IR 05000454/1981016

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IE Insp Repts 50-454/81-16 & 50-455/81-12 on 810922-25. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Promptly Identify & Correct Separation Problems in Lower Cable Spreading Room
ML20032B075
Person / Time
Site: Byron  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/21/1981
From: Hawkins F, Love R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20032B072 List:
References
50-454-81-16, 50-455-81-12, NUDOCS 8111040355
Download: ML20032B075 (5)


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- U.S. NUCIIAR REGULATORY C0tfMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND EFFORCEMENT

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/81-16; 50-455/81-12 Docket No. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. CPPR-130; CPPR-131 Licensee-Commonwealth Edisoa Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection Ati Byron Site, Byron, IL Inspection Conducted: September 22-25, 1981 w

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10 /2,1/ B l Inspector:

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Approved By:

F.

. Hawkins, Acting Chief (Q1ti/61 Plant Systens Section

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Inspection Summary Inspection on September 22-25, 1981 (Reports No. 50-454/81-16; 50-455/81-12)

Areas Inspected: Follow-up on previously identified inspection tindings; review of electrical procedures and records. This inspection involved a total of 30 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: Of the areas inspected, one apparent item of noncompliance was identified (Criterion XVI - failure to promptly identify and correct items of nenconformance - Paragraph 2.a).

8111040355 811023 PDR ADOCK 05000454 G

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company G. Sorensen, Project Superintendent

  • J. O. Binder, Project Electrical Supervisor
  • R. B. Klingler, Quality Assurance Supervisor
  • M. A. Standish, Quality Assurance Superintendent
  • R. Tuetken, Assistant Project Superintendent The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during this reporting period.
  • Denotes those present at the exit interview.

1.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.

(0 pen) Noncompliance (50-454/80-09-01; 50-455/80-08-01): CECO did not ensure that Sargent and Lundy (S&L) adequately translated

  • 5e requirements of the Byron PSAR and S&L Specifications 2831

.nto S&L Specifications 2815 in that corrosion protection was not specified for the exposed carbon steel material and exposad spot welds used in the installation of seismic Category 1 electrical cable tray hanger supports. Due to the unavailability of personnel, the inspector was unable to obtain the answers to the questions contained in NRC letter to CECO dated August 14. 1981.

b.

(0 pen) Noncompliance (50-454/80-12-01; 50-455/80-11-01): CECO did not ensure that Sargent and Lundy adequately translated the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterions IV and V, into the design of the cooling water piping for Emergency Diesel Generator IB in that the cooling water lines for D/G IB pass through the room housing Unit IA.

Ae indicated in NRC letter to CECO, dated November 18, 1980, this matter has been referred to our headquarters staff for resolation. We will advise you of their findings.

c.

(Closed) Noncompliance (50-454/80-15-01; 50-455/81-14-01):

Activities affecting quality were not prescribed by instructions, procedures, or drawings in that:

(1) Requirements were not estab-lished for the hardware used to assemble the seismic Category 1 battery racks to be capable of withstanding acidic atmosphere; (2) Documented instructions were not established to conduct timely inspections; (3' Documented instructions were not established to

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control instruments which were determined to be defective during bench testing.

(1) Station Procedure BHS 8.2.3.2.C-1 (125V Battery Bank and Charger Operability, Revision 0, dated August 1981)

includes an inspection point to verify that the battery rock and battery rack hardware is free of corrosion.

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c (2) Procedure QC-3, Paragraph 9.1, was revised to incorporate an " Inspection Request" form to ensure timely inspection.

Most of the inspection requests were honored the same day they were prepared.

(3) The licensee has taken and completed action to control (tag)

the defective instruments and revise the procedure.

d.

(Open) Noncompliance (50/454/80-25-09; 50-455/60-23-05): Safety related cables were bundled with non-safety related cables in the lower cable spreading room in violation of IEEE 384 and FSAR com-mitments. Procedure 10, " Class IF Cable Installation" was revised to incorporate a 12" separation requirement. This procedure was implemented on September 24, 1981 This item will remain open until implementation can be verified.

(Open) Noncompliance (50-454/80-25-13): Welds on cable pan bent c.

plate stiffeners do not conform to Sargent and Lundy (S&L) Standard STD-EB-701.

Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories made sketches of a pre-determined number of stiffener plate welds, showing weld size, crac ks, lack of fusion, craters, undercut, porosity, weld profile and underrun. This information was forwarded to S&L for evaluation.

This item will remain open until the results of S&L's evaluation can be reviewed.

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f.

(Closed) Unresolved item (50-454/80-25-15; 50-455/80-23-06):

Incom-plate / inaccurate documentation received from Okonite Cable Company for 5KV power cable. The inspector reviewed the documentation for the subject cable. All required documentation is on-site and the Quality Assurance Traceability Schematic has been corrected to show the proper QC Length Number.

g.

(Closed) Noncompliance (50-454/80-25-16): The minimum separation criteria for redundant impulse sensing lines as specified in the Byron PSAR was not translated into instructions, procedures, specifications, and drawings. Engineering Change Notice Number 1958, dated January 14, 1981, was issued to incorporate separation criteria and color coding requirements for all instrument sensing lines into Specifications F-2906 and F/L-2739.

2.

Review of Eiectrical Procedures and Records a.

In acco Jance with Commonwealth Edison's (CECO) commitment to the NRC (May 7, 1981 letter from Cordell Reed to James G. Keppler, Paragraph 2.a), Procedure Number 10, " Class 1E Cable Installation",

Revision 10, Issue 2, was prepared to incorporate the 12 inch separation requirement between Class IE and non-Class 1E cables in free-tir. This procedure was approved with comments by Sargent and Lundy (S&L) of August 7, 1981 and transmitted to Hatfield Electric by CECO on August 13, 1981.

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While a' Wapting to close Noncompliance 50-454/80-25-09; 50-455/80-73-05, which concerns the separation of Class IE and ncn-Class 1E cable in free air, it was observed tirat the separa-tion problems identiff ed ca a previous inspection had been corrected, but there are still separation prsiems in the lower cable spreading room.

During discussions with the Hatfield Quality Assurance Manager on September 24, 1981 (AM), it was learned that Hatfield chose not to implement Revision 10, Issue 2 but were implementing Revision 9, Issue 1, dated February 3, 1981.

The inspector queried the licensee as to when they planned to honor their commitment of May 7, 1981.

On September 24, 1981 (PM), CECA issued a letter to Hatfield directfng them to implement Procedure Number 10, Class 1E Cable Installation, Revision 10, Issue 2, dated June 8, 1981 with S&L comments immediately.

The Region III inspector informed the licensee of the failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected is an item of noncompliance in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI as described in Appendix A of the report transmittal 1ctter.

(50-454/81-16-01; 50-455/81-12-01)

b.

During a tour of the Unit I containment, it was observed that the cable pan markings on 1396E-C2E and 1396R-P2E exceeded the 15 foot maximum spacing requirements of S&L drawing 6E-0-3390, Hatfield Procedure 9E, " Class 1 Cable Pan Identification," Revision 6, Issue 1, dated January 23, 1981 and IEEE 384-1974 as commh ted to in Byron FSAR, Paragraph 8.3.1.4.2.1.

During discussions with the liatfield Quality Assurance Manager on September 24, 1981, it was learned that Hatfield chose not to implement Procedure 9E after it had been reviewed and accepted by S&L on January 26, 1981. The licensee informed the inspector that Hatfield's failure to implement Procedure 9E had been identified by CECO 62 ring an audit of Fatfield on September 9-10, 1981 and were awaiting their response. Pending a review of the response to the subject audit, this matter is unresolved.

(50-454/81-16-02; 50-455/81-12-02)

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c.

The Region III inspector observed that Hatfield Procedure 10, Revision 10, Issue 2 (Class 1E Cable Installation) did not address how the licensee was going to verify that the maximum cable pulling tension had not been exceeded when small cables and/or instrumentation cables were pulled.

(i.e., cables that have a maximum pulling tension that is less than the force that can be exerted on a cable by one person) Tests performed on other projects indicate this force to be approximately 125 pounds.

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Pending a detailed review of cable pulling records to verify that maximum cable pulling tensions have not been exceeded, this item is unresolved.

(50-454/81-16-03; 50-455/81-12-03)

d.

During an inspection of the main control room, it was observed that the safety related switches, instrue. ants, recorders, etc. were not distinctively identified as bring fx the protection system as required by Paragrapa 4.22 of IEEE-179. Pending a review of the technical specificatJons, FSAk re;quirements, etc., *.his.

item is unresolved.

(50-454/81-16-04; 50-455/81-12-04)

e.

During an inspection of Unit I containment, it was observed that the horizontal separation between C. lass 1E and non-Class 1E cable trays was approximately six inches. Trays involved were 1396E-C2E and 1396CC-C2B and 1396-P2E and 1396B-P2B. Para-graph 8.3.1.4.2.2 of the Byron FSAR discusses minimum raceway separation criteria for:

(1) Minimum spacing for Engineering Safety Featuren (ESF)

Divisions and Reactor Trip System (RTS) Channels.

(2) Separation for Non-Safety-Related Cable Trays.

The FSAR does not discuss the separation requirements for Safety-Related (ESF & RTS) Cable Trays and Non-Safety-Related Cable Trays.

Sargent and Lundy (S&L) drawings 6E-1-4027A, B, and C, Revision A, dated May 16, 1977 have interpreted the " Separation Requirements for Non-Safety-Related Cable Trays" to encompass the separation require-ments between Safety Related and Non-Safety-Related Cable Trays.

This item is unresolved pending a review of S&L calculations for all Safety-Related/Non-Safety-Related separation requirements where they deviate from the criteria established in IEEE-384.

(50-454/81-16-05; 50-455/81-12-05).

Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or items of noncom-pliance or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2.b 2.c, 2.d, and 2.e.

Exit Meeting The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) on September 25, 1981. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings reported in previous paragraphs.

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