IR 05000400/1997011

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Insp Rept 50-400/97-11 on 971006-10.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Observation & Evaluation of Biennial Emergency Preparedness Excercise for Plant
ML18016A246
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/24/1997
From: Barr K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18016A245 List:
References
50-400-97-11, NUDOCS 9712050138
Download: ML18016A246 (18)


Text

Docket No:

License No:

Report No:

Licensee:

Facility:

Location:

Dates:

Inspectors:

Approved by:

U. S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

50-400 NPF-63 50-400/97-11 Carolina Power and Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Pow'er Plant Unit 1 5421 Shearon Harris Rd New Hill NC 27562-9998 October 6-10, 1997 W. Sartor, Exercise Team Leader W. Rankin, Sr. Project Manager J.

Kreh, Radiation Specialist G. Salyers, Emergency Preparedness Specialist K. Barr, Chief,. Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure 97i2050i38 97ii24 PDR ADOCK 05000400

PDR

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY HARRIS NUCLEAR PLANT NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/97-11 This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise for the Harris Nuclear Plant.

This NRC/FEMA evaluated exercise was a plume and ingestion pathway exercise fully participated in by the State of North Carolina and Risk Counties.

The plume exposure exercise was conducted on October 7, 1997 from 2:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.

This report summarized the observations of the four-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the licensee's emergency preparedness program as the utility implemented its Emergency Plan. and Procedures for the plume exposure exercise.

The NRC evaluators observed licensee response from the Control Room Simulator (CRS), the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),

and the Joint Information Center (JIC).

Based on the performance observed, the evaluators concluded that the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to implement the Harris Emergency Plan and Procedures in response to the simulated accident.

Pro ram Areas Evaluated and Results Scenario--The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency response capability and exercise preparations were well organized.

Onsite Emergency Organization--Predesignated personnel with well defined responsibilities promptly staffed the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).

Emergency Classification System--The licensee had a staridard system for emergency classifications and used it to effectively classify the off-normal events promptly and correctly.

Notifications Methods and Procedures--The licensee demonstrated the ability to make timely and concise initial and follow-up notifications to the States and counties.

Emergency Communications--Provisions existed for the prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel, and they were effectively used during the exercise to provide timely information and coordinate emergency response.

Public Education and Information--The JIC and its staff were activated and functioned in a manner that provided for the dissemination of coordinated and accurate information to the public via the news media.

Emergency Facilities and Equipment--ERFs were organized.

equipped, and maintained in a manner that provided for the emergency respons Protective Responses--The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement protective measures for onsite personnel and to make the required Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the protection of the public. with the exception of Exercise Weakness concerning timely protective measures for the TSC.

Exercise Critique--The controller/evaluator organization conducted an excellent critique proces Re ort Oetails Summar of Exercise Events This biennial emergency preparedness exercise included full participation by the State of North Carolina and associated Risk Counties.

The plume exposure exercise was evaluated by an NRC inspection team and was conducted from 2:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.

on October 7, 1997.

Player critiques were conducted by the licensee's emergency response participants in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) following termination of the exercise.

The NRC exit meeting was conducted on October 9, 1997, following the licensee's summary to management of exercise results.

IV. Plant Su ort P4.

Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)

P4.1 Exercise Scenario a.

Ins ection Sco e

82302 The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements of the licensee's plan.

b.

Observations and Findin s The licensee submitted its scenario scope and objectives for the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness Exercise to the NRC with a letter dated July 3, 1997.

The exercise scenario with controller information and simulation data was submitted with a letter dated August 20, 1997.

A review of the package indicated that the scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the State of North Carolina and local government agencies for their participation in the exercise.

The briefings provided to both the evaluators and players prior to the exercise were reflective of an exercise staff that was well organized and had given attention-to-detail in the preparation phase.

c.

Conclusion The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency response capability and exercise preparations were well organize P4.2 Onsite Emer enc Or anization Ins ection Sco e

82301 The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were defined and whether adequate staffing was available to respond to the simulated emergency.

Observations and Findin s The inspectors noted that the responsibilities for emergency response were clearly defined.

The Superintendent for Shift Operations in the Control Room Simulator assumed the responsibilities as the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC)

and performed designated responsibilities to include the call-out of personnel to staff the emergency response facilities (ERFs).

The predesignated personnel responded and staffed the ERFs.

The Technical Support Center (TSC) was promptly staffed and fully activated within 41 minutes.

The Operational Support Center (OSC)

was staffed and activated within 17 minutes.

Minimum staffing for the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was available within 20 minutes, and activated along with the TSC.

The Joint Information Center activated two hours after the Alert, but prior to the Site Area Emergency declaration.

Conclusion Predesignated personnel with well defined responsibilities promptly staffed the ERFs.

P4.3 Emer enc Classification S stem Ins ection Sco e

82301 The inspectors observed selected emergency response personnel to determine whether a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee.

Observation and Findin s The procedure PEP-110, Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations provided guidance on the use of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for classifying an emergency.

An Alert was declared at 2:09 p.m.

based on indications of a seismic event.

The Site Area Emergency was declared at 4:32 p.m.

due to the loss of all charging pumps.

The General Emergency was declared at 6:56 p.m.

due to all fission product barriers breached.

The emergency declarations were all timely and made in accordance with the EALs projected by the scenari Conclusion p4.4 The licensee had a standard system for determing emergency classifications and used it to effectively classify the off-normal events promptly and correctly.

Notification Hethods and Procedures Ins ection Sco e 82301 The inspectors observed the licensee.'s notification of State and local governmental organizations and emergency personnel to determine whether timely and substantive emergency information was provided in accordance with procedures.

Observations and Findin s The initial emergency notifications to the State of North Carolina and the county authorities were made within 15 minutes following the Alert declaration.

Responsibility for offsite notifications was assumed by the EOF when it activated.

The notifications to the State and counties were made promptly from the EOF after the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency declarations, with concise and informative event descriptions.

Follow-up notifications were made as necessary.

Conclusion p4.5 The licensee demonstrated the ability to make timely and concise initial and follow-up notifications to the States and counties.

Emer enc Communications Ins ection Sco e

82301 The inspectors observed the flow of communications within the emergency response organization and from and between the ERFs to determine whether provisions existed for the prompt transmission of emergency information.

Observation and Findin s The inspectors observed that the communications between the utility and offsite agencies and amongst the ERFs were generally effective for the prompt transmission of emergency information.

Responsible personnel were kept informed of ongoing events and communicated effectively in performing accident mitigation and initiating protective actions for both onsite and offsite personne Conclusion p4.6 Provisions existed for the prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel, and they were effectively used during the exercise to provide timely information and coordinate emergency response.

Public Education and Information Ins ection Sco e 82301 The inspectors observed how information concerning the simulated emergency was made available to the public.

Observations and Findin s The Harris Nuclear Plant Joint Information Center (JIC) was located at the Center Plaza Building (11th floor) in downtown Raleigh, approximately 21 miles from the plant, with a media briefing room available for press conferences (located in the Civic Center, also in downtown Raleigh).

The licensee provided a total of 13 news releases during the exercise.

The news releases were timely and provided appropriate information regarding the emergency conditions.

c. Conclusions

,P4. 7 The JIC and its staff were activated and functioned in a manner that provided for the dissemination of coordinated and accurate information to the public via the news media.

Emer enc Facilities and E ui ment Ins ection Sco e

82301 The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of selected ERFs to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment were available and maintained to support an emergency response.

Observations and Findin s Control Room Simulator

- An inspector observed that the on-shift designated crew in the Simulator adequately responded to the off-normal events.

The facility and equipment supported the crew as they entered the Emergency Plan and responded to the simulated emergency.

This was the licensee's first use of the simulator for an NRC graded exercis Technical Support Center

- The TSC was promptly activated with assigned emergency response personnel.

The facility layout was adequate for the SEC and his staff.

The inspector observed that good command and control was demonstrated by the SEC and his staff developed good strategies for accident mitigation.

Operational Support Center (OSC)

- The OSC was activated in accordance with procedures and in a timely manner.

The layout of the OSC provided for the dispatch of damage control teams in a timely manner.

During the critique process the licensee noted that the damage control teams did not debrief upon returning to the OSC nor was there an established format for such debriefs.

Emergency Operations Facility - The EOF was located at the Harris Energy 8 Environmental Center within 10 miles of the plant.

The EOF was organized and equipped in a manner that facilitated the emergency response.

c. Conclusion P4.8 ERFs were organized, equipped, and maintained in a manner that provided for the emergency response.

Protective Res onses Ins ection Sco e

82301 The inspectors observed the protective actions implemented for onsite personnel and the protective action recommendations (PARs) provided by the licensee to the offsite agencies.

Observations and Findin s The inspectors in the TSC observed that the failure of the TSC staff to promptly detect and evaluate the waste gas decay tank leak delayed onsite protective actions.

Despite clear indications of an ongoing release in progress, there was no timely initiation of protective actions for TSC personnel and no sitewide PA announcement to inform personnel of the release.

It was not until 3:41 p.m. that the Radiation Control Director (RCD) directed onsite exposure controls to include the start of the TSC emergency ventilation and filtration system, placed restrictions on eating, smoking, and drinking in the TSC and made a site wide PA announcement as to the changed radiological conditions onsite.

These actions were untimely in that they were taken approximately

minutes after initial indications were available that the release had begun.

The failure to promptly direct onsite protective actions in a timely manner for a release in progess was identified by the inspectors

as an Exercise Weakness.

Inspector Follow-up Item 50-400/97-11-01:

The failure of the TSC staff to promptly detect and evaluate the waste gas decay tank leak resulted in delayed protective actions for the TSC.

The inspector in the EOF observed that the Emergency Response Manager provided for the prompt transmission of PARs to the offsite agencies.

Conclusion P4.9 The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement protective measures for onsite personnel and to make the required PARs for the protection of the public. with the exception of Exercise Weakness concerning timely protective measures for the TSC.

Exercise Criti ue Ins ection Sco e 82301 The inspectors observed the facility critiques immediately following the exercise and portions of'he controller/evaluator organization critique process to determine whether weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management.

Observations and Findin s The licensee conducted adequate player critiques following exercise termination.

The controller and evaluator staff also conducted a

detailed review of observations made during the exercise.

The deficiencies noted by the evaluator staff were well defined with proposed corrective action, an assigned responsibility and proposed due date.

Conclusion The controller/evaluator organization conducted an excellent critique process.

V. Hang ement Heetin s

X1 Exit Heeting Summary The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 10, 1997.

The summary indicated good performance with the exception of the exercise weakness identified in paragraph P PARTIAL LIST OF PERSON CONTACTED Licensee R. Bassett, Emergency Preparedness Analyst D. Corlett, Superintendent Operations Support J.

Donohue, Director Site Operations B. Clark, Plant General Manager J.

Eads, Supervisor, Licensing/Regulatory Programs T. Gilbert, Project Analyst, Harris Nuclear Assessment Section S

McNickle. Senior Analyst.

Emergency Preparedness C. Mitchell, Project Analyst.

Outage Management A. Hoss.

Emergency Preparedness Analyst E. Neuschaefer, Superintendent, Radiation Protection A. Poland.

Senior Analyst. Environmental Radiation Control W. Robinson, Vice President C.

Rose, Outage and Scheduling Analyst R. Steiner, Huma'n Resources Director C. VanDenburgh, Hanager, Regulatory Affairs R. Varley, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor M. Wallace, Senior Analyst. Licensing M. Warren.

Communications Specialist INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301:

Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302:

Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

~oened 50-400/97-11-01 IFI Exercise Weakness

- The failure of the TSC staff to promptly detect and evaluate the waste gas decay tank leak resulted in delayed protective actions for the TSC.

(Paragraph P4.8)

Attachment (3 pages):

Selected Drill Objectives, Scenario Time Line and Narrative

CP8 ( Harris Nuclear Plant Selected DrillObjectives EP Drill Packa e

A.l A.2 A.3 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.5 8.6 8.7 B.S 8.9

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Demonstrate performance of an exercise including an offsite radiological release, and involving on site participation, bi-ennially. This exercise willinclude the opportunity for the state and local a encies to participate.

Conduct a drill or exercise which provides an opportunity to satisfactorily demonstrate corrective actions in response to previous drill/exercise results as applicable.

Demonstrate performance of an exercise involving partial or full participation of state and local off-site agencies, at least every second year.

The scenario should provide aspects required to support demonstration of FEMA Objectives selected by off-site officials.

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Demonstrate the ability to detect accident conditions, perform accident assessment and implement those appropriate mitigating actions necessary to place the plant in a safe and stable condition annually.

Demonstrate the ability to perform EAL evaluations and emergency classifications annually.

Demonstrate the ability to perform dose projections, including the capability for detecting the magnitude and impact of the components of a release annually.

Demonstrate the ability to formulate Protective Action Recommendations based on plant parameters and/or environmental conditions, annually.

Demonstrate the ability of the technical analysis staffs to perform accident assessment, engineering evaluations of plant and reactor core conditions and formulation of near term miti ating actions, annually.

Demonstrate the ability of the TSC technical analysis staff to perform core damage assessments based on isotopic analysis of samples obtained via the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) and to compare the results of this assessment to other indicators of core dama e, annually.

Demonstrate response to, and analysis of, simulated elevated airborne 5 liquid samples and direct radiation measurements in the environment, semi-annually.

Demonstrate chemical and radiological analysis of actual radioactive liquid samples, annually

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C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 C.j C.S Demonstrate on-site alertin and warning of plant personnel, annually.

Demonstrate complete and accurate State and Local initial and follow-up notifications within the time requirements specified within the emergency procedures, annually.

Demonstrate NRC notification and communications, annually.

Demonstrate the adequacy of documentation, logs and related record keeping in response to declared plant emer encies, annually.

Demonstrate the adequacy of communications between HNP Emergency Response Facilities and emergency response personnel, including use of the normal PABX telephones, ARD circuits, and radio systems, annually.

This includes transmission and receipt of radiolo ical, meteorolo ical, and plant data as needed.

Demonstrate notification 5 activation of site emergency response personnel and facilities (OSC, TSC 5 EOF) via augmentation with assigned ERO members, during normal working hours, annually.

Demonstrate notification 5 activation of the Joint Information Center (JIC) via au mentation with assi ned ERO members, biennially.

Demonstrate notification and activation of utility representatives to the State and County EOCs bienniall

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Drill97-EX, Section

Company Confidential Until 10/08/97 Page 9 of 11

CP8 L Harris Nuclear Plant EP Dril)Packa e

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C.9 C.10 C.11 Demonstrate the preparation, review and release of news information prior to JIC activation, biennially.

Demonstrate coordination of the preparation, review and release of news information with the state and counties following JIC activation, biennially.

Demonstrate rumor control activities at least once per 6 years.

C.12 Demonstrate JIC security/access control activities, biennially.

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D.1 D.2 D.3 D.4 D.5 D.6 D.7 D.S D.9 Demonstrate distribution of dosimetry and maintenance of dose records for emergency res onse ersonnel, annuall

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Demonstrate the use of protective measures for entering radiologically controlled areas under simulated abnormal radiolo ical conditions, anriuall

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Demonstrate radiological monitoring and decontamination of personnel and equipment, annuall

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Demonstrate distribution and use of respirators and protective clothing for radiological protection, annually.

Demonstrate use of Kl for protection of workers from uptake of radioactive lodines once per 6 years.

Demonstrate radiological and contamination controls, including postings and barriers, annually.

Demonstrate coordination of In-plant surveys and out of plant on-site surveys, including TLD placement about the site, annually.

Demonstrate environmental monitoring and sampling (on-site and off-site) to include collection and analysis of sample media (water, vegetation, soil, and air), and provisions for communications and record keepin, annually.

Demonstrate contamination control of drinking water and food. for on-site personnel, annually.

D.10 Demonstrate application of emergency condition dose limits and controls, annually.

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E.1 F.1 F.3 F.4 Demonstrate the adequacy of the emergency response facilities, emergency kits, supplies and equipment to support emergency operations, annually.

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Demonstrate effective command and control of the Emergency Response Facilities and field personnel, annually.

Demonstrate coordination and tracking of in-plant and on-site activities/personnel, annually.

This includes OSC teams, operations personnel and personnel dispatched by Security or from the TSC.

Demonstrate coordination and tracking of off site radiological and environmental monitorin activities annually.

Demonstrate security related support of the emergency plan related activities to'provide prompt access to emergency equipment, supplies, and other support as needed, annually.

H.1 H.2 Demonstrate the ability to perform a self-critical post drill/exercise critique for all drills and exercises.

Demonstrate Access control for the Site and EOF at least annuall Drill97-EX, Section

Company Confidential Until 10/08/97 Page 10 ot 11

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