IR 05000528/1980015

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IE Insp Repts 50-528/80-15,50-529/80-15 & 50-530/80-15 on 800909-12.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings & Part 21 Repts & Installation of Pipe Supports & Restraints
ML17296B064
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  
Issue date: 10/29/1980
From: Dangelo A, Eckhardt J, Haynes R, Hernandez G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML17296B063 List:
References
50-528-80-15, 50-529-80-15, 50-530-80-15, NUDOCS 8012010014
Download: ML17296B064 (13)


Text

Report No.

50-528/80-15 50-529/80-15 50-530 80-15 U. S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS ION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Docket No.

50-528/529/530 License No.

CPPR-141-142 -143safeguards Group Licensee:

Arizona Public Service Com an P. 0. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1, 2 and

Inspection at:

Palo Verde Construction Site, klintersburg, Arizona 1nspect ion conducted.

September 9-12, 1980 Inspectors:

.

H. Eckhardt, Reactor Inspector

. Hernandez, React r Inspector ate igned zo z ga D te Signed Approved By:

R.

C.

Ha ction Chief, Reactor Projects Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:

/0 Ct Date Signed Ins ection on Se tember 9-12 1980 Re ort I'los. 50-528/80-15 50-529 80-15, an 50-5

-1

~AI td:

R i, di p

i b

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of activities relating to licensee action on previous inspection findings and Part 21 reports, installation of pipe supports and restraints, installation and records review of containment liner, and observation of cadwelding activities.

The inspection involved 52 inspection-hours onsite by two HRC inspectors.

Results:

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

RV Form 219 (2)

soxgoxooN'.

DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted a.

Arizona Public Service Com an APS)

  • E. E.

Van Brunt, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Projects G. Carl Andognini, Vice President, Plant Operations

  • L. K. Mundth, Vice President, Electrical Operations
  • A. C. Rogers, Nuclear Engineering Manager
  • J.

M. Allen, Nuclear Engineering Manager

  • W. E. Ide, Site QA Supervisor
  • D. B. Fasnacht, Site Construction Manager G. Pankonin, QA Engineer R.

D. Forrester, QA Engineer L. Souza, QA Engineer D. E. Fowler, QA Engineer b.

Bechtel Power Cor oration Bechtel)

  • W. J. Stubblefield, Field Construction Manager
  • W. H. Wilson, Project Manager

+A. K. Priest, Project Field Engineer

  • R. M. Grant, Project QC Supervisor
  • J. E. Pfunder, Project QA Engineer D.

R. Hawkinson, Project QA Supervisor W. S.

Cummings, Lead Discipline Engineer (Instrumentation)

M. Patterson, Lead Discipline Field Engineer (Pipe Supports)

S.

Chavey, Instrumentation Field Engineer J.

Robinson, Lead Discipline Field Engineer (Electrical)

Denotes those attending exit interview.

2.

Plant Tour During a general facility tour on September 9,

1980 the inspectors observed a craftsman deviating from procedural requirements wherein two horizontal cadwelds on the northside of Unit 3 containment were assembled and pinned before marking the bar ends.

Bechtel procedure WPP/QCI No. 56.0,

"Cadweld Splicing of Reinforcing Steel," states that, "Prior to assembling the cadweld sleeve into position on the rebar ends, the bar ends shall be marked."

The craftsman indicated that he could verify that the sleeve was properly centered by viewing the bar ends through the tap hole.

Licensee representatives later informed the inspector that the two cadwelds in question were disassembled and then reassembled according to procedure and that the craftsman was reinstructed on the procedural requirement and need to rigorously follow the procedur On September 11, 1980 the inspector observed four cadwelding crews on the southside of Unit 3 containment and all cadwelding crews appeared know-ledgeable and well-trained on cadwelding procedures.

Based on these observations, the initial incident with the two cadwelds is considered an isolated occur rence and the inspector has no further questions.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s

a ~

Closed Followu Item 50-528 80-12/01:

Tension Measurements urin Ca e

Pu in

.

b.

PCN No.

30 has been issued to clarify WPP/gCI 254.0,

"Cable Installation."

The change notice requires the pulling crew to monitor the cable during pulling to ensure that the pulling tension is not increased due to binding of the cable, and to record cable tension and generate a

NCR if cable binding results in cable pull tension exceeding the specified maximum force.

This item is considered closed.

(ODen Followu Item 50-528/80-12

Measurement and Test E ui ment Ca ibration Records.

The calibration control log cards for 21 pieces of measuring and test equipment were reviewed and compared with the requirements of WPP/gCI 7.0, Rev.

12, "Calibration and Control of Construction Measuring and Test Equipment."

Included in the review. were control log cards for five sling psychrometers.

The control log cards for four of these instruments indicated a calibration interval of one year, whereas the calibration interval list in WPP/gCI 7.0 indicated an interval of 6 months.

The inspector noted that the control log cards indicated that these instruments were "not for acceptance testing."

In addition, review of the control log card for dry film gauge JOA0099 indicated the gauge was overdue for calibration check and was also not listed on the latest recall list.

The person in custody of this gauge was interviewed and indicated that the gauge was only used in the water reclamation area and not on safety related components.

Also, the gauge did not have a calibration sticker attached to it so that the custodian of the gauge did not know when it was due for a calibration check.

These additional administrative problems were discussed with the licensee who indicated an extensive audit of this area was scheduled in the near future.

This item will remain open pending future inspectio.

Licensee Action on Part 21 Re orts The licensee's action and status concerning the following 10 CFR Part

reports was reviewed.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

a.

Defective pressure switch in chlorine monitoring equipment (NDA Scientific, Incorporated).

The licensee notified the regional office on June 4, 1980 concerning this problem and stated that a 50.55(e)

report would be submitted.

A final written report was submitted on July 3, 1980.

The corrective action includes a commitment by NDA Scientific to provide Palo Verde with alternate pressure switches after approval/qualification so that Bechtel can modify the equipment.

This problem is being controlled via Bechtel's normal NCR system.

Lack of protection for containment gas analysis system pump in the event of inadvertent closure of the outlet valve (Comsip, Incorporated).

The regional office was notified by the licensee on June 12, 1980 of this condition.

A final 50.55(e) report was submitted on July 9,

1980.

Comsip will supply modification kits and Bechtel will modify the units.

The work will be controlled via a design change package.

c Borg-Warner valve stem extension loosening problem.

The licensee notified the regional office on July 22, 1980 stating that a 50.55(e)

report would be written concerning this problem.

A final report was submitted on July 29, 1980.

Borg-Harner will supply Combustion Engineering with instructions and parts for the valves.

Bechtel will then modify the valves.

The problem is being controlled via Bechtel's NCR system.

Potential failure of temperature detection controllers on carbon filter system (CTI Nuclear).

The licensee indicated that a 50.55(e)

report would be submitted concerning this item.

Failure of Borg-Harner gate valve to fully close.

The licensee indicated that this item would also be handled via the 50.55(e)

system.

Notor shaft failure of gas monitoring system pump (Comsip, Incorporated).

This item will also be reported via 50.55(e).

Installation of Pi e

Su orts and Restraints Piping supports and restraints were examined to ascertain compliance with WPP/gCI-201.1,

"Nuclear Pipe Hangers and Supports Installation,"

Specification 13-PM-209,

"Nuclear Pipe Supports,"

and the applicable support drawings.

The examination included the following supports in Unit 1 and 2 auxiliary buildings:

~Su or t Unit 1 1AF006H002 1AF006H004 1AF027H004 1CH003H037 1CH003H067 1CH142H003 1CH149H003 1EW005H002 1NC081H005 1RC068H005 1S I002H002 1S I008H005 1S I072H009 1S I099H002 1SI114H016 Unit 2 2EC069H009 2EW056H010 2EW056H011 2SI067H002 2S I087H001 2S I087H003 2SI100H038 2S I 119 H007 2SI308H015 ASME Class

3

2

2 22'

~Te sway strut spring spring restraint combination snubber snubber snubber combination hanger snubber combination spring snubber spring combination sway strut spring hanger combination sway strut restraint spring spring All of these supports had been completed with the exception of the snubber type which were partially completed and inspected (the snubbers were not yet installed).

Particular attributes checked included configuration, welding, preservation, bolting, bleed holes, and spring setting, where applicable.

No problems were identified except for:

-5-(2)

Pipe support 1SIOOBH005 required a bar plate attached to a flange with a 5/16 inch fillet weld on three sides.

Approximately 2 inches of the 10 inches of weld was slightly undersized from 1/32 to 1/64 inches.

A nonconformance report was written on September 15, 1980 to ensure corrective action is taken.

A sway strut end bracket for pipe support 1AF006H002 was welded to a support beam on the sides of the bracket instead of the top and bottom of the bracket as required by the drawing.

This actually resulted in a longer weld length than specified due to the sides of the bracket being longer than the top and bottom of the bracket.

A NCR was written on September 12, 1980 to document this condition.

The recommended disposition was to accept the welding "as is" based on the fillet weld size being the same as the drawing requirement and the length being greater than the drawing requirement.

Both of the conditions are considered to be isolated cases.

The inspector had no further questions in this area.

6.

Steel Structures and Su orts a ~

Visual Examination of Welds Completed field welds in steel structures and supports for Unit 2 and 3 were examined to determine whether the welds met the specified visual standards established by the licensee's procedures, specifications and the code requirements.

Unit 2 - The inspector examined work-in-progress and completed weld seams on the containment dome liner plate to verify that the work was in accordance with the welding procedures specified, P1-A-Lh and Pl-F.

Specific attributes examined on completed weld seams included weld surface finish and appearance, weld reinforcement, joint configuration, removal of temporary attachments, arc strikes and weld spatter.

The weld seams conformed to the code and the licensee's visual acceptance criteria.

Fitup and welding activities associated with the 12 seams in the area of the dollar plate were also examined.

The inspector's observations included verifying that no excessive forces were being utilized or the materials stressed beyond the limitations specified in Specification 13-CN-370.

Unit 3 - Eight completed field welds were selected for examination, three beam clip support welds in the Auxiliary Building and five containment liner plate weld seams.

The clip welds in the Auxiliary Building are located at the 58'levation between AH and AJ lines and north of A7 line.

The containment liner plate weld seams examined were:

3-H4-2, 3-4V-1, 3-5V-2, 3-H4-5 and 3-4V-No items of noncompliance or deviations from licensee procedures or code requirements were identified during examination of the above welds.

b.

Review of ualit Records co The quality records for the eight vertical and horizontal Unit 3 containment liner plate weld seams examined during the NRC inspection of April 15-18, 1980 (NRC Inspection Report No. 80-06) were reviewed.

The records included welder qualification, gC inspector qualifications, weld maps and NDE reports.

The records were examined for comp 1 iance with 1 icensee pro cedur es and code requirements.

No item of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

Welder uglification The licensee's system for welder qualification was examined for compliance with the requirements of the PSAR, pertinent sections of the ASME code and the governing licensee procedures.

The examination included a review of procedures for qualifying welders and welding operators and for maintaining records of qualification status.

The performance qualification test records for ten welders involved in the welding of the Unit 2 and 3 containment liner plate were also examined.

d.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

Weldin Material Control 7.

Exit The inspector examined the licensee's control of welding material at the warehouse and in containments 2 and 3.

The examination also entailed a review of procedures applied to the purchase, receiving, storage, distribution and handling of welding material.

The inspector also sampled two purchase orders for weld filler material and receiving records to determine whether these activities were conducted in accordance with the licensee's procedures and instructions.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

Interview On September 12, 1980, the inspectors met with licensee representatives identified in Paragraph I and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as noted in this repor A