IR 05000390/2005006

NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report No. 05000390-05-006 and 05000391-05-006

ML050760366
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	03/17/2005
From:	Cahill S Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6
To:	Singer K Tennessee Valley Authority
References
-RFPFR IR-05-006
Download: ML050760366 (27)

Text

rch 17, 2005

SUBJECT:

WATTS BAR: NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000390/2005006 AND 05000391/2005006

Dear Mr. Singer:

On February 18, 2005, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on February 18, 2005, with Mr. J. Laughlin and other members of your staff.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that problems were generally being properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The NRCs overall assessment is that the Corrective Action Program is working well. NRC identified a few isolated instances of less than optimum performance but none were of more than minor safety significance.

TVA 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-390, 50-391 License No. NPF-90 and Construction Permit No. CPPR-92

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2005006, 05000391/2005006 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos: 50-390, 50-391 License Nos: NPF-90 and Construction Permit CPPR-92 Report No: 05000390/2005006, 05000391/2005006 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City TN 37381 Dates: January 31 through February 18, 2005 Inspectors: C. Julian, Team Leader J. Bartley, Senior Resident Inspector R. Carrion, Project Engineer J. Fuller, Reactor Inspector E. Michel, Reactor Inspector Trainee M. Pribish, Reactor Inspector Trainee Approved by: Stephen J. Cahill, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000390/2005006, 05000391/2005006, 01/31/2005 - 02/18/2005, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution.

The inspection was conducted by a senior resident inspector, a Region II reactor inspector, a Region II project engineer, and two Region II reactor inspector trainees. No findings were identified during this inspection.

A. Identification and Resolution of Problems The team determined that the licensee was identifying plant deficiencies at an appropriately low level and effectively entering them into their corrective action program.

The team made several observations on the licensees new eCAP computer system that the licensee is assessing. Some aspects of using it were cumbersome and it limited access to all licensee staff members and the ability to initiate anonymous concerns.

The team also determined that the licensee was prioritizing and evaluating issues properly. The team identified several examples where corrective actions did not appear appropriate or were not completely carried out. The team concluded, however, that several of these were documentation problems. Overall, the licensee was generally providing effective corrective actions.

On the basis of interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to put safety concerns into the corrective action program. The inspectors concluded that the employee Concerns Resolution program was functioning as intended.

B. Licensee-Identified Findings None.

Enclosure

Report Details 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones of safety to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Specifically, the team reviewed 266 problem evaluation reports (PERs) from a total of 5817 that had been issued during the inspection review period of May 1, 2003, to December 31, 2004. This review period was chosen to address PERs since the last biennial PI&R inspection in April 2003. The team examined PERs and work orders (WOs) associated with the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW), the Essential Raw Cooling Water System (ERCW), the High Pressure Fire Protection System (HPFP), The Standby Diesel Generators, the Radiation Monitoring System, the 480V Shutdown Power System, and the Main Control Room, Shutdown Board Room, and 480V Board Room Air Conditioning Systems. The team reviewed PERs associated with radiological protection, security, and emergency preparedness events, problems, and deficiencies. The team reviewed operating experience resolution documents, and Employee Concerns Resolution activities. The team also reviewed licensee corrective action trend reports, PER effectiveness reviews, as well as Nuclear Assurance department audits and surveillances from the review period. The team evaluated these items to determine the licensees threshold for identifying problems.

The team conducted system walkdowns to verify that observed problems were being properly identified. All members of the team also attended the licensees various Management Review Committee meetings to observe how site management implemented this initial phase of the corrective action program.

(2) Assessment The team determined that the licensee was effective at identifying problems at an appropriately low level and entering them into the corrective action program. The team observed that a broad spectrum of issues were entered in the system at a low threshold.

Also, during this inspection, there were no instances identified where plant deficiencies did not result in the initiation of a PER.

The inspectors observed that the new eCAP computerized corrective action system is cumbersome for general users and the ability to initiate a PER was not readily available to a small portion of plant staff due to the lack of computer access, passwords, and training on operating the system. Additionally, the inspectors identified that there was no process for initiating an anonymous PER. Although a paper PER initiation form can be printed, there are no paper forms readily available and no locations or drop boxes to Enclosure

deposit a completed form. The licensee was assessing these observations as part of their eCAP implementation.

b. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed Procedure SPP-3.1, Corrective Action Program, Revision 7, Business Practice document BP 250, Corrective Action Program Handbook, Revision 7, and various other supporting documents to determine the various licensee requirements for prioritizing and evaluating issues. The team then reviewed selected PERs to ensure that PER level classifications, operability determinations, reportability determinations, degraded and non-conforming condition determinations, cause evaluations, and selection of proper corrective actions were consistent with the significance of the problem described. The team reviewed a sample of PERs as described in paragraph a(1) above. The team also reviewed all the PERs associated with NRC findings, non-cited violations of regulatory requirements, and Licensee Event Reports issued during the selected review period. Inspectors attended Management Review Committee (MRC) meetings to assess the implementation of SPP-3.1 for evaluating and prioritizing new PERs. Specific items reviewed are listed in the attachment.

(2) Assessment The team determined that PER level classifications were consistent with established procedures and that licensee audits generally confirmed that conclusion. The team further determined that operability, reportability, degraded or non-conforming condition determinations and cause evaluations were also consistent with SPP-3.1. The team observed that industry operating experience was being incorporated by the initiation of PERs on potentially generic problems.

At the MRC meeting of February 2, NRC observed that there were several PERs designated as bring backs and reroutes which postponed MRC action on the PERs.

The inspectors expressed concern that these delayed resolutions might create a backlog of PERs, delay completion of MRC review, and be indicative of incomplete preparation by MRC members. The licensee initiated PER 76643 to address this matter and discussed it extensively in subsequent MRC meetings.

c. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed the same selected sample of PERs to verify that the specified corrective actions were effective in fixing the problems described. The team also reviewed documented results of MRC effectiveness reviews for completed PERs and observed an MRC effectiveness review meeting. Specific items reviewed are listed in the attachment.

Enclosure

Enclosure

(2) Assessment Based on a review of numerous corrective action plans and their implementation, the team found, for the most part, that the licensees corrective actions were effective.

Effectiveness reviews and audits were generally of good depth and correctly identified issues similar to those raised during previous NRC inspections. However, the team did identify several corrective action deficiencies of a minor nature.

The new eCAP system has problems with filing attachments to PERs. This causes the system not to be able to retrieve attachments and thus lose prompt access to documentation of corrective actions. The problem has been known since 8/12/2004 (PER 66958) and is scheduled for completion 3/31/2005. One attempt was made on 2/3/05 to fix the problem but was not successful. This deficiency can cause licensee staff to lose confidence in the system and not provide attachments to PERs. Security initiated PER 76175 regarding their halting use of attachments to PERs. The inspectors expressed concern that others in the plant may be similarly limiting their use of attachments due to this problem.

NRC observed several examples of corrective actions that do not appear appropriate or had not been completely carried out. Several of the examples, as well as others not discussed below, were determined to be problems with the documentation of the corrective actions:

• PER 8592 concerned the loss of CCS and subsequent loss of RHR cooling during the performance of a blackout test. One could not tell from this PER that all the corrective actions were completed. Corrective action (CA) 1 implied that in the future the licensee will establish a requirement to assign a Blackout Test Director. But Preoutage Milestone 61 which is referenced uses generic words which dont clearly require a blackout Test Director. CA 4 & CA 7 stated that four procedures 0-SI-82-3, 4, 5, & 6 would be designated as Complex Infrequently Performed Tests and Evolutions (CIPTE). However, the licensee later concluded that only two of these procedures (3 & 4) needed to be designated as CIPTE but didnt document this conclusion in the PER. CA 4 also stated that seven procedures will be designated CIPTE but only identified four procedures. This PER was associated with NCV 390/03-04-03.

• PER 9505 concerned water found in the oil of the TDAFW during testing. The cause was thought to be water entering the oil due to excessive leakage while adjusting packing. The CA did not address making changes to maintenance procedures to prevent this from recurring. However, NRC learned that the licensee has revised the procedure for replacing the TDAFW packing to prevent recurrence of this problem but that CA was not addressed in the PER.

• PER 03-020146 concerned the 11/17/03 NRC identification that the automatic start of the motor driven fire pumps had been defeated for an extended time period due to problems with pressure control valve 0-PCV-26-18. This was associated with NCV 390/03-05-01. The PER was closed with no substantive Enclosure

corrective actions, only FP tech staff to review event and ensure knowledge of event is understood. It did not reference separate actions taken to fix the pressure control valve. Subsequently, this was recognized by the licensee and PER 34398 was initiated on 4/21/04 for the same issue which did contain corrective actions to revise the Fire Protection Report to cause personnel to enter the action for the appropriate Fire Protection Operating Requirements anytime the fire pump auto start logic is defeated.

• PER 73215 concerned the receipt inspection of replacement tubesheets for Main Control Room chiller B. The tubesheet was shipped in a tool box, and the licensees receipt department did not open the tool box to conduct the initial receipt inspection. The tool box was later opened and the appropriate receipt inspection completed. MRC required an apparent cause analysis be completed, but PER 73215 did not document the apparent cause. In response to NRC comments, PER 76890 was initiated 2/17/2005 to include an apparent cause.

• PER 14606 (EMPAC # 03-014458) stated that seven disconnect switches in panel 1-R-72 for system 26 Fire Protection were mislabeled. The unit ID should begin with zero instead of one. The immediate corrective action states, SUP:

Prepared labeling requests for 0-FSV-26-215, 191,143,187,147,175,179."

However when inspectors along with the FP system engineer examined the switches, they observed that the labels had not been corrected. Also, when the inspectors inquired of the plant labeling staff if this was an outstanding labeling request, they were told there was no such outstanding labeling request in their process. The licensee wrote PER 76406 to address this matter.

• PER 7933 stated that Security failed to complete NRC performance indicators for the month of May 2003 due to the absence of the person who normally performs that work. Action 7933-002 says, A scheduling calendar has been established to inform Security Management of upcoming actions and/or events, with established due dates to ensure completeness during the absence of the responsible parties. The PER says the action was completed 10/13/2003, but when the inspectors inquired they were told that the calendar no longer exists.

NRC learned that Security initiated another PER 76974 dealing with the discontinued calendar and intends to reinitiate the calendar.

d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed numerous audits, assessments, PERs, WOs, and other corrective action documents and held discussions with numerous personnel at various levels in the organization to assess if a work environment existed that was conducive to the identification of nuclear safety issues. The team also examined the licensees Employee Concerns Resolution program records and discussed the program with the implementer to determine if issues affecting nuclear safety were being appropriately addressed.

Enclosure

(2) Assessment The team determined that workers at the site felt free to raise safety concerns.

Personnel stated that they do not hesitate to raise nuclear safety issues to their management without fear of retaliation by their management. The wide spectrum of PER-documented issues supported this conclusion. The team had no indication during this inspection of individuals being inhibited from identifying problems using the corrective action process.

4OA6 Management Meetings The team presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Laughlin and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on February 18, 2005. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The team asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee personnel J. Bushnell, Licensing Engineer H. Champagne, Radiation Protection Manager M. DeRoche, Site Quality Manager J. Hinman, Site Support Manager A. Hinson, Maintenance and Mods Manager W. Justice, Site Engineering Manager G. Laughlin, Plant Manager R. McCollom, Maintenance Support Manager J. McCullum, Site Security Manager P. Pace, Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager P. Salkeld, Site Support/Performance & Analysis G. Vickery, Chemistry & Environmental Manager T. Wallace, Operations Manager G. Yelliot, Concerns Resolution NRC personnel S. Cahill, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects J. Reece, Resident Inspector, Watts Bar ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED None Attachment

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures SPP-1.6 TVAN Self-Assessment Program,Revision 10 SPP-3.1 Corrective Action Program, Revision 7 SPP-6.0 Maintenance and Modification, Revision 2 SPP-6.1 Work Order Process Initiation, Revision 3 SPP-6.6 Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting - 10CFR 50.65, Revision 8 SPP-7.0 Work Management, Revision 1 SPP-8.1 Conduct of Testing SPP 9.7 Corrosion Control Program BP 250 Corrective Action Program Handbook, Revision 7 TI-119 Maintenance Rule Performance Indicators Monitoring and Trending, Revision 23 MMDP-1 Maintenance Management System, Revision 7 NEDP-12 System and Component Health, Equipment Failure Trending, Revision 4 WBN PM 1-ADPL-082-A/F-A Inspection and Cleaning of Diesel Generator 1A-A Panels WBN PM 1-GEN-082-0001A-A Diesel Generator 1A-A Voltage Regulator Range Potentiomenter (R4), Stability Pot (R5), and MOP Variable Resistor Verification WBN PM 1256f Inspection of Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler WBN PM 8955V Minimum Inspection and Testing of Diesel Generators WBN PM 0369f Lube Oil Sample and Coupling Inspection of TD Aux Feedwater Pump 1A-S MI-0.16 Maintenance Guidelines for Belt Driven Equipment Non-Cited Violations (NCV) Associated PERs 03-010602 NCV 390/03-03-01 Inadequate PMT for CCS Thermal barrier Booster Pump 04-000064 NCV 390/04-02-03 LER 390/2004-001 Failure to follow 1-SI-99-10-B caused reactor trip 64289 Finding 390/04-07-03 Panel cover came loose causing a security system failure 03-010788 NCV 390/03-03-01 Inadequate PMT for CCS Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 03-010882 03-011113 NCV 390/03-03 LER 390/2003-002 Reactor Protection Set Channel III, Panel 1-R-9 inoperable. Inadequate operability determination.

03-014782 LER 390/2003-003 Automatic reactor trip due to actuation of a sudden pressure relay for Phase C Main Transformer Bank 1C.

03-014178 NCV 390/03-04-01 Inadequate instruction to implement EDG contingency actions

03-016237 NCV 390/03-04-02 Inadequate procedure for control of containment penetrations.

03-015894 NCV 390/03-04-03 Failure to follow procedure for ESF testing resulted in interruption of core cooling 03-018343 NCV 390/03-05-03 LER 390/2003-0065 Containment Spray Pump Motor found racked down in Mode 1 03-016948 NCV 390/03-05 LER 390/2003-005 Two trains of ABGTS out of service 02-013111 NCV 390/04-02-01 Inadequate procedure involving the control of ECCS venting.

03-014922 03-019733 NCV 390/04-02-02 LER 390/2003-004 Inadequate corrective actions for previous ECCS venting problems 68941 NCV 390/04-04-02 Shift management failed to maintain proper level of oversight during rod drop event that caused a reactor trip.

69347 LER 390/2004-002 Manual reactor trip in response to a rod drop event.

03-020146 NCV 390/03-05-01 Failure to enter the appropriate Fire Protection Report OR for having the automatic start circuit of the electric-motor driven fire pumps defeated 03-019920 NCV 390/03-05-02 A seal was not installed in a cable conduit located in a fire barrier 69187 NCV 390/04-04-01 Failure to identify unsatisfactory performance of a fire brigade crew.

02-014475 NCV 390/04-02-01 Inadequate procedure involving the control of ECCS venting 03-005149 NCV 390/03-06 Failure to meet search requirements for an unsearched/unescorted tool box 65595 (Corp. Sec) Failure to conduct required extended credit checks by contractor 64292 NCV 390/04-07-02 Failure to initiate call-out of off-duty security personnel in a timely manner 66181 NCV 390/04-07 Three examples of security officers exceeding the Work Hour Order.

03-006204 NCV 390/03-08-01 Inadequate corrective action for a previous NCV Licensee Event Reports LER 05000390/2003-004-00 Emergency Core Cooling System Surveillance Requirement 3.5.2.3 - Verify Piping is Full of Water LER 05000390/2004-001-00 Automatic Reactor Trip due to an Invalid Turbine Trip Signal (P-4)

LER 05000390/2004-002-00 Manual Reactor Trip due to Dropped Rods Security PERs 7495 A security officer issued the wrong visitor badge 7629 Self Assessment WBN-ENG-03-15 was not completed within 30 days 7848 NRC inspector questioned the attentiveness of a security officer

7933 Failed to complete NRC Performance Indicators for May 2003 7935 Security failed to complete Tracking and Trending for the month of May 2003 7937 Intrusion Detection System, Zone 38 Infarid exceeding the threshold established for writing PER's on loggable equipment failures 8091 NRC Inspection identified that AOI-42 symptoms should include dicussion of imminent threats 8097 NRC identified failure to properly evaluate the impact to the facility for the loss of large areas 8339 Gas truck departed the Protected Area without a security escort 8490 During performance testing of the Owner Controlled, Vehicle Barrier System (VBS) it was discovered that both inbound and outbound VBS were inoperable 8572 Erratic operations of the security radio system 8824 NSDP-1, Appendix A, Item no. 10. b, page 4 of 12 and App. B, page 11 of 30, guidance for loggable events are in conflict with NRC guidance in GL 91-03, NUREG 1304 and Draft Reg Guide DG-5008.

9276 A review of 2003 PERS discovered that 24 errors in procedure compliance occurred within the Security group 9803 NRC observed command and control at the firearms range needed improvement.

12547 Physical Security Plan not fully met during weekly functional testing on door A-113 due to a non-security related hardware failure 14486 During the Self Assessment CRP-EP-03-001, Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA) training rosters could not be located 14616 The root cause grading results for WBPER 03-006445-000 did not meet management expectations.

14956 NRC identified during an inspection failure to properly analyze and document the impact to the facility for the loss of the Intake Pumping Station, due to waterborne threat 62335 NA Assessment NA-CH-04-002 identified problems with the completion of the overtime deviation forms 62365 NA Assessment NA-CH-04-002 questioned the classification of two PERs (14728 and 33990) related to overtime usage classified as Level D PERs.

64292 Upon loss of power to the security system, a recall of off duty members of the security force was not implemented within the time stated in SSI 2.8 64295 (B) Portions of the compensatory measures for security system loss of power may not be conservative enough 64695 During a walk down performed by the resident NRC inspector, a group of VA hatches were found without the required signage, as described in the WBN Physical Security Plan 66628 (B) Security is showing a decline in human performance based on error rate and injury rate 67151 During QA review of Security an Inspector noted differences between Day Shift and Night Shift on conducting inspections of the IPS 67493 Inadequate training exam process and oversight 67551 NA oversight of Security performance on August 11th and 12th identified that no TVA Security Managers or Pinkerton Management were providing oversight of Security operations or day/night shift turnover briefings.

69550 During closure of the West Portal Sally Port and opening of the North Portal Sally Port on 9/28/04, Interim Compensatory Measure B.2.c was not installed prior to making the Sally Port operational for vehicle traffic 69929 Protected Area Motor Patrols, failed to perform duties prescribed in SSI-2-7 71332 (B) NRC letter dated 10/29/04 denied TVA's October 26, 2004 schedule status letter of at risk items and required a 10 CFR 50.54(f) response 71850 NA identified issues with several Site Security Instructions (SSIs) during the independent verification activities associated with the WBN Security Upgrade Project 71851 During NA walk down with Security personnel to perform verification of VBS completion, numerous issues were identified with configurations not meeting the design output and or requiring the generation of additional design output (PIC) to make acceptable.

73414 The Security contractor maintains a work hour tracking system (WHTS) to monitor the Officers' work hours to meet the NRCs Fatigue Order. The delay time while the officer awaits shift turnover on post is not counted in the WHTS High Pressure Fire Protection PERs 7419 0-ISV-26-852 was excavated without the proper administrative controls i.e. Fire Protection Impairment Permit.

7580 Leak in the A-Train High Pressure Fire Protection header identified by WO 03-09227-01.

7586 REPEATED FAILURE OF SPRINKLER FLOW ALARM TEST AT NPIO 7587 THRU WALL LEAK ON HPFP PIPING AT TRAINING CENTER. WO#03-11004 7809 The leak in the 'A' High Pressure Fire Protection header (Ref. work order 03-009227-000) has not been repaired 8019 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF 0-TANK-026-0259, FILE 1, UNABLE TO OBTAIN THE AFFF LEVEL DUE TO NO MARKINGS ON THE SIGHT GLASS, PER SECTION 3.1 STEP 7.

8127 Inadvertent start of the diesel fire pump due to a lightning strike 8674 Leak in the weld of a 3 inch elbow on the 2-FCV-26-85 system 8780 Hold Order Tag Out (TO) 0229R5235 took out of service the Vital Inverter 1-II No compensatory actions were established 8840 Leak in the 4 inch piping that supplies hose stations 2-ISV-26-602 and -603 in the Turbine Building 8916 Fire door A065 U1 annulus entry door was breached with out obtaining an SPP-10 Impairment Permit 9046 Possible MIC leak on the 12 inch Fire Protection pipe in the Unit 2 ERCW Pipe Tunnel adjacent to pipe hanger 0026-26-1FP-R91 9067 In adequate Hold Order review for impact on plant equipment.

9071 Fire Protection Impairment Permit C03-0647 was closed but jumpers were not removed 9103 System 26 has a leak on the 1-1/2 inch piping in the Unit 1 Pipe Chase, el. 713 9230 During review of TI-26.008 - System 26 Flushing, it was identified that the requirement to perform TRO sampling should be deleted

9299 During the planning of WO# 03-011003-000 for replacement of WBN-0-PCV -

026-0018 it was identified that the flange bolting installed on the downstream side of the PCV is 1' diameter rather than 7/8' diameter as specified on drawing 37W206-7 R/P (item 540) and 37BM206-10 sh3 9358 Leak on the 8 inch Fire Protection pipe at approximately A2-R in the Auxiliary Building, el. 713 9378 During management review of outage related PER's, several administrative deficiencies were identified with the fire protection impairment (SPP-10.9)

permits 9498 Due to a leak in the Aux Building, the diesel fire pump was not run IAW 0-FOR-26-21 9499 Problems identified during QC inspection in work order 03-017820-000 9829 Fire Impairment Permit has not been requested from Fire Ops, thus hold order cannot be hung 9872 Herculite staged in 1B-B DG Room with no transient fire permit posted 12577 REPEATED FAILURES 0-PCV-026-0018. PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE IS NOT RESETING AFTER A FIRE PUMP RUN 12652 During the performance of 0-FPS-304-0002, Inspection of Fire Barrier in the TSOB Computer Room, identified a 4' conduit was not properly sealed 12762 The 'B' Train high pressure fire pumps were tagged out on 09/17/2003 without SPP-10.9 Fire Protection Impairment Permit (C03-0567)issued 12811 DURING PERFORMANCE OF 0-SI-82-5, DG2A-A BO TESTING, FIRE PUMP 2A-A DID NOT START 12878 Due to problems with 0-PCV-26-18 failing to control pressure properly, 0-PCV-26-18 was isolated. FPS circuit was defeated without entering OR 14.2.3 12978 OPERATIONS ACTIVITY TO PLACE CLEARANCE 253304026, HPFP STRAINER 1A-A, WAS DELAYED DUE TO NO FIRE PROTECTION IMPAIRMENT PERMIT WAS PREPARED IN ADVANCE 14606 While performing WO# 03-014420-00 the UNID for the disconnect switches located in the back of (1-R-72) for the System 26 Fire Protection (FSV) was found to be mislabled 33308 Design and implementation of the program for macrofouling were ineffective in correcting conditions identified in PER 02-203 33965 Flushing on system 26 designated points produced unacceptable free available oxidant (FAO) samples.

34086 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF 03-008954-000, DEAD CLAMS WERE FOUND WHILE FLUSHING THE UNIT 2 MAIN BANK TRANSFORMERS FIRE PROTECTION SPINKLER SYSTEM 61530 Aux Building el 729 RR bay area has numerous bullhoses, debris, and other equipment blocking access to a fire hose station and a fire extinquisher 61533 Aux Building el 729 N2 bottle area a Green bullhose is partially blocking a firehose station 62083 System 25 and 26 were treated with Clamtrol during the weeks of 5/5/2004 and 5/19/2004 as required by SPP-9.7. This PER is to document components not receiving flow during the treatment timeframe 62570 WO 02-014833-061 was scheduled to work 6/3/04 @ 0000 to perform a breaker swap in the Fire Protection Distribution Panel. The permit will not be available until dayshift on 6/3/04

63209 Clearance section 078005228 not hung due to the fire impairment permit not being available 63211 Impairment permit was not ready to support placing hold order 075505067 for C-A ERCW pump 66329 TVA HVAC Contractor requested the removal of ceiling tiles in the Engineering Manager's Office and the Break Room EL 746 of the EQB for access to the Ceiling area Prior to obtaining a "Fire Protection Impairment Permit" as required by MI-13.104 section 4.1.4 66854 System 25 and 26 were treated with non-oxidizing biocide during the weeks of 7/26/2004 and 8/2/2004 as required by SPP-9.7. This PER is to document components not receiving flow during the treatment timeframe 69190 Contrary to the requirements of SPP-10.9, work on the office area of Warehouse B removed the ceiling tile in the sprinklered area and the Fire Protection unit was not informed 72613 TI-50.002 for 1A DG fuel oil day tank quarterly performance did not have a fire protection impairment ready and the prerequisites required to be done before performance caused this TI to be rescheduled 72738 DURING PERFORMANCE OF PM 0-FPS-026-0006, FLUSHING OF SPRINKLER SYSTEMS ON UNIT 2 MAIN AND USS TRANSFORMERS, THE DIESEL FIRE PUMP STARTED. PUMP STARTED WHILE FLUSHING THE 2-C MAIN AND USS TRANSFORMER SYSTEM 73282 Preventative maintenance (PM) procedures 0-IPS-067-0001 and 0-IPS-067-0002 visually inspect the 652.0 elevation of the IPS pump suction area but do not inspect the 663.0 and 671.0 elevations nor the System 26, HPFP pump wells.

74293 0-FOR-26-3 needs to be revised to provide an alternate method of inspection of the sprinkler piping/hangers for the Aux. Bldg. 'B' Emergency Gas System Charcoal filter Unit which are located inside the unit and will require a plug to be opened for inspection Emergency Diesel Generators PERs 02-011441 Increased vibrations on 2A-A EDG 03-011094 2A-A EDG engine 2 oil line has slight interaction with the grating 7602 EDG vendor used non-conservative fouling factors when sizing heat exchangers 7713 2B-B EDG engine 2 left bank air start motors did not engage during drag start, PMT failure 7841 Pinhole leak in weld on EDG 2A-A engine 2 lube oil heat exchanger shell piping 7842 Pinhole leak in EDG 2A-A lube oil piping 8161 Fuel oil leak on 1B-B EDG required emergency stop 8865 OE - River Bend shutdown HPCS diesel due to significant fuel leak 9527 2A-A EDG intake damper 2-FCO-30-444 failed to open 12799 2B-B CCS pump sequenced on 31.5 seconds early during blackout testing 33458 OE - Palo Verde experienced erratic output of EDG voltage regulator 33562 OE - No plant instruction for perfomance of EDG emergency shutdown 62406 EDG 2B-B tripped and locked out on protective relay operation during surveillance test 63091 2A-A EDG electric board room exhaust fan vibrations high 67138 Increase in iron and silicon in the north generator bearing on 1A-A EDG

67404 EDG air start motor pressure switches not calibrated within specified frequency 69759 2A-A EDG made inoperable for work on air start system and appropriate LCO was not entered 71968 1B-B EDG exhaust fans did not auto start during performance of monthly surveillance 72039 2A-A EDG engine 2 air compressor breaker found tripped 72617 2A-A EDG engine 2 air compressor breaker found tripped (repeat of 72039)

EDG Work Orders 03-011098-000 Corrective Action for PER 03-011094-000, Grating above lube oil piping on 2A-A EDG needs to be modified to prevent interaction between pipe and grating (Cancelled)

03-011104-000 Corrective Action for PER 03-011099-000, Evaluate EDG 2B-B engine 1 setpoints for starting air compressor and starting air receiver pressure gauge calibration (Cancelled)

03-012225-000 Corrective Action for PER 02-011441-000 Obtain vibration data for EDG 2A-A per vendor recommendations (Cancelled)

03-020894-000 Investigate and repair cause of 2A-A EDG ventilation intake damper opening slowly 03-022608-000 Corrective Action for PER 3915, Inspect HEA relay located on panel 7 of the 6.9 kV fifth diesel generator board (Cancelled)

04-810470-000 Corrective Action for PER 03-016710-000, Remove additional elbow between the tee and fuel oil pressure gauge on 2B-B EDG 04-815172-000 The following panels have broken bolt heads: 1-PNL-82-A3, 1-PNL-82-B/4, 1-PNL-82-B/1, 2-PNL-82-B/4 (Cancelled)

04-817789-000 Second bolt from the top on the rear panel cover of 2-PNL-82-B/4-B is broken (Cancelled)

04-824646-000 Investigate and repair 2A-A EDG air compressor breaker tripped 04-824715-000 2B-B EDG engine 2 has low oil level (Cancelled)

04-824843-000 2A-A EDG engine 1 air receivers require manual blowdown (operator workaround)

04-825545-000 2A-A EDG engine 2 air compressor breaker found tripped 04-825588-000 2B-B EDG air dryer solenoid valve is not energizing Calculations Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Evaluation (EDMS #T71 030617 801)

Auxiliary Feedwater PERs 5619 MDAFW level control valves cannot be qualified to meet design bases requirements to close and stay closed against high differential pressure operating conditions 7417 An unplanned entry into LCO 3.7.5 occurred when the TDAFW pump inboard bearing oil sightglass lost oil level when the pump was stopped 8057 TDAFW pump inboard bearing bubbler assembly was loose

8742 Panel 1-L-381 el 692 aux building which houses TDAFW level control instrumentation was inadvertently exposed to excessive water 8751 Evaluate System 003 FAC grids inside containment that fail to meet the initial critieria for continued operation to RFO-6 9502 Leakage through 1-LCV-3-174A, SG1 TDAFW pump LCV, exceeded the allowable 20 gpm as described in the system description 9505 TDAFW pump outboard bearing oil sample showed water in the oil 9541 Unscheduled entry into LCO 3.7.5 due to leakage past 1-LCV-3-174A. The leakage was greater than 50 gpm with no demand for the valve to be open.

9687 Unplanned entry into LCO 3.7.5 upon failure of TDAFW pump room DC fan 9713 Instruction change to 1-SI-3-22, 18 Month Channel Calibration of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-B Suction Header Pressure Switches, was incorrectly processed as a minor typographical change instead of a non-intent change 12602 OE - Point Beach AFW recirculation orifice plugging issues 13505 TDAFW pump bearing oil sample on 10/18/03 is above warning limits for particle count 14768 Management questioned why 1-LCV-3-174 (AFW to SG1) is not tested during the quarterly pump performance test 61438 Ladder tied off to instrument drain lines associated with the TDAFW pump 67347 The bearing cooling supply line to the 1A MDAFW pump is bent and has very slow leak (1 drop/min) at the threaded connection 67913 As found MOVATS test on the ERCW header to AFW pump suction isolation valve found the unseating thrust and torque exceeded the guaranteed motor thrust and torque as shown on drawing 47A8910-03-10 72202 During the performance of 1-SI-3-901-B, Motor Driven Aux Feed Pump 1B-B Quarterly Performance Test, a technician inappropriately N/Ad steps involving vent and fill of instrument lines during restoration of test equipment 73994 Significant resources were expended on project WBC5641, Replace MDAFW LCVs, prior to determining that the project could not be implemented as originally scoped and approved. Additionally, the GL 91-18 condition that drove this project is now to be resolved for the current operating cycle without implementing the project.

AFW WOs 02-010876-003 Test MDAFW level control valves for leakage when exposed to high differential pressure operating conditions 03-003974-000 TDAFW pump inboard bearing oil level low 03-010031-000 TDAFW pump inboard bearing has a very slow oil leak 03-012489-000 TDAFW pump bubble is low on oil 03-015068-000 1B MDAFW pump need oil added to both pump bearing sightglasses 03-016067-000 1A MDAFW pump add oil to pump bearing 03-016079-000 1B MDAFW pump outboard bearing oil level is low 03-016801-000 During performance of 1-SI-3-81, 1-PDIC-3-132A did not operate in manual 03-017746-000 During performance of 1-SI-3-907-B 1-LCV-003-0171-B failed to go and stay full open. Air leak also heard.

03-017758-000 Durning performance of 1-SI-3-907-B , during the silt flushing portion, there was no flow coming from 1-TTV-3-808-B

03-022683-000 Investigate source of water in TDAFW pump outboard bearing oil 03-022711-000 TDAFW pump outboard bearing oil level is low 04-810795-000 1A MDAFW pump outboard motor bearing is weeping oil 04-810975-000 1-PI-3-1 failed high, repair or replace 04-817857-000 TDAFW pump breakdown orifice initially failed the flow test on the high side. Test was re-performed and was satisfactory.

04-821294-000 Replace 1A-A MDAFW pump bearing cooling water lines 04-821504-000 Replace 1B-B MDAFW pump bearing cooling water lines Auxiliary Feedwater Control System PERs 7448 OE - Browns Ferry HPCI turbine tripped due to the magnetic pickup unit not functioning AFWCS WOs 03-010613-000 Corrective Action for PER 7448, Inspect TDAFW turbine magnetic pickup amphenol connectors Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) PERs 73215 New tubesheets issued for Main Control Room Chiller B did not have appropriate documentation 76890 This PER was written to address the problems with PER 73215 7858 (B) Testing performed identified that valve seat material did not meet design requirements 14346 (B) Failure of B Main Control Room Chiller resulted in an unplanned entry into LCO 74391 (B) Failure to identify and document an ERCW silt accumulation trend 12591 No PER was generated to document blockage in ERCW supply to the CCS surge tank as required by SPP 9.7, Appendix C 34322 Failure to document blockage in a PER identified during a ultrasonic inspection 3308 (A) Failure to implement corrective actions from previous corporate A level PER on macrofouling 63708 (B) Work performed on wrong unit ERCW Strainer Inlet Pressure Gauge 9381 Pipe Chase Cooler 1A ERCW Return Valve found with locking device unlocked, broken, and bent.

64619 Locking device for 1-ISV-67-600A, 1A CCP Room Cooler ERCW Supply Isolation Valve, incorrectly installed 68813 Penetration Room Cooler 1B-B ERCW Return Throttle Valve was found inadequately secured by locking wire 72929 Locking Device on 1-ISV-67-602A not properly installed 70044 Some B Train ERCW pumps have displayed an increasing performance trend for an unknown reason.

69926 Documentation Error in Calculation Abstracts 70049 Problems with TI-67.007 and TI-67.002 flow acceptance criteria 70183 ERCW System Flow Analysis model may need to be revised

70052 To determine industry standard for the approach to periodic flow balancing in accident conditions and modify the WBN program appropriately 9413 Several large holes identified on 2AA ERCW Traveling Screen 2-TWS-67-439 61665 Trending PER to document examples of active galvanic corrosion cells on ERCW bolting 70184 Justification and technical basis for performing periodic CCS heat exchanger inspection and cleaning in lieu of periodic performance testing was not documented in a detailed evaluation 63850 Hole in 1B ERCW Supply Header 66241 No easy access to 1-ISV-67-523B where scaffolding or an EOP ladder is required to provide access to the valve in a timely manner 74107 ERCW leak caused by the rupture of a rubber gasket in a flanged pipe connection 14821 Blockage identified upstream of 1-FCV-3-136A 8201 Partial blockage of horizontal ERCW supply piping to turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump 9158 Water leakage found on oil cooler to A-A ERCW Pump 67547 Valve chain operator loose 69990 Radiography performed on component in wrong train 9509 H-B ERCW Pump did not pass total developed head (TDH) requirement during performance of 1-SI-67-902B 33296 Blockage identified of ERCW supply piping to the B Station Air Compressor Aftercooler 33431 Paint found on stainless steel ERCW piping 65145 No acceptance criteria specified for PMT as required by SPP-6.3 68139 Seal weld leak identified on 1-RFV-67-514A 8732 (B) Flood on elevation 692 from ERCW Discharge Header work on flanged connection 3308 (A) Failure to implement corrective actions of previous corporate A level PER on macrofouling Main Control Room (MCR), Shutdown Board Room (SDBR), and 480V Board room Air Conditioning PERs 74180 Shutdown Board Room Chiller A tripped on high oil/discharge temperature 73919 Main Control Room chill water pump hand switch found out of position 66930 Discrepancies identified between EPRI document and WBN Closed Cooling Water Strategic Plan and chemistry procedures 63091 Abnormal vibrations on 2A Diesel Generator exhaust fan 33918 2A 480V Board Room Chiller condensing unit breaker was found tripped 9522 Backdraft damper 0-BKD-031-2001A found open when it should have been closed 9407 Replacement 2-FS-031-0460-A switch was not a like-for-like replacement 9043 When the 1B-B main control room chiller was determined to be tripped, the appropriate Technical Specification was entered but a loss of safety function determination was not performed 8238 Main Control Room A chilled water system pH is outside of limits

71055 Main Control Room A chilled water system contaminants above action level 1 requirements 9416 Valve 1-TCV-67-158 was installed opposite preferred direction as indicated by arrows on valve body Emergency Preparedness PERs 3885 MMG Craft Personnel Inadvertently Entered Control Room Without the Proper Clearance Level 7485 Documentation Was Scanned into the PER with Social Security Numbers of the Involved Individuals 7753 Greater than 30% of the Off-site Notification Sirens Are Out-of-Service Due to Weather-Related Power Loss 71525 Off-year EP Exercise Missed Declaration 71527 Assembly and Accountability Expectations Radiation Protection PERs 7472 The Waste Gas Analyzer Room Went Radiologically Airborne During Troubleshooting of the Waste Gas Analyzer 7556 The Area in Front of the Hot Sample Room Sample Panel Is Designated as a C-Zone 7569 The External Pressure Sensor O-Ring Was Not Installed Causing Leak from Waste Gas Analyzer 7722 INPO-Requested Review of Radiological Protection Programs to Ensure That Adequate Barriers Are in Place to Prevent an Unplanned Radiation Exposure Such as That of Almost 2 Rem at Perry Nuclear Power Plant 7727 Indication of Small Leak in Waste Gas Analyzer Room 7776 MMG Personnel Inadvertently Stepped in Contaminated Portion of El. 713 U-1 Pipe Chase While Performing 1-SI-63-10a Resulting in Particle Contamination 7815 Worker Exited the U-1 Annulus with a 1000 Cpm Particle on His Scrub Pants 7853 Dry Boron Packing Leak on 1-ISIV-063-0350C, Isolation Valve to FI-63-2 7863 Dry Boron Leak on 1-CKV-062-0931 7959 While Transporting Radioactive Sources to Refuel Floor to Await Disposal, a Worker's Left Shoe Became Contaminated 8053 1-ISV-62-929 Appears to Have Dry Boron Residue at Gasket 8054 1-ISIV-63-309B/2 Has Dry Boron Residue at Packing 8055 Dry Boron Residue on Cap of Test Tee Downstream of 1-ISIV-63-310B/C 8056 1-FCV-62-140-A Dry Boron Residue at Valve Packing 8058 1-PDIS-62-0097 Dry Boron Residue on Fitting on Low Pressure Side 8059 1-ISIV-62-0097BC/L Dry Boron Residue on Top of 1st Down Stream Fitting 8060 1-PDIS-62-0097 Dry Boron Residue on the Bottom of the Fitting on the Low Pressure Side 8061 1-ISIV-62-0097BC/L Dry Boron Residue on Packing 8062 Worker Was in U1 Aux Bldg on 772 MG Set Room and Became Contaminated on Shoe 8167 1-ISIV-72-206C/1 Has Dry Boron Residue on Packing 8176 1-FT-68-48A-D Has Wet Boron Leak at 1-L-502 8186 Worker on Refuel Floor Picked Up 150-CPM Particle on Bottom of Shoe

8200 Dry Boron Leak on Three Components, 1-PI-43-36 and 1-FIC-43-36, Located on PNL 1-L-232 in the Hot Sample Room 713' AB 8255 Leakage Downstream of 1-SMV-43-844 Has Resulted in Boric Acid Residue Streaming ~12 Feet Down the Outer Annulus Wall 8306 An Individual Performing an LLRT on the Upper Containment Airlock Entered into a Posted High Radiation Area Without Receiving a HRA Briefing 8347 Worker Entered 1AA RHR/CS Hx Room Building Scaffolding for WO # 0209676000 and Alarmed PCM2 upon Exiting 8349 Worker Entered 1AA RHR/CS Hx Room Building Scaffolding for WO # 0209676000 and Alarmed PCM2 upon Exiting 8350 Worker Entered 1AA RHR/CS Hx Room Building Scaffolding for WO # 0209676000 and Alarmed PCM2 upon Exiting 8464 FME Controller Was Contaminated on the 757' Refueling Floor While Providing Coverage for Workers Inside the Cask Loading Pit 8466 Worker Was Flagging/Rigging for Man-Basket Used to Transport Personnel for Transfer Canal Work and upon Exit from HPCZ/CA Worker Alarmed PCM-1B on El 757 8473 Dry Boron Leak on 1-ISV-074-0524 around Stem and Packing 8546 Personnel Picked Up a Particle While Working and Traveling on El.757 Refuel Floor and the Emergency Gas Treatment Room 8596 While Attempting to Flush a Hot Spot from a Pressurizer Line, the Flush Hose Blew out of the Floor Drain Causing a Large Area of Lower Containment to Become Contaminated 8671 During Flood-up of the Reactor Cavity, Containment Went Airborne after the Water Flowed over the Top of the Reactor Vessel Flange Resulting in Internal Contamination of Individuals 8736 An ISI Worker Received a Dose Rate Alarm Inside the Enclosure Top of the Pressurizer 8757 Lead Shielding Was Found Removed from #1 Hot Leg 8931 Hot Trash Was Brought to the Lower Containment Stepoff Pad Without Notification Creating a Radiation Area in the Area Where Personnel Normally Undress.

8970 Radcon Responded to a High Radiation Alarm for 1-RE-90-59B and Found that the Monitor Was Taped over in order to Silence the Audible Function 8999 Refuel Floor Craft Inadvertently Hooked to the Wrong Tri-Nuc System and Pulled it out of the Water Causing Area Radiation Monitors to Alarm and Dose a Rate Alarm on One of the Individuals Supporting the Activity.

9006 Individual Was Contaminated on Right Shoe While Working in the Radwaste Railroad Bay Cask Area 9265 Radcon Technician Allowed Individuals to Continue Working on 1-SI-72-701A after ED Dose Alarm Had Occured 9346 Individual Was Contaminated While Working on the 757 Refuel Floor 9347 Individual Was Contaminated While Working on a Scaffold in the U1 713 Pipe Chase 9449 Worker Exited the U2 692' SIS 2A-A Pump Room with a 2500cpm Particle on the Front of the Shirt 12617 Wet Boron Leak on 1-FT-068-0048A on RCS Loop 3 Coolant Flow 12731 The Check Source Is Missing from Rad Monitor 0-RM-90-134 12734 Plant Services Personnel Contamination on Right Shoe

12740 Plant Services Personnel Contamination on Shoe 14666 Higher than Expected Dose Rates Were Observed in the S/G Cold Leg Bowls and on the Refueling Floor 15059 An Individual Who Had Been Working on the Refuel Floor Alarmed the PCM When He Attempted to Exit the RCA 33956 Airborne Due to System Breach 34237 Worker Alarmed PM7 and a Discrete Particle Was Found on the Left Shoe 66998 Trend PER to Document Five Occurrences Within the Past 6 Months of Incorrect RWP Usage Involving Entry to High Radiation Areas on the Wrong RWP 67751 Worker Making Rounds in Aux Bldg Alarmed PCM 69012 This PER Documents Four Personnel Contamination Events Due to Changing out the RCS Filter and Removing Trash from the RCS Filter Cubicle System Descriptions, Configuration Control Drawings, and System Status Reports N3-77A-4001, Revision 6, Gaseous Waste Disposal System N3-77B-4001, Revision 7, Solid Waste Disposal N3-77C-4001, Revision 9, Liquid Radwaste Processing System WB-DC-40-24, Revision 14, Radiation Monitoring Drawing 1-47W610-90-1, Revision 33, Electrical Control Diagram - Radiation Monitoring System Drawing 1-47W610-90-2, Revision 46, Electrical Control Diagram - Radiation Monitoring System Drawing 1-47W610-90-3, Revision 33, Electrical Control Diagram - Radiation Monitoring System Drawing 1-47W610-90-4, Revision 56, Electrical Control Diagram - Radiation Monitoring System System Status for the Radiation Monitoring System (System 090) for 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Quarters of FY 2003 System Status for the Waste Disposal System (System 077) for 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Quarters of FY 2003 Training Lesson Plans:

3-OT-SI82.3 0-SI-82.3 18 Month Loss of Offsite Power with Safety Injection Test - DG 1A-A 3-OT-MSC-072A Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements During Shutdown for Plant Outage Audits and Self-Assessments Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Analysis of Site Integrated Analysis for Third and Fourth Quarters of 2003, dated January 29, 2004 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Site Integrated Analysis for Second Quarter of 2004, dated May 7, 2004 Summary of WBN FY04 3rd Quarter Integrated Analysis

Periodic Site PER Analysis, dated 9/21/2004, Site Support Trending and Analysis of WBN PERs through August 2004 Periodic Site PER Analysis, dated 11/22/2004, Site Support Trending and Analysis of WBN PERs through October 2004 Open Effectiveness Review Actions for PERs Nuclear Assurance (NA) Assessment Report NA-CH-03-001 - Corrective Action Program (CAP)

Assessment NA Addendum to Assessment Report NA-CH-03-001 - CAP Assessment Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NA Bi-Monthly Oversight Report for the Period of March 21, 2003, through May 20, 2003 - NA-WB-03-003 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NA Bi-Monthly Oversight Report for the Period of May 21, 2003, through July 20, 2003 - NA-WB-03-005 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NA Bi-Monthly Oversight Report for the Period of July 1, 2003, through October 31, 2003 - NA-WB-03-006 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NA Bi-Monthly Oversight Report for the Period of November 21, 2003, through January 20, 2004 - NA-WB-04-001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NA Bi-Monthly Oversight Report for the Period of January 21, 2004, through March 20, 2004 - NA-WB-04-002 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NA Bi-Monthly Oversight Report for the Period of March 21, 2004, through May 20, 2004 - NA-WB-04-003 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NA Quarterly Oversight Report for the Period of August 21, 2004, through December 20, 2004 - NA-WB-04-005 Other PERs 02-013111 1-SI-63-10A, ECCS Venting Train A, Section 6.0 Note 4 contains actions to time an evolution and record results in the test log. No mechanism is specified for timing, and actions should be procedural steps.

02-014475 During performance of 1-SI-63-10A, Appendix F (Cold Leg 1 RHR injection line)

an air/gas mixture was received for approx 25-30 seconds followed by an air/water mixture for 2-3 minutes.

03-010602 WO 02-016715-000, Rebuild seals for thermal barrier booster pump did not specify to perform 1-FOR-70-4, Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 1A Quarterly Performance Test, as a post maintenance test.

03-010788 Operations personnel inappropriately exited OR-14.10 prior to completion of adequate testing to demonstrate the 1A-A CCS thermal barrier booster pump was operable following maintenance 8592 (B ) Cooling to the B RHR heat exchanger was terminated by blackout testing when the running CCS pump was load shed 8697 During RFO-5 TI-68.002, Containment Penetrations and Closure Control, was inadequately implemented 9584 (B) At 1137 on 1/16/2004, WBN Unit 1 tripped from 100% power 14691 (B) During preparations for blackout testing operations personnel opened supply breaker on the operable ABGTS train 68941 (B) WBN Unit 1 was manually tripped at 0456EDT on 9/19/2004 in response to four control rods in Control Bank B Group 2 fully inserting at 100% power

69347 (B) Shift crew response to the control rod drop event on 9/19/2004 did not meet management expectations 3157 Fuel handling accident main control room and offsite radiation dose calculations incorrect 4348 Vendor Notification (VN) 38421, 10CFR21 Report #41 concerning terry turbine trip throttle valve spindle has identified that material substitution of grade 12XX steel in place of grade 1018 carbon steel specified by design.

13972 Air distribution duct in main control room overhead may not comply fully with design basis requirements for seismic qualification.

3946 During MCR lighting diffuser replacement 10 ceiling hardware deficiencies were discovered 8736 Management expectations have not been met during transition of the WBN U2 PM program Other Documents:

U1 Cycle 6 Outage Safety Plan Outage LCOs Training Power Point Presentation