Information Notice 1996-53, Retrofit to Amersham 660 Posilock Radiography Camera to Correct Inconsistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility

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Retrofit to Amersham 660 Posilock Radiography Camera to Correct Inconsistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility
ML031060041
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/15/1996
From: Cool D
NRC/NMSS/IMNS
To:
References
IN-96-053, NUDOCS 9610080269
Download: ML031060041 (10)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 October 15, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-53: RETROFIT TO AMERSHAM 660 POSILOCK

RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA TO CORRECT

INCONSISTENCY IN 10 CFR PART 34 COMPATIBILITY

Addressees

All industrial radiography licensees.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to make

licensees aware of a scenario where the Amersham model 660 Posilock radiography

camera would not pass the horizontal shock test as required by 10 CFR Part 34, and of a

retrofit to the Amersham Model 660 Posilock radiography camera to correct that problem.

It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their licensed

activity. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not new NRC

requirements; therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

Recently, NRC became aware of a scenario where the Amersham Model 660 Posilock

radiography camera would not pass the horizontal shock test as required by 10 CFR

Part 34.20, Performance Requirements for Radiography Equipment." Amersham was

made aware of the test results, and took action to correct the situation.

Discussion

When Amersham tested the camera in accordance with ANSI N432-1 980 in 1989, the

target for the horizontal shock test was a point between the two bumpers, directly at the

slide lock. This point was chosen by Amersham as the most vulnerable impact site.

In 1995, tests performed as part of an independent testing contract revealed that there

was a more vulnerable impact site. The contractor's test focused aiming at one of the

bumpers. The result was damage to the bumper, causing the bumper to become

detached, thereby exposing the lock slide to direct impact. Subsequent impacts then

broke the lock slide. There appear to be no significant safety issues, since breaking the

lock slide would result in an inability to open the shutter. If the source were in the

exposed position at the time of impact, the source could still be returned to the shielded

and secured position.

C 9610080269 I X

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IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 As a result of the test information, Amersham redesigned the bumpers. The modified

bumpers contain a metal core that distributes the stress of an impact to the end plate.

Amersham states that the camera with the modified bumpers passed the horizontal shock

test, where the test was aimed at the bumper. The bumpers remained intact, and

although they showed signs of impact, they still protected the lock slide. Amersham

states that It sent retrofit kits to all owners, of potentially affected cameras, on record

with them. Attachment 1 contains a copy of the retrofit kit letter and bumper replacement

instructions. The retrofit will be differentiated by the use of a non-Phillips head screw

instead of the Phillips head screw currently in use. Cameras with the retrofit would

continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 34.

All affected cameras should be retrofitted as soon as possible. Licensees should contact

Amersham to obtain retrofit kits or assistance with retrofit procedures, or to notify

Amersham if they have not received their kit. Affected cameras may be checked for

completed retrofit during any inspection.

Licensees possessing these cameras should be aware of this issue and take action

appropriately.

This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below or the appropriate regional office.

Donald A. Cool, Director

Division of Industrial and

Medical Nuclear Safety

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Michele Burgess, IMAB

(301) 415-5868 Email: mlb5@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. Amersham Retrofit Kit Letter and Bumper Replacement Instructions

2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

M-41'Sc An

IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 As a result of the test information, Amersham redesigned the bumpers. The modified

bumpers contain a metal core that distributes the stress of an impact to the end plate.

Amersham states that the camera with the modified bumpers passed the horizontal shock

test, where the test was aimed at the bumper. The bumpers remained intact, and

although they showed signs of impact, they still protected the lock slide. Amersham

states that it sent retrofit kits to all owners, of potentially affected cameras, on record

with them. Attachment 1 contains a copy of the retrofit kit letter and bumper replacement

instructions. The retrofit will be differentiated by the use of a non-Phillips head screw

instead of the Phillips head screw currently in use. Cameras with the retrofit would

continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 34.

All affected cameras should be retrofitted as soon as possible. Licensees should contact

Amersham to obtain retrofit kits or assistance with retrofit procedures, or to notify

Amersham if they have not received their kit. Affected cameras may be checked for

completed retrofit during any inspection.

Licensees possessing these cameras should be aware of this issue and take action

appropriately.

This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below or the appropriate regional office.

OrigInal SIgned by

Donald A. Cool, Director

Division of Industrial and

Medical Nuclear Safety

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Michele Burgess, IMAB

(301) 415-5868 Email: mlb5@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. Amersham Retrofit Kit Letter and Bumper Replacement Instructions

2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: 96-53.IN SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

Te Delve a copy of this document. Indcate hi the box: C' - Copy without attachment/enclosure 'E

  • Copy with attachmentlenclosur N
  • No copy

OFFICE IMAB E IMAB IMAB IMOB IMNS

NAME MBurgess/mb* SBaggett* LCamper Picconel DCooI*

DATE 09/13/96 09/16/96 09/27/96 09/27/96 09/27/96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Distribution:

SSSS r/f NE02-SSD-3 KRamsey, IMOB t 'Z. sho" ,

Ror'405,1 1K\M5 DOCUMENT NAME: A:A6601N.IN nc- ye N' No copy ,

o receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: C" 8 Copy without attachmantenc_ 'E' a Copy with attachmentenclosure -

OFFICE IMAB I E IMAB L IMAB I IMOB ,A IMNS A I

NAME lMBurgess/mb 46 I SBaggettK, j LCamper S.4. JPiccone DCOOI

DATE 09 / /3 /96 09T/I x /96 109 / V /96 09 / l/96 09 /1- /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY I

Attachment 1 IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 Page I of 4 SENTINEL

Arnersham Corporation

40 North Avenue

Burlington, MA 01803 tel (6171 272-2000

tel (800) 225-1383 fax (617) 273-2216 Mr. Steven Baggett

Sealed Source Safety Section 7tAmersharm

Source Contai.ment and Devices Branch e

Division of Industrial of Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555

6 A 'h- Dear Mr. Baggett:

This letter serves to document the findings and actions we discussed in our conference call on 24 July

1996 concerning the model 660 posilock camera.

Upon receipt of the, results of the Southwest Research Institute tests that we we received from you

on 24 Jun 96, we learned that SwRl report concluded that the 660 Posilok series did not pass the

ANSI N432 Section 8.2 Horizontal Shock Test. We then performed an In depth investigation.

These test results greatly concerned us. Not only had we performed the horizontal shock test in

1989 with the product passing without difficulty, but there have not been any indications that there

were any problems noted in actual use conditions. ANSI Is a performance based standard, and we had

not seen any performance based or actual use problems relating to the horizontal shock test.

The results of our internal investigation have shnwrl that there is a more vulnerable impact site on the

device than we had selected in our testing in 1989. During our testing In 1989, we focused on aiming

between the two bumpers directly at the lock slide. In this scenario, the horizontal shock impacts both

bumpers. Under these conditions the device clearly passed the horizontal shock test. Until we received

the test results from SwRI in Jun 96, we were unaware of a more vulnerable area.

The testing performed by SwRl selected one bumper as the target impact point. Under this condition

the single bumper is damaged to a point where it becomes detached, thereby exposing the locking slide

to a direct impact. Subsequent impacts then break the slide.

In addition to testing the fragile area identified by SwRI, we tested a range of other areas to assure that

the single bumper impact was indeed the most fragile area. No other area was found to be more fragile

than the single bumper impact.

Through our evaluation, we have determined that there are no significant safety issues, since breaking

the lock slide in this position simply prevents the exposure of the source. The device fails safe.

Additionally, this situation has never occurred in the field, and it would be very unlikely for an impact

' >/

Attachment 1 IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 in field use conditions to actually result in the lock slide breaking.

While we feel that this is an issue we need to and can resolve quickly, there is no safety significance, or practical risk of this failure mode in field use conditions.

The corrective action for this is very simple, has been thoroughly tested, and can be easily retrofitted

in the field by the customer without any disassembly of the camera. We have fabricated bumpers that

will replace the original bumpers. These new bumpers have a metal core that distributes the stress of

an impact to the end plate. When subjected to the horizontal shock test, the bumpers remain intact, adequately preventing an impact to the lock slide. The retrofit will be differentiated by the use of a non

philips head screw instead of the Philips' head currently in use. We are advising users that upon

completion of this upgrade, the original certificate we provided stating that the device meets the

requirements of 10 CFR Part 34 will still be valid.

We have enclosed a copy of the instructions that will be provided to users for implementing the retrofit.

We will be sending out the retrofit kits early next week.

Please let me know if you require any additional information, we greatly appreciate your assistance in

quickly resolving this issue.

Sincerely,

Cathleen Roughan

Regulatory Affairs Manager

cc: W. McDaniel

I .

-/ ~ Attachment 1 IN 96-53 mmm EEL October 15, 1996 Dear Valued Customer:

In accordance with our IS09001 Certified QA Program. which links with our objective to provide the highest quality product

and service in the industry, SENTINEL strives towards continuous improvement by periodically updating our products and

services as a result of feedback from a range of resources.

SENTINEL has recently received information that when our 660 Posilok series is subjected to a specific, repeated, horizontal

shock aimed at one of the bumpers on the rear end plate, the lock slide will eventually break. We were concerned since we

had performed this tpe of testing in accordance with ANSI N432 - 1980, Section 8.2 (Horizontal Shock Test) in 1989 and

the product passed without difficulty. In addition, we have not seen any problems in actual use. We promptly initiated a

detailed investigation.

The results of our investigation have shown that there is a more vulnerable impact site on the device than we were aware of in

our 1989 testing. It is important to note that this is not a safety significant issue as the potential damage to the projector

prevents source exposure. The device fails safe. Additionally, this situation has never been reported from the field, and it is

unlikely for an impact in field use conditions to result in the type of damage seen in testing.

To preclude any possibility of this situation, we are sending retrofit kits to all owners on record of potentially affected

projectors. We've enclosed a sufficient number of kits to retrofit the 660 projectors your company owns. The retrofit process is

very simple and is described in the instructions on the opposite side of this card.

We have informed NRC of this situation, and they fully support and agree with our actions.

If you should have any questions, please feel free to call me at 1(800)815-1383 at extension 200, or Greg Field at extension

207.

Thank you in advance for your support, Bill McDaniel

Operations Manager

- eJ

Attachment 1 IN 96-53 Af October 15, 1996 660 RETROFIT

Each kit consists of 2 rubber protector assemblies and 2 slotted binder head screws. Please install these

components as follows:

a.) From the rear plate on your 660 Projector, remove and discard the two rubber protectors

and Phillips head screws located above and below the locking slide.

b.) Attach the new rubber protector assemblies with the slotted binder head screws provided.

Please call us at (800) 815-1383, extension 2??, if you have any questions.

VIme f= ,,

~I _-*

Attachment 2 IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

96-52 Cracked Insertion Rods 09/26/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

on Troxier Model 3400 Commission portable gauge

Series Portable Moisture licensees and vendors

Density Gauges

96-51 Residual Contamination 09/11/96 All material licensees

Remaining in Krypton-85 Handling System After

Venting

96-47 Recordkeeping, Decommis- 08119/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

sioning Notifications for Commission licensees

Disposals of Radioactive

Waste by Land Burial

Authorized Under Former

10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002

96-35 Failure of Safety Systems 06/11/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

on Self-Shielded Irradia- Commission irradiator

tors Because of Inadequate licensees and vendors

Maintenance and Training

96-33 Erroneous Data from Defec- 05/224/96 All material and fuel cycle

tive Thermocouple Results licensees that monitor tem- in a Fire perature with thermocouples

96-28 Suggested Guidance Relat- 05/01/96 All material and fuel cycle

ing to Development and licensees

Implementation of Correc- tive Action

I * .

S -

Attachment 3 IN 96-53 October 15, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

95-04, Excessive Cooldown 10/11/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Supp. 1 and Depressurization and vendors for nuclear

of the Reactor Coolant power reactors

System Following Loss

of Offsite Power

96-40. Deficiencies in 10/07/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Supp. 1 Material Dedication for nuclear power reactors

and Procurement

Practices and in

Audits of Vendors

96-52 Cracked Insertion 09/26196 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Rods on Troxier Commission portable gauge

Model 3400 Series licensees and vendors

Portable Moisture

Density Gauges

92-68, Potentially Sub- 09/16196 All holders of OLs or CPs

Supp. 1 standard Slip-On. for nuclear power reactors

Welding Neck. and

Blind Flanges

96-51 Residual Contamina- 09/11/96 All material licensees

tion Remaining in

Krypton-85 Handling

System After Venting

96-50 Problems with 09/04/96 All holders of OLs and CPs

Levering-In Devices for nuclear power plants

in Westinghouse

Circuit Breakers

OL = Operating Ucense

CP = Construction Permit