IR 05000461/1993008
| ML20045A510 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1993 |
| From: | Barger J, Cox C, Markley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045A509 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-93-08, 50-461-93-8, NUDOCS 9306110016 | |
| Download: ML20045A510 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-461/93008(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62 Licensee:
Illinois Power Company Mail Code V-275 P.O. Box 678 Clinton, IL 61727 Facility Name: Clinton Power Station
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Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, IL Inspection Conducted: May 18-21, 1993 b
d6h7 Inspectors:
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C. Cox'
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bba S/1lC T. Mark'idy~
Dat'e"# ' >
Accompanied By:
P. Brochman D. Pickett B. Korona P. Hayes bo*V7 (d /9 7 Approved By: 4 [0 m
4. W. McCormick-Barger," Chief Da'te' '
Emergency Preparedness and Non-Power Reactor Section Inspection Summary Inspection on May 18-21. 1993 (Report No. 50-461/93008(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Clinton Power Station's annual emergency preparedness exercise, involving:
review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302),_ observations by six NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301), and follow-up on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 82301).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified. The licensee's overall exercise performance was very good; however, one inspection _ follow-up item was identified regarding a few cases of not using procedure checklists in _the Technical Support Center (Section 6b).
Excellent turnover briefs and communications between facilities, scenario challenges involving weather and 9306110016 930603 gDR ADOCK 05000461 PDR s
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security emergency action levels, and a critical self-evaluation were strong points for this exercise.
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DETAILS 1.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed C. Cox, Control Room Simulator (CRS), Technical Support Center (TSC),
and Operations Support Center (OSC)
P. Brochman, CRS T. Markley, TSC D. Pickett, CRS, TSC, OSC, and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
B. Korona, CRS, TSC, OSC, and E0F P. Hayes, E0F 2.
Licensee Reoresentatives J. Perry, Senior Vice President J. Cook, Vice President F. Spangenberg, Manager, Licensing and Safety R. Morgenstern, Manager, Training Department R. Wyatt, Manager, Quality Assurance J. Miller, Manager, Nuclear Station Engineering Department M. Lyon, Director, Emergency Response P. Yocum, Director, Plant Operations R. Phares, Director, Licensing J. Hanskey, Director, Planning W. Evans, Supervisor, Emergency Drills and Exercises W. Yarosz, Supervisor, Emergency Planning J. Sipek, Supervisor, Regional Regulatory Interface E. Turner, Nuclear Program Controller The above licensee representatives attended the May 21, 1993 exit interview. The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Item (IP 82301)
a.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 461/92019-01(DRSS): This item pertains to a 30 minute delay in starting the site accountability in the 1992 Exercise due to a communications problem between the Control Room Simulator (CRS) and the actual Control Room.
During the 1993 Exercise, there was an average delay of five minutes from announcements made in the CRS and the time the announcements were relayed over the plant-wide public address (PA) system. The five minute delay did not appreciably affect the NRC team's ability to evaluate the timeliness of key decisions and actions. This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 461/92019-02(DRSS):
This.
item was an exercise weakness from the 1992 Exercise due to the Emergency Manager's failure to issue a mandatory protective action recommendation to the offsite agencies within the required 15 minutes after a declaration of the General Emergency.
During the 1993 Exercise, all protective action recommendations were timely.
This item is closed.
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4.
General (IP 82301)
An announced daytime exercise of the Clinton Power Station's emergency plan was conducted at the Clinton site on May 19, 1993. The exercise tested the capabilities of the licensee's emergency organization to respond to an accident scenario involving simulated high winds, a fire, and a sabotuer. The attachments to this inspection report summarize the licensee's scope of participation and the exercise scenario.
5.
General Observations (IP 82301)
The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the scenario events had been real, the actions tak.en by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit state and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety.
6.
Specific Observations (IP 82301)
a.
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
The CRS performance was very good. Classifications.for the i
Unusual Event (UE) and the Alert were' correct and offsite notifications were timely. The Shift Supervisor (SS) provided an I
excellent turnover brief to the Station Emergency Director-(SED)
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for the transfer of command and control to the Technical Support H
Center (TSC).
Communication between the crew members was excellent with the crew
using repeat backs and three part communications.
Crew briefings i
were very good. When the SS received the storm warning, he
.l directed the crew to monitor the wind speed periodically and
review loss of AC procedures.
Procedure use and review of Technical Specifications were very good.
Emergency Operating Procedure entry conditions were quickly recognized.
Some drill problems were noted in the CRS.
Because the CRS did not share the same environmental envelope with the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC) as does the real Control Room, no habitability was established. This was an oversight since the same Radiation Protection (RP)
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Technician that established habitability in' the TSC and OSC would be in the actual Control Room. Also once command and control was shifted to the TSC, no PA announcements were heard in the CRS.
That was due to the TSC directly making PA announcements through j
the actual Control Room. Also a controller problem at the
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simulated remote shutdown panel caused confusion in the CRS and the TSC when the controller responsible for injecting saboteur actions prematurely ended his scenario while operation controls were still being lost in the CRS. This lead the CRS and TSC players to suspect more than one saboteur.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Overall, the performance in the TSC was very good. While some minor examples of pre-staging were noted, the TSC was fully staffed and operational within 47 minutes after. the ALERT declaration. The transfer of command and control from the Control Room Simulator (CRS) by the SS to the Station Emergency Director (SED), in the TSC, was very good. The SED ensured that he was adequately briefed of the events and that all required TSC staff were assembled and ready to perform their duties prior.to the TSC operational declaration.
Likewise, the transfer of command and control from the SED in the TSC to the Emergency Manager (EM) in i
the Emergency Operations facility (EOF) was very good.
Event assessments, classifications, and notifications were procer and timely.
Status boards were generally well maintained.
Tracking and management of Operations Support Center -(OSC) teams were excellent.
Communications among work groups and emergency
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response facilities were generally good, although not always clear.
A specific problem was noted in communication between the TSC and the OSC regarding proper switch configurations for the remote shutdown panel. Good engineering and security brainstorming were noted in response to event information received in the TSC. A questioning approach was noted with all work groups observed.
Accountability was accomplished within 26 minutes. A delay was noted due to communications of event information being relayed from the CRS to the TSC and then h'and carried to the control room for announcement over the PA system.
That caused a five minute delay in the accountability announcement but it did not appreciably affect the ability to evaluate the timeliness of the
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accountability. However, a similar time delay of approximately
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six to eleven minutes was a factor in a poorly timed announcement.
At 10:16 a.m., a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) with instructions for
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non-essential personnel to evacuate the site'had been announced.
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over the PA system. At 10:19 a.m., an ALL CLEAR fer adverse weather with instructions for personnel to resume normal duties.
was announced over the PA system. - The TSC personnel recognized this situation and followed with a PA announcement for evacuation
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due to the SAE to continue.
SED briefings of TSC staff were'canducted periodically and were comprehensive. However, formal briefings of the SED by TSC discipline supervisors were not conducted.
Rather, the SED obtained his information from one-on-one briefings with the discipline supervisors.
Past practices of briefing the-' SED and'
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the TSC staff by the discipline supervisors had been used to fr.us TSC activities, communicate event status, and facilitate management of noise levels in the TSC. Although some instances of rising noise levels were noted, these were easily managed by the SED.
In general, the use of procedures and technical information by the staff in the TSC were very good.
However, there were several
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examples in which TSC personnel did not appear to utilize the
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emergency response procedure checklists.
Some checklists were not checked, initialed, or signed by the responsible individuals.
Inconsistent acknowledgement, checking versus initialing, was also noted.
While these checklists may have been used " informally",
inconsistent documentation and failure to document checklist performance requirements is an Inspection Followup Item (461/93008-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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c.
Doerations Support Center (OSC) and Inolant Teams Overall, the OSC performed very well, functioning in a very efficient and effective manner. The activation of the facility was timely even when one portal monitor failed causing a delay in activation when most of the OSC personnel had to wait and use the one monitor available before entering the OSC. Habitability was quickly established.
The dispatch and tracking of teams were excellent.
Team briefings
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were comprehensive. Status boards were used effectively to track available personnel and to track the teams that were dispatched.
The OSC Director and his assistants maintained good communications with the dispatched teams.
The TSC Assistant SED frequently went into the OSC to confer with the OSC Director face-to-face. This enhanced the transfer of information between the TSC and OSC on plant status, priorities, and results of the inplant teams' efforts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
d.
Emeraency Doerations Facility (EOF)
Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility was very good.
The EOF was fully staffed and ready to assume command and control within 36 minutes of the SAE. The turnover brief from the SED to the Emergency Manager (EM) was excellent.
Update briefings in the E0F were excellent, especially. the briefings received from the SED in the TSC over an intercom system.
Staff meetings were frequent and a good format for discussing priorities and sharing information within the E0F. The timing and length of the meetings were appropriate and were driven
by the events in the exercise rather than driven by an artificial time limit.
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Classifications, protective action recommendations, and notifications were all appropriate and timely. -0verall problem solving activities were very good.
Procedures and checklists use
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was excellent.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Medical Resconse The overall medical response and contamination control to the contaminated injured worker was good. The proper medical concerns were displayed and there was good coordination between operations, radiation protection (RP), and security.
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A small contamination control problem was noted when a security officer, who was a first responder, was stationed in another room to control access to the saboteur / hostage scene. He had handcuffed the contaminated injured saboteur and handled the t
simulated contaminated protective clothing in the possession of i
the saboteur. When the RP technicians arrived and established l
contamination control, they were never made aware of the security officer in the other room who may have been potentially l
contaminated. The very low levels of contamination and the extensive use of portal monitors made this situation a minor problem.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exercise Obiectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302)
The exercise scope and objectives and the exercise scenario were submitted to the NRC well within the required timeframes.
No problems were identified during the review of the scenario or objectives.
l Challenging aspects of the scenario included unusual and diverse
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emergency action levels including weather and security events and
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multiple mini-scenarios including wind damage, a fire, and a saboteur.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exercise Control and Exercise Simulation (IP 82301)
i Exercise control was very good.
There were adequate controllers to control the exercise.
It was noted on several occasions that when l
controllers were challenged by players to' provide unearned scenario
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data, the controllers refused to provide the information until the
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players performed the evolutions that would generate the data.
One control problem was noted in Section 6(a).regarding the saboteur at the remote shutdown panel.
The saboteur.was secured while the CRS controller was still injecting failure information concerning the CRS loss of control of equipment _to the remote shutdown panel.
This later caused confusion about the status of the hostage / saboteur situation and
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caused the other facilities to suspect other saboteurs delaying sending operators to the remote shutdown panel to secure the uncontrolled cooldown by securing the Safety Relief Valves.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Licensee Critiaue (IP 82301)
The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with the participants immediately following the exercise.
Several of these critiques were observed and were determined to be detailed.
Inputs from all participants were sought.
A formal critique was held on May 21, 1993 prior to the exit. interview.
The licensee provided a summary of its preliminary, self-identified, performance strengths and weaknesses, which were generally in agreement with the inspectors' preliminary findings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview On May 21, 1993, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives identified in Section 2 of this report in order to present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings.
The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
Attachments:
1.
Scope of Participation and Exercise Objectives 2.
Exercise Scenario Summary
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INTRODUCTION SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION The Clinton Power Station Emergency Exercise will be conducted during normal working hours to demonstrate the integrated capability of Illinois Power Company to respond to a simulated emergency at Clinton Power Station (CPS).
The exercise is designed to test the Clinton Power Station Emergency Plan.
This is a utility only exercise, therefore, there will be no participation from State or local governments..All coordination activities associated with these organizations will be simulated.
Illinois Power (IP) will participate in the exercise by activating the emergency response organization and emergency response facilities as appropriate, subject to limitations that may become necessary to provide for safe operations of the plant.
In lieu of using the Main Control Room, the Simulator Control Room will be used during the exercise.
Hereinafter, any reference to the Main Control Room implies the Simulator. An off-duty Main Control Room shift crew will be prepositioned in the Simulator to receive exercise messages.
Illinois Power Company has established specific objectives and ground rules for the exercise.
These objectives and ground rules may be found later in this section.
For the exercise on May 19, 1993 evacuation and accountability will be simulated.
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CLINTON POWER STATION 1993 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
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Primary Obiectives:
Demonstrate the capability to implement the Clinton Power Station (CPS)
Emergency Plan to protect the health and safety of the general public as well as plant personnel.
Supportinn Obiectives:
1.
Demonstrate the capability of the Main Control Room Staff to recognize the emergency conditions, to classify the event, and to perform mitigating actions.
2.
Demonstrate the capability to quickly and accurately identify and classify the accident as conditions change.
3.
Once the emergency is classified or reclassified, to demonstrate the capability to timely notify the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA), the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) and the Nuclear Regulatory * Commission (NRC) within the time required by implementing i
procedures
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Demonstrate the capability to properly notify Illinois Power (IP)
Emergency Response Organization personnel in accordance with implementing procedures.
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Demonstrate the ability to notify site personnel of the emergency
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Demonstrate.the capability to activate the Technical Support Center (TSC, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Operations Support Center (OSC), Headquarters Support Center (HSC) and Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) in accordance with implementing procedures.
7.
Demonstrate the clear transfer of Command Authority from the Shift
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Supervisor, to the Station Emergency Director, to the Emergency Manager in accordance with implementing procedures.
8.
Demonstrate the capability to assess accident conditions.
I 9.
Demonstrate the capability to dispatch and control Field Monitoring Teams for environmental monitoring.
10.
Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to control emergency teams including emergency maintenance activities, 11.
Demonstrate implementation of effective health physics controls by the Emergency Teams.
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12.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to in-plant Security threats by using i
a mock adversary that will require real time response by personnel.
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Demonstrate the capability to provide dosimetry and monitor radiation exposure to onsite emergency workers and Field Monitoring Teams.
14.
Demonstrate the capability to effectively communicate reports,
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information and assessments of the situation among participating-
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principal command and control centers, personnel and emergency teams, t
15.
Demonstrate the capability to make appropriate, timely public protective
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action recommendations to offsite authorities in accordance with implementing procedures.
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Demonstrate timely, effective.information flow from the Emergency
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Operations Facility (EOF) to the Joint Public Information center (JPIC).
17.
Demonstrate the capability to provide accurate, timely information to-the news media from the JPIC.
18.
Demonstrate the ability to discuss appropriate measures associated with recovery activities in order to restore the plant to a pre-emergency
condition.
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19.
Demonstrate the capability of the First Aid Team and Radiation
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Protection personnel to properly respond to an accident involving contaminated and/or injured personnel and to provide proper first aid.
20.
Demonstrate the capability to transport an injured-contaminated person (s) to an offsite medical facility and to provide support as necessary.
21.
Demonstrate the capability to critique objectively the emergency response and to identify deficiencies.
This will require an evaluation of items such as (1) the operation of the Emergency Response Facilities, (2) suitability of individuals in fulfilling emergency assignments and (3) the adequacy of emergency procedures and equipment available.
- This is a utility only. exercise.
Coordination / communications with offsite agencies will be simulate __
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CROUND RULES 1.
If a Controller / Evaluator or player witnesses an Esercise player performing any action which would, in the Controller / Evaluator's or player's opinion, place either the player, other personnet or equipment in an unsafe condition, the Controller / Evaluator or player is responsible for terminating the unsafe activities immediately and notifying the Lead Controller.
2.
Att personnet including controt ters are required to fotlow CPS safety practices and use personal safety equipment.
3.
No hazardous substances shall be allowed in the conduct of Exercise activities.
4.
If during tha conduct of the Exercisc an actual emergency condition occurs, then Exercise play shall be terminated imediately and the full resources of IP shall be directed toward mitigating the emergency.
Should this occur, att Controllers and Evaluators are considered non essential personnet and shalt leave the Emergency Response facilities or accident scene.
P 5.
All telephone comunications, radio transmissions and public address announcements related to the Exercise must begin and erd with the statement, "This is a drill." Should a Controller or Evaluator Jtness an Exercise participant not observing this practice, it is their responsibility to remind the individual of the need to follow this procedure.
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6.
The on-duty Shif t Supervisor has the authority to terminate the Exercise if conditions exist that adversely af fect public health and safety, or the safety of plant personnel.
7.
Manipulation of any actual plant systems, valves, breakers or controts in response to the Exercise are only to be simulated. There is to be no alteration of any plant opeisting equipment, systems or circuits during response to the Exercise.
8.
Any motor vehicle responding to the Exercise shall be operated within the timits of the law, irciudirrg observing posted speed limits, stop signs, etc.
9.
The contents of the scenario are confidential and shall not be disclosed to any player or other person not previously authorized for this information.
10.
Last minute changes to Exercise mock-ups or untested methods of simulation should not be allowed in Exercise
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scenarios. Players and Observers are not permitted to introduce items into the Exercise without the.
permission of the Lead Controller. Such requests to change the scenario are discouraged and will normatty be denied.
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Controtters, Evaluators and Observers are not required to follow radiological control practices for simulated radiation levels during the Exercise. However, players must follow all appropriate radiological controls for the radiation / contamination levels being simulated.
12.
All personnet are required to follow established radiological control procedures when encountering actual radiological conditions within the Station.
13.
Data will be provided in 10-minute intervals only. Data for the time period between 10 minute updates and data for future times are not avaltable to participants. Pte r s should request'from the Controllers any
data which they feel is necessary for the performance of their function. Valid data available from the Simulator may be used unless a Controller instructs differently.
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Some Exercise players may insist that certain parts of the scenario are unrealistic. The Controllers have_
the authority, with the approval from the Lead Controtter, to clarify any questions regarding scenario content. In some cases, it may be necessary to Exercise " Controller's perogative".of countermanding players-actions to preserve the continuity and objectives of the Exercise. The player must, however, accept his/her word as final and proceed. Inappropriate actions can delay or speed-up the entire Exercise and impact other '
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CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE The Exercise shall be coordinated by a Lead Exercise Controller who is responsible for the overall control of the scenario and for ensuring the Exercise time line is followed. The Lead Exercise Controller will have the freedom to move from one Emergency Response Facility to another, as necessary.
The Lead Exercise Controller shall be assisted by a team of Controllers and Evaluators.
Controllers shall be located at key functional areas to control the Exercise.
Controllers shall also accompany Field Monitoring Teams and In Station Emergency Teams to provide controlling information.
Some Controllers may be assisted by an Evaluator who will be responsible for monitoring the performance of the Exercise participants To help distinguish between the various individuals and gt.ups involved in the Exercise, certain personnel will be given arm bands to wear.
The arm bands will be color coded in the following manner:
Red
- Controller / Evaluator Yellow
- Evaluator Blue
- Federal Observer White
- Observer Orange
- State Player Message forms will be used to initiate the events which comprise the scenario.
The Controllers may either present the appropriate participant with a copy of the message form or read the contents of the message to the player, whichever is convenient and suitable for the situation. Message forms for Main Control Room alarms and indications are included in this scenario package. These will be substituted for actual alarms and indications from the Simulator panels if the Simulator is not functioning properly or becomes out of sync with the Exercise time line.
The decision to use the messages will be at the discretion of the Lead Main Control Room Controller.
Three types of message forms will be used during the Exercise; Player messages: Messages.which are given to Exercise participants which are used as the primary means of implementing scenario events or to provide plant scenario data.
Contingency messanes: Messages which are given to Exercise partic'ipants which are used to keep the scenario events on schedule with the Exercise time line.
They can be used to solicit a response if an action has not been taken within the required time.
Pre-planned Contingency Messages are included in this scenario package.
In addition, Controllers may develop "on-the-spot" Contingency Messages to modify or alter participants' actions which may lead the Exercise astray. Whenever possible, the Lead Exercise Controller will be consulted prior to the delivery of any Contingency Message.
DRILL / CONDUCT
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Controller messares: Messages which have been developed to provide Controllers and Evaluators details regarding scenario events.
Controller messages themselves are for Controller / Evaluator information and are not normally given to any Exercise participant.
All messages have been identified with the time at which they should be delivered. Messages shall be presented to the designated Exercise participant l
at the time specified on the message.
The Controller may, as necessary, i
follow up with an explanation of the message and answer questions to ensure
that the participant understands the message.
The Controllers will not prompt any particular response.
Please refer to the Controller instructions for more details.
Plant system and radiological data that would normally be available to personnel within the various Emergency Response Facilities on installed Cathode Ray Tubes (CRT's) for given plant conditions will be provided to Exercise participants at the appropriate time.
Plant system information will be provided to Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility.
personnel using data generated by the simulator cince the Safety Parameter-Display System (SPDS) cannot display exercise data.
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Special information is provided to Controllers in functional areas such as
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Emergency Repair Teams and In-Station Survey Teams.
Such information includes contamination levels and alarms on continuous air monitors, i
All Controllers and Evaluators shall be in their position at least fifteen minutes prior to the start of the Exercise, that is at 0745. hours. All Controllers shall synchronize their watches with the Simulator clock and ensure the clocks in the Emergency Response Facilities are set accordin5 7-
ihe Exercise is tentatively scheduled to terminate no later than 1245 hours0.0144 days <br />0.346 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.737225e-4 months <br />.
The Exercise may be terminated earlier if Federal Observers are satisfied and objectives are met.
Unless advised otherwise, all Controllers and Evaluators shall reassemble following the termiratfan of the Exercise in the. CPS Energy and Environmental Cent.er to prepare fer the Exercise Critique.
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DRILL / CONDUCT j
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1993 GP.ADED EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY
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INITIAL CONDITIORE Clinton Power Station is currently operating at 100% power on the 387th day of continuous operation. The Fire Pump "A" is currently tagged out of service for scheduled outage.
At 0710 a tornado passed through the area and took down the 138KV line just west of Birkbeck.
Crews are dispatched to repair the line.
SUMMARY OF EVENTS At 0810 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) initiates and injects.
This should result in a Notification of Unusual Event being declared in accordance with EC-02, Symptom 3.1, HPCS INITIATES AND INJECTS.
If investigated, the cause will be a failed card in the manual initiation circuitry.
At 0830 a severe thunderstorm warning is issued for the counties of Macon, DeWitt, and McLean until 0915.
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At about 0900 a severe thunderstorm passes through the area briefly causing sustained winds of 78 mph. This should result in an Alert.being declared in accordance with EC-02, Symptom 14.2, SUSTAINED HIGH WINDS NEAR DESIGN B. ASIS LEVEL (greater than 75 mph, without tornadoes present).
Damage to the facility results from the high winds. Two roof smoke vents are jammed open on the Turbine Building roof, causing Fuel Building, Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building ventilation to trip.
In addition, one air compressor tripped and will not restart due to a damaged and obstructed inlet screen. Two people outside the Service Building were hurt by flying debris sustaining minor cuts and bruises.
A lightning strike causes one of the running Circulating Water (CW) Pumps to trip. When operators attempt to start the standby CW pump, it will start.
At about 1000 a Fire Alarm for Division II battery is received in the MCR.
Shortly thereafter Division II DC is lost.
Fire fighting efforts will be
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successful. This should result in a Site Area Emergency being declared in accordance with EC 02, Symptom 12.1, ANY FIRE THAT IS INFLICTING SEVERE DAMAGE TO SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT SUCH THAT THE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY.0F THIS SYSTEM
IS LOST.
'l When accountability is completed, one person will not be accounted for.
The Security System indicates the missing person is in Zone 1 (Vital Area, but not
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Containment, Main Control Room (MCR) or Shutdown Service Water.(SX) pump rooms).
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At about 1045 during _ the search for this person, he will be found by the Search and Rescue (S&R) Team in Division I Battary Room setting a fire. This person will take one of the S&R team members hostage. The arsonist will then take his hostage over to the Remote Shutdown Panel. The arsonist will start turning switches taking control of Shutdown Systems away from the MCR. This should result in a General Emergency being declared in accordance with EC-02, Symptom 13.1, ADVERSARIES OCCUPY VITAL AREAS.
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The arsonist will become enraged and start smashing meters with his knife. At about 1120 during this destruction his knife will smash into a meter face coming into contact with 120VAC. He will receive an electrical shock and be
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rendered unconcious. When the Medical Team removes him from the Power Block,
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contamination will be found originating from the PC and rubbish used to start the fire.
The remainder of the exercise will focus on restoring control of plant systems and the reactor.
In addition, walkdowns of the plant will be completed to verify the integrity of plant systems and equipment. When the plant is in a stable condition and all recovery planning discussions are completed, the exercise will terminate.
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1993 GRADED EXERCISE TIME LINE APPROXIMATE EVJEI TIME
,
High Pressure Core Spray Initiates and Injects.
0810
'
Notification of Unusual Event Declared Per EC+02, Symptom 3.1.
0825
'
Severe Thunderstorm Warning Issued.
'0830
'
,
'
Sustained High Winds of 78 mph.
0900 Circulating Water Pump Trip, i
Standby Starts.
0910 ALERT Declared Per EC-02, Symptom 14.2.
0915 Fire in Division Il Battery Room.
1000 Loss of Division II DC.
1005 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Declared Per
,
EC-02, Symptom 12.1.
1020 Missing Person (Arsonist) Found, Hostage Taken.
1045 Arsonist Takes Control of Remote Shutdown Panel.
1050
,
GENERAL EMERGENCY Declared Per EC-02, Symptom 13.1.
1105
-
Arsonist Injured.
1120
,
Plant Stable, Walkdown of Plant Systems Complete, Exercise Terminated, Critique Begins.
1245
,
i
'l i
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