IR 05000445/2018011
| ML18276A097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/2018 |
| From: | Anton Vegel NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Peters K Vistra Operations Company |
| Haire M | |
| References | |
| 4-2017-030, EA-18-064 IR 2018011 | |
| Download: ML18276A097 (13) | |
Text
October 4, 2018
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000445/2018011; 05000446/2018011 AND NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2017-030
Dear Mr. Peters:
This letter refers to the investigation completed on May 23, 2018, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. The investigation was conducted, in part, to determine whether a reactor operator assigned to Vistra Operations Company LLC, at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, willfully documented inaccurate information in a required record regarding the filling of the refueling water storage tank on April 28, 2017. Enclosure 1 provides a factual summary of the basis for the NRCs concern that willfulness was associated with an apparent violation in this case. The issue was discussed with Mr. T. McCool, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff during a telephone conversation on September 10, 2018.
Based on the information acquired during the investigation, one apparent violation was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The apparent violation is against Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.9 which requires, in part, information required by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Further details regarding this apparent violation are documented in Enclosure 2 to this letter.
The circumstances surrounding the apparent willful violation, the potential significance of the issue, and the need for lasting and effective corrective action were discussed with members of your staff at the inspection exit meeting on September 10, 2018. Additionally, this report documents, in Enclosure 2, one finding of very low safety significance (Green), which involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to:
(1) respond in writing to the apparent violation addressed in this inspection report within 30 days of the date of this letter; or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference (PEC); or (3) request alternative dispute resolution (ADR). If a PEC is held, the PEC will be closed to public observation since information related to an Office of Investigations report will be discussed and the report has not been made public. If you decide to participate in a PEC or pursue ADR, please contact Mr. Mark Haire, Chief, Project Branch A, at 817-200-1148 within 10 days of the date of this letter. A PEC should be held within 30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000445/2018011; 05000446/2018011; EA-18-064 and should include for the apparent violation: (1) the reason for the apparent violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response.
Additionally, your response should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Director, Division of Reactor Projects, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 1600 E. Lamar Blvd.,
Arlington, TX 76011-4511. If an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision.
If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a PEC does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned.
In lieu of a PEC, you may also request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue.
Alternative dispute resolution is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts using a neutral third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral mediator works with parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the issues.
Additional information concerning the NRCs ADR program can be obtained at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html, as well as NRC brochure NUREG/BR-0317, Enforcement Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, Revision 2 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession ML18122A101). The Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violation described in the Enclosure 2 may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
For administrative purposes, this letter and enclosures are issued as NRC Inspection Report 05000445/2018011; 05000446/2018011. The apparent violation will be issued as AV 05000446/2018011-01; and the finding and associated NCV will be issued as NCV 05000446/2018011-02, both as described in Enclosure 2.
If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your responses, if you choose to provide them, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs ADAMS, accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.
However, you should be aware that all final NRC documents, including the final Office of Investigations report, are official agency records and may be made available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act, subject to redaction of certain information in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Mark Haire of my staff at 817-200-1148.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anton Vegel, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-445; 50-446 License Nos. NPF-87; NPF-89
Enclosures:
1. Factual Summary 2. Inspection Report 05000445/2018011; 05000446/2018011
Enclosure 1 FACTUAL SUMMARY OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 4-2017-030
On May 23, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations (OI),
Region IV, initiated an investigation to determine, in part, whether a licensed reactor operator (RO) employed by VISTRA Operations Company LLC (licensee) at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant willfully provided ina
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000445, 05000446
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000445; 05000446/2018011
Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-011-0049
Licensee:
Vistra Operations Company, LLC
Facility:
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Glen Rose, Texas
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2018, to September 10, 2018
Inspectors:
R. Alexander, Senior Project Engineer
A. Athar, Project Engineer
J. Josey, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Mark S. Haire
Chief, Project Branch A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1
and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is
the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the
table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Maintain a Quality Record Complete and Accurate in All Material Respects
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-cutting
Aspect
Inspection
Procedure
Not
Applicable
Apparent Violation
Open
Not
Applicable
71153 -
Follow-up of
Events and
The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9, in that the licensee appears to
have failed to maintain information required by the Commissions regulations that was
complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, following equipment manipulation
and an unanticipated loss of inventory in a portion of the reactor coolant system, the licensee
appears to have failed to maintain complete and accurate information in condition report
CR-2017-005788 relative to the cause of the loss of inventory event and the identified
condition adverse to quality in the corrective action program.
Failure to Follow a Quality Procedure Associated with the Reactor Makeup and Chemical
Control System
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-cutting
Aspect
Inspection
Procedure
Initiating
Events
Green
Closed
H.12 - Avoid
Complacency
71153 -
Follow-up of
Events and
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensees failure to follow a quality procedure associated with the
reactor makeup and chemical control system which resulted in an unanticipated loss of
inventory from the volume control tank in the reactor coolant system. Specifically, on
April 28, 2017, a reactor operator failed to complete step 5.2.7.G in quality procedure
SOP-104B, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control System, which would isolate the volume
control tank from the chemical and volume control system, prior to directing a nuclear
equipment operator to complete subsequent steps 5.2.7.K and 5.2.7.L, which opened isolation
valves to the refueling water storage tank. These actions resulted in the unanticipated loss of
inventory from the volume control tank into the refueling water storage tank.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were
declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were
met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71153Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Personnel Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated an unanticipated loss of inventory from the volume control tank in
the reactor coolant system and the licensees performance in response to the transient on
April 28, 2017.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Maintain a Quality Record Complete and Accurate in All Material Respects
Cornerstone
Significance/Severity
Cross-cutting
Aspect
Inspection
Procedure
Not Applicable
Apparent Violation
Open
Not
Applicable
71153 -
Follow-up of
Events and
The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9, in that the licensee appears to
have failed to maintain information required by the Commissions regulations that was
complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, following equipment manipulation
and an unanticipated loss of inventory in a portion of the reactor coolant system, the licensee
appears to have failed to maintain complete and accurate information in condition report
CR-2017-005788 relative to the cause of the loss of inventory event and the identified
condition adverse to quality in the corrective action program.
Description: On April 28, 2017, following an attempt to fill the refueling water storage tank
(RWST) that resulted in a lowering level in the volume control tank (VCT), a licensed reactor
operator (RO) admitted that he provided incomplete or inaccurate information to licensee
personnel on a number of occasions. Specifically, the RO stated that after he realized that
valve 2-FCV-110B, reactor coolant system makeup to charging pump suction isolation valve,
was not aligned properly he did not alert the control room, and when others assumed the
valve was leaking by he did not correct them. The RO also admitted that he knowingly
submitted a written statement where he indicated that the valve had been closed and reported
the same in Condition Report CR-2017-005788 that he drafted, which was not accurate. As a
result, the NRC has identified an apparent willful violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness
and Accuracy of Information.
Corrective Action(s): The licensee entered the apparent violation into the corrective action
program, and initiated actions to evaluate the reasons for the apparent violation and the
effectiveness of the corrective actions taken for the initial event in April 2017.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-2018-006118
Enforcement:
Severity: The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider
willfulness in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address
this apparent violation which involves willfulness using traditional enforcement to adequately
deter non-compliance. The severity of this apparent violation will be determined in
accordance with the Enforcement Policy pending a final enforcement determination.
Apparent Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information required by the
Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall
be complete and accurate in all material respects.
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, requires, in part, that sufficient records shall
be maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality. The licensee established
three quality related procedures STA-422, Corrective Action Program, STI-421.01, Initiation
of Issue Reports, and STI-421.02, Issue Report Reviews, in part, to implement the stations
problem identification and resolution process, including the identification and documentation
of conditions adverse to quality. Further, the licensees procedures above define a condition
adverse to quality, in part, as an undesired condition which impacts a system, structure, or
component, including but not limited to failures, malfunctions, deviations, deficiencies,
defective material and equipment, and non-conformances.
However, on April 28-29, 2017, the licensee appears to have failed to maintain information
required by the Commissions regulations that was complete and accurate in all material
respects. Specifically, following equipment manipulation and an unanticipated plant transient,
the licensee appears to have failed to maintain complete and accurate information in
condition report CR-2017-005788 relative to the cause of the transient and the identified
condition adverse to quality in the corrective action program. As part of the corrective action
program, the information in the condition report was material to the NRC because it is subject
to NRC inspection and informs the NRCs review of and response to incidents such as the
underlying procedure violation.
Enforcement Actions: This violation is being treated as an apparent violation (AV) pending a
final significance enforcement determination.
Failure to Follow a Quality Procedure Associated with the Reactor Makeup and Chemical
Control System
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-cutting
Aspect
Inspection
Procedure
Initiating
Events
Green
Closed
H.12 - Avoid
Complacency
71153 -
Follow-up of
Events and
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the licensees failure to follow a quality procedure associated with the
reactor makeup and chemical control system which resulted in an unanticipated loss of
inventory from the volume control tank in the reactor coolant system. Specifically, on
April 28, 2017, a reactor operator failed to complete step 5.2.7.G in quality procedure
SOP-104B, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control System, which would isolate the volume
control tank from the chemical and volume control system, prior to directing a nuclear
equipment operator to complete subsequent steps 5.2.7.K and 5.2.7.L, which opened
isolation valves to the refueling water storage tank. These actions resulted in the
unanticipated loss of inventory from the volume control tank into the refueling water storage
tank.
Description: On April 28, 2017, while Unit 2 was shutdown and in Mode 5, a reactor operator
(RO) was tasked with filling the refueling water storage tank (RWST) from the chemical and
volume control system using Procedure SOP-104B, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control
System, Section 5.2.7, Makeup to RWST. The procedure Step 5.2.7.G directed the RO to
close valve 2-FCV-110B, reactor coolant system makeup to charging pump suction isolation
valve, and therefore, isolate the volume control tank (VCT) from the chemical and volume
control system prior to initiating fill of the RWST. However, the RO directed a nuclear
equipment operator (NEO) to complete Steps 5.2.7.K and 5.2.7.L, to open the isolation valves
to the RWST, before the RO had isolated the VCT. When the NEO opened the isolation
valves, the VCT level began lowering because the RO had failed to perform his procedure
step. Another operator in the control room promptly identified the rapidly lowering VCT level
and the operators initiated actions to arrest the loss of inventory from the VCT and identify the
cause of the transient.
Corrective Action(s): In addition to closing valve 2-FCV-110B in the control room, the RO
also directed the NEO to close the two isolation valves in the field, which terminated the
inventory loss from the VCT. The licensee documented the inventory transient in the
corrective action program and began an investigation to determine the cause of the transient.
Subsequently, the licensee documented the performance deficiency in the corrective action
program and initiated actions to evaluate the reasons for the procedural violation and
effectiveness of the corrective actions to address the initial issue when it occurred in April
2017.
Corrective Action Reference: CR-2017-005788; CR-2018-006115
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure of the RO to follow a quality procedure associated with
the reactor makeup and chemical control system was determined to be a performance
deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it adversely affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events
cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge
critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the ROs
failure to follow the procedure resulted in loss of reactor coolant system inventory from the
VCT to the RWST during a time in which the plant was shutdown in Mode 5.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection
Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated
October 7, 2016, and Appendix G Shutdown Operations Significance Determination
Process, dated May 9, 2014, in that the performance deficiency occurred while Unit 2 was
shutdown in Mode 5, with residual heat removal providing shutdown cooling. Using the
Phase 1 screening criteria in Appendix G, Attachment 1, the inspectors determined that the
finding impacted the inventory control safety function of the charging system resulting in a
loss of inventory in a portion of the reactor coolant system (i.e., the VCT). Further using the
Initiating Event screening questions (IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 2), the
inspectors determined that (1) the finding did not increase the likelihood of a shutdown
initiating event; (2) the loss of inventory event did not result in a leakage such that if
undetected and/or unmitigated in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or less, would have caused the operating decay
heat removal method to fail; (3) the loss of inventory event was self-limiting such that leakage
would stop before impacting the operating method of decay heat removal; (4) the finding did
not impact the transient initiators; and (5) the finding did not increase the likelihood of a fire or
internal/external flood that could cause a shutdown initiating event. Therefore, the finding
was determined to be of very low safety significance (i.e., Green).
Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human
performance, avoid complacency, because the RO failed to recognize and plan for the
possibility of mistakes even while expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the RO failed
to use the error prevention techniques afforded to him and/or request support from other
operators when balancing the conduct of several simultaneous activities during the RWST
filling evolution [H.12].
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be
established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended
in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Revision 2,
Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Step 3.n, addresses
procedures for the chemical and volume control system. Procedure SOP-104B, Reactor
Make-Up and Chemical Control System, Revision 12, implements Regulatory Guide 1.33,
Appendix A, Step 3.n. Procedure SOP-104B, Step 5.2.7.G, requires, in part, to close Valve
2-FCV-110B, reactor coolant system makeup to charging pump suction isolation valve, prior
to the performance of subsequent steps.
Contrary to the above, on April 28, 2017, a licensed reactor operator failed to perform
Procedure SOP-104B, Step 5.2.7.G, and close Valve 2-FCV-110B, prior to the performance
of subsequent steps. Specifically, the reactor operator failed to complete Step 5.2.7.G to
close valve 2-FCV-110B before a nuclear equipment operator completed Procedure
SOP-104B, Steps 5.2.7.K and 5.2.7.L, which resulted in an unexpected lowering level in the
volume control tank.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
On September 10, 2018, the NRC staff presented the inspection results to Mr. T. McCool, Site
Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff in a telephonic exit meeting. The NRC
staff verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
SUNSI Review:
ADAMS:
Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive
Keyword:
By: RDA/rdr
Yes No
Publicly Available
Sensitive
OFFICE
SPE:DRP/A
C:DRP/A
TL:ACES
RC
NAME
RAlexander
MHaire
MVasquez
DCylkowski
MMarshfield
RCarpenter
SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/ E
/NLO/ E
DATE
09/13/18
09/17/18
09/20/18
09/20/18
09/25/18
09/26/18
OFFICE
D:DRP
NAME
AVegel
SIGNATURE
/RA/
DATE
10/04/18