IR 05000483/2009006
| ML090990747 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/2009 |
| From: | O'Keefe N NRC/RGN-IV/DRS/EB-2 |
| To: | Heflin A AmerenUE |
| References | |
| IR-09-006 | |
| Download: ML090990747 (27) | |
Text
April 9, 2009
SUBJECT:
CALLAWAY PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000483/2009006
Dear Mr. Heflin:
On February 26, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Callaway Plant. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed in an exit meeting on February 26, 2009, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
There is one finding of very low safety significance (Green) identified in the report. The report also documents a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance. However, because of the very low safety significance and because they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a written response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.:
Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the Callaway Plant.
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R E GI ON I V 612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125
AmerenUE
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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Neil OKeefe, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000483/2009006
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION IV==
Docket:
05000483
License:
Report:
Licensee:
AmerenUE
Facility:
Callaway Plant
Location:
Junction Highway CC and Highway O Fulton, MO
Dates:
February 2 to February 26, 2009
Team Leader:
J. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2
Inspectors:
S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 G. Tutak, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 E. Uribe, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2
Accompanying Personnel:
C. Smith, Reactor Inspector NSPDP
Approved by:
Neil OKeefe, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety
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Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000483/2009006; 02/02/2009 - 02/26/2009; AmerenUE; Callaway Plant; Triennial Fire
Protection Team Inspection.
The report covered a two-week triennial fire protection team inspection by specialist inspectors from Region IV. One Green finding, which was a non-cited violation (NCV), was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the significance determination process (SDP) does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
An NRC-identified violation of License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, was identified for failing to effectively correct problems with the issuance and establishment of Fire Protection Impairment Permits. After problems were identified in 2006 and 2007, as a corrective action, the licensee conducted training in 2008 on the program requirements in the Maintenance and Operations Departments. Despite this corrective action, the licensee continued to experience failures to request a fire impairment and failures to implement pre-planned impairments. Some failures involved oversight problems for contract workers, who were not addressed in the training. Two procedural violations occurred in late 2008 that involved the failure to establish a Fire Protection Impairment Permit before performing hot work. The licensee has entered the issue into the corrective action program as Callaway Action Request (CAR) 200901638.
The inspectors determined that failing to correct problems associated with the use of required Fire Protection Impairment Permits is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it affects the protection against external factors attribute of the initiating events cornerstone, and it directly affects the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Phase worksheet, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the condition represented a low degradation of fire prevention and administrative controls. The cause of the finding is related to the Human Performance cross-cutting component of Work Practices, in that the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations and personnel failed to follow procedures H.4.b].
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and the corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05TTP)
This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.05TTP, Fire Protection-NFPA Transition Period (Triennial), at the Callaway Plant. The licensee committed to adopt a risk informed fire protection program in accordance with National Fire Protection Association 805 (NFPA-805), but have not yet completed the program transition. The inspection team evaluated the implementation of the approved fire protection program in selected risk-significant areas, with an emphasis on the procedures, equipment, fire barriers, and systems that ensure the post-fire capability to safely shutdown the plant.
Inspection Procedure 71111.05TTP requires the selection of three to five fire areas for review. The inspection team used the fire hazards analysis section of the Callaway Plant Individual Plant Examination of External Events to select the following five risk-significant fire areas (inspection samples) for review:
- Fire Area A-1 Auxiliary Building - 1974 Elevation, General Area
- Fire Area A-17 South Electrical Penetration (Room 1409)
- Fire Area A-27 Reactor Trip Switchgear Room
- Fire Area C-10 Train B Engineered Safety Feature Switchgear Room
- Fire Area C-27 Control Room
The inspection team evaluated the licensees fire protection program using the applicable requirements, which included plant Technical Specifications, Operating License Condition 2.C.(5), NRC safety evaluations, 10 CFR 50.48, and Branch Technical Position 9.5-1. The team also reviewed related documents that included the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 9.5; the fire hazards analysis; and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.
Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment. Five inspection samples were completed.
.01 Shutdown From Outside Main Control Room
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical drawings, the Final Safety Analysis Report, and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained for fires in areas where the licensees post-fire safe shutdown strategy relies on manipulating shutdown equipment from outside the control room. The team verified that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained, with or without offsite power available. The team also verified that the safe shutdown analysis properly
identified the components and systems needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.02 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the piping and instrumentation diagrams, safe shutdown equipment list, safe shutdown design basis documents, and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for fires in the selected fire areas. The team observed walk-downs of the procedures used for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in the event of a fire to verify that the procedures properly implemented the safe shutdown analysis provisions.
For each of the selected fire areas, the team reviewed the separation of redundant safe shutdown cables, equipment, and components located within the same fire area. The team also reviewed the licensees method for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48; Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, Appendix A; and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. Specifically, the team evaluated whether at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path remained free of fire damage in the event of a fire. In addition, the team verified that the licensee met applicable license commitments.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.03 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe the material condition and configuration of the installed fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) and verify that the electrical raceway fire barriers were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area. The team compared the installed configurations to the approved construction details, supporting fire tests, and applicable license commitments.
The team reviewed installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material possessed an appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design. The team also reviewed similar records for the rated fire wraps to ensure the material possessed an appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.04 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design, maintenance, testing, and operation of the fire detection and suppression systems in the selected fire areas. The team verified the manual and automatic detection and suppression systems were installed, tested, and maintained in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association code of record or approved deviations, and that each suppression system was appropriate for the hazards in the selected fire areas.
The team performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the detection and suppression systems in the selected fire areas. The team also performed a walkdown of major system support equipment in other areas (e.g., fire pumps and Halon supply systems) to assess the material condition of these systems and components.
The team reviewed the electric and diesel fire pump flow and pressure tests to verify that the pumps met their design requirements. The team also reviewed the halon suppression functional tests to verify that the system capability met the design requirements.
The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, and drill critique records. The team also reviewed pre-fire plans and smoke removal plans for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact post-fire safe shutdown capability. In addition, the team inspected fire brigade equipment to determine operational readiness for fire fighting.
The team observed an unannounced fire drill, conducted on February 25, 2009, and the subsequent drill critique using the guidance contained in Inspection Procedure 71111.05AQ, Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly. The team observed fire brigade members fight a simulated fire in the Auxiliary Building, located in the radiological controlled area. The team verified that the licensee identified problems, openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and identified appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were:
- (1) proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus;
- (2) proper use and layout of fire hoses;
- (3) employment of appropriate fire fighting techniques;
- (4) sufficient fire fighting equipment was brought to the scene;
- (5) effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control;
- (6) search for victims and propagation of the fire into other areas;
- (7) smoke removal operations;
- (8) utilization of pre-planned strategies;
- (9) adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and
- (10) drill objectives.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.05 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed plant walkdowns and document reviews to verify that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown, which are located in the same fire area, would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. Specifically, the team verified that:
- A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not directly, through production of smoke, heat, or hot gases, cause activation of suppression systems that could potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains.
- A fire in one of the selected fire areas or the inadvertent actuation or rupture of a fire suppression system would not directly cause damage to all redundant trains (e.g., sprinkler-caused flooding of other than the locally affected train).
- Adequate drainage is provided in areas protected by water suppression systems.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.06 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
Review of Methodology
The team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical drawings, the Final Safety Analysis Report, and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from outside the control room for fires that require evacuation of the control room, with or without offsite power available.
Plant walkdowns were conducted to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with the description contained in the safe shutdown and fire hazards analyses. The team focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor decay heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation, and support systems functions.
The team also verified that the systems and components credited for shutdown would remain free from fire damage. Finally, the team verified that the transfer of control from the control room to the alternative shutdown location would not be affected by fire-induced circuit faults (e.g., by the provision of separate fuses and power supplies for alternative shutdown control circuits).
Review of Operational Implementation
The team verified that the licensed and non-licensed operators received training on alternative shutdown procedures. The team also verified that sufficient personnel to perform a safe shutdown are trained and available onsite at all times, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.
A walkthrough of the post-fire safe shutdown procedure with licensed and non-licensed operators was performed to determine the adequacy of the procedure and ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedure. The team verified that the operators could be reasonably expected to perform specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits. Time critical actions that were verified included restoring electrical power, establishing control at the remote shutdown and local shutdown panels, establishing reactor coolant makeup, and establishing decay heat removal.
The team reviewed manual actions to ensure that they had been properly reviewed and approved and that the actions could be implemented in accordance with plant procedures in the time necessary to support the safe shutdown method for each fire area.
The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfer capability and instrumentation and control functions to verify that the tests are adequate to demonstrate the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.07 Circuit Analysis
This segment of inspection is suspended for plants in transition to a risk-informed fire protection program in accordance with NFPA 805. Therefore, the team did not evaluate this area.
.08 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the contents of designated emergency storage lockers and reviewed the alternative shutdown procedure to verify that portable radio communications and fixed emergency communications systems were available, operable, and adequate for the performance of designated activities. The team verified the capability of the communication systems to support the operators in the conduct and coordination of their required actions. The team also verified that the design and location of communications equipment such as repeaters and transmitters would not cause a loss of communications during a fire. The team discussed system design, testing, and maintenance with the system engineer.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.09 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the portion of the emergency lighting system required for alternative shutdown to verify that it was adequate to support the performance of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions and to illuminate access and egress routes to the areas where manual actions would be required. The team evaluated the locations and positioning of the emergency lights during a walkthrough of the alternative shutdown procedure.
The team verified that the licensee installed emergency lights with an 8-hour capacity, maintained the emergency light batteries in accordance with manufacturer recommendations, and tested and performed maintenance in accordance with plant procedures and industry practices.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that the licensee identified repairs needed to reach and maintain cold shutdown and had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and materials to accomplish these repairs. Using these procedures, the team evaluated whether these components could be repaired in time to bring the plant to cold shutdown within the time frames specified in their design and licensing bases. The team verified that the repair equipment, components, tools, and materials needed for the repairs were available and accessible on site.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.11 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that compensatory measures were implemented for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment; passive fire barriers; or pumps, valves, or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions). The team also verified that the short-term compensatory measures compensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective action could be taken and that
the licensee was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
[OA]
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected a sample of condition reports associated with the licensee's fire protection program to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying deficiencies. In addition the team reviewed the corrective actions proposed and implemented to verify that they were effective in correcting identified deficiencies. The team also evaluated the quality of recent engineering evaluations through a review of condition reports, calculations, and other documents during the inspection. An example of a problem with the quality of engineering evaluations is discussed in Section 4OA5.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of License Condition 2.C(5), Fire Protection, for failing to effectively correct problems with the issuance and establishment of Fire Protection Impairment Permits (FPIPs).
Description:
The team determined that the licensee failed to take effective corrective action with respect to personnel failing to initiate or implement fire protection impairment permits on several occasions. Callaway Action Request (CAR) 200604371 addressed FPIP problems identified by NRC inspectors in June 2006. The team completed a partial review of 2007 and 2008 CAR documents and discovered four additional violations of Procedure APA-ZZ-00701, Control of Fire Protection Impairments, with regard to a missing or an inactive FPIP. Because of observations made by NRC inspectors in 2007, CAR 200705833 was initiated to request specific training on the requirements for transient combustible permits and fire protection impairment permits.
This training was created for the Maintenance and Operations Departments and was completed between April 7 and October 2, 2008. After the training was completed, two procedural violations occurred by failing to establish a FPIPs, demonstrating that the licensees corrective actions had not been effective. These two occurrences were documented in CAR 200810702 and CAR 200810919.
Analysis:
Failing to correct problems associated with the use of required Fire Protection Impairment Permits was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it affected the protection against external factors attribute (i.e.,
fire) of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Using the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire
Protection Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheet, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the condition represented a low degradation of fire prevention and administrative controls. The inspectors concluded that the repeated failures to implement the requirements of Procedure APA-ZZ-00701 were related to the plants work practices. The cause of the finding was related to the Human Performance cross-cutting component of Work Practices in that the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations and personnel failed to follow procedures H.4.b].
Enforcement:
License Condition 2.C.(5) requires AmerenUE to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the FSAR.
Appendix 9.5A, Section C.8, Corrective Action, of Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, states that measures to assure conditions adverse to fire protection, such as uncontrolled combustible material and nonconformances, are promptly identified and corrected. The licensees response to this requirement states that failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible material and nonconformances which affect fire protection are controlled as discussed in the Operating Quality Assurance Manual, Section 16.0 and addressed under the plants corrective action request (CAR) program.
Contrary to the above, after specific training was completed, the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions with respect to the issuance and establishment of fire protection impairment permits on several occasions. Specifically, after completing the planned corrective action, there were two additional occurrences where the licensee failed to obtain a permit. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and entered into the licensees corrective action program as CAR 200901638, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), per Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy, (NCV 05000483/2009006-01), Failure to Correct Problems with Fire Protection Impairment Permits.
4OA5 Other Activities
Review of Thermal Hydraulic Analysis for Alternative Shutdown Scenarios
In response to Unresolved Item 2003007-02, Failure to Perform Alternate Shutdown Manual Actions within the Required Times, the licensee developed a thermal hydraulic analysis for alternative shutdown scenarios. The analysis examined the plant response under various transients and compared the response to the performance goals contained in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L. The goal of the analysis was to determine the amount of time available for the operators to take manual actions before exceeding the performance goals of Section III.L.2. The licensee documented the thermal hydraulic analysis in a series of Engineering Information Records (EIRs):
- EIR 51-5046966, Callaway Appendix R Steam Generator Overfill Analysis Basis Document, Revision 0
- EIR 51-5050606, Callaway Appendix R Secondary Side Depressurization Analysis Basis Document, Revision 0
- EIR 51-5051110, Callaway Appendix R Maximum Reactor Coolant System Overcooling Analysis Basis Document, Revision 0
- EIR 51-5051812, Callaway Appendix R Maximum Reactor Coolant System Depressurization Analysis Basis Document, Revision 0
- EIR 51-5054393, Callaway Appendix R Maximum Reactor Coolant System Overheating Analysis Basis Document, Revision 0
The licensee conservatively analyzed a maximum reactor coolant system depressurization transient (full flow of all auxiliary feedwater pumps concurrent with the spurious opening of both pressurizer power-operated relief valves) in EIR 51-5051812. The analysis concluded that operators would be unable to take the required manual actions before the pressurizer went solid during a maximum reactor coolant system depressurization transient. The analysis concluded that a solid pressurizer would not be problematic since the transient would not result in a loss of reactor coolant system subcooling margin and the transient would be temporary in nature.
The team reviewed the thermal hydraulic analysis contained in EIR 51-5051812 and the data contained in the underlying simulator scenarios. The team identified that the reactor coolant system would lose subcooling approximately one minute into the maximum reactor coolant system depressurization transient. The loss of subcooling would occur before the operator could take manual actions to deenergize and close the pressurizer power-operated relief valves. The analysis did not assess the impact on natural circulation, nor did the analysis provide acceptance criteria for an allowable amount of reactor coolant system voiding.
The team considered the EIR 51-5051812 thermal hydraulic analysis to be an example of inadequate engineering quality. The analysis was reviewed and approved with conclusions which were not supported by the detailed data it contained. This resulted in an inadequate acceptance criteria being applied to manual actions in the fire protection program.
This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CAR 200901662 and will be addressed in the licensees transition to NFPA 805. The licensee has implemented an hourly fire watch in the control room as a compensatory measure for this issue.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
The team presented the inspection results to Mr. A. Heflin, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff at an exit meeting on February 26, 2009. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.
- License Condition 2.C.(5), Fire Protection, requires the licensee to maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program described in listed regulatory documents. The provisions include the requirement that conditions adverse to fire protection shall be promptly identified, reported, and corrected.
Contrary to the above, the licensee identified several examples of performance deficiencies related to the controls of combustible material. The licensee failed to adhere to Procedure APA-ZZ-00741, Control of Combustible Material, by exceeding transient combustible material limits and not storing combustible material in the appropriate locations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since it involved a low degradation of the fire prevention and administrative controls program. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CAR 200901623.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- S. Abel, Engineering Services Assistant Manager
- S. Cantrell, Fire Protection Program Engineer
- F. Diya, Vice President - Nuclear
- K. Duncan, Operations
- L. Eitel, Supervisor, Balance of Plant Systems Engineering
- T. Elwood, Supervising Engineer, Regulatory Affairs
- M. Fletched, Project Engineer
- J. Fortman, Supervising Engineer, Engineering
- R. Glassner, Engineer, Quality Assurance
- D. Hall, Engineering Assistant Manager
- G. Harris, Project Engineer
- A. Heflin, Senior Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer
- T. Herrmann, Vice President - Engineering
- G. Kremer, Supervisor, Engineering - Mechanical/Civil
- S. Maglio, Assistant Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- D. Martin, Systems Engineer, Emergency Lighting
- M. McLachlan, Manager, Engineering Services
- K. Mills, Manager, Plant Engineering
- S. Petzel, Engineer, Regulatory Affairs
- J. Ross, Assistant Operations Manager - Support
- S. Sandbothe, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- J. Schaefer, Emergency Operating Procedure Coordinator
- B. Taylor, Fire Protection System Engineer
- D. Walker, Licensing Engineer, Regulatory Affairs
- J. Wallendorf, Fire Marshal
- J. Weekley, Assistant Manager, Operations
NRC
Jeremy Groom, Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Opened and Closed
- 05000483/2009006-01 NCV Failure to Correct Problems with Fire Protection Impairment Permits (Section 4OA2)
Closed
None
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System CAR
Callaway Action Request CFR
Code of Federal Regulations DRS
Division of Reactor Safety EIR
Engineering Information Records FPIP Fire Protection Impairment Permits FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report NCV
Non-cited Violation NFPA National Fire Protection Association NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission PAR
Publicly Available Records SDP
Significance Determination Process SNUPPS Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System