IR 05000461/1993006
| ML20035E526 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1993 |
| From: | Hague R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035E516 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-93-06, 50-461-93-6, NUDOCS 9304160126 | |
| Download: ML20035E526 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
l Report No. 50-461/93006(DRP)
Docket No.
50-461 License No. NPF-62 Licensee:
Illinois Power Company 500 South 27th Street Decatur, IL 62525
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Facility Name: Clinton Power Station
Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, Illinois Inspection Conducted: March 2 - April 8, 1993 Inspectors:
P. G. Brochman F. L. Brush
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MD Approved By:
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Richara L. Hague, Chi Da'te Reactor Projects S c on 1C Inspection Summary l
Inspection from March 2 throuah April 8. 1993. (Report No. 50-461/93006(DRP))
l Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee actions on plant operations, radiological controls, l
maintenance and surveillance, engineering and technical support, and I
management meetings.
Results: Of the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
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identified in three areas: one non-cited violation was identified in the remaining area: (failure to follow operating procedures---paragraph 2.b).
One i
unresolved item was identified (operability of Drywell and Containment Atmosphere H,/0, Analyzer---paragraph 5).
l 9:N34160126 930412 PDR ADOCK 05000461 G
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Executive Summary Plant Operations The plant operated at power levels up to 100 percent for the entire
report period.
A control rod was mispositioned during a sequence exchange due to a
i reactor operator's personnel error. After identification of the error, the operating crew failed to follow the abnormal operating procedure for a mispositioned control rod. There was no safety impact on the reactor core.
Radioloaical Controls Effective April 1, 1993, the licensee implemented the requirements of
the new 10 CFR Part 20, " Standards for Protection Against Radiation."
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. Maintenance and Surveillance The licensee determined that a change to the size of Agastat relays
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interfered with the relay's restraining device and affected seismic qualification. Two safety-related relays in the control room
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ventilation system were &ffected. The impact of these relays on the capability of the system to perform all of its design functions required further review. (IFI 461/93006-01(DRP))
Enaineerina and Tcchnical Support The licensee determined that both containment and drywell H,/0,
atmosphere monitors had been inoperable since plant licensing, due to missing components. These instruments were required by Regulatory j
Guide 1.97, but did not prevent or mitigate any accidents.
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DETAILS I.
Persons Contacted Illinois Power Company (IP)
J. Perry, Senior Vice President
- J. Cook, Vice President and Manager of Clinton Power Station (CPS)
J. Miller, Manager - Nuclear Station Engineering Department (NSED)
- R. Wyatt, Manager - Quality Assurance
- F. Spangenberg, III, Manager - Licensing and Safety
- R. Morgenstern, Manager - Training
- J. Palchak, Manager - Nuclear Planning and Support
- L. Everman, Director - Radiation Protection
- P. Yocum, Director - Plant Operations W. Clark, Director - Plant Maintenance K. Moore, Director - Plant Technical W. Bousquet, Director - Plant Support Services C. Elsasser, Director - Planning & Scheduling
- R. Phares, Director - Licensing R. Kerestes, Director - Nuclear Safety and Analysis D. Korneman, Director - Systems and Reliability, NSED
- J. Langley, Director - Design and Analysis, NSED
- J. Sipek, Supervisor - Regulatory Interface The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspection.
Denotes those present during the exit interview on April 8, 1993.
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2.
Plant Operations
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The unit operated at power levels up to 100 percent for the entire period.
a.
Doerational Safety (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. Duriro these discussions and observations, the operators were ale *t, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified the
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proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the circulating water screen house and auxiliary, containm2nt, control, diesel, fuel handling, rad-waste, and turbite buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment
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conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness i
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conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls and physical security plan.
Plant housekeeping
conditions had declined in some areas. This was discussed with i
plant management and corrective actions were being taken.
b.
Control Rod Mispositionino Event At 3:05 p.m. on February 27, 1993, the reactor operator (RO)
mispositioned a control rod due to personnel error. This condition was immediately identified to the control room supervisor. After discussions with the on-shift nuclear engineer, the control rod was returned to its original position; however, the immediate action steps for Clinton procedure CPS 4007.02, l
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" Inadvertent Rod Movement," were not followed. There were no adverse effects on the reactor core.
No change was observed in the off-gas radiation monitors.
No changes were observed in reactor coolant chemistry.
The operating crew had completed scram time testing for the control rods and had commenced a rod sequence exchange at 2:11 p.m.
Reactor power was approximately 76 percent.
The R0 had intended to withdraw control rod 12-21 from position 12 to 48 by depressing the continuous withdrawal and withdrawal pushbuttons.
However, the R0 depressed the continuous withdrawal and insert pushbuttons. This caused the control rod to insert. The R0 observed the control rod at position 08 instead of 14 and released
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the pushbuttons. The control rod settled at position 06.
This personnel error was due to lack to attention to detail.
The control room supervisor (SRO) was immediately notified by the R0
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that a rod was mispositioned.
The on-shift nuclear engineer had been monitoring the sequence exchange from the process computer room. After seeing the error, he immediately entered the control room and briefly discussed the problem with the control room personnel. The nuclear engineer stated, in an interview, that his primary concern was that two adjacent rods were at position 06.
The SR0 directed the RO to withdraw rod 12-21 back to position 12.
Rod withdrawal commenced 73 seconds after the control rod was inserted. The shift supervisor was notified. The operating crew then reviewed CPS 4007.02, and determined that several immediate actions had not been completed.
These immediate actions included:
Reducing power by 50 MWe by reducing reactor recirculation
fl ow.
Obtain a P-1 core thermal limits report from the proces:
computer.
If an adjacent control rod was at the same position, insert
the mispositioned control rod two notches further.
As supplemental action, the nuclear engineer was to be contacted to obtain guidance to reposition the control rod.
(Note: The
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nuclear engineer is not normally on-shift).
In subsequent i
interviews, the operating crew stated that they believed the i
concept of CPS 4007.02 was to get the plant to a safe condition and then contact the nuclear engineer to obtain guidance. As the nuclear engineer was already on scene, the operating crew (
concluded that they did not need to perform the immediate actions, i
but could proceed directly to the supplemental actions.
t The operating crew documented this event and notified licensee i
management and the NRC. The licensee's investigation concluded l
that the cause of the first error was lack of attention to detail
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l involving a routine repetitive task. The licensee concluded the l
second error was due to the crew not understanding the philosophy l
of accomplishing the abnormal operating procedure's immediate
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I actions-to place the plant in a safe condition-and then taking I
l the time to assess the appropriate corrective actions.
In assessing the failure to execute the immediate actions the
licensee concluded that reducing power by 50 Mwe was not necessary l
as reactor power was already at 76 percent. Also, the P-1 data i
would not be valid in the middle of the sequence exchange.
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However, the control rod could have been inserted to position 02.
There was no safety impact to the core from the operator's
omission of CPS 4007.02 immediate actions.
The licensee's corrective actions included reviewing this event with all of the operating crews and nuclear engineers, stressing
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the need to execute immediate actions on reactivity abnormal
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i operating procedures before performing supplemental actions, and I
the intent behind the procedures. The sequence exchange
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procedures were under revision to reference CPS 4007.02. A i
similar event where control rods were inserted rather than continuously withdrawn occurred in September 1992. The licensee was still evaluating if any changes to the rod control system j
hardware would be reasonable, given two errors in 6 months.
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i Based on a review of the corrective actions and interviews of the involved personnel, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate.
Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regu7ations, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires l
that activities affecting quality be accomplished in accordance with documented procedures. The failure of the control room crew
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to follow the immediate actions of CPS 4007.02 was a violation of j
Criterion V.
However, the violation is not being cited because
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the criteria specified in Section VII.B.1 of the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
(Enforcement Policy,- 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C) were met.
No deviations were identified. One non-cited violation was identified.
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3.
Radiolooical Controls (71707)
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Implementation of the Revision to 10 CFR Part 20 Effective April 1,1993, the licensee implemented the revised requirements for 10 CFR 20.1001 - 20.2402, " Standards foi Protection Against Radiation." The inspectors attended the training provided to plant personnel on the differences between the new and old Part 20 and did not have any concerns in this area. Regional specialist inspectors will conduct further review of the licensee's program.
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Verification of Radiolooical Surveys The inspectors performed a gamma radiation survey of various areas of the containment and auxiliary buildings, as part of routine
I monitoring of radiation protection activities. The results of
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this survey were compared to the licensee's most recent records and were in close agreement.
No violations or deviations were identified.
l 4.
Maintenance and Surveillance (61726 & 62703)
a.
Observations Of Work Activities The inspectors observed maintenance and surveillance activities of
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both safety-related and nonsafety-related systems and components listed below. These activities were reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.
Document Activity 9080.01 Diesel Generator 1A Monthly Operability Test D25229 H,/0, Analyzer Repair
I D32393 Reactor Protection system "A" Inverter Repair D33675 Troubleshooting of "B" Control Room Chiller b.
Incorrect Restrainino Devices Affect Seismic Qualification of Aqastat Relays Licensee maintenance personnel discovered a separate problem with proper engagement of Agastat relays' restraining devices, during an investigation of a problem with missing restraining devices (see Inspection Report 461/93004(DRP)). The licensee determined that relays "date coded" prior to 1983-1984 were 0.125 inches shorter than the currently available relay. With the newer,
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longer, relay installed, the restraining device was not fully engaged and the relay was not in a seismically qualified configuration. These new relays had the same stock code and there
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were no instructions to alert maintenance workers to the problems that these longer relays could cause.
The licensee inspected all 426 safety-related relays to determine if any of the longer relays were installed without the correct length restraining device. Two were identified on the control ventilation system (VC), train
"A".
The system was taken out of service and the condition was corrected. One relay controlled dampers used in the purge mode of operation. The other relay controlled annunciators for high temperature in the~ charcoal adsorber bed. The licensee's initial position was that the
failure of these relays did not affect the capability of the VC system to perform its design function. The inspectors reviewed
Section 6.4 of the CPS Updated Safety Analysis Report and
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identified two questions relative to the fire protection aspects
of the VC system's design. These questions will be reviewed in a
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subsequent report as inspection follow-up item 461/93006-01(DRP).
i The licensee evaluated this condition and concluded it was not
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reportable under 10 CFR Part 21.
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- The inspectors concluded that maintenance personnel had done an excellent job in identifying this problem; and that management
actions to address the problem were prompt and thorough.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Enaineerina and Technical Support
Drywell and Containment H,10, Analyzer
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Atmosphere H,/0, Analyzers had been inoperable since initial plant
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The licensee determined that both of the Drywell and Containment l
construction. These instruments were required by Regulatory Guide 1.97 ~
and did not prevent or mitigate any accidents.
During a routine surveillance test, the
"A" analyzer's backup air compressor's motor tripped on thermal overload..The backup compressor
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would be used when plant instrument air pressure decreased below
35 psig. Normal instrument air pressure was regulated to 40 5 psig.
l The air was used to operate the valves in the analyzer. The licensee i
l determined that a flywheel should have been installed on the motor shaft i
to smooth out the compressor cycles. The compressor motor's running i
current was in excess of its thermal overload setting with the flywheel
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missing. The problem also existed on the "B" analyzer's compressor.
Additionally, sometime after startup testing, a cap had been placed on
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the bleed line on each of the backup air compressors' storage tank. The i
tank was normally pressurized by instrument air and the bleed line was
used to ensure that moisture did not collect in the tank. Additionally, an orifice in the bleed line was sized to regulate the tank's air pressure at 40 i 5 psig when the backup compressor was in operation.
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The air pressure in the tank was 65 psig when the cap was installed.
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This caused the motor to run at even a higher current, than was attributed to the missing flywheel.
The inspectors identified the following concerns to the licensee:
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What was the safety significance of having both analyzers
What acceptance criteria was used to determine that the compressor
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passed its periodic surveillance test?
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Had any changes to the surveillance procedure been appropriately l
reviewed or recommended changes incorporated.
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Did the increased air pressure, during backup air compressor
operation, affect the operability and/or service life of the analyzer valves?
I The inspectors will review the results of the licensee's evaluation.
This issue will be followed as an unresolved item (461/93006-02(DRP)).
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No violations or deviations were identified. One unresolved item was identified.
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Manaaement Meetinas On March 4,1993, Mr. H. J. Miller, Deputy Regional Administrator and l
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members of his staff met with Mr. J. S. Perry, Senior Vice President and
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l members of his staff at the NRC office in Glen Ellyn, Illinois. Topics
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included: recent plant events; performance in the operations,
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maintenance, and engineering areas; staffing reductions; and independent
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assessments of licensee performance.
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Unresolved Items
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l Unresolved items are matters about wh..
more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or l
deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is
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discussed in paragraph 5.
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8.
Inspection Follow-up Items
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l Inspection follow-up items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector,. and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An inspection follow-up item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.b.
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Non-Cited Violation The NRC uses the Notice of Violation to formally document failure to meet a legally binding requirement. However, because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee's initiatives for self-identification and correction of problems, the NRC will not issue a Notice of Violation if the requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, are met. A violation of regulatory requirements identified during the inspection, for which a Notice of Violation will not be issued, is discussed in paragraph'2.b.
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10.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph I at the conclusion of the inspection on April 8,1993. The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational l
content of the inspection report, with regard to documents or processes
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reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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