IR 05000440/1993013
| ML20045B523 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1993 |
| From: | Barger J, Markley A, Reidinger T, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045B520 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-93-13, NUDOCS 9306180038 | |
| Download: ML20045B523 (22) | |
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t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-440/93013(DRSS)
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Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58 Licensee:
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
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10 Center Road Perry, OH 44081
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Facility Name:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At:
Perry Site, Perry, Ohio Inspection Conducted: June 1-4, 1993 k dD N/0/93 Inspectors:
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H. Simons Date T?f?,cdAhigt w'
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T. Reidinger u
Date el.banon 4 6 ln 93
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,Y Amt
%. Markley
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Accompanying Personnel:
G. Cicotte-i D. Kosloff
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CO. W. McCormick-Barger,' Chief Date
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Non-Power Reactor Section i
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Inspection Summary Inspection on June 1-4. 1993 (Report No. 50-440/93013(DRSS))
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Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Perry Nuclear Power -
Plant's annual emergency preparedness exercise involving a review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302), and observations by five NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301).
Results:
No violations or deviations'were identified.
The' licensee demonstrated a very good overall response to a challenging scenario which
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included a refueling outage scenario, off-hours activation of the emergency
response organization, and multiple unrelated equipment failures.
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The overall performance of the emergency response organization was very good.
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The interface between the EOF staff and the State and. local government j
representatives was excellent. 0ne exercise weakness was identified in the Operational Support Center (050). The OSC personnel failed to verify a worker was qualified to wear respiratory protection equipment.
This resulted.in a worker simulating donning a self-contained breathing apparatus without having the proper medical evaluation as required by 10 CFR 20.103(c)(2).
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DETAILS
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NRC Observers and Areas Observed H. Simons, Control Room Simulator (CRS), Backup Emergency Operations _
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Facility
D. Kosloff, CRS T. Reidinger, Technical Support Center G. Cicotte, Operational Support Center and Inplant Teams
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A. Markley, Inplant Teams 2.
Eersons Contacted
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F. Stead, Director, Perry Nuclear Services Department D. Cobb, Superintendent, Plant Operations R. Vondrasek, Manager, Emergency Planning B. Beyer, Director, Perry Administrative Services Department M. Bezilla, Operations Manager
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E. Riley, Director, Perry Nuclear Assurance Department
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M. Roseum, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
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D. Conran, Compliance Engineer C. Shelton, Lead Quality Engineer K. Pech, Manager, Integrated Scheduling and Control K. Donovan, Manager, Licensing and Compliance Section J. Anderson, Emergency Planning Coordinator
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The above and approximately 30 other licensee representatives attended I
the exit interview on June 4, 1993.
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The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during.the course j
of the inspection.
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3.
General (IP 82301)
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An announced, off-hours exercise of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant's emergency plan was conducted at the Perry site on June 2,1993. The exercise tested the capabilities of the licensee's emergency i
organization to respond to an accident scenario involving the simulated release of -radioactive effluent. The attachments to this inspection report summarize the licensee's scope of participation and the exercise
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scenario.
The licensee successfully responded to the accident scenario in a coordinated, orderly, and timely manner in accordance with the emergency
plan and implementing procedures.
If the scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit State and local authorities to take appropriate
actions to protect the public's health and safety.
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Specific Observations (IP 82301)
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Control Room Simulator (CRS)
The Control Room Simulator (CRS) crew's performance was very good.'
The staff promptly identified abnormal plant conditions and
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implemented corrective actions.
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The Shift Supervisor (SS) and the CRS crew quickly recognized the conditions which warranted the Unusual Event and Alert
declarations. These declarations were made in a timely manner. -
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The notifications to the State, counties and NRC were completed
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within the regulatory time limits.
Communications, both in the CRS and to other facilities, were very l
good. Although all CRS personnel were cognizant of scenario events, the SS could have conducted more briefings early in the scenario. After the Alert declaration, he held frequent and
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detailed briefings.
i The SS displayed very good command and control of the emergency response efforts. He did an excellent job ensuring the CRS staff was augmented to support the emergency response.
The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) and CRS communicator quickly responded to support the SS. The operators and STA provided independent verification of emergency classifications using the emergency
action levels.
No violations or deviations were identified, b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Security access control was established within 10 minutes of the
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alert declaration. The Technical Support Center (TSC) was
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activated within one hour of the Alert declaration.
Prior to the TSC being declared operational, the technical staff
members were proactive in obtaining and providing a technical
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overview of plant conditions and tentative priorities on the status boards for review by the TSC managers.
Technical and engineering analyses in support of the TSC priorities were excellent.
Good technical discussions were held throughout the duration of the event regarding various plant conditions; such as the fuel handling bridge problems, fuel handling building ventilation, loss of shutdown cooling, and-the numerous bomb threats. Good support was provided by various TSC technical engineers assigned to accompany the Operational Support Center (OSC) inplant teams for direct observations of the affected or failed equipment. TSC staff conducted good recovery discussions on the long term plans for the damaged fuel bundle.
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The TSC Operations Manager was proactive in getting status updates from the CRS, Backup Emergency Operations Facility, and OSC personnel on a frequent basis and providing detailed briefings to the TSC staff on the status of the emergency, priorities, and the status of repair activities in plant.
The.TSC staff was excellent in maintaining the status boards current for the TSC priorities, OSC priorities, inplant team status, radiological status, plant conditions, and emergency repair activities. The status board for the periodic emergency notifications ensured timely updates were accomplished by the administrative assistant. The TSC staff effectively utilized and monitored this data closely. They continued to monitor and post changes to the onsite radiological conditions, radiological-monitoring team status, and State recommendations for offsite i
protective actions.
All onsite personnel were accounted for within thirty minutes.
One minor problem was noted with accountability. An inplant repair team did not hear the Site Area Emergency declaration announcement. They heard the announcement to assemble; however,
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the repair team did not report their accountability status to the
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OSC as directed by the public address announcement.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inolant Teams
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Overall performance in the Operational Support Center (OSC) was good. Thirty-three teams were dispatched from the OSC during the exercise.
Each team observed by the inspectors demonstrated excellent technical knowledc ' and use of procedures.
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The OSC was activated in an orderly and timely manner. The OSC Coordinator conducted detailed briefings of plant events to supplement the TSC briefings which were audible in the OSC.
Radiological conditions in the OSC were properly monitored throughout the exercise.
All inplant teams were dispatched in a timely manner.
Each team was given a thorough briefing prior to being dispatched. Team composition was excellent as system engineers accompanied most repair teams. Communications with the inplant teams were also excellent.
Each team kept the OSC Coordinator informed of their'
actions. One minor communication problem was noted with the inplant team contaminated during the simulated airborne release from the~ damaged fuel bundle. The controller allowed the team to turn off their radio as the teas shought their active
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participation with the OSC was terminated.
As each team returned from the plant, debriefings were informal since most of the important information had been transmitted from
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the field. Due to the informal nature of debriefings, two teams
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L did not officially get logged back into the OSC until one hour after their return. Documentation of team debriefings was
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sketchy. Several team debriefing forms were not completely filled out; however, this did not affect the overall emergency response.
A team was dispatched to perform a visual inspection of the
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damaged fuel bundle. While preparing for the inspection, a worker i
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stated that he was unsure if his respiratory certification was-l-
current. A radiation protection technician (RPT) confirmed that the worker had attended classroom training, but did_ not verify if l
the medical evaluation was current prior to assigning a respirator to the worker. The inspectors later discovered that the worker had not received a medical certification within the last 12 months
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as required by 10 CFR 20.103(c)(2).
In a real event, this would be a violation of 10 CFR 20.103(c)(2).
The failure to verify a worker's medical qualification prior to issuing him a respirator
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is considered an exercise weakness (No._440/93013-01).
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l No violations or deviations were identified; however, one exercise i
weakness was identified.
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d.
Medical Drill
The overal'1 response to the simulated contaminated injured person
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The victim had received a simulated, severe knee injury in a contaminated area. A radiation protection technician (RPT)
discovered the individual, determined potential-radioactive contamination was involved, and immediately reported the injury to radiation protection (RP) management and the control room.
simulator (CRS).
The RPT was instructed to maintain communications with the CRS until the first aid team (FAT)
arrived. This initially prevented the RPT from performing normal duties such as surveying the immediate area and controlling potential contamination. The RPT did not evaluate the extent of the injury and began to partially undress the injured individual by removing his rubber overshoes, hood, and gloves.
The RP supervisor and FAT arrived approximately six minutes after the injury report. Although initial surveys were not performed, RP personnel set up boundaries for the potential contaminated area and established radiological control on the scene. This initial
setup was followed up by thorough surveys of the area. The FAT was delayed approximately five minutes by RP prior to attending to the victim to ensure proper radiological controls had been
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l established. The FAT removal of protective clothing and immobilization of the injured leg was very good. However, the victim's pulse and respiration rate were not taken until
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14 minutes after the FAT began treatment.
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Coordination between RP and the FAT was good. The removal of the victim from the radiologically controlled area was accomplished within 30 minutes from the time of the injury report. The-transfer of the victim to the ambulance crew was excellent. They were provided good briefings and a RPT was dispatched to accompany the ambulance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Backuo Emeraency Operations Facility (BE0F)
The nearsite Emergency Operations Facility was simulated to be out of service at the beginning of the exercise. Therefore, the Backup Emergency Operations Facility (BEOF) was activated.
The BEOF was activated out of sequence of other events in the scenario in order to allow more exercise time for the BEOF participants.
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The BEOF was promptly activated after the Shift Supervisor learned
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that a mock NRC Site Team was in transit to the site. The activation was orderly and timely. The BEOF was fully functional within one hour of the request to activate the facility.
The Emergency Coordinator (EC) did an excellent job ensuring the BEOF staff were ready to assume their responsibilities before
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accepting command and control of the emergency response from the Technical Support Center (TSC).
In addition, the EC provided a detailed briefing to all BE0F personnel prior to accepting command and control.
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The interface between the. mock NRC Site Team, State and county representatives, and BEOF personnel was outstanding. The BEOF
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staff provided the State,-mock NRC, and county representatives with all pertinent information and quickly provided answers to all questions.
The Plant Operations Advisor quickly recognized that the condition of the simulated damaged fuel bundle satisfied the criteria for a Site Area Emergency (SAE). He discussed the potential declaration with the EC and the SAE was properly declared.
Status board maintenance in the BEOF was very good.
The status board recorder, posting plant status, took the initiative to trend and post reactor pressure vessel water temperature as a function of time which was the most critical parameter during the loss of i
shutdown cooling event.
The BEOF staff did an excellent job discussing the bomb threat and possible consequences. The EC had the good idea to tap the telephone line so that the caller could be potentially identified.
- The dose assessment team did an excellent job performing dose assessments.
Release rate data was generally 20 minutes old prior
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to being transmitted to the BEOF via a line printer. The dose
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assessment staff took the good initiative to obtain current information from the TSC.
Overall communications within the BEOF were very good. However, several minor details during the exercise could have been
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announced during facility briefings.
For example, the status of
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two contaminated individuals, the seismic monitor alarm, and the first bomb threat were not promptly announced.
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No Jiolations or deviations were identified.
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Exf Lc La 'o.iertives and Sc?nario Review (IP 82302)
The licensee submitted its proposed scope of exercise participation, objectives, and copies of the scenario within the established deadlines.
The licensee addressed the inspectors' scenario review questions.
The licensee activated the Backup Emergency Operations Facility (BEOF)
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out of sequence in order to maximize the amount of exercise time for
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BEOF participants. By activating this facility out of sequence, the licensee's objective, "to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct the activation of emergency facilities in a timely manner when required by procedure or warranted based on postulated events," was only partially demonstrated.
The most challenging aspects of the exercise included a contaminated,
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injured worker, multiple unrelated equipment failures, and off-hours activation of emergency response facilities.
The scenario was well prepared; however, one simulator problem was noted. Simulator modeling for the reactor water temperature during the loss of shutdown cooling
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event reflected the heat decay characteristics for the water level at the reactor vessel flange vice the characteristics for the actual containment water level. This reduced the time for core boil from 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
This modeling problem was not compensated for by the controllers and led to some confusion during the exercise.
The licensee made excellent use of equipment " mock-ups" to enhance the exercise realism for players.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exercise Control and Critioues (IP 82301)
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Overall, exercise control was good. Three minor instances of controller prompting were identified. One controller had to coach a repair team because the mock-up used was different from the actual piece of equipment in the plant. Another controller told the first responder to the fire in the diesel generator room that he had to enter the room, even though the responder indicated he would not enter the room under the given conditions.
Finally, a team asked a controller whether they
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had caused the accidental high pressure core spray injection to the reactor vessel. The controller responded by telling them the procedure step they just completed may have been the cause.
The licensee's controllers held initial critiques-in each facility with participants. immediately following the exercise. Several of these critiques were observed and were determined to be detailed with inputs
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sought from all participants.
The licensee provided a summary of its preliminary, self-identified-performance strengths and weaknesses, which were in good agreement with the inspectors' preliminary findings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview On June 4, 1993, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives identified in Section 2 of this report in order to present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
Attachments:
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Scope of Participation and Exercise Objectives l
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Exercise Scenario Summary
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. Mr. A. Bert Davis PY-CEI/0IE-0398 L
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Attachment Page 1 of 8
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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES Scope
The 1993 Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted'during off hours as an announced exercise on June 2, 1993, vill simulate accident events designed to test the effectiveness of the Emergency Preparedness Program for the Perry Plant, located in North Perry Village, Lake County, Ohio. Successful demonstration of the emergency response capabilities of the State of Ohio and the Counties of Lake,'Geauga, and Ashtabula was accomplished in.the December 9, 1992 Emergency
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Preparedness Exercise and vill not be demonstrated in this exercise.
Onsite Objectives The major objective of the exercise is to demonstrate the response capabilities of the Perry Plant Emergency Response Organization (ERO).
Vithin this overall objective, individual objectives are specified as
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follows:
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ITEM
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OBJECTIVE A.
EVENT CLASSIFICATION
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1 Demonstrate ability to effectively assess postulated plant indications, alarms and reports, and correctly classify an emergency event in a timely manner.
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2 Demonstrate ability to correctly identify a series of postulated emergency events which escalate to a Site Area or General Emergency classification.
Limiting Condition:
Exercise scenario vill only postulate conditions
requiring escalation to a Site Area Emergency.
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3 Demonstrate ability to correctly terminate from the emergency phase and i
enter Recovery per procedural guidelines.
Limiting Condition:
Demonstration vill be limited to correctly identify procedural criteria and requirements for terminating from a Site Area Emergency and entry into Recovery, j
No Recovery activities, planning or formation of a Recovery Organization vill be demonstrated.
B.
ERO NOTIFICATIONS / RESPONSE 1 Demonstrate ability to notify on-call ERO personnel in a timely manner upon (re) classification of an emergency event.
2 Demonstrate ability to adequately staff and activate facilities promptly i
in support of postulated emergency conditions.
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Attachment Page 2 of 8
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3 Demonstrate ability to augment staffing in support of postulated emergency conditions.
4 Demonstrate ability to effectively direct the activation of emergency facilities in a timely manner when required by procedure or warranted based on postulated events.
5 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize key ERO staff and to activate the
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TSC, OSC, and EOF between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m.
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Limiting Condition: The Backup EOF, located at the Company's Ashtabula
Service Center, vill be activated in lieu of the onsite EOF.
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6 Demonstrate ability to activate the Backup EOF a a timely manner in l
support or in lieu of the onsite EOF.
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Limiting Condition: Backup EOF vill be activated in lieu of onsite EOF.
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7. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate with and support NRC Regional-Site Team activities.
Limiting Condition: Utility personnel vill be used to simulate ERO-
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interface with key Regional Site Team positions
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co-located in the Control Room (Simulator), TSC and Backup EOF.
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OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS
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1 Demonstrate ability to notify the State of Ohio and local counties within 15 minutes of initially declaring and reclassifying an emergency event.
2 Demonstrate ability to notify the NRC vithin one hour of initially I
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declaring or reclassifying an emergency event.
3 Demonstrate ability'to periodically update Federal, State and local county officials and agencies on the status of emergency based on available information.
4 Demonstrate ability to maintain an open line over the ENS and "5-vay" circuits and respond to inquiries promptly.
5. Demonstrate ability to utilize alternate means of communication upon the postulated failure of the ENS and/or "5-vay" circuit (s).
Limiting Condition: A failure of one or more local county drops off the
"5-vay" circuit vill be simulated.
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6 Demonstrate the ability to effectively transfer responsibility for ENS and "5-vay" circuits between facilities.
7 Demonstrate ability to notify and periodically update utility support organizations (e.g., INPO, ANI) as required.
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Attachment Page 3 of 8 8 Demonstrate mechanism for recommending protective actions to State and local county authorities.
Limiting Condition: Mechanism via available communications using Perry Plant notificetion forms vill be demonstrated; however, scenario vill not require utility to recommend an offsite shelter or evacuation protective action.
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EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS 1 Demonstrate ability to communicate clearly and effectively between onsite facilities.
Limiting Condition: Backup EOF vill be activated in lieu of onsite EOF.
2 Demonstrate ability to communicate clearly and effectively with shift and OSC repair / assessment team personnel dispatched in-plant.
3 Demonstrate ability to communicate clearly and effectively with RMTs.
4 Demonstrate ability to effectively warn or advise Plant personnel or individuals onsite or in adjacent areas controlled by CEI utilizing the Plant Public Address (PA), Exclusion Area Page, and Tone-Alert Radio Systems.
E.
COMMAND AND CONTROL 1 Demonstrate ability of Shift Supervisor to promptly assume and carry out duties of the Emergency Coordinator upon the initial classification of an emergency event.
2 Demonstrate the effective and orderly transfer of Emergency Coordinator duties betveen facilities.
3 Demonstrate ability of key ERO personnel to coordinate emergency assessment and response activities.
4 Demonstrate ability to establish / revise in-plant ERO priorities and effectively utilize ERO personnel to address priorities.
5 Demonstrate ability to effectively coordinate facility activities and to update facility staff on event status, priorities, and expected actions.
6 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the assembly, effective briefing /
debriefing, and timely dispatching of OSC teams.
7 Demonstrate ability to promptly access spare / replacement parts and materials and deliver to OSC or in-plant repair team.
8 Demonstrate the effective coordination of on-shift personnel (PP0s/PPAs, Security Officers, etc.) and integration with the Emergency Response Organization (ERO).
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Attachment
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9 Demonstrate ability to effectively transfer dose assessment responsibility and control of RMTs between facilities.
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ACCIDENT ASSESSME!W RESPONSE I Demonstrate the timely and effective use of PEIs, ONIs, and other operations procedures to respond to postulated indications, alarms and reports.
2 Demonstrate ability of ERO to assess postulated equipment / component failures in a timely manner and effectively develop corrective actions to l
mitigate events.
3 Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy-RMTs in a timely manner.
i 4 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
5 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and pr9cedures for measuring airborne radioactive concentrations as lov as 10- uCi/cc under field conditions in the presence of noble gases.
6 ' Demonstrate ability to project exposures based on plant ef fluent monitor.
i readings and field data for various meteorological conditions.
Limiting Condition:
Postulated scenario vill not drive Perry Plant to recommend offsite protective actions.
Demonstrate ability to effectively track airborne radioactive plume using RMTs.
Limiting Condition:
Postulated scenario will not drive Perry Plant to recommend offsite protective action.
Demonstrate onsite capability and resources to provide initial values and continuing assessment throughout the course of an accident.-to include:
- radiation and effluent monitors
- in-plant radiation monitoring instrumentation Limiting Condition: Postulated scenario vill not support the use of PASS
results or Containment radiation monitors to
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demonstrate this objective.
G.
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 1 Demonstrate the effective operation and adequacy of the following onsite facilities in the assessment and mitigation of a postulated emergency event:
- Control Room
- Technical Support Center (TSC)
- Operations Support Center (OSC)
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- Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
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- Public Information Response Team (PIRT)
Limiting Condition: Backup EOF to be activated in lieu of onsite EOF.
2 Demonstrate the ability of key ERO personnel to perform the staffing-
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responsibilities outlined in Table 8-1 of the Emergency Plan for the event postulated.
3 Demonstrate the ability of the Backup E0F to adequately perform the
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functions of the onsite EOF.
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Limiting Condition: Only limited interfacing with State and local county representatives located in the Backup EOF vill be demonstrated. Utility personnel, acting in the role of State / county liaisons, may be used to demonstrate this objective.
4 Demonstrate the ability of facility staff to update / maintain status j
boards and other displays in an accurate and timely manner.
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5 Demonstrate ability of ERO staff to effectively use the Emergency
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Response Information System (ERIS) to monitor and assess plant conditions.
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i Limiting Condition: Backup EOF does not have' direct access to ERIS.
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Rather, a telephone link vill be established from
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the Backup EOF to either the Control Room
(Simulator) or TSC to obtain ERIS or other plant
operational data, i
.i 6 Demonstrate ability of TSC and EOF staff to place. facility HVAC in
emergency isolation mode.
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i Limiting Condition: To be demonstrated in TSC only, since Backup EOF
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vill be activated in lieu of onsite EOF.
EOF HVAC vill be tested later as part of annual ERO training
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drills.
i 7 Demonstrate ability of the TSC and EOF HVAC systems.to adequately j
maintain facility temperature control within established limits.
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Limiting Condition: To be demonstrated in TSC only, since Backup EOF
vill be activated in lieu of onsite EOF.
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vill be tested later as part of annual ERO training j
drills.
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8 Demonstrate the availability of equipment (including dosimetry and sampling devices) to effectively support facility operations, OSC teams, and RMTs.
I 9 Demonstrate ability to access and acquire data from geophysical ~ phenomena monitors (e.g., meteorology,. hydrologic, seismic).
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H.
ACCOUNTABILITY 1 Demonstrate ability to account for all individuals within the Protected
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Area upon initiation of personnel accountability by ascertaining the-names of missing individuals within 30 minutes and accounting for
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2. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to perform
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accountability outside the Protected Area by-means of an orderly evacuation of non-essential site personnel.
Limiting Condition: A holding area for non-essential personnel vill be
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established in lieu of offsite evacuation.
3 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control e
site access.
4 Demonstrate the organizational' ability and resources necessary to assemble and arrange transportation for individuals without a means of
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i personnel transportation, o
Limiting Condition:
Source of offsite transportation (Laketran) and method of contacting agency vill be identified, and call vill be placed to exercise controller.
Required actions vill be discussed with Security
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officer dispatched to site assembly. The actual l
relocation offsite of plant personnel ~will not be
demonstrated.
5 Demonstrate ability to radiologically monitor individuals' evacuating the
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Protected Area.
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EXPOSURE CONTROL 1 Demonstrate ability to effectively monitor and control _ emergency worker exposures per Plant procedures.
2 Demonstrate the ability to authorize extensions for Plant emergency worker exposures in an expeditious manner which takes into account reasonable consideration of relative risks.
3 Demonstrate the ability to assign personal dosimetry, effectively monitor exposure at appropriate frequencies, and maintain accurate dose records for Plant emergency workers.
4 Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of
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Plant emergency workers and equipment, and for vaste disposal.
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5 Demonstrate onsite contamination control measures, including area access
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control, drinking vater and food supplies, and criteria for permitting return of areas and items to normal use.
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6 Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for individual respiratory I
protection and use of protective clothing-for individuals remaining or arriving onsite during the postulated emergency event.
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MEDICAL RESPONSE j
1 Demonstrate the ability of onsite first aid responders to effectively assess a medical emergency and render appropriate medical care within
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their training in a timely manner.
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'i 2 Demonstrate the adequacy of health physics support in determining the radiological status of a victim and advising first aid responders on radiological concerns.
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3 Demonstrate the adequacy of facalities and equipment to support first aid responders.
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t 4 Demonstrate the ability to promptly notify and request offsite ambulance
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support for transportation of a victim.
5 Demonstrate the organizational ability and procedures for Plant first aid
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responders, health physics and security officers to effectively
coordinate: access and egress into the Protected Area of an offsite.
ambulance; dress-out and radiological monitoring of the ambulance and I
crev; and transfer of a victim.
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6 Demonstrate the ability to notify and coordinate with a local medical l
facility for the care, handling and treatment of a contaminated and injured victim.
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Limiting Condition:
Plant backup facility, Lake Vest Hospital in l
Willoughby, OH, vill be utilized.
i 7 Demonstrate the ability of offsite medical facility to evaluate radiation exposure and uptake to a contaminated victim.
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PUBLIC INFORMATION/ RUMOR CONTROL
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1 Demonstrate points of contact and physical locations for use by news
media during an emergency.
Limiting Condition:
Objective limited to initial response af ter event declaration and interfaces with Public Information Response Team (PIRT). JPIC, while requested to be
activated, vill not become operational during
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exercise.
2 Demonstrate that adequate space is available at the EOF / Training and
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Education Center (TEC) for a limited number of news media.
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. Mr.-A. Bert' Davis PY-CEI/01E-O'398 L
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Page 8 of 8
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3 Demonstrate the organizational ability and procedures which:
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- designate a spokesperson having access to necessary information l
- arrange for a timely exchange of information among designated spokespersons
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4 Demonstrate the ability to brief media representatives in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
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3 Demonstrate the ability of Company telephone attendants and personnel to
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reroute incoming inquiries regarding the emergency to the PIRT.
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6 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
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RECOVERY
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No objectives to be demonstrated under this category.
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1993 PERRY PLANT EVALUATED EXERCISE
6.1 INITIAL CONDITIONS SUMMARY The Perry Plant is currently in Mode 5 (Refueling) having entered Mode 4 for i
the 4th refuel outage on May 27.
Reactor Engineering has validated the decay heat curves presently in the Plant Data Book and they can be utilized for this
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outage. The 1993 Outage Schedule for the Day is current as of 1400.
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The following major plant evolutions are in progress:
1.
Containment integrity and Fuel Handling Building integrity are set for fuel movement.
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2.
Main steam line plugs have been installed.
3.
The vessel is being offloaded in preparation for Recirculation Loop "A" l
Suction Valve (B33-F023A) replacement. Of the 748 fuel bundles, 17
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bundles have been transferred to the Fuel Handling Building, 10 are in the Containment Storage Pool, and 721 remain in the core.
4.
Reactcr Vater Cleanup is isolated. Various decontamination and maintenance tasks are scheduled for later this week.
5.
Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Fan OM40-C002C is out of service for motor i
re-build.
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6.
Due to the large number of fuel elements scheduled to be tested, an additional fuel sipping machine has been setup in the cask pit pool.
7.
'B'
is isolated and drained; various maintenance tasks are scheduled to begin tomorrow.
8.
ILC is performing surveillance SVI-B21-T0188G, "ECCS/HPCS Reactor Level 2 j
and 8 Channe) G Calibration."
9.
Both control rod drive pumps are tagged out of service.
Temporary water is in service. A control rod drive is in the CRD Rebuild Room for
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overhaul.
10.
The following feedvater pumps are tagged out of service for the feedvater maintenance vindov:
RFBP N27-C001A-D and MFP N27-C004.
11.
Division 2 Diesel Generator is out of service for teardown / inspection.
12.
Yesterday, breaker EHlll6 to Stub Bus XH11 tripped for unknown reasons.
l Troubleshooting is in progress.
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SECT. 6.1 - 1 s
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13.
Repairs to the Inclined Fuel Transfer System (IFTS) were completed. The
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Containment IFTS Pool is flooded. The isolation gates will be moved to their storage locations this shift.
14.
The EOF was declared inoperable at 1502 due to the failure of the OR58-F013 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system. Smoke was detected:
the fire brigade was toned out and the building evacuated; Perry Township
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was called but left soon after investigation.
See the available Condition Report and Event Notification Form for details.
notification has been made; the backup EOF is to be utilized if needed.
The CEI Room, the Display Room and the Whole. Body Counter are without power. The NRC Room and TEC-110/111 are available; other TEC offices are unaffected.
15.
Current meteorological conditions are as follows:
Today will find partly cloudy skies, temperatur's in the 70's with light e
vinds out of the west. This evening expect temperatures in the mid 60's with vinds from 5 to 15 mph.
(93 EVEX)
SECT. 6.1 - 2
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i 1993 PERRY PLANT EVALUATED EXERCISE 6.2 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS I
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Approximate Key
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Time Events i
1600 Initial conditions are established.
1650 The inclined fuel storage transfer gate is moved to its storage
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location.
j 1700 While securing a pressure transmitter during SVI-B21-T0188G, a l
technician inadvertently causes a Level 2 initiation signal.
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High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) injects to the vessel.
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1700+
A loud banging noise is reported by an operator making rounds in.
the Auxiliary Building.
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1701 Operators secure HPCS. Potentially radioactive water may be
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spilled around the Surge Tank Area if operators do not secure HPCS within one minute.
1710 An UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared (EPI-A1, Section A.I.1,
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" Initiation of the Emergency Core Cooling Syste.m with Flov to the Reactor Pressure Vessel").
l 1730 Ultrasonic testing examinations of fuel bundles are taking place
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in the cask pit pool. As Perry Plant Operators (PP0s) are_
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moving an unchanneled bundle in the cask pit pool, the bridge
fails to continue moving due to a damaged bridge position interlock. A spent fuel bundle is suspended from the grapple.
j 1745 Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Fan OM40-C002A trips.
1750 A fire breaks out in the Division 1 Diesel Generator Room; the l
CO2 system activates..The Plant Fire Brigade is toned out and j
the Perry Township ~r' ire Department is called.
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1805 An ALERT should be declared (EPI-Al, Section F.II.1,." Fire
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Affecting or Potentially Affecting a Safe Shutdown System or i
Component"). The TSC and OSC should'be directed to be j
activated.
1820 While on rounds near the CRD Rebuild Room, a fire technician l
severely injures his knee. The victim is transported
contaminated to Lake Vest Hospital.
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SECT. 6.2 - 1
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1993 PERRY PLANT EVALUATED EXERCISE 6.2 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
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Approximate Key Time Events
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E 1830 The optical isolator for Residual Beat Removal (RHR) Suction Valve E12-F008 fails. This failure removes the suction path g
permissive for the RHR
'A' pump. The pump trips and shutdown
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cooling is lost.
1835 The Shift Supervisor is informed by the NRC that the Regional i
Site Team is being dispatched. The Backup EOF (BEOF) should be
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staffed per EPI-A6.
f; 1900 Output breaker EF1A03 from transformer EHF-1-A trips open. As a result, several components, including Fuel Pool Cooling Circulating Pump (FPCC) A, lose power.
i 1910 The TSC and OSC should be operational by now.
1920 Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Fan OM40-C002A may be restored to-j service by now.
I 1925 The NRC Regional Site Team arrives at the Perry Primary Access f
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Control Point (PACP).
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1930 The operating FPCC pump (B) trips. There is no cooling to the
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Reactor Vessel.. Operators should initiate the Outage
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Contingency Vork Order to power FPCC Pump
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from EFIC. If operators use Fuel Pool Cooling Assist Mode, valve IE12-F066A fails to open.
2000 The Backup EOF should be operational by now.
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2010 The Fuel Handling Bridge is repaired.
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2020 When the fuel bridge is re-powered following limit switch l
replacement, the Bridge roves.and the suspended bundle strikes
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the pool vall. Bubbles are'seen coming from the fuel bundle.
The fuel bridge radiation monitor alarms first, followed by the l
Fuel Handling Building area radiation monitor. The Fuel
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Handling Building evacuation alarm sounds.
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2022 Upon frisking, several Fuel Handling Building vorkers are found
to be contaminated, t
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(93 EVEX)
SECT. 6.2 - 2
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i 1993 PERRY PLANT EVALUATED EXERCISE 6.2 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Approximate Key
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Time Events
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2023 The Fuel Handling Building ventilation gas channel increases above the high alarm setpoint. The Fuel Handling Building supply fan
"A" fails to automatically trip. The operators
should notice this (vhile implementing Off Normal Instruction ONI-D17 and ONI-J11-2) and secure the fans.
I 2025 Upon notification by the Control Room per ONI-D17, Site j
Protection implements its contingency plan to verify Fuel Handling Building ventilation system integrity.
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2030 A SITE ARRA EMERGENCY should be declared (EPI-Al,
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Section J.III.1, " Major Damage to Spent Fuel in Containment or Fuel Handling Building"). The operators may implement PEI-D17.
- The JPIC is directed to activate. Off-site radiation monitoring is under way.
2100 Radiation Monitoring Teams (RMT's) detect low levels of radiation near the site boundary.
2100 A bomb threat is received by Security over the phone.
Site Protection responds to the security threat, t
2115 The "5-vay" circuit to Geauga County fails. Communicators must
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use alternate means to re-establish communications.
2130 The seismic trigger inadvertently initiates due a faulty sensor.
The seismic monitor alarms Operators should implement ONI-D51.-
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2200 The event may be downgraded when the radiation monitors as
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offsite readings return to normal after the building is. purged
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of any airborne radiation.
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i 2230 The response portion of the Exercise may be secured; in-facility
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critiques commence.
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2300 The exercise may be terminated.
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(93 EVEX)
SECT. 6.2 - 3-i I
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