RP areas (low dose rate waiting areas). and in the RCA appeared satisfactory controls observed being made of effective. It appeared that effective use was and controls.
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4.15.3 Conclusion The DCPP radiation protection program for controlling radiation doses inside and outside the plant appears effective overall. DCPP had experienced unusually high radiation dose rates during Outage 1R9 but had effectively reduced those levels in three subsequent outages. The DCISC will closely follow radiation protection during future outages.
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4.16 Risk Assessment and Management 4.16.1 Overview and Previous Activities to perform PG&E has developed in-house capability its Probabilistic risk assessments. PG&E periodically uipdates plant to incorporate changes in Risk Assessment (PRA) operational changes. The configuration and, if appropriate, original 1995 risk assessment PRA Group has been updating the and shutdown seismic, fire which included the sum of internal, 1.12x10-4 per (CDF) was risks. The 1995 core damage frequency at 9.72x10-5 per year - a year, and the revised risk is lower is due to implementation 13% decrease. Much of the reduction increased equipment of the Maintenance Rule and resultant reduced overall reliability and PRA modeling improvements. The flexibility in scheduling on-line risk permits more 6 per year maintenance. The NRC criteria are based on a 1.0x10-and DCPP will have risk threshold for on-line maintenance, that threshold to perform additional more room within maintenance on line.
important tool in At PG&E, risk assessment has become an and planners on how to providing guidance to decision-makers operations. PG&E applications best minimize the risk of plant of of PRA include, start up risk assessment, risk assessment assessment of primary vessel on-line maintenance, risk (PTS) and out-of-service risk pressurized thermal stress Rule.
assessments in support of the Maintenance PG&E controls its risk from on-line maintenance procedurally.
Group prepares a Risk Profile For On-Line Maintenance the PRA basis. The PRA Group works on a weekly, monthly and fuel cycle the On-Line Maintenance very closely with personnel performing been working very well.
risk assessment, and the program has (OLM) model has been used by The On-Line Maintenance an on-line planning tool for Operations and Maintenance as DCPP is operations and maintenance activities.
various (Outage Risk and Management) considering using ORAM Sentinel instead of OLM. Using ORAM, the PRA Group has increased the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump allowable outage times (AOTs) for water. Similarly, AOTs have and identified more sources of been increased for the EDGs, startup power, and CCWPs. AOTs and RHR pumps and have have decreased for the SI, Charging SSPS, which represents the decreased significantly for the shutdown highest-risk AOT. The Group planned to develop a model in 2001.
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The DCISC has found that the PG&E PRA performance appeared effective in previous reporting periods. The PRA Group continues to take a strong, effective role in plant risk-based decision making.
4.16.2 Current Period Activities The DCISC reviewed the following PRA items during the current reporting period:
NRC Report on Refueling Outage Risk The DCISC Team reviewed a recent NRC report on outage safety (Volume II, Exhibit D.6, Section 3.3). The NRC report analyzed data from 19 refueling outages, including 16 pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and 3 boiling water reactors (BWRs). The PWR list included DCPP-l and -2. The purpose of the study was for NRC to gain an understanding of the overall risk of each refueling from two perspectives: plant configuration risk and modification impact risk.
The report showed the expected and actual total risk estimates for each outage and identified the peak risk per hour. The report identified major modifications and maintenance activities, which could significantly add to outage risk.
Human errors and other operational issues contributing to risk were listed. The operational issues were of particular interest because they included events, which could cause loss of core cooling and potential core damage. The events included loss of offsite power, loss of shutdown cooling, inadvertent isolation of service water, improper alignment of spent fuel cooling, etc. The NRC looked specifically at mid-loop operations as a relatively high contributor to risk but also concluded that it received increased attention and awareness, which lessened its impact.
The NRC noted, as did the DCISC, that there was a wide range of risk values observed in the estimates of both the cumulative outage risk and peak risk. This was attributed to differences in modeling and other related data or analysis issues as opposed to actual differences in risk.
DCPP personnel were familiar with the study and had performed a full plant-specific, operational risk assessment as well as a generic industry modeling of shutdown risk. DCPP has begun a 4-88
shutdown risk analysis, formal, comprehensive, plant-specific in 2002. They currently estimate which it expects to complete plant risk. Upon risk at about 10-20% of total outage able to completion of the full shutdown analysis, DCPP will be to better compare risks in it and the operational assessment on-line maintenance.
determine when or whether to perform (PRA) Program Update DCPP Probabilistic Risk Assessment the DCPP PRA Program (Volume The DCISC reviewed the status of Exhibit D.7, Section 3.8). The PRA Group continues to II, era. The group presently progress in the new NRC risk informed engineers and a supervisor.
has three full-time qualified configuration support activities are model Their routine Rule Operations, the Maintenance control, risk assessments for applications for for Engineering, and risk-informed and management.
as follows:
Progress that has been made is update in two years
- Completion of the second plant model (WOG) peer
- Successful Westinghouse Owners Group certification and internal events Integrated model for seismic, fire I
including flooding Survey
- High PRA Group scores on the Cultural
- in service
- Submittal of RI-ISI (risk informed in December 2000 and inspection of piping) to the NRC January 2001 for reliability
- Development of a risk-ranking tool improvement projects outage time) for CCP 2-1
- Currently developing the next generation on SDP
- First plant to undertake NRC benchmarking Phase II (Significant Determination Process) its benchmarking, the NRC said PG&E reported that, following PRA Groups in the industry. The that DCPP had one of the best a PRA of ALTRAN Corp.,
DCPP PRA Group discontinued use They use PL&G, consultant, for support of PRA activities.
with any questions involving another PRA consultant, to assist call for evaluating the priority the PRA model. Future plans for the second half of 2001 of the next PRA-AOT application SSC) . The development of a (diesel generators or one ECCS been deferred to 2002.
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It appears that DCPP has been successful in staffing and developing the PRA Group at the site. The PRA Group is also supportive of daily plant activities and has prepared themselves to work in the new NRC risk-informed era.
4.16.3 Conclusions Overall, PG&E's risk assessment and risk management programs appear to be effective in supporting safe plant operation. The PRA Group has become pro-active and effective in supporting station decisions with risk-based analyses. The DCISC will continue to review risk management activities as part of its normal activities.
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4.17 Safety Conscious Work Environment Activities 4.17.1 Overview and Previous Period work environment supports The safety conscious as the (non-confidential) Action employees with such programs process, and the Employee Request (AR) problem-documentation report a Concerns Program (ECP), whereby any employee may and confidentiality, if desired safety concern with anonymity Opinion Differing Professional and the non-confidential surveys, by the Martin Program. There have been two major Inc (1997) and Synergy, Sigmon organization and 1998, November 1999 (mini-survey),
(September/October, discussed November 2000). Their findings and recommendations, below, were accepted and implemented.
a PG&E Operations shift foreman contacted a
"* In April 1996, of safety-related member of the DCISC about a number several raised with PG&E. After concerns, already and a review of PG&E's discussions with the employee, that PG&E had the DCISC determined investigations, performed a satisfactory investigation.
in February
"* PG&E engaged Martin-Sigmon Consulting Services assessment of PG&E's 1997 to conduct an independent and the safety culture in Employee Concerns Program (ECP)
Nuclear Power Generation (NPG).
employees with the ECP
"* The number of concerns raised by 1997 (36) and 1998 (37) . The remained fairly constant in 1996 also remained consistent:
number of NRC allegations was a had 22. In 1999, there had 21, 1997 had 18, and 1998 (13) and NRC (3) decrease in both DCPP significant back to DCPP to NRC referred one concern referrals. raised significant investigate. None of these concerns safety issues.
plant's safety culture in Inc assessed the
"* Synergy, It concluded that the nuclear September and October 1998. DCPP adequate-to-good, and that safety culture at DCPP is to identify potential nuclear personnel are very willing safety issues and concern.
actions by management for
"* Synergy recommended specific the safety culture, as follows:
further improvement of appeared to be Employee trust and confidence in management site-wide, with employees generally lower than desired 4-91
perceiving a lack of openness by DCPP management to input from the workforce. Some personnel perceived a chilling effect due to the relief from duty of the concerned Operations shift foreman. Employees were also concerned about future decisions regarding continued operation of DCPP. Synergy suggested specific actions to improve trust in management, management and supervisory practices, new leadership in operations and in maintenance, and the establishment of a 5-year business plan.
"* The results of the 1999 Synergy Mini-Survey results were as follows:
"* FH&S and NSSS Maintenance showed very significant improvement in almost all areas.
"* RP and Operations showed significant improvement in Nuclear Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment
"* Chemistry showed significant decline in almost all areas
"* DCPP established a site on their intranet website for updates on the ECP program, findings of the Synergy cultural surveys and non-sensitive results of ECP Investigations. ECP members are listed and can be readily contacted by e-mail and phone.
"* "Managing in NPG" is an effort to improve the safety conscious culture, training managers to be more open to employee input. First-line supervisors have been meeting monthly since December 1999, with plans to eventually include the entire plant. Evaluation questionnaires are used at every meeting to gauge progress and satisfaction.
"* PG&E established "Centers of Excellence" for process support of the Asset Teams, to facilitate cost reductions, safety, and communication. The Asset Teams are streamlining procedures with workers' inputs in the process.
"* PG&E conducted separate training classes for supervisors on responding effectively to employee concerns, and for other employees, to help them be more effective when raising concerns to their supervisors.
"* The inclusion of the first-line supervisors and then, the entire plant was a positive move in the safety conscious culture change, and appears to be going along as planned.
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supervisors to
- PG&E added 8 new classes for maintenance transition.
facilitate the implementation of the cultural with experience and "Process Partners" assigns individuals issues and team process to expertise in both maintenance the Work Control assist the Team Leaders in implementing Process and the "We culture."
to prcvide and support a The DCISC has found DCPP programs acceptable in previous safety conscious work environment periods.
4.17.2 Current Period Activities Employee Concerns Program of the Employee Concerns The DCISC met with representatives formal They reported that the number of Program (ECP). from within that Program has decreased concerns raised for the ECP previous years. Employees continue to utilize which are handled through discussion, informal contacts, On the other hand, the number of intervention or mediation. higher NRC allegations from all sources concerning DCPP is than in previous years.
it is noted that While the ECP appears to be satisfactory, of allegations, the numbers there has been an increase in the average of other plants in which are approximately double on this area.
the region. The DCISC will follow-up Organization Development Program Development (OD) Program.
The DCISC reviewed the Organization been redefined, to deal with The PG&E expectation for OD has in the organization, including training interpersonal skills are doing one in facilitation and communication. OD personnel on-one coaching, as well gradually replacing the outside consultants in facilitating the cultural shift.
being assessed. The 360 Leadership development is continuously managers, and directors, feedback has been used by officers, important in the move from to determine leadership behaviors, It is tied to Performance function to process management. and it is now management, Incentive Program goals for senior Survey will The Synergy being introduced to the supervisors.
reflect their level of achievement.
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Operations has been included in the General Supervisor Training, providing an opportunity to better integrate them into the plant. The next step is to move these skills to craft personnel. The new work groups, or Centers of Excellence, are meeting regularly, and plan on expanding their scope of synergy.
There are regular "connection events" where different employees are invited on rotation to have a "brown bag" lunch with an officer or manager, to discuss the culture change.
With dwindling numbers of attendees, PG&E is considering less formal interactions, with the managers being available for informal conversation in the lunch area.
Double (function and process) budgeting began on July 1, 2000.
On January 1, 2001, both function and process will give way to process only.
Regarding staffing, with baby boomers retiring, the Plant will be running into large attrition through retirement, making retention and recruitment a high priority. It takes 3-5 years to get new personnel fully effective in their jobs. All nuclear plants have the same issue, so there is more competition for skilled workers. The new hires will impact the culture, with more demand for increased attention to pay, job flexibility, and challenging of the "command and control" management style. The DCISC believes that PG&E should take the initiative in dealing with staffing issues by developing a long-term staffing plan.
There are major positive shifts going on at DCPP, in keeping with the times and other businesses. Based on a well-accepted model by organizational transformation guru, Michael Harmer, this culture change is on par with other plants and with other industries implementing similar changes in a regulated environment.
Effects of Reengineering Reengineering is a term coined by organizational consultants and authors Michael Hammer and James Lampy. It refers to the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business that is directed toward desired outcome. Unlike traditional organizational structure, which is more focused on tasks, jobs, people, or structure, the focus is on process. From that perspective emerges a new range of options for improving performance in the areas of quality, responsiveness and cost-4-94
The organization not only looks at how it effectiveness. goals, but also actually performs its processes to achieve its how the process can be improved.
to process teams; jobs Work units change from functional change from simple tasks to multidimensional; employee roles to empowered; performance measures change from controlled change change from activity to results; advancement criteria ability; executives change from from performance to scorekeepers to leaders.
are supports for the various At DCPP the Centers of Excellence The various new programs processes which are now the focus.
the prior, more reflect and encourage this transition from traditional organizational structure.
2001 Culture Transition Strategies Initiative was developed following The Culture Transition Synergy Safety Culture Survey.
concerns identified by the 1998 improve trust in management The Initiative is being taken to based on conscious workforce, and create an improved safety developing the following five behaviors:
- 1. Understand others
- 2. Embrace feedback
- 3. Provide face time
- 4. Develop and support common goals
- 5. Create a positive work environment have demonstrated a strong officers, directors and managers and efforts are being made to understanding of the new culture the supervisors. This is the fully implement the process with including bargaining first year that individual contributors, will be participating in creating a new unit employees, of PG&E's strategy involves culture at DCPP. An important part unit members of the gaining acceptance from the bargaining at DCPP.
cultural changes being implemented and exit interview The compensation, positive discipline, which have evolved and programs are examples of DCPP programs transformation process.
been aligned to support the cultural public meeting February 2001 For details, see the minutes of Exhibits B.6 (Volume II, and July 2000 Fact-Finding meeting D.1, Section 3.5).
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Results of December 2000 Culture Survey The DCISC met with the Supervisor of Employee Concerns Program on April 18, 2001, and May 2, 2001. The purpose was to review the results of the 2000 Comprehensive Safety Cultural Assessment that was conducted in November/December, 2000 on the plant-wide safety culture. The survey, which also included 40 employee interviews, was designed to provide comparison to the previous survey, conducted in 1998.
SYNERGY, the company designing and analyzing the survey, also compared the results of the DCPP survey to 12 other nuclear plants in their database to provide an industry ranking. The 2000 survey response by the employees showed improvement over the 1998 survey (80.4 % Vs 62%).
The first plant-wide culture survey was conducted in 1998, and the DCISC reviewed its results at its January 21-22, 1999 Fact-finding meeting (Reference 6.7), and its January 28-29, 1999 Public Meeting (Reference 6.8).
The following overall results were reported:
"* Overall, the DCPP nuclear safety culture (NSC) was rated "good to very good" and was perceived as having improved
(+6%) since the 1998 survey.
"* The safety conscious work environment was rated "very good to excellent" and was perceived to have improved notably
(+7%).
"* The Employee Concerns Program (ECP) was rated "adequate to good" and was perceived to have improved moderately (+4%).
It was noted that seven of the eight previous "targeted organizations" showed significant (>10%) or notable (>5%)
improvement. One of the eight, Shift Operations, remained steady, except for a decline in the Employee Concerns Program rating. PG&E and Synergy believe the decline was likely due to lingering concerns about the Operations Shift Foreman who was removed from duty in 1998.
On the other hand, the summary of results on "clearing the air on removal from duty of the Shift Foreman" showed that it appears that most Operations personnel have put this matter behind them. There remains a small but vocal minority who apparently have not, being concerned specifically about issues related to his employee concerns and to the related Department of Labor report. It appears that most of the lingering bad 4-96
senior management as opposed feelings are directed at off-site to on-site management.
are as follows:
PG&E's actions following the survey schedule with the
"* Develop an action plan and communications Culture Steering Team and management plant results and action plans to
"* Communicate the management plans to employees via
" Communicate the results and action e-mail and site-wide meetings Managers will hold section-wide
"* Following Outage 2R10, section action plans meetings to discuss results and results appeared positive for The 2000 Synergy Culture Survey in all but a few areas. PG&E DCPP with perceived improvements plan to address is developing an action and communications results and issues.
the implementation of this The DCISC will continue to monitor should take DCISC believes that PG&E plan. The the employees' perception of actions necessary to improve the Employee Concerns Program.
Safety Process (BOBS)
New Behavioral Observation Based above the goal, DCPP instituted In response to an injury rate identify barriers to working a new program to track incidents, processes safely and institute continuous improvement in work found in the December 13, 2000 and practices. Details can be Called BOBS 19, 2001 fact-finding meetings.
and June the program Safety Process),
(Behavioral Observation Based with focus on the involves many levels of the organization, person, conditions, and relationship between various elements:
behavior.
checklist, trained craft people observe Using a specific immediate feedback regarding workers in the field and give in of job safety. BOBS is currently system-wide issues Peak, plant-wide, as at Comanche maintenance, and will expand program. Craft people were sent which is a flagship for the program.
there to benchmark and learn the Summary of BOBS:
- Steering committee looks for barriers
- Peer observation of work by craft 4-97
- Immediate feedback
- Implementation of solutions Results based on the program's feedback have been as follows:
- 1. Increase in personal protective equipment use, due to increased enforcement and greater availability.
- 2. With the aging work force, increased vulnerability to injury has become an issue, with risk factors that include slower reaction time, decreased flexibility, and longer healing time for injuries. As a result, precautionary measures have been implemented.
- 3. During the recent outage, the safety report data correlated well with minor injury reports (pink slips) produced by BOBS.
As a result, they are now working on refining and reinforcing the process.
- 4. Motivation is high, with the workers gaining a passion for safety, with resulting increased savings and efficiency. There is an increased sense of control and empowerment, increased individual and "community" responsibility, and an increase in morale.
- 5. The program has helped increase safety awareness at all levels, and is supported by the overall culture. Rather than being left to the supervisor, the safety culture is pushed down to the individual contributor level. It affects not only first line supervisors, and crafts workers, but contractors as well.
The Behavioral Observation Based Safety Process appears to provide a major cultural change, and provides a positive force in increasing work safety. Even though its focus is on safety, it is teaching craft many of the concepts and skills involved in the "We culture", with resulting impact in other areas such as communication. It is an excellent way of enrolling craft in the "We Culture" not just from the top down but from the bottom up.
4.17.3 Conclusions and Recommendations PG&E's actions to improve its safety conscious work environment appear satisfactory. A cultural survey concluded that the safety culture was satisfactory and about average for 4-98
the industry; however, some employees are reluctant to bring concerns to management. PG&E has an action plan to address these actions.
these findings, and the DCISC will monitor the initiative in R01-6 It is recommended that PG&E take developing a long dealing with staffing issues by term staffing plan.
necessary R01-7 It is recommended that PG&E take actions of the Employee to improve the employees' perception Concerns Program.
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4.18 Steam Generator Performance 4.18.1 Overview and Previous Activities Steam generator (SG) tube reliability is important to operational safety, because the SG tubes are part of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) boundary. The nuclear industry has experienced substantial problems with a variety of failure mechanisms, notably tube stress corrosion cracking.
The DCPP SGs have experienced fewer tube cracks than most of the industry's SGs. This has been primarily a result of delay in the startup of the DCPP which allowed PG&E to take advantage of the industry experience with respect to water chemistry control, heat treatment of tube bends and shot peening of tube expansion areas.
The DCISC reviews steam generator performance following each refueling outage.
Steam Generator Tube Inspections in Outage 1R9 The DCISC reviewed the results of the 1R9 outage inspections of steam generator (SC) tubes. Overall, 461 tubes, or 3.4% of Unit 1 SG tubes have been plugged. This is well below the 15%
technical specification limit, which would require operational limits due to safety analyses. For U-1 the leading cause of tube plugging has been PWSCC, resulting in 234 tubes plugged through 1R8. ODSCC has resulted in 60 tubes plugged.
Outage 2R9 Steam Generator Inspection Results There were 67 tubes plugged in 2R9. Applying the ARC for Unit 2 permitted 138 previously plugged tubes to be reclaimed and saved 117 tubes from being plugged. The result was a net return of 71 tubes back to service. The total number of plugged tubes in Unit 2 is 365 or 2.7%. The leading cause of plugging in Unit 2 is PWSCC with 251; the second leading cause, ODSCC, with 46 tubes.
During previous periods, the DCPP steam generators appeared to be in good health and well within safety limits. PG&E's monitoring plan appeared satisfactory.
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4.18.2 Current Period Activities affecting DCPP The principal degradation mechanisms stress (SGs) include: outside diameter Steam Generators primary water stress corrosion corrosion cracking (ODSCC) and at the tube sheets and at cracking (PWSCC)at the hot legs, intersection; U-bend PWSCC; dented intersection and non-dented fatigue and cold leg anti-vibration bar(AVB)wear scarring; regular tube (CLT). The degradation requires thinning during refueling outages. During the current inspections the results of the IR10 reporting period, the DCISC reviewed inspections.
and 2R10 refueling outage SG tube Outage IRl0 SG Inspection Results was performed, During 1R10, a standard inspection of the SGs days. The inspection included which took approximately ten length of the SG tubes with a (1) inspecting 100% of the full
+point probe inspection of bobbin; a detailed rotating coil short radius U-bends in Rows 100% of the U-bend areas and the top of the 1 and 2; (2) 100% inspection of the hot leg dented tube tubesheet; (3) 100% inspection of the hot leg in critical areas, plus 20%
support plate (TSP) intersections at TSP zone; and (4) bobbin inspections in the buffer intersections.
during IR10 inspections of SGs Tube degradation was identified A total of 108 tubes were plugged and 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 and 1-4. The total of 65 tubes plugged.
43 were unplugged, for a net for the Unit-l SGs is now overall percentage of tubes plugged each SG and 15% overall. PG&E 3.9%, with a limit of 15% in approach the 15% limit before does not expect U-l's SGs to of 10% or 2005-2006; however, a plugged tube percentage to have an impact on generation greater would begin due to Reactor Coolant System performance for U-1. This is transfer area, requiring all (RCS) flow and change in heat impacting MW generation. At turbine valves to be wide open, believes sleeving the tubes 12% plugged in any one SG, PG&E may be necessary.
of plugged tubes at 8.8%.
SG 1-2 has the highest percentage tubes, which did not require During 1R10, there were 852 sizing techniques and the ARC.
plugging due to application of by a different manufacturer SGs 1-1 and 1-2 were manufactured than 1-3 and 1-4, which is believed to explain, to a great inspection results.
extent, the differences in the 4-101
The Indian Point-2 U-bend tube failure experience was caused by flow slot hour-glassing due to significant denting at the upper TSP. This caused high stresses in the U-bend apex, leading to axial PWSCC. Early detection was not made during inspections, as the crack signal was masked by noise due to deposits. PG&E has implemented lessons-learned from the Indian Point-2 experience, including: (1) establishing data quality guidelines which resulted in a significant number of U-bend retests using higher frequency probes and smaller diameter probes; (2) preventively plugging 23 tubes due to unacceptable data quality; and (3) plugging 4 tubes due to small circumferential indications near U-bend tangents. One tube with circumferential indications was tested in place to 4000 pounds with no resulting tube leakage.
PG&E plans to obtain NRC approval for a revised ARC to allow tubes with >40% axial PWSCC to remain in service in time to implement this ARC for one cycle during 2R10. PG&E will also seek NRC approval of reduced ARC exclusion zone at wedge locations and will request extension of W* ARC for another two cycles. Chemical cleaning is being proposed during IRI1 and 2RI1 to remove scale and reduce the potential for free span ODSCC. Sleeving and electro-sleeving options are being investigated for eventual licensing.
It appears that SG tube plugging does not have any impact on the safety or generation of the plant at this time. The DCISC will continue to review SG tube inspections and results after each refueling outage.
Outage 2R10 SG Inspection Results Inspection results for Outage 2R10, which concluded in May 2001, will be reviewed in the next reporting period.
4.18.3 Conclusions PG&E's Steam Generator (SG) program appears effective. PG&E now expects that the DCPP steam generators will last the currently-licensed life of the plant, if the NRC approves the PG&E License Amendment Requests for Alternate Repair Criteria; however, economic considerations may call for early steam generator replacement. The DCISC will continue to closely monitor DCPP steam generator performance.
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4.19 System and Equipment Performance/Problems 4.19.1 Overview and Previous Activities the During past periods, the DCISC had reviewed as some DCPP equipment and systems performance and problems of The by PG&E to resolve them.
well as the actions taken problems reviewed include:
"* Reactor Baffle Jetting
"* Vessel Head Control Rod Drive Penetrations
"* Failure in Welded-Steel Moment Frames Pump Governor
"* Water in Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW)
Orifice Performance
- Cracks in Piping Connected to
- Status of the MOV Program
- Depletion of Battery Power Supply
- Containment Liner Corrosion Temperature Increase
- Component Cooling Water (CCW)
- Single Failure Vulnerability I&C
- Impact of Ventilation System on
- Relief for Reactor Vessel Inspection
- Status of the Y2K Problem at
- Intake Area Concrete Delamination Instrumentation
- Reactor Coolant Flow Measurement
- Security Computer Problems
- Seismic Gap Problems and Repair
- Reactor Coolant Pump 1-3 Leakage Engineer:
- Systems reviewed with the System
"* Emergency Electrical Power System
"* Spent Fuel Cooling System
"* Fire Protection Water System
"* Security System
"* Emergency Power System 2000), the (July 1, 1999 - June 30, During the previous period items:
DCISC reviewed the following Generator Walls
"* Seismic Adequacy of Emergency Diesel Valve
"* Use of Potentially-Unqualified 4-103
"* CFCU Motor Cracks
"* SOER 98-02 Circuit Breaker Reliability
"* Year 2000 Update
"* Status of NRC GL 96 Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety Related MOVs
"* Program to Develop and Track Plant System Health and System Long-Range Plans
"* OE 97 Acceptability of Continued Operation with Containment Piping Penetration Overpressure Concerns
"* Turbine Blade Cracking
"* Reactor Vessel Head Penetration Cracks
"* Containment Debris, Sump Issues and RHR Flow Evaluations
"* ISI of Containment Structures
"* Security Computer Problems & New Computer System
"* Control Board Degraded Lamp Sockets System reviews with System Engineers performed during the prior period were as follows:
"* Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) System
"* Main Steam System
"* Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) System In previous periods PG&E's identification and correction of system and equipment problems has been satisfactory. Their management of plant systems using the System Engineer ownership concept has appeared effective.
4.19.2 Current Period Activities The DCISC reviewed the following system and equipment areas during the current reporting period:
System Summary Health Reports and Long-Term Plans The DCISC reviewed DCPP system health indicators. System Engineers have a system notebook for use in monitoring the health of that system. The notebook includes:
- 1) Walkdowns
- 2) Trending
- 3) Jumpers
- 4) POAs/OEs
- 5) Maintenance Rule 4-104
- 6) Long Term Plans
- 7) Predictive Maintenance
- 8) ARs/AEs
- 9) Upcoming Maintenance Activities on System Summary Health Report DCPP had just started using a Oil and Diesel Generator/Fuel two systems: 125/250 VDC System other System. This summary is currently being expanded to a method in 2000 to include systems. DCPP planned to develop of system Maintenance in the review Operations and performance.
a new program, which included The System Long Term Plan was as a issues and budgeting. DCPP had selected four systems these completed in 1999. Each pilot project and plan to have Term Plan for the system and System Engineer develops a Long Operations &
be reviewed by MOE (Maintenance, will to Estimating and Budgeting and Engineering). The plan is sent by ARRT (Action Request Review then reviewed and approved recommendations through Team). In the future MOE will make the normal budgeting process.
initially completed. The System Five systems plans were Long Term Plans, obtained Engineers had prepared 15 System and input, and completed the Maintenance and Operations review plans by the end of 2000.
with the System Engineer, The DCISC regularly reviews systems Health Report and Long Term and the review includes the System Term Plans a key element of the Plans. PG&E considers the Long Aging Management Program.
Turbine Blade Cracking in some blades of the low DCPP experienced cracks appearing that the cracks were not a pressure turbines. PG&E believed a possible thrown blade becoming threat to nuclear safety from the turbine casing.
a missile if ejected through the ejection of small pieces From an analytical standpoint, required to blades lack the energy such as individual safety a hazard to a nuclear penetrate the casing and to be (turbine manufacturer) system. This is based on a Westinghouse cases in which similar analysis. This is supported by actual turbines without penetrating blades have separated in similar separations of one-to-five the casing. These cases include blades.
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Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity DCPP Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.6 is the licensing requirement governing reactor vessel lifetime. Extended exposure to neutrons changes the toughness of steel, raising strength but increasing the brittleness of the material.
Steel exhibits a rise in the temperature at which its toughness properties change from "brittle" at low temperature to tough or ductile above this transition temperature. The TS requires that vessel steel remain in a tough condition at pressure, not only for operation but for pressure testing and early pressurization at startup when the vessel has not yet reached full operating temperature. Another limiting condition applies to a safety-related hypothetical event in which the maximum injection of emergency coolant takes place.
These requirements are believed to be highly conservative, but significant uncertainties still exist in material behavior, neutron dosimetry, variation of material condition throughout the vessel wall, mechanical testing and fracture mechanics, coolant injection rates and temperature effects, and the low probability of the limiting event.
Vessel material data is obtained from surveillance capsules containing specimens that can be tested to measure toughness with a number of years of lead-time become available. DCPP has its own surveillance capsules in place in the vessel, and the first two (Unit 1) and three (Unit 2) have already been removed and tested. DCPP also has some EPRI research capsules installed for irradiation.
DCPP continues to comply with its Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) for the reactor vessel, and its internal compliance program appears to be in order and under active attention by the plant staff.
Intake Structure Inspection & Results Diablo Canyon's Intake Structure/Circulating Water Conduits (CWC) surveillance program, initiated in 1991 for Units 1 and 2, monitors, restores and preserves the structural integrity of the reinforced concrete structures. The inspections provide data for trending the degradation of the structures as well as providing data on the concrete condition, assessing corrosive degradation and furnishing engineering properties of the concrete to assist in the development of future inspection criteria and repair priorities. The surveillance program is 4-106
and performed by Technical directed by ES Civil Engineering areas of the structures Non-submerged and Ecological Services. areas (dewatered during submerged are inspected annually and per fuel cycle based on inspected once refueling outages) are a sampling program.
surveillance and repair program, As a result of an aggressive and degraded concrete at the the quantity of the delaminations since have decreased significantly intake structure and CWCs and in 1991. The surveillance the inception of the programs the have effectively controlled the effects of repair programs structures to and allowed the harsh coastal environment currently The structures are perform their intended functions. status under classified as (a) (2) in good condition and are the The overall condition of the Maintenance Rule Program. classified as good. It structure and the CWCs is intake program surveillance and repair appears that the aggressive basis is ensured that the design implemented by DCPP has maintained.
V.C. Summer Piping Concerns 2000 crack was discovered in October A 4-inch circumferential in the A loop reactor coolant at the Summer Nuclear Station have Further inspection and testing system hot leg piping.
inner wall cracking as well.
confirmed axial cracking and crack in PWR RCS This is the first discovery of a significant that Early investigations of this cracking revealed piping. why this circumstances which explain there may well be unique The crack is at the pipe-to-nozzle weld cracking occurred.
field-welded, and during the joint. This particular joint was part of improper bonding. A large welding, inspection revealed that weld had to be chipped out and replaced. It is likely the this positioning the pipe during the techniques used for other weld stresses and perhaps process resulted in residual integrity problems.
NRC has cause analyses have not yet been completed.
Root has regarding the cracking but issued an information notice DCPP 1R10 by licensees. During the not called for any actions from the In-Service outage, an experienced staff engineer to nozzle examined primary piping Inspection group visually of cracking or leakage were weld joint regions. No indications found.
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Security System Computer Performance and Long Term Plan DCPP replaced the main frame security computer in January 2000 and experienced some startup problems; however, the overall system appears satisfactory. At the request of NQS, Security has begun implementing the Corrective Action Program by generating ARs to identify problems and track their resolution; however, their program to trend security equipment problems was not being implementing properly. They presently do not have a long-term plan for security equipment, but intend to develop one.
Security has performed four self-assessments this year to identify issues and correct them. They have implemented a supervisor observation program for each supervisor to perform once each month. Security Services has not formalized a Human Performance Program like other departments. The Director is on the DCPP Human Performance Steering Committee. Security is considering doing more in improving human performance and has started trending information on how security personnel impact security events.
Security has lagged behind other departments at the plant in implementing the Corrective Action Program, Human Performance Program, and System Long Term Plan Program. The DCISC believes that PG&E should determine the extent to which these normally used plant programs (and possibly others) apply to Security Services and develop an implementation plan.
RCS Hot Leg Flow Measurement The DCISC reviewed an update on Reactor Coolant System (RCS) flow measurement. This topic involved the development of a new analytical model for the existing flow instrumentation to permit increased operating margins, specifically full power operation with the Technical Specification 15% steam generator tube plugging limit. Several other nuclear plants had obtained NRC approval to use the new methodology, and DCPP was preparing a new submittal to NRC. NRC had not approved a previous DCPP submittal because of hot leg thermal streaming, which could adversely affect the readings.
DCPP is sending operating data to Westinghouse for the development and substantiation of a DCPP model; however, there was no money budgeted for 2001 for the development. Revised analysis and a Westinghouse topical report are planned for 2002.
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to NRC and have received Other plants have made submittals approval. Sequoyah utilized IOCFR50.59 for the change, but NRC is not accepting this approach any longer. South Texas Plant the model. McGuire Nuclear received approval but is not using but from a different Station uses an approved methodology flow detector, but it model. DCPP had considered an ultrasonic calibration.
is expensive and requires more extensive actions on the new RCS flow Apparently, DCPP will not take any to budget methodology until 2002, due measurement considerations.
new Reactor Coolant DCPP is proceeding slowly on using the methodology due to budget System hot leg flow measurement no adverse safety impact and considerations; however, there is plugging gets close to the no urgency until steam generator which has passed since this 15% limit. With the long time, program was started, and the mixed results with similar re-examine its projects in the industry, PG&E may wish to plans.
with their respective The DCISC reviewed the following systems System Engineers as part of its ongoing system reviews:
Control Room Ventilation System environment in the The CRVS functions to provide a habitable to remotely manipulate Control Room (CR) to allow operators to shut down the reactor systems, structures and components The CRVS and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
and off-normal and accident operates during normal operation and independent CRVS.
modes. Units 1 and 2 contain separate The safety-related system is designed to enter one of the conditions:
following modes, depending on plant
"* Mode 1: Normal Operation
"* Mode 2: Smoke Removal (when the other unit goes
"* Mode 3: Full Recirculation into Mode 4)
"* Mode 4: Accident is by a Safety Injection Activation into a particular mode Manual monitor signal or manually.
Signal, radiation for example, upon smoke generation activation would occur, air is pulled from the from a fire. In normal operation supply turbine mounted on the ends of the normal air intakes 4-109
building, filtered and conditioned prior to being admitted to the CR. In Mode 4 the outside air intake is changed to a remote intake, and the system activates heaters and high efficiency particulate & charcoal filters to remove radioactive or other contaminates which might be released within or outside the plant in an accident. The system is designed to maintain a slightly positive pressure in the CR to prevent unfiltered in-leakage. Portions of the system are safety-related, i.e., necessary to function during accidents.
The DCISC reviewed Maintenance Rule Performance Reports on the CRVS. The results for the CRVS appeared satisfactory.
The System Engineer led the DCISC on a walkdown of the system using the System Engineer Walkdown Checklist and pointing out significant system features and components. The physical system observed appeared satisfactory.
The DCPP Control Room Ventilation System appeared satisfactory, and the System Engineer was knowledgeable about the system.
Low Level Liquid & Solid Radwaste Handling Systems The liquid radwaste system included the Chemical and Volume Control System, Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System, and Boron Recycle System. System inputs, processing equipment, alignment, and discharges were described. Annual radioactive waste discharges have been a small fraction of NRC limits.
The Solid Radwaste System included Spent Resin Transfer, Spent Filter Handling, Mobile Vendor Packaging, and Dry Active Waste Packaging. PG&E has on-site storage space for about 500 boxes of Class A waste and has contracted with Envirocare Disposal to dispose of some solid waste. DCPP plans to dispose of Class B & C waste at Barnwell, SC as long as that site is open and use Envirocare. The plant has about 18 years' storage space on-site.
Auxiliary Saltwater System The ASW System supplies cooling water to the Component Cooling Water heat exchangers from the ultimate heat sink (Pacific Ocean) in order to reject heat from primary plant systems.
The only significant active components are the redundant Auxiliary Salt Water Pumps located in the Intake Structure.
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each of the two redundant trains There are two ASW Pumps for in a watertight system. Each pump is located of the damage to the motor as a result compartment to prevent water doors assure that flooding of flooding or tsunami. Watertight opposite train does not affect the of one compartment capability. The operability, thus maintaining safe shutdown an ASW Pump could be replaced System Engineer reported that 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> as compared to the on-line, if necessary, in about allowed outage time.
72-hour Technical Specification was developed by the system The ASW system long-term plan upgrades, modifications or engineer for system improvements, The assure long-term reliability.
major repairs/maintenance to plans for ASW appeared satisfactory.
system health, i.e., performance The DCISC team reviewed ASW Rule Program.
on the Maintenance indicators, which were based was in Alert status due One component, a CCW heat exchanger, than others. Also, some ASW to having a higher rate of fouling sticking but had been repaired.
vacuum breakers had been piping near the intake Several years ago, ASW underground corrosion and was replaced.
structure had experienced severe had replacement at the time and The DCISC had monitored this showed that ASW had been found it satisfactory. All indicators operating satisfactorily.
portions of the ASW System The DCISC toured of the accessible and in the plant, observing items both at the intake structure engineer monthly walkdown and normally inspected on the system in good order, and the plant inspection. The system appeared appeared in good materiel condition.
DCPP's connection to its The Auxiliary Salt Water System, Ocean), appeared to be in good Ultimate Heat Sink (the Pacific System Engineer readiness condition. The operating and system and up-to-date on the appeared to be knowledgeable design, performance and health.
Water (CCW)
System Review - Component Cooling Health Report for the first The DCISC reviewed the CCW System information Health Report lists quarter of 2001. The System on:
- Performance Indicators
- Performance Indicators Discussion a(l) Status
- Scheduled Major Maintenance or Modifications
- System Long Term Plan's (LTP's) Requested or Approved for Current Year
- NRC Issues/Self-Assessments/Engineering Analysis PG&E reported that the overall condition of CCW system is good, based on the System Health Report.
The System Notebooks document the monthly formal system walk downs, the weekly tour (looking at the plant) and the LTP.
The System Engineer reviewed the LTP for this system. The plan consists of:
- 1) LTP Summary, which lists the item number, budget year, approximate cost, item description, status and date of status.
- 2) Appendix A - Detailed information on each item.
- 3) Appendix B - Excluded/Declined/Completed LTP Items All System Engineers are to have a System Health Report ready for each system before start of 2R10. The System Engineer will then show these reports to Operations Department to get them to use it. The System Engineer reported that the System Health Reports are presently being used by the Engineering Department but do not get much use by the other Departments.
It appears that the System Health Reports and the Long Term Plans are useful in determining the condition of the system and planning long-term maintenance or modification on the system. From information reviewed on the System Health Report, the Component Cooling Water System appears to be in good condition.
The DCISC believes that PG&E should develop a plan for how these reports should be utilized by Operations and Maintenance.
4.19.3 Conclusions and Recommendations PG&E appears to have taken appropriate action in addressing system and equipment performance issues; however as noted in several instances, the DCISC believes additional work is needed and has provided recommendations accordingly. The DCISC will continue to review this area as part of its normal activities.
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the normally used R01-8 It is recommended that PG&E apply Action Program, Human Performance Corrective Plan Program (and Program, and System Long Term and develop an possibly others) to Security Services implementation plan.
a plan for how R01-9 It is recommended that PG&E develop Plans should be System Health Reports and Long Term utilized by Operations and Maintenance.
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4.20 Training and Development Programs 4.20.1 Overview and Previous Period Activities The DCISC has looked at the following development, culture change, and improvement programs at DCPP during the past reporting periods:
"* Facilitative Leadership program
"* Outdoor day-long team-building program
"* Operations Personnel Training - much-needed training in building communication skills, besides technical competencies, and bringing DCPP up to current high standards
"* Cultural Strategy Training - to help clarify DCPP's current culture, as reflected in part by the Synergy Report, and design one that is optimal, particularly for the new competitive environment
"* Operator Training Program Self-Assessment - -The DCPP self assessment of actions on areas-for-improvement from the INPO operator training program accreditation appeared to be sufficiently responsive.
"* Observation of "Managing for Nuclear Safety Revisited" training - informative and on-target in preparing supervisors to effectively receive and respond to employee concerns
"* "Observation and Intervention Skills" Training - to help operations supervisors better observe operators at work, assess their performance, intervene when necessary, and reinforce good behavior.
"* Asset Team Support - Human Performance support of the asset teams had dwindled as lid the relationship with the SPARK team. The DCISC believed that these coach-the-coaches meetings should be reinstated.
"* Supervisory Leadership Meeting - Follow-up to the previous Cultural Strategy training with upper management, now geared to supervisors
"* Observation Operator Re-qualification Class - to review and be able to trouble shoot failures in the emergency diesel generator
"* INPO Accredited Training Programs - There are twelve INPO accredited training programs, which are currently under the purview of the Learning Services organization. For details, refer to minutes of Sept public meeting. Six of these accredited training programs focus solely on the Operations organization: Non-licensed Operator, Reactor Operator, Senior Reactor Operator, Shift Manager, Shift Technical 4-114
Two of the Advisor, and Operations Continuing Training.
serve both the Chemistry and INPO-accredited programs as their personnel are Radiation Protection organizations, focused multi-functional. INPO-accredited programs are also Maintenance Supervisor, and on Mechanical Maintenance, Engineering Support.
DCPP training and development The DCISC has found that the periods.
programs acceptable in previous 4.20.2 Current Period Activities Training Class Observe Shift Technical Advisor was to present the knowledge The purpose of the training individuals to perform Plant necessary for STA-qualified the PEP M-98A used to calculate Engineering Procedure factor and maximum expected feedwater nozzle-fouling lasted two hours for the electrical generation. The training had operating shift). The procedure five STAs (one per Engineering Services during previously been implemented by assigned to the STAs their normal day schedule but was being at the plant.
because of their 24-hour presence handout was provided which included pertinent A student equipment set-up, and other drawings, theory and equations, The instructor and procedural information.
technical nozzles. The and fouled distributed photographs of clean the class by with instructor maintained good interaction Following the discussion.
asking questions and stimulating and actually into the plant classroom session, the STAs went performed the procedure (not observed).
qualification training in The Shift Technical Advisor for setting final feedwater performance of the DCPP procedure crossflow appeared nozzle venturi readings by ultrasonic The instructor exhibited good appropriate and effective.
and interacted well with the knowledge of the subject students.
the Accredited Training & Instructor Tracking Data Concerning Training Programs Maintenance Training and The DCISC discussed with various means Chemistry/Radiation Training Instructors the 4-115
that are used to track data concerning the accredited training and instructor training programs.
There is a Senior Management Oversight Training Committee and each group has an oversight training committee. These committees meet quarterly or more often if necessary to review the status of performance, problems and actions taken for each of the accredited training programs.
A Performance Plan Review Report is prepared monthly for the accredited programs and quarterly for the instructor training program. The information for the Performance Plan Review Report is gathered by the instructors and sent to the Director of the line organization for approval. The report has an executive summary that lists 1) summary of the month's training, 2) the top 5 training program issues and 3) areas for improvement (and work in progress). The report also includes answers to a list of 10 questions (each question is worth a total of 10 points) on the overall performance of the training program for that period. Operations training programs must have a pass grade of 80% and the other training programs a pass grade of 70%.
The performance plans were reviewed for Instructor Training Program, Technical Maintenance, Mechanical Maintenance and Chemistry/Radiation Protection.
It appears that the method DCPP has for tracking the performance of the accredited training & instructor-training programs is comprehensive and involves both the training and line organizations. The DCISC will review the Performance Plan Review for the remaining of the accredited training programs in the fall of 2001 and all of the Performance Plan Reviews in 2002 to determine the status of the improvements that DCPP identifies.
4.20.3 Conclusions The DCPP training and development programs appeared satisfactory, and the DCISC will continue to monitor them.
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4.21 Strategic and Business Plans 4.21.1 Overview and Previous Activities Bill 1890, passed in 1996, California Assembly With in California.
legislated electric rate restructuring utility industry in deregulation coming in the electric 1998, PG&E has been preparing for California beginning in organizations and rate structure competition by realigning its and delivering electricity.
and reducing costs of generating part in by doing its DCPP is following the corporate lead ways of doing reviewing its reducing costs and critically business.
through PG&E hoped to reach its competitive position primarily and processes to be more efficient redesigning many of its the most significant Twelve of require fewer personnel. eight for redesign. In addition, processes have been scheduled and Increasing other initiatives, including Unit 1 uprating identified. Most of the efforts Spent Fuel Storage, have been some continuing into 2002.
were completed by 2000 with Year Business Plan. The purpose PG&E has developed a DCPP Five plant all departments' goals and of the plan was to be sure alignment. Prior to the business goals match and have total goals and objectives did not plan, the plant and department have total alignment.
Utility July 1999 to form a Joint PG&E began discussions in with four other a potential venture Venture (JUV). The JUV was (Callaway, Wolf Creek, similar, well-run nuclear stations cost savings to explore shared South Texas and Comanche Peak) and to through alliances and increased industry influence operating to form a joint nuclear ultimately decide whether company (JNOC).
Resource the Strategic Teaming and The name was changed to structure was A STARS management Sharing (STARS) initiative. to begin teams would be created established and implementation be created New functional teams will on approved initiatives. and the Joint Nuclear to explore the next opportunities, study will begin in feasibility Operating Company economic 2001.
of priority remaining was to develop a culture supportive One "We Culture", shaped by an the business changes. The so-called team, emphasizes ongoing communication and outside consultant 4-117
feedback. The DCPP supervisors have been added to the ongoing process, and have been meeting regularly ever since.
In previous reporting periods PG&E's transition programs and activities appeared satisfactory with no apparent adverse effect on safety of operations.
4.21.2 Current Period Activities DCISC reviewed Strategic and business Plans at four Fact-Finding Meetings (Volume II, Exhibit D.4, D.5, D.6,& D.8) and one DCISC Public Meetings (Volume II, Exhibit B.6) as described below.
Five Year Business Plan The DCISC reviewed the Five-Year Business Plan at the December, 2000 Fact-Finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.4),
and PG&E made a presentation on the Plan at the February, 2001 Public Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit B.6).
PG&E reported that their Five-Year Business Plan is a strategic performance plan, which identifies key focus areas and that the Plan is updated annually. They reviewed some of the major initiatives, past and future, which have or are expected to impact DCPP operations. These efforts should bring DCPP operating costs down to permit the plant to operate effectively in the competitive electric power market in California. The Cost Management Plan, Performance Plans and the Re-Engineering Program were integral parts of efforts to reduce the cost. These efforts were largely successful in reducing the costs and, given the present state of the market for electric power in California, there is no question that DCPP is a very competitive generating resource.
PG&E discussed the four separate strategies to facilitate the transition of DCPP to the new market environment. These include: 1) the STARS alliance formed with four other nuclear plants with very similar designs to DCPP and that a joint nuclear operating company may eventually emerge from the STARS alliance; 2) continuing the Process Focus for addressing re engineering and cultural change efforts in terms of budget, costs, goals and organizing personnel to break down functional barriers; 3) continuing encouragement and development of cultural change within the DCPP organization; and 4) market development and creation of a strong market as that market 4-118
evolves.
Performance Plan through PG&E reviewed and discussed the DCPP overall goals for the 2004 and beyond, which defines PG&E's leadership, generation DCPP organization into safety, industry financial performance, and human performance performance, by the For every overall goal established categories. plan to Performance Plan, there is a corresponding the organization, functionally link that overall goal within by process or by and the implementation plans are organized Centers of Excellence concepts.
STARS partners to meet PG&E also intends to work with its the DCPP organization and long-term staffing requirements for and develop and maintain a plans are in place to secure, train skills required to continue workforce with the necessary operating DCPP.
Plan is helpful in It appears that the Five-Year Business and objectives. DCISC aligning the department and plant goals Meetings after they are will review this plan at Fact-Finding developed each year.
(STARS)
Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing the STARS Program at the The DCISC received updates on Meetings (Volume II, December 2000 and May 2001 Fact-Finding Exhibit D.5 & D.8). STARS is an effort to consolidate the similar nuclear stations to achieve resources of five of risk. The stations economies of scale and greater reduction Peak, Callaway and are Diablo Canyon, South Texas, Comanche Wolf Creek.
oversight; 2)
Work in progress includes 1) Labor-Sharing
- 3) Refueling Services; 4)
Digital Control Systems Upgrades; Room
- 5) Common In-Processing; 6) Control Fuel Services; Event Project; 8) Common Habitability; 7) Risk-Informed ISI Project.
Reporting Program; and 9) 10CFR50.59 in April 2001 and agreed The five Chief Nuclear Officers met forward with STARS. The on a collaborative document for moving and NRC are interested in venture has heard that both INPO stations "as one" to the considering dealing with the five all the shared initiatives degree possible. PG&E believed that common In the financial area, use of were going well. vendors however, some contracts appeared to be saving 7-10%;
contracts (e.g., turbine were wary due to existing separate 4-119
maintenance). To date the STARS initiative has exceeded its cost savings goals (i.e., over $5 million at the end of 2000) mostly in the supply chain area. There has not been much opportunity for labor sharing during outages because of the similarity of schedules.
STARS stations will be looking more at operating, generation and service companies in 2001. A study will be performed to determine what value exists in this approach. In any event, STARS will continue as an alliance looking to share strengths.
The participants will begin looking at pilot programs to determine how they can get the most out of intangibles.
The DCPP participation in the Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing (STARS) appears to be continuing as planned, and there have been cost savings as expected. There does not appear to be any adverse impact on nuclear safety.
Transition Program to Prepare for Competition DCISC reviewed the status of the Transition Program for the year 2000 at the December, 2000 Fact-Finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.5). The remaining action of the Transition Plan has been incorporated into DCPP Performance Plan or Center of Excellence (COE) Plans. There is a Performance Incentive Plan (PIP), and Performance goals are based on functional processes. Budgeting is based on the four Core Processes and COE. The four Core Processes are 1) Production; 2) Manage Plant Assets; 3) Supply Chain; and 4) Revenue Realization. The six Centers of Excellence are: 1) Engineering; 2) People Performance; 3) Business Support: 4) Loss Prevention; 5)
Information Management; and 6) Maintain License.
All personnel are in one of the COEs and then loaned out to the Processes. The budget for the year 2000 was reviewed, as was the overall status of the DCPP Transition Plan. The status of each of the elements of the Transition Plan were discussed.
Original plans had some assumptions that are no longer valid and will be revisited. Staffing at DCPP is currently at 1257.
Over all, the Transition Plan is largely complete.
It appears that DCPP has completed their efforts with the Transition Program and has the implementation well under way.
4-120
Performance Plans from the Business Support The DCISC met with DCPP Personnel (Volume II, Group at the March, 2001 Fact-Finding Meeting 2001 on an item from the February Exhibit d.6) to follow up B. 6) on DCPP (Volume II, Exhibit DCISC Public Meeting the high level strategic plan performance plans. PG&E covered the the DCISC was interested in at the public meeting, and Plan.
and the DCPP Performance lower level implementing plans results achieved The overall DCPP Performance Plan contained
- 2004 (and beyond).
in 2000 and those to be achieved in 2001 2) Industry of focus are 1) Safety; The major areas Financial Performance; 4)
Leadership; 3) Generation Development, Sustain Performance; and 5) People (Performance, an Excellent Workforce, and Learning Organization).
nine Plan was broken down into The overall DCPP Performance Performance process-based and Center-of-Excellence-based from new breakdown for DCPP and a departure Plans. This is a These process plans the previous functional organization. for actions and numerical measures contained process-specific Industry the categories of Safety, the period 2001-2004 in Financial Performance and Leadership, Generation Performance, with These strategies, measures and goals are aligned People. manager and DCPP goals. Individual the higher-level with these will be aligned contributor performance plans from should have a "line of sight" goals. Thus, each employee plans to the DCPP plan.
his/her individual and team in these plans in eight Nuclear safety was included process further specified in the measures/goals. These were based plan actions and measures.
of DCPP performance plans The DCISC believes the hierarchy management method of disseminating represented an effective Nuclear safety is expectations to the whole organization. follow up The DCISC should appropriately addressed. being effectively the plans are periodically to assess how implemented.
4.21.3 Conclusion Business Plan is It appears that the Five-Year and department and plant goals helpful in aligning the plans objectives. Also, the hierarchy of DCPP performance 4-121
represented an effective method of disseminating management expectations to the whole organization. Nuclear safety was appropriately addressed. The DCISC will follow up periodically to assess how effectively the plans are being implemented.
4-122
5.0 DCISC PERFORMANCE INDICATORS to performance indicators (PIs)
The DCISC uses 18 selected of the Diablo Canyon Power measure the safety performance and for each DCISC public meeting Plant. These PIs are updated PG&E.
supporting information by presented with more detailed at the represent those presented The PIs in the enclosed table June 2001 Public Meeting. At its DCISC June 2001 Public these PIs with a the DCISC decided to replace Meeting, and DCPP performance of existing INPO, NRC combination during indicators will be developed measures. The use of these the next reporting period.
5-1
6.0 DCISC OPEN ITEMS LIST items is a database used to track The DCISC Open Items List reviewed The List is updated and for follow-up and monitoring. in The Open Items List included at each public meeting. 2001 Public used at the DCISC June Exhibit F in Volume II was Meeting.
6-1
7.0 PUBLIC INPUT period, July 1, 2000 - June 30, During the current reporting Safety Committee (DCISC) 2001, the Diablo Canyon Independent public input at the following provided the opportunity for DCISC public meetings:
2000 Public Meeting at The Cliffs at September 14 & 15, Shell Beach Conference Center at Shell Beach 2001 Public Meeting at The Cliffs at February 7 & 8, at Shell Beach Conference Center Shell Beach 2001 Public Meeting at The Cliffs at June 20 & 21, at Shell Beach Conference Center at Shell Beach 2001 a tour of DCPP was conducted Additionally, on February 7, and all three DCISC Members, for 15 members of the public, of this three of its consultants (reference Section 1.4.4 several members of the public report) . During the plant tour, and equipment being specific questions about plant asked or DCISC.
observed. These were all answered by PG&E members of the public raised During the three public meetings, as follows:
the following issues/concerns September 14 & 15, 2000 Public Meeting comments at the September 14 No members of the public provided
& 15, 2000 public meetings.
February 7 & 8, 2001 Public Meeting at the February 7 & 8, 2001 The following two persons spoke public meeting:
Grande, California expressed Mr. John Gagliardini of Arroyo receive contracts for further his opinion that PG&E should He concerning nuclear power.
research and development efforts on other PG&E projects stated that he had reviewed information Gunneson Land Project 18PO13, in the local area including the that that it was not PG&E's fault and he expressed his opinion result in additional these projects did not ultimately were no questions or power generation. There electric 7-1
comments and the Chair then thanked Mr. Gagliardini for his comment.
Mr. Les Goldfisher directed the Committee's attention to a lecture being held that evening, at California Polytechnic University in San Luis Obispo, by Professor Ernest J.
Sternglass concerning the health effects of nuclear fallout and releases from the operation of nuclear power plants. Mr.
Clark noted that all the Committee Members have been long aware of Professor Sternglass' views. Dr. de Planque commented that she has been aware of Professor Sternglass' studies for 30 years that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain Professor Sternglass' conclusions concerning the effects of radiation and that his claims have not been substantiated by significant numbers of scientists working in the field, both in this country and abroad. Mr. Clark also noted that there is an extensive radioactivity monitoring program of the local area around DCPP, reviewed regularly by the NRC, which has consistently shown the radiation levels around the Plant are undistinguishable from natural background levels existing in nature and that studies have consistently shown that the impact of the operation of nuclear power plants on radiation level is low and does not present a health issue.
June 20 & 21, 2001 Public Meeting The following persons spoke at the June 20 & 21, 2001 public meeting:
Ms. June von Ruden, a resident of Pismo Beach, observed that in her opinion the forum provided by the Committee is a valuable one and that it was unfortunate that more members of the public did not choose to attend. She suggested that the public comment period should be at the beginning of DCISC public meetings for those who cannot wait until the scheduled presentations for a session have concluded, and also noted that the use of the reference to "Technical Presentations" in the notices of meetings of the Committee might discourage some from attending its meetings. The Chair and Members believed that this was a good idea and agreed to take Ms. Von Ruden's suggestions under advisement.
Ms. von Ruden reported that a staff person from DCPP had sent her a letter in April to express concern over the Synergy report characterization of certain aspects of DCPP operations as "adequate" or "nominally adequate." The writer expressed concern over working conditions and lack of ability to interface with DCPP management. Her contact also expressed a belief that the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) was useless and that DCPP employees harbor significant mistrust of PG&E 7-2
management's actions and the NRC. Her source alleged that stress on the resulting in very significant levels of were given a higher outage operations were DCPP workforce and that stress and fatigue. Ms. von priority by PG&E than employee after with a copy of the letter, Ruden provided the DCISC The DCISC chair out identifying information.
blocking interest to the that the letter would be of responded Committee.
cannot wait that emergency planning Ms. von Ruden remarked day has a crisis occurs. She noted that this particular day until as "Lights Out Day" by some organizations, a been denoted to join in a protest when electricity users were being asked of electricity for 4-5 hours and she by curtailing their use DCISC might affect DCPP operations.
questioned if that action demand varies drastically electricity Members replied that, as this protest on a daily basis, it was highly unlikely that in California.
generation facilities would have any impact on whether re-racking to change the Ms. von Ruden inquired a viable of the present Spent Fuel Pool was really to capacity PG&E. She remarked that an engineer who claimed option for Spent construction of the original have been involved in the 20 years had informed her some Fuel Pool rack configuration inquired racks had cracked. She ago that the steel in those near the proposed dry cask the hillside located whether of landslides common storage facility was subject to the type bolting questioned whether the in the local area and she inquired as to its purpose. She also process would be adequate and whether one canister on the pad to the cost of installing or PG&E's contractor done by DCPP this work would be that the regulatory The DCISC Chair replied personnel. determine the requires soil sampling to approval process and other issues raised by Ms.
site adequacy of the proposed process.
addressed by the approval Von Ruden would also be of Dave Oatley stated that any re-racking proposal PG&E's Mr. and require further NRC approvals the Spent Fuel Pool would public input.
that the Luis Obispo suggested Ms. Sheila Baker of San of the consider inviting members or representatives to Committee other non-management personnel working at DCPP unions and to during its regular public meetings speak to the Committee having only what is achieved by open up the dialogue beyond to the DCISC. The DCISC management make presentations PG&E how to better replied that the Committee will consider Chair all who may process and dialogue to open the public meeting while PG&E's Dr. Cass observed that wish to address the forum. effect on safety, a barrier efforts are having a positive and employees.
exists between management 7-3
Ms. Baker asked whether plans for the proposed Yucca Mountain storage facility would affect the fuel storage situation at DCPP and whether rail or barge transportation might be utilized. Mr. Oatley of PG&E replied that, if available, Yucca Mountain would be an option for storage of DCPP spent fuel. He stated that no transportation mode had been selected, but the Holtec cask storage system allowed for transportation options.
The DCISC Chair replied that any future method of transportation of spent fuel would be subject to a rigorous regulatory approval process including public hearings.
Ms. Pam Marshall Heatheringthon, the Executive Director of the Environmental Center in San Luis Obispo, expressed her concern regarding negotiations between PG&E and the Creditor's Committee established by the Bankruptcy Court. She asked whether different reorganization plans might be presented for consideration. The DCISC replied that it was following the safety of DCPP with regard to the bankruptcy and would likely review any proposed reorganization plan to assess its effect on plant safety. She reminded the Members that the DCISC bears a heavy responsibility to represent the public.
Ms. Heatheringthon questioned why PG&E was unable to respond concerning Holtec's use of helium in the dry cask spent fuel storage canisters. The DCISC replied that use of an inert gas for these applications was well known and that adequacy of the particular selection was not a concern. Ms. Heatheringthon inquired if the power lines serving the 230kV and 500kV switchyard would pass over the proposed dry cask storage facility. Mr. Oatley responded that this matter would be analyzed in PG&E's application for the facility.
Mr. David Weisman, a resident of Morro Bay, stated that he was alarmed concerning the bankruptcy situation and the availability of fuel for the DCPP emergency diesel generators.
He questioned whether PG&E management, in making a decision whether to bring in a fuel truck, might feel pressured between the need for financial economy and the need to ensure a sufficient supply of diesel fuel. The Committee responded that it was satisfied with DCPP's diesel fuel supply and that it was following the safety of DCPP operations during the bankruptcy.
Mr. Weisman stated that dry cask storage for DCPP fuel was being treated as an inevitable event, while the reasons for dry cask storage were not being adequately addressed. He questioned whether the availability of a proposed storage facility for nuclear waste to be located at Yucca Mountain, coupled with the proposed increase in on-site dry cask storage 7-4
an extension of licensing for capacity at DCPP, might lead to issues further debate on fundamental DCPP and require use of concerning viability and advisability of continuing the creation of more radioactive nuclear power and the consequent had questions concerning the waste. He also remarked that he and concerning the high delay of the geotechnical reports the event that it was buried by temperature of stored fuel, in or other event. He mentioned a a landslide due to a seismic which seemed to indicate the study by a Professor Resnokoff could be raised significantly temperature of the stored fuel the shielding materials and result in a danger of melting or possible lead to and burn, which might subsequently ignite He observed that the Plant the melting of the fuel itself. be vulnerable to site is located along the coast and might that attack by terrorist launched from open water. He remarked concerning on-site storage of the public input to the debate concerning the small details spent nuclear fuels is solicited with reference to the overall and is not focused or solicited as well as considerations. He noted that state standards, bodies, may differ from the those of other federal regulatory Mr. Weisman believed the public standards set by the NRC.
how these questions wold be would be interested to know The DCISC approval process.
addressed by the licensing and and approval process requires Chair replied that the licensing PG&E's Mr. Strickland responded these questions be addressed.
design safety and maintains that PG&E has committed to seismic long-term seismic department which studies a geosciences impacts.
of many members of the Mr. Weisman observed that the lack of the DCISC may reflect the public at the public meetings plans are already firm and any public's perception that PG&E's concern only the further discussion would necessarily which has already been technicalities of achieving a result beyond the ability of the public to have determined and is meaningful input into the matter.
the current membership of the Mr. Weisman also observed that backgrounds. He asked how DCISC reflects science and technical health and safety might someone with a background in public to the Diablo Canyon receive consideration for appointment replied that the DCISC Member Independent Safety Committee. A for appointing officials take seriously a nominee's concern technical understanding of public health and safety and that is essential to assessing how a nuclear power plant operates safety.
was impressed with the Ms. Fay Magilhill observed that she she asked safety; however, efforts being made to address examines worst case scenarios whether the Committee adequately 7-5
when reviewing safety of DCPP operations. The DCISC Chair replied that if the Committee were aware of any undue risk, it is obligated to raise the issue with PG&E, NRC or state agencies. Ms. Magilhill believed that people living near nuclear facilities are better able to judge whether a plant should remain in operation than the regulators, who are heavily involved in nuclear power issues on a broad basis. The DCISC Vice-Chair responded that at the NRC safety is the primary concern. Ms. Magilhill urged the Members of the DCISC to maintain an openness beyond their own professional and technical backgrounds in nuclear power. The DCISC Chair replied that none of the Committee Members have any professional connection or financial or other investment in PG&E or DCPP.
These appearances by the public are documented in Volume II, Exhibits B.3, B.6, and B.9 (public meeting minutes) of this report and reported verbatim in the meeting transcripts on file at the Diablo Canyon Public Document Room in the California Polytechnic University Library in San Luis Obispo.
Letters and phone calls have been received by the DCISC Legal Counsel's office with questions, concerns and requests for information. During this reporting period, 26 calls were received from individuals on the DCISC toll-free telephone line. The breakdown of these calls is as follows:
Number Number of Calls of E-mails Reason for Contact 15 Inquiry about February 2001 plant tour 6 27 DCPP issues or nuclear information requests 5 3 Other (administrative, document requests, media and miscellaneous other than from the public)
When requested, answers, responses or documents were provided either during the call, a return call, or by a letter or documents from the Committee. The DCISC Telephone/
Correspondence Log is included as Exhibit G.1 and correspondence with the public is included as Exhibit G.2.
The Committee maintains a California toll-free telephone number (800-439-4688), an E-mail address (dcsafety@dcisc.org) and a site on the World Wide Web at www.dcisc.org for receiving 7-6
the public. The concerns or information to and from the questions, has developed an information pamphlet describing DCISC Exhibit I).
Committee and its function (see Volume II, are documented for public activities and meetings DCISC All documents in several ways as described below.
information Document Room at the California are available at the Public Obispo, Poly) Library in San Luis Polytechnic University (Cal CA.
each year (July 1 through
"* An Annual Report is published description of June 30) which is a comprehensive Committee activities throughout the period.
in the Meeting are contained
"* Minutes of each Public Cal Poly Library.
Annual Report and at the maintained at Meeting is
"* A transcript of each Public the Cal Poly Library to the Diablo Canyon Power
" Reports of DCISC visits Annual Report.
Plant are contained in the 7-7
RECOMMENDATIONS PREVIOUS DCISC REPORT 8.0 PG&E ACTIONS ON previous Annual DCISC has made 154 recommendations in its DCISC The PG&E responses and Reports. The recommendations, period are from the previous DCISC reporting to dispositions along with references in Volume II, included in Exhibit H bases for the recommendations.
the location for the in initial responses to the 13 DCISC recommendations that PG&E's in Section 8.0 of the last Annual Report were included meeting the DCISC found report. At its February 7, 2001 public follow-up or satisfactory; however, all PG&E responses as reported on several recommendations monitoring was required in Exhibit H.
made in the all of the recommendations The PG&E responses to in Section 10.0. DCISC comments current report are contained recommendations to the current DCISC on the PG&E responses DCISC Annual Report.
will be made in the next by PG&E DCISC concludes that the actions taken Overall, the satisfactory recommendations have been relative to past DCISC or improve safety and reliability.
and have helped to maintain
9.0 CONCLUSION
S, CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (July 1, 2000 - June 30, During the eleventh annual period inception in late 1989, the Diablo Canyon 2001) since its held three public meetings Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) (DCPP). The Power Plant in the vicinity of Diablo Canyon programmatic and plant meetings included numerous technical, In and input from the public.
status presentations by PG&E Consultants have performed addition, Committee Members and/or a general plant tour with 15 several plant tours (including visits and of the public) and nine fact-finding members Chair visited the California inspections at DCPP. The DCISC staff on DCISC offices to brief the Attorney General's safety activities. The DCISC employed two general/nuclear behavior consultant to review consultants and one medical/human documents and plant operations, a large variety of nuclear are documented in this concerns. These efforts and activities report.
9.1 Conclusions has Based on its activities, the DCISC concludes that PG&E safely during the period.
operated and maintained the DCPP Specific conclusions are:
positive steps in reviving
- 1. PG&E appears to be taking with new neglected portions of its Aging Management Program support, and several new leadership, augmented management initiatives (the latter due in large part to aging-related The DCISC has had concerns failures of plant components).
reporting periods and about the program in the last several A major improvement.
is pleased to see progress towards is the system long-term element of DCPP aging management engineers are responsible planning process in which system planning for aging-related for monitoring, measuring and effects.
PG&E's progress with The DCISC will continue to follow including review of the Generation aging management, report and the Passive Vulnerability Identification Team Team report. (4.1.3)
Device Aging Management Investigation appears to be functioning
- 2. The DCPP Maintenance Program to meet NRC and implemented properly satisfactorily 9-1
Maintenance Rule requirements. The Maintenance organization is functionally aligned to the work scope, and the On-Line Maintenance Program is soundly PRA-based. The DCISC will follow up on Maintenance activities and on the possible effects on safety of lowered/delayed plant capital spending. (4.2.3)
- 3. DCPP Conduct of Operations appeared satisfactory, including outage activities; Control Room policies and demeanor, and priorities; and preparation and implementation of the Improved Technical Specifications. The DCISC will continue to review this area as part of its normal activities.
(4.3.3)
- 4. It appeared that DCPP has performed well in its emergency drills and exercises and has been working on improving its communication of accurate and understandable radiation release information to the public. The DCISC plans to follow this item. (4.4.3)
- 5. The PG&E engineering programs, including Configuration Management and Equipment Qualification, continue to be satisfactory for supporting safe operations at DCPP.
(4.5.3)
- 6. Although DCPP has methods to track performance and work load of ARs and AEs and System Engineers, they do not appear to have a method for tracking work that is not covered by either ARs or AEs nor to identify the entire Engineering Workload to determine if they have enough resources to perform the work without getting behind.
(4.5.3)
The DCISC will continue to monitor PG&E's engineering performance, including workload management and a review of the results of the new Generation Vulnerability Identification Team report following its release in June 2001.
- 7. PG&E appears to have taken appropriate actions in response to plant off-normal operating events and system and equipment problems during this period and has applied appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The DCISC will continue to review this area as part of its normal activities. (4.6.3) 9-2
have Corrective Action Program (CAP) appears to
- 8. The DCPP of self-assessments, external been improved as a result of of other plant CAPs. Measures evaluations and reviews and were just being developed program effectiveness will right direction. The DCISC appeared headed in the of 2002, following completion review the CAP in early and the next self-assessment.
improvement action items (4.6.3) and DCPP environmental performance appeared satisfactory, meet
- 9. program appeared to the DCPP environmental to The DCISC will continue applicable requirements. normal program as part of its review the environmental activities. (4.7.3) inspections DCISC and NRC reviews and
- 10. Based on satisfactory did not review period, the DCISC in the previous reporting A DCISC current reporting period.
fire protection in the period.
is planned for the next review of fire protection (4.8.3) of Performance Program is doing an adequate job
- 11. The Human the data, and working toward error trending, evaluating error performance and enhancing safety. Human increasing and, largest cause of problems, continues to be the small, the of human errors are although the numbers The sustained improvement.
trends are not yet showing performance actively review human DCISC will continue to at DCPP. (4.9.3) well Program appears to be
- 12. The DCPP Employee Assistance its responsibilities and is carrying out utilized, will review this area as part of appropriately. The DCISC normal activities. (4.9.3) its which to be an issue of concern,
- 13. Operator fitness continues to a DCISC will continue to track. Indicators point the and it was not operator fitness, growing problem with with the measures in place to deal apparent that DCPP had problem. (4.9.3) fuel or fuel-related problems
- 14. PG&E appears to be handling and Unit 1 core has been reliable appropriately. The DCPP amount of has experienced a small clean; however, Unit 2 a fuel jetting and debris or fuel damage due to baffle returned to removed, repaired and defect. The assembly was 9-3
the reactor. It appears PG&E will maintain its 19-21 month fuel cycle or move to an 18-month cycle. (4.10.3)
The DCISC will continue to follow on-going problems such as expansion of spent fuel storage, spent fuel pool poison (Boraflex), and any fuel-related fuel problems or issues that arise.
- 15. Nuclear safety oversight and review functions and organizations appear to be functioning satisfactorily at DCPP. It also appears to be very beneficial to have the joint PNAC/NSOC meetings, since each committee covers much of the same agenda. The results of the 2001 INPO evaluation appear to be favorable. The DCISC will continue to monitor the PNAC and NSOC meetings to observe their review of plant safety issues. (4.11.3)
The DCISC observed that although there was constructive and helpful dialogue during the NSOC meetings, there were limited challenges to existing thinking and processes.
(4.11.3)
- 16. It appears that the Integrated Assessment Report is a positive tool for management's use to assess the overall performance of the plant. It combines all of the information from the various reports on the plant performance into one very useful document. The DCISC will continue to review the Integrated Assessment Report.
(4.11.3)
- 17. It appears that PG&E managed the IRlO and 2RI0 outages very effectively to achieve the best outages at DCPP in all measures except cost and schedule. DCISC will continue to review the performance of each refueling outage. (4.12.3)
- 18. Although no specific reviews were made of DCPP overtime activities, there did not appear to be any problems. The DCISC will remain sensitive to overtime problems. (4.13.3)
- 19. As in past years, the DCISC concludes that the quality program and self-assessment program have been effective in identifying strengths and weaknesses of the activities at DCPP and bringing about effective corrective action.
It appears that the NQS group is doing a good job in monitoring the top quality problems and bringing them to the attention of line management. The DCISC will continue 9-4
as part of its normal to review DCPP quality programs activities. (4.14.3) program for controlling
- 20. The DCPP radiation protection outside the plant appears radiation doses inside and experienced unusually high effective overall. DCPP had 1R9 but had dose rates during Outage radiation three subsequent levels in effectively reduced those follow radiation The DCISC will closely outages.
(4.15.3) protection during future outages.
assessment and risk management
- 21. Overall, PG&E's risk in supporting safe plant programs appear to be effective pro-active and operation. The PRA Group has become decisions with risk-based effective in supporting station to review risk management analyses. The DCISC will continue activities. (4.16.3) activities as part of its normal actions to improve its safety conscious work
- 22. PG&E's A cultural survey environment appear satisfactory.
culture was satisfactory and concluded that the safety however, some employees are about average for the industry; to management. PG&E has an reluctant to bring concerns findings, and the DCISC will action plan to address these monitor these actions. (4.17.3) program appears effective.
- 23. PG&E's Steam Generator (SG) steam generators will last PG&E now expects that the DCPP the NRC of the plant, if the currently-licensed life Requests for the PG&E License Amendment approves however, economic Alternate Repair Criteria; may call for early steam generator considerations continue to closely monitor replacement. The DCISC will (4.18.3)
DCPP steam generator performance.
action in addressing
- 24. PG&E appears to have taken appropriate issues; however as noted system and equipment performance believes additional work is in several instances, the DCISC accordingly. The needed and has provided recommendations will continue to review this area as part of its DCISC normal activities. (4.19.3) programs appeared
- 25. The DCPP training and developmentcontinue to monitor will satisfactory, and the DCISC them. (4.20.3) that the Five-Year Business Plan is helpful in
- 26. It appears 9-5
aligning the department and plant goals and objectives.
Also, the hierarchy of DCPP performance plans represented an effective method of disseminating management expectations to the whole organization. Nuclear safety was appropriately addressed. The DCISC will follow up periodically to assess how effectively the plans are being implemented. (4.21.3) 9.2 Concerns There are some concerns, which the DCISC believes PG&E needs to address in order to ensure continued and improved safe operation. The more significant general DCISC concerns are listed below.
- 1. Human error continues to be the largest cause of problems, and, although the numbers of human errors are small, the trends are not yet showing sustained improvement. The DCISC will continue to actively review human performance at DCPP.
- 2. DCPP operators continue to age, and fitness levels appear to be declining, but PG&E does not have an active program to address the situation.
- 3. The potential impacts of bankruptcy need to be followed.
- 4. A recent study for NRC confirms the general experience that periods of rapid change and stress can have an adverse effect on the performance of organizations. DCPP has and continues to undergo major changes, including reorganization focusing on processes rather than functions. In addition, employees are understandably stressed by major changes underway in the industry and the PG&E filing for bankruptcy. DCPP recognizes these and has been taking steps to assure that they don't affect safe, reliable operation; however, the DCISC will continue to look for any adverse effects.
9.3 Recommendations There are nine new recommendations regarding PG&E actions, which DCISC believes, are prudent for continued and improved safe operation. The specific recommendations are stated and highlighted in bold type in the various sections of this report. These recommendations are repeated below in order of 9-6
sections appearance in the report, and references to the report are shown.
and implement a R01-1 It is recommended that DCPP develop the entire to identify and monitor method that the necessary Engineering Work Load to assure support safe work is performed to effectively to help in ensuring operation of the plant and available.
engineering resources are adequate (4.5.3) of events is human R01-2 Because the predominant cause closely error, it is recommended that DCPP more Corrective Action and Human coordinate the training in human Performance Programs and utilize interviewing and skills (e.g.,
characteristics for personnel skills, human error characteristics) and corrective preparing root cause analyses actions. (4.9.3) continue to augment its R01-3 It is recommended that PG&E and aging to consider programs for operator health management", physical such areas as operator "aging on shift to further fitness, and mental alertness (4.9.3) improve operator human performance.
raise its R01-4 It is recommended that PG&E management Oversight Committee expectations of the Nuclear Safety take a more and external members to internal solving and problem aggressive stance in challenging PG&E should consider the status quo. Additionally, members (not just from adding independent external STARS plants). (4.11.3) a more active role in R01-5 It is recommended that NSOC take audit of NQS to determining the scope of the biennial DCISC had made a The give the audit more independence.
previous Annual Report similar reconmmendation in the its response of and requests that PG&E reconsider plan. (4.14.3) having NSOC only review the audit take the initiative in R01-6 It is recommended that PG&E by developing a long dealing with staffing issues term staffing plan. (4.17.3) 9-7
R01-7 It is recommended that PG&E take actions necessary to improve the employees' perception of the Employee Concerns Program. (4.17.3)
R01-8 It is recommended that PG&E apply the normally used Corrective Action Program, Human Performance Program, and System Long Term Plan Program (and possibly others) to Security Services and develop an implementation plan. (4.19.3)
R01-9 It is recommended that PG&E develop a plan for how System Health Reports and Long Term Plans should be utilized by Operations and Maintenance. (4.19.3)
The DCISC has also reviewed and considered issues raised by members of the public and has responded to or is investigating them. The DCISC finds that no issues have been raised by the public during this reporting period that would cause additional reviews or actions other than those DCISC has in place. There has been limited public interest and input at the three DCISC public meetings, with the toll-free DCISC phone line or in correspondence received by the DCISC Members. The DCISC will continue its efforts to more fully involve the public.
Finally, the DCISC appreciates PG&E's cooperation in arranging and providing information for DCISC fact-finding meetings and tours at its Headquarters and DCPP and for the professional, high quality presentations at DCISC meetings.
9-8
10.0 PG&E RESPONSE to the DCISC (This section is reserved for PG&E's response annual report).
10-1
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE SAFETY OF DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATIONS July 1, 2000 - June 30, 2001 Volume II - EXHIBITS Philip R. Clark, Chair*
E. Gail de Planque, Vice-Chair*
A. David Rossin
- for the period July 1, 2000 - June 30, 2001 Approved: October 17, 2001 The DCISC invites questions and conments on this report.
Contact the DCISC at the following:
The Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee 857 Cass St., Suite D Monterey, CA 93940 Telephone: 1-800-439-4688 (California Only)
E-Mail: dcsafety@aol.com
Volume II - EXHIBITS Exhibits Page A. Documents Received By the DCISC A-I B. DCISC Public Meeting Notices, Agendas and Reports B-I B.I Notice of September 14 & 15, 2000 Public B.I-I Meetings B.2 Agenda for September 14 & 15, 2000 Public B.2-1 Meetings B.3 Minutes of September 14 & 15, 2000 Public B.3-1 Meetings B.4 Notice of February 7 & 8, 2001 Public Meetings B.4-1 B.5 Agenda for February 7 & 8, 2001 Public Meetings B.5-1 B.6 Minutes of February 7 & 8, 2001 Public Meetings B.6-1 B.7 Notice of June 20 & 21, 2001 Public Meetings B.7-1 B.8 Agenda for June 20 & 21, 2001 Public Meetings B.8-1 B.9 Minutes of June 20 & 21, 2001 Public Meetings B.9-1 B.10 Typical DCISC Service Mailing List B.10-i C. Diablo Canyon Operations C-i 1.0 PG&E/DCPP Organization C-I 2.0 Summary of Diablo Canyon Operations C-I 2.1 Summary of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operations C-I 2.2 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Performance Indicators C-i 2.2.1 Capacity Factor C-I 2.2.2 Refueling Outages C-2 2.2.3 Collective Radiation Dose C-4 i
Industrial Safety Lost Time C-4 2.2.4 Accident Rate Unplanned Reactor Trips C-5 2.2.5 2.2.6 Unplanned Safety System Actuations C-5 2.2.7 Secondary Chemistry I:Adex (SCI) C-5 2.2.8 Fuel Reliability C-6 Employee Concerns Program Statistics C-7 2.3 Fitness for Duty C-9 2.4 D-1 D. DCISC Reports on Fact-finding Meetings D.1-1 D.1 Report on Fact Finding Meeting at DCPP on July 6-7, 2000 Summary D.1-1 1.0 Introduction D.1-1 2.0 D.1-2 3.0 Discussion 3.1 Corrective Actions from September 22, D.l-2 1999 Reactor Trip 3.2 Human Performance D.1-4 System Health Indicators and Long-Term D.1-8 3.3 Plans 3.4 Environmental Performance for 1999 and D.1-10 First Half of 2000 Organization Development Program D.1-12 3.5 Turbine Blade Cracking D.1-14 3.6 3.7 DCISC Performance Indicators D.1-15 3.8 INPO SOERs 98-1 and 98-2 D.1-15 May 15, 2000 Fire and Unusual Event D.1-16 3.9 ii
3.10 Control Room Ventilation System Review D.1-18 3.11 Meeting with Medical Facility Director D.1-19 4.0 Conclusions D. 1-21 Recommendations D. 1-23 5.0 6.0 References D. 1-23 Report on Fact Finding Meeting at DCPP D.2-1 D.2 on October 25-26, 2000 1.0 Summary D.2-1 Introduction D.2-2 2.0 Discussion D.2-2 3.0 3.1 Observe Outage IR10 Daily Meeting D.2-2 3.2 Tour Outage Work Control Center D.2-3 3.3 Outage 1R10 Overview and Outage D.2-3 Safety Plan 3.4 Meeting with Manager of Operations D.2-5 Services 3.5 Meeting with NRC Resident Inspector D.2-6 3.6 Meeting with Vice President and Plant D.2-6 Manager 3.7 Meeting with Manager of Engineering D.2-6 Services Meeting with Manager of Maintenance D.2-7 3.8 Services Outage IR10 Main Turbine Work D.2-7 3.9 D.2-8 3.10 Tour of Containment 3.11 Observe Control Room Shift Manager D.2-8 Turnover iii
3.12 Driving Tour of DCPP Site and Intake D.2-9 Facility D.2-9 3.13 Low Level Liquid & Solid Radwaste Handling Systems D.2-10 3.14 Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity D.2-11 3.15 Aging Management D.2-13 3.16 Radiation Protection Overview D.2-14 3.17 Meeting with Human Resources Director D.2-15 3.18 Meeting with Manager of Nuclear Quality & Licensing D.2-15 4.0 Conclusions D.2-16 5.0 Recommendations D.2-17 6.0 References D.3-1 D.3 Report on Fact Finding Meeting at DCPP on November 14-15, 2000 D. 3-1 1.0 Summary D.3-1 2.0 Introduction D.3-2 3.0 Discussion D.3-2 3.1 Joint NSOC & PNAC Meetings D.3-7 3.2 Intake Structure Inspection & Results D.3-9 3.3 Outage IR10 RP Results D.3-10 3.4 Corrective Actions on 9/22/99 Unit 1 Reactor Trip D.3-11 3.5 V.C. Summer Piping Concerns (NRC IN 2000-17)
D.3-12 3.6 SG Inspection Results D.3-13 3.7 Spent Fuel Storage Status iv
3.8 Nuclear Fuel Items D.3-14 D. 3-14
- 1. IR10 Nuclear Fuel Performance/
Inspection D.3-15
- 2. Gap Re-opening D.3-15
- 3. Extended Fuel Cycle D.3-16
- 4. Boraflex D.3-16 4.0 Conclusions D.3-17 5.0 Recommendations D.3-17 6.0 References D.4-1 D.4 Report on Fact Finding Meeting at DCPP on December 13, 2000 D.4-1 1.0 Summary D.4-2 2.0 Introduction Discussion D.4-2 3.0 D.4-2 3.1 PG&E's Response to the Annual Report D.4-2 3.2 Management View of Human Performance D.4-4 3.3 Maintenance Human Performance D.4-6 3.4 Human Performance Measures for Engineering (Latent Errors)
D.4-7 3.5 Informal Meeting with Supervisors D.4-8 3.6 Incentives for Increased Physical Fitness, Attention Enhancement and Stress Management D.4-9 3.7 Employee Concerns Program/Differing Professional Opinions D.4-10 3.8 New Behavior-Based Safety Program D.4-11 3.9 Five Year Plan D.4-12 3.10 Medical Center Visit re Operator Fitness V
3.11 Safety Class on Cardiac Health D.4-13 D.4-14 4.0 Conclusions D.4-16 5.0 Recommendations D.4-16 6.0 References D.5-1 D.5 Report on Fact Finding Meeting at DCPP on December 14, 2000 D.5-1 1.0 Summary D.5-1 2.0 Introduction D.5-2 3.0 Discussion D.5-2 3.1 Transition Program to Prepare for Competition D.5-3 3.2 Engineering Work Load Performance Indicator Recommendation D.5-5 3.3 Alternate Source Terms D.5-7 3.4 Joint Utility Venture Status (STARS)
D.5-8 3.5 Top Ten Quality Problems D.5-9 3.6 Security System Computer Performance and Long Term Plan D.5-10 3.7 Self-Assessment Program Update D.5-11 3.8 Asset Team Update D.5-13 4.0 Conclusions D.5-14 5.0 Recommendations D.6-1 D.6 Report on Fact Finding Meeting at DCPP On March 14-16, 2001 D.6-1 1.0 Summary vi
2.0 Introduction D.6-2 3.0 Discussion D.6-2 3.1 DCISC Performance Indicators D.6-2 3.2 Meeting with New NRC Resident Inspector D.6-4 3.3 NRC Report on Refueling Outage Risk D.6-5 3.4 On-line Maintenance D.6-6 3.5 Corrective Action Program D.6-9 3.6 Winter Storm Experience/Procedures D.6-12 3.7 Year 2000 Environmental Performance D.6-13 3.8 RCS Hot Leg Flow Measurement D.6-14 3.9 Amount of Time PG&E Corporate Officers D.6-15 Devote to DCPP 3.10 Auxiliary Saltwater System Review & D.6-16 Tour with System Engineer 3.11 Configuration Management Program D.6-17 3.12 Equipment Qualification Program D.6-19 3.13 Reportable Items in Outage IR10 D.6-20 3.14 Performance Plans D. 6-22 3.15 Control Room Tour D. 6-25 3.16 Observe Shift Technical Advisor D. 6-25 Training Class 3.17 Observe Brown Bag Management Discussion D.6-26 3.18 Observe Multi-Facility Table Top D.6-27 Emergency Exercise 4.0 Conclusions D.6-29 5.0 Recommendations D.6-31 vii
6.0 References D.6-31 D.7 Report on Fact Finding Meeting at DCPP D.7-1 on April 18-19, 2001 1.0 Summary D.7-1 2.0 Introduction D.7-2 3.0 Discussion D.7-2 3.1 DCPP Communications Update D.7-2 3.2 Results of December 2000 Culture D.7-3 Survey 3.3 Results of INPO Evaluation D.7-6 3.4 Tracking Data Concerning the Accredited D.7-6 Training & Instructor Training Programs 3.5 Update on Self-Assessments D.7-8 3.6 Company Status After Declaring D.7-9 Bankruptcy 3.7 Status & Plans for Dry Cask Storage of D.7-10 Spent Fuel 3.8 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program D.7-11 3.9 Generation Vulnerability Identification D.7-12 Program 3.10 Establishment of Priorities for D.7-13 Operators 3.11 Security Response to QA Security Audit D.7-14 3.12 System Review of Component Cooling D.7-15 Water 3.13 Discussion with Manager, Radiation D.7-16 Protection 3.14 Nuclear Quality Services (NQS) - D.7-17 viii
Statusof Improvements from Last Biennial Audit & NQS Self-Assessment 4.0 Conclusions D.7-18 5.0 Recommendations D.7-20 D.8 Report on Fact Finding Meeting at DCPP D.8-1 on May 1-2, 2001 1.0 Summary D.8-1 2.0 Introduction D.8-1 3.0 Discussion D.8-2 3.1 Changes in Radiation Protection D.8-2 Philosophy & Organization 3.2 Radiation Protection Preparations D.8-3 for Outage 2R10 3.3 Radiation Control Area Tour D.8-4 3.4 Emergency Preparedness Radiological D.8-5 Processes & Tools 3.5 Communicating Radiological Information D.8-6 to the Public 3.6 STARS Update D.8-7 3.7 2000 Synergy Comprehensive Cultural D.8-9 Assessment Results 3.8 Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee D.8-11 Meeting 4.0 Conclusions D.8-18 5.0 Recommendation D.8-19 6.0 References D.8-19 ix
D.9-1 D.9 Report on Fact Finding Meeting at DCPP on June 19, 2001 D.9-1 1.0 Summary Introduction D.9-1 2.0 Discussion D.9-2 3.0 3.1 Human Performance Update D.9-2 3.2 Behavioral Observation Based Safety D.9-3 (BOBS) Process Update 3.3 Work Process Review D.9-5 Employee Assistance Program Update D.9-5 3.4 Medical Center Update D.9-7 3.5 Conclusions D.9-8 4.0 Recommendations D.9-8 5.0 References D.9-8 6.0 E-1 E. Record of DCISC Tours of DCPP F-1 F. DCISC Open Items List G-1 G. DCISC Public Contacts Log G.1-1 G.1 DCISC Telephone/Correspondence G.2-1 G.2 DCISC Correspondence H-1 H. Past DCISC Recommendations and PG&E Responses I-i I. DCISC Informational Brochure J-1 J. Glossary of Terms x
Exhibit B.l THE DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on September 14 and 15, 2000, at The Cliffs at Shell Beach Conference Center, 2757 Shell be Beach Road, Shell Beach, California, a public meeting will held by the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee to (DCISC), in four separate sessions, at the times indicated, consider the following matters:
- 1. Morning Session - (9/14/2000) - 9:00 A.M. Opening comments, approve minutes of June 7-8, 2000 meeting; discussion of administrative matters including the review and approval of the DCISC Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations for the period July 1, 1999 - June 30, 2000; open items on the DCISC issues list; an update on financial matters and DCISC future plans; Committee member and staff-consultant reports; receive, approve and authorize transmittal of fact finding reports to PG&E; Committee correspondence; and receive public comments and communications to the Committee.
- 2. Afternoon Session - (9/14/2000) - 2:00 P.M.:
Comments by Committee members; consider technical presentations from PG&E on topics relating to plant safety and operations including implementation of the Diablo Canyon Self Assessment Program, a discussion of the plans for Unit l's tenth refueling outage(iRl0) and a report on the radiation exposure management program for lRIo; and receive public comments and communications to the Committee.
- 3. Evening Session - (9/14/2000) - 5:30 P.M.:
PG&E on Consideration of further technical presentations from topics relating to plant safety and operations including an update on plant performance and operational status, a review on the of the DCISC selected performance indicators, an update activities of PG&E's Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee, a review of Reportable Events and NRC Notices of Violation; and receive public comments and communications to the Committee.
- 4. Morning Session - (9/15/2000) - 8:00 A.M.:
Introductory comments; consideration of further technical presentations from PG&E on topics relating to plant operations including an overview of the Training Program, a presentation on the 1999 Biennial Nuclear Quality Services audit and self assessment, an overview of the Integrated Assessment Program, discussion of tracking and trending of non-cited violations and a report on the transition to improved Technical to Specifications; receive public comments and communication B. 1-1
the Committee; and wrap-up discussion by Committee members and the scheduling of future site visits, study sessions and meetings.
The specific meeting agenda and the staff reports and materials regarding the above meeting agenda items will be available for public review commencing Monday, September 11, 2000, at the NRC Public Document Room of the Cal Poly Library in San Luis Obispo or on the Committee's website at www.dcisc.org. For further information regarding the public meetings, please contact Robert Wellington, Cormittee Legal Counsel, 857 Cass Street, Suite D, Monterey, California, 93940; telephone: 1-800-439-4688.
Dated: August 29, 2000 B. 1-2
Exhibit B.2 DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE Committee Members: Philip R. Clark E. Gail de Planque A. David Rossin AGENDA Thursday & Friday The Cliffs at Shell Beach September 14-15, 2000 Conference Center Shell Beach, California 2757 Shell Beach Road Morning Session - 9/14/2000 - 9:00 A.M.
I. CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL II. INTRODUCTIONS III. CONSENT AGENDA (Routine items which the Committee can approve with a single motion and vote. A member may request that any item be placed on the regular agenda for separate consideration.)
A. Minutes of June 7-8, 2000 Meetings: Approve IV. ACTION ITEMS A. DCISC Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations; July 1, 1999 - June 30, 2000 Discussion/Action B. Update on Financial and Budgetary Matters and DCISC Activities During 2000 Discussion/Action C. Nomination and Election of DCISC Vice-Chair for the July 1, 2000 - June 30, 2001 Term Action D. Approval of Consultant Contract:
William E. Kastenberg Action E. Update on DCISC Web Site Discussion F. Timeliness of Fact-Finding Reports
& Public Meeting Transcript Discussion/Direction G. Resolution of Appreciation and Commendation - William E. Kastenberg Approve V. COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION A. Site visits and Other Committee Activities B.2-1
B. Documents Provided to the Committee VI. STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS A. Ferman Wardell:
Review of Open Items List; Annual Report and Fact-finding topics B. Jim E. Booker:
Fact-finding topics and reports C. Dr. Hyla Cass:
Human performance issues D. Robert Wellington:
Administrative and legal matters VII. COMMITTEE FACT-FINDING REPORTS:
Receive, approve and authorize transmittal to PG&E VIII. CORRESPONDENCE IX. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications on Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker. No action will be taken on matters raised, but they may be referred for further study, response or action.)
X. ADJOURN MORNING MEETING Afternoon Session - 9/14/2000 - 2:00 P.M.
XI. RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON MEETING XII. COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS XIII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE A. Technical Presentations Requested by the Committee of P.G.& E. Representatives:
- 1) General Introductions
- 2) Implementation of the Self-Assessment Program
- 3) Overall Plans for Unit l's Tenth Refueling Outage
- 4) Management of Radiation Exposure During Unit l's Tenth Refueling Outage XIV. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications on Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker. No action will be taken on matters raised, but they may be referred for further study, response or action.)
B.2-2
XV. ADJOURN AFTERNOON MEETING Evening Session - 9/14/2000 - 5:00 P.M.
XVI. RECONVENE FOR EVENING MEETING XVII. COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS XVIII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)
- 5) Update on Plant Performance, Plant Events and Operational Status
- 6) Review of Selected Performance Indicators
- 7) Activities of PG&E's Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee and President's Nuclear Advisory Committee
- 8) Review of Reportable Events and NRC Notices of Violation XIX. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (oral communications on Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker. No action will be taken on matters raised, but they may be referred for further study, response or action.)
XX. ADJOURN EVENING MEETING Morning Session - 9/15/2000 - 8:00 A.M.
XXI. RECONVENE FOR MORNING MEETING XXII. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS XXIII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)
- 9) Overview of the Training Program
- 10) Results of the 1999 Biennial Nuclear Quality Services Audit and Self-Assessment
- 11) Overview of the Integrated Assessment Program
- 12) Review of Tracking and Trending Results for Non-Cited Violations
- 13) Report on the Transition to Improved Technical Specifications XXIV. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications on Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker. No action will be taken on matters raised, but they may be referred for further study, response or action.)
B.2-3
XXV. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS A. Future Actions by the Committee B. Further Information to Obtain/Review C. Scheduling of Future Site Visits, Study Sessions and Meetings XXVI. ADJOURNMENT OF THIRTY-FIRST SET OF MEETINGS.
B. 2-4
Exhibit B.3 M I NUT E S of the SEPTEMBER 2000 MEETINGS OF THE DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE Thursday & Friday September 14-15, 2000 Shell Beach, California Notice of Meeting local A legal Notice of Meeting was published in advertisements, and was newspapers, along with several display the Committee's mailed to the media and those persons on service list.
Agenda I CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL Canyon The September 14, 2000 meeting of the Diablo to order by Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) was called the Cliffs at Committee Chair Philip Clark at 9:00 A.M. at Beach, California.
Shell Beach Conference Center in Shell Roll call was taken.
Present: Committee Chair Philip Clark Committee Member E. Gail de Planque Committee Member A. David Rossin Absent: None II INTRODUCTIONS first The Chair observed that this was Dr. Rossin's welcomed him.
meeting as a new Member of the Committee and and Legal Mr. Clark introduced the Committee's consultants Present were Counsel in attendance at the meeting.
and Legal Counsel Consultants Booker, Wardell and Dr. Cass Wellington.
III CONSENT AGENDA The Chair requested Mr. Wellington to introduce the item which the only item from the Consent Agenda,- a routine of a member Committee could approve by vote or on motion That item was approval of the remove to the regular agenda.
B.3-1
Minutes of the public meeting held by the DCISC on June 7-8, 2000. Some minor editorial corrections and clarifications were noted and upon a motion made by Dr. de Planque, seconded by Dr. Rossin, those Minutes were unanimously approved as amended.
Committee Business IV ACTION ITEMS A. DCISC Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations; July 1, 1999 - June 30, 2000. The Chair requested Consultant Wardell to review the latest draft of the Committee's 1999-2000 Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations, two earlier drafts having been circulated and comments received and incorporated into the latest draft.
The Chair led a review of the latest draft of the Executive Summary section of the Report and each of the Committee's Conclusions, Concerns and Recommendations. A copy of the Executive Summary was included in the public agenda packet for this meeting. PG&E Senior Vice President Greg Rueger provided information to the Members during their discussion. Members and consultants discussed the content of several sections of the Report which expressed the Committee's Conclusions and offered suggested changes to certain sections including those concerning the Radiation Protection and Steam Generator Programs. The Members and consultants discussed the sections containing the Committee's Concerns with Mr. Rueger and Mr.
Stan Ketelsen of PG&E's Regulatory Services organization.
Members and consultants had several questions and requested clarification concerning certain of the Concerns contained in the draft Report from the PG&E representatives present. The Committee Members then briefly reviewed and discussed the basis for each of their Recommendations as contained in the current draft of the Annual Report. Members and consultants agreed to provide Mr. Wardell with all of their final comments and suggestions for the final version of their 1999-2000 Annual Report. That final version will be prepared by Mr.
Wardell and will incorporate those comments and suggestions adopted by the Members during this meeting as well as those received from former DCISC Member Dr. William Kastenberg who was a serving Member of the Committee during this Annual Report period.
The Members and consultants discussed with Mr. Rueger and Mr. Ketelsen the procedure for PG&E to receive, review and respond to the 1999-2000 DCISC Annual Report. PG&E's response B. 3-2
will then be included within the final Report. Opportunity for further questions and clarification, if necessary, of the Annual Report will be scheduled during a future fact-finding meeting with PG&E representatives.
The Chair expressed the Committee's appreciation and thanks to Consultant Wardell for all his efforts in coordinating and assembling the Annual Report.
B. Update on Financial & Budgetary Matters. Legal Counsel Wellington reviewed with the Members some financial information received from the Committee's accountants.
Members reviewed and discussed planned activities by the DCISC for the remainder of this calendar year. Consultant Wardell noted that there are presently three fact-findings scheduled with PG&E for the rest of 2000, during October, November and December, and the Members discussed their respective schedules to determine their availability to attend these fact-findings.
The Chair requested a revised and simplified monthly budget summary be prepared by the Committee's accountants and made available to the Members to better enable them to monitor the Committee's financial status. Following a review of the current budget and resources on hand, it was determined that to the Committee's current budget appears adequate at present fund the Committee's remaining activities for calendar year 2000, and to maintain a sufficient contingent reserve.
A short break followed.
C. Nomination and Election of DCISC Vice-Chair for the July 1, 2000 - June 30, 2001 Term. The elected DCISC Chair noted that Dr. Kastenberg had been duly Vice-Chair for the current term, however, as his appointment as a to the Committee has lapsed and he is no longer serving Member to Member, it was therefore appropriate to select a serve as Vice-Chair. Upon nomination by Dr. Rossin, seconded by Mr. Clark, Dr. de Planque was elected to the office of 30, DCISC Vice-Chair for the term July 1, 2000 through June 2001.
D. Approval of Consultant Contract:
Dr. William E. Kastenberg. Members briefly reviewed the scope of services for a proposed consulting provide agreement with former DCISC Member Dr. Kastenberg to for his review of the 1999-2000 Annual Report. Upon a motion made by Dr. de Planque, seconded by Dr. Rossin, that contract was approved by the Committee.
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E. Update on DCISC Web Site. Legal Counsel Wellington briefly reviewed the content and components of the Committee's new world-wide-web site and he discussed with Mr.
Ketelsen procedures to refer, as appropriate inquiries concerning Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) to Mr. Ketelsen or to the PG&E or the NRC websites as appropriate.
F. Timeliness of Fact-Finding Reports &
Public Meeting Transcripts. Committee Members discussed with the consultants a schedule for the preparation, completion and review of the written reports which are prepared by the consultants following every fact-finding meeting. The Members directed that these reports should be prepared by the consultant attending the fact-finding and made available for the review and comments of all Members within four to eight weeks after the fact-finding and that all pending reports should be closed out prior to or during the next public meeting of the Committee. Mr. Wellington remarked that the transcript of the discussion at the Committee's public meetings could be produced and available for review within forty-five days of the public meeting. The transcript would then be sent to PG&E with a request that, if they chose to provide any comment or revisions, these be provided to the DCISC within thirty days. The Committee will continue to file its public meeting transcripts with the NRC Public Document Room at the R.E. Kennedy Library at California Polytechnic University in San Luis Obispo. The Committee further directed that minutes of their public meetings prepared from the transcripts be available for review by the Members, consultants and PG&E at least two weeks prior to the next scheduled public meeting.
G. Resolution of Appreciation and Commendation Dr. William E. Kastenberg. Following the Committee Members review and approval of the content of their Resolution and upon a motion of Dr. de Planque, seconded by Dr. Rossin, the Committee Members unanimously adopted a Resolution of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee thanking and commending Dr. William E. Kastenberg for his service on the Committee since its inception.
H. PG&E's pending Application before the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC. At the request of the Chair, Mr. Rueger discussed PG&E's pending Application before the CPUC and the potential effect on the continued existence of the DCISC should the CPUC grant the Application B.3-4
as submitted. Mr. Rueger stated that PG&E's Application to a deregulated contains a request that the transition period terminated. He market for electric power in California be Settlement briefly reviewed the terms of the present CPUC DCPP operations to Agreement which provides for profits from be shared on a fifty-fifty basis with PG&E's customers.
certain areas of PG&E's June 30, 2000 Application addresses discussed some the Settlement Agreement and Mr. Rueger briefly clarification.
of the provisions which will require further DCISC, the CPUC's Office of He stated that three groups, the Utility Rate Ratepayer Advocates (ORA) and the group Towards the CPUC Normalization (TURN) have filed comments with Rueger reported that concerning PG&E's Application and Mr.
this matter is now pending before the CPUC.
DCISC to the The Chair referred to the Response by the Committee's PG&E Application and remarked that, while the the Committee in Response does not advocate continuing DCISC was existence, the Committee believes that, as the decision by the established through an express provision of a would disestablish CPUC, any future action by the CPUC which the DCISC should be unambiguous. Mr. Clark stated that the Committee and its Members should be available and prepared to their appointing address questions from any of the parties or entities. The Committee then approved and requested Legal conference with Counsel Wellington to attend the pre-hearing to report back the CPUC to observe, respond to questions and or schedule for to the Members concerning any actions taken further consideration adopted by the CPUC.
V COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION Dr.
a) Site Visits and Other Committee Activities:
reported on de Planque and DCISC Legal Counsel Wellington representatives meetings they attended on June 9, 2000, with and the California Energy of the California Attorney General reviewed some of Commission in Sacramento, and they briefly of the the topics discussed which included: the content for the June 2000 current DCISC Open Items List, the agenda NRC's safety public meeting, proposed revisions to the of a recent employment oversight function, final resolution and the status discrimination case involving a DCPP employee the CPUC.
of the pending application by PG&E before b) Documents provided to the Committee: Mr.
Wellington briefly reviewed the lists of the various provided to documents, copies of correspondence and reports B.3-5
the Committee by PG&E and the NRC. Copies of these lists are included in the public agenda packet for every DCISC public meeting.
VI STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS Consultant Wardell reviewed certain of the items on the current Open Items List which is used to track the status of those items which the DCISC has identified for follow-up, further information or future action. Mr. Wardell identified certain items which have been consolidated or closed out since the last public meeting of the DCISC in June 2000. A copy of the current Open Items List was included in the public agenda packet for this meeting.
Mr. Wardell reported on a fact-finding he attended on July 6-7, 2000, with Drs. Kastenberg and Cass. He discussed the topics reviewed during meetings with PG&E representatives at those meetings which included: the September 22, 1999 reactor trip event due to a lightning strike in the switchyard; the DCPP lightning protection program; the status of the System Health Indicators and long-term plans for individual Plant systems; the single index NRC Maintenance Rule-based system indicator being developed to track aggregate performance of DCPP systems; an overview of environmental performance; the results of the recent audits and surveillances performed by the Nuclear Quality Services (NQS) organization; the recent efforts to resolve an issue concerning the Plant cooling water discharge with the Regional Water Quality Control Board; turbine blade cracking; the status of the DCISC-selected performance indicators and efforts to consolidate those indicators with the NRC-mandated performance indicators; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Significant Operating Event Reports (SOERs) 98-1 and 98-2; and the Control Room ventilation system. DCISC representatives also received reports on the fire and declaration of Unusual Event which occurred on May 15, 2000 and PG&E's efforts to resolve issues concerning communication of information concerning the Plant's status to the public during that event. Mr. Rueger and Mr. Jeff Lewis of PG&E's News Department discussed with the Members the issue of public communication during the May 15, 2000 Unusual Event and the respective roles and efforts of PG&E and the NRC in disseminating timely, accurate and useful information to the general public. Dr. de Planque suggested, and Mr. Rueger agreed, that PG&E may want to discuss with the NRC at a future meeting those issues which concern improving communication B.3-6
with the public.
Following the Thursday afternoon technical presentation to by Mr. Nugent (see page 13-15) concerning the transition resumed the Improved Technical Specifications, the Committee consideration of consultant reports.
in Consultant Booker stated that he had not participated of the DCISC any fact-finding since the last public meetings in June 2000.
she Consultant Dr. Cass reported on the fact-finding review human performance attended on July 6-7, 2000 at DCPP to issues. She stated that the Human Performance Group reviews now entitled low-level Action Requests (ARs) using a new model personnel the "personnel Accountability Policy" to analyze accountability and the relationship to human performancePolicy.
of that events, and she briefly reviewed the evolution She include identifying reported that the principles of the Policy actions throughout blameless error and associated corrective to achieve the organization and using coaching and counseling correction rather than discipline. The Operations and perceived as Maintenance organizations at DCPP are presently she reported those most susceptible to personnel errors and year, with an that there were seven events during this past the past increasing trend in personnel error observed during three months. Dr. Cass stated that preliminary analysis has review identified the need for better pre-job tailboard and conferences, rigorous feedback, improved communication in address the increase self-verification by the workforce to Front line workers and first line personnel error.
a job or work supervisors are now polled after completing will be used to order to develop an anonymous database which feedback to provide information to management as well as work-control workers and supervisors and result in an improved In concluding this segment of her report, Dr. Cass process.
DCPP appears to observed that the Human Performance Group at human errors.
be taking positive steps to analyze and address changes Tools are being developed to support the cultural Dr. Cass which are occurring and to improve human performance.
making a stated that the Committee may wish to consider efforts in the area recommendation that PG&E closely interface development and other of human performance with organizational and integrated plant-wide efforts to develop a comprehensive increased cross program to address human error and to foster Plant communication.
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Dr. Cass reported on the recent activities of the Organizational Development Program. She stated that the Program deals with interpersonal skills in the organization including training and the facilitation of communication. She 0
stated that a method entitled 36 °Feedback is presently being used by officers, managers and directors to determine leadership behaviors and plans are under consideration to introduce this method to supervisors. This feedback method is tied to the Performance Incentive Program which provides employees with a financial incentive for their performance.
Dr. Cass remarked that efforts are being made to expand the new culture and integrate the various union bargaining units and the craft organizations at DCPP into a plant-wide training dynamic to ensure all groups receive an appropriate level of training. PG&E Vice President and DCPP Plant Manager David Oatley remarked that the shift foremen and shift managers as well as some of the key individuals in the bargaining units are currently included in the officer-management-supervisor cultural meetings which focus on safety and human performance.
Dr. Cass stated that DCPP is making efforts to address its future needs, in recruiting new employees as well as to retain current employees, as a significant portion of the present DCPP workforce reaches retirement age. In concluding this portion of her report, Dr. Cass observed that the Organizational Development Program appears to be comprehensive and is playing a significant role in the major cultural shift which has and is occurring at DCPP. Mr. Clark reviewed with Dr. Cass and the PG&E representatives present the ongoing efforts being made to coordinate the efforts of the Human Performance and Industrial Safety organizations.
Dr. Cass reported on her visit to the DCPP Medical Center to review the Stress Reduction Program, overall operator fitness and the efforts to enhance alertness and wakefulness of personnel working the night shifts. Dr. Cass, in response to a question from Dr. Rossin, briefly reviewed the origin of the Committee's interest in these topics and the impact of chronic stress on safety. She also discussed a program entitled Dash for Cash which is aimed at providing a financial reward to those employees who voluntarily improve their physical fitness and health. This program has been offered to DCPP personnel in the Security Department and she reviewed that Program's impact and the requirements which must be met by those security officers who carry weapons within the Plant.
Dr. Cass remarked that a similar program might be effective in motivating Operations Department personnel to greater levels B.3-8
of fitness. She also reviewed several other programs aimed at improving the overall health of employees.
Committee Legal Counsel Wellington reported that he had sent information to Mr. John Gagliardini, a member of the of public who had addressed comments concerning the ownership the lands underlying DCPP to the Committee Members during several of their previous public meetings. Mr. Wellington also reported that he is continuing discussions with PG&E's Regulatory Services and Legal departments concerning an issue concerning the use of a unilateral advocate within the Employee Advocate Program.
Following the final technical presentation on Friday afternoon by Mr. Russell Gray (see page 31-33) concerning the management of radiation exposure during refueling outage IR10, Dr. Cass reported her attendance with Consultant Wardell at a public meeting held by the NRC on Thursday evening, September NRC 14, 2000, in San Luis Obispo to present an overview of the process to address claims of discrimination at NRC licensed facilities under the provisions of regulations contained in 10 CFR 50.7. She stated that during this presentation the NRC reviewed the significance and importance of employees feeling safe from discrimination should they chose to identify concerns regarding operational issues within a nuclear plant, without fear of retaliation, and that multiple avenues must be maintained within the work environment for workers to identify and communicate their concerns. The NRC's presentation also reviewed the anxiety which currently exists and the challenges faced by employees and management created by their changing work environment and impact of those factors on reporting safety concerns.
Dr. Cass observed that PG&E reported that 90% of the allegations reported to the NRC are ultimately determined to be unsubstantiated. The 10% of allegations which are found to media.
be substantiated receive intense scrutiny in and by the Dr. Cass reported that a representative from DCPP made a presentation on the investigation and determination by the NRC that PG&E had not discriminated against one of its employees who raised safety concerns. The DCISC had been closely involved in reviewing that employee's concerns and the employee has addressed the Committee several times during its past public meetings. However, Dr. Cass reported that the Department of Labor, in their preliminary investigation, concluded that there had been discrimination by PG&E in responding to and dealing with the allegations raised by that B.3-9
employee. The preliminary conclusions reached by the inadvertently, released Department of Labor were, apparently and that information by the employee's legal representatives Mr. Rueger commented received wide distribution in the media.
with the individual that PG&E has since settled the matter the premature and one involved; however, he remarked that of Labor's conclusions sided release of only the Department by the public at large affected how the matter was perceived that PG&E has discussed as well as by many DCPP employees and He discussed with with the NRC the impact of that situation.
the investigatory the Members attempts to better coordinate the NRC. In response efforts of the Department of Labor and stated that the to a question from Mr. Clark, Dr. Cass transcribed; however, a discussion during the meeting was not electronically on report on the meeting will be made available the NRC website. Mr. Rueger stated that, while the NRC he was surprised by advertised the meeting in the local media, Mr.
who attended.
the small number of members of the public administrative office Wellington remarked that the Committee's meeting.
did not receive written notice of the VII COMMITTEE FACT-FINDING REPORTS was deferred to On Thursday, the discussion of this item 15, 2000.
the Friday's public meeting, September by PG&E Following the last of the technical presentations to consideration on Friday afternoon, the Committee returned Subject to the of the July 2000 fact-finding report. and by the Members inclusion of editorial comment provided by Dr. de Planque, the upon motion by Dr. Rossin, seconded approved for July 2000 fact-finding report was unanimously transmittal to PG&E.
VIII CORRESPONDENCE the attention Committee Legal Counsel Wellington directed sent and of the Members to copies of the correspondence last public meetings of received by the Committee since the the DCISC in June 2000.
IX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATION session, The Chair, prior to adjourning the morning audience to address any invited any persons present in the There was no comments or communications to the Committee.
response to this invitation.
B.3-10
X ADJOURNMENT The morning meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was adjourned by the Chair at 12:45 P.M.
XI RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION The Chair convened the DCISC for its afternoon meeting at 2:00 P.M.
XII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS There were no comments from the Committee members at this time.
XIII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE Senior Vice President Rueger recognized Mr. Oatley and PG&E Vice President for Power Generation and Nuclear Services Larry Womack to assist with the technical presentations to the DCISC.
Mr. Rueger introduced Mr. Steve Hiett, DCPP Self Assessment Coordinator, to make the first of the technical presentation requested by Committee.
Implementation of the Self-Assessment Program.
Mr. Hiett began his presentation with a review of the it was a Self-Assessment Program's history and he stated that focus area for the nuclear power industry as the industry begins to move towards re-evaluating the threshold for regulation. Mr. Clark had a question concerning PG&E's its regulatory perception of the NRC's direction as it alters posture with the nuclear power industry and Mr. Rueger to responded with his observations that the NRC is attempting direct its resources toward identified areas wherein in the regulatory and licensee focus has been demonstrated past to have been the most effective. Mr. Hiett reviewed the upgrades made to the Self-Assessment Program which include:
position to establishment of the Self-Assessment Coordinator manage and direct self-assessments; issuance of a program of guide for performing self-assessments, establishment and departmental coordinators for self-assessment education; self establishment of an integrated scheduling program for The Self-Assessment Advisory Board, chaired by assessments.
B.3-11
the Vice President and Plant Manager, was established to provide a critical and independent review of self-assessment results and plans. Mr. Hiett briefly discussed efforts to coordinate and integrate the Self-Assessment Program with the audits performed by NQS, INPO and the NRC to ensure that an opportunity is provided to coordinate the implementation of findings and results of self-assessments. He reported that DCPP is concentrating on increasing the Self-Assessment Program's visibility within the Plant and is increasingly making use of industry peers to participate in performing self-assessments and is using industry-wide accepted standards of excellence as Self-Assessment Program measuring tools.
This year there have been 33 self-assessments which have met the Program's standards and Mr. Hiett reported that the quality of information contained in the written reports has improved significantly. In response to a question from Dr. de Planque, Mr. Hiett replied that the writing course taught at DCPP by INPO to improve the report writing skills of personnel charged with documenting the results of the self-assessments did address incorporating industry accepted standard terminology into report findings. Mr. Hiett discussed the content and format of the self-assessment reports with the Members and he stated that one of his roles as the Program Coordinator is to review and integrate all the reports and attempt to identify common areas or trends. He reviewed the results of self-assessments performed and Mr. Clark requested that a future Committee fact-finding be scheduled to include a review of the Self-Assessment Program and the next NQS Quality Performance and Assessment Report (QPAR).
Mr. Hiett concluded his presentation with his observation that DCPP management's belief in the success of the Self Assessment Program involves the communication to, and recognition and acceptance by, the line organizations and the workforce that critical or opposing views are welcome and that management remains open to criticism and suggestions. In response to a question from Mr. Clark, Mr. Oatley and Mr.
Hiett responded that areas for self-assessments are generally not selected or based upon an upcoming audit by another reviewing body, but are selected based upon existing data and review of identified trends. Mr. Clark requested that the DCISC receive a copy of the integrated schedule for the Self Assessment Program and a copy of the most recent quarterly report for the Program.
Mr. Rueger introduced Mr. Mike Davis, Systems Scheduling B. 3-12
Supervisor at DCPP for a presentation to the Committee.
Plans for Unit l's Tenth Refueling Outage (IR10).
Mr. Davis began his presentation by reviewing the IRl0 outage scope and issues and areas identified by experiences during past outages for improvement during IRl0. The critical outage scope of activities for 1R10, which is scheduled to commence on October 8, 2000, include:
- Refueling the reactor.
- Critical valve maintenance.
- Steam generator maintenance.
- Low pressure turbine/generator inspection and maintenance.
- Low pressure C rotor replacement
- Diesel generator maintenance.
- Vital bus H maintenance.
Mr. Davis briefly discussed and responded to questions concerning each of these activities. Mr. Oatley and Mr.
Womack both responded to a question from Mr. Clark concerning the qualification of the techniques used for inspection and assessment of the condition of the steam generator tubing.
Mr. Davis then reviewed the major projects and modifications to DCPP systems scheduled for IRl0, which include replacement of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) sump screen to increase its area; replacement of the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) cable on RCPs 1-1 and 1-3 due to aging; replacement of the Main Feedwater pump Lovejoy speed control system with the more modern Woodward system; and increasing Unit l's power output rating. Mr. Davis reported that no significant risks to the reactor core are expected to occur during IR10 and that the overall outage risk factors are approximately the same as experienced during other recent DCPP refueling outages. Mr. Davis and Mr. Oatley discussed with the Members the activities planned during the second of two mid-loop operations, when there will necessarily be only one Component Cooling Water Pump (CCWP) available because of work taking place within the 4kV switchgear room. Goals for iRl0 include achieving the personnel radiation exposure goal of <=
148 person-rem, no disabling or reportable injuries, no loss of core cooling with the core in any location, event free mid loop operations, no significant personnel errors or equipment damage.
B.3-13
Mr. Davis reviewed the initiatives planned for IRl0 to improve personnel safety. These include conducting a to tailboard review meeting prior to commencing any job discuss safety risks and compensatory measures. Personnel be discussed stand-downs during which safety expectations will demonstrate that are to be conducted prior to 1R10 to level attention to safe work practices remains at the highest of management's attention. During IRI0 there will be that increased in-field supervisory oversight to ensure management's expectations are being met. He observed that the the primary focus for improving human performance involves Maintenance, Operations and Chemistry/Radiation Protection organizations and emphasis will be placed upon self tailboards verification techniques, closed-loop communication, and adherence to standards and expectations. Emphasis will also be placed on personal accountability with in-field supervisory oversight and use of human performance communication and culpability tools.
Davis Concerning the outage duration and cost goals, Mr.
in 30 days reported that PG&E currently hopes to achieve 1R10 The present or less and at a cost of $30 million or less.
previous projected duration is 26 days 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, while DCPP's 31 days 18 hours. He best outage performance during 2R9 was review; identified pre-outage preparation; improved schedule scheduled; fewer projects, with no failed fuel or fuel repairs Pump speed incorporation of lessons learned in Main Feedwater specimen control replacement; no reactor vessel surveillance Operations and Outage removal required; and the co-location of to the Management organizations as significant contributors projected short duration. Mr. Davis and Mr. Womack briefly possible discussed with Dr. Rossin some of the contingencies in the event that fuel damage was discovered or occurred during core off-load. The PG&E representatives then reviewed to the pre-outage preparation schedule which is developed prior to an attempt to preclude unforeseen issues arising just path schedule for outage, and Mr. Davis reviewed the critical the 1R10. Members had several questions concerning IR10 to availability of radiation protection technicians for which Mr. Davis and Mr. Oatley both responded.
A short break followed this presentation.
Mr. Rueger introduced the Licensing Supervisor for the next Regulatory Services at DCPP, Mr. Pat Nugent, to make presentation to the Committee.
B. 3-14
Report on the Transition to Improved Technical Specifications.
DCPP to Mr. Nugent stated that the program to transition recently been the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) has in completed. He stated that the ITS were developed beginning Wolf Creek, 1995, with DCPP working in conjunction with the partnered with Callaway and Comanche Peak nuclear plants which DCPP in that effort. The Licensee Amendment Request (LAR) was responded submitted in June 1997, and all Plants received and to requests for additional information. The NRC issued the In response License Amendment (LA) for the ITS in May 1999.
that the new to a question from Mr. Clark, Mr. Nugent replied are somewhat set of technical specifications (TS) themselves basis for the TS have less lengthy than before; however, the expanded considerably. He remarked that implementation of the 2000.
ITS was originally scheduled for the end of May emergency LAR However, that date was later changed and an of the ITS submitted to permit postponement of implementation over until the end of June 2000 due to PG&E's concern Units because implementing the ITS during the restart of both of the 12kV bus outage which had occurred.
was An ITS Implementation Project Manager position all required changes created and a Team was formed to identify the resulting from the ITS which included members from Licensing, Surveillance Test, Operations, Engineering, Instrumentation and Control Procedures, Administrative Procedures and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) organizations. Mr. Nugent reviewed the number, scope, and revisions complexity and volume of major and minor changes additions to made to various documentation and the changes and attention of programs and test procedures which required the and review by the Team.
March DCPP submitted a clean-up LAR to the NRC during the 2000 which addressed the changes resulting from Oversight ITS, and a Management Implementation Program for the Team was formed to monitor progress of the Implementation Program. Work curves were created using the projections were reviewed developed by various organizations and these were available frequently to assure that sufficient resources to meet goals. Mr. Nugent stated that this effort was based in part upon the successful Y2K Program. A self-assessment of April 2000, the Implementation Program was performed in and Quality utilizing personnel from DCPP's Licensing from Wolf Creek, Assurance organizations as well as personnel B.3-15
Callaway and Comanche Peak Plants. This self-assessment identified enhancements to the implementation efforts but no major issues were found which would hamper the process.
Mr. Nugent reviewed the comprehensive efforts made to adequately train the licensed operators and other necessary DCPP personnel on the ITS. These efforts included a detailed review of TS rules of usage and all the changes made to the TS, which were illustrated by comparing the current TS with the ITS. In response to a question from Mr. Clark, Mr. Nugent reviewed the emphasis placed upon what he termed the rules of usage for the TS which provide guidance for the actual application of the TS.
Mr. Nugent reviewed the results of the Implementation Program which have been measured in terms of the absence of requests by DCPP for enforcement discretion of any LARs from the NRC, which might have been necessary to address problems experienced with the ITS. The Implementation Program was completed as scheduled. He identified some of the lessons learned during the ITS Implementation Program which include some unanticipated ramifications resulting from their application to the Containment Isolation Valve requirements of when to apply administrative controls to open valves.
Personnel have been asking questions of the Implementation Team to clarify issues; however, there have been no errors reported or identified to date from the application of the ITS. He stated that there have been some instances where a TS, or a portion of a TS, has been relocated to the FSAR or to the Equipment Control Guidelines (ECG) to address a specific licensing commitment, a surveillance requirement or to better define operability criteria for a system. He described the ECGs as a form of administrative TS which may be altered without prior NRC approval under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
In concluding his presentation, Mr. Nugent remarked that the Implementation Program for ITS was a huge effort for DCPP and it involved thousands of procedures, hundreds of individuals and required strict project management coordination. The success of the Implementation Program demonstrated the feasibility of working jointly with other utilities and this resulted in a better product.
Committee Members had questions for Mr. Nugent following his presentation concerning the value to DCPP of such a comprehensive industry-wide effort to make the change to ITS.
B. 3-16
Mr. Nugent, Mr. Oatley and Mr. Rueger reviewed the NRC's rationale for implementing the joint ITS rather than continuing to deal with TS changes only on a plant-specific basis. Mr. Womack reviewed the evolution of the development latest of TS since the mid-1970's and he stated that this real action to effort by the industry represents the first the underlying consolidate or truly standardize the basis and make them assumptions for the limits in the TS and to consistent. The PG&E representatives discussed and commented to upon the savings in time and cost, and the advantage with the scheduling, which resulted from working together other utilities to develop the ITS and the savings to the NRC in terms of its review efforts. In response to a question operators are from Mr. Clark, Mr. Oatley responded that the have approved now accustomed to the new ITS and, in general, articulated bases of the better understanding afforded by the now incorporated within the ITS. In response to a question that the other from Consultant Booker, Mr. Nugent confirmed the ITS will plants which participated with DCPP in developing necessary.
also be cooperating on changes as they become Following Mr. Nugent's presentation, the Committee returned to consideration of its consultants' reports under Section VI of the agenda, as reported above.
XIV PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS The Chair, prior to adjourning the afternoon session, invited any persons present in the audience to Committee.
address any comments or communications to the There was no response to this invitation.
XV ADJOURN AFTERNOON MEETING The afternoon meeting of the Diablo Canyon the Chair at Independent Safety Committee was adjourned by 4:45 P.M.
XVI RECONVENE FOR EVENING MEETING meeting Mr. Clark called to order the evening public of the DCISC at 5:00 P.M.
XVII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS The Chair introduced the Members and consultants Rueger to present and requested PG&E Senior Vice President B.3-17
continue with the technical presentations to the Committee.
XVIII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)
Mr. Rueger requested Mr. Oatley to make a presentation to the Committee concerning overall Plant performance and operational events since the last public meeting of the DCISC in June 2000.
Update on Plant Performance, Plant Events and Operational Status.
Mr. Oatley began by reviewing the events and accomplishments at DCPP since the last public meeting of the DCISC. These have included hosting an INPO Plant Evaluation Training Team during May 2000, reaching a tentative agreement in June with the California Regional Water Quality Board concerning all issues regarding DCPP's ocean cooling water discharge permit, achieving implementation of the ITS during June, and the successful completion during August of an intensive three-week NRC assessment of the Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) and 4 kV Systems. A review was also conducted of corrective actions taken or planned due to a "white" status for the NRC Performance Indicator for loss of normal heat sink because of kelp loading at the Intake Structure.
Mr. Oatley reviewed generation performance for both Units. For Unit 1(U-1), year-to-date, the operating capacity factor is presently 93.72%. Mr. Oatley briefly reviewed the events, both planned events and forced outages, which have impacted U-l's performance. For Unit 2 (U-2) the year-to-date operating capacity factor is presently 100.17% and events impacting U-2 were briefly reviewed by Mr. Oatley. He reported that U-2 has experienced some minor fuel failure, which were characterized as tight defects associated with two or three rods, following the 2R9 refueling outage in September-October 1999.
Mr. Oatley reviewed PG&E's recent decision to accept a ten- day forced outage for U-2 due to the catastrophic disintegration of a metal bellows which connects fixed piping to the underside of the Turbine and he discussed with the Committee the rationale for the decision to shut down U-2 and repair the failed bellows and some of the other bellows which were found to be cracked. The failure of the bellows resulted in debris being deposited within the condenser and this might have been damaging to condenser tubing. The B. 3-18
bellows' age was determined to have been the cause of the failure and Mr. Oatley reported that three other plants have also experienced forced outages due to this problem. Mr.
Clark asked a question concerning PG&E's past evaluation of the bellows and the decision to try to keep U-2 operating until the serious nature of the failure became apparent. Mr.
Rueger responded that there were several reasons for PG&E to try to keep U-2 operating after the damage to the bellows was initially suspected, including a lack of indication of the serious extent and potential impact of the failure and the fact that the other bellows were not believed to be damaged.
Mr. Rueger observed that PG&E recognized that an unplanned outage would have to be scheduled to address the bellows failure but that PG&E wished to avoid, if possible, any conflict with scheduled refueling outage IRl0 while continuing to monitor for salt leakage from the condenser and to evaluate the performance of U-2 and to take time to plan for the necessary forced outage. Mr. Oatley remarked that PG&E was in contact with the condenser's manufacturer, Westinghouse, and that Westinghouse did not indicate their concern in U-2 continuing operation for one week.
During U-2's forced outage, 7 of a total of 27 metal bellows were replaced and plans are to replace the remainder during U-2's next refueling outage (2R10) scheduled for May 2001. U-1 will have all its metal bellows replaced during lRI0 during October 2000. In response to a question from Mr.
Clark, Mr. Oatley and Mr. Rueger responded that U-2's unplanned forced outage probably did have a detrimental effect on the NRC Performance Indicators for DCPP in a manner different than had the forced outage taken place one week later, although both PG&E representatives stated that this did not impact in any way the initial decision to attempt to continue U-2 in operation. Mr. Oatley remarked that he has recently sent a letter to all DCPP Operations personnel stating that neither any possible impact on the NRC Performance Indicators nor the current condition of the California electrical grid system should be considered in any context whatsoever when making operational decisions.
Review of Selected Performance Indicators.
Mr. Rueger briefly discussed and reviewed with the Members and consultants the 23 indicators currently being tracked by PG&E for the DCISC to measure DCPP performance, the goals presently established for those indicators and their performance as measured to date. He summarized their status, B.3-19
follows (T indicates an through the end of August 2000, as a declining trend and -*- indicates improving trend, I indicates reported to indicator was last a steady performance since that the Committee):
on or better than the target:
Eleven of the indicators are 1 Personnel contamination incidents.
backlog.
T Non-outage corrective maintenance (OEA) backlog.
T Operating Experience Assessment
$ Quality problem completion.
- Event-free days.
U-2 operating capacity factor.
Unplanned reportable releases.
U-I primary system chemistry index.
U-2 primary system chemistry index.
-U-I secondary system chemistry index.
-U-2 secondary system chemistry index.
to meeting expectations:
Three of the indicators are close
$ Radiation exposure.
due dates.
I Meeting corrective maintenance
$ U-1 operating capacity factor.
not meeting expectations:
Three of the indicators are clearly safety. SIndustrial Unplanned automatic reactor U trips.
I Unplanned safety system actuation.
a qualitative indicator, without a set target:
One is System Health Indicator (no target).
One indicator has been deleted:
Event Trend Records (ETR).
Maintenance Services Rework applicable for this period:
Two of the indicators are not U-I refueling outage duration.
U-2 refueling outage duration.
reviewed with the DCISC during Two confidential indicators fact-findings include:
B. 3-20
SHuman events.
factor security SVital area events.
Mr.
Members and consultants had several questions during Rueger's review. Mr. Rueger and Mr. Oatley discussed the can have impact that a single event, such as the 12kV failure, trends on several of the indicators and they discussed the evident in several of the indicators.
on Mr. Rueger discussed with the Committee the effect the electric DCPP operations of recent efforts to deregulate power industry in California. He stated that a shortage of generating capacity within California has posed very of significant challenges to assuring sufficient supplies electricity are available to meet demand and that the impact upon of that shortage of supply is having significant impact the price of electric power. He observed that the Northern separately and Southern California electric power markets are administered by California's Independent System Operator factors (ISO) . He also reviewed several of the fundamental in consumers which have contributed to significant increases electric bills in Southern California, as well as to a areas of curtailment of supply, when the rate freeze ended in Southern California. These factors included a significant in increase in demand due to hot weather, growth of demand power to out-of-state areas which previously exported natural California and significant increases in the price of gas supply pipeline to gas and damage to a main natural Mr. Rueger opined that these are very significant California.
factors which have precluded, at present, a truly competitive market for electric power in California and that collusion amongst power generating entities has not played a significant role in increasing the price of power. Mr. Rueger stated that, as the rate freeze is still in effect for Northern California consumers, the full effects of the deregulated market have yet to be felt in Northern California and that issues of deregulation and its resulting impact on the price of the of power as well as a final decision as to what share and by increased costs are going to be paid by the consumer is going to be an important political issue for the utilities some time to come. He stated that any immediate impact on which may DCPP will depend on several price-related factors able to affect the time that DCPP-produced power is actually Members and consultants discussed command market-rate prices.
driving the with Mr. Rueger the factors and events which are projections market for electric power and some of the future and elsewhere.
which will affect that market in California B.3-21
Activities of PG&E's Nuclear Safety Oversight and President's Nuclear Advisory Committees.
Mr. Womack reviewed the activities of the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) since the last public meeting of the DCISC.
A regular meeting of NSOC was convened at DCPP on July 25-26, 2000. Mr. Womack identified some of the items of particular interest to the DCISC which were discussed during that meeting. These included an update on the status of cultural transformation efforts, a summary of the 12kV bus event, the status of the Corrective Action Process and Enhancements, and the status of the issues before the State Regional Water Quality Board. Mr. Womack reported that NSOC has two new members, both of whom are external to PG&E. These new members are the Site Vice President at Comanche Peak and the Chief Operating Officer of the Wolf Creek nuclear generating facilities. He reported that by the beginning of 2001 NSOC will consist of a total of three external members and five members from within PG&E. Mr. Clark remarked that, during past discussion with PG&E, the Committee raised the question of the value of having a member of NSOC who specialized in human performance issues and Mr. Womack responded that PG&E periodically reviews the performance of NSOC with similar committees at other plants to assess NSOC's future role.
Mr. Jim Tomkins, Manager for Nuclear Safety, Assessment and Licensing at DCPP was recognized to make the next presentation to the Committee.
Review of Reportable Events and NRC Notices of Violation.
Mr. Tomkins stated that there have been three reportable events at DCPP during the period June 7, 2000 through September 13, 2000. He then reviewed each in detail.
The first event involved a 12kV fault and fire which resulted in a declaration of an Unusual Event and a trip of U-1 and a loss of off-site power. The 12kV fault caused a fire and significant damage to 4kV bus and loss of vital power to vital loads. This led to a reactor trip and U-1 shut down safely as designed. The declaration of an Unusual Event was made based upon a fire which lasted longer than fifteen minutes and the loss of both sources of off-site power during B.3-22
this event. The root cause was determined to have been the thermal failure of a bolted connection, apparently due to degradation or inadequate preventative maintenance, which was exacerbated by a marginal design. Most of the actual physical evidence was destroyed by the fire. Actions taken to preclude a re-occurrence have included upgrading the damaged 12kV bus material from aluminum to copper and refurbishing the damaged 4kV bus. INPO performed an Assist Visit to develop perspective on this event. Long-term corrective actions will include inspection, re-torquing and installation of new boots for all of the bolted joints; upgrading buses with little design margin to copper; and institution of a preventative maintenance program for non-segregated buses. In response to a questions from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Tomkins replied that off-site power to the 12kV system was not completely lost, but the Plant did rely on the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) for the 4kV system for about a day until offsite power was fully restored. Mr. Tomkins further reported that the NRC conducted a Special Inspection from May 15 to June 29, 2000 and held a public meeting in the local area concerning this event on June 29, 2000.
and The NRC concluded that Plant's response was good, overall, the Unusual Event was properly classified. NRC analysis confirmed the root cause and the corrective actions were found to be appropriate. The NRC did issue one non-cited violation (NCV) which resulted from a missed opportunity to detect the degraded condition following a transformer explosion in 1995.
On May 15, 2000, a second reportable event occurred which involved TS 3.0.3 being inadvertently entered when operators restored power to all Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator isolation valves while RCS pressure was at 1500 psig, which was 500 psig above the minimum TS limit. Those valves are required to be operable and open-in-place any time RCS pressure is above 1000 psig. The cause was personnel error and the shift foreman was coached regarding the TS requirements. Operating Procedure L-5 will be changed to contain the TS pressurizer pressure requirement and a lamicoid notice now located at the equipment site will be revised to reference the TS number. Mr. Tomkins and Mr. Oatley discussed with Mr. Clark the nature of the individual counseling provided to the shift foreman and the need to address more than just the specifics of any single personnel error in attempting to prevent a reoccurrence.
Mr. Tomkins reported that on May 25, 2000, a third B.3-23
reportable event occurred when U-I was in Mode 3 and TS 3.4.9.1 was not met when operators failed to adequately document compliance with requirements for system heat-up limits. The cause was a faulty procedure which, while it required the Plant process computer to automatically record RCS parameter data, did not require the operators to periodically review that data. Allowable limits were never exceeded during this event. Procedures have been revised to assure adequate documentation of compliance and monitoring of RCS heatup and cooldown surveillance requirements.
Mr. Tomkins reviewed and discussed with the DCISC Notices of Violation (NOVs) from June 7 to September 13, 2000. He reported that there have been no cited NOVs received during this period. Three NCVs were issued for events which included: a portable load center not being restrained to prevent potential seismic interaction with adjacent component cooling water (CCW) piping, the use of an employee from the Emergency Planning organizations to assist in conducting an audit of that program and for re-energizing the safety injection accumulator discharge isolation valves above 1000 psig RCS pressure, which was discussed with the Committee during the review of the reportable events.
Mr. Tomkins observed that there have been significant reductions in the numbers of received NOVs to date in 2000 as compared to 1999. Common cause trend analysis performed by NQS has not identified any discernable trend in the cause of NOVs, however three NCVs have been received involving inadequate control of TS equipment. All NCVs received have been entered into the DCPP Trend Program. During 2000 there have been 13 NCVs received, as compared to a total of 34 during 1999.
In concluding this presentation, Mr. Tomkins briefly reviewed the NRC Performance Indicators and stated that the current white status window status for the Initiating Events Indicator is expected to return to green status very shortly.
Mr. Oatley, Mr. Rueger and Mr. Tomkins discussed with the DCISC Members the development of the NRC Performance Indicator Program, its present areas of emphasis and the rationale for the development of certain indicators, currently being reviewed with the industry by the NRC.
XIX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS The Chair invited any members of the public present B. 3-24
comments in the audience who wished to address any remarks or to the DCISC to do so at this time. There was no response to this invitation.
XX ADJOURN EVENING SESSION The evening meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent 6:40 P.M.
Safety Committee was adjourned by the Chair at XXI RECONVENE FOR MORNING SESSION of The Friday, September 15, 2000 morning meeting was called to the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee order by the Chair at 8:05 A.M.
XXII INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS The Chair introduced the Members and the Committee's of the consultants and Legal Counsel present for this session public meeting. PG&E Senior Vice President Rueger was then requested asked to continue with the technical presentations by the Committee.
Mr. Rueger introduced the Director of Learning Services, Mr. Tim Blake, to make a presentation to the DCISC.
INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)
XXIII Overview of the Training Program.
of Mr. Blake began the presentation with an overview the twelve INPO-accredited training programs which are currently under the purview of the Learning Services organization. Six of these accredited training programs focus solely on the Operations organization:
- Non-licensed Operator.
- Reactor Operator.
- Senior Reactor Operator.
- Shift Manager.
- Operations Continuing Training.
the Members discussed with Mr. Blake and with Mr. Rueger grouping of shift technical advisors, a position requiring an organization engineering degree, with the Operations training B.3-25
rather than as a part of the Technical training organization.
Mr. Rueger observed that treating the shift technical advisors to as a part of the Operations organization appears to conform current industry norms and is consistent with the function of the position as it has evolved at DCPP.
Two of the INPO-accredited programs serve both the Chemistry and Radiation Protection organizations, as their personnel are multi-functional:
- Chemistry Technician.
- Radiation Protection Technician.
Technical maintenance INPO-accredited training programs include:
- I&C Technician and Supervisor.
- Electrical Maintenance Personnel & Supervisor.
INPO-accredited programs are also focused on:
- Mechanical Maintenance.
- Maintenance Supervisor.*
- Engineering Support.
(*The maintenance supervisor programs have been separated into separate electrical and mechanical components.)
Mr. Blake then briefly reviewed and discussed the various other training programs at DCPP which are not INPO-accredited, these include:
"* General Employee Training.
"* Fire Brigade Training.
"* Hazardous Material Emergency Response Training.
"* Instructor Training.
"* Respirator Training.
"* Chemistry Technician Proficiency Training.
"* Chemistry and Radiation Protection Non-Accredited Training.
"* Radioactive Material Shipping & Radwaste Training.
"* Qualification and Certification of Plant Staff.
In response to a query from Mr. Clark, Mr. Blake replied that each of these individual programs has a significant B.3-26
element of supervisory skill training included as an integral part of the program.
monitored Mr. Blake stated that the training programs are Performance Plan Reviews are prepared on a in several ways.
recognized monthly basis for all accredited programs and are in conjunction with departmental as an important tool and used goals by the Learning Services organization. Accredited programs also undergo annual self-assessments. An INPO place every four Evaluation and Accrediting Board review takes years for each of the INPO-accredited programs. NQS performs each of the training programs a continuous audit function for and NQS also reviews the qualification and training credentials of all personnel.
PG&E representatives discussed some of the instances qualified where employees were discovered not to be properly some of the to perform assigned tasks, and Mr. Rueger reviewed controls and the databases which are utilized at DCPP to remind employees of the necessity for timely re-qualification or other training requirements. Mr. Blake stated that the through Performance Plan Review process tracks numerous items experience, the use of feedback, industry and Plant operating through assessments of the status of corrective actions and activities at other PG&E's participation in outside assessment He identified several of the warning flags which have plants.
and been developed by INPO for the training organization managers; include: a lack of ownership by line and training by weak self-assessments; dissatisfaction as expressed participants in the programs; failure to use the training or experience to improve performance; lack of expertise; program distraction of management's attention from training and its goals.
Mr. Blake reviewed with the Committee the Learning Services Training Program Evaluations Sheet and the described as a Performance Plan Review for July 2000, which he to review ten tool monitored by management on a monthly basis separate and distinct areas. This report is used to track training program.
performance concerning each INPO accredited Members had several questions concerning the process of and the assembling the data for the Performance Plan Review nature and value of the feedback received from the Mr. Blake and participants in the training efforts, to which Mr. Womack and Mr. Oatley responded. Mr. Clark stated that data the Committee would like to review the tracking concerning the INPO-accredited training and instructor B.3-27
he training programs at DCPP on a quarterly basis and similar to the suggested PG&E may want to review something training Performance Plan Review format of the INPO-accredited programs. In programs to monitor the non-accredited training Blake response to a question from Dr. de Planque, Mr.
Review entitled discussed the column on the Performance Plan the efforts of the Human Performance in Lessons which reflects on a forward training organization to focus line-management to prevent looking, proactive perspective on training issues in response error rather than focusing on training conducted to a particular incident or event.
Mr. Blake reviewed and discussed the Learning Services departmental goals which are updated on a monthly basis and with which include assessment of: student satisfaction self-assessment training; support of the line organizations; performance; NRC exam results; workload management; budget performance; human performance initiatives and training He remarked that each INPO observations by management.
own steering committee accredited training program has its incumbent program consisting of members from line management, These steering participants and Learning Services personnel.
training settings committees review program feedback, select In response and topics and review human performance issues.
the PG&E to questions from the Committee Members, evolutions within representatives reviewed current changes and that the the various training programs at DCPP and remarked provide new data process-based budget management efforts will in the on the actual time expended by the DCPP organization some of the entire training process and they reviewed of PG&E's other components of training organizations at some non-nuclear facilities.
Mr. Oatley In response to a question from Mr. Clark, been added to replied that around 16 or 17 employees have DCPP's workforce by virtue of their union seniority rights as of most of its other a result of PG&E divesting itself provisions of generation assets, as required under the California's deregulation legislation. In response to a replied that the question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Blake the first multi-discipline Asset Team leaders have completed are expected to phase of their required technical training and the end of 2001.
complete the balance of their training by Nuclear Mr. Rueger then introduced the Director of to make the next Quality Services at DCPP, Mr. Dave Taggart, presentation to the Committee.
B.3-28
Results of the 1999 Biennial Nuclear Quality Services Audit and Self-Assessment.
Mr. Taggart stated that Nuclear Quality Services (NQS) performs a self-assessment of its key activities every two years. During the years when self-assessments are not performed, NQS coordinates an audit of key NQS activities performed by independent industry peers, which in the past was referred to as the Joint Utility Management Audit (JUMA). The 1999 Biennial Audit was performed during the period December 6-10, 1999. He then discussed and reviewed the scope of that audit which included:
- Internal Audits.
- Supplier Audits.
- Receipt Inspection Program.
- Procurement Quality Testing Lab.
- Auditor Personnel Qualifications.
- Inspector Personnel Qualifications.
- Follow-up on Previous JUMA Findings.
In response to a query from Consultant Booker, Mr.
Taggart replied that the scope of a Biennial Audit is determined by procedures which require the audit to address certain mandatory topics and by a review of previous problems or changes which have occurred within the DCPP organization.
Mr. Taggart and Mr. Rueger stated that the audit findings are primarily directed to PNAC for its review, comment and direction and that a required minimum scope of the Quality Assurance (QA) audit function is an integral part of the FSAR.
NSOC's external members have occasionally been asked to review the DCPP Quality Program and the performance of audits and to make recommendations to NSOC as a whole. Mr. Taggart remarked that the latest audit represented about 250 person-hours of assessment time and included industry peers from Palo Verde, WNP-2 (Columbia), Cooper and Fermi nuclear power plants. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Oatley responded that PG&E encourages and makes available DCPP personnel for similar efforts at other nuclear facilities in its attempt to identify the best practices industry-wide.
Mr. Taggart then reviewed with the Committee a summary of the independent peer group's conclusions and the results of the Biennial Audit as follows:
B.3-29
" The Internal Audit Program, the Supplier Audit Program exhibited good and and the Receipt Inspection Program very effective performance.
and
"* The Material Testing Program exhibited satisfactory effective performance.
"* Improvements were necessary in the areas assessed from the last JUMA and the 1998 NQS Self-Assessment.
"* Good teamwork was observed, both internally and externally within NQS.
1999 audit team There were three findings made by the which included:
found with
"* Receipt Inspection Certification Packages were administrative errors.
past due for
"* Two auditor certifications were found to be their annual evaluation.
"* A potential conflict was identified between Procurement Engineering and NQS procedures on sampling.
identified six Mr. Taggart reported that the 1999 audit strengths including:
of the
" Senior NPG management participation and support by the Senior Vice internal audit process as demonstrated audit of Emergency President's participation on the 1998 Preparedness.
"* Audits and assessments of the Engineering organization in-depth, performance-based were found to be thorough, and technically probing.
"* Third party reviews and follow-up by NQS procurement assessment for potential impact on DCPP.
Management
" Development and use of the Plant Information database, as well System (PIMS) qualified suppliers list receipt inspector.
as other databases that support the inspector
"* Development and implementation of the receipt B.3-30
qualifications guidelines.
- Receipt inspector qualifications and proactive support of the plant.
Mr. Taggart and Dr. Rossin briefly discussed the current requirements concerning the purchase and use of commercial grade materials by nuclear facilities. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Taggart confirmed that the next Biennial Audit is scheduled for 2001.
Mr. Womack reported to the DCISC that the NQS and Nuclear Safety Licensing and Assessment organizations at DCPP will be consolidated shortly in order to improve efficiency and he briefly reviewed the proposed structure of the new organization.
A short break followed.
Mr. Rueger requested Mr. Oatley to make the next technical presentation to the Committee.
Integrated Assessment Process Overview.
Mr. Oatley observed that the purpose of the Integrated Assessment Process is to use information obtained from various performance assessments to facilitate the early identification of declining or marginal performance. The Integrated Assessment Process facilitates communication to senior management and Plant staff of those recommendations which are made to enhance performance and it provides a means to evaluate DCPP performance against NRC criteria. He remarked that the Integrated Assessment Process does tend to focus on areas needing improvement, rather than those demonstrating identified strengths. The Integrated Assessment Process utilizes data from:
- NQS Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR).
- Line Self-Assessments.
- NRC Performance Indicators.
- NRC Inspection findings.
- Assessments of NRC violations.
- Significance Determination Evaluations.
Mr. Oatley reviewed the results of the Integrated Assessment Process for the second quarter of 2000 which he B.3-31
cA Mr. Rueger, stated has been compiled into a report directed to provided by as PG&E's Chief Nuclear Officer, from information The second the Plant Manager and senior managers at DCPP.
quarter report for 2000, while finding that overall issues:
performance was acceptable, identified the following
"* DCPP human performance is not improving and may be declining slightly in the Maintenance and Operations organizations.
" DCPP currently has an NRC Performance Indicator white for status window for unplanned loss of normal heat sink U-2.
" DCPP does not adequately trend low level errors due to inadequate guidance on when to write an Event Trend the present Record (ETR) and because of the complexity of software in use.
"* DCPP has not made sufficient progress toward lowering periods.
personnel radiation exposure during non-outage Report Mr. Clark remarked that the Integrated Assessment copies of the appears to be a positive tool and he requested 2000 first and second quarter reports and a copy of the third quarter report when it is prepared for the Committee's review.
Mr. Oatley reviewed trends at DCPP since 1997 concerning error is the rate of human error which indicate that human the Plant remains in the increasing slightly at DCPP, although error top quartile of the industry for acceptable human He observed that the increase in this trend performance.
Maintenance somewhat correlates to those times within the concern regarding organization when there has existed the most as PG&E employees job security among the present workforce, from other non-nuclear facilities were afforded and exercised well as to those their union rights to claim jobs at DCPP, as which utilized times when refueling outages were conducted additional contractor personnel on-site. Mr. Oatley reviewed human errors efforts being made to identify the reasons for and to create strategies to address them. Members discussed incentives with Mr. Oatley and Mr. Rueger the value of using as well as and competition in lowering rates of human error, three-part use of self-verification efforts employing formal training sessions.
communication and tail-board reviews and planning a fact-Mr. Clark remarked that the Committee is B.3-32
various efforts finding during December 2000 to study how the to minimize human error at DCPP are integrated.
of Mr. Rueger introduced Mr. Bruce Terrell, Supervisor make the next the Corrective Action Program at DCPP to technical presentation to the Committee.
for Non-Cited Review of Tracking and Trending Results Violations.
the NCV Mr. Terrell began his presentation by reviewing a very criteria which he described as those violations with with the Members the low safety significance and he discussed by currently employed definition of low safety significance as has revised the NRC. Mr. Rueger remarked that since the NRC nuclear plants have seen a drop in NOVs and their process all NCVs at DCPP is an the tracking and trending program for the given strict effort to make sure that these NCVs are attention.
could result Mr. Terrell reviewed the circumstances which NOV. These include a in a NCV rising to the level of a cited reasonable time, failure to restore compliance within a Action failure to place the violation in the Corrective Program to address its reoccurrence, a repetitive violation which is the result of inadequate corrective actions or a finding that a violation is willful.
the Mr. Terrell discussed the mechanics of managing Status of corrective review process for tracking the NCVs.
are analyzed by an actions for NCVs are reviewed weekly and that the level of engineer and the Error Review Team to ensure to the nature of the remediation is appropriate and adequate (AR) is initiated identified error. A tracking Action Request the Event Trend and all trend data for each NCV is entered on to Record. Periodic trending of the NCVs is performed actions. During the determine the effectiveness of corrective 8 27 NCVs, of which past one-year period, DCPP has received open with corrective actions yet to be completed.
are still This involved One specific event has had a repeat occurrence.
gas container in the the presence of a flammable, compressed the need for power block and DCPP management is evaluating additional corrective actions. Mr. Terrell stated that the for a process which NCV trending data is the starting point entire scope of Plant ultimately includes evaluation of the discovered ETR data. No discernable negative trends have been which include:
to date within the ETR data categories, B.3-33
"* Procedures being used.
"* Work process data concerning procedural problems.
"* worker-related data concerning human error and procedural adherence.
"* organizational data from Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, etc.
Mr. Terrell briefly reviewed the individual attributes of the 27 NCVs received during the preceding one-year period as follows: 23 of the 27 involved surveillance test procedures; 22 of the 27 involved TS; 21 of the 27 involved administrative procedures. He then summarized the NCV trends according to the origin of the problems and he observed that problems in using and adhering to the TS were the most frequent contributor to NCVs at DCPP. Members and consultants had several questions for Mr. Terrell concerning the data he presented. Mr. Terrell then reviewed Plant trend data which, he remarked, identified inattention and failure to adhere to procedure as significant items in the ETR database.
Mr. Terrell concluded his presentation with a review of the NCV ETRs by organization and noted that more than one department can be involved with generating a single NCV.
Maintenance and Operations departments were identified as contributing to the largest share of NCVs which was not unexpected due to their direct impact on the Plant's operation.
In concluding his presentation, Mr. Terrell stated that DCPP does have a program in place to review and trend all the NCVs received from the NRC as well as to analyze the various attributes of individual NCVs.
Mr. Rueger introduced Mr. Russell Gray to make the final technical presentation to the Committee.
Management of Radiation Exposure During IR10.
Mr. Gray began the presentation with a brief history of the high radiation dosage rate experienced during the 1R9 refueling outage, which resulted in a 309.5 person-rem exposure and exceeded by a considerable margin the exposure goal set for 1R9 of 184 person-rem. Mr. Gray stated that the reasons for the higher exposure rate experienced during 1R9 were:
B.3-34
"* RHR pipe dose rate was 2 to 4 times higher than that experienced during IR8.
"* The reactor head dose rate was about 2 times higher than that experienced during IRS.
"* The excess letdown system showed a significantly higher dose rate.
Mr. Gray observed, however, that the steam generator bowl dose rate during 1R9 decreased by an average of 12% due to the use of zinc injection during the 1R8-1R9 operating cycle. The zinc was injected in an effort to mitigate potential primary water stress corrosion cracking. He also identified as contributing to the high dose rate during 1R9 the forced outage experienced during December 1999; an increase in particulate activity transport during the end of the lR8-1R9 cycle; and higher concentration of cobalt due to the injections of zinc and plate-out activity when RHR was placed in service.
Mr. Gray then reviewed the initiatives undertaken at DCPP during 2R9 to avoid the experiences of 1R9 and their anticipated effect. The RCS pH was lowered near the end of the fuel cycle in an attempt to avoid an end-of-cycle increase in RCS activity. The Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) filters were changed out during the end of cycle to reduce dissolution of source term at the end of the cycle.
The zinc injection concentration was lowered to reduce the potential effect of the zinc. There was a complete boration of the RCS prior to cooldown to ensure acid reducing conditions prior to cooldown. A hold was reestablished at 325AOF prior to RHR initiation, to support the dissolution of particulates. The RCS temperature at which the RHR is placed may drive in service was lowered to reduce thermal delta which particulate drop out. The RHR was pre-heated before being placed into service to reduce thermal delta which may drive particulate drop out. Forced oxygenation of the RCS was work scheduled for a specific time, in order that a minimum of rate period during forced could be scheduled for the high dose oxygenation.
Mr. Gray reviewed efforts made within the DCPP These organization to achieve lower dose rates during 2R9.
included emphasis on principles of accountability, the As Low between As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Program, coordination workgroups, better staffing, outage planning and work B.3-35
practices and increased training for radiation and technical workers. A Rad Worker Handbook was developed and extensive tailboards were conducted with workgroups. Databases were established to trend workers' practices and ALARA Program staffing was redesigned. Service level agreements were made with the Asset Teams and there was increased management involvement with radiation protection issues. The results for an 2R9 were the lowest dose rates ever experienced at DCPP for outage, 120.3 person-rem, and improved rad worker performance in terms of low numbers of documented errors.
Mr. Gray discussed the May 2000 forced outage for U-I caused by a bus fire which tripped the plant. Little radiological work was performed but a 2.5 person-rem dosage was accumulated during this forced outage. Lessons concerning chemistry were incorporated into the forced outage and forced oxygenation was performed and resulted in a good cleanup.
However, Mr. Gray remarked that U-I developed unexpectedly up high dose rates in the RHR and Letdown Systems during start for reasons which are still not fully understood.
Mr. Gray stated that DCPP, as compared to other nuclear facilities, showed a higher dose rate for personnel, on the order of 2 to 3 person-rem per month, and he observed that management recognized that this was too high for a pressurized water reactor. An effort was initiated, entitled Manage the Mili-Rem, to focus attention on small doses. He discussed and described some other efforts being undertaken DCPP to reduce dose, including increased use of temporary shielding during non-outage periods; reduction in the number of radiation protection surveys and containment entries; purchase of new telemetry and electronic dosimetry systems; improvement to equipment and techniques to reduce exposure to rad waste personnel; and the use of ultrasound for venting the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) .
The goal for IR10 was set as an exposure goal of 147.5 person-rem, to be achieved using shutdown techniques similar to those used during 2R9 with the addition of an RHR flush during startup. Other planned flushes will include and containment spray/RHR on the 115 foot level of containment the RHR above the RHR sump. Work activities have been planned factoring daily exposure goals and any deviation from these goals will receive management attention.
Plans for monitoring radiation exposure during IR10 include early characterization of radiological conditions and B.3-36
a communication plan. Mr. Gray stated that the overall outage the dosage exposure goal for IRI0 is somewhat high due to received during the May forced outage. Mr. Gray discussed exposure with the Members the various factors impacting the rates, given the outage duration, and he then compared exposure rates experienced at other facilities and discussed outage the possibility of altering the exposure goal as an progresses. The PG&E representatives discussed their method goals of setting goals with Dr. Rossin and stated that these are not normally varied during an outage. The 1R9 outage was term an exception to this rule due to the greater source impact on the outage incentive package.
experienced and its In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Gray replied is that the administrative limit of 2 rem for any employee has never exceeded and the highest dosage for any employee Mr. Clark questioned, and been an exposure of 1.7 to 1.8 rem.
Mr. Gray and Mr. Rueger confirmed, that a source-term reduction program is currently an element of the ALARA program. Mr. Gray observed that there are significant Clark differences in dose rate between U-1 and U-2 and Mr.
differences mentioned that the North Anna Plant has similar between its operating units. Mr. Gray confirmed that PG&E is (EPRI) and working with the Electric Power Research Institute between the INPO to identify the reasons for the differences DCPP units.
XXIX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS The Chair invited public comments at this time, public. The however, there were no comments by members of the of Committee then returned to a discussion on the approval fact-finding reports.
XXV CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION Drs. de Planque and Rossin observed that the and technical presentations made by PG&E were valuable Mr. Clark reviewed and discussed with the PG&E informative.
for representatives the two days of fact-finding scheduled December 2000, with Dr. Cass, to review human performance Plant site.
issues as well as other technical issues at the a fact-finding with Dr. Rossin reported that he is planning planning to Consultant Wardell during October 2000 and is also Booker in attend the meetings of PNAC and NSOC with Consultant Dr. Rossin also remarked that he is planning a November 2000.
Rueger's meeting with Mr. Rueger in San Francisco at Mr.
Dr. de Planque stated that she planned to convenience.
B.3-37
schedule a fact-finding during Spring of 2001 to attend an emergency drill and she requested that PG&E provide a schedule for the PNAC and NSOC meetings scheduled for 2001 when it is available.
The next public meeting of the DCISC are scheduled for February 7-8, June 20-21 and October 17-18, 2001.
XXVI ADJOURNMENT OF THIRTY-FIRST SET OF MEETINGS There being no further business, upon a motion by Dr. Rossin, seconded by Dr. de Planque, the thirty-first meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was adjourned by the Chair at 12:10 P.M.
B.3-38
Exhibit B.4 NOTICE OF MEETING, PUBLIC FACT-FINDING AND PLANT TOUR BY THE DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on February 7, 2001, at 8:00 A.M., the members of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee ("DCISC") will conduct an inspection tour of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. This tour, which will take approximately four hours, will be open to the public on a limited basis, as follows: because the plant is an operating nuclear power plant, the tour will be limited to fifteen (15) members of the public on a reserved first-come, first-served basis, with preference given to those members of the public who have not attended previous DCISC tours, and with prior clearance of all public attendees required in compliance with NRC procedures.
NOTICE IS HEREBY FURTHER GIVEN that on February 7 and 8, 2001, at the Cliffs at Shell Beach Conference Center, 2757 Shell Beach Road, Shell Beach, California, a public meeting and fact-finding will be held by the DCISC in four separate sessions, at the times indicated, to consider the following matters:
- 1. Afternoon Session - (2/7/2001) - 1:30 P.M.:
Introductory comments, approve minutes of September 14-15, 2000 meetings; consider PG&E's response to the 1999-2000 DCISC Annual Report; a review of the DCISC Open Items List; discussion of administrative matters; Committee member and staff-consultant reports including a report on the plant tour; receive, approve and authorize transmittal of fact-finding reports to PG&E; and to receive public comments and communications to the Committee.
- 2. Evening Session - (2/7/2001) - 5:30 P.M.: Comments by Committee members; consider various technical presentations requested by the Committee from PG&E on topics relating to plant safety and operations, including an update on plant events and operational status, a review of DCISC and NRC selected performance indicators, an update on the activities of PG&E's Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee, a review of NRC Notices of Violations and Licensee Event Reports, a presentation on Nuclear Quality Services 2000 Review; and receive public comments and communications to the Committee.
- 3. Morning Session - (2/8/2001) - 8:00 A.M.: Opening comments by Committee members; consider further technical B.4-1
to plant safety and presentations from PG&E on topics relating Strategies, operations, including the 2001 Culture Transition tube test a review of refueling outage 1R10 steam generator As Low As results, a review of refueling outage IR10 a presentation Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and dose results, discussion of on the status of the California energy issue, a Power Plant's the California energy issue and Diablo Canyon the actions; receive public comments and communications to members and Committee; and wrap-up discussion by Committee and the scheduling of future site visits, study sessions meetings.
- (2/8/2001) - 1:30
- 4. Afternoon Public Fact-Finding P.M.: Convene public fact-finding and consider technical safety and presentations by PG&E on topics relating to plant outage operations including the overall result of refueling IR10 and the Safety 1R10, a presentation on refueling outage Five Plan, a discussion of PG&E's Nuclear Power Generation communications Year Business Plan; receive public comments and to the Committee; and adjournment of the public fact-finding.
and the The specific meeting and fact-finding agenda agenda items staff reports and materials regarding the above Monday, will be available for public review commencing Room of the Cal February 5, 2001, at the NRC Public Document information Poly Library in San Luis Obispo. For further fact-finding, please contact regarding the public meeting and 857 Cass Street, Robert Wellington, Committee Legal Counsel, telephone: 1-800-439 Suite D, Monterey, California, 93940; at www.dcisc.org. To 4688 or visit the Committee's website telephone the make a reservation for the plant tour, please between the hours of 9:00 A.M.
Committee's office on a weekday Please make your call prior and 5:00 P.M. at 1-800-439-4688.
when tour to 5:00 P.M. on Thursday, January 25, 2001, reservations will be closed.
Dated: January 18, 2001.
B.4-2
Exhibit B.5 DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE Committee Members: Philip R. Clark E. Gail de Planque A. David Rossin AGENDA Cliffs at Shell Beach Wednesday & Thursday Hotel Conference Center February 7 & 8, 2001 2757 Shell Beach Road Shell Beach, California Afternoon Session - 2/7/2001 - 1:30 P.M.
I. CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL II. INTRODUCTIONS IIl. CONSENT AGENDA (Routine items which the Committee can approve with a single motion and vote. A member may request that any item be placed on the regular agenda for separate consideration.)
A. Minutes of September 14-15, 2000 Meetings:Approve IV. ACTION ITEMS A. PG&E Response to the 1999/2000 Discussion DCISC Annual Report Discussion/Action B. Review of the Open Items List C. Update on Financial and Discussion/Action Budgetary Matters for 2000/2001 Discussion D. DCISC Activities During 2001 V. COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION A. Site visits and Other Committee Activities B. Documents Provided to the Committee VI. STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS A. Ferman Wardell Fact-finding topics B. Jim E. Booker Fact-finding reports C. Dr. Hyla Cass B. 5-1
Human performance Issues D. Robert Wellington Administrative and legal matters VII. COMMITTEE FACT-FINDING REPORTS:
Receive, approve and authorize transmittal to PG&E VIII. CORRESPONDENCE IX. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (oral communications on No immediate Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker. for action will be taken on matters raised, but they may be referred further study, response or action.)
X. ADJOURN AFTERNOON MEETING Evening Session - 2/7/2001 - 5:30 P.M.
XI. RECONVENE FOR EVENING MEETING XII. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS XIII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE A. Technical Presentations Requested by the Committee of P.G.& E. Representatives:
- 1) General Introductions
- 2) Plant Events and Operational Status
- 3) Review of DCISC-Selected Performance Indicators
- 4) Review of NRC-Selected Performance Indicators
- 5) Activities of PG&E's Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee
- 6) Review of NRC Notices of Violations and Licensee Event Reports
- 7) Nuclear Quality Services 2000 Review XIV. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications on No action will Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker.
they may be referred for further be taken on matters raised, but study, response or action.)
XV. ADJOURN EVENING MEETING Morning Session - 2/8/2001 - 8:00 A.M.
XVI. RECONVENE FOR MORNING MEETING B. 5-2
XVII. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS XVIII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)
- 8) 2001 Culture Transition Strategies
- 9) Refueling Outage IRl0 Steam Generator Tube Test Results
- 10) Refueling Outage IR10 "As Low As Reasonably Achievable" (ALARA) and Dose Results
- 11) Status of California Energy Issue
- 12) California Energy Issue - Diablo Canyon Power Plant's Actions XIX. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications on Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker. No action will be taken on matters raised, but they may be referred for further study, response or action.)
XX. ADJOURN MORNING MEETING Afternoon Session - 2/8/2001 - 1:30 P.M.
XXI. RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON MEETING XXII. MEMBERS COMMENTS XXIII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Con'd.)
- 13) Refueling Outage IR10 Overall Results
- 14) Refueling Outage 2R10 and Safety Plan
- 15) Five-Year Nuclear Power Generation Business Plan XXIV. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications on Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker. No action will be taken on matters raised, but they may be referred for further study, response or action.)
XXV. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS A. Future Actions by the Committee B. Further Information to Obtain/Review C. Scheduling of Future Site Visits, Study Sessions and Meetings XXVI. ADJOURNMENT OF THIRTY-SECOND SET OF MEETINGS.
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Exhibit B.6 MINUTES of the FEBRUARY 2001 MEETING OF THE DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE Wednesday & Thursday February 7-8, 2001 Shell Beach, California Notice of Meeting A legal Notice of Meeting was published in local and was newspapers, along with several display advertisements, mailed to the media and those persons on the Committee's service list.
Agenda I CALL TO ORDER The February 7, 2001, afternoon meeting of the to Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee(DCISC)was called at the order by Committee Chair Philip R. Clark at 1:30 P.M.
in Shell Beach, Cliffs at Shell Beach Hotel Conference Center California.
Present: Committee Chair Philip R. Clark Committee Member Dr. E. Gail de Planque Committee Member Dr. A. David Rossin Absent: None II INTRODUCTIONS Mr. Clark introduced the Committee Members, the meetings.
consultants and Legal Counsel in attendance at these III CONSENT AGENDA The Chair requested Legal Counsel Wellington to present the only item from the Consent Agenda, a routine item of a which the Committee could approve by vote or, on motion That item was approval Member, remove to the regular agenda.
of the Minutes of the September 14-15, 2000 DCISC Meetings.
Revisions to content were suggested and approved by the to Members and editorial corrections were noted and provided Mr. Wellington.
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Committee Business IV ACTION ITEMS A. PG&E Response to the 1999/2000 DCISC Annual Report. Committee Members and consultants discussed, reviewed and evaluated responses by PG&E to the Committee's Recommendations contained in its 1999/2000 Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations and they discussed certain of the PG&E responses with PG&E Vice President Larry Womack:
R2000-1 Re: PG&E emphasis on assuring employees, particularly within Operations, improve Technical Specification(TS)adherence - Response found acceptable, however, the DCISC will continue to follow-up on PG&E's performance concerning adherence to TS in the future.
R2000-2 Re: including all Licensee Event Reports(LERs),
which involve problems affecting offsite power, in the Corrective Action Program effectiveness review and to report the results to the DCISC during a future fact-finding or public meeting
- Response found acceptable.
R2000-3 Re: assuring that, during review of the Aging Management Program, adequate program controls and functions are maintained and any revised program is designed and resourced to be at least as strong and effective as the previous program - Response found acceptable, subject to PG&E providing a list of the systems which will and will not be covered by the long-term Aging Management planning process.
R2000-4 Re: training of foremen for all the Asset Teams in areas where they lack expertise - Response found acceptable.
R2000-5 Re: PG&E visiting other utilities with strong Corrective Action Programs to measure their effectiveness and help in the further development of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant(DCPP)Corrective Action Program - Response found acceptable, subject to DCISC review of B. 6-2
the Nuclear Energy Institute(NEI)Corrective Action Benchmarking Project report and PG&E's implementation of the lessons identified in that report.
R2000-6 Re: performing a comprehensive review to assure all materials subject to aging or requiring periodic replacement are included in aging and replacement management programs and to address any other areas where a manufacturer's guidance may not have been followed - Response found acceptable.
R2000-7 Re: investigating a method to coordinate various Human Performance Programs and to disseminate information within the DCPP organization on these Programs - Response found acceptable.
R2000-8 Re: augmentation of programs for operator health, fitness and aging to address relevant issues and to further improve operator human performance - Response found acceptable.
R2000-9 Re: emphasizing teaching operators to recognize the priorities of the tasks themselves, rather than relying largely on prioritized procedures
- Response found acceptable. The issue may be followed-up during a future fact-finding.
R2000-10 Re: Nuclear Quality Services(NQS) involving the Nuclear Safety oversight Committee(NSOC)in the selection and the scope of the Biennial Audit/Self-Assessments to be sure of the independence of the NQS department - Response found acceptable.
R2000-11 Re: initiating a review by the Design Engineering organization, or at the Plant Staff Review Committee(PSRC) or NSOC level, to determine if any other design basis requirements, particularly in the civil engineering area, have not been implemented such as with the Seismic Gap Program, the emergency diesel generator(EDG) seismic wall problem and the previously corrected seismic masonry wall inadequacies - Response found B.6-3
acceptable.
R2000-12 Re: continuing short and long-term development of the System Summary Health Report for all systems and sharing this information with Operations, Maintenance and Engineering Response found acceptable, subject to receipt of a comprehensive listing of DCPP systems for which System Summary Health Reports will be implemented.
R2000-13 Re: review of the Intake Structures concrete inspection plan for each refueling outage to assure that the entire inspection plan is implemented and conducted and that necessary repairs are made to these structures - Response found acceptable, however, DCISC will follow-up concerning the specific reasons for not inspecting these structures during certain past refueling outages.
The Chair reported that the Committee accepted all of the PG&E responses to the DCISC Recommendations contained in the 1999/2000 Annual Report.
B. Review of Open Items List. Consultant Ferman Wardell reviewed the Open Items List which is used to track items which the Committee designated for follow-up, requested further information during fact-finding, at its public meetings or in its Annual Report. In response to a query from the Chair, Mr. Wardell reported that the total number of items on the List appears to be decreasing slightly. The Chair reviewed with the other Members the efforts made to consolidate and review the frequency with which the Committee commits to revisit certain of the topics on the Open Items List. Mr. Clark requested the Members and consultants carefully review all the items which are recommended on the List for closure to verify the appropriateness of that action.
Any requests to continue items indicated for closure on the current Open Items List should be provided to Mr. Wardell during this public meeting of the DCISC.
C. Update on Financial & Budgetary Matters for 2000-2001. The Chair requested Mr.
Wellington to review financial reports received from the Committee's Accountant. Members discussed with Mr. Wellington the DCISC spending for 2000, and the amount to be remitted to B.6-4
by PG&E for grantor trust funds remaining and not disbursed 2000 calendar year. The the Committee at the end of the the Members directed the Committee's accountant to discontinue reference to profit on the Committee's financial statements, as the Committee receives its funding in trust from PG&E as from its the grantor, and the DCISC does not retain any profit instruct operations. The Committee directed Mr. Wellington to the Committee's Accountant to review the Committee's financial records and continue to comply with California's new child support enforcement regulations.
D. DCISC Activities During 2001. Mr. Clark stated that he plans to attend a fact-finding meeting with Consultant Wardell at DCPP during March 14-15,2001. Dr. Rossin and with Consultant Jim Booker will coordinate their schedules PG&E's calendar of events to arrange for a fact-finding for she the third week of April 2001. Dr. de Planque reported that of is planning to attend fact-finding meetings and a meeting be NSOC at the Plant during May 1-2, 2001, and that she would either before or available to meet with State representatives, after the next scheduled public meeting of the Committee on June 20-21, 2001. The Committee Members and consultants discussed coordinating a fact-finding on human performance issues with Consultant Dr. Hyla Cass and PG&E during June 2001. Dr. de Planque will investigate any possibility of at altering her existing commitments to permit her attendance August 17, 2001. The Chair the Emergency Drill scheduled for for requested that Members and consultants coordinate agendas ensure future fact-findings with Mr. Wardell and Mr. Booker to for follow-up on continued coverage of those items selected DCISC are the Open Items List. The next public meetings of the scheduled for June 20-21 and October 17-18, 2001. The Chair an requested that the Members continue the practice of making to their appointing State agencies to update them annual visit and discuss the Committee's current activities.
A short break followed.
V COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION a) Site Visits and Other Committee Activities: Dr.
with Rossin reported that he participated in two fact-findings with Consultant Wardell was held on October PG&E, the first 25-26, 2000, and took place during a refueling outage. The shift turnover and activities DCISC representatives observed a within Containment. They also held discussions with PG&E the concerning issues of low-level radioactive waste and B.6-5
the integrity of the reactor pressure vessel and met with Director of Human Resources at DCPP.
A second fact-finding with Consultant Booker included attending a meeting of NSOC and discussions with PG&E issues.
concerning pipe cracking, fuel, and spent fuel storage Dr. Rossin reported that these fact-findings proved to be useful and informative.
In response to a query from Mr. Clark, Mr. Womack replied fuel that PG&E has made a decision to proceed with dry spent storage and is presently working with HOLTECH, a contractor, on the design of a dry cask spent fuel storage facility for DCPP. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Vice President Womack opined that there would be concern and possible opposition from segments of the local community to PG&E's License Amendment Request(LAR) to the NRC to approve dry cask on-site storage of spent fuel.
Mr. Clark reported on a fact-finding held in December 2000, with Consultants Dr. Cass and Mr. Booker. The first day of the fact-finding concerned human performance, behavior, health and wellness issues and Mr. Clark reported that PG&E appears to be making significant efforts to address human error. The second day of the fact-finding concerned topics which will be reviewed during Mr. Booker's report.
Mr. Clark then reported briefly on his meeting with The Commissioner Laurie of the California Energy Commission.
Commissioner and his staff received information on the Committee and its activities from Mr. Clark and he answered several questions concerning the Committee and its role.
b) Documents provided to the Committee: Mr.
Wellington reviewed the lists of the documents provided to the last Committee by PG&E, the NRC and other sources since the public meetings of the Committee.
VI STAFF-CONSULTAINT REPORTS Consultant Wardell reported on the October 25-26, 2000, fact-finding meeting with Dr. Rossin. This fact-finding was conducted during the tenth refueling outage for Unit 1 Daily (1R10) and the DCISC representatives observed an Outage Meeting, visited the Outage Work Control Center and discussed the Outage Safety Plan with the Outage Director. Mr. Wardell IRI0 reported that there were three reportable events during which PG&E will review with the DCISC. It was reported that B. 6-6
risk PG&E created a chart, used during IRl0, to determine the of loss of heat removal at any time during a refueling outage.
This chart is used during Outage Daily Meetings and it shows the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) water level versus heat removal for various modes of operation. Mr. Wardell and Dr. Rossin commented that the chart was a useful tool and Dr. Rossin suggested that PG&E consider sharing this valuable and effective tool within the nuclear industry.
The DCISC representatives then met with the Turbine (U
Component Engineer to discuss work performed on the Unit 1 hot
- 1) Turbine, resulting from a blade which was lost due to cycle fatigue. They also toured Containment, observed fuel movement, Radiation Protection (RP) controls and a Control Room Shift Manager turnover and control board walkdown.
to meet During the fact-finding, Dr. Rossin had an opportunity with several DCPP managers. Mr. Wardell and Dr. Rossin also Inspector met with the NRC Resident Inspector for DCPP and the issues at confirmed the NRC's intent to continue to review DCPP regarding human performance and the effects of deregulation on the transmission system and grid reliability.
They also discussed with the inspector the NRC's implemen tation of its risk-based review process. The DCISC represen tatives also took a driving tour of DCPP to familiarize Dr.
site.
Rossin with the important physical features of the Plant Mr. Clark commented that the Committee may wish to consider meeting on a regular basis with the NRC's Resident Inspector at DCPP during some of its fact-findings held at the Plant site.
Dr. Rossin and Mr. Wardell met with the System Engineer Systems for the Liquid and Solid Radioactive Waste Processing and received a briefing on those Systems. They held concerning the discussions with the Component Engineer to a integrity of the Reactor Pressure Vessel. In response there query by Mr. Clark, Dr. Rossin replied that it appears is sufficient margin concerning Reactor Pressure Vessel full embrittlement to permit continued operations during the DCPP. The DCISC term of the current license period for of the representatives also met with the current Director yet Aging Management Program and observed that PG&E has not earlier established goals for the Aging met some of its Management Program. The Program Director discussed some areas which PG&E will be addressing to meet management's expectations for the Aging Management Program. A discussion B. 6-7
was also held with the RP Program Director during this fact el,ý finding. A detailed report of the Fact-Finding will be developed and included in the Annual Report.
Mr. Wardell briefly discussed the Annual Report preparation schedule and distributed individual assignments for sections of the Committee's Eleventh Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, covering the period July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2001.
Committee Consultant Booker reported on the November 14 15, 2000,fact-finding conducted with Dr. Rossin. DCISC representatives attended a joint meeting of PG&E President's Nuclear Advisory Committee (PNAC) and the NSOC and they reported that the joint meeting format proved an excellent and efficient venue to permit the participants to remain informed on the major issues affecting DCPP and that the DCISC should consider recommending to PG&E that the joint format be continued whenever possible.
The DCISC representatives received a presentation on the Intake Structure inspection and repair and the RP Program results during IR10 and they reviewed the corrective actions taken and those planned, which resulted from a U-I reactor trip on September 22, 1999, caused by a lightning strike in a switchyard. They also reviewed the results of the steam generator(SG) inspections during IRl0 and discussed PG&E's plans for addressing the spent fuel storage issue and the efforts to disseminate information to the public concerning those plans. The DCISC representatives held discussions concerning DCPP nuclear fuel and issues relating to the use of boraflex in the Spent Fuel Pool. In response to a query from Dr. de Planque and an observation by Dr. Rossin, it was noted that all reference to discussions and observations contained within Committee fact-finding reports should clearly indicate when a comment is taken from NSOC or PNAC materials or participants and when a comment expresses the opinion or observations of the DCISC representatives. A detailed report of the Fact-Finding will be developed and included in the Annual Report.
Mr. Booker reported on a fact-finding held on December 14, 2000, with DCISC Member Clark. Topics reviewed with PG&E on that occasion included a report on the status of the Transition Program preparing DCPP for competition and he noted that activities outstanding from the Transition Plan are now being included in the long-term Performance Plans for DCPP.
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The DCISC representatives discussed the Engineering Workload Performance Indicators used to assess resources available to accomplish work assigned. In response to a question from Dr.
Rossin and Mr. Clark, Vice President Womack observed that PG&E is not surprised that some employees have raised issues concerning the number of ad hoc committees on which they serve, however, PG&E continues to believe the efficiency improving objectives which are realized through the use of plant-wide, rather than intra departmental committee participation warrant the time spent in those efforts. Mr.
Womack discussed PG&E's expectations concerning communication to their workforce from the directors, managers and supervisors participating in committees. Mr. Clark and Mr.
Booker also had a presentation by PG&E on NRC approved alternate source terms which can be used by utilities for accident calculations and PG&E's plans to implement these alternate requirements. The DCISC representatives reviewed the status of the STARS Program, in which DCPP participates and which fosters cooperation by and between four other nuclear power plants with similar design. Mr. Booker reported that the NQS organization reviewed the efforts made in addressing computer problems experienced by DCPP's Security organization and that the DCISC representatives were provided an update on the Self-Assessment Program. Mr. Clark commented that the Committee may wish to consider conducting a review of the DCPP Security organization and the level of attention given to that organization by PG&E management.
Committee Consultant Dr. Hyla Cass M.D. reported to the Committee on the fact-finding of December 13-14, 2000, which she attended with Member Clark. Dr. Cass commented on multiple issues which were addressed by the Committee in their 1999/2000 DCISC Annual Report and which concern human performance.
Dr. Cass observed that the DCISC representatives discussed during the fact-finding the efforts at DCPP to create additional incentives for increased physical fitness and to implement successful stress management techniques.
The Human Performance Coordinator for DCPP presented an overview to the DCISC representatives which indicated that efforts to improve human performance have the full support of Plant Management and a steering committee of senior managers is working with various departments to review human performance issues and systems for error prevention on a plant-wide basis to ensure efforts to improve human B.6-9
These performance continue throughout the DCPP organization.
effective tailboard pre efforts include emphasizing the use of work briefings and the importance of three-way communication and self-verification.
Dr. Cass reported that the error rate at DCPP, as measured over periods of 90 days and using 10,000 person-hour one work increments, has shown an upward trend over the past the error rate year period. Vice President Womack confirmed was trending higher and he stated that this justifies PG&E improvement and placing additional focus on human performance the reduction of the error rate.
Dr. Cass reviewed with the Committee some of the innovations PG&E has introduced, including determining which as organizations are responsible and assessing organizational, well as individual responsibility, for error and using the first page of the Outage Plan of the Day publication to emphasize safety and human performance.
Dr. Cass observed that 40% to 50% of errors involve the Maintenance organization and that DCPP Management has on implemented a Management Observation Program (MOP)to focus She behavioral causes for errors rather than on the results.
to stated that poor communication, a lack of attention over tailboards and the STARS self-verification system, and to the reliance upon direction by others have contributed error rate within the Maintenance organization.
Dr. Cass observed that aging of the DCPP workforce is another factor impacting Plant-wide industrial safety.
Dr. Cass noted that PG&E reported it is placing and increasing reliance on tailboards, three-way communication that PG&E self-verification techniques and Dr. Cass opined recognizes that organizational culpability does not exonerate or an individual from responsibility and a need for counseling coaching.
is Dr. Cass reported that it appears that the error rate not significantly impacted by PG&E's use of contractor personnel during refueling outages. Dr. de Planque questioned industry whether PG&E is using definitions which are accepted wide concerning identification and categorization of error.
no Vice President Womack remarked that there are currently errors accepted standards for event tracking and the types of precipitating an event, however, he noted that the Corrective B. 6-10
the use of the Action Program does provide a framework through Action Request (AR) process and the initiation of an Event Trent Record (ETR).
Dr. Cass observed that there is a separate Engineering Engineering Human Performance Committee which reports on and that performance, including the evaluation of ETRs, industry to address human efforts are being made within the performance issues.
Dr. Cass reported that she and Mr. Clark met informally with DCPP supervisors representing various departments.
by the During this meeting they discussed issues raised to address supervisor including: 1) the average time taken to 600-days ARs, which is now around 130-days as compared previously; 2) increased efforts to foster cooperation and Operations between the craft personnel in the Maintenance beneficial to Plant organizations which appeared to be
- 3) the performance during the last refueling outage; for more Maintenance craft organization expressed need of their supervisors in the field and increased inclusion organization in the use and evaluation of results and surveys made or complaints feedback from the data collected, registered; 4) the Operations organization expressed and their awareness of an increased scrutiny from supervisors should be framed more feeling that human performance critiques in terms of positive praise. Dr. Cass expressed her workforce appeared observation that the dialogue with the DCPP to be open and thoughtful.
Director of The DCISC representatives also met with the to increase Operations to discuss incentives and efforts enhancement and effective stress physical fitness, attention The Committee has addressed the need for these management.
efforts in its last two Annual Reports and during numerous fact-findings with PG&E. She reported that there is currently level of a requirement that operators maintain a defined in the Control fitness or they are not permitted to be alone However, as DCPP requires four licensed operators to be Room.
in the Control Room at any time, this requirement is not a personnel.
significant motivating factor for Operations of the operators' Health classes have been scheduled as a part observed they requalification training program and Dr. Cass information on the should prove valuable in disseminating benefits of increased physical fitness. She remarked that the as a leader current Operations Director has been recognized as a team-and innovator in the use of physical fitness B. 6-11
building activity and Dr. Cass recommended that the Committee continue to encourage those efforts.
Dr. Cass reported that PG&E has adopted new policies which remove certain nonessential activities and functions from the environs of the Control Room, thereby creating a more formal atmosphere in the DCPP Control Room. She remarked that this effort appears to be part of a positive direction to enhance professionalism and decrease distraction in the Control Room.
The DCISC representatives met with a representative of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP)who reported that the number of formal concerns raised within that Program has decreased from previous years. Employees continue to utilize the ECP for informal contacts which are handled through discussion, intervention or mediation. However, the number of NRC allegations from all sources concerning DCPP is higher than in previous years. The DCISC representatives expressed their belief that PG&E should determine the reasons for the increase in the numbers of allegations which are approximately double the average of other plants in the region. Mr. Clark briefly discussed the need by PG&E to appropriately address differences in their handling of concerns, as opposed to informal contacts, raised with the ECP. Dr. Cass observed that the next Synergy Inc. survey of the safety culture at DCPP is scheduled to be completed soon and she confirmed that the Committee requested an opportunity to review the results of that survey when they are available.
Dr. Cass reported that a new Behavior-Based Safety Process has been instituted within the Maintenance organization at DCPP in response to the higher injury rate experienced. This process tracks incidents and identifies barriers to work safety in an effort to institute continuous improvement in work process and practices.
In concluding her presentation, Dr. Cass remarked on her visit to the DCPP Medical Center to observe a cardiac health class and her observation that the Medical Center is doing a remarkable job in tracking the health of those employees whose health and fitness are below par, while maintaining a supportive environment and a good relationship with DCPP personnel.
Legal Counsel Robert Wellington reported to the Committee concerning the prehearing conference for the recent B.6-12
Application by PG&E to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) which was conducted by Administrative Law Judge Barnett on September 19, 2000. That Application by PG&E, among other matters, addresses the continuation of the DCISC's functions. Mr. Wellington observed that an order by CPUC Commissioner Wood, following the prehearing conference, has effectively tabled the PG&E Application and suspended the procedural schedule relating to continued consideration of PG&E's Application. The matter could, however, be reinstated at any time in which event the Committee should receive timely notice.
Mr. Wellington also reminded the Committee Members that Conflict of Interest Statements, Form 700, under provisions mandated by the California Fair Political Practices Commission, are due annually from each member of the DCISC.
He also distributed a revised Committee Roster containing information relative to the Committee's operations. Mr.
Wellington also discussed an increase in the number of contacts received from students and other members of the public which are generated by the Committee's presence on the worldwide web and which involve inquiries about nuclear power issues of a general nature. A procedure was discussed and agreed on to generate an appropriate reply to these inquiries.
VII COMMITTEE FACT-FINDING REPORTS:
RECEIVE, APPROVE AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL TO PG&E Members discussed with the consultants editorial and substantive revisions to the fact-finding reports awaiting of approval and transmittal to PG&E and coordinated the status items reviewed in those reports with the current Open Items List.
VIII CORRESPONDENCE Copies of correspondence to and from the Independent Safety Committee were included in the agenda packets provided to those present and placed on file in the Public Document Room of the R.E. Kennedy Library at California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo.
IX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS The Chair inquired whether there were any members of the public present who wished to address any remarks to the Committee. There was no response at this time to this inquiry.
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X ADJOURNMENT The February 7, 2001, afternoon meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was adjourned by the Chair at 5:15 P.M.
XI RECONVENE FOR EVENING MEETING The evening meeting of the DCISC was called to order by the Chair at 5:30 P.M.
XII INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS There were no comments from Members at this time.
XIII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE Mr. Clark requested PG&E Vice President Womack to begin the technical presentations requested by the DCISC for this public meeting. Mr. Womack introduced Mr. Jim Becker to make the first presentation to the Committee.
Update on Plant Performance, Plant Events and Operational Status.
Mr. Becker reviewed operational performance during 2000 for both units and reported that Unit 2(U-2)completed a 9.7 day forced outage and manual shutdown in September 2000, as a result of indications of a failed expansion joint on a steam extraction line from the low pressure turbine. The expansion bellows in the Main Condenser was replaced and a Main tenth Condenser tube leak was also repaired. U-1 conducted its refueling outage (iR10)in October 2000, and the expansion bellows in U-l's Main Condenser were also replaced as a preventative measure. The IR10 duration was 40.4 days, which was longer than the goal of 26 days, due to a number of equipment issues associated primarily with the Turbine and Generator. The results of IR10, with reference to radiation exposure, were the best ever for PG&E, achieving 162 person Rem during the outage.
PG&E finalized a negotiated settlement with the State Water Quality Control Board (SWQCB) concerning the effect of DCPP's cooling water discharge to the ocean. In response to a question by Mr. Clark, Mr. Becker stated that it was his belief that the agreement between PG&E and the SWCQB would B.6-14
have little or no effect on DCPP operations, however, it would affect the monitoring of the cooling water discharge.
Mr. Becker reported that in November there was an.
automatic U-1 reactor trip and an outage of 1.8 days due to an electrical fault in test instrumentation during 1R10 power ascension causing the protection system to actuate. A Licensee Event Report (LER) was submitted to the NRC concerning this event. During 1R10 PG&E completed the work necessary to permit U-1 to operate at a higher electrical output, approximately 24 megawatts higher than in the cycle previously permitted. Nominal electrical output for each unit is now approximately 1155 megawatts. A planned 1.6 day forced outage for U-2 took place on December 9-10, 2000, to repair a hydrogen leak on a weld on the Generator lead box and for planned cleaning of the 2-1 Circulating Water Pump tunnel and removal of bio-fouling from the tunnel. Mr. Becker reported that PG&E actually scheduled this forced outage a few days prior to December 9-10, but postponed commencing the forced outage for one week at the request of the California Independent System Operator(ISO)and PG&E's scheduling coordinator for electricity.
Mr. Becker reported PG&E has now completed the five-year Fire Penetration Barrier Project which involved an extensive inspection program and upgrade to the design and installation of the fire barriers themselves. Modifications were completed to the U-1 Residual Heat Removal(RHR)sump during IR10 and a similar modification will be accomplished for U-2 during its next scheduled refueling outage. He reported significant progress in developing DCPP's involvement with the STARS cooperative initiative program and he responded to questions from the Committee and confirmed that the STARS' initiatives have been, in general, well received by the DCPP workforce.
In concluding his presentation, Mr. Becker observed that a more rigorous, formal and strategic Self-Assessment Program is now in place at DCPP which has more than met management's goal of performing 40 high quality Self-Assessments during 2000.
Vice President Womack introduced Mr. Jim Tomkins, Director of Nuclear Quality Analysis and Licensing at DCPP and asked him to make the next presentation to the Committee.
Review of NRC Licensee Event Reports, Notices of Violations and NRC Issues.
Mr. Tomkins reviewed and discussed with the Members and B.6-15
(LERs) for DCPP.
consultants recent Licensee Event Reports These included:
of non A voluntary LER for identified seismic inadequacy in the vicinity of load bearing walls in the Turbine Building, on August the Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms was initiated walls and 19, 2000, when engineering determined that several walls as some components subsequently attached to the applicable to a constructed did not meet design criteria Hosgri fault.
postulated seismic event involving the nearby PG&E determined through an operability evaluation(OE)that, although design criteria were not met, the walls and the wall of performing supported components would have been capable The cause of their safety function during a seismic event.
and inadequate the LER was determined to be personnel error enhanced, the design design control. Procedures have been walls criteria memoranda (DCM) have been revised, and these during the next and their attached components will be upgraded several refueling outages.
failed When containment temperature indicator (TI-26) for a six-month "as-is" and this condition was not recognized determined that TS period during daily TS surveillance, it was The cause was a 3.6.5.1 was not met and a LER resulted.
mode during design failure to recognize the "as-is" failure Daily TS change and surveillance process development.
manipulate the surveillance now requires that an operator the Containment temperature indicator and observe it calculate average air temperature.
more than Inspection during IR10 determined that slightly to be 1% of the Steam Generator(SG) tubes were determined tubes within defective, 38 tubes out of approximately 3,300 The cause was determined to be primary water stress the SG.
stress corrosion cracking(PWSCC) and outside diameter plate (TSP) corrosion cracking (ODSCC) at tube support intersections. Defective tubes were plugged and PG&E verified 1.121 for that all defective tubes met Regulatory Guideline 10.
structural integrity at the end of U-1, Cycle a first While performing concurrent tests during IRI0, in an level undervoltage relay actuated which resulted unplanned start of Component Cooling Water(CCW) Pump 1-1 and actuation.
constituted an Engineered Safety Feature(ESF) and the scheduler, Personnel error by the licensed operator be performed both of whom determined that two tests could the cause. Testing simultaneously, was determined to have been B. 6-16
procedures have been revised to include a prerequisite not to test when an EDG is running. During IRlO testing and restoration, a first level undervoltage relay failed to reset, resulting in an ESF actuation signal, which shed the only ESF load on the bus, Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) Pump 1-1 which was feeding the CCW and cooling the spent fuel pool.
The cause was found to be the high resistance, due to corrosion, in a test switch pivot point. Corrective actions included repair of the switch and the issuance of a summary alert to operators regarding returning solid state relays to service. There was also a LER initiated for an ESF actuation when two operators opened 230kV switch 211-2, for U-2, instead of 211-1 for U-I. The undervoltage condition on the startup bus resulted in an auto start of all three U-2 EDGs, which did not load as there was still power to the vital buses from the auxiliary transformer. The cause was established as inattention to detail and failure to verify that the intended switch was being actuated. Color-coded signs have been added to the switches for both units and individuals have received coaching on self-verification.
Confirming an observation from the Committee, Mr. Becker stated that PG&E has experienced an increase in errors involving misidentification of unit components located in the same area of the Plant or through misidentification of individual trains and the use of the wrong equipment. He reported that PG&E is employing three techniques to reduce these types of errors: self-verification, tailboards and effective communications. In response to a question, Mr.
Becker confirmed that PG&E is also employing post evolution critiques to review lessons learned. Mr. Chuck Belmont of PG&E also commented on efforts at DCPP to reduce errors by operators through self-verification and the use of techniques to assist operators in identifying the proper components of these complex systems.
Mr. Tomkins then reviewed a LER initiated due to excessive flow which was observed from two valves when a temporary leak test of the CCW butterfly valve rubber seat seals was performed. It was found that these valves would have been unable to isolate a leak from the other vital header within 20 minutes, as required by the design basis. Personnel error was the cause, as travel stops were not set correctly and the discs were allowed to overtravel. The travel stops have been checked and adjusted on the CCW valves used to separate headers for both units and maintenance verification tests will be required after each instance of future valve B. 6-17
maintenance. ?OýN; A LER-type Special Security Event Report was initiated when notification of an Unusual Event was given due to the discovery of a bomb-like device located about 100 yards from The the Turbine Building and within protected area for U-i.
suspicious object was identified as resembling an explosive device. The cause of this event was a contractor workgroup culture which tolerated unprofessional behavior. The for several months. A suspicious object had been in place memo has been sent to all DCPP personnel stressing professionalism and the Vice President and Plant Manager have held two meetings with DCPP supervisors to emphasize their oversight role and to stress the supervisors incorporating lessons learned in general employee training and behavioral observation training.
A LER was filed with the NRC when, during IR10 low power rod physics testing, U-1 was manually tripped due to control problems initiated when rod control was lost due to an instrument failure. The safety function of the rod control the function was not impacted by the failure. The cause was buffer memory card, failure of a Westinghouse supervisory which has been replaced, and the necessary maintenance verification testing has been performed. DCPP will be using these new testing methodology provided by Westinghouse to test cards individually.
A failure to test equipment resulted in a U-I automatic reactor trip and a LER following IRI0, with the Unit at 46%
power operation, when an intermittent electrical short occurred in test equipment. The cause was the poor decision to test other NI channels with NI-41 then in a tripped condition.
of Procedures have been revised to require a sufficient number switches.
test devices and to eliminate the need to use toggle of the A memo has been issued to plant personnel warning and a possibility of electrical shorts in digital volt meters case study has been provided to appropriate Plant personnel regarding this event and expected test prerequisites.
Mr. Tomkins reviewed the LER trends at DCPP and reported that, as of December 31, 2000: sixteen LERs have been submitted of which ten involved personnel error during equipment return-to- service, design and testing; five LERs involved equipment failures; and one involved inadequate procedures. Corrective actions have included coaching, training and procedure revisions.
B.6-18
No Notices of Violation (NOV) were received from the NRC during 2000, while four Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) have been received during 2000, all of which have been discussed with the Committee during previous public meetings. Mr. Tomkins reported that this represents a 50% reduction in the number of NCVs since 1999. Of the four NCVs, two were for procedural violations resulting in work being performed on the wrong component or unit. Common cause trend analysis performed by NQS did not identify any discernable trends in the cause for the NCVs and all NCVs were entered into the DCPP NCV Tracking/Trending Program. He then compared the NOVs and NCVs received by DCPP over the past three years and compared DCPP's performance concerning NOVs and NCVs with other plants in NRC Region IV during 2000. DCPP received no NOVs which compared to a 0.6 average for Region IV plants. DCPP received seventeen NCVs which compared to an average of eighteen for Region IV plants. In response to a question from Dr. de Planque, Mr.
Tomkins and Mr. Belmont reported that PG&E has emphasized the need for an aggressive, significant and successful Corrective Action Program regarding violation of the Equipment Control Guidelines(ECGs)to achieve full implementation of the improved Standard TS.
Discussion of the NRC's Performance Indicators.
Mr. Tomkins reviewed the status of the NRC performance indicators(PIs). The indicators produce red, white or green status indications for levels of performance evaluation for the indicators in each category.
Mr. Tomkins reviewed with the Committee the current status and recent actions relative to the PIs. He reported that all DCPP PIs have returned to green status, however, the two trips following 1R10 currently challenge the Unplanned Scrams PI threshold. Both units are at the threshold for Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal PI, and he noted that this PI at DCPP actually entered a white window during part of 2000. He reported that the NRC has now implemented a pilot program concerning Initiating Events and that PG&E has been successful in obtaining tentative approval from the NRC with reference to two Frequently Asked Questions(FAQs) concerning power operations during storm activity and on the Mitigating Systems PI. He then reviewed and discussed with the Members and consultants the PIs and their present values, the threshold and present color status for the PIs for both Units at DCPP and the station thresholds set by PG&E for the PIs B.6-19
through the fourth quarter of 2000. These were as follows:
Category - Initiating Events (1) Unplanned Scrams (automatic and manual) per 7000 critical hours over previous 4 quarters.
and Values for U-1 and U-2 are 2.8 and 0.0 respectively the NRC threshold for each unit is 3. Status - Both Green.
Station threshold for each unit is 2.
Removal (2) Unplanned Scrams Involving Loss of Normal Heat per previous 12 quarters.
for each Value for both units is 2 and the NRC threshold unit is 2. Status - Both Green. Station threshold for each unit is 2.
(3) Unplanned Transients per 7000 critical hours over previous 4 quarters.
and Values for U-1 and U-2 are 0.9 and 1.6 respectively Status - Both Green.
the NRC threshold for each unit is 6.
Station threshold for each unit is 3.
Category - Mitigating Systems (average (4) Safety System Unavailability - Emergency Power of previous 12 quarters).
and Values for U-1 and U-2 are 1.7% and 0.3% respectively the NRC threshold for each unit is 2.5%. Status - Both Green.
Station threshold for each unit is 1.9%.
previous (5) Safety System Unavailability - RHR (average of 12 quarters).
and Values for U-1 and U-2 are 0.3% and 0.4% respectively Status - Both Green.
the NRC threshold for each unit is 1.5%.
Station threshold for each unit is 1.1%
of previous (6) Safety System Unavailability - AFW (average 12 quarters).
and Values for U-i and U-2 are 0.8% and 0.6% respectively Status - Both Green.
the NRC threshold for each unit is 2%.
Station threshold for each unit is 1.5%
B.6-20
(7) Safety System Unavailability - High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) (average of previous 12 quarters).
and Values for U-I and U-2 are 0.5% and 0.8% respectively Status - Both Green.
the NRC threshold for each unit is 1.5%.
Station threshold for each unit is 1.1%
(8) Safety System Functional Failures (over the previous 4 quarters).
each Value for both units is 0 and the NRC threshold for threshold for each unit is 5. Status - Both Green. Station unit is 2.
Category - Barrier Integrity (9) Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity (maximum monthly values - % of Tech Spec limit).
and Values for U-I and U-2 are 0.1% and 0.9% respectively the NRC threshold for each unit is 50%. Status - Both Green.
Station threshold for each is 1%.
(10) RCS Leak Rate (maximum monthly values - % of Tech Spec limit).
Values for U-i and U-2 are 8.0% and 3.3% respectively and the NRC threshold for each unit is 50%. Status - Both Green.
Station threshold for each unit is 40%.
Category - Emergency Preparedness (11) Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill/Exercise Performance - percentage of success/opportunities for notifications and PARs during drills, exercises and events of the past 8 quarters.
Value for U-i and U-2 combined is 92.8% and the NRC Status - Green. Station threshold is not less than 90%.
threshold is 95%.
that (12) ERO Participation - percentage of key ERO personnel have participated in a drill or exercise in the previous 8 quarters.
Value for U-1 and U-2 combined is 91.8% and the NRC B.6-21
threshold is not less than 80%. Status - Green. Station threshold is 90%.
(13) Alert and Notification System Reliability - percentage reliability during the previous 4 quarters.
Value for U-1 and U-2 combined is 99.5% and the NRC threshold is not less than 94%. Status - Green. Station threshold is 98%.
Category - Occupational Exposure (14) Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness - the number of T.S. high radiation area occurrences, very high radiation area occurrences, and unintended exposure occurrences in the previous 4 quarters.
Value for U-I and U-2 combined is 0 and the NRC threshold is 2. Status - Green. Station threshold is 0.
Category - Public Exposure (15) RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences - occurrences during the previous 4 quarters.
Value for U-I and U-2 combined is 0 and the NRC threshold is 1. Status - Green. Station threshold is 0.
Category - Physical Protection (16) Protected Area Security Equipment Performance Index availability of PA IDS/CCTV security systems over previous 4 quarters.
Value for U-1 and U-2 combined is 0.030 and the NRC threshold is 0.080. Status - Green. Station threshold is 134 hrs/mo.
(17) Personnel Screening Program Performance - prompt reportable events over the previous 4 quarters.
Value for U-1 and U-2 combined is 0 and the NRC threshold is 2. Status - Green. Station threshold is 1.
(18) Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) Personnel Reliability Program Performance - reportable events over previous 4 quarters.
B.6-22
Value for U-I and U-2 combined is 0 and the NRC threshold is 2. Status - Green. Station threshold is 1.
Members and consultants discussed performance and aspects of the performance indicators with Mr. Tomkins.
Nuclear Quality Services 2000 Review.
Mr. Tomkins reviewed and discussed the Quality Performance Assessment Reports(QPARs)issued during 2000.
Identified strengths and positive observations in the QPARs were the increased focus on radiation protection dose practices, which contributed to the lowest accumulated during IR10 for a U-I outage, the lowest number of outage personnel contamination incidents ever at DCPP and the lowest numbers of non-surface contamination area personnel Mr.
contamination incidents for a non outage period at DCPP.
Tomkins observed that the QPARs indicate that the DCPP organization responded well to plant transients, curtailments in the and shutdowns during 2000, and improvement was noted quality and use of Self-Assessments performed. Implementation have of the Improved Technical Specifications was judged to been well-coordinated and peer certification of the program Probabilistic Risk Assessment(PRA) Program ranked that that as the best observed among ten similar plants. He stated and conservative decision making, good use of self-assessment innovation in design were characteristics of noteworthy during performance by the Engineering Services organization 2000. Increased focus and management support of Human Performance as evidenced by formation of a Human Performance Steering Committee and subcommittee in Operations, Maintenance and Engineering were identified as strengths. One licensed operator training class was conducted and all candidates passed their NRC exams.
Mr. Tomkins stated that the 2000 QPARs identified certain areas for improvement including a number of equipment related problems, which highlights a need for a comprehensive program Use of to address age-related degradation of DCPP equipment.
Event Trend Records(ETRs)has had limited success in to identifying adverse trends although that Program continues which show improvement. There are, however, some organizations do not use the Program effectively. The QPARs identified less List and than effective use of the Operator Walkaround/Burden an increase in the numbers of Control Board Action Requests (ARs) .
B. 6-23
'__Nlý In conclusion, and in response to a question from Mr.
Clark, Mr. Tomkins stated that the QPARs and the NQS Assessments have identified many of the same issues and, used together with Self-Assessments and the NRC PIs, they are by STATION to produce the Comprehensive Integrated Assessment Report for DCPP.
Review of DCISC Selected Performance Indicators.
PG&E Vice President Larry Womack discussed, reviewed with the Members and consultants and responded to questions from them concerning the 22 indicators selected by the DCISC to track DCPP performance. These he summarized as follows (a indicates an improving trend, T indicates a declining trend, and u indicates a steady performance since that indicator was last reported to the Committee):
Ten of the indicators are on or better than the target.
U Personnel Contamination Incidents.
Y Meeting Corrective Maintenance Due Dates
" Operating Experience Assessment(OEA)Backlog.
" Quality Problem Completion.
"o Event-Free Days.
t U-2 Operating Capacity Factor.
" U-i Primary System Chemistry Index.
"o U-2 Primary System Chemistry Index.
"o U-I Secondary System Chemistry Index.
"o U-2 Secondary System Chemistry Index.
Three of the indicators are close to meeting expectations:
"o Radiation Exposure.
T Non Outage Corrective Maintenance Backlog.
T Unplanned Reportable Releases.
Five of the indicators are not meeting expectations.
- Industrial Safety.
SUnplanned Automatic Reactor Trips.
U Unplanned Safety System Actuations.
Operating Capacity Factor. SU-i IR10 Refueling Outage Duration.
One is a qualitative indicator with no set target.
B. 6-24
System Health Indicator.
not applicable for this period.
One of the indicators is U-2 Refueling Outage Duration.
Two are confidential indicators reviewed with the DCISC during fact-findings include:
U Human-Factor Security Events.
T Vital Area Events.
The Members and consultants discussed the DCISC noted that Performance Indicators with Mr. Womack and it was comparisons to data used to determine their status includes station goals, rather than industry, INPO or NRC regional goals. Mr. Womack confirmed that PG&E presently tracks each process of the DCISC Indicators as a part of another tracking of or under a different mandate, and he stated the tracking PG&E. He the DCISC goals is not, at present, a burden on confirmed that the summaries provided to the Members concerning the Indicators were end-of-year 2000 results.
Committee Members requested that, at the next public the meeting of the DCISC, PG&E need only prepare and present for their summary results of the DCISC Performance Indicators review.
Activities of PG&E's Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee.
Vice President Womack reported to the Committee and the PNAC concerning the regular joint meeting of the NSOC which was held at DCPP on November 14, 2000. Dr. Rossin and Mr. Booker attended the meeting as the DCISC representatives.
meeting, which Mr. Womack reviewed topics discussed during the have all been presented to the DCISC. These include: the expectations System Engineering Program and PG&E managements' human of system engineers; the strategies used to address As Low As performance issues; and Radiation Protection(RP)and Mr. Womack Reasonably Achievable(ALARA) Program strategies.
which was scheduled for confirmed that the meeting of the NSOC meeting of what Mr.
February 2001, was canceled and an initial of the NSOC was held. Mr.
Womack described as a subcommittee ad hoc and Womack discussed PG&E's plans to develop other efforts standing subcommittees of the NSOC and to coordinate to align their with PG&E's partners in the STARS Program that he will offsite committee review functions and he stated B.6-25
report further to the DCISC during future public meetings as these efforts develop. In closing, Mr. Womack discussed with the Members and consultants the need to retain the independence of the NSOC function in context of the participation by STARS member's personnel.
XIV PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS The Chair invited any member of the public present who wished to address any comment or communication to the Committee to do so at this time. There was no response to this invitation.
XV ADJOURN EVENING AFTERNOON MEETING The evening meeting of the DCISC was adjourned by the Chair at 7:35 P.M.
XVI RECONVENE FOR MORNING MEETING The February 8, 2001, meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was called to order by the Chair at 8:00 A.M.
XVII INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS Mr. Clark introduced the members and consultants present for this session.
The Committee took up the approval of the November 2000, Fact-Finding Report and, subject to minor editorial corrections, on a motion by Dr. Rossin, seconded by Dr. de Planque, the November 2000 Fact-Finding Report was unanimously approved for transmittal to PG&E.
The Chair recognized Mr. Stan Ketelsen of PG&E's Nuclear Regulatory Services organization to express the appreciation and thanks of the Committee Members and consultants for his help and professionalism during the time he has worked with the DCISC. Mr. Ketelsen will be moving to another assignment within PG&E.
The Chair then requested PG&E Vice President Larry Womack to continue with the technical presentations to the Committee.
Mr. Womack introduced Ms. Linda Jolley, Manager of Human B. 6-26
Resource Services at DCPP.
XVIII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)
2001 Culture Transition Strategies.
Ms. Jolley began her presentation by discussing the results of the cultural transition effort during 2000, which she described as a progressive effort to continue to enlist employee support in changing DCPP culture and to facilitate safety. She stated that during 2000, the focus of the cultural transition effort had been primarily on the leadership group, the officers and directors, who were later joined by managers. However, currently supervisory personnel are being added to the transition effort through use of a method she described as the cascade approach. All levels of management are now being aligned to support and exhibit leadership behaviors within their work process. She observed that DCPP is managed by process and by what are termed the Centers of Excellence, and that the cultural transformation process at DCPP is designed to foster greater trust, productivity and collaboration among the workforce. Part of this process involves changing the way people think about their daily jobs and requires personnel to hold the leaders accountable for growth and development. She stated her opinion that the leadership group at DCPP was making good progress in achieving these goals, with the leadership team members exemplifying the standards and expectations of leadership in the new culture. She discussed the application of the cultural transformation process to the new competitive power marketplace in California and she acknowledged that some confusion concerning the future still exists within the workforce at DCPP and that the cultural environment appropriate to a competitive market environment is presently in a redefinition process.
Ms. Jolley confirmed that 2001 is the first year that individual contributors, including bargaining unit employees, will be participating in creating a new culture at DCPP. In response to a question from Mr. Clark, Ms. Jolley replied that an important part of PG&E's strategy involves gaining acceptance from the bargaining unit members of the cultural changes being implemented at DCPP. She stated that systems and infrastructures are now in place to support and sustain the new culture and she cited the compensation, positive discipline, and exit interview programs as examples of programs which have evolved and been aligned to support the B. 6-27
cultural transformation process. She discussed some of the systems, measurement techniques and the infrastructure being created to support the transformation effort and human performance fundamentals. Mr. Clark expressed the interest of the Committee in reviewing the metrics developed for measuring benefits from the cultural transformation effort when those are all established.
Mr. Womack remarked that the Performance Plans, which the DCISC has reviewed during its past public meetings and fact finding, are based on the Centers of Excellence which have been created to measure progress in achieving cultural transition at DCPP. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin concerning the various levels of supervision and lines of responsibility at the Plant, Ms. Jolley replied that the officers, directors and managers have demonstrated a strong understanding of the new culture and that efforts are being made to fully implement the process with the supervisors. Ms.
Jolley acknowledged Dr. Rossin's concern regarding the need for clear reporting responsibilities between the individual contributors and their supervisors. She stated that the connections between individual contributors and their existing supervisors remain strong and defined and that the process of including individual contributors in the cultural transformation process will be further developed over the next year. Ms. Jolley agreed to provide the DCISC copies of information used internally by PG&E to develop and assess progress concerning the continuing process of cultural transformation and which is used to review and assess the impact of communication with the workforce regarding the supervisory hierarchy at DCPP. The DCISC will be kept informed as PG&E makes efforts to incorporate involvement of the individual contributors. In response to a question from Dr. de Planque, Ms. Jolley described PG&E's efforts to implement the Cultural Transformation Program as about on par with other plants and with other industries implementing similar changes in a regulated environment.
Ms. Jolley then reviewed and discussed each of the strategies being used at DCPP in the cultural transformation effort, these include:
First-Line Supervisor Development - to assess skills and identify and develop those which positively impact the culture, while continuing to define, coach, and modify behaviors to enhance the supervisors' identification with the cultural transformation process.
B.6-28
Leadership Development - of the officers, process owners and Centers of Excellence leadership through use of workshops, to further develop behaviors through Leadership Team sessions to further the leader's identification with the process and the Centers of Excellence, to support cultural and process initiatives and to leverage new skills to enhance supervisor development, including use and evaluation of information received from feedback and face-time interaction.
" System Alignment - to evaluate existing processes and programs for alignment to support the new culture and incorporate systemic elements to ensure existing systems support human performance fundamentals.
" Employee Communication & Education - to develop and implement individual behaviors and revamp, reenergize and reinforce human performance fundamentals through communication, market and business education, meeting with bargaining unit leadership and employees in informal forums to discuss and review process goals, perceived problems, results and measurements of success.
The Chair thanked Ms. Jolley and observed that the cultural transition efforts at DCPP appear to have been carefully considered by PG&E management. Mr. Clark recognized PG&E Senior Vice President Greg Rueger, who joined the PG&E representatives present for the public meeting.
Mr. Womack then introduced Mr. John Arhar, Engineer in to the the Steam Generator Group at DCPP for a presentation Committee.
Refueling Outage IRIO Steam Generator Tube Test Results.
Mr. Arhar began his presentation by briefly reviewing the principal degradation mechanisms affecting DCPP Steam Generators (SGs), these include: outside diameter stress corrosion cracking (ODSCC)and primary water stress corrosion at cracking(PWSCC)at the hot legs, at the tube sheets and dented intersection and non- dented intersection; U-bend cold PWSCC; anti-vibration bar(AVB)wear scarring; fatigue and leg thinning(CLT) . During IR10 a standard inspection of the The SGs was performed, which took approximately ten days.
length of the inspection included: inspecting 100% of the full probe SG tubes with a bobbin; a detailed rotating coil +point B.6-29
U inspection of 100% of the U-bend areas and the short radius of bends in Rows 1 and 2; 100% inspection of the hot leg top the tubesheet; 100% inspection of the hot leg dented tube support plate (TSP) intersections in critical areas, plus 20%
in the buffer zone; and bobbin indications at TSP intersections. During IR10 there were 43 tubes unplugged and reinspected for return to service under new repair criteria, which, Mr. Arhar stated, was substantially all of the tubes which can be unplugged under the repair criteria presently approved for DCPP. In response to a question from Mr. Clark, Mr. Arhar and Mr. Womack confirmed that the SG inspection efforts during 1R10 took into account the recent failures involving the SGs at the Indian Point-2 nuclear facility.
Mr. Arhar summarized the SG tube repair criteria as it has evolved from the original TS criteria of 40% depth size by bobbin applied to AVB wear and cold leg thinning. The new per Generic Letter 95 alternate repair criteria(ARC)provides:
TSP; 05, concerning voltage-based ARC for axial ODSCC at the W* for axial PWSCC in tubesheet and 40% depth sizing by
+Point for axial PWSCC at dented TSPs. An ARC to allow >40%
NRC axial PWSCC damaged tubes to remain in service is pending review of PG&E's License Amendment Request(LAR) . Members discussed with Mr. Arhar and Mr. Womack the heightened level of attention which SG tube failure, as opposed to tube rupture, is receiving from the NRC and the public as a result of the Indian Point experience. In response to a comment by Mr. Clark, Mr. Arhar opined that the ARC does not contribute to an actual increase in the risk of a SG tube leak, as the ARC is confined to support structures during normal operation, to however, potential for increased leakage would be likely damage exist after an accident which resulted in removal of or to the support structure.
Mr. Arhar then reviewed the results of tube degradation and 1 identified during IR10 inspections of SGs 1-1, 1-2, 1-3
- 4. A total of 108 tubes were plugged and 43 were unplugged, for a net total of 65 tubes plugged during 1R10. The overall percentage of tubes plugged for the Unit-l SGs is now 3.9%,
with a limit of 15% in each SG and 15% overall. In response to a question, Mr. Arhar stated that PG&E does not expect U l's SGs to approach the 15% limit before 2005-2006, however, a plugged tube percentage of 10% or greater would begin to have an impact on generation performance for U-l, due to Reactor SG Coolant System (RCS) flow and change in heat transfer area.
at 8.8%. Mr.
1-2 has the highest percentage of plugged tubes Arhar reported that during 1R10 there were 852 tubes which did B.6-30
not require plugging due to application of sizing techniques and the ARC. He discussed and reviewed the history of tube plugging for U-I since IRI and over a period of 12.9 effective full power years of operation. In response to an observation from Consultant Booker, Mr. Arhar confirmed that SG 1-1 and 1 2 were manufactured by a different manufacturer than 1-3 and 1-4, and that this difference explains, to a great extent, the differences in the inspection results.
Mr. Arhar reviewed the lessons learned from the Indian Point-2 U-bend tube failure experience, which was caused by flow slot hour-glassing due to significant denting at the upper TSP causing high stresses in the U-bend apex, leading to axial PWSCC. Early detection was not made during inspections, as the crack signal was masked by noise due to deposits. He stated that PG&E has implemented lessons learned from the Indian Point-2 experience including: establishing data quality guidelines which resulted in a significant number of U-bend retests using higher frequency probes and smaller diameter probes; 23 tubes were preventively plugged due to unacceptable data quality; 4 tubes were plugged due to small circum ferential indications near U-bend tangents. One tube with circumferential indications was tested in place to 4000 pounds with no resulting tube leakage.
In concluding this presentation, Mr. Arhar reviewed the next steps PG&E plans to take including obtaining NRC approval for a revised ARC to allow >40% axial PWSCC to remain in service and he stated that PG&E hopes to receive approval for its request to implement this ARC for one cycle during 2R10.
In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Arhar stated that PG&E has been successful in unplugging tubes using a tungsten inert gas relaxation technique. PG&E will also seek NRC approval of reduced ARC exclusion zone at wedge locations and will request extension of W* ARC for another two cycles.
Chemical cleaning is being proposed during IRlI and 2RII to remove scale and reduce the potential for free span ODSCC and sleeving and electro-sleeving options are being investigated for eventual licensing. In conclusion and in response to a question, Mr. Arhar briefly discussed the experience and methodology used with ANO SGs during burst pressure tube testing.
A brief break followed this presentation.
The Chair recognized Senior Vice President Rueger for the next presentation to the Committee.
B. 6-31
Status of California Energy Issue & DCPP's Actions.
Mr. Rueger began his remarks to the Committee with the caveat that much of the information he will discuss with the DCISC represents his own opinions concerning the present situation and may not accurately reflect PG&E's opinion or position. He observed that prices for electrical power have escalated rapidly in California since the last public meeting of the DCISC in September 2000. At that time, expectations were that power prices would come down following reduction of the normal summer requirements. He stated that questions have now arisen about when concerns regarding price and supply issues were first raised with the CPUC and Mr. Rueger opined that these are legitimate questions which are now being addressed.
Mr. Rueger stated his observation that, fundamentally, the problems in California and the Western part of the United States are due to the present shortage of available energy, compared to the situation ten years ago when there was a 30%
surplus. This shortage resulted from the large growth in load demand which is consuming necessary reserves as the economy in the region expands, coupled with a situation where only about 4% of actual generating capacity was added during the same period. Out of state resources, which traditionally have supplied California's needs during peak demand periods, are presently unavailable as they are required to meet increased demand in their areas. Mr. Rueger opined that the only impact from deregulation which has directly impacted the current shortage, although he acknowledged that in hindsight the deregulation formula was certainly not perfect, was the fact that there has been no investment in the construction of generating facilities during the transition period. This is due, in part, to the protracted period of uncertainty on the part of the utilities and the new market participants on precisely what their new roles will be. He noted that new plants will be entering the marketplace eventually, however, the uncertainties in the market may stop or delay investment and prolong the shortages in California and the West for some time to come. Mr. Rueger observed that the regulatory system in California is not one which makes it easy or fast to create new sources of energy supplies without fully addressing and responding to local concern and opposition to facility location and other issues.
Mr. Rueger discussed the impact of the requirement that B.6-32
utilities purchase and sell power on the Power Exchange which he described as a spot market for electric power. Utilities are slowly being allowed to purchase on longer-term contracts for what is termed their net open position requirements, i.e.,
beyond their own generation capacity, however, the utilities are still restricted as to the percentage of their overall requirements which may be purchased on long-term contracts.
The result of this short term market activity has been the creation of a situation where virtually 100% of a utility's needs were required to be met in the short term market and at very high prices. DCPP's power production, while not sold directly into the market because the transition period for DCPP has not yet been terminated by the CPUC, has resulted in the reduction of PG&E's net open position. Mr. Rueger observed that DCPP power is now the lowest cost electric power resource available to the State, due to the very bad year experienced in 2000/2001 for the production of hydro power.
The deregulation scheme also created what is termed a "second price auction," which has resulted in the award of contracts based on bids for power generation at the price bid by the last bidder. Mr. Rueger stated that although theoretically this system might function successfully, in a short term market with no price cap one legitimate generator charging a very high price creates the situation where the entire market pays a higher price. Due to a shortage of supply, no comparative market exists and no significant regulatory action has been taken to control the market. Mr.
Rueger also observed that the CPUC rate freeze for Southern California Edison and PG&E has meant that the price increases paid for the power supplied could not be passed on to their customers and hence no corresponding reduction in demand due to the high prices has taken place. He summarized the current situation as comprising a broken market with extremely high prices in conjunction with a continuing legal obligation on the part of the utilities to purchase high-cost power to meet their commitments to their customer at a flat rate of return.
He stated that one of the few realistic alternatives to escape the situation for the utilities is to consider defaulting on payments owed and to seek protection from creditors in bankruptcy. In response to an observation by Dr. Rossin, Mr.
Rueger commented that when San Diego Gas & Electric Company's customers received large increases in their electric bills, the Legislature's imposition of a rate cap resulted in energy usage, which initially dropped around 11% after customers' bills increased, returning very quickly to its pre-increase B. 6-33
levels. Mr. Rueger opined that, over time, one of the impacts will be that the high prices paid by the utilities for power used by their customers will be passed on to consumers at all levels.
Mr. Rueger stated that the energy picture has been as much driven by supply considerations, due to a very dry year for hydro production in California and the driest year on record for the Northwest, as financial over the past winter.
PG&E has the largest investor-owned hydro power production system in the United States. Normally, winter is not a time when supply problems are encountered, however, he remarked that there havebeen three Stage-3 Emergencies in the last 26 days and at least two days when rolling blackouts were experienced. Mr. Rueger commented on the constraints imposed on electric power transmission which exist within California and which limit PG&E's ability to transport power from Southern to Northern California, and which has caused Northern California to bear the brunt of rolling blackouts. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Rueger noted that to date it has not been economically feasible to build a new parallel line to increase transmission capabilities, however, the high cost power has made the $300 million necessary for the construction of such a line feasible and PG&E has been given authorization from the ISO to augment the transmission grid by constructing additional lines. Mr. Rueger observed that, because prices stayed extremely high through this winter, the financial situation for PG&E and Southern California Edison has deteriorated rapidly and their suppliers have expressed concern about receiving payment. With the extremely high cost of power purchased on the Power Exchange during the November-December 2000 period, PG&E has found itself unable to pay for that power. He noted that in January 2001, a number of independent power generators were not producing power due to what he termed a virus of condenser tube leaks, which may have masked the reality that these independents feared they would not receive payment for any power they sold into the market. In response to this situation to the California Department of Water & Power Resources began purchase power on behalf of the utilities, and he noted that in a matter of days approximately 4,000 additional megawatts became available.
Mr. Rueger remarked that, unlike electricity, PG&E is able to pass on increases in prices it pays for gas to its customers. However, the financial transactions necessary to purchase that gas have been structured so that the PG&E must B.6-34
have the capability to borrow funds for a period of time.
With the current uncertainties and the financial situation impacting PG&E's credit rating, gas suppliers are demanding payment prior to delivering gas and PG&E has been challenged to keep the supplies of gas available. He remarked that any disruption or diversion of gas supplies from PG&E's core residential customers would be a huge problem, due to the resulting need to enter every residence to restore service.
However, disrupting gas supplies from PG&E's non-core customers operating gas-fired electric power generators would have a severe negative impact on the supply of electric power.
The U.S. Department of Energy issued a mandatory order requiring domestic gas suppliers to continue deliveries, and Mr. Rueger remarked that Canadian sources, which supply about one half of PG&E's gas needs, have never stopped their deliveries. PG&E has negotiated terms with gas suppliers which would give the suppliers an advantageous position in a possible bankruptcy, and the order by the Department of Energy is not expected to be extended. Mr. Rueger, in response to a question from Dr. Rossin, discussed efforts to mitigate the effects of the second price auction and attempts which have taken place to manipulate power requirements and bidding prices on the Power Exchange. He remarked that, because the market has had no consistent cap, a situation was allowed to exist wherein out-of-state brokers were able to control power allocations and were actually able to purchase PG&E generated power at $250 a megawatt hour and then sell that same power back into the market the next day for $1,400 a megawatt hour.
In response to this situation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission instituted what is termed a "soft price cap."
However, the soft price cap considers opportunity as a justification for price which largely negates the soft cap's effect. He further noted that the computers used by the Power Exchange and the ISO have proven to be inadequate to implement the soft price cap. The Power Exchange has now been essentially replaced by the ISO in the deregulation scheme, as California is now purchasing its power requirements on the market. In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr.
Rueger replied that, although PG&E's natural gas system is configured to provide for storage during the summer months, many independent generators have opted to use their stored reserves during the summer because of the high gas prices.
These independent generators must now purchase gas on the spot market. Mr. Rueger remarked that the capacity of the PG&E's reserves to serve new sources of gas-fired electrical generation, provide supplies to meet normal requirements and B.6-35
to maintain normal reserves during the summer months may be challenged. However, at present PG&E believes the system will be able to cope with these problems, and he again directed the Committee's attention to the interrelated nature of the issues.
Mr. Rueger observed that February 1, 2001, was the first instance when PG&E actually defaulted on a payment due for energy. PG&E is committed to maintaining a working cash reserve, sufficient to continue the vital public service provided by the Utility's activities. He reported that payment in full to electric energy suppliers and principal payments on loan obligations have necessarily been suspended due to PG&E's cash flow situation and to keep its other utility-related functions operating. Dividend payments to shareholders have also been stopped. He observed that PG&E is attempting to avoid being forced into bankruptcy and remains cautiously hopeful that the State can act in time to avoid that situation. Mr. Rueger expressed his view that the State should: 1) act to stabilize the situation and keep the energy supply viable by purchasing its long-term power requirements and address the situation created by the current rates, which 2) do not pass the cost of the power provided to the consumer; address the debt incurred by the utilities; and 3) bring power from new sources into the State, create new generation resources within the State and implement immediate and effective energy conservation measures.
In discussing DCPP's actions in response to the California energy issue, Mr. Rueger confirmed that the situation in the State has impacted DCPP, however, PG&E has been working to minimize any impact on operational considerations. He observed that because of the challenges faced by California, DCPP has been recognized as an important, energy crucial and reliable contributor to meeting the State's Mr. Rueger remarked that there have been few requirements.
or instances when PG&E recognized any attempt to pressure to the influence DCPP operational decisions in response State's energy situation. He stated that the NRC has been supportive of PG&E and DCPP management in resisting such when situations. He also provided some examples of instances safely PG&E has responded to the State's immediate need, and modified, postponed or curtailed certain operational activities in order to continue to operate within acceptable safety parameters as determined by PG&E and the NRC.
Mr. Rueger also acknowledged that the California energy B. 6-36
situation has received the attention of DCPP employees and he noted that PG&E is working to communicate with the employees through daily meetings with the leadership teams, directors and managers concerning current information on the energy situation. Efforts have also continued to communicate with all DCPP employees during All Hands Meetings and by holding informal brown bag lunch assemblies to provide information and respond to questions from employees. Dr. de Planque commented on an article by Mr. Rueger in a newsletter and expressed her opinion that it was very well done and noted that his emphasis on safety was clear and direct. Mr. Rueger remarked that PG&E continues to monitor the early warning indicators for employee distraction and he observed that personnel error rates have actually improved over the recent period. In response to a question from Mr. Clark, Mr. Rueger replied that, as the NRC has ultimate jurisdiction for DCPP operations, there is no person in California who could issue an emergency order to PG&E to operate the Plant. Dr. de Planque remarked on the challenge which DCPP may face due to requirements for off site power availability and Mr. Rueger confirmed that PG&E has held discussions with the NRC on this subject and has previously made equipment changes to increase voltage support.
Mr. Rueger observed that DCPP's emergency siren system would be minimally affected by the rolling blackouts. In response to a question from DCISC Consultant Booker, Mr.
Rueger confirmed that the PG&E's financial situation has had some impact on estimated budget expenditures at DCPP, although he remarked that very few of the budget reductions which would affect power generation activities because those activities are considered crucial functions. He observed that there will be no impact due to financial condition on upcoming outage activities for either unit. Minor projects which have been deferred at DCPP for the first months of 2001, due to the financial situation of the Utility, total only about $2-$2.5 million. Impact will be directly felt with regard to deferment of employee merit salary increases and financial bonus for DCPP performance. PG&E has communicated to its employees that such payments must be suspended until sufficient cash reserves are again available. A small number of contractors have been released at DCPP. Mr. Clark encouraged Mr. Rueger and PG&E to be alert for employees who might tend to make non-conservative decisions, based upon the California energy situation and PG&E's current financial difficulties, and Mr. Rueger confirmed that PG&E was cognizant of the possibility and he observed DCPP management has purposely assumed a "business as usual" posture concerning B.6-37
regularly scheduled activities, including an upcoming inspection of DCPP by INPO, and is continuing to emphasize that no sacrifices in safety are acceptable at any time. He remarked that much of the publicity concerning DCPP's operation and its importance in meeting California's energy needs has been very positive, and has even included positive feedback from groups fundamentally opposed to nuclear power and that employees are aware that the State is very cognizant of the important part Diablo plays in meeting its needs for energy.
Mr. Clark remarked that the Committee would appreciate being kept up to date with regard to plans by PG&E which would impact DCPP operations, resources or staffing. Dr. de Planque offered, on behalf of the Committee, to foster communication between PG&E and any or all of the Committee Members' appointing entities. Mr. Clark noted that PG&E's actions at DCPP in response to the California energy situation appear to be appropriate to the situation and that management has taken effective action in communicating concerning the situation with employees. The DCISC will continue to monitor the situation, however, at the present time the Committee has not identified any new concern about the continued safe operation of DCPP due to the current California energy situation.
Mr. Rueger requested Mr. Bob Hite to make the next presentation to the Committee.
Refueling Outage lRIO - "As Low As Reasonably Achievable"(ALARA)and Dose Results.
Mr. Hite stated that the official exposure for 1R10 was 162.5 Rem which made 1R10 the lowest dose outage in U-l's operational history. U-1 outages have generally seen a radiation dosage in the range 300 Rem for a typical outage.
The duration of 1R10 was 40 days 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and there were 77 personnel contamination incidents(PCI)for exposure of both clothing and skin, which Mr. Hite observed was a good performance. He then briefly reviewed other statistics relating to the dose results for 1R10. The exposure estimate for IR10 was 168 Rem and the goal for the outage was 147.5 Rem. Emergent work contributed 12.9 Rem and the extended duration of the outage added 1 Rem for a total additional exposure of 13.9 Rem.
Mr. Hite reviewed and discussed with the DCISC 1R10 radiation work permits and the estimated-to-actual exposure as B.6-38
follows:
Estimated Actual Radiation Work Permit Exposure Exposure Primary SG Eddy Current Work 25.0 Rem 23.9 Rem Primary SG Nozzle Dams 7.9 Rem 8.9 Rem 4.7 Rem 7.2 Rem Scaffolding in Containment SG Secondary Side Inspection 5.8 Rem 7.2 Rem Reactor Reassembly 7.8 Rem 6.0 Rem Mr. Hite discussed the exposure experienced during 1R9 which resulted in a higher dose rate than planned and a higher exposure than expected. He stated that there was a IRl0 concentrated and successful effort to make sure that the to forced 02 crud burst dose rate, which activity contributed the higher dosage experienced for U-I during 1R9, was explicitly planned for IRI0 and scheduled to reduce the 1R9 experience. He discussed the effect of zinc injection on the dose rates in the high-dose areas and described the dose Dr. de reduction rate and the consequent benefits during IRlO.
Planque expressed her observation, and Mr. Hite agreed, that the nuclear industry should look at dose distribution equally with collective dose when examining the impact of managing an dose rates and she suggested the DCISC may want to schedule examination of dose distribution results during a future fact finding. Mr. Hite opined that the largest contributor to and collective exposure reduction is good scheduling, planning implementation of work control processes. He remarked that there has also been a concerted effort over the last two refueling outages to employ state of the art filtration techniques to reduce crud source term in the primary coolant, which directly reduces available contamination.
Mr. Hite confirmed that DCPP is considering utilizing more remote monitoring techniques and technology to further reduce personnel exposure during future outages. He remarked that U-i experienced fairly significant reductions in SG of inside bowl dose rate averages since 1R7 and the experience the experience of iRlO at 10.1 Rem/Hr is actually less than 10.3 Rem/Hr during U-i's first refueling outage. He described burst this as the results of forced oxygenation and the crud He and subsequent cleanup work for the ALARA Program.
observed that extending an outage results in an overall outages collective dose increase and short duration, efficient contribute to lower dosages. He then reviewed the DCPP annual used by radiation exposure and the three-year rolling average B.6-39
the NRC to grade performance. Members discussed with Mr. Hite the INPO goals and comparison of performance data. In response to a question from Mr. Clark, Mr. Hite stated that at present, with the available data, the contribution of zinc is not demonstrable because of a present lack of sufficient isotopic gamma scans of the piping surfaces to determine the relative ratios of Cobalt 58 and 60 and Zinc 65. However, he stated that it has been his professional experience with boiling water reactors that zinc assists in reducing dose rate and collective dose results.
In response to a question from Dr. de Planque concerning the availability of RP technicians, Mr. Rueger and Mr. Hite replied that DCPP and other plants are continuing to work together and with their contractors to ensure qualified personnel are available for refueling outages. In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Hite remarked that the exposure goal for 2R10 is expected to be around 109 Rem.
XIX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS The Chair invited any member of the public present who wished to address any comment or communication to the Committee to do so at this time. There was no response to this invitation.
XX ADJOURN MORNING SESSION The morning meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was adjourned by the Chair at 11:55 P.M.
XXI RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON MEETING The afternoon session of the DCISC was called to order by Mr. Philip Clark, Chair of the Committee at 1:30 P.M.
XXII INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS The Chair noted that DCISC Member Dr. de Planque was present, Dr. Rossin having left the meeting earlier, and that a quorum of the Committee was present to continue the public meeting and requested Vice President Womack to present the final technical presentations scheduled for this public meeting of the DCISC.
XXIII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)
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PG&E Vice President Womack introduced DCPP Outage Manager Mr. Brad Hinds to make the next two technical presentations to the Committee.
Refueling Outage IR1O Overall Results.
Mr. Hinds stated that IRl0 was his first outage experience as Outage Manager for DCPP, having been at the Plant since 1994 and having served previously in Operations as a shift technical advisor and as DCPP Manager of Scheduling and Project Management.
as Mr. Hinds observed that 1R10 was a very good outage regards nuclear safety. There were four personnel injuries during 1R10 which equaled the best performance for a refueling outage. Senior Vice President Rueger noted that PG&E is of a focused on developing and communicating fundamentals safety program at DCPP which is based upon everyday behavior and which encourages involvement from employees to remain vigilant against unsafe work habits of their fellow employees.
human Mr. Hinds stated that there were three significant has performance events during 1R10 on which the Committee observed received prior presentations by PG&E and Mr. Hinds that none of these events challenged nuclear safety.
The baseline schedule for 1R10 was 26 days and the actual to the schedule was 40 days. Significant factors contributing delay were: six days delay attributable to Main Generator Phase C repair; three days attributable to Phase B repairs; and 1 three days attributable to M-48 testing and leak repair; day delay due to voltage regulator repair. All these delays were for items which were emergent in nature and were planned for the outage. Mr.
unrelated to work activities and the Hinds discussed these items, the repairs effected, testing by which they rationale and future plans for generator were identified. Mr. Hinds observed that work which was to make planned was well scheduled and that absent the need been repairs to the Main Generator the outage might have accomplished within the scheduled 29-day duration.
Mr. Hinds reviewed the major routine scope of the items which were accomplished during 1R10. These included:
- Refueling the Reactor.
- Critical valve maintenance.
- Steam Generator maintenance and inspections.
- Turbine Generator maintenance and inspection.
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"* Diesel Generator maintenance.
"* Vital Bus H maintenance.
"* Surveillance testing.
He then reviewed and discussed the activities which constituted projects of major scope for the IRlO outage, and he noted that no items of major scope were deferred during the outage. The items accomplished included:
"* Containment Recirculating Sump Screen replacement.
"* Reactor Coolant Pump cable replacement
"* Main Feedwater Pump speed control replacement.
"* Unit up-rated by 23 Mwe.
Mr. Hinds identified and discussed certain experiences during lRlO which have been identified as areas of possible improvement for future outages. These include routine comprehensive preoutage planning and preparation, adherence and coordination of the outage schedule, and cost forecasting and control. In responding to a question, posed during an earlier presentation, concerning why one SG had significantly higher dose accumulation than the other, Mr. Hinds observed that the Reactor Coolant Pump for that particular SG was secured earlier during the shutdown sequence, raising the bowl dose rates. In response to a question from Mr. Clark concerning outage goals and incentives, Mr. Hinds remarked that the goals set for lRlO were challenging to the organization but were achievable and Mr. Rueger remarked that the schedule duration represented the largest unachieved goal and that outage cost goal was essentially met.
Refueling Outage 2R10 and Safety Plan.
Mr. Hinds reviewed and discussed with the Committee the major maintenance scope of the upcoming tenth refueling outage for U-2, these include:
"* Refueling and fuel repair.
"* Steam Generator maintenance.
"* Main Turbine Generator maintenance
"* 4kV and 480V Bus H maintenance.
"* Valve maintenance.
"* Surveillance testing.
Mr. Hinds reported that chemistry indications of fuel B.6-42
one open rod damage have been found for U-2 which may involve be doing on one fuel assembly and that consequently, PG&E will any "in mast" sipping of the fuel assemblies removed to locate deal fuel damage and will have contingency plans in place to the spent fuel with any damaged fuel discovered once it is in and pool. Mr. Hinds then discussed with the DCISC the scope to date for the reasons for the major projects identified 2R10, these include:
- Main feedwater piping replacement.
- Containment Recirculating Sump Screen modification.
- Reactor Coolant Pump motor cable replacement.
- Main Generator current transformer dismounting.
- Reactor Vessel Refueling Level Indication System upgrade.
- Reactor Coolant System Vacuum Refill System.
Personnel goals for 2R10 include achieving an exposure goal of 109 person Rem with no personnel safety incidents, errors or disabling or reportable injuries. Nuclear safety in any goals include no loss of core cooling with the core location, event-free mid-loop operations and no equipment damage. The budget for outage duration and cost for 2R10 is the goal for a 35-day outage at a direct cost of $31 million, and the is for a 30-day outage at a direct cost of $30 million direct cost plan is to achieve the outage in 26-27 days at a of no more than $28 million. Mr. Hinds reviewed the schedule work for 2R10 major milestones in outage preplanning including order preparation, issuance of the Rev 0 Schedule, completion is and issuance of work instructions for the outage which observed that scheduled to commence April 29, 2001. Mr. Hinds for IRI0 the Outage Safety Plan will be very similar to that and that there have been no unusual activities or risks as recent identified and that overall risk as about the same DCPP outages. He identified the higher risk evolutions as the two mid-loop operations, before core offload and following core reload. Mr. Clark suggested that the Committee may wish that of to review any differences between DCPP outage risk and might be other Region IV plants, or whether the differences attributable to PRA modeling.
the In concluding this presentation, Mr. Hinds discussed expanded use focus areas for improvement during 2R10 including quality of pre-outage milestones, top priority for safety and use of and attention to human performance fundamentals through tailboard briefings, self-verification and use of three-way communications. Mr. Clark observed that the Audit Report on B.6-43
area for 1Rl0 identified post evaluation critiques as an that PG&E is possible improvement and Mr. Hinds confirmed working to improve the Lessons Learned Program to encourage to personnel to make immediate comment and offer suggestions and the Program in a timely fashion so they may be evaluated next if appropriate incorporated and implemented during the refueling outage.
In response to questions from Consultant Wardell, Mr.
Hinds confirmed that there were no significant errors involving clearance coordination during 1R10, that Emergency 1R10 Core Cooling System(ECCS)voiding was not a problem during and that due to enhanced void venting procedures for the ECCS, baffle jetting was not a problem during 1R10. Mr. Hinds found remarked that because evidence of baffle jetting was fuel during 2R9, fuel assemblies will be clipped in the spent a precaution to pool during 2R10 prior to core reload as cycle.
prevent baffle jetting during the next U-2 operating of Vice President Womack commented on the difference in design that it is reactor internals between U-I and U-2 and he stated PG&E's belief that U-2's design, with a partially bolted baffle and the direction of cooling flow between the core barrel and baffle, represents the principal cause for the onset of baffle jetting for U-2 during its last two cycles.
to Mr. Clark called upon Senior Vice President Rueger meeting.
make the final presentation to the Committee for this Five-Year Nuclear Power Generation Business Plan.
is Mr. Rueger stated that PG&E's Five-Year Business Plan areas a strategic performance plan which identifies key focus with the and that the Plan is updated annually. He reviewed Committee some of the major initiatives, past and future, Mr.
which have or are expected to impact DCPP operations.
costs Rueger reviewed PG&E's efforts to bring DCPP operating down to permit the plant to operate effectively in the competitive electric power market in California. He remarked that PG&E identified a gap of approximately $200 million, or which had to be made up from either increased revenue reduced generation costs for DCPP power. The Cost Management Plan, Performance Plans and the Re-Engineering Program, during concerning which the DCISC has received information integral parts of efforts to past public presentations, were these efforts were reduce the gap and Mr. Rueger observed that the largely successful in reducing the gap and that, given power in California, present state of the market for electric B.6-44
there is no question that DCPP is a very competitive generating resource. At the present time, DCPP-produced power is the lowest-cost available within California.
Mr. Rueger identified and discussed with the Committee four separate strategies to facilitate the transition of DCPP to the new market environment. These include: the STARS alliance formed with four other nuclear plants with very similar designs to DCPP, and Mr. Rueger opined that a joint nuclear operating company may eventually emerge from the STARS alliance; continuing the Process Focus for addressing reengineering and cultural change efforts in terms of budget, costs, goals and organizing personnel to break down functional barriers; continuing encouragement and development of cultural change within the DCPP organization; and market development and creation of a strong market alliance for bidding DCPP Mr.
power into the competitive market as that market evolves.
Rueger observed that PG&E has been preparing DCPP for entry into the market and he briefly reviewed some of the efforts made. He stated that PG&E is now at a point where DCPP must continue to demonstrate profitability and sustained good performance at lower cost to secure its current value, and he identified and discussed some of the challenges DCPP will face in extending its value through the current license periods of 2021 and 2025 respectively for both units. PG&E has chosen unit, not to address the issue of license extension for either may or major asset replacement for DCPP, until around 2005 and do so in concert with some or all of its STARS partners. In response to a question from Mr. Clark concerning the reactor pressure vessel, Mr. Rueger confirmed PG&E received construction period recapture on its license term from the NRC and that both reactor vessels are being preliminarily evaluated for license extension. U-2 appears to have no major issues in this regard, while U-1 may require some modification prior to receipt of a license extension.
Mr. Rueger reviewed and discussed the DCPP Performance Plan through 2004 and beyond, which defines PG&E's overall goals for the DCPP organization into safety, industry leadership, generation performance, financial performance, human performance categories. Mr. Rueger remarked that, for there every overall goal established by the Performance Plan, goal is a corresponding plan to functionally link that overall with a practical plan for actually achieving the goal within the organization, and he confirmed that those implementation plans are organized by process or by Centers of Excellence concepts. Mr. Clark requested PG&E provide a current set of B.6-45
the overall Performance Plan documents, together with the supporting plans to implement the strategies, to the Committee when they are available and that the Committee may wish to schedule a fact-finding to further review the Performance Plan. Mr. Rueger and Mr. Clark briefly discussed PG&E's current requirement to keep certain information concerning generation cost as proprietary due to the present competitive environment for power generation.
In response to a question from Dr. de Planque, Mr. Rueger confirmed that PG&E intends to work with its STARS partners to meet long-term staffing requirements for the DCPP organization and strategies are in place to secure, train and develop and maintain a workforce with the necessary skills required to continue operating DCPP.
The Chair then expressed the Committee's thanks and appreciation to PG&E and Mr. Rueger for the excellent quality of the technical presentations made to the DCISC during this public meeting. A short break followed.
XXIV PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATION The Chair recognized Mr. John Gagliardini of Arroyo Grande, California, to address some remarks to the Committee.
Mr. Gagliardini expressed his opinion that PG&E should receive contracts for further research and development efforts concerning nuclear power. He stated that he had reviewed information on other PG&E projects in the local area including the Gunneson Land Project 18PO13, and he expressed his opinion that it was not PG&E's fault that these projects did not ultimately result in additional electric power generation.
There were no questions or comments and the Chair then thanked Mr. Gagliardini for his comment.
Mr. Les Goldfisher was then recognized to address remarks to the DCISC.
Mr. Goldfisher stated that he was present as a concerned citizen and that he wished to direct the Committee's attention to a lecture being held that evening, at California Polytechnic University in San Luis Obispo, by Professor Ernest J. Sternglass concerning the health effects of nuclear fallout and releases from the operation of nuclear power plants. Mr.
Goldfisher read a press release concerning the subject matter of Professor Sternglass' lecture, which includes a discussion B.6-46
concerning the level of Strontium-90 found in the teeth of children residing in the vicinity of U.S. nuclear facilities and data regarding cancer and infant mortality rates. Mr.
Clark thanked Mr. Goldfisher and noted that he believes that all the Committee Members have been long aware of Professor Sternglass' views. Dr. de Planque commented that she has been aware of Professor Sternglass' studies for 30 years and that it is her recollection that Professor Sternglass' studies were considered by the Health Physics Society during the 1970's and that the Society's position at that time was that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain Professor Sternglass' conclusions concerning the effects of radiation. Dr. de Planque observed that the data she has reviewed, as a part of her professional field, indicate that health effects below certain levels, and certainly at low-level environmental levels, are not evident at all in epidemiological studies or any other human studies. Dr. de Planque noted that she is not familiar with Professor Sternglass' current data regarding children's teeth and could not comment on it, however, she noted that there are many reasons why radioactivity in teeth might be observed. She remarked that it was her opinion that Professor Sternglass' claims, based upon the data he has presented, have not been substantiated by significant numbers of scientists working in the field, both in this country and abroad. Mr. Clark noted that there is an extensive radioactivity monitoring program of the local area around DCPP, reviewed regularly by the NRC, which has consistently shown the radiation levels around the Plant are in undistinguishable from natural background levels existing nature and that studies have consistently shown that the impact of the operation of nuclear power plants on radiation level is low and does not present a health issue. Mr. Clark noted that Mr. Goldfisher has attended past meetings of the Committee and participated in the public tour of DCPP held this date. He remarked that the DCISC's role does not include supporting or opposing nuclear power and that the nuclear industry is doing many things to disseminate facts concerning nuclear operational issues. Legal Counsel Wellington noted that he had previously provided a copy of the press release concerning Professor Sternglass' lecture to the Committee Members and consultants.
XXV CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION Mr. Wellington reviewed with the Members the present status of the Committee finances and he noted that all outstanding balances or amounts carried over from past year's B. 6-47
grants of funding from PG&E have been resolved. Mr.
Wellington noted that PG&E will shortly receive a full refund of the grant balance remaining unspent from the funds provided for the Committee's operations during 2000. Mr. Clark remarked that it was his observation that during 2000, the Committee operated within its budget and he commented that, if possible, funds should be reserved through the end of any calendar year to address any unforseen contingencies affecting DCPP operations.
The Chair directed that Consultant Booker obtain Dr.
Rossin's comments on the December 13 and 14, 1999, fact finding reports and incorporate those comments, if any, into the final reports. Final versions of the reports will then be sent to the Members for their review and, upon their verbal approval, the December 13 and 14, 1999 fact-finding reports were authorized for transmittal to PG&E.
Future public meetings of the Committee are scheduled for June 20-21 and October 17-18, 2001, and a public meeting of the Committee was tentatively scheduled for January 29-30, 2002, by the two Members present.
XXVI ADJOURNMENT OF THE THIRTY-SECOND PUBLIC MEETING There being no further business, the Chair adjourned the thirty-second public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee at 3:36 P.M.
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