IR 05000461/1993007
| ML20044G045 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1993 |
| From: | Hague R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044G042 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-93-07, 50-461-93-7, NUDOCS 9306010358 | |
| Download: ML20044G045 (8) | |
Text
.
.-.
.
=
.
.
.
,
i
-
..
$
'
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
REGION III
'l e
Report No.
50-461/93007(DRP)
i Docket No.
50-461 License No. NPF-62
'
Licensee:
Illinois Power Company
500 South 27th Street Decatur, IL 62525 L
Facility Name:
Clinton Power Station Inspection At:
Clinton Site, Clinton, Illinois
!
Inspection Conducted:
April 9 - May 17, 1993 Inspectors:
P. G. Brochman
<
F. L. Brush Approved By:
f3 Ricfiard C a Je, Chief D' ate-l
-
Reactor Pr ts Section IC
,
Insoection Summary
.
Inspection from April 9 throuah May 17. 1993. (Report No. 50-461/93007(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident
-)
inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, plant j
operations, radiological controls, maintenance and surveillance, security, and
safety assessment and quality verification.
-
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
'
.
-!
i I
t
$
f v
E
!
!
,
i 9306010358 930520 PDR ADOCK 05000461
-
-. - - -
-
- -
-
-
-
-
- - - -
..
.
_
..
.
-.
-. - -
.
_
.
.
.,
!
-
$
-
i I
Executive Summary
Plant Operations
!
The plant operated at power levels up to 100 percent for the entire
-
report period.
-i i
Reactor power briefly exceeded 100 percent when the B reactor
__
-
recirculation flow control valve drifted open after its associated hydraulic power unit tripped.
.
~ Licensed operator training on problems with reactor vessel water level
--
'l instruments following rapid depressurization was very thorough..
_
However, the control room simulator does not yet sufficiently model-this
!
phenomena for all crews to enter the emergency operating' procedure for
!
reactor vessel flooding.
l t
Maintenance and Surveillance i
battery charger were very thorough.
~
l Licensee efforts in preparing cont'ingencies for troubleshooting the IB
-
'
Security Security personnel were very alert and properly identified a simulated
-
weapon during its attempted introduction into the protected area in a
,
training exercise.
l
!
Safety Assessment and Ouality Verification
]
i The quality of the safety assessments performed by both the off-site and
-
-
on-site review committees remained-excellent.
l
!
.
I
}
.
o t
!
!
j
!
..
.
--
-
.!
.
-
-
. - -
.
~
-
..
,
.
j i
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Illinois Power Company (IP)
'
J. Perry, Senior Vice President i
J. Cook, Vice President and Manager of.Clinton Power Station (CPS)
- J. Miller, Manager - Nuclear Station Engineering Department (NSED)
- R. Wyatt, Manager - Quality Assurance
.
,
- F. Spangenberg, III, Manager - Licensing and Safety l
- R. Morgenstern, Manager - Training
.,
- J. Palchak, Manager - Nuclear Planning and Support
- L. Everman, Director - Radiation Protection l
- P. Yocum, Director - Plant Operations
- W. Clark, Director - Plant Maintenance
- K. Moore, Director - Plant Technical
~!
W. Bousquet, Director - Plant Support Services
,
- C. Elsasser, Director - Planning & Scheduling l
- R.
Phares, Director - Licensing R. Kerestes, Director - Nuclear Safety and Analysis i
D. Vorneman, Director - Systems and Reliability, NSED e
"J. Langley, Director - Design and Analysis, NSED
!
- J. Sipek, Supervisor - Regulatory Interface
,
The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspection.
Denotes those present during the exit interview on May 17, 1993.
l
- -
2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (92701 & 92702)
i
,
a.
(Closed) Violation (461/92016-01(DRP)):
Failure to identify that a generic error in the calibration method of a nonsafety-related relay affected safety-related equipment. The inspectors verified that the corrective actions had been implemented as stated in the
!
licensee's response. The causes of this event were:
insensitivity of maintenance personnel to the potential _ of
_
nonsafety-related equipment affecting safety-related equipment;. a
!
lack of urgency in investigating this problem; and failure to
-)
'
involve the appropriate engineering personnel in analyzing the event.
l The licensee's corrective actions included:
Revising the condition report procedure'to lower the threshold-i
-
for-initiating a report.
_
.
'
Training for management on root cause analysis and corrective q
-
action program improvements.
Training for maintenance and technical personnel on maintaining
-
a questioning attitude and this specific event.
i Development of a root cause analysis manual and training on it
-
for maintenance and engineering personnel.
j l
'
3
!
i a'
i
.
.
_
.
-
.
.
'
Based on the corrective actions taken, this issue is considered closed.
b.
(Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item (461/93006-01(DRP)):
Questions relative to the fire protection design aspects of the main control room (MCR) ventilation system (VC). The licensee had previously identified two Agastat relays that were not in a seismically qualified configuration. One relay controlled an annunciator;in the MCR that would indicate a high temperature (i.e. fire) in the Train A VC system's charcoal adsorber bed.
Based on the.
annunciator, the operators would manually initiate a deluge system for the charcoal adsorber bed. The other relay controlled a damper which, when opened, would allow the operators-to purge the MCR of smoke, using outside air.
The licensee evaluated these two conditions and determined there was no safety impact.
For the first relay, a separate high-high temperature annunciator was available, as well as a-separate temperature detector and its two annunciators.
These annunciators would provide adequate information to alert the operators of a fire.
For the second relay, the capability of purging the MCR with outside air was part of the VC system's design, but was not a design basis requirement, as defined in Section 6.4.1 of the Clinton Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR).
Smoke could be removed by recirculating air through the charcoal adsorbers and filters.
Based on this information, the inspectors agreed with the licensee's conclusion that the potential failure of these. two relays would not prevent the licensee from meeting the design basis requirements. The inspectors have no further concerns.
This item is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Plant Operations The unit operated at power levels up to 100 percent for the entire report period.
a.
Operational Safety (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs, and' conducted discussions-with control room operators. During.these discussions and observations, the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions,- attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected-emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified the proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the circulating water screen house and auxiliary, containment, control, diesel, fuel handling, rad-waste, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks,
_ _.
.
_
__.._
. _
.
.
.
.
excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had-been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls and physical security plan.
b.
Reactor Power Greater than 100 Percent (71707)
l i
On April 8, 1993, reactor power reached 100.2 percent for
!
approximately 5 minutes when the reactor recirculation flow
control valve (FCV) drifted open, after its hydraulic power unit
,
(HPU) tripped. The shift supervisor monitored reactor power while
!
the reactor operators restarted the HPU..The highest power level
observed was 100.2 percent.
!
,
The reactor operators restarted the HPU and the FCV returned to e
t its original position. The seals on the FCV's hydraulic actuator-were leaking. Consequently, if the HPU tripped, the FCV would
open due to the -fluid force on the valve disk, rather than locking
!
in position. The HPU tripped due to problems with its Nodicon
-
controller. This problem has occurred several times. over the last l
few months.
The licensee evaluated this event and concluded there was no safety significance. The reactor has been analyzed for.brief l
power excursions up to 102 percent. The licensee had. scheduled i
the actuators for replacement in the next refueling outage l
(September 1993).
The licensee was also developing a modification j
to replace the Nodicon controller with a newer model.
The-i inspectors have reviewed the licensee's actions'and have no further concerns.
,
I c.
Operator Trainina on Problems With Reactor Water level Instruments (2515/119)
.:
The inspectors verified the licensee's implementation of operator j
guidance and training on problems with reactor vessel water level l
instruments following rapid depressurization transients
<
(notching), as directed by Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/119.
The inspectors forwarded the information requested by' Appendix A
of the TI to Region Ill.
'
The inspectors reviewed the training material and verified it j
incorporated the interim guidance from the BWR owners group. All.
!
operating crews have received classroom and simulator training on this issue.
Discussions with several operators indicated.they i
were familiar with the phenomena and understood what compensatory j
actions should be taken. The inspectors observed two crews on~the a
simulator. One crew did not enter the E0P for reactor vessel (RPV) flooding. They did suspect this problem was occurring and
asked each other several times if the " notching" effect was-
!
occurring.
However, they concluded that sufficient level channels
'
!
,
s
~
v ww-
-
~
.
"
l
.
.
!
-
'!
remained unaffected so that they did not need to enter the RPV flooding E0P. Training department management stated the simulator did not model the phenomena sufficiently for a crew to enter RPV-
flooding based solely on level transmitter " notching" effect. The
!
second crew did enter the flooding procedure after level indication was lost due to reaching saturation conditions.
The training department management stated the modeling of this effect would be reviewed after the licensee received the equations from the owners group. A determination would be made if any
changes were warranted. This information was expected by the end
[
of July 1993. The inspectors concluded that when-faced with
!
erratic reactor vessel level instruments the operators would enter i
the correct E0P.
-
The licensee will also make any changes to the E0Ps after it l
receives the owners group information. The E0Ps were reviewed to verify that they were consistent with the guidance issued to date.
,
i
The licensee does not have a program for controlling. level transmitter process fluid leakage, but does inspect transmitters,
'
as part of their 18 month calibration procedure.
Finally, the
,
licensee has not observed any level anomalies during. reactor
.
'
,
depressurizations. The inspectors concluded that the licensee has adequately incorporated the interim information into its licensed
_1 operator training program.
Based on this review, the-inspectors
have no further concerns. This TI is considered closed.
)
d.
Alternate Boration Procedure Review (71707)
)'
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedure, engineering calculation, and equipment necessary to support alternate.
i boration.. Alternate boration would be utilized if the reactor
!
needed to be shut down and control rods were inoperable combined l
with-the-failure of the standby liquid control (SLC) system.
The
.i inspectors reviewei NSED calculation No IP-Y-0001 and verified
the quantities of boric acid and borax were correct. These
!
quantities were incorporated into CPS procedure 4411.10, "EOP SLC
!
Operations." The inspector verified the required quantity of.
-;
chemicals (12,038 pounds) and support equipment were in the
.
.!
correct warehouse. The chemicals were appropriately segregated
,
and labeled. The inspectors did not. identify any concerns.
!
?
No violations or deviations were identified.
l i
4.
Maintenance and Surveillance (61726 & 62703)
!
a.
Observations Of Work Activities
.
The inspectors observed maintenance and surveillance activities of j
both-safety-related and nonsafety-related systems and' components
'
listed below. These activities were reviewed tc ascertain that i
,
they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures,
!
[
.
e
'
-.
.- -,-.
.
..,.
..
-
-
..
--.
, _ _ _ _
.
,
.
regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance j
~
with technical specifications.
Document Activity D32490 Replace valve IE51F095 D32972 Repair valve IE51F045 D34302 Install Modification SAF009 on Air Dryer ISA01D D34941 Votes test valve IE51F010 PMMRIS014 Clean and Lubricate Coupling on Pump IE51C003 PMMRIS015 Sample Oil in Pump IE510003 b.
Problems with the IB Battery Charoer On April 30 and May 1,1993, problems were observed with the float voltage output from safety-related battery charger IB.
In both
!
cases the float voltage potentiometer was adjusted to. correct the
~
problem.. The licensee developed a plan for troubleshooting.this
problem.. The amount of troubleshooting that could be performed
,
on-line was limited due to a very short technical specification
>
allowed outage time. The licensee conducted _ preliminary
'!
discussions with the NRC Region III and NRR personnel in case
!
'
enforcement discretion would be needed.
,
However, the licensee's on-line troubleshooting did not identify
>
any problems and the licensee elected to postpone any off-line i
troubleshooting until the problem reccurs.
The inspectors monitored the licensee's activities and did not identify any
'
concerns.
No violations or-deviations were identified.
,
!
5.
Security (71707)
!
!
'
Security Trainino Exercise
-
The resident inspector participated in a security training exercise at l
the licensee's request.
The resident inspector attempted to smuggle a i
simulated weapon into the protected area.
The simulated weapon was
!
identified as a training device.
The security force member, at the l'
protected area access facility, detected the simulated weapon promptly.
and followed the appropriate procedures. The exercise was well controlled by security management.
The inspectors did not identify any-
-i concerns.
j No violations or deviations were identified.
!
6.
Safety Assessment and Ouality Verification-a.
Offsite and Onsite Review Committee Activities (40500)-
!
The inspectors attended a Nuclear Review and Audit Group (NRAG)
- offsite review committee - meeting and observed its interaction i
i
)
-
.
.
,.
.
.
. _.
_ _ _
-__
,
.
-
._
__
N
< '
.
.
,
p
.
with licensee management. The group discussed plant performance.
.
the new standardized technical specifications, results of the
NRC's E0P and EDSFI inspections (Inspection Report Nos.
461/93005(DRS) and 461/93003(DRS)) The NRAG committee merbers
.
were well qualified and very probing in their review.of licensee
!
activ4 ties. The committee appeared to be independent and not
,
subject to undue influence by licensee management as evidenced by
{
the content of the subcommittee reports and in the discussions
!
between licensee personnel and committee members. The emphasis i
'
towards safety was clearly evident in various NRAG meeting minutes reviewed by the inspector.
,
t The inspectors attended a Facility Review Group (FRG) (onsite
review committee) meeting. The appropriate personnel were present
!
and there was good interaction between the members when discussing
'
the agenda items. The FRG did not seem biased towards plant-
operations but judged the items from a safety perspective.
The j
proper emphasis towards safety was also evident in various FRG
'
meeting minutes reviewed by the inspector.
I The inspectors did not identify any concerns in the performance of
'
the offsite and onsite review committees. Both are considered
!
strengths in the licensee's safety assessment program.
,
b.
Licensee Event Reoort Follow-uo (90712 & 92700)
.
?
Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, i
and review of records, the following licensee event reports (LER)
I were reviewed to determine that the reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
d LER Title j
461/92010 Partial loss of Reactor Feedwater Flow l
461/93001 Inoperable H,/0, Analyzers j
No violations or deviations were identified.
l
'
7.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in f
-
paragraph I at the conclusion of the inspection on May 17, 1993. The
,
inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the i
findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational
-
content of the inspection report, with regard to documents or processes
'
reviewed.by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee.did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
,
l
.
-
.
.
..
.
.