IR 05000389/1998011

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Forwards Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-389/98-11.Corrective Actions:Addl Procedural Guidance Developed for ECCS Containment Sump Insps for Units 1 & 2. Mode 1 Walkdown of Unit 1 Also Performed
ML17229B004
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/04/1999
From: PLUNKETT T F
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-389-98-11, L-99-028, L-99-28, NUDOCS 9902120166
Download: ML17229B004 (9)


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CATEGORYj.REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9902120166DOC.DATE:99/02/04NOTARIZED:NO~~~~~~~~~~FACIL:50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower6LightCo.AUTH.NAME.AUTHORAFFILIATIONPLUNKETT,T.F.'loridaPowerSLightCo.RECIP.NAME'ECIPIENTAFFILIATIONRecordsManagementBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT: Forwardsresponsetoviolationsnotedininsprept50-389/98-11.Correctiveactions:addiproceduralguidancedevelopedforECCScontainmentsumpinspsforUnits1&2.Mode1walkdownofUnit1alsoperformed.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseDOCKET¹05000389NOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDCOPIESLTTRENCL11RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEGLEAVES,WCOPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL:ACRSAEOD/TTCCENTNRR/DRPM/PECBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS3EXTERNAL:LITCOBRYCE,JHNRCPDR221111111~1111111AEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DRCH/HOHBNRR/DRPM/PERBOEDIRRGN2FILE01NOACNUDOCSFULLTEXT111111111111YNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTETHTOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROZDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR19ENCL19 FloridaPower&LightCompany,P.0.Box14000,JunoBeach,FL33408.0420February4,1999L-99-02810CFR2.201U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationNRCInsectionReort98-11FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hasreviewedthesubjectNoticeofViolationand,pursuantto10CFR$2.201,theresponsetotheviolationisattached.Asdiscussedintheviolationresponse,theUnit2Spring1997refuelingoutagesumpscreenrepairanddispositionactivitiesfailedtoadequatelyconsiderthegenericimplicationsoftheidentifieddiscrepancies.St.LuciesitepersonnelarebeingtrainedtoreinforcetherequirementsoftheSt.Luciecorrectiveactionprogram.Pleasecontactuswithquestionsontheenclosedviolationresponse.Verytrulyyours,ThomasF.PlunkettPresidentNuclearDivisionTFP/JAS/EJWAttachmentcc:RegionalAdministrator,USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant9902120i66990204PDRADOCK05000389PPDRanFPLGroupcompany

L-99-028AttachmentPage1of5VIOLATIONPart50ofTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations(10CFR50),AppendixB,CriterionXVIrequiresthatmeasuresshallbeestablishedtoassurethatconditionsadversetoquality,suchasfailures,malfunctions,deficiencies,deviations,defectivematerialandequipment,andnonconformancesarepromptlyidentifiedandcorrected.Contrarytotheabove,asofNovember15,1998,conditionsadversetoqualitywerenotpromptlyidentifiedandcorrectedinvolvingtheUnit2emergencycorecoolingsystems(ECCS)containmentsump.Specifically,inMay1997,correctiveactionswereimplementedtoaddressgapsandopeningsintheECCScontainmentsumpscreensinexcessofdesignrequirementsdescribedintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.However,asevidencedbytheidentification.ofapproximately100additionaldiscrepanciesinNovember1998,thecorrectiveactionsinMay1997werenoteffectiveinidentifyingandcorrectingthedeficiencies,andthesumpwasnotrestoredtodesignrequirements.ThisisaSeverityIVLevelviolation(Supplement1).RESPONSE1.AreementwithorDenialotheViolationFPLconcurswiththeviolation.ReasonfortheViolationThefailureofthecorrectiveactionsperformedinMay1997toeffectivelyidentifyandcorrectdeficiencies,andtorestoretheECCScontainmentsumptodesignrequirements,isprimarilytheresultofinadequateconsiderationofgenericimplicationsofthedocumenteddeficiencies(i.e.,considerationofthepotentialfordeficienciesinallareasoftheUnit2sumpscreens).InMay1997,neartheendoftheSpring1997Unit2refuelingoutage(SL2-10),theNRCResidentInspectornoteddiscrepanciesintheconstructionoftheECCScontainmentsumpscreen.Thesediscrepanciesinvolvedgapsbetweenthedividerscreenandtheouterverticalscreen,andbetweenthedividerscreenandtheconcretewall.ConditionReport97-1102waswrittentodocumentthesediscrepancies,andPlantChange/Modification(PC/M)97-037waswrittenfortheimplementationofrequiredrepairs.FPLperformedadditionalinspectionsofthedividerscreen,andnotedadditionaldiscrepancies.Duringtheimplementationof L-99-028AttachmentPage2of5therequiredrepairs,otherminorgapswerenotedinthedividerscreenandinthehorizontalscreenatthetopofthesump;thesegapswerealsodocumentedinConditionReport97-1102andrepairedpursuanttoPC/M97-037.Duringthisperiod,FPLeffortswerefocusedontherepairofthegapsnotedatthedividerscreenandthehorizontalscreen.TheareasofconcernnotedbytheNRCResidentdealtwithgapsbetweenthedividerscreenandtheouterscreen,andbetweenthedividerscreenandtheconcretewall(i.e.,discrepanciesthatwouldallowthepassageofdebrisfromonesideofthesumptotheotherside,thuspotentiallyaffectingbothECCStrains).AdditionalinspectionsperformedbyFPLduringtheSL2-10refuelingoutagetoaddressgenericconcernsforUnit2wereoriginallylimitedtothedividerscreen;aAerdiscrepancieswereobservedinthehorizontalscreens,thescopeofinspectionswasincreasedtoincludethehorizontalscreens.Acommitmentwasmade(andfulfilled)toprepareguidelinesforinspectionofthesumpscreensforbothUnits1and2duringfutureoutages.However,St.LuciedidnotrecognizethatthescopeofgenericconcernstobeaddressedduringtheSL2-10outageshouldhavebeenexpandedtoincludetheverticalouterscreens,toprovidecompleteassurance(a)thatallsumpscreendeficiencieswereidentifiedandcorrectedand(b)thatthedesignrequirementsfor'theECCScontainmentsumpweresatisfied.ThegapsinthedividerscreenwerediscoveredduringtheSpring1997Mode4containmentcloseoutwalkdown.Theimplicitawarenessbypersonnelofthescheduleforunitre-start(inherentduringrefuelingoutages)wasafactorinthe.narrowfocusofcorrectiveactionwhichfailedtoidentifytheneedforadditionalinspectionstobeperformedtoaddressgenericconcerns.Duringthedispositionofthesediscrepancies,genericimplicationsforUnit1wereconsidered.SincethedesignoftheUnit1screenshasacompletelydifferentconfigurationthanUnit2(withnodividerscreen),FPLdeterminedthatnoimmediateactionswererequiredforUnitl.AsubsequentMode1powerentrywasperformedasdescribedbelowincorrectiveaction3.b.DetailedinspectionsandrepairsoftheUnit1screenswereperformedduringthe,Fall1997Unit1refuelingoutage(SL1-15).Basedonthesefacts,FPLhasdeterminedthatthereasonforthisviolation(ineffectivecorrectiveactions)wasthefactthatinsufficientattentionandconsiderationweregiventogenericconcerns(i.e.,thepotentialfordiscrepanciesintheverticalouterscreerisandthehorizontalscreens)subsequenttothediscoveryofgapsinthedividerscree L-99-028AttachmentPage3of53.CorrectiveStesTakenandResultsAchievedSubsequenttotheSL2-10refuelingoutage,additionalproceduralguidancewasdevelopedforECCScontainmentsumpinspectionsforUnits1and2toprovidespecificinspectionrequirementsforgapsinthesumpscreenaswellasforverificationofsumpareacleanliness.Theproceduralguidanceisintendedtoensurethatthephysicalconditionofthesumpscreensmeetsthedesignrequirements.TherequiredguidancewasissuedviaMaintenanceSurveillanceProcedureMSP-68.01("ContainmentSumpInspection")andPSLNuclearAssuranceQualityControlTechniqueSheet10.54("Unit1andUnit2ContainmentSumpInspection").SubsequenttotheSL2-10refuelingoutage,aMode1walkdownofUnit1wasperformedtoinspecttheaccessibleareasoftheUnit1ECCScontainmentsumpscreens.Onlythehorizontalscreenatthetopofthesumpcouldbeinspectedduringthiswalkdown.Eightminordiscrepantconditionswerefound;anengineeringevaluationconcludedthattherewerenooperabilityconcernsassociatedwiththeseconditions.Twoofthesediscrepancieswererepairedimmediately.TheremainingsixdiscrepancieswererepairedduringthenextUnit1refuelingoutage(SL1-15);seeparagraphc,below.Thesediscrepancies,andtheevaluationoftheas-foundcondition,weredocumentedinConditionReportNo.97-1465,Supplement1.C.DuringtheSL1-15refuelingoutage(thefirstoutagesubsequenttotheissuanceoftheproceduralguidancediscussedinparagrapha,above),theUnit1ECCScontainmentsumpscreenswereinspectedindetailinaccordancewithMSP-68.01andTechniqueSheet10.54.No,discrepancieswereobservedontheinnerscreens.Severaldiscrepanciesweredocumentedwithregardtotheouterscreensandthesumpitself.ThesediscrepanciesweredocumentedandevaluatedinConditionReportNo.97-2225andPlantManagementAction-ItemNo.97-12-166.FPLconcludedthattherewerenooutstandingoperabilityconcernsorreportabilityissues.RequiredrepairstothesumpscreenswereperformedinaccordancewithPC/M97-058.DuringtheFall1998Unit2refuelingoutage(SL2-11),adetailed,.comprehensiveinspectionoftheUnit2ECCScontainmentsumpscreenswasperformedinaccordancewithMSP-68.01andTechniqueSheet10.54.ThiswasthefirstUnit2outagesubsequenttotheissuanceofthedetailedproceduralguidancediscussedinparagrapha,above.Atotalof101discrepantconditions,alongwithalimitednumberofinaccessibleareas,wereidentifiedduringthisinspection.Theseconditionsweredocumented

~r0 L-99-028AttachmentPage4of5andevaluatedinConditionReportNo.98-1766and98-1766(Supplements1and2).ThesumpscreendiscrepancieswhichrequiredrepairwerecorrectedinaccordancewithPC/M98-029.Allotheridentifiedsumpscreendiscrepancies,includinganypotentialdeficienciesassociatedwiththeinaccessiblesumpscreenareas,weredispositionedasanacceptableconfiguration.FPLconcluded(a)thattherewerenooperabilityconcernsassociatedwiththeas-foundcondition(withtheunitoffline),and(b)thattheevaluationforsafetysignificanceprovidedforthediscrepanciesdiscoveredduringtheSL2-10refuelingoutageboundedthenewlydiscoveredanomalies.FPLdeterminedthatthediscrepancieswerereportableunder10CFR50.73as"aconditionoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant".FPLissuedarevisiontoLER50-389/97-02,inwhichthediscrepancieswereattributedto(a)afailuretoproperlyimplementthedesignrequirementsduringoriginalconstructionand(b)inadequateinspections.4.CorrectiveStestoAvoidFutureViolationsSt.LucieUnit2TechnicalSpecification4.5.2.e.2requiresavisualinspectionofthecontainmentsumpatleastonceper18monthsforverificationthatthescreensshownoevidenceofstructuraldistressorcorrosion.AsimilarinspectionisrequiredbyUnit1TechnicalSpecification4.5.2.d.2.Asdiscussedabove,MaintenanceSurveillanceProcedureMSP-68.01("ContainmentSumpInspection")andPSLNuclearAssuranceQualityControlTechniqueSheet10.54("Unit1andUnit2ContainmentSumpInspection")havebeenissuedtoprovideadditionalproceduralguidanceforECCScontainmentsumpinspections.Thesedocumentsprovidespecificinspectionrequirementsforgapsinthesumpscreensaswellasforverificationofsumpareacleanliness.Satisfactorycompletionoftheseprocedureswillensurethatthephysicalconditionofthesumpscreensmeetsthedesignrequirements.InspectionpersonnelwillutilizethesedocumentsduringfuturerefuelingoutagestosatisfytheTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.Inordertoprovideassurancethattheproblemnoted(inadequateconsiderationofgenericconcerns)willnotrecur,aTechnicalAlertaddressingthisconcernhasbeenissuedtoEngineeringpersonnelFormalizedtrainingforre-emphasisofexistingproceduralguidancewillbeprovidedaspartofscheduledEngineeringSupportPersonnel(ESP)training;thistrainingwillbecompletedbyMarch26,1999.Inordertoprovideassurancethatfutureconditionreportswillnotbeapprovedwithoutadequateconsiderationofgenericconcerns,atraining L-99-028AttachmentPage5of5bulletinforre-emphasisofexistingproceduralguidancewasissuedtoSt.LuciemanagementpersonnelresponsibleforapprovingConditionReportdispositions.d.Futurepre-outageEmployeeCommunicationmeetingswillre-emphasizemanagementexpectationsconcerningtheneedtothoroughlyinvestigateoutagediscoveryitems,includingtheconsiderationofgenericimplicationsaspartofthecorrectiveactionplan.DateofFullComlianceFullcompliancewasachievedonDecember2,1998,uponimplementationofPC/M98-029whichincludedmodificationstotheECCScontainmentsumpscreensnecessarytomeetdesignrequirements.ThisPC/MwascompletedpriortotheUnit2startupfollowingtheSL2-11refuelingoutage.