IR 05000443/1982004
| ML20055B616 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1982 |
| From: | Cerne A, Gallo R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055B607 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-82-04, 50-443-82-4, 50-444-82-04, 50-444-82-4, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-03, IEB-79-03A, IEB-79-04, IEB-79-09, IEB-79-2, IEB-79-25, IEB-79-3, IEB-79-3A, IEB-79-4, IEB-79-9, IEB-80-08, IEB-80-09, IEB-80-16, IEB-80-20, IEB-80-21, IEB-80-23, IEB-80-8, IEB-80-9, NUDOCS 8207220554 | |
| Download: ML20055B616 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I 50-443/82-04 Report No.
50-444/82-04 50-443 Docket No.
50-444 CPPR-135 License No. CPPR-136 Priority
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Category A
Licensee:
Public Service Company of New Hampshire 1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name:
Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Seabrook, New Hampshire and Framingham, Massachusetts (YAEC Corporate Offices)
Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
W ne W W 82_
i A. C. Cerne, Sr. Resident Inspector date signed date signed datgsigned Approved by:
b i 1 N R. M. Gallo, Chief, Projects Section 1A, dateisi(ned Division of Resident and Project Inspection
Inspection Summary:
Unit 1 Inspection on May 4-14 and June 1-18,1982 (Report No. 50-443/82-04)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by the resident inspector of work activities and records relative to control battery installation and inspection; follow-up of a concern regarding concrete repair sand usage and control; and follow-up on licensee actions and responses to IE Bulletins and Circulars. The inspector also reviewed licensee action on previously iden-tified items and performed plant inspection-tours. The inspection involved 72 inspector-hours, including four off-shift hours, by the NRC SRI.
Results: Of the four areas inspected, one violation was identified in one area--Failure to follow procedures and manufacturer's specification in control battery installation and inspection (paragraph 5 )-
Unit 2 Inspection on May 4-14 and June 1-18,1982 (Report No. 50-444/82-04)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by the resident inspector of work activities and records relative to follow-up of a concern regarding concrete repair sand usage and control; and follow-up on licensee actions and responses to IE Bulletins and Circulars. The inspector also reviewed licensee action on previously identified items and performed plant inspection:
tours. The inspection involved 18 inspector-hours by the NRC SRI.
Results:No items of noncompliance were identified.
gRADOCKo7220554 82070s 05000443 g
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)
F. W. Bean, Lead Electrical QA Engineer D. L. Covill, Lead Civil QA Engineer J. DeVincentis, Project Manager (Framingham)
R. E. Guillette, QA Engineer (Framingham)
J. H. Herrin, Site Manager (PSNH)
A. L. Legendre, Jr., Licensing Engineer (Framingham)
D. A.- Maidrand, Project Engineer (Framingham)
G. F. Mcdonald,Jr., QA Manager (Framingham)
J. F. Nay, Jr., Lead Mechanical QA Engineer W. K. Peterson, QA Engineer (Framingham)
S. B. Sadosky, Lead Start-up/ Test QA Engineer J. W. Singleton, Field QA Manager R. Tucker, Engineer (Framingham)
H. E. Wingate, Sr., Project Engineer (Framingham)
United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C)
R. H. Bryans, Site Engineering Manager M. A. Edgar, Resident Construction Engineer J. A. Grusetskie, Engineering Manager Assistant R. A. Kountz, Welding Superintendent D. C. Lambert, Field Superini.endent of QA Fischbach-Boulos-Manzi (FBM)
A. H. Clements, Lead QA Engineer N. T. Frost, QC Supervisor F. Kollin, Project Manager
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Pullman-Higgins (Pullman)
R. G. Davis, Field QA Manager D. B. Hunt, QA Records Supervisor Royal 'nsurance J. C. inzivino, Authorized Nuclear Inspector G. Vois mis, Authorized Nuclear Inspector
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2.
Plant Inspection-Tours (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector observed work activities in-progress, completed work and plant status in several areas of the plant during general inspections of the plant. The inspector examined work for any obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory requirements or license conditions. Particular note was taken of the presence of quality control inspectors and quality control evidence such as inspection records, material identification, nonconforming material identification, housekeeping and equipment preservation. The inspector in-terviewed craft personnel, supervision, and quality inspection personnel as such personnel were available in the work areas.
Specifically, the inspector witnessed a portion of the second cycle weld repair operation to Unit 1 field weld F0604 (pipe line SI251-06). He also noted completed cadwelds on rebar for the concrete shield walls around the Unit 1 steam generators and pressurizer. UE&C drawings detailing the pressurizer enclosure and pressurizer safety valve support system were reviewed for engineering recognition of the cadweld configuration. No structural connection between the safety valve support system and the shield enclosure walls exists.
Missile shield design, enclosure wall rebar splicing details, and the removable wall section geometry were all evaluated with regard to any engineering impact created by cadweld usage. None was evident.
The inspector also reviewed corrective actions, taken to date, regarding a licensee identified problem in which ASME NDE procedures and acceptance criteria had erroneously been utilized to examine AWS welds. Various contractor nonconformance reports, documenting the questionable welds, were examined, along with documents evidencing construction manager control of this issue.
QA cognizance of the status of corrective actions and QA input to and con-currence on recommended dispositions were verified.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items a.
(Closed) Infractions (443/80-03-02and444/80-03-01):
Failure to control changes to documents. The inspector reviewed applicable portions of the following documents and verified the procedural delineation of the res-ponsibility and accountability for change controls, to include revision to all affected documents.
-- Perini Field General Construction Procedure, FGCP-2 (Revision 6)
-- Pullman Procedure III-4 (Revision 10)
-- FBM Quality Assurance Procedure, QAP 204 (Revision 2)
-- Johnson Control Procedure QAS 401 (Revision 1) tnru Interim Procedure Revision, IPR 2.
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Random NRC inspections of document control activities since the issuance of these infractions have revealed no similar change control problems.
Discussions with QA persoinel indicated that all contractors' perfonning safety-related work have established procedural requirements to assure the incorporation of changes into all affected documents. This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved items (443/80-12-02 and 443/32-01-03): Questionable interface controls. As discussed in combined NRC Inspection Report (IR)
81-01, the adequacy and uniformity of contractor interface procedures were examined. Questions of program implementation were raised in later.
irs.
In each case the technical issues involved were adequately addressed, l
but the program had not ytt been fully defined.
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The following UE&C documer ts now specifically define the construction manager controls for area interfacing and contractor interface reports:
-- Field General Construct. ion Procedure, FGCP-31 (Revision 1);
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-- Field Administrative Ctnstructors Report, FACP-2 Each contractor has been required to incorporate the generic UE&C
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philosophy on interf acing into their program and procedures. The inspector reviewed the abcve UE&C procedures and spot-checi:ed certain
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contractor procedures. He has no further questions,on definition of the interface control program.
While this item is now considered closed, the adequacy \\and implementation of the current controls will be the subject of ongoing NRC review during future inspections.
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c.
(Closed) Violation (443/81-09-01):
Inadequate structural support welds.
The inspector evaluated corrective action to include the disposit' ion ef.
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Perini nonconformance report NCR 2179, redesign of the c6anection
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details (reference: UE&C Engineering Change Authorization ECA 01/2533B),
and discussion and resolution as to the root cause of this violation; '
Documented UE&C investigation of this issue,has resulted\\in the finding that inadequate joint design was the primary problem. Generic actions to preclude recurrence included a search for similar joint design in other areas of the plant, further direction to UEaC design detailers, and general instructions to the installing contractor in line with standard J
AWS welding practices.
The inspector confinned that action had~been taken to revise all affected design drawings, as necessary. This item is considered closed. '
d.
(Closed) Unresolved items (443 and 444/82-03-02):
Flame retardance of cable color coding. The inspector examined documentation from the suppliers of Seabrook cable (Anaconda, Ckonite, Brard-Rex) verifying that the color coding material is flame retardant, that the paint is also
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non-propogating with respect to flame, and that neither the vehicle nor pigment adversely affect the cable jacket. Cable qualification is not affected.
This item is closed.
4.
Allegation on Screening of Sand for Concrete Repairs (Units 1 & 2)
As a result of an allegation communicated to the NRC regarding the failure to screen the sand used by the cement finishers in concrete patching and repair activities, the SRI visually examined questionable storage areas, reviewed UE&C concrete specifications and Perini concrete procedures, and interviewed QA personnel and cement finisher tenders as they were available in the work area.
The following documents were reviewed:
-- UE&C Specifications 13-2 and 13-3 (both Revision 7)
-- Perini Field Civil Construction Procedures, FCCP-2, 115, and 117
-- Perini Quality Assurance ProceMures, QAP 10.5 and 10.10 The following facts were detemined regarding the subject sand control
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and usage:
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-- the quality of the sand is controlled by its supply from concrete batch plant stockpiles, for which certification is available.
-- the sand is treated as " safety-related"; however, there are no QC inspection points associated with the sand screening.
-- Required inspection points for the sand are procedurally imposed only when this sand is used for dry packing under base plates. The sand has not been used for this purpose during the last six r 'ths and hardly at all during construction.
(Note: The SRI during previous inspections
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confirmed that nonshrink grout, which does not use sand, is almost exclusively used for base plate grouting).
-- The primary use of the subject sand is for tie rod, form bolt hole patching and architectural repairs to concrete surfaces (" minor voids").
Even~though these activities are discussed in safety-related procedures, no inspection is associated with them.
Failure to properly control these activities (eg: screening of the sand, mixing of the sand-cement grout, placing) has no safety-related effect upon the quality of the concrete
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itself.
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certification for the sand material and the cement is controlled).
The SRI's inspection did not confinn the existence of unscreened sand.
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upon the above facts regarding the end use of this sand, the SRI determined
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that current licensee controls are adequate. No items of noncompliance i
or unresolved safety questions were identified.
5.
StationBatteryInstallation(Unit 1)
The inspector examined the installed status and condition of the four 125V station control batteries in their individual rooms in the Unit 1 Control
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Building. He noted that installation and inspection of two batteries (1-EDE-B-1A and IB)were complete, accepted and documented while installation
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of the other two batteries (1C & 10) was still in progress. Each battery consists of 59 Gould NCX-2250 cells connected in series with lead plated
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copper plates connecting the cells; jumper cables making the inter-tier
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connections; and power cables, run through conduit supported in accordance
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with UE&C Interim Change Approval ICA 23/0077A, providing the series connec-tion across each room's aisle.
Examination of the hardware and supporting documentation revealed that bolt / washer configurations had been approved by UE&C ECA 03/1303A.
However, several of the bolts had different head stamps, even though all were uniformly specified as 316 stainless steel material. The inspector also noticed that the cable connections to the battery terminal posts didn't appear to provide support to the cables such that loading was not imparted to the posts themselves. Cable support clamps to the battery rack or wall were not installed as is standard practice for cable to battery connections.
i The inspector requested that the licensee explain the different markings on the installed bolts and confirm the adequacy of the existing cable terminations relative to the potential for overstressing the battery posts.
Pending resolution of these questions by UE&C electrical design engineers, this item
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isunresolved(443/82-04-01).
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In evaluating the adequacy of the battery installations the inspector reviewed the following documents:
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--UE&CSpecification137-1(Revision 4)
-- FBM Procedures FECP-511 (Revision 1) and QCP-511 (Revision 1) with Interim Procedure Change, IPC No.1
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-- Gould Drawing 0642930 (UE&C Foreign Print FP31697)
-- Gould " Stationary Battery Installation and Operating Instructions" (UE&C FP32364)
For accepted batteries 1A & IB, the completed FBM " Quality Control Installation Report for Battery and Rack Installation" was examined. Two of the checklist items indicated that (1) cells were installed per manufac-turer's specification and (2) intercell connections were properly torqued.
FECP-511 also requires installation to these two criteria. Both the FECP
& QCP require that QC must witness torque application. However, the inspector's
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visual examination of these battery installations did not confirm certain manufacturer's specification and procedural requirements as follows:
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-- no terminal and cell connector bolt hardware was torqued on both the head and nut sides, as required by Gould.
-- if the inter-tier cable connector (ie: jumpers) bolt hardware was i
torqued at all, QC witness was not provided, as required by FBM.
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-- certain inter-cell connectors were installed upside down relative to the position on the battery cell posts that was directed by Gould.
The inspector informed the licensee Site Manager, and Corporate and Field QA Managers during an exit interview on June 11,1982 that the failure to install two control batteries in accordance with manufacturer's and procedural requirements represented a violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V (443/82-04-02).
He also questioned the adequacy of QC inspection of these items since specific checklist acceptance criteria had been signed off despite visual evidence of nonconforming conditions. With regard to this later issue, the licensee initiated their own reinspection of certain accepted electrical installations to determine generically whether manufacturer's installation instructions were indeed followed.
6.
Inspection at YAEC Corporate Offices During an inspection of YAEC in Framingham, Massachusetts, the inspector, through records review and discussion with both YAEC QA and project personnel, evaluated the adequacy of both program and implementation for the following subject areas:
-- ECA Task Force Charter - the recommendations for a revised design change control program have served as input to the latest revision (No. 14) to UE&C Administrative Procedure AP-15.
-- YAEC Audit Schedule of UE&C (Philadelphia) - the 1981 and 1982 audit schedules were examined as were several audit reports. Check of identified design deficiencies indicates heavy YAEC audit emphasis in the design control area commencing in early 1980 (Audit Report SA322VE009) and continuing thru the present (latest Audit Report SA555UE016). Corrective action audits were conducted or are planned and increased management attention to this area (eg: YAEC/UE&C management meeting on February 18,1982) was noted.
-- IE Bulletin / Circular /Information Notice follow-up program - the method of receiving, circulating, tracking, and responding to IE Bulletins was reviewed.
Selected document record packages were examined.
Licensee actions to IE Circulars were spot-checked and Infonnation Notices were discussed.
(See paragraph 7 for specific Bulletin /
Circular closecut).
With regard to all above inspection items, no items of noncompliance were f
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identified; however, one item remains unresolved as discussed below.
Where IE Bulletins / Circulars identify questionable equipment, a review is accomplished to determine whether that equipment is planned for use at Seabrook.
If the equipment is not applicable, it is so documented.
However, no program for " flagging" that equipment from future procurement activities with regard to the generic Bulletin / Circular concern has been established.
This is true not only of future construction procurement, but also equipment purchases during plant operation.
The licensee committed to the establishment of some formal mechanism to preclude such questionable items from being procured in the future without further licensee review.
Pending implementation of an adequate tracking system for such items, this issue is unresolved (443/82-04-03 and 444/82-04-01).
7.
IE Bulletin / Circular /Information Notice Follow-Up The inspector reviewed YAEC Seabrook Project Policy No. 13 (Revision 2)
which assigns responsibility for transmission of and response to IE Bulletins to the Seabrook Project Office.
Examination of the Project Office log revealed evidence of both internal YAEC routing and transmittal to UE&C and Westinghouse for comment. This system was being uniformly applied to IE Bulletins, Circulars, Bulletins for Info Only, and Information Notices, even though the NRC requires response only for Bulletins.
The following Bulletins are closed based upon documented evidence that the subject components or equipment are not planned for use at Seabrook station.
IE Bulletins:
79-09 80-20 79-25 80-21 80-09 80-23 80-16 (Note: Verification that the subject items will not be used at Seabrook at some future time will be addressed with resolution of the unresolved item of paragraph 6).
The following Bulletins are closed based upon a review of UE&C and/or
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Westinghouse documents, presenting technical justification, discussion, and corrective actions substantiating the position set forth by the licensee in their response to the NRC.
IE Bulletins:
79-02, thru Revision 2 79-03 79-03A (including NUREG/CR2263 recommendations)
79-04 80-08 i
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The following Circulars are closed based upon evidence that the licensee has received, reviewed for applicability, and routed them and has evaluated required corrective actions, as necessary.
IE Circulars:
79-02 79-10 80-04 81-05 With regard to the inspection follow-up of IE Bulletins / Circulars /Information Notices, no items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or de-viations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5 and 6.
9.
Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.