Retrofit to Amersham 660 Posilock Radiography Camera to Correct Inconsistency in 10 CFR Part 34 CompatibilityML031060041 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
10/15/1996 |
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From: |
Cool D NRC/NMSS/IMNS |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-96-053, NUDOCS 9610080269 |
Download: ML031060041 (10) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 October 15, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-53: RETROFIT TO AMERSHAM 660 POSILOCK
RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA TO CORRECT
INCONSISTENCY IN 10 CFR PART 34 COMPATIBILITY
Addressees
All industrial radiography licensees.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to make
licensees aware of a scenario where the Amersham model 660 Posilock radiography
camera would not pass the horizontal shock test as required by 10 CFR Part 34, and of a
retrofit to the Amersham Model 660 Posilock radiography camera to correct that problem.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their licensed
activity. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not new NRC
requirements; therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
Recently, NRC became aware of a scenario where the Amersham Model 660 Posilock
radiography camera would not pass the horizontal shock test as required by 10 CFR
Part 34.20, Performance Requirements for Radiography Equipment." Amersham was
made aware of the test results, and took action to correct the situation.
Discussion
When Amersham tested the camera in accordance with ANSI N432-1 980 in 1989, the
target for the horizontal shock test was a point between the two bumpers, directly at the
slide lock. This point was chosen by Amersham as the most vulnerable impact site.
In 1995, tests performed as part of an independent testing contract revealed that there
was a more vulnerable impact site. The contractor's test focused aiming at one of the
bumpers. The result was damage to the bumper, causing the bumper to become
detached, thereby exposing the lock slide to direct impact. Subsequent impacts then
broke the lock slide. There appear to be no significant safety issues, since breaking the
lock slide would result in an inability to open the shutter. If the source were in the
exposed position at the time of impact, the source could still be returned to the shielded
and secured position.
C 9610080269 I X
PDA rttE MVoT'CE.CP-0e*3 qi/5i
IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 As a result of the test information, Amersham redesigned the bumpers. The modified
bumpers contain a metal core that distributes the stress of an impact to the end plate.
Amersham states that the camera with the modified bumpers passed the horizontal shock
test, where the test was aimed at the bumper. The bumpers remained intact, and
although they showed signs of impact, they still protected the lock slide. Amersham
states that It sent retrofit kits to all owners, of potentially affected cameras, on record
with them. Attachment 1 contains a copy of the retrofit kit letter and bumper replacement
instructions. The retrofit will be differentiated by the use of a non-Phillips head screw
instead of the Phillips head screw currently in use. Cameras with the retrofit would
continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 34.
All affected cameras should be retrofitted as soon as possible. Licensees should contact
Amersham to obtain retrofit kits or assistance with retrofit procedures, or to notify
Amersham if they have not received their kit. Affected cameras may be checked for
completed retrofit during any inspection.
Licensees possessing these cameras should be aware of this issue and take action
appropriately.
This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
below or the appropriate regional office.
Donald A. Cool, Director
Division of Industrial and
Medical Nuclear Safety
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Technical contact: Michele Burgess, IMAB
(301) 415-5868 Email: mlb5@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1. Amersham Retrofit Kit Letter and Bumper Replacement Instructions
2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
M-41'Sc An
IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 As a result of the test information, Amersham redesigned the bumpers. The modified
bumpers contain a metal core that distributes the stress of an impact to the end plate.
Amersham states that the camera with the modified bumpers passed the horizontal shock
test, where the test was aimed at the bumper. The bumpers remained intact, and
although they showed signs of impact, they still protected the lock slide. Amersham
states that it sent retrofit kits to all owners, of potentially affected cameras, on record
with them. Attachment 1 contains a copy of the retrofit kit letter and bumper replacement
instructions. The retrofit will be differentiated by the use of a non-Phillips head screw
instead of the Phillips head screw currently in use. Cameras with the retrofit would
continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 34.
All affected cameras should be retrofitted as soon as possible. Licensees should contact
Amersham to obtain retrofit kits or assistance with retrofit procedures, or to notify
Amersham if they have not received their kit. Affected cameras may be checked for
completed retrofit during any inspection.
Licensees possessing these cameras should be aware of this issue and take action
appropriately.
This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
below or the appropriate regional office.
OrigInal SIgned by
Donald A. Cool, Director
Division of Industrial and
Medical Nuclear Safety
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Technical contact: Michele Burgess, IMAB
(301) 415-5868 Email: mlb5@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1. Amersham Retrofit Kit Letter and Bumper Replacement Instructions
2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: 96-53.IN SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
Te Delve a copy of this document. Indcate hi the box: C' - Copy without attachment/enclosure 'E
- Copy with attachmentlenclosur N
OFFICE IMAB E IMAB IMAB IMOB IMNS
NAME MBurgess/mb* SBaggett* LCamper Picconel DCooI*
DATE 09/13/96 09/16/96 09/27/96 09/27/96 09/27/96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Distribution:
SSSS r/f NE02-SSD-3 KRamsey, IMOB t 'Z. sho" ,
Ror'405,1 1K\M5 DOCUMENT NAME: A:A6601N.IN nc- ye N' No copy ,
o receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: C" 8 Copy without attachmantenc_ 'E' a Copy with attachmentenclosure -
OFFICE IMAB I E IMAB L IMAB I IMOB ,A IMNS A I
NAME lMBurgess/mb 46 I SBaggettK, j LCamper S.4. JPiccone DCOOI
DATE 09 / /3 /96 09T/I x /96 109 / V /96 09 / l/96 09 /1- /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY I
Attachment 1 IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 Page I of 4 SENTINEL
Arnersham Corporation
40 North Avenue
Burlington, MA 01803 tel (6171 272-2000
tel (800) 225-1383 fax (617) 273-2216 Mr. Steven Baggett
Sealed Source Safety Section 7tAmersharm
Source Contai.ment and Devices Branch e
Division of Industrial of Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
6 A 'h- Dear Mr. Baggett:
This letter serves to document the findings and actions we discussed in our conference call on 24 July
1996 concerning the model 660 posilock camera.
Upon receipt of the, results of the Southwest Research Institute tests that we we received from you
on 24 Jun 96, we learned that SwRl report concluded that the 660 Posilok series did not pass the
ANSI N432 Section 8.2 Horizontal Shock Test. We then performed an In depth investigation.
These test results greatly concerned us. Not only had we performed the horizontal shock test in
1989 with the product passing without difficulty, but there have not been any indications that there
were any problems noted in actual use conditions. ANSI Is a performance based standard, and we had
not seen any performance based or actual use problems relating to the horizontal shock test.
The results of our internal investigation have shnwrl that there is a more vulnerable impact site on the
device than we had selected in our testing in 1989. During our testing In 1989, we focused on aiming
between the two bumpers directly at the lock slide. In this scenario, the horizontal shock impacts both
bumpers. Under these conditions the device clearly passed the horizontal shock test. Until we received
the test results from SwRI in Jun 96, we were unaware of a more vulnerable area.
The testing performed by SwRl selected one bumper as the target impact point. Under this condition
the single bumper is damaged to a point where it becomes detached, thereby exposing the locking slide
to a direct impact. Subsequent impacts then break the slide.
In addition to testing the fragile area identified by SwRI, we tested a range of other areas to assure that
the single bumper impact was indeed the most fragile area. No other area was found to be more fragile
than the single bumper impact.
Through our evaluation, we have determined that there are no significant safety issues, since breaking
the lock slide in this position simply prevents the exposure of the source. The device fails safe.
Additionally, this situation has never occurred in the field, and it would be very unlikely for an impact
' >/
Attachment 1 IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 in field use conditions to actually result in the lock slide breaking.
While we feel that this is an issue we need to and can resolve quickly, there is no safety significance, or practical risk of this failure mode in field use conditions.
The corrective action for this is very simple, has been thoroughly tested, and can be easily retrofitted
in the field by the customer without any disassembly of the camera. We have fabricated bumpers that
will replace the original bumpers. These new bumpers have a metal core that distributes the stress of
an impact to the end plate. When subjected to the horizontal shock test, the bumpers remain intact, adequately preventing an impact to the lock slide. The retrofit will be differentiated by the use of a non
philips head screw instead of the Philips' head currently in use. We are advising users that upon
completion of this upgrade, the original certificate we provided stating that the device meets the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 34 will still be valid.
We have enclosed a copy of the instructions that will be provided to users for implementing the retrofit.
We will be sending out the retrofit kits early next week.
Please let me know if you require any additional information, we greatly appreciate your assistance in
quickly resolving this issue.
Sincerely,
Cathleen Roughan
Regulatory Affairs Manager
cc: W. McDaniel
I .
-/ ~ Attachment 1 IN 96-53 mmm EEL October 15, 1996 Dear Valued Customer:
In accordance with our IS09001 Certified QA Program. which links with our objective to provide the highest quality product
and service in the industry, SENTINEL strives towards continuous improvement by periodically updating our products and
services as a result of feedback from a range of resources.
SENTINEL has recently received information that when our 660 Posilok series is subjected to a specific, repeated, horizontal
shock aimed at one of the bumpers on the rear end plate, the lock slide will eventually break. We were concerned since we
had performed this tpe of testing in accordance with ANSI N432 - 1980, Section 8.2 (Horizontal Shock Test) in 1989 and
the product passed without difficulty. In addition, we have not seen any problems in actual use. We promptly initiated a
detailed investigation.
The results of our investigation have shown that there is a more vulnerable impact site on the device than we were aware of in
our 1989 testing. It is important to note that this is not a safety significant issue as the potential damage to the projector
prevents source exposure. The device fails safe. Additionally, this situation has never been reported from the field, and it is
unlikely for an impact in field use conditions to result in the type of damage seen in testing.
To preclude any possibility of this situation, we are sending retrofit kits to all owners on record of potentially affected
projectors. We've enclosed a sufficient number of kits to retrofit the 660 projectors your company owns. The retrofit process is
very simple and is described in the instructions on the opposite side of this card.
We have informed NRC of this situation, and they fully support and agree with our actions.
If you should have any questions, please feel free to call me at 1(800)815-1383 at extension 200, or Greg Field at extension
207.
Thank you in advance for your support, Bill McDaniel
Operations Manager
- eJ
Attachment 1 IN 96-53 Af October 15, 1996 660 RETROFIT
Each kit consists of 2 rubber protector assemblies and 2 slotted binder head screws. Please install these
components as follows:
a.) From the rear plate on your 660 Projector, remove and discard the two rubber protectors
and Phillips head screws located above and below the locking slide.
b.) Attach the new rubber protector assemblies with the slotted binder head screws provided.
Please call us at (800) 815-1383, extension 2??, if you have any questions.
VIme f= ,,
~I _-*
Attachment 2 IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
96-52 Cracked Insertion Rods 09/26/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
on Troxier Model 3400 Commission portable gauge
Series Portable Moisture licensees and vendors
Density Gauges
96-51 Residual Contamination 09/11/96 All material licensees
Remaining in Krypton-85 Handling System After
Venting
96-47 Recordkeeping, Decommis- 08119/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
sioning Notifications for Commission licensees
Disposals of Radioactive
Waste by Land Burial
Authorized Under Former
10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002
96-35 Failure of Safety Systems 06/11/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
on Self-Shielded Irradia- Commission irradiator
tors Because of Inadequate licensees and vendors
Maintenance and Training
96-33 Erroneous Data from Defec- 05/224/96 All material and fuel cycle
tive Thermocouple Results licensees that monitor tem- in a Fire perature with thermocouples
96-28 Suggested Guidance Relat- 05/01/96 All material and fuel cycle
ing to Development and licensees
Implementation of Correc- tive Action
I * .
S -
Attachment 3 IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
95-04, Excessive Cooldown 10/11/96 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 1 and Depressurization and vendors for nuclear
of the Reactor Coolant power reactors
System Following Loss
of Offsite Power
96-40. Deficiencies in 10/07/96 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 1 Material Dedication for nuclear power reactors
and Procurement
Practices and in
Audits of Vendors
96-52 Cracked Insertion 09/26196 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Rods on Troxier Commission portable gauge
Model 3400 Series licensees and vendors
Portable Moisture
Density Gauges
92-68, Potentially Sub- 09/16196 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 1 standard Slip-On. for nuclear power reactors
Welding Neck. and
Blind Flanges
96-51 Residual Contamina- 09/11/96 All material licensees
tion Remaining in
Krypton-85 Handling
System After Venting
96-50 Problems with 09/04/96 All holders of OLs and CPs
Levering-In Devices for nuclear power plants
in Westinghouse
Circuit Breakers
OL = Operating Ucense
CP = Construction Permit
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list | - Information Notice 1996-01, Potential For High Post-Accident Closed-Cycle Cooling Water Temperatures to Disable Equipment Important to Safety (3 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-01, Potential for High Post-Accident Closed-Cycle Cooling Water Temperatures to Disable Equipment Important to Safety (3 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-02, Inoperability of Power-Operated Relief Valves Masked by Downstream Indications During Testing (5 January 1996, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1996-03, Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Variation as a Result of Thermal Effects (5 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-03, Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Variation As a Result of Thermal Effects (5 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-04, Incident Reporting Requirements for Radiography Licensees (10 January 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-05, Partial Bypass of Shutdown Cooling Flow from Reactor Vessel (18 January 1996, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1996-06, Design & Testing Deficiencies of Tornado Dampers at Nuclear Power Plants (25 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-07, Slow Five Percent Scram Insertion Times Caused by Viton Diaphragms in Scram Solenoid Pilot Valves (26 January 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-08, Thermally Induced Pressure Locking of a High Pressure Coolant Injection Gate Valve (5 February 1996, Topic: Anchor Darling, Cold shutdown justification)
- Information Notice 1996-09, Damage in Foreign Steam Generator Internals (12 February 1996, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1996-10, Potential Blockage by Debris of Safety System Piping Which Is Not Used During Normal Operation or Tested During Surveillances (13 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-10, Potential Blockage by Debris of Safety System Piping Which is Not Used During Normal Operation or Tested During Surveillances (13 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-11, Ingress of Demineralizer Resins Increases Potential For Stress Corrosion Cracking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetrations (14 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-11, Ingress of Demineralizer Resins Increases Potential for Stress Corrosion Cracking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetrations (14 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-12, Control Rod Insertion Problems (15 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-13, Potential Containment Leak Paths Through Hydrogen Analysis (26 February 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-14, Degradation of Radwaste Facility Equipment at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (1 March 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-15, Unexpected Plant Performance During Performance of New Surveillance (8 March 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-16, BWR Operation with Indicated Flow Less than Natural Circulation (14 March 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-17, Reactor Operation Inconsistent with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (18 March 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-18, Compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 for Airborne Thorium (25 March 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-19, Failure of Tone Alert Radios to Activate When Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal (2 April 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-20, Demonstration of Associated Equipment Compliance with 10 CFR 34.20 (4 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-21, Safety Concerns Related to the Design of the Door Interlock Circuit on Nucletron High-Dose Rate and Pulsed Dose Rate Remote Afterloading Brachytherapy Devices (10 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-22, Improper Equipment Settings Due to Use of Nontemperature-Compensated Test Equipment (11 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-23, Fires in Emergency Diesel Generator Exciters During Operation Following Undetected Fuse Blowing (22 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-24, Preconditioning of Molded-Case Circuit Breakers Before Surveillance Testing (25 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-25, Traversing In-Core Probe Overwithdrawn at Lasalle County Station, Unit 1 (30 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-26, Recent Problems with Overhead Cranes (30 April 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-26, Recent Problems With Overhead Cranes (30 April 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-27, Potential Clogging of High Pressure Safety Injection Throttle Valves During Recirculation (1 May 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-28, Suggested Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation of Corrective Action (1 May 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-29, Requirements in 10 CFR Part 21 for Reporting and Evaluating Software Errors (20 May 1996, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1996-30, Inaccuracy of Diagnostic Equipment for Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves (21 May 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-31, Cross-Tied Safety Injection Accumulators (22 May 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-32, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) (6) (II) (A), Augmented Examination of Reactor Vessel (5 June 1996, Topic: Non-Destructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1996-32, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) (6) (ii) (A), Augmented Examination of Reactor Vessel (5 June 1996, Topic: Nondestructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1996-33, Erroneous Data From Defective Thermocouple Results in a Fire (24 May 1996, Topic: Reverse polarity)
- Information Notice 1996-33, Erroneous Data from Defective Thermocouple Results in a Fire (24 May 1996, Topic: Reverse polarity)
- Information Notice 1996-34, Hydrogen Gas Ignition During Closure Welding of a VSC-24 Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket (31 May 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-35, Failure of Safety Systems on Self-Shielded Irradiators Because of Inadequate Maintenance and Training (11 June 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-36, Degradation of Cooling Water Systems Due to Icing (12 June 1996, Topic: High winds, Ultimate heat sink, Frazil ice)
- Information Notice 1996-37, Inaccurate Reactor Water Level Indication and Inadvertent Draindown During Shutdown (18 June 1996, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1996-38, Results of Steam Generator Tube Examinations (21 June 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-39, Estimates of Decay Heat Using ANS 5.1 Decay Heat Standard May Vary Significantly (5 July 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-40, Defciencies in Material Dedication and Procurement Practices and in Audits of Vendors (7 October 1996, Topic: Coatings, Troxler Moisture Density Gauge)
- Information Notice 1996-41, Effects of a Decrease in Feedwater Temperature on Nuclear Instrumentation (26 July 1996)
- Information Notice 1996-42, Unexpected Opening of Multiple Safety Relief Valves (5 August 1996, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1996-43, Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers (2 August 1996)
... further results |
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