IR 05000440/2025004
| ML26035A405 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/2026 |
| From: | Sanchez-Santiago E NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2 |
| To: | Tony Brown Vistra Operations Company |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26035A405 (0) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2025004
Dear Terry Brown:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. On January 15, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
February 5, 2026 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Elba M. Sanchez Santiago, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000440 License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000440
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I2025004-0049
Licensee:
Vistra Operations Company, LLC
Facility:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Perry, OH
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2025 to December 31, 2025
Inspectors:
J. Beavers, Senior Resident Inspector
B. Jebbia, Senior Operations Engineer
T. McGowan, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
V. Myers, Senior Health Physicist
T. Ospino, Resident Inspector
J. Robb, Operations Engineer
Approved By:
Elba M. Sanchez Santiago, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Correct Faulty Control Rod Hydraulic Control Unit 5839 Resulting in Control Rod Drift Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000440/202500401 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152A The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, when the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to correct control rod hydraulic control unit 5839 directional control valve degradation identified in corrective action program document CR202502755 prior to performing control rod scram time testing that resulted in an unexpected change in reactivity and reactor power.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at full power. On November 22, 2025, the unit was reduced to approximately 60 percent power for plant system maintenance. On November 23, 2025, the unit was returned to rated power. The plant operated at near or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Division 2 diesel generator starting air system
- (2) Residual heat removal system 'A'
- (3) Division 1 1E electrical system
- (4) Control rod drive system 'A'
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) FZ 2CC3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d on November 25, 2025
- (2) FZ DG1D on November 25, 2025
- (3) FZ 1DG1A on November 25, 2025
- (4) FZ 1DG1B on November 25, 2025
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
(1) 'B' residual heat removal system heat exchanger loop
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered between Oct. 27, 2025 and Dec 18, 2025.
Fifty-six operators were examined. This population is two short of RPS OL Report 9.
Two operators did not take the exam and are currently in license class for upgrade.
This is permissible per NUREG 1021. No concerns with number of personnel examined. Additional action is not warranted per IP71111.11A.
There were no individual or crew failures requiring remediation.
TABLE 03.031 EXAMINATION RESULTS
1. Total number of licensed operators: 58
2. Number of licensed operators administered a requalification examination
required by 10 CFR 55.59(a): 56
3. Number of individual licensed operators who failed any portion of a
requalification examination (written, JPM or individual simulator scenario failures): 0
4. Divide line 3 by line 2 to obtain the individual requalification examination
failure rate. Line 3/Line 2: 0%
5. Number of crews administered simulator scenarios as part of a requalification
examination required by 10 CFR 55.59(a): 8
6. Number of crews who performed unsatisfactorily on the simulator scenarios: 0
7. Divide line 6 by line 5 to obtain the crew simulator scenario failure rate. Line
6/Line 5: 0%
The failure rates are below thresholds which require additional actions per IP 71111.11A.
The licensee and NRC staff discussed future dates for Licensed Operator Requalification examinations.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during down power and rod sequence exchange on November 22, 2025
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator requalification training on October 28, 2025
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Media translator replacement for digital feedwater on November 18, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 elevated risk due to division 2 work week with short term limiting condition for operation on September 20, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Emergency response data system functionality
- (2) Hydrogen analyzer 'A' operability
- (3) Liquid radwaste to emergency service water radiation monitor operability
- (4) Offsite power via unit 2 startup transformer operability
- (5) Reactor core isolation cooling operability
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) Hydrogen analyzer 'A' after replacement of the sample pump, on October 1, 2025
- (2) Digital feedwater after replacement of the media translator on November 13, 2025
- (3) Hydraulic control unit 5839 after replacement of the direction control valves on November 22, 2025
- (4) Emergency service water flow instrument after maintenance on September 25, 2025
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.0102.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes:
- Emergency Plan for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 63
- PSI0019, Emergency Action Level (EAL) Bases Document, Revision 23 This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Technical support center and emergency operating facility tabletop drill on November 4, 2025
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
- (1) Friskers located in the auxiliary building
- (2) Frisker located in the fuel handling building
- (3) Area monitor in the auxiliary building
- (4) Personal contamination monitors located at the radiologically restricted area boundary
- (5) Portal monitors located at the radiologically restricted area boundary
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (10 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) AMP100; MPL L70L077V
- (2) Ludlum Model 12; MPL L7060964
- (3) Whole Body Counter; MPL L70L800A
- (4) DMC3000; A0B73E
- (5) Telepole; MPL L70L072D
- (6) Telepole; MPL L70L072B
- (7) PCM2; MPL L70L004H
- (8) Air Sampler H809V1; MPL# L70L2014
- (9) Containment high range monitor
- (10) Containment/drywell purge exhaust plenum area monitor
Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
- (1) Nuclear closed cooling radiation monitor
- (2) Turbine building and heater bay noble gas monitor
- (3) Liquid radioactive waste to emergency service water radiation monitor
OTHER ACTIVITIES-BASELINE
71152A - Annual Followup Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Followup of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Hydraulic control unit 5839 rod drift
- (2) Traversing incore probe computer communication issue
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in computer system related change management that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Correct Faulty Control Rod Hydraulic Control Unit 5839 Resulting in Control Rod Drift Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000440/202500401 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152A The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, when the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to correct control rod hydraulic control unit 5839 directional control valve degradation identified in corrective action program document CR202502755 prior to performing control rod scram time testing that resulted in an unexpected change in reactivity and reactor power.
Description:
Control rod 5839 had a documented history of degraded performance. In 2023, degraded performance was documented in corrective action program (CAP) document CR202303026, noted that control rod 5839 required drive pressure of 350 pound differential pressure (PSID)vice the normal 250 to 275 PSID for control rod withdrawal. During refuel outage 1R20 circa early spring 2025, degraded control rod drive mechanism seals prompted the replacement of the control rod drive mechanism 5839. Following replacement of the mechanism and during refuel outage 1R20, CR202502755, titled Hydraulic Control Unit 5839 Needs Refurbished,"
was generated during system testing and noted continued reliability issues with required drive pressure of 400 PSID for control rod withdrawal. This indicated the issue was with the hydraulic control unit (HCU) and would require refurbishment of HCU 5839. Work Order (WO)200971102 was issued, but the directional control valves (DCVs) were not replaced.
On September 6, 2025, the licensee was performing atpower scram time testing on control rod 4635 per SVI-C11T1006, Control Rod Maximum Insertion Time. With the scram signal present for control rod 4635, control rod 5839 unexpectedly drifted in to the core from position 48 to position 32. In response to the unexpected change in reactivity and reactor power, the licensee entered their abnormal procedure ONI-C51, Unplanned Change in Reactor Power. Control Rod 5839 was fully inserted into the reactor core per a Special Maneuver Sheet by the control room staff and subsequently declared inoperable. After plant stabilization was verified and nuclear engineering review completed, the abnormal procedure was exited.
The licensee and NRC became aware of the problem on this date.
The cause of the drift was a differential pressure formed between the exhaust water header and the scram discharge head via a leaking DCV in HCU 5839. As a result, WO 200980723 was generated to replace the DCVs on HCU 5839. CAP document CR202506292-ATA001 was generated for extent of condition failure analysis on the DCVs from HCU 5839. The maintenance on HCU 5839 and restoration of the control rod to operable was completed on November 22, 2025.
The inspectors contacted outage management, and the maintenance team were to determine why the work order step to replace the DCVs was marked not applicable and not performed, but the information could not be located that documented the decision. The decision to restart the plant with a non-conforming control rod was made, and the refuel outage completed.
Corrective action to complete the HCU refurbishment and replace the DCV's was scheduled for refuel outage 1R20 in spring of 2027.
As required by the licensees NOP-LP2001, CAP, the inspectors concluded that the licensee failed to correct the adverse condition in a timely manner to prevent the unplanned reactivity transient during scram time testing. Specifically, control rod 5839 was identified as degraded in 2023 and again on April 13, 2025. Prior to fixing the degraded condition, the licensee conducted individual scram time testing on control rod 4635 that resulted in a rod drift on control rod 5839 and reactivity transient requiring entry into the licensee's procedure for an unplanned change in reactor power. Because of this, the inspectors determined the licensee had the ability to repair or prevent the degraded HCU from causing the unexpected change in reactivity and power.
Corrective Actions: Work Order 200980723 was generated and executed for the replacement of the DCVs on HCU 5839.
Corrective action program document CR202506292-ATA001 was generated for extent of condition failure analysis on the DCVs from HCU 5839.
Corrective Action References: CR202506292
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors concluded that the failure to resolve identified conditions in a timely manner, as required by the licensees NOP-LP2001, CAP, Section 4.2.4.2, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, HCU 5839 DCVs were identified as faulty on April 13, 2025. Prior to resolving the faulty condition, the licensee conducted individual scram time testing on September 6, 2025, that resulted in an unplanned control rod drift and reactivity transient requiring entry into the licensee's procedure for an unexpected change in reactivity and reactor power.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors compared the issue to the examples and guidance in IMC 612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues finding the issue similar to example 4.b of Appendix E. Specifically, the performance deficiency caused an unexpected change in reactivity and reactor power.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened the finding using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, Section A, Transient Initiators. The inspectors answered the question no, which results in a Green characterization of the issue.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, the licensee did not consider the impact delaying the repair of the control rod hydraulic unit 5839 directional control rod, especially as associated with planned activities which resulted in the control rod drift during scram time testing.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, from April 13, 2025, until September 6, 2025, the licensee failed to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee failed to correct control rod HCU 5839 directional control valve degradation identified prior to performing atpower control rod scram time testing that resulted in an unexpected control rod drift and change in reactivity and reactor power.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Traversing InCore Probe Computer Communication Issue 71152A The inspectors performed a detailed review of condition report (CR)-202508990, Unable to Process Traversing InCore Probe [TIP] Data to Generate Local Power Range Monitor [LPRM]
Gain Adjustment Factors. Specifically, the inspectors identified the licensee entering the grace period of the LPRM nuclear instrumentation surveillance window with potential to drive the plant into a shutdown condition. The inspectors selected this sample as a specific extension of the issues related to computer upgrades and the entry of a nuclear instrumentation safety system into the grace period for surveillance with a potential to drive the plant into a shutdown condition.
On November 26, 2025, the TIP operation was performed for the calibration of the LPRM nuclear instrumentation. Due to recent plant computer system upgrades, the system was unable to process probe data to generate LPRM adjustments. This unexpected consequence was not identified in the change management of the plant computer upgrades and challenged the nuclear instrumentation safety system's status to remain operable.
General Electric technical experts were contacted by Perry reactor engineers on November 26, 2025. It was determined that the database array was not sized correctly for how the new TIP data would be processed. Following modification of the array dimensions, TIP data was processed successfully, and the LPRM calibration surveillance was completed. The inspectors did not identify any issues with the corrective actions taken.
Observation: Potential Trends in Computer System Upgrade Change Management 71152S The inspectors performed a semiannual review of a potential adverse trend in the licensees corrective action program (CAP) associated with work planning and execution issues that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. Included in this sample were the following CAP documents:
- CR 202507790, Plant Computer Rebooted After Database Crash
- CR 202508400, ERDS Not Transmitting to the NRC
- CR 202508838, Plant Computer Corporate Network Challenges During the inspection period, the inspectors evaluated several instances of plant computer system and security computer system upgrades with unexpected results such as loss of data monitoring, data processing, and ability to communicate information. The identified issues also affected NRCs emergency response data system (ERDS). The planning and execution of the computer upgrade related activities affected the maintenance backlog and complicated operator ability to monitor and track plant parameters.
The safety culture common language associated behavior was LA.5/H.3: Change Management: Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority. Specifically, managers maintain a clear focus on nuclear safety when implementing the change management process to ensure that significant unintended consequences are avoided.
The inspectors completed the objectives of the inspection procedure and trended the behavior to consider potential safety culture weaknesses and discussed with the licensee of taking appropriate actions before significant performance degradation occurs as stated in NUREG2165, "Safety Culture Common Language." No violations or more than minor performance deficiencies were identified and the licensee implemented appropriate contingencies and the necessary parameter monitoring and tracking remained functional through approved and redundant means.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 15, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to T. Brown, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On November 25, 2025, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to D. Benyak, Plant General Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 23, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to C. Jones, Emergency Preparedness Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SOI-E12
ATTACHMENT 1
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System-Verification Checklist
Section 4.1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 7.26 Alignment to Standby
Readiness-Loop A
2/12/2025
VLI-C11
Control Rod drive Hydraulic System (CRDH)
2/16/2025
VLI-E12
Residual Heat Removal Valve Lineup Instruction
2/11/2025
Procedures
VLI-R44
Division 1 and Division 2 Diesel Generator Starting Air System 11/24/2025
1DG1A
Unit-1-Division-2 Diesel Generator Building 620' 6" and 646'
6"
11/25/2025
1DG1B
Unit 1-Division3 Diesel Generator Building 620'-6" and 646' 6"
elevations
11/25/2025
2CC3a, 3b, 3c, 3d Unit 2-Division 1,2,3 4160V & 480 V Switchgear,
Communications Room, Radiation Protection Offices and
RRA Access Facility 620' - 6" Elev
11/25/2025
Fire Plans
DG1D
Hallway Diesel Generator Building 620" 6' and 646' 6"
11/25/2025
Calculations
E12102
RHR System Heat Exchanger B Loop Performance Test
Evaluation
Procedures
PTI-E12P0003
RHR Heat Exchanger B and D Performance Testing
Work Orders
RHR B/D Heat Exchanger Performance Results
05/20/2025
Evolution Specific
Reactivity Plan -
Perry Nuclear
Power Plant
November 2025 Control Rod Sequence Exchange
FLT-OPRM1002
Conduct of Operations
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
Scenario Guide
OT3070PCIB Copy 4 of 6
10/28/2025
CR202504457
Digital Feedwater System Trouble Alarm
06/18/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202506186
Digital Feedwater Node Bus Transmitter Middle Amber Light
Not Flashing
09/02/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202507233
Reprioritize Media Translator Replacement for Digital
10/10/2025
Drawings
2080025-00015
Feedwater Control System-System Control
10/21/2025
Procedures
SVI-R43T1348
Division 2 Standby Diesel Generator 24 Hour Run
Work Orders
RHR B/C Water Leg Pump Maintenance
10/20/2025
CR202506807
Liquid Radwaste to Emergency Service Water Radiation
Monitor Setpoint Issue
09/25/2025
CR202506825
ERDS Transmission Issues Due to Plant Computer Upgrade
09/26/2025
CR202506960
AsFound Data Found Outside Allowable Value During
Performance of SVI-M51T0321A
10/01/2025
CR202507789
Unit 2 Startup Transformer Serveron High Carbon Monoxide
Alarm
10/22/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202508573
Late Environmental Qualification (EQ) Maintenance Plan
11/13/2025
CR202506964
Hydrogen Analyzer 'A' Gas Values Spiking During
Performance of SVI-M51T0321
10/01/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202508884
Rod Speed Adjust Not Performed as Scheduled
11/22/2025
Drawings
E2100100-00155
1H13P865
11/18/2025
Miscellaneous
Guidance
Document
DFWCS Guidance Document
11/18/2025
Procedures
SVI-M51T0321A
Combustible Gas control System Hydrogen Analyzer 'A'
Calibration for 1H51P022A
Work Orders
200982240
Radwaste to Emergency Service Water Monitor 0D17K0606
09/25/2025
EP 000
Perry Operations Manual, Emergency Plan
Procedures
PSI0019
Emergency Action Level (EAL) Bases Document
Corrective Action
Documents
CR20258300
EOF Critical Digital Asset (CDA) for URI Not Working
11/04/2025
Miscellaneous
Tabletop Drill
25 4th Quarter ERO Tabletop Drill
TSC-EOF
HPI-J0053
AMP Calibration Record for MPL L70L077V
2/04/2025
Calibration
Records
HPI-J0065
MGP Telepole Calibration Record for MPL L70L072D
09/04/2025
HPI-J0073
Ludlum Model 12 Calibration Records for MPL L70L0964
08/28/2025
HPI-J14
Calibration Record for H809V1 Air Sampler MPL L70L2014
01/22/2025
HPI-J54
ABACOS 2000 Whole Body Counter Calibration Record for
MPL L70L600A
10/10/2024
N/A
MGP Calibration Certificate for DMC3000 A0B73E
2/27/2025
NOP-OP440401
PCM2 Calibration Record for MPL L70L004H
2/19/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202506807
Liquid Radwaste to Emergency Service Water Radiation
Monitor Setpoint Issue
09/25/2025
CR202508827
NRC identified (IP 71124.05)-Unable to Locate Two Radiation
Monitoring Calibration Records Requested by Inspectors
11/20/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR202508828
NRC identified (IP71124.05)-Telepole Radiation Survey
Instrument Calibration Methodology Needs Improvement
11/20/2025
CHI0006
Radiation Monitoring Alarm Setpoint Determination
HPI-J0065
Calibration of the MGP Telepole and Telepole II
HPI-J0053
Calibration and Operation of the MG AMP Area Monitor Probe 7
PAP1403
Control of Setpoints
Procedures
SVI-G50T5266
Liquid Radwaste Release Permit
200788291
Nuclear Closed Cooling Radiation Monitor Calibration
08/08/2023
20090263
Containment/Drywell Exhaust Plenum Radiation Channel A
Calibration
05/17/2024
200902652
Containment High Range Radiation Monitor Channel A
Calibration
04/29/2024
Work Orders
200920266
Turbine Building/Heater Bay Vent Noble Gas Radiation
Monitor Calibration
07/09/2025
CR202506292
Rod Drift for Control Rod 5839 from Position 48 to Position
09/06/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202508980
Unable to Process Traversing InCore Probe Data to
Generate Local Power Range Monitor Gain Adjustment
Factors
11/26/2025
CR202507790
Plant Computer Rebooted After Database Crash
10/22/2025
CR202508400
ERDS Not Transmitting to the NRC
11/07/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202508838
Plant Computer Corporate Network Challenges
11/20/2025