IR 05000443/1982012
| ML20028B201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1982 |
| From: | Durr J, Gray E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028B186 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-82-12, NUDOCS 8211300163 | |
| Download: ML20028B201 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN
REGION I
Report No.
82-12 Docket No.
50-443 License No.
CPPR-135 Priority
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Category A
Licensee:
Public Service of New Hampshire 1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name:
Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection At:
Seabrook New Hampshire - Unit 1 Inspection Conducted:
September 28-October 1, 1982 Inspectors:
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ed^d #/
/v/zv/#L E. H. Gray, Re p r Inspector date date date Approved by:
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/o/so/8:.t.
(/J.P.Durr,SectionChief, Materials
'datd and Processes Section Inspection Summary:
Routine unannounced inspection by the regional based inspector of procedures, instructions, drawings, records and work activities relative to reactor vessel internals and containment boundary electrical, mechanical and access penetrations.
The inspection involved 28 inspector hours on site.
Results: One violation was identified in the two areas inspected.
(Failure to
distribute a safety related design change.)
Region I Form 12 (Rev. February 1982)
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82113bO163 821103 PDR ADOCK 05000 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)
- J. Azzopardi - Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer
- R. E. Guillette - QA Engineer
- J. H. Herrin - Site Manager (PSNH)
8. Missau - Quality Assurance
- V. T. Middleton - Quality Assurance Supervisor
- W. F. Monteith - Quality Assurance Supervisor J. F. Nay - Lead Mechanical QA Engineer J. W. Singleton, Field QA Manager United Engineers and Constructors (UE&CJ V. Ajemian - Newington Storage Supervisor R. Beaumont - QA Engineer
- R. H. Bryans - Site Engineering Manager J. Carrabba - Storeroom / Preventive Maintenance Supervisor J. Gries - Storeroom / Preventive Maintenance Inspector
- J. A. Grusetskie - Site Engineer
- D. C. Lambert - QA Field Supervisor Pullman Higgins (P-H)
R. Donald - Assistant QA Manager R. Johnson - QA Engineering A. Nance - Chief Field Engineer USNRC
- R. Gramm - Resident Inspector
- A. Cerne - Sr. Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the October 1, 1981 exit interview 2.
Containment Penetrations The inspector selected samples of electrical, piping and access containment penetrations for observation of both work in progress and completed work.
l Portions of the site PSAR, drawings, procedures, and instructions relating
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to containment penetrations were reviewed for adequacy and compliance to regulatory requirements. The following items were noted:
The attachment weld of electrical penetration IE DEMM113-H37 as
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detailed on Westinghouse Drawing for specification number E-40144,
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dated 3-30-81, lacks the depth of the counterbore on the bulkhead
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extension.
Similar uninstalled electrical penetrations were not available for inspection of this counterbore depth. As the penetra-t. ion to bulkhead extension weld root gap would be determined by the counterbore depth on weld joint fitup, the inspector asked to see the drawing defining this dimension. At the time of this inspection, no drawing was available describing this dimension. This item is unresolved pending licensee submittal of a drawing or drawings showing the counterbore depth, its effect on weld joint root gap and review of quality records of similar attachments as necessary to assure that the required weld penetration has been or will be reviewed (443/82-12-01).
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High Energy piping penetrations were observed in position. The documentation for flued head type penetration X-13 including drawings, field process instructions, non destructive testing and inspection reports were reviewed.
No violations were identified.
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Moderate energy piping pentetrations were observed in position and with installation work in progress. The containment penetration to end plate and end plate to pipe assembly identified as X-35, including relevant drawings, field process instructions and inspections, were reviewed by the inspector.
The review disclosed that the UE&C Engineering Change Authorization (ECA), dated March 19, 1982, changing the ASME Code Classification of these welds from NC, Class II to subsection NE, Class MC had not been implemented. This revision imposes added destructive and nondestructive examinations required on the BASE materials and finished welds.
It also imposes added welding controls through the supplementary essential variables of ASME IX. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criterion VI, " Document Control".
(443/82-12-02)
The personnel access penetration identified as Irwin P2030-1979,
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Serial #32704 and shown on drawing E90, contract 14691 was observed in position. No work was in progress on this access penetration.
No violations were identified.
3.
Reactor Vessel Internals (RVI)
Installation of the reactor vessel internals has been sublet to the Nuclear Installation Services Company (NISCO), although installation of internals had not actually started by the date of this inspection.
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The inspector reviewed the following NISCO procedures applicable to RVI installation:
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Q. A.
Manual, Revision H of 5/28/81 for ASME Section III
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E. S. No. 56. Welding Filler Metal Control procedure
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E. S. No. 100-1. Magnetic Particle Examination procedure E. S. No.100-2, Liquid Penetrant Examination procedure
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E. S. No. 100-5. Visual Inspection of Welds.
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E. S. No.116-1. Qualification and Certification of Non-destructive Examination Personnel.
E. S. No.116-2. Qualification and Certification of inspection
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personnel.
E. S. No. 137. 10 CFR 21 procedure.
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E. S. No. 140. Calibration and Control of Measuring and Test Equip-ment.
E. S. No. 300. General Welding Procedure.
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No violations were identified.
The inspector visited the reactor vessel interior observing the entrance control and the present condition of the vessel interior.
No violations were identified.
Reactor vessel internals including the reactor head, core barrel and control rod drive mechanisms were observed in storage.
Internals were located both on site and off site at Newingten, N.H. Records of periodic inspections at the storage area and records of in storage inspections under control of the preventive maintenance supervisor were reviewed.
The actual storage conditions of temperature, humidity and cleaniiness, were observed and compared to the manufacturers recommended storage conditions.
No violations were identified.
4.
Site Tour The inspector observed other work and work activities in progress around
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the site including:
ISO-RH-158-08 NCR 2456 ISO-SI-201-3-R3 FW 306
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ASME Class I and Class II pipe storage, handling, end preparation, fitup and welding were observed and a sample of documents controlling the work was reviewed. The inspector interviewed welders and other c*aftsmen concerning tasks in progress.
No violations were identified.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 2.
6.
Exit Interview An exit interview was held on October 1, 1982 with members of the licensees staff, as denoted in paragraph 1.
The inspector discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
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