IR 05000369/2012301

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Er 05000369-12-301, 05000370-12-301, August 20 - 28, 2012 & September 5, 2012; McGuire Nuclear Plant, Units 1 &2, Operator License Examinations
ML12297A295
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/22/2012
From: Widmann M
Division of Reactor Safety II
To: Capps S
Duke Energy Corp
References
50-369/12-301, 50-370/12-301
Download: ML12297A295 (13)


Text

October 22, 2012

SUBJECT:

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION

REPORT 05000369/2012301 AND 05000370/2012301

Dear Mr. Capps:

During the period August 20 - 28, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

administered operating tests to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate the McGuire Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. At the conclusion of the tests, the examiners discussed preliminary findings related to the operating tests and the written examination submittal with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report. The written examination was administered by your staff on September 5, 2012.

All applicants passed both the operating test and written examination. There was one post-administration comment concerning the operating test. This comment, and the NRC resolution of this comment, is summarized in Enclosure 2. A Simulator Fidelity Report is included in this report as Enclosure 3.

The initial examination submittal was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination. All examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and your staff were made according to NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 9, Supplement 1.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 997-4550.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief

Operations Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No.: 50-369, 50-370 License No.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Enclosures:

1. Report Details 2. Facility Comments and NRC Resolution 3. Simulator Fidelity Report

REGION II==

Docket No.:

50-369, 50-370

License No.:

NPF-9, NPF-17

Report No.:

05000369/2012301 and 05000370/2012301

Licensee:

Duke Power

Facility:

McGuire Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location:

Huntersville, NC 28078

Dates:

Operating Test - August 20 - 28, 2012

Written Examination - September 5, 2012

Examiners:

M. Meeks, Chief Examiner, Senior Operations Engineer

G. Laska, Senior Operations Engineer

D. Lanyi, Operations Engineer

Approved by:

Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief

Operations Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure 1

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

ER 05000369/2012301, 05000370/2012301; August 20 - 28, 2012 & September 5, 2012;

McGuire Nuclear Plant, Units 1 &2, Operator License Examinations.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) examiners conducted an initial examination in accordance with the guidelines in Revision 9, Supplement 1, of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements identified in 10 CFR §55.41, §55.43, and §55.45, as applicable.

Members of the McGuire Nuclear Plant staff developed both the operating tests and the written examination.

The NRC administered the operating tests during the period August 20 - 28, 2012. Members of the McGuire Nuclear Plant training staff administered the written examination on September 5, 2012. All applicants passed both the operating test and written examination. Thirteen applicants were issued licenses commensurate with the level of examination administered. One applicant will be issued a license once power plant experience requirements are met.

There was one post-examination comment.

No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA5 Operator Licensing Examinations

a. Inspection Scope

Members of the McGuire Nuclear Plant staff developed both the operating tests and the written examination. All examination material was developed in accordance with the guidelines contained in Revision 9, Supplement 1, of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." The NRC examination team reviewed the proposed examination. Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee were made per NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the examination materials.

The NRC reviewed the licensees examination security measures while preparing and administering the examinations in order to ensure compliance with 10 CFR §55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests.

The NRC examiners evaluated six Reactor Operator (RO) and eight Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicants using the guidelines contained in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered the operating tests during the period August 20 - 28, 2012.

Members of the McGuire Nuclear Plant training staff administered the written examination on September 5, 2012. Evaluations of applicants and reviews of associated documentation were performed to determine if the applicants, who applied for licenses to operate the McGuire Nuclear Plant, met the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

The NRC determined, using NUREG-1021, that the licensees initial examination submittal was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.

Three generic weaknesses were identified by the NRC during administration of the operating tests, and were discussed at the exit meeting. The first weakness involved the coordination of operators performing concurrent actions to restore main feedwater and condensate flow using procedure EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK. The second weakness involved operators introducing unnecessary extreme challenges to the INTEGRITY critical safety function by failing to adequately control auxiliary feedwater flow to a faulted steam generator. The final issue involved operators misunderstanding integrated plant response during a pressurizer steam space small break LOCA (i.e., similar to the 1979 accident at TMI-2).

Copies of all individual examination reports were sent to the facility Training Manager for evaluation of weaknesses and determination of appropriate remedial training.

The licensee submitted one post-examination comment concerning the operating test.

A copy of the final written examinations and answer keys, with all changes incorporated, may be accessed not earlier than September 10, 2014, in the ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Number(s) ML12275A383 and ML12275A390). The licensees post-examination comment may be accessed in the ADAMS system as ML12275A393.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On August 29, 2012, the NRC examination team discussed generic issues associated with the operating test with Mr. C. Morris, Plant Manager, and members of the McGuire Nuclear Plant staff. The examiners asked the licensee if any of the examination material was proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

S. Capps, Site Vice President
C. Morris, Plant Manager
D. Brewer, Organizational Effectiveness Manager
P. Schuerger, Training Manager
D. Brenton, Operations Manager
L. Sarratt, Shift Operations Manager
R. Pope, Operations Training Manager
W. Killette, Operations Exam Team Supervisor
K. Ashe, Regulatory Compliance Manager
S. Helms, Initial Licensed Operator Training Supervisor
S. Mosteller, Operations Department Representative on Operations Exam Team
C. Fletcher, Operations Exam Team Lead

NRC personnel

J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector

FACILITY POST-EXAMINATION COMMENTS AND NRC RESOLUTIONS

A complete text of the licensees post-examination comments can be found in ADAMS under

Accession Number ML12275A393.

Item

Job Performance Measure C, Remove Pressurizer Heaters From Service

Comment

The licensee recommends that JPM C step 19 not be graded as a critical step.

JPM C step 19 (procedure step 3.4.4.10), is listed as a critical step on the final revision. Step

is NOT a critical step.

The critical task is placing the [Pressurizer] PZR Pressure Master Controller in AUTO in step

20. If the applicant fails to lower the output signal in MANUAL in step 19 to cause the C PZR

spray valves to close, going to AUTO on the PZR Pressure Master Controller in step 20 has

the same effect. Output will lower causing the C PZR Heaters to cycle on and the Spray

Valves receive a signal to close. Since there is no consequence to performing step 19

incorrectly, it is NOT a critical step.

NRC Resolution

The licensees recommendation was accepted. JPM C step 19 will not be evaluated as a

critical step in the JPM, because there were no adverse consequences, or an adverse impact to

completion of the assigned task, associated with incorrect performance of JPM C step 19.

Correctly setting the PZR Pressure Master Controller to AUTO in the next JPM step will

mitigate any incorrect performance of the previous step.

SIMULATOR FIDELITY REPORT

Facility Licensee: McGuire Nuclear Plant

Facility Docket No.: 05000369/2012301 and 05000370/2012301

Operating Test Administered: August 20 - 28, 2012.

This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit

or inspection findings and, without further verification and review in accordance with Inspection

Procedure 71111.11 are not indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.46. No licensee

action is required in response to these observations.

While conducting the simulator portion of the operating test, examiners observed the following:

Item

Description

OAC Communication Error

During prep week, simulator went to freeze due to a

communication problem between the OAC and the main simulator

module. Documented in PIP M-12-06735.

C Presssurizer Heater

Breaker

During prep week, an alarm did not annunciate as expected

associated with a trip of the C Pressurizer Heater breaker.

Documented in ILT SDR 68.

CRT in the OATC area

During the exam, a CRT (monitor) in the OATC area failed

(displayed a blank screen) several times during simulator scenario

administration. This monitor was replaced by the simulator

support staff. Documented in SDR 501.

Various EMTs

During the exam, on one occasion three radiation monitor modules

(EMTs) required replacement between simulator scenarios.

Documented in SDR 502.

High Temperature Alarms

Unexpectedly Annunciate

post-pump start

During both prep week and the exam, unexpected high

temperature alarms were received following pump starts (e.g., the

1A1 Component Cooling Water {KC} pump) during simulator

scenarios. Operations training personnel (running the simulator at

the time) stated a special file was being used to correctly model

the temperatures. This file appeared to be ineffective.

Documented in SDR 494.

SR Audio Count Rate

speaker

During the exam, after performing one simulator JPM and

resetting the simulator in order to start the next JPM, the Source

Range audio count rate speaker was found making spurious

noises (static), and required adjustment by the simulator support

staff to resolve the issue. Documented in SDR 503.

Containment Pressure

Instrument Channels

During the exam, while performing one of the simulator JPMs, it

was noted that the containment pressure parameter was not

trending as expected. The issue was later associated with the

auxiliary feed water flow rates provided to a faulted steam

generator in order to establish initial conditions for the simulator

JPM. Documented in PIP M-12-06735.

1B Diesel Generator

Cooler Bypass Valve OAC

Alarm

During the exam, while performing one of the simulator JPMs, it

was noted that an OAC alarm associated with the 1B Diesel

Generator Cooler Bypass Valve unexpectedly annunciated when

the 1B Diesel Generator was started by the applicants.

Documented in ILT SDR 66.