IR 05000400/1997005
| ML18012A821 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18012A820 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-97-05, 50-400-97-5, NUDOCS 9707030227 | |
| Download: ML18012A821 (12) | |
Text
Docket No:
License No:
Report No.:
Licensee Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspector:
Approved by:
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
50-400 NPF-63 50-400/97-05 Carolina Power and Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 May 19-23, 1997 D. H. Thompson, Safeguards Specialist P. E. Fredrickson, Chief, Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety 9707030227 9706i6 PDR ADOCK 05000400
PDR ENCLOSURE
e'
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-400/97-05
, This safeguards inspection included aspects of licensee plant support.
The report covers a week period of an announced routine inspection by a regional safeguards specialist inspector.
Plant Su ort The random review of plans, records, reports, and interviews with appropriate individuals verified that security plan and procedure changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the Physical Security Plan.
(S3.1)
The inspector found that licensee management provided appropriate and excellent support for the Physical Security Program.
Examples of the excellent management support were the continued upgrade of the outstanding firing range facility; purchase of a new radio system; purchase of body armor; replacement of the old shotguns and additional training for Tactical Response Force personnel.
(S6.1)
The inspector concluded that the licensee evaluated the non-human errors, hardware and mechanical problems and they are effectively controlled and managed.
(S6.2)
Licensee-conducted audits were thorough, complete, and effective in terms of uncovering weaknesses in the security systemprocedures, and practices.
The last audit report concluded that the security program was effective and recommended appropriate action to improve the effectiveness of the security program, and the licensee had acted appropriately in response to recommendations made in the audit report.
(S7.1)
ENCLOSURE
Re ort Details IV. Plant Su ort S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S3.1 Securit Pro ram Plans a.
Ins ection Sco e 81700 The inspector reviewed appropriate chapters of the licensee's Physical Security Plan (PSP), Revision 0, dated March 15, 1996, and security procedures as listed in paragraph S3.1(b).
b.
Observations and Findin s Review of the changes, submitted to the NRC in Revision 0, to the PSP for approval, verified that the PSP changes as submitted are in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p).
The PSP changes were numerous and consolidated regulatory requirements for specific areas into one location, i.e., all protected area or vital area requirements are in their own chapter.
Additionally, the PSP combined the requirements of Brunswick and Harris into a generic plan.
The changes will make it easier for the security personnel to find specific security requirements as needed. The inspector reviewed the changes to security procedures (SP)-002, Security Contingency Events, dated April 1996, SP-003, Security Orientation, Indoctrination, and Training, Revision 6, dated April 3, 1996, SP-014, Additional Surveillance/Compensatory Measures, Revision 11, dated September 26, 1996, and SP-017, Reporting of Safeguards and Fitness for Duty Events, Revision 8, dated April 3, 1996.
c.
Conclusions The random review of plans, records, reports, and interviews with appropriate individuals verified that security plan and procedure changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the PSP.
The inspector reviewed Revision 0, dated March 15, 1996, to the PSP and concluded that the PSP change as submitted met the requirements of
'0 CFR 50.54(p).
There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this area.
S6 Security Organization and Administration S6.1 Mana ement Su ort a.
Ins ection Sco e 81700 The inspector evaluated the degree of the licensee's management support to the Phy'sical Security Program.
Based on the requirements contained in the PSP, the inspector reviewed the Licensee's Safeguards Event Log (SEL) entries.
This review was to determine ifthe licensee appropriately assigned, analyzed, and set priorities ENCLOSURE
for corrective action for the reports and log entries, and whether the corrective action taken was technically adequate and timely.
Observations and Findin s The licensee had an on-site physical protection system and security organization.
Their objective was to provide assurance against. an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.
The security organization and physical protection system were designed to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a).
A contract security force of approximately 85 personnel provided site security for the licensee.
At least one full-time manager of the security organization was always on-site.
This individual had the authority to direct the physical protection activities of the organization.
The management system included a mechanism for establishing, maintaining, and enforcing written security procedures.
Licensee management exhibited an awareness and favorable attitude, toward physical protection requirements.
This continues to be evident by the continuing upgrade of an outstanding firing range facility; the additional training for Tactical Response Force personnel; the training of the security force to the armed officer level; the purchase of body armor for protection of armed responders; and replacement of the old shotguns.
The review of the SELs as of 3rd and 4th Quarter 1996 and 1st Quarter 1997 indicated the following:
Human Errors Hardware Systems Other Events TOTALS 01 (01%)
62 (68%)
27 (31%)
90 (100%)
00 (0%)
17 (45%)
21 (55%)
38 (100%)
00 (0%)
35 (74%)
12 (26%)
47 (100%)
Each quarter had an excellent Trending Summary report that was provided to site management.
The security force turnover rate for calendar year (CY) 1996 was 28% which continues to be higher than normally found at other Region II plants.
The security manager attributed the high turnover rate to the expanding job market in the local area, and the higher pay scale for similar positions of less stringent demands than those required in the nuclear industry.
There were compensatory measures in effect for perimeter zone failures and to support the outage work at the time of the inspection.
Review of previous compensatory measures indicated that the licensee had in CY 1995, expended 4600 hours0.0532 days <br />1.278 hours <br />0.00761 weeks <br />0.00175 months <br /> for compensatory measures.
ln CY 96 the compensatory measures rate was reduced to 1064 hours0.0123 days <br />0.296 hours <br />0.00176 weeks <br />4.04852e-4 months <br />.
The major reduction in compensatory measures hours was as a result of a very good preventative maintenance program and excellent maintenance response to repair inoperative security equipment requiring compensatory measures.
Review of the outstanding security work-orders showed the following:
ENCLOSURE
0 High Priority (¹1) orders 0 Medium Priority (¹2)
3 Low Priority (¹3)
4 Lower Priority (¹4)
TOTAL 7 outstanding security work-orders.
(0 of the 7 are work-orders that involve regulatory requirements)
c.
Conclusions The inspector found that licensee management provided appropriate and excellent support for the Physical Security Program.
This continues to be evident by the maintenance support, continuing upgrade of an outstanding firing range facility, the additional training for Tactical Response Force personnel, the training of the security force to the armed officer level, the purchase of body armor for protection of armed responders and replacement of the old shotguns.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this area.
S6.2 Effectiveness of Mana ement Control a.
Ins ection Sco e 81700 The inspector evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's controls for identifying, resolving and preventing problems by reviewing such areas as corrective action systems, root cause analyses, and self-assessment in the area of physical security.
Also, this inspectiori was to determine whether there are strengths or weaknesses in the licensee's controls for the identification and resolution of the reviewed issues that could enhance or degrade plant operations or safety.
b.
Observations and Findin s To determine the adequacy of the above, the inspector reviewed the licensee's SEL entries.
This review was to determine ifthe licensee appropriately assigned, analyzed, and set priorities for corrective action for the reports and log entries, and whether the corrective action taken was technically adequate and timely.
The root cause analyses, corrective actions, and self-assessment, as mentioned in paragraph S6.1 above and in paragraph S8.1 below, were reviewed and found appropriate and adeq'uate.
One of the comments in the Nuclear Assessment Section Audit Reports was that "The use of self-assessment by the security organization could be used as a model for other work groups."
Conclusions The inspector concluded that the licensee evaluated the non-human errors, hardware and mechanical problems and they are effectively controlled and managed.
ENCLOSURE
S7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities S7.1 Audits and Corrective Actions a.
Ins ection Sco e 81700 Based on the commitments of the PSP, the inspector evaluated the licensee's audit program and corrective action system.
This also ensured compliance with the requirement for an annual audit of the security and contingency programs.
During the inspection, a small representative sample of the problems identified by audits was evaluated by the inspector to determine whether review and analysis were appropriately assigned, analyzed, and prioritized for corrective action and whether the corrective action taken was technically adequate and performed in a timely manner.
b.
Observations and Findin s Tha licensee's program commitments included auditing its security program, including the Safeguards Contingency Plan, at least every 12 months.
The audit included a review of routine and contingency security procedures and practices.
This review evaluated the effectiveness of the physical protection system testing and maintenance program.
The Nuclear Assessment Section Audit Group prepared Report H-SC-97-.
01, dated February 27, 1997.
This audit was conducted during the period of January 20-31, 1997.
The report was sent to the site vice president and corporate management.
Reports of audits were available for inspection at the plant for a period of three years.
There were three strengths, one issue, and three weaknesses identified. The audit'conclusion was, "The security program at the Harris Nuclear Plant is effective in support of the safe operation of the Harris Nuclear Plant."
Conclusions Licensee-conducted audits were thorough, complete, and effective in terms of uncovering weaknesses in the security system, procedures, and practices.
The last audit report concluded that the security program was effective and recommended appropriate action to improve the effectiveness of the security program, and the licensee had acted appropriately in response to recommendations made in the audit report.
The inspector determined that audit items were reviewed, appropriately assigned, analyzed and prioritized for corrective action.
The corrective actions taken were technically adequate and performed in a timely manner.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this area.
ENCLOSURE
j S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards Issues protected area.
S8.1 (CLOSED) Violation 50400/96-09-04, Failure to properly secure a
re an opening into the The corrective actions for violation 50-400/96-09-04 included the following:
The gate was secured immediately upon discovery The event was documented in the Safeguards Event Log doc A security incident/complaint and condition report was prep d
umenting the circumstances surrounding the event prepare The officer received disciplinary action and was re-trained Each shift was trained on "Operation and Opening Protected Area a es, which included an overview of the circumstances includin
'nvolvedin the incident; extracts from applicable security proced ures inte rit'; monitoring protected area gate activity from an I
t t'
arm s a ion; inte rit of the r
g iy ofthe vehicle barrier; responsibility assignment f t '
g y o e protected area barrier; maximum permissible size openings within the protected area barrier; method of securing the protected area gate when it is not attended by a security officer; and opened.
prerequisite security manning before a protected area t
b V. MANAGEMENTMEETING X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to licensee mana emen th i
tio o
M
1997.
The licensee acknowledged the findings present d.
t ough reviewed durin h'
',
'
'
n aine in is g t is inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
ENCLOSURE
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Alexander, Supervisor, Licensing and Regulatory Programs D. Braund, Superintendent, Security J. Donahue, Director, Site Operations, Harris Plant R. German, Manager, Plant Support G. Olive, Senior Analysts, Security W. Robinson, Vice President, Harris Plant M. Wallace, Regulatory Compliance NRC J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed VI0 50400/96-09-04 Failure to control access to the protected area.
ENCLOSURE
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