IR 05000416/1996015
| ML20128P370 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128P361 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-96-15, NUDOCS 9610170234 | |
| Download: ML20128P370 (17) | |
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. ENCLOSURE 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-416 License No.:
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Repori No.:
50-416/96-15 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, !nc.
Facility:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location:
'Naterloo' Road Port Gibson, Mississippi Dates:
August 18 through September 28,1996 Inspectors:
J. Tedrow, Senior Resident inspector K. Weaver, Resident inspector T. Andrews, Radiation Specialist G. Pick, Project Engineer G. Werner, Project Engineer Approved By:
P. Harrell, Chief, Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment 1:
Supplemental Information 9610170234 961001 PDR ADOCK 05000416 l
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-416/96-15
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The inspectors evaluated aspects of Scensee operations, maintenance, surveillance, engineering, and plant support activities. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations
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Control room personnel were knowledgeable of the conditions associated with the
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plant and all continuously illuminated control board annunciators. Excellent communications were demonstrated by licensed operators, in that the operators used 3-way communication and announced control panel equipment manipulations and alarming annunciators (Section 01.1).
Operators properly implemented clearance orders. However, the inspectors
identified a weakness in the licensee's process that provided the potential to have clearance order implementation errors (Section 02.2).
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Maintenance I
Surveillance tests observed were properly performed. Operations personnel used-
proper self-checking techniques and demonstrated good command and control.
Test procedures provided clear guidance and properly implemented Technical Specifications requirements. Technicians were knowledgeable and qualified
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(Section M1.3).
After the inspectors identified minor foreign material exclusion (FME) deficiencies,
licensee management increased their oversight to ensure improved FME control practices (Section M2.1)
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Work performance was satisfactory, in accordance with procedure instructions, and
well coordinated during the new fuel handling and inspections. Maintenance personnel were knowledgeable of procedure instructions and equipment operation (Section M4),
i Enaineerina Enginee;ing and safety evaluations and the setpoint calculations reviewed were
found to be appropriate and technically sound (Section E1.1).
Plant Support l
A noncited violation associated with an individual exiting the site while
contaminated with a hot particle was identified. The inspectors concluded that the
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licensee performed a detailed, thorough evaluation to identify the root cause l
(Section R1.1).
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-2-The inspectors found that security officers dernonstrated detailed knowledge related
to vehicle control inside the protected area (Section S1.1).
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Report Details i
Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at 100 percent power throughout this inspection period except for minor power reductions for periodic turbine valve testing and control rod sequence
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exchanges.
1. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent observations of ongoing plant operations, which included routine control room operations. During these observations, control room personnel were found to be knowledgeable of the conditions associated with the plant and all continuously illuminated control board annunciators. The inspectors also observed excellent communications by all licensed operators, in that, the j
operators used 3-way communication, announced control panel equipment manipulations, and announced alarming annunciators.
Operational Status of Facilities and E:;uipment-02.1 Plant Tours (71707)
The inspectors toured the turbine, auxiliary, control, and containment buildings to l
evaluate existing materiel and equipment conditions. The inspectors found materiel and equipment conditions generally good; however, some minor discrepancies were identified by the inspectors and condition identifications initiated. Overall, housekeeping was good.
02.2 Safetv-Related Clearance Taaout Verification a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
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The inspectors verified the following tagouts for the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system components to ensure components were properly tagged and positioned in accordance with the respective clearance.
Clearance Number 961405
Clearance Number 961412
Clearance Number 961413
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Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors noted that clearance tags for control panel handswitches specified handswitch numbers that were not present on the identification label. The
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i 2-inspectors questioned operators, who stated that the applicable handswitch numbers were located underneath the control panel and that, generally, they used the noun description to identify and hang the clearance tags. The inspectors noted that some noun descriptions for control panel handswitches differed slightly from the tagout sheet; for example, "RCIC TURB OIL CLG WTR SUPPLY VALVE HANDSWITCH" was identified on the tagout and labeled on the control panel as
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"RCIC WTR TO TURB LUBE OIL CLR." The inspectors verified that the appropriate handswitch was tagged.
The inspectors found that the component noun descriptions listed in the component database, which was used to generate the tagouts, differed from the control room component labels and system operating procedures. The inspectors expressed concern that, since the component noun descriptions were different, the wrong component could potentially be tagged and result in possible personnel / equipment damage. Operations management stated that an operations assessment previously identified this same discrepancy, and personnel generated operations feedback forms and initiated condition identifications to correct the component database, in addition, operations management stated that further evaluations were in process regarding changing the component database to address this issue, c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that all components specified on the observed clearance orders were properly tagged, labeled and positioned. However, the inspectors determined that there was a potential for clearance errors in that there were discrepancies in the component noun descriptions among the component database used to generate clearances, the control room panel component identification labels, and the system operation procedures.
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
(Closed) Violation 50-416/96008 01: Failure to identify and document the repetitive failures and inaccurate readings of a pressure indicator. The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated May 9,1996, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
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3-II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M 1.1 General Maintenance Comments a.
Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities, as specified by the following work orders (WOs).
WO 173874: Acid flush on Division I switchgear room cooler in accordance
with Procedure 07-1-34-T46-BOO 1 A-2
WO 171997: Replace RCIC condensate storage tank suction piping rupture disc b.
Observations and Findinas During an acid flush of the Division I switchgear room cooler, the inspectors observed that the mechanic demonstrated excellent knowledge and farniliarity with his task and reviewed the procedure sections prior to proceeding with various portions of the task. The mechanic performed Repetitive Task 020451 in accordance with WO 173874 and Procedure 07-1-34-T46-B001 A-2,"ESF Switchgear Header and Room Cooler Q1T46B001 A Acid Flush," Revision 2. The inspectors found the procedure well written in that the procedure clearly described options for implementing the flush.
The inspectors found that the RCIC rupture disc replacement WO 171997 was initiated as priority one, which allowed work to proceed before completing detailed planning and documentation. However, when the inspectors observed the maintenance, they noticed that a work document was generated and that planning had occurred. The inspectors determined that technicians completed a continuity
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check on the rupture disc alarm circuit, which indicated that the rupture disc needed I
to be inspected or replaced. Supervisory personnel and a quality controlinspector observed the work.
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Conclusions l
The inspectors found the performance of this work to be satisfactory. Personnel performed the work in accordance with the instructions and procedures provided in
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the work packages.
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-4-M1.2 Motor Ooerated Valve (MOV) Testina for Valve E21-FO12, Low Pressure Core Sorav (LPCS) Test Return to Socoression Pool a.
Inspection Scone (62707)
The inspectors observed electricians performing portions of MOV diagnostic testing and resettin,, if a torque switch on LPCS Valve E21-FO12 under WO 159500.
Electricians performed the work in accordance with Procedure 07-S-12-127,
' Installation and Operation of VOTES Diagnostic Test Equipment," Revision 2.
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Observations and Findinas On September 9,1996, the inspectors observed electricians adjust the closed torque switch for the valve actuator and subsequent diagnostic testing. The
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electricians demonstrated appropriate knowledge and understanding of the work.
The inspectors noted that the closed torque switch was being reset because of an overtorque condition; however, the inspectors observed that the as-found thrust value had dropped significantly and was found below the minimum closing thrust value specified for the valve.
The electricians could not explain the decreased closing torque values.
Subsequently, the inspectors questioned an engineering support supervisor
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regarding the cause for such a large decrease in the closing torque and the potential j
for generic concerns with other MOVs. Based on the performance traces for l
Valve E21-FO12, absence of metallic filings in the MOV actuator tube oil, and
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proper MOV operation, the engineering supervisor stated that he was not concerned l
with equipment degradation.
l Initially, the engineering supervisor thought the problem may have been with the l
D-clamp (a device that connects to the valve stem to indirectly measure torque), so i
the electricians retested the MOV using another D-clamp and found that the closing torque values agreed within 1 percent of the previous test. Based on this information, the engineering supervisor suspected that the large decrease in closing torque resulted from either a testing error or a software problem. The licensee identified that personnelinput some inaccurate data into the VOTES computer program in 1993; however, even with corrected valve data, the revised torque value did not explain the large decrease observed during the MOV testing of September 9.
The licensee discussed the software concern with the MOV test equipment vendor but identified no software problems.
The engineering supervisor stated that no generic testing concern existed with other MOVs since out of 90 valves tested prior to 1993 only one other valve hed skewed test results. The skewed data resulted because of entering incorrect valve data into
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the VOTES computer program. Licensee personnelinitiated Condition l
Report 96-0047 to document the underthrust condition found on Valve E21-F012.
At the end of the inspection, the licensee had not identified the cause for the large
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-5-decrease in closing torque. The inspectors reviewed the operability evaluation and found no problems with the licensee's determination that the valve would perform-its safety function. Condition Report 96-0047 recommended that Valve E21-FO12 be disassembled and inspected during the upcoming refueling outage. The cause for the unexpected decrease in closing torque as well as potential generic implications for other MOVs will be reviewed during a future inspection as an inspection followup item (50-416/96015-01).
M1.3 General Surveillance Comments a.
Inspection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors observed portions of the following surveillances:
Procedure 06-OP-1E21-O-0006,"LPCS Quarterly Functional Test,"
Revision 100 Procedure 06-OP-1 E12-O OO24,"LPCl/RHR Subsystem B Quarterly
Functional Test," Revision 100 b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors determined that operations personnel performed the LPCS surveillance using proper self-checking techniques and good command and control.
An adequate prejob brief was given with appropriate time for both licensed and nonlicensed operators to review the procedure. The inspectors verified that the surveillance satisfied both the Technical Specifications and postmaintenance testing requirements. All the test data met the required acceptance criteria.
During the low pressure coolant injection / residual heat removal (LPCl/RHR) system test, the inspectors noted that the test procedure provided clear guidance and properly implemented Technical Specifications requirements. Measuring and test equipment was verified to be within its current calibration cycle. When personnel removed the instrumentation from service, operators properly entered applicable Technical Specifications limiting conditions for operation. Technicians were very knowledgeable and qualified. The inspectors verified that previous tests were performed at the correct periodicity.
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Conclusions The surveillance tests observed were properly performed. Operations personnel used proper self-checking techniques and demonstrated good command and control.
Test procedures provided clear guidance and properly implemented TechMcal Specifications requirements. Technicians were knowledgeable and qual.ried.
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6-M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M 2.1 0bservation of FME Controls a.
Insoection Scoce (60710)
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'The inspectors observed FME controls during preparations to place new control rods l
into the spent fuel pool, b.
Observations and Findinas in preparation for the placement of new control rods in the spent fuel pool, the licensee had to perform routine maintenance and checkout of the fuel handling machine. The bridge of the fuel handling machine was considered to be a FME control area.
A sign on the side of the bridge stated that all materials entering the FME control area had to be attached by lanyard or otherwise properly secured to prevent the
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material from falling into the pool. The inspectors noted the numerous examples of poor FME control practices below and identified these to the licensee.
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Workers wearing lab coats with objects in the lab coat pockets with the
l pockets not taped; Workers removed individual pages from a binder and walked about the fuel
i handling machine bridge with the individual sheets of paper. Additionally,
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adhesive note paper was attached to some of these pages; Tools and meters located on the fuel handling bridge were not attached by
l lanyards; Some individuals taped dosimetry and security badges to the front of their
garments, while others used necklace straps either inside or outside of lab coats; and Some unsecured articles entering the FME control area were not inventoried
and entered into a log for accountability purposes.
The inspectors discussed these observations with licensee personnel, who investigated these deficiencies and initiated corrective actions. During a subsequent l
tour, the inspectors again noted minor FME control discrepancies for the spent fuel i
pool area. These discrepancies were also discussed with licensee personnel and Condition Report 96-0057 was initiated. The inspectors considered these
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deficiencies personnel perfoimance weaknesses. Further, procedures recommended,instead of required, strict FME controls. Subsequently, managers emphasized the need to adhere to strict FME controls at plan-of-the-day meetings.
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Conclusion i
The licensee initiated steps to address poor FME control practices after the l
inspectors identified FME control deficiencies.
M4 IW:intenance Staff Knowledge and Performance a.
Inspection None (60710)
The inspectors observed portions of the new fuel receiving and inspecticn efforts and interviewed personnel performing the work.
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Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors observed maintenance personnel perform new fuel handling and inspections in accordance with Procedure 17-S-02-110,"New Fuel Processing."
The inspectors found the performance of the new fuel handling and inspections to be satisf actory, in accordance with the procedure instructions, and well coordinated. The inspectors noted good communication between personnel during the activities. Also, maintenance supervision and reactor engineering personnel continuously monitored the work in progress and remained readily available should problems occur. Based on interviews with the maintenance personnel performing the new fuelinspections, the inspectors found the workers knowledgeable of procedure instructions, equipment operation, and new fuel components.
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Conclusions Work performance was satisf actory, in accordance with procedure instructions, and well coordinated during the new fuel handling and inspections. Maintenance personnel were knowledgeable of procedure instructions and equipment operation.
l MS Maintenanco Staff Training and Qualification The inspectors reviewed the training records and qualification requirements of the maintenance personnel observed during the new fuelinspections. The inspectors found that the licensee trained and qualified maintenance personnel as Level 11 fuel receipt inspectors in accordance with Quality Assurance Procedure 2.5, " Inspector Certification," which was commensurate with their responsibilities for new fuel inspections. The inspectors concluded that the workers had received sufficient l
training to satisfactorily complete the fuelinspections.
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l M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
(Closed) Violation 50-416/95021-02: Failure to previde appropriate procedure for calibration of the hydrogen analyzers. The inspect)rs verified the corrective actions i
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l-8-described in the licensee's response letter, dated March 27,1996, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were subsequently identified.
Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 General Comments (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the engineering evaluations and calculations listed below:
Safety Evaluation 9f.-0086 on reactor recirculation system operation with
degraded flow contr " system.
Engineering evaluatior and MOV setpoint calculation associated with
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Material Nonconformance Report 0146/96 for Standby Service Water l
Valve P41-F189.
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The inspectors found the engineering / safety evaluations and the setpoint l
calculations to be appropriate and technically sound and identified no problems.
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment l
l E2.1 Review of Facility and Eauipment Conformance to Uodated Safety Analvsis Reoort (UFSAR) Descriotion (71707. 37551)
l A recent discovery of a licensee operating a facility in a manner contrary to the l
UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares l
plant practices, procedures, and parameters to the UFSAR description. While
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performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant
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practices, procedures, and parameters. No anomalies between the UFSAR and operation of the facility were identified.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92700)
l (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 50-416/95009: High pressure core spray injection because of an invalid low water level signal. This event was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50 416/95-14. The inspectors verified that the licensee completed the corrective actions and determined that no noncompliance resulted
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-9-l IV. Plant Support
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R1 Radiological Protectiosi and Chemistry Controls R 1.1 Hot Particle Contamination Event Followuo a.
Inspection Scope (92904)
l The inspectors reviewed the response to the discovery of a hot particle on a worker exiting the security access point.
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Observations and Findinas On August 28,1996, af ter an individual had difficulty exitir the PM-7 portal monitors located at the security access point, a radiation nurvey located a hot particle on the individual's neck strap. This neck strap supported the individual's dosimetry and key card badge. The embedded hot particle was in close-contact on the individual's neck and measured 4.22x10 2 microcuries of Cobalt-60.
The licensee learned that the individual had experienced similar difficulty exiting the PM-7 portal monitors at the security access point each workday since August 14.
Consequently, during this period, the individual would use a frisker located in the immediate area with no success and then repeatedly attempt to exit the PM-7 portal monitor until the monitor did not alarm. The licensee performed dose calculations using worst case assumptions and estimated that the worker received 52 millirem deep dose exposure and 19 rads shallow dose exposure. No regulatory limits were exceeded.
The inspectors evaluated the investigation, which identified one item of significant concern that questioned how a person with a hot particle could leave the radiological control area. The licensee used PCM-1B contamination monitors at the radiological control area exit but had not installed PM-7 portal monitors because the hot machine shop on the other side of the wall created high background radiation.
The licensee indicated that the PCM-1B contamination monitors located at the I
radiological control area exit alarm at 5000 counts per minute and that the hot particle measured 9000 counts per minute. The licensee used this hot particle to test the PCM-1B contamination monitors, which alarmed as expected. Therefore, the geometry of the hot particle location on this individual and shielding provided by the individual's hair (thick hair and low energy gamma rays) contributed to the het particle not being detected earlier.
The licensee recognized that the PM-7 portal monitors located at the security access point had improved sensitivity because of lower background radiation. They tested the monitors with the hot particle and they alarmed as expected. The
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The inspectors concurred with the assessment of the accuracy of PCM 1B contamination and PM-7 portal monitors. Given the low activity of the hot particle that was discovered, if a worker successfully exited the radiological control area, then worked the remainder of the work day and attempted to exit the PM-7 portal monitors, the accumulated exposure would be very small. Had the individual
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The licensee identified the following contributing f actor to this event. Security l
officers at the security access point no longer monitored the PM-7 portal monitors, j
As a corrective action, the licensee modified the alarms on the PM-7 portal monitors to provide an audible and visible alarm in the security access control point. This would alert security officers that someone or something alarmed the portal monitors. Security would then notify radiation protection and have the situation evaluated.
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According to Procedure
>S-02-021," Hot Particle Contamination Control,",
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Section 6.2.3.c, Revisica 6, personnel who continuously alarm whole-body contamination monitors or hand / foot monitors, even after decontamination efforts and evaluation for noble gas contamination (decay), must be carefully surveyed for hot particle contamination before release from the site. This procedure section was followed by a note that stated, the Health Physics Supervisor must authorize release of these individuals in accordance with Procedure 08-S-02-22," Personnel l
l Decontamination." Each workday from August 14 to 28, an individual failed to
notify radiation protection when the PM-7 portal monitor at the security access
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I point alarmed. Therefore, the appropriate surveys and authorization to leave the site was not obtained as required and constituted a violation of Technical
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Specification 5.4.1. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement j
Policy.
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Conclusions A noncited violation associated with an individual exiting the site while contaminated with a hot particle was identified. The licensee had thoroughly evaluated the root cause surrounding a failure to detect a hot particle for approximately 2 weeks and verified that the radiation monitors operated
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R1.2 Observation of Field Measurements and Radicaraohv a.
inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors observed field measurements and radiography associated with the Residual Heat Removal Pump B quarterly functional test.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed the radiological protection prejob briefing provided to the
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l radiographer. Questions were answered regarding the proposed positioning of the l
radiography unit and emergency procedures, if needed. The briefing was concise
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and addressed the pertinent issues, i
The inspectors observed the radiographer using electronic personnel dosimeters that were set to the proper setpoints defined in the radiation work permit. The inspectors verified that these setpoints were consistent with those in 10 CFR 34.33.
The inspectors observed the radiographer activities via camera in the work area.
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Postings were properly positioned and access restricted to the area in accordance
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with plant procedures. Additional radiation surveys were made by radiation i
protection personnel, c.
Conclusion Good radiation work practices were demonstrated by licensee personnel during radiography.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
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S1.1 General Comments a.
Inspection Scone (71750)
The inspectors made periodic plant tours and observed activities inside the protected area.
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Observations and Findinas During a tour of the plant protected area, the inspectors noted that a contractor drove a tractor trailer into the protected area. The inspectors questioned security j
personne! patrolling the protected area concerning the purpose of the tractor trailer and the procedural control requirements for contractor vehicles inside the protected
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i the vehicle on the security logs in accordance with Procedure 11 -1 -11 -4, " Vehicle
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Control," Revision O.
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Conclusi'on
The inspectors concluded that security personnel who were patrolling the protected area were knowledgeable of procedural requirements concerning contractor vehicle
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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary l
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the J
conclusion of the inspection on October 2,1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings
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l The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection l
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifiedi l
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e ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORM ATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee C. Bottemiller, Superintendent, Plant Licensing C. Brooks, Licensing Specialist, Plant Licensing J. Burton, Manager, Mechanical / Civil Engineering L. Daughtery, Technical Coordinator, Plarit Licensing N. Edney 11, Supervisor, Radiation Protection C. Elisaesser, Manager, Performance and System Engineering J. Hagan, Vice President, Nuclear Operations C. Holifield, Licensing Engineer, Plant Licensing B. Jones, Auditor, Quality Programs A. Khanif ar, Manager, Materials, Purchasing and Control M. McDowell, Operations Superintendent M. Meisner, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs R. Moomaw, Manager, Plant Maintenance J. Roberts, Manager, Training M. Rohrer, Mechanical Maintenance Coordinator, Maintenance S. Saunders, Manager, Electrical /l&C Engineering T. Tankersley, Technical Coord!nator, Maintenance J. Venable, Manager, Operations NRC J. Donahew, NRR Project Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 60710 Refueling Activities 61726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observations 71707 Plant Operations l
71750 Plant Support Activities
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92700 Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities 92901 Followup - Plant Operations 92902 Followup - Maintenance l
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-416/96015-01 IFl Review of unexpected drop in MOV closing torque and potential generic implications (Section M1.2)
50-416/96015-02 NCV Individual exiting the site while contaminated with a hot particle (Section R1.1)
Closed 50-416/95021-02 VIO Failure to identify and document the repetitive failures and inaccurate readings of a pressure indicator (Section 08)
50-416/96008-01 VIO Failure to provide appropriate procedure for calibration of the hydrogen analyzers (Section M8)
50-416/96015-02 NCV Individual exiting the site while contaminated with a hot particle (Section R1.1)
50-416/95009 LER High pressure core spray injection because of an invalid low water level signal (Section E8)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR code of federal regulations FME foreign material exclusion LPCl/RHR low pressure coolant injection / residual heat removal LPCS low pressure core spray MOV motor operated valve NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission RCIC reactor core isolation cooling UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report WO work order
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