IR 05000382/1978011

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Insp Rept 50-382/78-11 on 780905-08.Noncompliance Noted: to Follow Contract Spec Provisions Re Fire Prevention & Weld Repair of Base Metal Performed W/O Use of Procedure
ML20062C027
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/26/1978
From: Crossman W, Rosenberg A, Stewart R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20062C020 List:
References
50-382-78-11, NUDOCS 7811060105
Download: ML20062C027 (7)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION IV

Report No. 50-382/78-11 Docket No. 50-382 Category A2 Licensee:

Louisiana Power and Light' Company 142 Delaronde St.

New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Facility Name:

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit No. 3 Inspection at:

Waterford Site, Taft, Louisiana Inspection conducted:

September 5-8, 1978

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Inspectors:

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SG S

R. 'C.

Stewart, Reactor Inspector, Projects Section Date

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(Paragrahs 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 & 8)

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. 8. Rosenberg, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Date /

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Support Section (Paragraphs 4 & 5)

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Other Accompanying Personnel:

R. E. Hall, Chief, Engineering Support Section 9[W/'78 Approved:

v-W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section Date

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s R. E. Hall, Chief, Engineering Support Section Date

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection on September 5-8, 1978 (Report No. 50-382/78-11)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of construction activities related to installation of safety related structural steel in containment, HVAC support structures, previously reported construction deficiencies, and the review of corrective action initiated by the licensee regarding an item of noncompliance. The inspection involved fifty-two inspector-bours by two NRC inspectors.

Results: Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were found in three areas, two apparent items of noncompliance were found in the area of structural steel installation (infraction - failure to follow contract specifications relating to fire prevention - paragraph 4.c; infraction -

performing weld repair of base metal without a procedure - paragraph 5)f,.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons' Contacted Principal Licensee Employees i

  • A. E. Henderson, Jr., QA Manager l
  • T. F. Gerrets, Project QA Engineer
  • B. P. Brown, QA Enginner
  • C. J. Chatelain, QA Engineer
  • J. Woods, QA Engineer
  • B. M. Toups, QA Engineer
  • P. A. Jackson, Project Coordinator Other Personnel
  • J. Crnich, Site Manager, Ebasco y
  • R. Milhiser, Project Superintendnet, Ebasco
  • R. Hartnett, QA Site Supervisor, Ebasco
  • R. Hollenbeck, QA Supervisor, Tompkins-Beckwith (T-B)
  • H. Burns, Project Manager, Peabody /X-Ray G. Baker, Site QA Supervisor, Waldinger, Corp.

R. Shillinsky, Weldi.ng Engineer, Ebasco

  • R. Renquillo, QA Manager, Gulf
  • T. McAllister, QA Manager, J. A. Jones (JAJ)
  • E. Breedlove, Project Manager, T-B
  • W. Lamson, Project QC Manager, Fischbach & Moore, Inc.
  • P. Smith, Site QA Officer, American Bridge
  • L. Stinson, Manager, Site QA Program, Ebasco The IE inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel including members of the engineering and QA/QC staffs.

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  • denotes those attending the exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Deficiency (50-382/78-08):

Failure to Report Safety Signi-ficant Deficiency.

The licensee provided a written response to this deficiency. dated August 24, 1978.

During this inspection, the IE inspector reviewed the corrective steps taken to prevent future recurrence and verified related correspondence and training records referenced by the licensee in the written response.

The IE inspec-tor observed that follow up audits, re'tating to corrective action initiated by the principle contractors, are scheduled for the first week in October. The IE inspector had no further questions regarding this matter.

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(Closed) Potential Construction Deficiency Report (50-382/78-08):

Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve.

A deficiency relating to a stem failure of a Class 2, 4 inch, 150# motor operated valve which oc-curred at the Arkansas Power and Light, ANO, Unit 2 facility and of a similar designed system, was determined by the licensee not to be a reportable deficiency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e).

The infoma-tion provided by the licensee is contained in a letter sent to the Region IV Director, dated August 17, 1978 (LPL 9386).

The IE inspector concurs with the licensee's evaluation.

(0 pen) Construction Deficiency (50-382/78-08):

Emergency Diesel Generator - Governor Drive Shaft and Spring Defects.

By cover letter dated August 17, 1978, the licensee provided the Region IV staff an interim report describing the specific ' deficiencies.

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During this inspection, the IE inspector was informed that replace-ment of parts on the diesel generator will be accomplished in mid-September; however, a final report will not be issued until December 30, 1978. This matter will remain open pending NRC review of the final report.

3.

Potential Construction Deficiency - Electrical Penetrations On August 28, 1978, the licensee informed the Region IV staff by telephone that a potential construction deficiency exists regarding broken swage nuts on Conax Electrical Penetration No.148.

The swage nuts have been pulled loose from the mounting brackets for the terminal block assembly on the secondary section.

During this inspection, the IE inspector conducted a visual examination of

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the defective assembly.

In addition, the IE inspector reviewed non-conformance reports No. W3-1010 and W3-1018, dated August 23, 1978, which indicate similar defects were identified on Penetrations No.

137 and 139.

The licensee is contacting the manufacturer for correc-tive action.

This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent site inspection.

4.

Structural Steel - Containment a.

Structural Steel - Welding The IE inspector reviewed the welded connections of four structural steel beams to shear plates and to embedded plates.

The connections involved were 123C1, 123C6, 123C7 and 123D1 at elevation +21 feet.

The observed connections were checked for weld size, weld contour and shear plate dimensions.

These characteristics were verified and found to be in accordance with Peden Steel Drawings C-3496-N, Sheet 123 and C-3496-N, Sheet E17.

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b.

Structural Steel Inspection The IE inspector also observed the ultrasonic examination (UT)

of three structural welds of beams to columns at elevation +21 feet.

The welds involved were:

Beam to Column 14301 73D16 149D2 62D9 139D2 73D16 The examinations were observed to be in accordance with Peabody Procedure IPUT-408.

The UT inspector qualifications and the UT instrument calibration were reviewed and found to be current.

c.

Housekeeping During observation of work activities (on 9/7) related to structural steel erection, the IE inspector noted the following:

(1)

Planking being utilized by American Bridge as temporary scaffolding was not identified as being flame retardant.

(2)

Protective covers installed on two safety related fan /

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cooler units, stored in place, inside containment were fabricated from plastic and plywood, which were not identifiable as flame retardant.

Section D-7 of contract W3-NY-16

" Erection of Main and Mis-cellaneous Structural Steel and Performance of Related Work "

states in part that, "The use of wood and other combustible material will be restricted on site.

Inside the Plant Island

Structure and within 50' of the exterior of the structure, all

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gang boxes, tool boxes, scaffolding and scaffold board, temp-orary protective enclosures..., must be constructed of an approved fire retardant treated wood or metal...."

During this inspection, it could not be verified from records on site, that the above mentioned materials were either treated for flame retardancy or were untreated.

The protective covers on the two fan units were replaced with protective covers known to be flame retardant.

Records research by Anerican Bridge personnel and a contact with the planking vendor by American Bridge personnel confirmed that the planking observed being installed inside containment had not been procurred as flame retardant.

This is considered an item of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

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HVAC Supports The IE ins'pactor' reviewed the installation and inspection records for twelve HVAC supports.

l Support No.

Reviewed Records Observed in Field F334-X X

F619 X

X F620 X

X F660 X

X F662 X

X F663 X

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F748 X

F749 X

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F750 X

F751 X

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F1592 X

X F1606 X

5even of the installed hangers were observed in the field and weld sizes were verified to b'e in accord with detail drawings.

Qualification' records for eight welders and six QC inspectors were

reviewed and found to be in accordance with Waldinger Procedures FQCP 9.1-1 and SQCP 2.1-1, respectively.

The IE inspector also reviewed Waldinger HVAC support fabrication shop activities.

During this review, the IE inspector observed weld repair of base metal for supports.

Subsequent review deter-mined that repair of base metal was being perfomed without a precedure.

The licensee and contractor were infomed that the repairing of base metal of safety related equipment without a pro-cedure appeared to be in noncompliance with Criterion V to 10 CFR 50,

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Appendix B.

The contractor site QA Supervisor issued a "Stop-l Work Order" at 2:00 p.m., September 6,1978, to stop the repair of base metal in the fabrication shop.

Subsequently, by September 8,1978, the contractor had developed

Procedure FWP 2.2-6, " Fabrication -- Correction Methods," which speaks to the control of weld repair of' base metal.

During the review of the above matter, the IE inspector and con-tJactor determined that cause of damage to the base metal was poor f

control of air arc gouging of a weld.

The Waldinger Site QA Super-visor infonned the IE inspector that consideration is being given

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to methods of better controlling arc gouging.

This matter is

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considered unresolved pending IE review of the measures developed to better control are gouging to protect base metal.

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Site Tour

,, The IE inspectors walked through various areas of the site to observe

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construction activities in progress and to inspect housekeeping and equipment storage.

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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more infonnation is required

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in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations.

One item relating to control of air are gouging is identified in paragraph 5.

8.

Exit Interview The IE inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 8,1978.

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The IE inspectors sunnarized the scope and findings of the inspection.

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