IR 05000409/1979002
| ML19282C291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1979 |
| From: | Ridgway K, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19282C280 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-79-02, 50-409-79-2, NUDOCS 7903220485 | |
| Download: ML19282C291 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-409/79-02 Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee:
Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue, South La Crosse, WI 54601 Facility Name:
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At:
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Site, Genoa, WI Inspection Conducted:
January 22-26, 1979
$N G
Inspector:
K. R. Ridg Aws:d 2/f /74 y
RFU) 5 Approved By:
R. F. Warnick, Chief 2-/3-79 Reactor Projects Section 2 Inspection Summary Inspection on January 22-26, 1979 (Report No. 50-409/79-02)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of the licensee's Quality Assurance Program Changes; Design, Design Changes, and Modifications; Spent Fuel Packaging and Shipping; Spent Fuel Racks; Peripheral Shroud Change; Fuel Failure Prevention; and followup actions relative to previous items of noncompliance, IE Bulletins, Licensee Event Reports and open inspection items.
The inspection involved 39 inspector hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results:
Of the ten areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were found in nine arcs; one item of noncompliance was found in one area (Deficiency - failure to state 10 CFR Part 21 applicability on purchase documents - Paragraph 5).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R.
Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
- J.
Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- C.
Boyd, Operations Supervisor
- P.
Wiley, Assistant to Operations Supervisor
- H.
Towsley, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- L.
Papworth, Operations Engineer
- L.
Kelley, Shift Supervisor
- L.
Malcom, Consultant
- R.
Wery, Quality Assurance Specialist W. Angle, Process Engineer N. Hoefert, Mechanical Engineer V. Verosta, QA Technician In addition, the inspector observed and held discussions with other engineers, shift supervisors, plant equipment operators, reactor operators, assistants, and plant attendants.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
General The plant had operated at 46 percent power between December 4, 1978, and mid-January with only one forced circulation loop in operation because of a seal failure of the 1A pumo.
In mid-January the failure of a relay on one control rod automaticev shutdown the plant. The 1A Forced Circulation Pump seal wm repaired and the pump was instrumented in an attempt to deter mine the cause of repeated seal failures.
The olant was restarted during this inspection and shortly after startup the 1A pump seal failed again. The licensee plans to continue operation on one loop until refueling is necessarv in early April.
3.
Quality Assurance Program (QA)
The inspector reviewed changes or revisions and additions madetotheQAJrogramsincethelastQAinspectionmadein February 1978,- to determine that the changes conform to the QA criteria described in the licensee's QA Prograg Description submitted in 1976 and approved February 14, 1977.1j 1/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 78-01.
2/ NRC - NRR ltr to DPC dtd 2/14/77.
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During this time, the licensee has made extensive changes in QA procedures; revising fifteen and developing six new procedures. These procedure changes have revised procedure systems, organizational resposibility lines, and job descrip-tions still present in the approved QA Program Description.
These revision and addition improvements in the procedure systems and organization have not been kent current in the OA Program Description. The licensee agreed to revise the QA Program Description to bring it into agreement with the changes.
The licensee has divided his procedure - document control into three systems as follows:
a.
Administrative Control Procedures relating to Operations and Maintenance procedures.
b.
Quality Assurance Instructions relating to QA documents and procedures.
c.
Engineering Control Procedures relating to design documents and
_aer engineering control procedures.
Three new document control procedures had been developed and old procedures were being revised and new ones developed to fit into these new systems. The three document control procedures ACP-7.1, Review, Approval and Issuance of LACBWR Controlling Documents, QAI-2, Preparation and Issuance of QA Documents and ECP 2, Control of Design Documents, were reviewed by the inspector and appeared to meet the requirements of the approved QA Program Description and to provide proper instruction in document control.
Other QA procedure revisions reviewed during the inspection were:
ACP 2.5 Housekeeping, System, and Component Cleanlin,ss ACP 4.1 Design Control and Review ACP 4.2 Facility Change Request ACP 4.3 Substitution Request ACP 7.2 Central Subject File ACP 8.2 Receiving Inspection ACP 8.3 Inventory Control / Material Storage ACP 8.4 Receiving Inspection - Radioactive Materials ACP 10.4 LACBWR Crane Operator Qualification and Certification ACP 11.1 Inspections ACP 12.1 Test Control ACP 15.1 Installation and Removal of Jumpers ACP 17.1 Incident Reports ACP 17.2 Reporting of Reportable Occurrences ACP 17.3 Maintenance Requests QACP - 1.1 Visual Examination by Direct or Remote Viewing QACP - 1.2 Liquid Penetrant Examination QACP - 1.3 Dry Powder Magnetic Particle Examination No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Design, Design Changes, and Modifications Six design changes from five reactor systems were selected and reviewed to determine that the changes were made in conformance to regulations, Technical Specifications, and implementing procedures.
The Facility Changes reviewed were:
FC-77-06 Start of ECCS backup diesels on containment high pressures.
FC-77-10 Fuse additions to electrical circuits entering containment.
FC-77-18 Low pressure service water discharge value bypass.
FC-78-06 Addition of a check value in the seal inject system FC-78-10 Annunciator for the 1A Diesel Generator when it is not in automatic.
FC-78-15 Peripheral shroud replacement.
The following procedures which cover design, design changes, and modifications were reviewed for conformance to the QA Program Description and good quality practices:
ACP 4.1 Design Control and Review ACP 4.2 Facility Change Requests ACP 4.3 Substitution Request ACP 3.3 Classification of Structures, Systems and Components The design, design changes and modifications in the above Facility Change files were inspected to determine that the following areas had been evaluated and documented:
a.
Provisions for unreviewed safety questions, 10 CFR 50.50 b.
Technical Specification requirements.
c.
Quality codes and standards specified.
d.
Independent reviews by qualified personnel for design, quality, and health and safety.
e.
Special procedure requirements, tests and inspections.
The inspector reviewed procedures and design drawings to deter-mine that the above changes had been incorporated in the appli-cable procedures and mastet drawings.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Perinheral Shroud Change During the last refueling outage, the licensee detected cracks developing in the existing peripheral shroud and repairs were-4-
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made before restarting the plant. /4/ A new replacement shroud 3 -
has been fabricated and is to be installed during the next refueling outage scheduled to start in April 1979.
The new shroud is made of 12 gauge (0.1094 inches) 304L stainless steel versus 16 gauge (0.063 inches) of the old shroud.
The sharp corners in the holes of the old shroud, which have a pro-pensity to start cracks, have been replaced with punched holes with rounded corners.
The louvers over the holes in the new shroud are of thicker material and of a more sturdy design.
The louvers have also been repositioned to facilitate reaching the holddown fastener bolts.
Nuclear Engineering Services of Danburg, Connecticut, provided the design, specifications, QA Program, and installation pro-cedures.
Special tools necessary for the removal of the old shroud were also designed and fabricated.
The shroud was fabricated by Nuclear Components, Inc. (NUCOM)
of Great Barrington, Massachusetts.
The licensee reviewed NUCOM's QA Plan and performed a QA audit of their facility on December 15, 1978, before accepting them as an approved vendor.
The Facility Change package was reviewed by the inspector and and the shroud will be inspected prior to installation. During the inspection it was noted that the Purchase Order for the shroud fabrication did not specify that the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21 applied.
This is considered to be an item of noncompliance.
6.
Spent Fuel Packaging and Shipping The licensee has contracted to make shipments of 8 spent fuel assemblies to the General Electric Co., Morris Operation in order to provide storage space for the next refueling in April.
Two Nuclear Assurance Corporation (NAC) shipping casks will be used. These casks are of the same design as the Model No.
NFS-4 cask, Certificate of Compliance Number 6698.
The certi-ficate has been amended authorizing Dairyland Power Cooperative to ship two LACBWR assemblies per cask.
Since the cask length will not permit the closure of both equipment air lock doors, transfer of the cask in and out of containment will require the reactor to be shutdown.
The inspector reviewed a draft of the Special Procedure M-07-78, Irradiated Fuel Shipment (NAC-1/NFS-4 Cask), to determine if the restrictions committed to by the licensee in their cask 3/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 77-13.
4/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 78-10.
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drop safety analysis and requirements of the cask Certificate of Compliance had been included. The inspector pointed out that some of the administrative restrictions on cask movement inside containment were not clear in the procedure and that the procedure on training crane operators also did not refer to these restrictions. The licensee stated that the procedures would be revised to clarify the cask movement restrictions.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Spent Fuel Storage Comnaction fuel storage pool from 133 to 448 assemblies.3prage in The licensee has submitted a request to increase fuel s ruclear the spent Energy Services, Inc., has provided the design and safety analysis; Metal Products Corp., Greenville, South Carolina, has been selected as the fabricator.
The inspector reviewed the vendor qualifica-tons evaluation of the Company conducted by the licensee.
A QA Manual review had been completed and a survey of the facilities had been conducted July 22, 1978.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Fuel Failure Prevention Following the extensive fuel damage in Cycle 4, the licensee committed to some further restrictions of power escalation damage.gyol rod movements to reduce the possibility of fuel clad and con administer these restrictions yed the licensee's procedure to The inspector reviy to ascertain if all commitments had been included. He also reviewed records of the last cold startup and a subsequent hot startup to ascertain that the procedures were being followed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Followup on Previous Noncompliance Items and Outstanding Inspection Items a.
(Closed) Infraction (Inspection Report No. 78-01 and 78-07)
Failure to provide adequate implementation of the Quality Assurance Program in the area of document control.
The inspector reviewed three new procedures developed to provide control of documents. The procedures met all requirements specified in the approved QA Program Description.
5/ DPC Ltr to NRR dtd 4/20/78.
6/ DPC Ltr to NRR dtd 12/9/77.
1/LACOperationsMemo,DPC-2,Rev. 22, dtd 2/15/78.
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b.
(0 pen) Regarding failure to adequately formalize a work inspection program.
The licensee had revised pro-
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cedures, however, the inspector did not consider that a mechanism to assure that maintenance requests are reviewed to determine and initiate inspection requirements had been adequately addressed.
c.
(Open) Regarding QA Records. Resolution is pending con-struction of an adequate facility.
(Closed) Te During a previous d.
inspection,gporaryChangeControl.
the inspector had reported concerns over the control of temporary changes and the return of equip-ment to normal conditions.
During this inspection, a member of the licensees staff stated that any changes or abnormal conditions were logged in the Operations Log or the Supervisor's Log and carried there from shift to shift until returned to normal.
The Lock and Tag system is also used to control equipment and systems, mainly for personnel safety, but also for control of temporary changes.
In addition a Status Board in the Control Room carries abnormal condition status.
(Closed) Temporary Gagging of Main Steam Relig Duringapreviousreviewofmaintenanceitems{ Valve.
e.
it was noted that a Main Steam Relief Valve had been temporarily gagged to try and stop a small leak.
The work had been done only after a safety review and special procedures had been carried out.
An intrepretation of Technical Specification requirements in that area by IE Headquarters declaresth5/fl)threeMainSteamReliefvalvesshallbe in service.f- - - - -
The licensee stated that they would continue to negotiate with NRR for a Technical Specification change.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed the following LER's to ascertain if the reports were correct and if evaluations and corrective actions taken were completed as stated in the LER.
a.
LER 50-409/78-13, Failure of Personnel Airlock unit door to pass Type B leak rate test.
8/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 78-11.
9/ Ibid.
13/ IE RONS RIII Ltr to IE DRO dtd 11/28/78.
jl/IEDROLtrtoIERONSRIIIdtd 12/18/78.
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b.
LER 50-409/78-14, Emergency Diesel tripped due to
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indicated overspeed and incorrect overspeed setting.
c.
LER 50-409/79-01, Fuel Oil for lA and 1B High Pressure Service Water Pump exceeded moisture limits.
Resample indicated original sample was contaminated.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin Followup a.
(Closed) IEB 78-14, regarding deterioration of BUNA-N components in ASCO solenoid valves.
This valve is not used in LACBWR control rod drives. The licensee reported by telephone following the inspection, that other safety related systems were searched for this type of valve and ten were found in use, three of which had original BUNA-N components that appeared to be in good condition and the other seven used stainless steel parts. The licensee plans to replace the BUNA-N components during the next refueling outage.
b.
(Closed) IEB 78-03, regarding potential explosive gas mixture accumulations associated with the off gas system operation. The inspector reviewed an approved procedure that had been developed for operational emergency response to possible detonation in the off gas system.
No items of noncompliane were identified.
12.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representative (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspec-tor summarized the scope and results of the inspection.
In response to several items discussed by the inspector the licensee agreed to:
a.
Revise the approved QA Program Description to bring it into agreement with recent changes in organization and QA procedure systems.
b.
Review the Nuclear Engineering Services Inc., OA Program.
c.
Issue a letter to all consultants responsible for safety of the plant to inform them that the provisions of 10 CFR 21 are applicable.
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d.
Make minor changes in Special Procedure M-07-78, Irradiated Fuel Shipment and ACP 10.4, LACBWR Crane Operator Quali-fications and Certification, to clarify and bring them into agreement with cask routing and set down locations committed to in the cask drop safety analysis.
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