IR 05000443/1980004
| ML19332A957 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1980 |
| From: | Cerne A, Mcgaughy R, Varela A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332A948 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-80-04, 50-443-80-4, 50-444-80-04, 50-444-80-4, NUDOCS 8009190106 | |
| Download: ML19332A957 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-443/80-04 Report No. 50-444/80-04 50-443 Docket No.
50-444 CPPR-135 License No. CPPR-136 Priority Category A
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Licensee:
Public Service Company of New Hampshire 1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name:
Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection conducted: April 14-17, 1980 Inspectors: jJ. Nd A M2./ f7J
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A. C.
re ac Inspector
' date signed
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st.STAL E
f."A.' Varela, Reactor Inspector
'date signed AB.sh/L sh/ vo G. A. Walton, React Inspector
'date s gned Approved by: / d/ bha
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/ [0 R. W. McGaughy, n' f, Frojects
/date signed Section, RC&ES B ch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 14-17, 1980 (Report No. 50-443/80-04)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by three regional based inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings, pipe welding controls, the cadweld reinspection program and corrective action, and plant inspection tours. The inspection involved 60 inspector-hours onsite 'y three regional based inspectors.
Results: Of the four areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Infraction-Failure to provide sequence for examination of pipe weld repairs to assure code compliance, paragraph 5B).
Inspection on April 14-17, 1980 (Report No. 50-444/80-04)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by three regional based inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings, the cadweld reinspection program and corrective action, and plant inspection tours. The inspection involved 12-inspector-hours onsite by three regional based inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12
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F DETAILS 1.-
~ Persons Contacted-L Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)'
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- B. B. Beckley,' Manager of Nuclear. Projects (PSNH-Manchester)
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D. L. Covill= QA Engineer
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- W.JJ.JGagnon, QA Engineer.
- J..'H. Herrin, Construction Manager (PSNH)
- W. P.~ Johnson, Vice President.(Westborough)
- G. F.-Mcdonald, QA Engineer (Westborough)
- W..J. Miller, QA Manager-(Westborough)
- R. P. Pizzuti, Construction Manager (Westborough)
- J. W. Singleton, Field QA Manager
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United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C)
J. Carrabba Field Staff Assistant M. J. Cunniff, Material Supervisor-
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- R. J. Phelps, Field Superintendent of. QA
. R. R. Thomas, Office Eng; seer -
J. F. Vought, ~ Resident' Construction Manager
~T. P. Vassallo, QA Supervisor, Civil / Structural Perini Power Constructors (Perini)
W. - Daigle, Construction Documentation Engineer J. Kowalik, Assistant Construction Documentation. Engineer J. McLaughlin,, Document Control Chief Pullman-Higgins (Pullman)-
R.: Davis, Field QA Manager R.-Donald, QC Supervisor
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R.-Johnson,-QA Process Engineer D. Walker,- QA -Supervisor
- Denotes ~ those present at the exit interview.
2.
Plant Tours-(Unit's 1 and-2)
The inspectors observed work activities in progress, completed work
- and ' plant status ~ in.several areas of the construction site.
Particular note was' taken of the presence of quality control inspectors and j
Jevidence of quality. control activities.- The inspectors interviewed
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craft personnel and supervisors and quality inspection personnel as
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Specific activities observed'for Unit #1 were containment's interior shield walls -and exterior building'. walls with reinforcing
. steel -installation and'cadweld splicing, preparations for concrete
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- placement of PAB walls, < cold weather protection and curing of control
building walls'and cadweld splice' reinspection teams on the containment
. exterior wall. An inspector also-observed and attended a craft training session oniquality assurance _ conducted.by Perini's construction manage-
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ment training coordinator to. inform iron. workers as to the project
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i requirements.
Unit #2 containment base mat activities observed were
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Leadweld splicing and cadweld splice reinspections.'
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The inspectors observed a Dravo shop fabricated weld, identified as
"C",. Mark 1-RH-155-2-601-8"-3 which appeared to have a " necking-in"
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i effect adjacent to the weld. ' An-. inspector questioned whether the weld
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met the applicable code requirement...On April 15, 1980.the inspector reviewed the shop documentation and could not determine from this
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review that the weld met the code. The inspector.then requested that i
the licentee-perform a wall thickness-check and that the bolted end cap be removed to allow an internal inspection.of this area.
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l performed by' Pu11 man-Higgins, verified the base material at approximately
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r The material was identified as.a 0.322" wall.
The thickness check, 2 inches away from the weld as 0.321"-0.329.
A thickness check was
not possible.directly adjacent.to the weld at the " necking-in" area
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because of the nonparallel surfaces and limited access.in the lowest area i
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i of the depression.
y Pullman-Higgins had previously, questioned this weld and had re-X-rayed
to verify weld _ integrity.
In addition, a density variation check _was
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made at-the " necking-in" location and the adjacent. unaffected base o
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material.
They had. determined within !1/64" that the density variations
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represented a worst. case of wall re.iuction-of 0.312" from the adjacent
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unaffected base material.
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The inspector.also performed a visual inspection of the weld surface
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on the inside and questioned whether the amount of reinforcement present on the inside might exceed the code allowable 1/8 inch.
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The two areas described above had not been adequately resolved to
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justify acceptance of:this area.
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L0n April 17,1980 Pullman-Higgins wrote a nonconformance report- (NCR)
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' This item' remains unresolveo pending resolution of the NCR and review
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by'the NRC (443/80-04-01).
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3.
. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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I (Closed).UnresolvedItem(443/80-03-01)i Require engineering approval
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for use of unistruts' as embed conduit supports in concrete. The inspector verifledtin UE&CLMarch.13. 1980 engineering memorandum MM #-
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15686A that_ under prescribed guidelines for resident construction
- engineersithe use of unistruts is acceptable to support embedded.
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conduits.j pipes. etc., without.any. significant concrete voids and-
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Lreduction in structural strength.
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(0 pen)' Noncompliance Items (443 and 444/79-08-06)',.(443/79-09-01) anc (Reopening) Noncompliance-Item.(443/79-07-02): The licensee has responded to NRC-findings of infractions against 10 CFR 50 Appendix B criteria. At this inspection a review was made of the corrective actions taken individually for each infraction. -In. light of the more recentTy identified potential significant deficiency addressed in-paragraph.4, it appears that previous interim corrective actions taken
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may have been inadequate and insufficient' to effectively preclude
- repetition in related areas.. This raises questions as to licensee Lactions in fulfilling the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criteria II with regard to "the. status.and. adequacy of the quality assurance program."
Since the licensee has committed to changes-in the QA program with regard to the identified deficient areas, these items remain open
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pending NRC. review of the effectiveness.of future action.
(Closed) Unresolved _ Item.(443/80-03-04):
Control of welding interpass temperatures.
During. review of various field weld process sheets
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(paragraph 5) the inspector was able to determine adequate specification of those parameters,. including interpass temperatures, required for proper welding. This.itemLis' resolved.
(Closed) Noncompliance (443/79-06-02):
Visual inspection of weld
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preparations' prior to tack welding.- The inspector interviewed QA o
personnel and reviewed Pullman Procedure X-9, Revision 4, and examined several completed and in-process Field Weld' Process Sheets.
A Hold Point has been added to the visual inspection requirement for ASME III welds prior.to fit-up and tack welding, insuring that the required
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inspection will.be accomplished.. Additionally, the back of the Process Sheets now delineate criteria from Procedure X-9 to be used in the visual. examination process. : This item is resolved.
(C?osed)fNoncompliance (443/79-06-03 and 444/79-06-02): Control of access into. storage areas.
The. inspector reviewed Revision 9 to UE&C
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Quality Control Procedure QCP-13 and discussed the current log-in and badge program for controlled access into Levels A. B, and C storage areas with responsible personnel.
He toured warehouses 'I and 3 and noted new barriers had been installed.
Controlled access points for entrance into.these warehouses with available authorized personnel listings-appeared to provide sufficient' control in line with ANSI requirements to, preclude unauthorized or unaccounted entry. This item is resolved.-
-(0p'en) Noncompliance (443/79-06-04 and'444/79-06-03): Lack of documentation controls. TheLinspector reviewed the status of Perini actions to improve' document: controls-including the revision of the Perini Ouality
'Assurande Procedure QAP.6.0 to include statistical sampling, the
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reorganization.of. the Perini Document Control Department and. the
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result of a comprehensive review of previous ~ document control status.
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.5 He noted'that corrective actions had been taken and spot-checked various_UE&C. drawings and Engineering Change Authorizations"on file with Perini to compare their status with the most recent UE&C Monthly 1 Status Report - G-1 (March 4,1980) and Project Change Log - 6 (April 19,1980).
The inspector found no deficiencies in the current Perini document ccstrol. -system.
The inspector also verified the currency cf a UE&C Design Change Notice on file with Pullman, but detennined that the Pullman Procedure VI-1 (Revision 2) which added requirements for the surveillance of
' document control activities had not yet been approved and was not in effect.
Pending approval of this procedure and full implementation of the program with NRC review, this item remains open.
4.
Review of Potential Sionificant Deficiency Item Reported by Licensee (Units 1 and 2)
On April 8,1980 the licensee reported by telephone tr the NRC's regional office an item. considered at that time to be a potential significant deficiency and reportable under 10 CFR 50.55e. The item involved cadweld splicing activities.and laxity in QC inspection by Perini.
Surveillance activities had found numerous completed cadweld splices, previously reported by Perini 0C as acceptable, that had packing still remaining at the splice sleeve ends.
This violates craft work procedure and QC inspection criteria. At this inspection a review'was made of nonconforming reports and actions underway in reinspecting a11' exposed,and accessible cadweld splices to determine extent of and evaluate the deficiency for. its safety related significance.
The following documentation, subject matter, immediate corrective actions and corrective action requests are related to the problem and its evaluation as a significant deficiency in the QA Program under 10 CFR 50.55e..
a.
Licensee surveillance (March 26 and 31) reports #024 and
.#029 informed UE&C and Perini of two cadweld splices (out of about 400 Perini QC had inspected and-passed) with unremoved packing and one excess void at end of sleeve.
b.
UE&C issued on Apri1 ~ 1 a Corrective Action Request, CAR
- 032, identifying ~three other cadweld sleeves with unremoved packing and/or excess end voids. This.. CAR identifies issuance of two previous CARsLon inadequate inspections of completed cadwelds by Perini, dated 8/18/78_and 8/30/79.
CAR #032 reconsnends. six conditions for correction to be taken by -
Perini'.
c.: -Perini~NCRs #777 800 and 802 dated 3/27, 4/4/ and 4/8/80
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and response to-CAR #032 dated 4/7/80_ identify essential
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items for-immediate corrective actions, planned corrective
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reinspection program.
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A sampling plan for reinspection of previously accepted cadwelds was developed and instituted on April 4.
The reinspections concentrated on evidence of packing left in completed splices and. verification that end of sleeve voids are within acceptance limits.
As of April 11, a total of 2723 splices had been reinspected in the Perini program, with assistance provided by UE&C and licensee QA personnel. Of these, 391 sleeves had unreaoved packing, four had excess voids and two had unacceptable cavities.
Starting April 14, cadweld reinspection on Unit 1 and 2 by combined personnel was continued under UE&C supervision.
The inspector observed reinspection teams and their supervision on Unit 1 containment exterior wall and Unit 2 base mat during this-inspection. He noted their capability, inspection techniques and discussed the overall program, governing criteria and evaluated their qualifications. Pending completion of the reinspection, findings on the remaining estimated 12,000 accessible cadwelds, engineering evaluation of the problem and its reportability under 10 CFR 50.55e, this item remains open. The inspector considers the above interim measures to be coninensurate with the problem and identifies no items of noncompliance or program inadequacies with regard to the licensee's current program of corrective action on this issue.
5.
Pullman-Higgins Process Sheet and Associated Documentation Review-(Unit 1)
a.
The inspector rsidomly reviewed Pullman-Higgins field process sheets and associated documentation such as radiography and liquid penetrant results to ascertain compliance with the fabrication requirements described in the ASME B&PV Code Section III, 1977 Edition, including the Winter 1977 addenda.
The inspector noted the field process sheets contain a space for Quality Assurance." Final Check" and "Date" signature.
There a]peared to be some inconsistencies. in the intent of the QA final cieck.
For example, the process sheet for RH-160-01, Weld No.
F0103 showed the sequences were completed 3/13/80 and the final sequence (radiography) was. rejected.
The final check block was not signed off at that time. A repair process sheet was issued and all sequences completed, accepted on 3/27/80. The repair process sheet was signed and dated 3/28/80.
Also the original process sheet was signed and dated 3/28/80 with the words " Weld is rejected."
To determine the intent of this entry the inspector reviewed the Pullman Power Products document VI--S titled " Control of Process Sheets" dated 10/29/79.
The document does not address the intent of the-sign off and the final check.
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During the above review the inspector noted that the liquid penetrant report for a " cavity" inspection of weld RH-160-01, FW F0105 was missing from the original documents.
The inspector was informed that the missing or misplaced inspection report is not duplicated.until it is put on microfilm for permanent record purposes and therefore no other copy is in existence. This report is required as part of the final documentation and either a duplicate system or better controls must be established to assure records are either not lost or are reproducible.
The above items remain unresolved pending action by the licensee and further review by NRC (443/80-04-02).
b.
The inspector reviewed repair weld process control sheet RH-151-01 for Field Welds, F0101 and F0102 to ascertain code compliance when repairs are made.
The inspector noted that visual inspection was included on the original process sheet to perform a mechanical examination, reinforcement, surface finish, undercut, convexity, etc. This sequence is performed prior to the nondestructive examinations. A reject weld found by nondestructive examinations requires a second process sheet to' repair the weld. After the repair is made or grinding is performed to eliminate surface defects, a reexamination is necessary to assure the weld meets applicable code requirements.
The two welds described above were not visually examined after repairs were made.
In one case no welding was necessary, however it is required to verify that minimum wall was maintained after surface preparation was performed, as stated in the ASME B&PV Code Section III, paragraph NC 4452, " Weld metal surface defects may be removed by grinding and not repaired by welding provided the remaining thickness of the section is not reduced below that required by NC 3000 and the depression, after defect elimination, is blended uniformly into the surrounding surface."
Failure to verify minimum wall thickness and to provide a sequence for performing the visual examination and thickness verification is contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion IX.
This item is an infraction (443/80-04-03).
6.
Allegation - Waste Processing Building Work An allegation concerning some undefined hazard to the public as a result of work by Seabrook Station laborers in the Radwaste Building area was received by the NRC from an anonymous telephone caller.
The alleger, who provided no means by which to be recontacted, had learned of this alleged problem second-hand and had no details, except when questioned, that the concerns may be environmental.
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In an _ attempt to determine facts relative to the allegation, the inspector toured the Unit I waste processing building area, which was in the stage of initial structural (concrete) erection. He noted that even though this structure was near the sea wall at the south end of the site, all lines carrying pumped water from the relief wells and construction drains ran toward the settling pond on the north end of the site. The inspector questioned licensee representatives regarding the substance of. the allegation and interviewed the laborer steward to determine if any facts or. compliants related to the allegation could be ver.ified..In all cases no unresolved safety concerns were identified and furthermore, no one had any idea as to what could possible constitute the basis of the allegation.
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No facts.-events, or concerns related to the allegation could be verified. No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required
in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of
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noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraph 2 and SA.
8.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection on April 17, 1980, a meeting was held at the Seabrook Station site with representatives of the licensee.
Attendees at this meeting included personnel whose names are indicated by notation (*) in Paragraph 1.
The inspector summarized the results of the inspection as described in this report.
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