IR 05000528/1980022
| ML17296B327 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1981 |
| From: | Kirsch D, Vorderbrueggen NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17296B326 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-80-22, 50-529-80-22, 50-530-80-22, NUDOCS 8104130496 | |
| Download: ML17296B327 (12) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION V
Report No.
50-528/80-22 50-529/80-22 50-530/80-22 Docket Nos.
50-528, 50-529 50-530 License Nos.
CPPR-141 CPPR-142 CPPR-143'icensee:
Arizona Public Service Com an P.
0.
Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name:
Palo.Verde Nuclear Generatin Station
.Units',
2 and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Construction Site, Wintersburg, Ar'izona Inspection Conducted:
December 1-31, 1980 Inspectors:
E.
or er ruegg Resident Reactor Inspector pproved by:
F. Kirsch, Acting hief, Reactor Projects
.
ection 1, Reactor Construction Projects Branch ate igne Hl ate 1gne Summary:
Ins ection"on'December'1-'31,'1980'(Re ort'Nos.'50-'528/80-'22; 50-, 529/80-22, and 50-530/80-22
.
~AI d:
R i, d i p
i by h
id
.i p
construction activities including:
followup on a previously identified item of noncompliance; protection of installed reactor vessels hand Unit ],reactor vessel internals; preparations for installation of Unit 1 containment tendons; verificqtion-of containment shell/basemat reinforcing steel for Units ] and 2; instal]ation of safety related piping; resolution of electrical cable tray separation concerns; care and preservation of equipment; and general activities in progress at the site.
The inspection involved 55 inspector hours on-site by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie ) l\\
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Public Service Com an APS
- E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Projects Management
- J. A. Roedel, Manager, guality Assurance
- W. E. Ide, Site gA Supervisor G. Pankonin, gA Engineer R.
D. Forrester, gA Engineer
- J.
M. Allen, Nuclear, Engineering Manager
- A. C. Rogers, Nuclear Engineering Manager
- B. S.
Kaplan, guality Systems Supervisor
- D. B. Fasnacht, Site Construction Manager
- R. D. Kimmel, Field Engineering Superyisor b.
Bechtel Power'Cor oration'(Bechtel
- W. J. Stubblefield, Field Construction Hanager
- D. R. Hawkinson, Project gA Supervisor
- R. H. Grant, Project gC Engineer C. Nelson, Civil Engineer-Unit
L. Afek, Lead Hechanical Field Engineer R. Hedzi k, Lead gC Engineer-Mech/piping/NSSS W. Sears, gC Supervisor-Administration c.
Western Concrete'Structur'es,
Inc.
K. Guffey, General Superintendent T. Patel, gC Supervisor Other persons contacted during the inspection peri.od included construction craftsmen, inspectors and supervisory personnel.
- Management meeting attendees.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous'ns ection Findin s 50-528/80-17 01 Closed
'Noncom liance:
Failure to rovide', rescribed maintenance on the motor o erators'for'the Unit main steam an ee water isolation valves The corrective action identified in the licensee's response, dated December 17, 1980, was reviewed and the subject valves were observed in their installed location.
Each valve was totally enclosed by a heavy plastic cover for protection from construction generated dust and dirt.
The inspector verified that the valves and their respective operators had been added to the plant equipment maintenance program and are now being maintained on a monthly basis.
The inspector also reviewed the measures that have been initiated by Bechtel to assure that the equipment maintenance list is complete and that items will not be inadvertently omitted in the future.
This item is close 'o s.
4.
Protection of Installed Reactor Vessels Guarded access control to the Unit 1 reactor pool area continues to limit the entry of personnel, equipment, tools and materials to those which are authorized.
When there is no work activity inside the vessel, a plastic protective cover is kept in place over the vessel flange to prevent the entry of foreign objects and debris.
Nozzle welding operations continued on the Unit 2 reactor vessel.
Nozzle openings not being worked are covered for protection from adjacent construction activities.
Work platforms and ladders inside the vessel are metallic or of treated wood so as to minimize fire hazards.
The top of the vessel is covered to prevent the accidental entry of foreign objects and debris.
The inspector found.that the procedures for protection of the installed reactor vessels were being implemented.
Unit 1 Reactor Vessel'Internals During this reporting period, work continued on the installation of the six sets of shims which attach to the sides of the six core stabilizing lugs on the lower wal,l of the reactor vessel.
These lugs mate with the snubber lugs on the outside diameter of the core support barrel.
The work is being performed. by Combustion Engineering, Inc. under subcontract to Bechtel, with workmen furnished by the Boilermaker craft.
The components are kept covered and protected except when work is actually progressing.
I It appeared to the inspector that the procedures for installation and protection of the vessels were being followed.
Unit 1 Containment Tendon'nstallation
The inspector met with site personnel of. Western Concrete Structures, Inc.,-the contractor for the contai,nment post-tensioning system, to assess their readiness to begin installation of the stressing tendons.
Their gA program and installation procedures have been reviewed and approved by Bechtel, but they have not yet hired the two additional 9C inspectors required to complete their staff.
The buttress traveling platforms are in place and had been operationally checked out.
The tensioning jacks (2) have been tested, but have not yet arrived at the site.
Plans were being finalized to pull in three horizontal tendons between buttresses 1 and 3 for the purposes of craft training and final checkout of the equipmen.
Safet Related Pi in Instal lation
~
~a.
Com onent Installation Activities The inspector observed various installation work activities associated with portions of the chemical and'olume control and safety injection systems at the C level of the Unit 3 auxiliary building.
Particular attention was given to the handling and supporting of system components, correctness of configuration, control of welding records in the work area, use of specified materials, control of weld filler metal, absence of defects on component surfaces, and inspection performance by qualified personnel.
The applicable requirements are specified in WPP/gCI 202.0 (Piping System Installation)
and Specification 13-PH 204 (Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems).
No items of -noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
In-rocess Weldin Activities The inspector examined two welds in Unit 3 toascertain compliance with requirements of the applicable specifications,'odes, standards, and procedures.
The welds were:
Fit up of Weld No.
W-001 joining spool 001 to motor operated valve HV-531 in line CH-A-424-20" - refueling water storage tank supply to safety injection pump train A.
Partially completed Weld No.
W-OQ6 joining spool, 004 to manually operated valve V-435 in line SI-A-087-10"-LPSI pump A discharge.
A properly filled out Field Welding Check List (WR-5 Form} was present at the work location of each weld with hold points and NDE call-outs specified.
The weld identification, material specifications, and interpass temperature were specified on the WR-5 Form.
The WR-5 provisions were in accordance with the requirements of the ASHE Code,
-Section III, 1974 edition.
Fil1er metal issue slips and,the qualification records of the welders involved were examined and found to be acceptable.
The inspector observed that quality control inspection and supervisory surveillance were being performed as required.
Wpp/OCI 101.0 (Welding Control) along with the two documents identified in paragraph 6.a above, contained the applicable work and inspection requirements for both welds.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie Containment Shell Basemat Reinforcin Steel Reinforcing steel had been omitted from certain localized segments of the circumferential joint between the containment exterior wall and the basemat.
This omission occurred in all three Palo Verde units.
Circumstances associated with this situation were described in IE
Inspection Report
No. 50-528/80-13,
Paragraph
4.
The matter
was
verbally reported to Region
V by the licensee
on July 1,
1980
as
a potential
50.55(e)
item and their final written report 'was submitted
on November 6, 1980.
At the licensee's
request,
a meeting
was held
in the Region
V office on November 20,
1980 between
the licensee,
their technical
consultant
(Bechtel).and
NRC personnel.
The meeting
was intended to answer
any remaining questions
that Region
V personnel
might have about the physical situation,
and the nature
and validity
of. the analysis
which showed that the structural
adequacy of the
containment buildings had not been
compromised.
Since the licensee's
conclusion of structural
adequacy,
based
on the
licensee's
analysis,
rests
on the premise that the "as-built" steel
reinforcing in the area of interest
does
indee'd
conform to the
specified material
and configuration requirements,
the inspector
attempted to verify that fact through
a review of the relevant
installation documentation for the three units.
Documents
examined
included reinforcing steel material certifications,
cadweld splice
inspection reports,
cadweld splice tensile test repor ts, concrete
preplacement
checklists,
nonconformance
reports
and construction
progress
photographs.
The areas,
as designated
by the concrete
placement
numbers,
are
C012 and
C013 for the building basemat,
and
C100 for the
exterior wall.
(Each placement
number is preceded
by its unit number,
i.e.,
1C012 for Unit 1, 2C012 for 'Unit 2, etc.)
All reinforcing steel
was of the type specified
(pSTH./615
Gr'gde 60).
The cadweld splice
gC inspection reports
were in order and
showed
a reject rate less
than
1 percent (all rejects
were replaced}.
Cadweld
tensile test reports
showed
no breaks
below 90,000 psi - the majority
being in the range of 95,000 to 105,000 psi.
All concrete
preplacement
check lists identified no such descrepancies
and each
one listed the
noncomformance
reports pertaining to that placement.
All nonconforming
conditions identified in the reports had'een
corrected in 'accordance
with approved
measures.
The corrective actions
had
been
examined
and approved
by the assigned
gC inspectors.
The construction,. progress
photographs
displayed
no conditions that would indicate that the
installations
were deviating from the intended design.
From the documents
reviewed,
the inspector
concluded that the containment
basemat-exterior
wall junction,
on each of the three units,
had
been
built in accordance
with the design
document ~
s.
El ectri cal
Racewa
Se ar ati on
During surveillance
and audit activities
by the licensee's
site
gA personnel,
in connection with electrical
raceway installation,
it was found that clarification and additional details
were
needed
on the electrical
drawings in order to assure that the separation
requirements
of Regulatory
Guide 1.75 would be satisfied.
The inspector
discussed
this matter with the licensee
and reviewed the action taken
by Bechtel to assure that the installation will meet specified
requirements.
The Bechtel actions
included
a review of all drawings
and unique identification of all cable trays that must have covers
or barriers installed,
issuance
of a Design
Change Notice
(DCN 49)
to clarify separation
distance
requirements for conduit,
and reinspection
and walkdowns of installed raceway prior to signoff of the
EE580 raceway
installation card.
A new procedure
was also being developed pertaining
specifically to installation
and inspection of fire barriers,
tray
covers
and conduit sealing.
The inspector
had no further'questions
on this matter at this time.
9.
Plant Tours
Several
times during this reporting period the inspector toured the
plant site to observe
general
housekeeping
conditions
and the care,
handling
and preservation of equipment.
Particular attention.was
given
to: the handling of heavy pipe spools
and valves during welding fit-up;
presence
of covers over installed equipment for. protection from adjacent
work activities; adequate
caps
over pipe openings
not being worked on;
and adequacy of dunnage
under stored valves,
pipe spools
and other
components.
No welding electrode
stubs
were found lying around the
various work areas.
No deviations or items of noncompliance
were, identified.
10.
Mana ement Meetin
s
On December
5, 1980 and January
9,
1981 the inspector met with the
licensee
representatives
identified in Paragraph
1 to sgmmarize
the
scope of the inspection activities and revi'ew the inspection.findings,
as described in'his repor )
~/