05000390/LER-2003-004, Emergency Core Cooling System Surveillance Requirement 3.5.2.3 - Verify Piping Is Full of Water
| ML033030403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/2003 |
| From: | Lagergren W Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 03-004-00 | |
| Download: ML033030403 (9) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3902003004R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City. Tennessee 37381-2000 William R. Lagergren, Jr.
Site Vice President, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant OCT 2 7 2003 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of
)
Tennessee Valley Authority
)
Docket No. 50-390 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (NVBN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-390/2003-004 This submittal provides Licensee Event Report 390/2003-004. This LER addresses an event that occurred on August 28, 2003, which resulted in an a failure to meet Surveillance Request (SR) 3.5.2.3. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
The commitment documented in tis letter is in Section VII of the Enclosure. If you have any questions about this change, please contact P. L. Pace at (423) 365-1824.
Sincerely, Enclosure cc: See page 2
_IL 6;2;Z Prnted o recyc d pax
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 OCT 2 7 2003 cc (Enclosure):
NRC Resident Inspector Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 Ms. Margaret H. Chernoff, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MS 08G9 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 700 Galleria Parkway, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5957
Abstract
During preparation for the Unit 1 Cycle 5 refueling outage, work orders were being prepared to perform ultrasonic testing (UT) on the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) safety injection (SI) system piggy back" supply piping to the SI pump (SIP) lB-B. During the history review of that system for the work order preparation, it was discovered that on January 14-15, 2003, the SIP was drained to support maintenance activities. It appeared that the draining and subsequent refilling of the SIP 1 B-B may have been inadequate because the associated work orders did not contain instructions for draining and refilling, and because there was no evidence of special precautions to assure the supply piping to the SIP 1 B-B was filled with water when restoring the equipment to service. The method of filling in the procedure was involved valve alignments outside the clearance boundary and therefore, did not adequately address the piggy back line. A work order was initiated to perform UT which subsequently verified the presence of approximately 5.5 cubic feet of gas in the piping line. The gas in the line is contrary to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.2.3 to verify piping is full of water. A work order was initiated to vent the piping. Following the venting of the piping, a UT verified that the pipe was full of water.
NRC FORM 366 (7.2001)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 3664)
VII.
C. Additional Information
None.
D. Safety System Functional Failure:
This event did not Involve a safety system functional failure as defined in NEI-99-02, Revision 0.
E. Loss of Normal Heat Removal Consideration This event Is not considered a scram with loss of normal heat removal.
VII.
COMMITMENTS
TVA will provide a supplement to LER 390/2003-004 upon development of the root cause and corrective actions by December 19, 2003.