L-2010-078, Attachment 4, St. Lucie License Amendment Request Extended Power Uprate, Technical Specifications Bases Markups (for Information Only)

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Attachment 4, St. Lucie License Amendment Request Extended Power Uprate, Technical Specifications Bases Markups (for Information Only)
ML101160192
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/16/2010
From:
Florida Power & Light Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML101160214 List:
References
L-2010-078
Download: ML101160192 (25)
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Text

St. Lucie Unit 1 L-2010-078 Docket No. 50-335 Attachment 4 ___________________________________________________________________________________ St. Lucie Unit 1 EPU LAR Att. 4-1 ATTACHMENT 4 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST EXTENDED POWER UPRATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES MARKUPS (For Information Only) FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 This coversheet plus 24 pages Technical Specifications Bases Markups St.. Lucie Unit 1 L-2010-078 Docket No. 50-335 Attachment 4 LIST OF PAGES St. Lucie Unit 1 EPU LAR Att. 4-2 Technical Specifications Bases Markups Technical Specification Bases Section 2.0 3 of 10 4 of 10 8 of 10 Section 3/4.1 5 of 9 6 of 9 Section 3/4.2 5 of 5 Section 3/4.4 7 of 29 21 of 29 INSERT 1 22 of 29 23 of 29 24 of 29 28 of 29 Section 3/4.5 4 of 6 Section 3/4.6 3 of 10 4 of 10 6 of 10 Section 3/4.7 3 of 13 4 of 13 5 of 14 Section 3/4.9 2 of 9 9 of 9 Section 3/4.11 3 of 3

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        1. TheElimitsEareEcycleJspecificEandEhaveEbeen relocatedEtoEtheEFOLRH 70f29SECTIONNO.:3/4.4REVISIONNO.:3TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT6OFADM-25.04REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMS1.LUCIEUNIT1PAGE:IIl3/4.43/4.4.5REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(continued)......:---.....,.....,..._..:.....-_------.....,,and2)thepre-existingsecondaryBASES(continued)sidefluidinventorySTEAMGENERATORS(SG)TUBEII"I"ntriinued-,activityinthedTheanalysisfordesignbasisaccidensandtransientstheranaSGTRassumetheSGtubesretaintheirintegrity(i..,theyareassumednottorupture).IntheseanalysesthesteamdischargetotheatmosphlreisIt'1)basedo'1t.thetotalprimary-to-secondaryleakagefromallSGsof1gpmandIwosources.0.5gpmthroughanyoneSGasaresultofaccidentinduced....----------__----,Foraccidentsthatdonotinvolvefueldamage,theprimarycoolantactivity,"andthesecondarylevelofI1d1isassumedtobeequaltothelimitsincoolantsystemactivityisLCO3.4.8,"ReactorCoolantSystemSpecificActivity";Foraccidentsthatassumedtobeequaltoassumefueldamage,theprimarycoolantactivityisafunctionoftheamountthelimitsinLCOofactivityreleasedfromthedamagedfuel.Thedoseconsequencesof3.7.1.4,"PlantSystemstheseeventsarewithinthelimitsofGDC19(Ref.2),10100(Ref.d)Activity."ortReapprovedliseRsiR§Basis(e.§.,asfflallfrostioRoftReselifflits).L....------r------lSteamgeneratortubeintegritysatisfiesCriterion2of10CFR50.36(C)(2)(ii)\LimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)land10CFR50.67(Ref.7).TheLCOrequiresthatSGtubeintegritybemaintained.TheLCOalsorequiresthatallSGtubesthatsatisfytherepaircriteriabepluggedinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorProgram.DuringaSGinspection,anyinspectedtubethatsatisfiestheSteamGeneratorProgramrepaircriteriaisremovedfromservicebyplugging.Ifatubewasdeterminedtosatisfytherepaircriteriabutwasnotplugged,thetubemaystillhavetubeintegrity.InthecontextofthisSpecification,aSGtubeisdefinedastheentirelengthofthetube,includingthetubewallbetweenthetube-to-tubesheetweldatthetubeinletandthetube-to-tubesheetweldatthetubeoutlet.Theto-tubesheetweldisnotconsideredpartofthetube.ASGtubehastubeintegritywhenitsatisfiestheSGperformancecriteria.TheSGperformancecriteriaaredefinedinSpecification6.8.4.1,"SteamGeneratorProgram,"anddescribeacceptableSGtubeperformance.TheSteamGeneratorProgramalsoprovidestheevaluationprocessfordeterminingconformancewiththeSGperformancecriteria.TherearethreeSGperformancecriteria:structuralintegrity,accidentinducedleakage,andoperationalleakage.FailuretomeetanyoneofthesecriteriaisconsideredfailuretomeettheLCO.

SECTIONNO.:TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSPAGE:I3/4.4BASESATTACHMENT6OFADM-25.0421of29REVISIONNO.:REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM3S1.LUCIEUNIT1I3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(continued)lBASES(continued)3/4.4.7CHEMISTRYThelimitationsonReactorCoolantSystemchemistryensurethatcorrosionoftheReactorCoolantSystemisminimizedandreducethepotentialforReactorCoolantSystemleakageorfailureduetostresscorrosion.MaintainingthechemistrywithintheSteadyStateLimitsprovidesadequatecorrosionprotectiontoensurethestructuralintegrityoftheReactorCoolantSystemoverthelifeoftheplant.Theassociatedeffectsofexceedingtheoxygen,chlorideandfluoridelimitsaretimeandtemperaturedependent.CorrosionstudiesshowthatoperationmaybecontinuedwithcontaminantconcentrationlevelsinexcessoftheSteadyStateLimits,uptotheTransientLimits,forthespecifiedlimittimeintervalswithouthavingasignificanteffectonthestructuralintegrityoftheReactorCoolantSystem.ThetimeintervalpermittingcontinuedoperationwithintherestrictionsoftheTransientLimitsprovidestimefortakingcorrectiveactionstorestorethecontaminantconcentrationstowithintheSteadyStateLimits.Thesurveillancerequirementsprovideadequateassurancethatconcentrationsinexcessofthelimitswillbedetectedinsufficienttimetotakecorrectiveaction.RIS'fAf'tB'thepacepeciICcIVIyasesWI3/4.4.8.."J..t",...tAOrosl:lltiR§2ASl:lrSSSOSattAOsitoeSI:lRsarywillRStOHSOOSaRaJ=)J=)FOJ=)riatolysrTlallfrastisRsfj:2art100lirTIitsfslIswiR§astoarTI§oRoratsrtl:leorl:lJ=)tl:lreassisoRtiRsSRjl:lRstisRwitAaRassl:lrTIossteasystateJ=)rirTIarytssossRsarystoarTI§oReratsrloalm§oratesf1.0Gj:2MaRsaSSRSl:lrroRtIssssfsffsiteolostrisalJ=)swor.TAovall:losfsrtAOlirTIitsSRsJ=)osifisasti>rityrOJ=)rosoRtlirTIitseasosI:lJ=)SRaJ=)ararTIotriso>rall:latisReytAOsftYJ=)isalsiteIssatisRs.TAoso>rall:losarosSRsor>rati>roiRtAatsJ=)osifissiteJ=)ararTIotorssftAOLl:lsiosito,SI:lSAassitoeSI:lRsaryIssatisRaRsrTIotosrels§isalsSRsitisRs,woreRStsSRsisoresiRtAisovall:latisR.TAostatOrTIORtJ=)orrTIittiR§tssSRtiRl:lofsrlirTIitostirTIoJ=)orissswitAtAOJ=)rirTIaryssslaRt'ssJ=)osifisasti>rity>1.0I1d1,el:ltwitAiRtAOallswaelolirTIitSASWRSRd.41,asssrTlrTlssatosJ=)sssieloissiRosJ=)il(iR§J=)AORSrTlORSRwAisArTIaysssl:lrfslIswiR§oAaR§osiRTI=IERM/\Lj:20WER INSERT 1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY The maximum allowable doses to an individual at the exclusion area boundary (EAB) distance for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following an accident, or at the low population zone (LPZ) outer boundary distance for the radiological release duration, are specified in 10 CFR 50.67 for design basis accidents using the alternative source term methodology and in Branch Technical Position 11-5 for the waste gas decay tank rupture accident. Dose limits to control room operators are given in 10 CFR 50.67 and in GDC 19.

The RCS specific activity LCO limits the allowable concentration of radionuclides in the reactor coolant to ensure that the dose consequences of limiting accidents do not exceed appropriate regulatory offsite and control room dose acceptance criteria. The LCO contains specific activity limits for both DOSE EQUIVALENT (DE) I-131 and DOSE EQUIVALENT (DE) XE-133.

The radiological dose assessments assume the specific activity of the reactor coolant is at the LCO limits, and an existing reactor coolant steam generator tube leakage rate at the applicable Technical specification limit. The radiological dose assessments assume the specific activity of the secondary coolant is at its limit as specified in LCO 3.7.1.4, "Plant Systems - Activity."

The ACTIONS allow operation when DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 is greater than 1.0 Ci/gram and less than 60 Ci/gram. The ACTIONS require sampling within four hours and every four hours following to establish a trend.

One surveillance requires the determination of the DE XE-133 specific activity as a measure of noble gas specific activity of the reactor coolant at least once per 7 days.

A second surveillance is performed to ensure that iodine specific activity remains within the LCO limit once per 14 days during normal operation and following rapid power changes when iodine spiking is more apt to occur. The frequency between two and six hours after a power change of greater than 15% RATED THERMAL POWER within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period, is established because the iodine levels peak during this time following iodine spike initiation.

The RCS specific activity satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

SECTIONNO.:3/4.4REVISIONNO.:3TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT6OFADM-25.04REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMS1.LUCIEUNIT1PAGE:I22of29I3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(continued)BASES(continued)3/4.4.RSPE"",C.....I....l3/4.4.9Resl:lain§Tavgto<eOO°F"preventstAereleaseofaativitySAol:llsastearn§eneratortl:lberl:lptl:lresinaetAesatl:lrationpressl:lreoftAeprimaryooolantisbelowtAeliftpressl:IreoftAeatmospAeriostearnreliefvalves.TAesl:IF'v'eillanaeproviseassl:IranaetAato>wessivespeaifiaaativitylevelsintAeprimaryaoolantwillbeseteotesinsl:Iffioienttimetotalmoorreotionaotion.Informationobtainesoniosinewillbel:IsestoassesstAeparametersassoaiateswitApAenomena./\resl:lationinofisotopiaanalysesfollowin§poweraAan§esmaybepermissibleifjl:lstifiesbytAesataobtaines.PRESSURE/TEMPERATURELIMITSAllcomponentsintheReactorCoolantSystemaredesignedtowithstandtheeffectsofcyclicloadsduetosystemtemperatureandpressurechanges.Thesecyclicloadsareintroducedbynormalloadtransients,reactortrips,andstartupandshutdownoperations.ThevariouscategoriesofloadcyclesusedfordesignpurposesareprovidedinSection5.2.1oftheFSAR.Duringstartupandshutdown,theratesoftemperatureandpressurechangesarelimitedsothatthemaximumspecifiedheatupandcooldownratesareconsistentwiththedesignassumptionsandsatisfythestresslimitsforcyclicoperation.Duringheatup,thethermalgradientsthroughthereactorvesselwallproducethermalstresseswhicharecompressiveatthereactorvesselinsidesurfaceandaretensileatthereactorvesseloutsidesurface.Sincereactorvesselinternalpressurealwaysproducestensilestressesatboththeinsidesurfaceandoutsidesurfacelocations,thetotalappliedstressisgreatestattheoutsidesurfacelocation.However,sinceneutronirradiationdamageislargerattheinsidesurfacelocationthanattheoutsidesurfacelocation,theinsidesurfaceflawmaybemorelimiting.Consequently,fortheheatupanalysis,boththeinsidesurfaceandoutsidesurfaceflawlocationsmustbeanalyzedforthespecificpressureandthermalloadingstodeterminewhichismorelimiting.Duringcooldown,thethermalgradientsthroughthereactorvesselwallproducethermalstresseswhicharetensileatthereactorvesselinsidesurfaceandarecompressiveatthereactorvesseloutsidesurface.Sincereactorvesselinternalpressurealwaysproducestensilestressesatboththeinsideandoutsidesurfacelocations,thetotalappliedstressisgreatestattheinsidesurface.

SECTIONNO.:3/4.4REVISIONNO.:3TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT6OFADM-25.04REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMS1.LUCIEUNIT1PAGE:I23of29I3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(continued)BASES(continued)l3/4.4.9PRESSURIZER/TEMPERATURELIMITS(continued)Sinceneutronirradiationdamageisalsogreaterattheinsidesurface,theinsidesurfaceflawlocationisthelimitinglocationduringcooldown.Consequently,onlytheinsidesurfaceflawmustbeevaluatedforthecooldownanalysis.70Theheatupandcooldcwnlimitcurves(Figures3.4-2aand3.4-2b)arecompositecurveswhichwerepreparedbydeterminingthemostconservativecase,witeithertheinsideoroutsidewallcontrolling,fortheheatuprateofuptoandforanycooldownrateofupto100°Fperhour.Theheatupandcooldowncurveswerepreparedbaseduponthemostlimitingvalueofthepredictedadjustedreferencetemperatureattheendoftheapplicableserviceperiod.ThereactorvesselmaterialshavebeentestedtodeterminetheirinitialRTNOT;theresultsofthesetestsareshowninTableB3/4.4-1.Reactoroperationandresultantfastneutron(E>1Mev)irradiationwillcauseanincreaseintheRTNOT.Therefore,anadjustedreferencetemperaturecanbecalculatedbaseduponthefluence.TheheatupandcooldownlimitcurvesshownonFigures3.4-2aand3.4-2bincludepredictedadjustmentsforthisshiftinRTNOTattheendoftheapplicableserviceperiod,aswellasadjustmentsforpressuredifferencesbetweenthereactorvesselbeltlineandpressurizerinstrumenttaps.TheactualshiftinRTNOTofthevesselmaterialwillbeestablishedperiodicallyduringoperationbyremovingandevaluating,inaccordancewithASTME185-82,reactorvesselmaterialsurveillancespecimensinstalledneartheinsidewallofthereactorvesselinthecorearea.Thecapsulesarescheduledforremovalattimesthatcorrespondtokeyaccumulatedfluencelevelswithinthevesselthroughtheendoflife.Sincetheneutronspectraattheirradiationsamplesandvesselinsideradiusareessentiallyidentical,measured.'1RTNOTforsurveillancesamplescanbeappliedwithconfidencetothecorrespondingmaterialinthereactorvesselwall.Theheatupandcooldowncurvesmustberecalculatedwhenthe.'1RTNOTdeterminedfromthesurveillancecapsuleisdifferentfromthecalculated.'1RTNOTfortheequivalentcapsuleradiationexposure.Thepressure-temperaturelimitlinesshownonFigures3.4-2aand3.4-2bforreactorcriticalityandforinserviceleakandhydrostatictestinghavebeenprovidedtoassurecompliancewiththeminimumtemperaturerequirementsforAppendixGto10CFR50.

SECTIONNO.:3/4.4REVISIONNO.:3TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT6OFADM-25.04REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMS1.LUCIEUNIT1PAGE:I24of29I3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(continued)BASES(continued)l3/4.4.9PRESSURIZER/TEMPERATURELIMITS(continued)ThisLowestServiceTemperaturevalueof165°FalsoincludesanadditionalrFtoaccountfortemperaturemeasurementuncertainty.ThemaximumRTNOTforallreactorcoolantsystempressure-retainingmaterials,withthee;ceptionofthereactorpressure158IestablishedtobeIneLowestServiceTemperaturelimitlineshown'-----r----'onFigures3.4-2aand3.4-2bisbaseduponthisRTNOTsinceArticleNB-2332ofSectionIIIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCoderequirestheLowestServiceTemperaturetobeRTNOT+100°Fforpiping,pumpsandBelowthistemperature,thesystempressuremustbelimitedtoamaximumof20%ofthesystem'shydrostatictestpressureof3125psia.ThelimitationsimposedonthepressurizerheatupandcooldownratesandspraywatertemperaturedifferentialareprovidedtoassurethatthepressurizerisoperatedwithinthedesigncriteriaassumedforthefatigueanalysisperformedinaccordancewiththeASMECoderequirements.3/4.4.10STRUCTURALINTEGRITYTheinserviceinspectionprogramforASMECodeClass1,2and3componentsensurethatthestructuralintegrityofthesecomponentswillbemaintainedatanacceptablelevelthroughoutthelifeoftheplant.ThisprogramisinaccordancewithSectionXIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableAddendaasrequiredby10CFRPart50.55a(g)exceptwherespecificwrittenreliefhasbeengrantedbytheCommissionpursuantto10CFRPart50.55a(g)(6)(i).ComponentsofthereactorcoolantsystemweredesignedtoprovideaccesstopermitinserviceinspectionsinaccordancewithSectionXIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode1971EditionandAddendathroughWinter1972.

SECTIONNO.:3/4.4REVISIONNO.:3TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT6OFADM-25.04REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMS1.LUCIEUNIT1PAGE:I28of29I3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(continued)BASES(continued)3/4.4.11DELETED3/4.4.12PORVBLOCKVALVESTheopeningofthePowerOperatingReliefValvesfulfillsnosafetyrelatedfunction.TheelectroniccontrolsofthePORVsmustbemaintainedOPERABLEtoensuresatisfactionofSpecifications3.4.12and3.4.13.SinceitisimpracticalandundesirabletoactuallyopenthePORVstodemonstratereclosing,itbecomesnecessarytoverifyoperabilityofthePORVBlockValvestoensurethecapabilitytoisolateamalfunctioningPORV.l3/4.4.133/4.4.14300POWEROPERATEDRELIEFVALVESandREACTORCOOLANTPUMP-STARTINGThelowtemperatureoverpressureprotectionsystem(LTOP)isdesignedtopreventRCSoverpressurizationabovethe10CFR50AppendixGoperatinglimitcurves(Figures3.4-2aand3.4-2b)atRCStemperaturesatorbelowofdblriR§ReatblpaRd2g1ofdblriR§oooldowR.TheLTOPsysteISbasedontheuseofthepressurizerpower-operatedreliefvals(PORVs)andtheimplementationofadministrativeandoperationalntrols.ThePORVsalignedtotheRCSwiththelowpressuresetpointsof350and530psia,restrictionsonRCPstarts,limitationsonheatupandcooldownrates,anddisablingofnon-essentialcomponentsprovideassurancethatAppendixGPITlimitswillnotbeexceededduringnormaloperationordesignbasisoverpressurizationeventsduetomassorenergyadditiontotheRCS.TheLTOPsystemAPPLICABILITY,ACTIONS,andSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSareconsistentwiththeresolutionofGenericIssue94,"AdditionalLow-TemperatureOverpressureProtectionforLight-WaterReactors,"pursuanttoGenericLetter90-06.

SECTIONNO.:3/4.5REVISIONNO.:2TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT7OFADM-25.04EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)S1.LUCIEUNIT1PAGE:40f6II3/4.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)(continued)BASES(continued)3/4.5.2and3/4.5.3ECCSSUBSYSTEMSlTheOPERABILITYoftwoseparateandindependentECCSsubsystemsensuresthatsufficientemergencycorecoolingcapabilitywillbeavailableintheeventofaLOCAassumingthelossofonesubsystemthroughanysinglefailureconsideration.EithersubsystemoperatinginconjunctionwiththesafetyinjectiontanksiscapableofsupplyingsufficientcorecoolingtolimitthepeakcladdingtemperatureswithinacceptablelimitsforallpostulatedbreaksizesrangingfromthedoubleendedbreakofthelargestRCScoldlegpipedownward.Inaddition,eachECCSsubsystemprovideslongtermcorecoolingcapabilityintherecirculationmodeduringtheaccidentrecoveryperiod.TS3.5.2.cand3.5.3.arequirethatECCSsubsystem(s)haveanindependentOPERABLEflowpathcapableofautomaticallytransferringsuctiontothecontainmentsumponaRecirculationActuationSignal.Thecontainmentsumpisdefinedastheareaofcontainmentbelowtheminimumfloodlevelinthevicinityofthecontainmentsumpstrainers.Therefore,theLCOsaresatisfiedwhenanindependentOPERABLEflowpathtothecontainmentsumpstrainerisavailable.*S3.5.2,ACTIONa.1.providesanallowedoutage/actioncompletiontime(AOT)ofupto7daysfrominitialdiscoveryoffailuretomeettheLCOprovidedtheaffectedECCSsubsystemisinoperableonlybecauseitsassociatedLPSItrainisinoperable.This7dayAOTisbasedonthefindingsofadeterministicandprobabilisticsafetyanalysisandisreferredtoasa"risk-informed"AOTextension.EntryintothisACTIONrequiresthatariskassessmentbeperformedinaccordancewiththeConfigurationRiskManagementProgram(CRMP)whichisdescribedintheAdministrativeProcedure(ADM-17.0B)thatimplementstheMaintenanceRulepursuantto10CFR50.65.TheSurveillanceRequirementsprovidedtoensureOPERABILITYofeachcomponentensurethatataminimum,theassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysesaremetandthatsubsystemOPERABILITYismaintained.TS3.5.2.drequiresthatanECCSsubsystem(s)haveOPERABLEchargingpumpandassociatedflowpathfromtheBAMT(s).ReferencetoTS3.1.2.2requiresthattheTrainAchargingpumpflowpathisfromtheBAMT(s)through1....-----1theboricacidmakeuppump(s).TheTrainBchargingpumpflowpathisfromtheBAMT(s)throughthegravityfeedvalve(s).

SECTIONNO.:3/4.6REVISIONNO.:5TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT8OFADM-25.04CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSS1.LUCIEUNIT1BASESFORSECTION3/4.6PAGE:I3of10Il3/4.6CONTAINMENTBASES3/4.6.1CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSVESSEL3/4.6.1.1CONTAINMENTVESSELINTEGRITYCONTAINMENTVESSELINTEGRITYensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialsfromthecontainmentatmospherewillberestrictedtothoseleakagepathsandassociatedleakratesassumedintheaccidentanalyses.Thisrestriction,inconjunctionwiththeleakageratelimitation,willlimitthesiteboundaryradiationdosestowithinthelimitsof10CFRPart100duringaccidentconditions.InaccordancewithGenericLetter91-08,"RemovalofComponentListsfromTechnicalSpecifications,"theopeningoflockedorsealedclosedcontainmentisolationvalvesonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingconsiderations:(1)stationinganoperator,whoisinconstantcommunicationwiththecontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols,(2)instructingthisoperatortoclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation,and(3)assuringthatenvironmentalconditionswillnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivityoutsidethecontainment.3/4.6.1.2CONTAINMENTLEAKAGE42.771Thelimitationsoncontainmentleakageratesensurethattocontainmentleakagevolumewillnotexceedthevalueamedintheaccidentanalysesatthepeakaccidentpressure,Papsig)whichresultsfromthelimitingdesignbasislossofcoolantaccident.ThesurveillancetestingformeasuringleakageratesisperformedinaccordancewiththeContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgramandisconsistentwiththerequirementsofAppendix"J"of10CFR50,OptionBandRegulatoryGuide1.163Rev.0,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.3/4.6.1.3CONTAINMENTAIRLOCKSThelimitationsonclosureandleakrateforthecontainmentairlocksarerequiredtomeettherestrictionsonCONTAINMENTINTEGRITYandcontainmentleakrate.Surveillancetestingoftheairlocksealsprovidesassurancethattheoverallairlockleakagewillnotbecomeexcessiveduetosealdamageduringtheintervalsbetweenairlockleakagetests.

SECTIONNO.:3/4.6REVISIONNO.:5TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT8OFADM-25.04CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSS1.LUCIEUNIT1PAGE:4of103/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS(continued)BASES(continued)3/4.6.1CONTAINMENTVESSEL(continued)3/4.6.1.4INTERNALPRESSUREThelimitationsoncontainmentinternalpressureensurethat1)thecontainmentstructuralispreventedfromexceedingitsdesignnegativepressuredifferentialwithrespecttotheannulusatmosphereof0.70psiand2)thecontainmentpeakpressuredoesnotexceedthedesignpressureof44psigduringsteamlinebreakaccidentconditions.0.5Themaximumpeakpressureobt.asteamlinebreakaccidentis.psig.Thelimitof.pSlgforinitialpositivecontainmentpressurewilllimitthetotalpressureto44.0psigwhichisthedesignpressureandisconsistentwiththeaccidentanalyses.3/4.6.1.5AIRTEMPERATUREThelimitationoncontainmentairtemperatureensuresthatthecontainmentvesseltemperaturedoesnotexceedthedesigntemperatureof264°FduringLOCAconditions.Thecontainmenttemperaturelimitisconsistentwiththeaccidentanalyses.3/4.6.1.6CONTAINMENTVESSELSTRUCTURALINTEGRITYThelimitationensuresthatthestructuralintegrityoftheontainmentsteelvesselwillbemaintainedcomparabletotheoriginalsignstandardsforthelifeofthefacility.Structuralintegrityisrequired0ensurethatthevesselwillwithstandthemaximumpressureof.psigintheeventofthelimitingdesignbasislossofcoolantaccident.AvisualinspectioninaccordancewiththeContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgramissufficienttodemonstratethiscapability.

SECTIONNO.:3/4.6REVISIONNO.:5TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT8OFADM-25.04CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSS1.LUCIEUNIT1PAGE:I6of10I3/4.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS(continued)l3/4.6.2BASES(continued)DEPRESSURIZATIONANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS(continued)3/4.6.2.1CONTAINMENTSPRAYANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS(continued)Ensuringthatthecontainmentspraypumpdischargepressureismetsatisfiestheperiodicsurveillancerequirementtodetectgrossdegradationcausedbyimpellerstructuraldamageorotherhydrauliccomponentproblems.Alongwiththisrequirement,SectionXIoftheASMECodeverifiesthepumpdevelopedheadatonepointonthepumpcharacteristiccurvetoverifyboththatthemeasuredperformanceiswithinanacceptabletoleranceoftheoriginalpumpbaselineperformanceandthattheperformanceatthetestflowisgreaterthanorequaltotheperformanceassumedintheunitsafetyanalysis.SurveillanceRequirementsarespecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASMECode.SectionXIoftheASMECodeprovidestheactivitiesandfrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.3/4.6.2.2SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEM17.0ITheOPERABILITYofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficientisaddedtothecontainmentsprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHvolumeandconcentrationensureapHvalueofbetween"and11.0forthesolutionrecirculatedwithincontainmentafteraLOCA.ThispHbandminimizestheevolutionofiodineandminimizestheeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.Thecontainedwatervolumelimitincludesanallowanceforwaternotusablebecauseoftankdischargelinelocationorotherphysicalcharacteristics.Theseassumptionsareconsistentwiththeiodineremovalefficiencyassumedintheaccidentanalyses.3/4.6.2.3DELETED3/4.6.3CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTheOPERABILITYofthecontainmentisolationvalvesensuresthatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseofradioactivematerialtothecontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainment.ContainmentisolationwithinthetimelimitsspecifiedensuresthatthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironmentwillbeconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedintheanalysesforaLOCA.Thisincludesthecontainmentpurgeinletandoutletvalves.

SECTIONNO.:3/4.7REVISIONNO.:23/4.7PLANTTITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT9OFADM-25.04PLANTSYSTEMSS1.LUCIEUNIT1BASESFORSECTION3/4.7SYSTEMSPAGE:I3of13IlBASES3/4.7.1TURBINECYCLE3/4.7.1.1SAFETYVALVESTheOPERABILITYofthemainsteamlinecodesafetyvalvesensuresthatthesecondarysystempressurewillbelimitedtowithin110%ofitsdesignpressureof1000psiaduringthemostsevereanticipatedsystemoperationaltransient.Themaximumrelievingcapacityisassociatedwithaturbinetripfrom100%RATEDTHERMALPOWERcoincidentwithanassumedlossofcondenserheatsink(i.e.,nosteambypasstothecondenser).ThespecifiedvalveliftsettingsandrelievingcapacitiesareinaccordancewiththerequirementsofSectionIIIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureCode,1971EditionandASMECodeforPumpsandValves,ClassII.Thetotalrelievingcapacityforallvalvesonallofthesteamlinesis12.38x106Ibs/hrwAioAis102.8r:>eFGeRttAetotalseooRsarystealTlflowof12.04)(4e2Ibs/Arat100%Aminimumof2OPERABLEsafetyvalvespersteamgeneratorensuresthatsufficientrelievingcapacityisavailableforremovingdecayheat.STARTUPand/orPOWEROPERATIONisallowablewithsafetyvalvesinoperablewithinthelimitationsoftheACTIONrequirementsonthebasisofthereductioninsecondarysystemsteamflowandTHERMALPOWERrequiredbythereducedreactortripsettingsofthePowerLevel-Highchannels.Thereactortripsetpointreductionsarederivedonthefollowingbases:'FortwoloopoperationSP(X)-(Y)(V)x(1065)X.where:SP=reducedreactortripsetpointinpercentofRATEDTHERMALPOWERV=maximumnumberofinoperablesafetyvalvespersteamline SECTIONNO.:3/4.7REVISIONNO.:2TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT9OFADM-25.04PLANTSYSTEMSS1.LUCIEUNIT1PAGE:I4of13I3/4.7PLANTSYSTEMS(continued)lBASES(continued)3/4.7.1TURBINECYCLE(continued)106.5=PowerLevel-HighTripSetpointfortwoloopoperationx=TotalrelievingcapacityofallsafetyvalvespersteamlineinIbs/hour(6.192x106Ibs/hr.)+2/-3%Y=MaximumrelievingcapacityofanyonesafetyvalveinIbs/hour(7.74x105Ibs/hr.)SurveillanceRequirement4.7.1.1verifiestheOPERABILITYofe1+/-3%bytheverificationofeachMSSVliftsetpointinaccancewithTestingProgram.TheMSSVsetpointsa1000psia.-1r1<,(4valveseachheader)and1040psia-1/')(4valveseachheader)forOPERABILITY;however,thevalvesareresetto1000psia+/-1%and1040psia+/-1%,respectively,duringtheSurveillancetoallowfordrift.TheLCOisexpressedinunitsofpsigforconsistencywithimplementingprocedures.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.4donotapply.ThisallowsentryintoandoperationinMODE3priortoperformingtheSurveillanceRequirementssothattheMSSVsmaybetestedunderhotconditions.3/4.7.1.2AUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPSTheOPERABILITYoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsensuresthattheReactorCoolantSystemcanbecooleddowntolessthan325°Ffromnormaloperatingconditionsintheeventofatotallossofoff-sitepower.NSATESTORAGETANKSAnytwoofthethreeauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpshavetherequiredcapacitytoprovidesufficientfeedwaterflowtoremovereactordecayheatandreducetheRCStemperatureto325°Fwheretheshutdowncoolingsystemmaybeplacedintooperationforcontinuedcooldowr*rt-o-m-ai-n-ta-in-H-O-T-....o.,STANDBYfor1hourandthen3/4.7.1.3CONDETheOPERABILITYofthecondensatestoragetankwittheminimumwatervolumeensuresthatsufficientwaterisavailablecooldownoftheReactorCoolantSystemtolessthan325°Fintheeventofa4effil.lossofoff-sitepower.TheminimumwatervolumeissufficienttomaintaintheRCSatHOTSTANDBYconditionsfor8hourswithsteamdischargetoatmosphere.Theminimumusablevolumetosatisfythecriteriastatedaboveis130,500gallons,whichisensuredbytheLCOfortheCSTvolumeof153,400gallons.

SECTIONNO.:3/4.7REVISIONNO.:4TITLE:TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSBASESATTACHMENT9OFADM-25.04PLANTSYSTEMSS1.LUCIEUNIT2PAGE:5of14***0*\.3/4.73/4.7.1PLANTSYSTEMS(continued)BASES(continued)TURBINECYCLE(continued)3/4.7.1.3CONDENSATESTORAGETANKSTheOPERABILITYofthecondensatestoragetankwiththeminimumwatervolumeensuresthatsufficientwaterisavailabletomaintaintheUnit2RCSatHOTSTANDBYconditionsfor4hoursfollowedbyanorderlycooldowntotheshutdowncoolingentrytemperature(350°F).Thecontainedwatervolumelimitincludesanallowanceforwaternotusablebecauseoftankdischargelinelocationorotherphysicalcharacteristics.Theactualwaterrequirementsare149,600gallonsforUnit2and,gallonsforUnit1.Includedintherequiredvolumesofwaterarethetankunusablevolumeofgallonsandaallowanceforinstrumenterrorofgallon.9203Ian3/4.7.1.4ACTIVITY4230IThelimitationsonsecondarysystemspecificactivityensurethattheresultantoffsiteradiationdosewillcomplywiththedosecriterionprovidedin10CFR50.67intheeventofasteamlinerupture.Thedosealsoincludestheeffectsofacoincident1.0gpmprimarytosecondarytubeleakinthesteamgeneratoroftheaffectedsteamlineandaconcurrentlossofoffsiteelectricalpower.Thesevaluesareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalyses.3/4.7.1.5MAINSTEAMLINEISOLATIONVALVESTheOPERABILITYofthemainsteamlineisolationvalvesensuresthatnomorethanonesteamgeneratorwillblowdownintheeventofasteamlinerupture.Thisrestrictionisrequiredto(1)minimizethepositivereactivityeffectsoftheReactorCoolantSystemcooldownassociatedwiththeblowdown,and(2)limitthepressurerisewithincontainmentintheeventthesteamlineruptureoccurswithincontainment.TheOPERABILITYofthemainsteamisolationvalveswithintheclosuretimesoftheSurveillanceRequirementsisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalyses.Thespecified6.75secondfullclosuretimerepresentstheadditionofthemaximumallowableinstrumentresponsetimeof1.15secondsandthemaximumallowablevalvestroketimeof5.6seconds.Thesemaximumallowablevaluesshouldnotbeexceededbecausetheyrepresentthedesignbasisvaluesfortheplant.

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