IR 05000409/1979017
| ML19209A465 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1979 |
| From: | Boyd D, Ridgway K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19209A460 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-79-17, NUDOCS 7910040087 | |
| Download: ML19209A465 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-409/79-17 Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 IIcensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South La Crosse, WI 54601 Facility Name: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At:
La Crosee Boiling Water Reactor Site, Genoa, WI Inspection Conducted: July 25-27, 1979 4 Y)2
/n c9lh7h Inspector:
K. R. Rid a y, IM Approved By:
D.
ting Chief C
Reactor Projects Section 3 Inspection Summary Inspection on July 25-27, 1979 (Report No. 50-409/79-17)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's organization and administration; onsite review committee program and activities; procedures; review of refueling activities; and followup actions relative to Licensee Event Reports, IE Bulletins and IE Head-quarters requests. The inspection involved 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> onsite by ont NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in five areas inspected, one deficiency, failure to meet Operations Review Committee quorum require-ments, and one deficiency, use of an unapproved startup graph, in two other areas inspected.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
- J.
Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor P. Wiley, Assistant to Operations Supervisor L. Krajewski, Health and Safety Supervisor
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H. Towsley, Quality Assurance Supervisor L. Papworth, Operations Engineer
- L. Kelley, Security and Fire Protection Supervisor R. R. Very, QA Specialist
- J.
Joseph, Assistant Security Director In addit 4on, the inspector observed and held discussions with other engineers, plant equipment operators, reactor operators, assistants, and plant attendants.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
General The reactor was taken critical on May 25, 1979, follwing a nine week refueling and maintenance outage. Several interuptions were encoun-tered before the unit was put on the line May 28, 1979; mainly due to the turbine overspeed control system.
While in power escalation on June 1, 1979, a reactor scram o: curred from closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valve which was attributed to loose wires in the valve control system. On June 18, the reactor was scrammed by a momentary short in an alarm circuit caused by personnel action while performing maintenance on a multipoint recorder.
Recovery was made the same day.
On July 4, 1979, the unit was shutdown due to the loss of hydraulic oil from the Main Steam Bypass Valve and on July 7, 1979, the unit was scrammed due to failure of the seal inject delta pressure trans-mitter which caused loss of both Forced Circulation Pumps.
In July, power generation was restricted to about 86% due to decreased efficiency of the main condenser probably caused by fouling of the condenser tubes.
Late in July, the condenser tubes were cleaned and power has been increased to 91%.
3.
Organization and Administration The licensee's onsite e anization was reviewed for conformance with the Technical Specifics. ion description. No significant organization-2-1089 219
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changes had been made during the past year and the organization
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conformed with the Technical Specification. The organization was also reviewed for cot'ormance to qualifications, authorities, and responsibilities, minimum shift crew requirements, and review and approval requirements.
The Electrical Engineer position has not been filled for over a year and recent resignations have left the positions of Nuclear Engineer, Mechanical Engineer, Operations Engineer, and Administrative Assistant vacant. Two Shift Supervisors have resigned and been replaced by
qualified Senior Operators. The licensee stated that the recruitment of replacements for these positions was being expedited and in the interim, qualified contractor personnel would be used.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Onsite Review Committee There have been no changes in the Operations Review Committee (ORC)
Charter since 1976, however, a revised charter had been reviewed by the ORC in March. ORC meeting minutes since the last inspection, a year ago, were reviewed for Technical Specification requirements in frequency, compositions, use of alternates, quorum requirements, responsibilities, and records.
It was noted that the quorum require-ments of members at ORC meetings had not been met on seven occassions.
An internal QA audit of December 11, 1978 had detected this problem and as a result the Chairman had, in writing, appointed two alternate members to the ORC by name and position title. However, for the ORC meeting of May 2, 1979, only four members were present when required business was conducted. This is considered to be in noncompliance with Technical Specification requirements.
In addition, a personnel change in one of the appointed alternate positions, made since the origins 1 appointment, resulted in the question of whether the new position holder, even though qualified, was an alternate ORC member or not.
5.
Precedures The inspector reviewed the following procedures to determine if the procedures were issued, reviewed, updated and approved in accordance with technical specification requirements; also that procedure changes were reviewed and approved properly and did not conflict with Technical Specification requirements.
a.
General Operating Procedures (Normal Operating Procedures)
(1)
2.1, Plant Startup, Revised April 6, 1978 (2)
2.3, Normal Plant Shutdown, Revised April 27, 1978-3-1089
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b.
Startup Procedures for the following Systems (1) Nuclear Steam Supply and Forced Circulation System (2) Decay Heat System (3) Component Cooling Water System (4) Turbine - Generator System (5) Service Water System (6)
Instrument Air System (7) Control Rod Drive System
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c.
Abnormal Condition Procedures One procedure for each of the above systems
d.
Emergency Procedures (1)
3.3.3 Primary System Leaks (2)
3.3.2 Loss of Electric Power e.
Administrative Procedures (1) ACP 3.2 Security and Visitor Control (2) ACP 2.1 Authority and Responsibility for Safe Operation and Shutdown During the inspection it was noted that changes had been made to Procedure 2.4, " Predicted Critical Control Rod Position" which included a change in Figure 2.4.1 "29 Rod Bank Critical Position versus Reactor Temperature for Fuel Cycle 6".
This change had not been reviewed by the ORC or approved by the ORC Chairman but the unapproved Figure had been used to calculate plant startups in May, June and July. The inspector determine that these startups con-formedtotheTechnicalSpecifications.fj This is considered to be in noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.8.2 "Each procedure and changes thereto, shall be reviewed by the ORC and approved by the Plant Superintendent prior to implementation.
6.
Review ofPlant Operations During Refueling Only minor changes have been made to refuelfng procedures; the inspector reviewed these changes. During a previous inspection,2/
all procedures, checklists, valve-switch alignments, and piping and instrument diagrams for all engineered safety features had been inspected to verify that avaibility of the systems were not compro-mised when returned to service following refueling operations or surveillance checks. The inspection identified a number of incon-sistencier between test procedures and data checkoff sheets. The 1/
LACBWR Technical Specifications Paragraph 4.2.4.8 and 4.2.4.9.
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IE Inspection Report No. 50-409/79-10.
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licensee had reviewed,nd revised some of these procedures but all
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had not been completed. This is considered an open inspection item and will be reviesed during subsequent inspections.
Logs and data sheets of the startups following refueling were reviewed to determine if Technical Specification and procedural requirements had been met.
The review revealed that for three hours during the heat up on May 27, 1979, the recorded delta T between vessel thermo-couples (T/C) 18 and 19 exceeded the technical specification limit of 150 F.
The review of records indicated that T/C No. 18 was wet
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and not indicating properly, and therefore, the delta T limit had not actually been exceeded, however, there was no notation by the operator that he was cognizant of the improper T/C reading or that the delta T might be exceeding the Technical Specifications. Neither the Operations Log Book nor the Shift Supervisors Log Book carried entries of recognition that the T/C was giving an improper reading.
This matter was discussed with management at the closeout meeting.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed the following LER's to determine if the reports were correct and if the evaluations and corrective actions taken were completed as stated in the LER:
a.
(Closed) LER 50-409/79-05, Abnormal degradation of fuel cladding, assembly 2-33.
b.
(Closed) LER 50-409/79-06, Abnormal degradation of fuel cladding, assembly 2-13.
c.
(Closed) LER 50-409/79-08, The downstream containment isolation damper operator shaft packing was found leaking back to contain-ment, thus, the damper leak rate test exceeded limits but containment integrity was maintained. The packing was replaced with a new square braided teflon packing and subsequently met the leak rate tests, d.
(Closed) LER 50-409/79-09, The Control Power Switch was turned on during refueling while a 125-volt DC bus was out of service for required surveillance testing putting the unit into a degraded shutdown mode. The battery surveillance procedures have been changed to require the tagging of the Control Power Switch during surveillance tests which require the removal of battery banks from service.
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e.
(Closed) LER 50-409/79-10, Primary coolant gross alpha activity
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exceeded the Technical Specifications imit while shutdown following refueling. Following the replacement of primary coolant purification resins, the gross alpha activity returned to and remained below the limits. The excess alpha activity was attributed to failed fuel cladding of Cycles 4 and 5 and no further corrective action was taken, f.
(Closed) LER 50-409/79-11, During routine monthly surveillance testing, the Nuclear Instrument Channel 6 upscale +2ip setting
was found to be set less conservative than Technical Specifi-cation, but did not prevent fulfillment of the required protective function. The trip setting was reset and a retest successfully conducted. A recheck of the set point three weeks later indicated no further setpoint drift.
8.
Followup of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins a.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 79-03, Longitudinal weld defects in certain stainless steel pipe spools. The licensee reviewed records to determine that the specific pipe spools in question were not used or planned to be used in LACBWR systems.
Piping specification for the original construction specified seamless pipe in systems above 150 psig.
b.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 79-04, Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation. The licensee surveyed records and determined that this type valve was not in use.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 79-11, Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in c.
Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems.
The licensee had determined that the Circuit Breakers in questica were rot used at LACBWR.
9.
Actuation Signals During Containment Purging In early 1979 NRR issued a generic letter of the same title which required the inaugeration of permanent administrativo controls to prevent the improper manual defeat of safety actuation signals.
LACBWR operates with continous containment purging with automatic closure of ventilation inlet and outlet dampers upon containment high radiation, high containment pressure or high reactor pressure.
In addition, a facility change is in progress, which will give automatic damper closure on low reactor vessel water level. And as a result of the review required by this letter and of IE Bulletin No. 79-08, the licensee reduced the radiation level setpoints on the containment gas monitor, containment delayed particulate monitor, and containment immediate particulate monitors to give a more rapid-6-1039
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response of damper closure in the event of a small loss of coolant
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An Operations Memo, DPC-78, issued July 17, 1979, instructs the operacors that after containment isolation the area monitors and cavity activity must be cl.rcked to see that they are normal before reopening the ventilation system. Operation Memo DPC-79, issued July 27, 1979, instructs the operator to manually close the con-tainment ventilation dampers following a reactor trip for low vessel water level or whenever the dampers close automatically and to leave the dampers manually closed until the reactor water level returns to normal and/or other parameters, i.e., radiation levels, pressure,
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and temperatures indicate that no problems exist.
10.
Emergency Plan Drills On July 10, 1979, the inspector observed the initiation and immediate action taken for a drill of the LACBWR Emergency Plan for outside agencies.
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representative (denoted in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspector summa-rized the scope and findings of the inspection. The following items were discussed:
a.
The inspector expressed his concern over the recent loss of ex-perienced personnel and the licensee.1 slowness in filling the Electrical Engineer position. The licensee responded that the replacement of technical personnel would be expedited and that
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in the interim their contractor, Nuclear Engineering Services, would supply qualified engineering expertise. The licensee also stated that a QA consultant would be obtained to complete the set up of various QA systems that are still inadequate.
b.
Concern was also expressed regarding operations failure to notice or note the improperly operating thermocouple and the apparent excessive or delta T readings during the May 27, 1979 heatup. The licensee acknowledged the remarks.
c.
The two apparent iteme of noncompliance.
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