IR 05000409/1979016
| ML19208B869 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1979 |
| From: | Chow E, Streeter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B868 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-79-16, NUDOCS 7909210516 | |
| Download: ML19208B869 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
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Report No. 50-409/79-16 Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2614 East Avenue - South La Crosse, WI 54601 Facility Name: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Site, Genoa, Wisconsin Inspection Conduc d: J yA O-13, 1979 f
E. T. Chow'yp'
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3 M Inspectors:
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eb Approved By:
M ief M/79 Nuclear Support Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on July 10-13, 1979 (Report No. 50-409,*79-16)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of determination of shutdown margin; power distribution limits; reactivity anomaly deter-mination; control rod sequence and react ivity checks; unresolved item.
The inspection involved 30 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
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s 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
- S. Raffety, Reactor Engineer
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- P. Wiley, Assistant Operations Supervisor
- H. Towsley, QA Supervisor
- W. Nowicki, Instrumentation and Electrical Supervisor J. Parkyn, Assistant Superintendent The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical operations staff.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-409/79-04-01): Battery electrolyte surveillance. The licensee has decided to correct measured battery electrolyte specific gravities for electrolyte level as recommended
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by the vendor manuals. The measured levels will be rounded to the nearest 1/4 inch and an adjustment of
.007 will be made for each 1/4 inch below the high level mark. This adjustment will be made for each of the weekly and quarterly electrolyte surveillances required by TS 5.2.11.2.3.2.
The licensee will place a note on the battery surveillance sheets to emphasize that electrolyte specific gravities are to be corrected for both temperature and level.
In addition to specific gravity adjustments for electrolyte level, the licensee has decided to use 1.200 as the minimum acceptable adjusted spreific gravity rather than the 1.180 value allowed by TS 5.2.11.2.3.2.
The 1.200 value is consistent with statements made in the vendor manuals. The licensee will place a statement on the battery surveillance sheets to emphasize the 1.200 lower limit. At some future date, the licensee will propose a change to the TS lower limit which will reflect vendor recommendations.
3.
Shutdown Margin Determination The Technical Specifications require that the shutdown margin with the most reactive control rod stuck out of the core be greater than 0.5% of reactivity. The inspector verified that the licensee had demonstrated that he met that requirement.
The inspector reviewed information relative to shutdown margin determination as described in Special Test Procedure STP-BOC-6, Issue 0.
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The inspector examined data taken on May 25, 1979, to confirm that
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the required shutdown margin was available. The reactor temperature was maintained at 95 F and all 29 control rods were withdrawn to 12.82 dial inches to reach criticality. Rod 14, the highest worth rod calculated by the computer program (TRILUX), was completely withdrawn while the remaining 28 rods were inserted to 12.88 dial inches so that criticality was still maintained. All rods except Rod 14 were further inserted to 10.27 dial inches and the reactor was determined to be suberitical by 1.02% of reactivity using the known worth of the 28 partially withdrawn rods. The inspector concluded that the shutdown margin determination was adequate.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Control Rod Sequence and Reactivity Checks The inspector reviewed information relating to Cycle 6 control rod sequence and reactivity checks as described in Special Test Procedure STP-BOC-6, Issue 0.
The inspector noted that the computer code (TRILUX) was utilized for predicting control rod sequence, evaluating the reactivity worth of each withdrawal step in a control rod sequence, and estimating the most conservative step worth.
The inspector reviewed the results of tests preformed on May 25, 1979, as described in STP-BOC-6. The results indicated that there was a small discrepancy of 0.33% of reactivity between the predicted and the actual critical configuration. The inspector noted that the test results satisfied the 2% of reactivity discrepancy as stated in the Technical Specifications.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Core Power Distribution Limits The inspector reviewed information relating to surveillance of core thermal power distribution limits which were calenlated by the computer code (TRILUX). The inspector examined the TR1 LUX printouts obtained in May and Jure,1979, and determined that all prerequisites were met, the computer was using input values from the actual plant conditions, all thermal margins satisfied Technical Specification requirements, and the calculated values by the computer were within the acceptable criteria established by the licensee.
The inspector noted that while putting the plant on line, Control Rod 10 was incorrectly pulled instead of Rod 12.
The inspector reviewed the records and noted that corrective action was taken and all thermal margins were within limits, and an LER will be submitted to NRC.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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6.
Reactivity Anomaly Determination
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The inspector reviewed information relating to Cycle 6 determination of reactivity anomaly. The Technical Specifications require that the reactivity anomaly be no greater than 0.6%.
The inspector noted that the computer code (TRILUX) was used for calculations of keff. The inspector further noted that the predicted keff at the beginning of Cycle 6 was 1.0166 as stated in LAC-TR-067,
" Refueling Plan for Cycle 6 of LACBWR," dated February 5, 1979. The inspector reviewed the TRILUX printouts dated June 25, 1979, and noted that the keff for actual core conditions varied from 1.016 to 1.012.
The inspector concluded that the determination of reactivity anomaly satisfied Technical Specification requirements.
The inspector noted that there was no provision for the, frequency of reactivity anomaly determination. The licensee stated that it was performed approximately once a month at operation, and the new Technical Specifications would include the frequency of reactivity anomaly determination.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 13, 1979.
The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
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