IR 05000354/1982007
| ML20062C275 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1982 |
| From: | Bateman W, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062C244 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354-82-07, 50-354-82-7, NUDOCS 8208050214 | |
| Download: ML20062C275 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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Region I Report No. 50-354R2-07 Docket No. 50-354 License No.
CPPR-120 Priority Category A
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Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza - 17C Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: lipp_e_Cteek Generating Station, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey Inspection conducted: June 1 - July 5,1982 ff F> %
fnspectors: _
ateman, Senior Resident Inspector date signed
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W. H.
date signed date signed 7/M!NM
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Approved by:
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E. Tr 3, Chief, Projects Section 2A
' date signed Inspection Summary: Unit 1 Inspection of June 1-July 5, 1982 (Report No. 50-354/82-07):
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Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspector (117 hours0.00135 days <br />0.0325 hours <br />1.934524e-4 weeks <br />4.45185e-5 months <br />)
l of work in progress including reactor pressure vessel internals installation, pipe and
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hanger installation, concrete placement, electrical penetration installation, structural l
steel erection, formwork and rebar erection, spent fuel pool assembly, material and equip-
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ment storage, HVAC ductwork installation, concrete panel wall anchoring details, and housekeeping and fire protection. The inspector also mi.de tours of the site, reviewed NDE records, reviewed qualifications of HVAC QC inspectors, reviewed control rod drive mechanism housing weld procedures and related documentation, evaluated licensee action t
l on previous inspection findings, and reviewed licensee action on construction deficiency reports.
Results:
Violations:
Three (failure to bend test shear connector automatically welded studs in accordance with AWS D1.1 Code requirements as described in paragraph 3;
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8208050214 820722 PDR ADOCK 05000354 i
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G PDR Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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Inspection Summary
failure of HVAC contractor to comply with QC personnel qualification and certification requirements as described in paragraph 4; and failure to follow procedure requiring an excavation permit prior to drilling expansion anchor bolt holes to a depth equal to or greater than 6" as described in paragraph 5).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)
A. Barnabei, Site QA Engineer R. Bravo, Principal Construction Engineer G. Dalton, Senior Construction Engineer A. E. Giardino, Project QA Engineer P. Kudless, Project Construction Manager A. Nassman, Manager,QA Engineering and Construction Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
8. Bain, Lead Welding Engineer A. J. Bryan, Project QC Engineer W. Dorman, Assistant Project Field Engineer M. Drucker, Lead Site QA Engineer D. Gillis,- Assistant Project Superintendent R. Hanks, Project QC Engineer M. Henry, Project Field Engineer D. Long, Project Superintendent R. Mackey, Resident Project Engineer J. R. McCoy, Lead Contracts QC Engineer G. Moulton, Project QA Engineer D. Sakers, Assistant Project QC Engineer J. Serafin, Assistant Project Field Engineer D. Stover, Project Superintendent, Contract Administration S. Vezendy, Lead Welding QC Engineer General Electric Installation and Services Engineering (GEI&SE)
R. Burke, Site Project Manager M. Hart, Site QC Supervisor General Electric Nuclear Energy Business Operations (GENEB0)
J. Cockroft, Site Engineer C. Brinson, Site QA Engineer J. Rich Steers b.7)_
T. Hughes, Site Project Superintendent M. Russell, Site QC Supervisor J. Saums, Sponser Engineer W-H Constructors (W-H)
S. Herschman, Corporate QA Manager M. Wita, Site QC Manager Reactor Controls, Inc. (RCI)
J. Benedetti, Site QC Supervisor
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2.
Site Tour Routine inspections were made to observe the status of work and construction activities in progress. The inspector noted the presence of and interviewed QC and construction personnel.
Inspection personnel were observed performing
required inspections and those interviewed were knowledgeable in their work activities. Work items were examined for obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory requirements or license conditions. Areas inspected included pipe and hanger installation, structural steel erection, maintenance and storage of equipment and materials in and adjacent to the power block, cable tray and support installation, HVAC ductwork and support installation, house-keeping and fire protection, formwork and rebar erection, and concrete curing activities.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Safety Related Structures (Welding) - Observation of Work and Work Activities j
The inspector inspected the automatically welded studs used as shear connectors
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on slab support beams at elevation 201'-0" inside the reactor building cylinder
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wall. The inspector noted that none of the studs had been bend tested in accordance with the requirements of AWS D1.1, Structural Welding Code p The beams were supplied by Lakeside Bridge and Steel do aragraphs to 4.29 and 4.30.
the requirements of Bechtel Specification C-151(Q), Furnishing, Detailing, Fabricating and-Delivering of Structural Steel for Primary Containment, Rev. 2.
This specification required that all welding be done in accordance with AWS D1.1 requirements, however, it did not specifically address stud welding.
The licensee informed the inspector that the beams under discussion were not
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originally included as part of the C-151(Q) specification but were part of the C-131(Q) specification. Because of unrelated problems with the C-131(Q)
maining under C-131(Q)pplier than C-151(Q)), the balance of material re-supplier (different su was reawarded to the C-151(Q) supplier. These beams were part of the new work under C-151(Q) and were the first encounter Lakeside Bridge had with stud welding under the C-151(Q) specification.
The particular AWS D1.1 bend test requirements are as follows:
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Paragraph 4.29.1.1 requires bend testing to 300 the.first two stud shear connectors welded on each beam and then inspecting the stud welds.
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Paragraph 4.30.1 requires bend testing to 15 any stud shear connector
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that does not exhibit a full 3600 weld fillet and then inspecting the weld.
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Various courses of action are specified by the AWS Code depending on the results of the bend tests. As of the end of this inspection report period, representatives from Lakeside Bridge were onsite performing bend tests under the cognizance of Bechtel QC personnel.
The failure of Lakeside Bridge to bend test the shear connector automatically welded studs on the floor support beams at elevation 201'-0" in accordance with AWS D1.1 Code requirements and the failure of the Bechtel Supplier Quality Representative to identify this violation prior to authorizing shipment of the beams, is contrary to Criterion VII of Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 and is an
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item of noncompliance.
(354/82-07-01)
4.
Qualification of Inspection Personnel In NRC Inspection Report 82-06, the inspector discussed the results of a review of the qualification records of Bechtel and JRS QC personnel.
It was also stated that W-H was a contractor performing safety related activities onsite. During this inspection report period the inspector completed a re-view of the qualification records of W-H QC i,nspection personnel. This re-view disclosed that W-H failed to comply with the requirements of their own QA Manual and ANSI N45.2.6 regarding qualification and certification of QC inspection personnel. The following particular problems were identified:
(1) Personnel training and indoctrination was inadequate to non-existent.
(2) Some inspectors' records lacked a statement clarifying the activities they were certified to perfonn.
(3) A Level II inspector elevated to Level III did not meet minimum requirements for education and experience.
(4) Qualification and certification of some Level II personnel was based on written and practical examinations that were incorrectly graded.
The incorrect grading resulted in grades higher than those actually achieved.
The above problems serve to indicate that W-H corporate and site QA management was not effectively administering and managing the QA/QC program requirements for qualifications and certification of QC inspection personnel.
The inspector notified the licensee of his concerns.
After a brief review of the W-H records to confirm the NRC inspector's findings, Bechtel issued W-H an order to stop wor i
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4 The failure of W-H to adhere to the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6 and their own QA manual regarding qualification and certification of QC personnel is contrary to Criterion V of Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 and is an item of non-compliance.
(354/82-07-02)
Determinations and actions taken by the licensee, Bechtel, and W-H subsequent i
to the violation include but are not.imited to the following:
(1) W-H work was stopped.
(2) W-H QC inspection personnel underwent required indoctrination and training.
(3)
Resumes of W-H QC inspection personnel were evaluated and it was determined that all personnel certified Level II had sufficient education and experience for a Level II certification and, there-
fore, did not need to be qualified by examination and/or capability
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demonstration.
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(4)
It was detennined that the Level III QC Supervisor did not have sufficient education and experience and was promptly downgraded to Level II.
(5) Upon completion of correctly qualifying and certifying W-H QC personnel, work was resumed.
i (6) On 6/28/82,Bechtel QC assumed first line QC inspection responsi-bilities for all new work performed by W-H.
All work started previous to this date remains the responsibility of W-H QC.
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Eventually, all of W-H's work will be totally inspected by Bechtel QC.
(7) Qualifications of W-H shop QC personnel were under review.
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(8) Bechtel will perform final ductwork acceptance air tests of all ductwork.
(9) Bechtel will review all of the QC documentation completed by W-H.
The inspector considers the action taken at the time of the identification of the violation and subsequent action taken to date, to be appropriate and responsive.
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5.
Structural Concrete - Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector reviewed the various drawings, FCR's, FCN's and DCN's relating to methods used to anchor poured concrete panel walls to existing reinforced concrete walls. The Bechtel drawings reviewed included:
C-302-0, Rev. 11
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C-1509-0, Rev. 4
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C-0303-0, Rev. 25
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The inspector then observed work in progress to ensure consistency with drawing requirements. Detail 3 on drawing C-0302-0, Rev.11 permits the use of expansion anchor bolts (EAB's) with a minimum 6" projection from the reinforced concrete wall as a method for connecting the sides of poured panel walls to existing walls. This detail was in use for several panel walls at elevation 102' between column lines R and S at the diesel generator /
controlbuildinginterface.
The inspector noted that "T" size EAB's were in use and that 6" A projection existed.
"T" size EAB's are 12" long thus implying an EAB hole depth of at least 6" into the reinforced concrete wall.
Bechtel procedure SWP/P-C-4, Rev. 5, Installation of Expansion Type Concrete Anchors, requires, in paragraph 7.2.6, an excavation pennit prior to drilling an EAB hole to a depth equal to or greater than 6".
The inspector asked the Responsible Discipline Field Engineer (individual responsible for obtaining the excavation pennit) if the inspector could re-view the excavation permits.
It was determined at this time that no ex-cavation permits had been issued. The field engineer stated that he had told supervision to limit EAB hole depth to less than 6".
The failure of Bechtel to follow the requirement in SWP/P-C-4 to obtain an excavation permit prior to drilling an EAB hole to a depth equal to or greater than 6" is contrary (to Criterion V of Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 and is an item of noncompliance.
354/82-07-03)
Subsequent to identification of this violation, Bechtel engineering reviewed in process and completed panel walls to identify all the locations where "T" size EAB's were used. The as-built drawings for the reinforced concrete walls into which the EAB holes were drilled, were examined to determine if any embedded conduit or pipe existed in the area of hole drilling. This review determined there were no problems. At the end of the inspection report period, activity was continuing to mechanically limit the depth
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a hole could be drilled and to determine the cause of the communication problem between field engineering and project supervision.
6.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (354/82-03-01): Licensee to clarify position on NDE of ASME III Subsection NF Class 1 fillet welds. The licensee issued PSAR Change Notice No. 229 to ammend the PSAR commitment for NDE of NF Class 1 fillet welds.
In particular, the Code commitment for NDE of Class 1 fillet welds was changed from ASME III 1974, Winter '74 Addenda to ASME III
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1977, Winter '78 Addenda. The later edition of the Code, which has been accepted by the NRC, recognizes that volumetric examination of fillet welds is not practical. In lieu of volumetric examination, the later edition re-quires either MT or PT. The inspector had no further questions and considers the item closed.
l (0 pen) Unresolved Item (354/82-05-04):
Lack of a well defined and understood definition of the GENEB0/Bechtel jurisdiction at NSSS boundaries. The in-spector reviewed the NDE records for the weld of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) drain line to RPV nozzle N-12 located at the bottom of the vessel.
The following documents were part of the review:
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GE drawing 197R628, Rev. 12
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Bechtel QCIR P-1-BG-641-1-Pl.10
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Bechtel QCIR P-1-BG-641-1-T1.10
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Bechtel FSK P-1-BG-641, Rev. 2 Bechtel Test Report P-1000-1-BG-06
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As a result of this review,it was apparent that a conflict existed between the NDE performed on the weld by Bechtel and that required to be performed by GE.
In particular, note 7 on the above listed GE drawing required a PT of the root pass and the final accessible surface. The Bechtel inspection report indicated that only the final surface was PT'd.
The inspector questioned Bechtel as to why the root PT was not performed and was told that Bechtel NDE requirements applied to the weld since they made the weld.
The Bechtel hDE requirements did not include a root PT which is consistent with ASME Code requirements. The inspector then questioned GE to determine if this position was acceptable to them. The result of the discussions emphasized the point of the original unresolved item that Bechtel and GE must agree who has jurisdiction at NSSS boundaries.
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The inspector considers this unresolved item open until the jurisdictional boundary conflict is resolved.
7.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee On June 7, 1982, the licensee reported a potential significant construction deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) involving a Part 21 report from Colt Industries.
The Part 21 report from Colt Industries reported a potential problem with Robertshaw Controls 5" and 6" thermostatic valves in that a nut which controls valve overrun may not be soldered in place. The failure to lock the nut in position could result in the nut moving and permitting the control valve to over open thus possibly overcooling the diesel engine. The licensee examined the Robertshaw valves on the only onsite diesel and determined that the valve nuts were correctly
soldered. Colt Industries and the Bechtel Supplier Quality Representative at Colt Industries will ensure all future diesels sent to the site contain
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the correct Robertshaw valves. Based on their findings and provisions made for diesels to be shipped, the licensee withdrew this item as not reportable.
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The inspector concurs that this item is not reportable and considers it closed.
(354/82-00-03)
8.
Reactor Vessel Internals - Observation of Work Activities and Review of Procedures During this inspection report period, welding of the incore instrument housings to their stub tubes continued. Welding of the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) housings to stub tubes in the bottom of the RPV commenced.
The weld sequence to accomplish this weld included three root passes by
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manual GTAW process and GTAW weld out using a Magnatech Series 400 auto-matic pipe welding system. The inspector witnessed welding and inspection activities of both the incore housing and CRDM housing welding.
The inspector reviewed the following documents relative to welding of the
CRDM housings:
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GEI&SE WPS HC5001W, Rev. 5
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GEI&SE WPS HC5001D, Rev. 5
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l GEI&SE PQR ISE-PQ-504, Rev. 5
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GEI&SE WPS HC4010W, Rev. 1
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GEI&SE PQR ISE-PQ-42, Rev. 0
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GEI&SE WPS HC4010D, Rev. 1
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GEI&SE Site Mockup Procedure 17MU-1, Rev. 1, CRD Housing to Stub Tube GEI&SE WPS HC5003W
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Calibration Data for Magnatech Series 400 Welding Machines with
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Serial No.'s 337, 338, and 339
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GENEB0 Dwg. 197R628, Rev. 12 GENEB0 Welding Specification 22A4202
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Individual welder qualifications were reviewed and found satisfactory.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Structural Concrete - Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector observed concrete preplacement, placement, and post-placement activities of several wall pours by Bechtel and two slab pours by JRS.
In completeness of rebar installation, formwork integrity, chute particular, height of free drop of concrete, concrete temperature and slump, location, cleanliness of construction joint and other areas in the pour, and avail-ability of standby equipment were sampled to ensure conformance to drawings and jobsite specifications.
QC personnel were questioned as to details of placement including use of batch plant to point of discharge correlation data to accept concrete, proper use of vibrators to achieve consolidation, and provisions for covering up the placement in case of rain. Additionally, the inspector observed that concrete was being cured as required.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems In NRC Inspection Report 82-03,the inspector reviewed the attachment of ASME III NF Class 2 supports supporting the CRDM hydraulic piping to the
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non-safety related steel reactor vessel pedestal liner. The licensee informed the inspector at that time that Bechtel had identified and was pursuing a resolution of the problem. During this inspection report period, the inspector cbserved activities involving removal of the piping supports connected to the pedestal liner. Because the space available for access to the supports was limited due to the presence of the CRDM hydraulic pipe lines, care had to be taken not to damage the piping when burning off the supports. RCI inspection personnel were observed closely monitoring support removal. No problems relating to removal of the pipe supports were identified. Specific plans for replacement of the pipe supports were not finalized as of the inspector's last discussions with RCI personnel.
The inspector observed Bechtel's pipe hanger and support installation activities to ensure conformance of work to jobsite requirements. The inspection status of supplementary structural steel that had been welded and then covered with fire protection material was checked to ensure the inaccessible welds had been inspected.
Installed spring hangers were inspected to ensure they were blocked. Hanger spacing, use of correct diameter rod, material traceability markings, and quality of welding was also inspected.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Safety Related Welding - Arc Strikes During recent inspections of construction activities inside the drywell, the inspector noticed an increase in the number of arc strikes on hangers, pipe whip restraints, and structural members. The inspector discussed this problem with the licensee, Bechtel field welding personnel, and Bechtel supervision.
Because two NCR's had recently been written for arc strike damage to ASME III Class I piping, Bechtel field welding was in the process of writing a letter to Bechtel supervision specifying the steps to take to minimize arc strike damage. As of the end of this inspection report period the following steps had been or were being taken:
(1) When welding in limited access areas, coverup of areas adjacent to the weld groove is required.
f (2) A rollup of welding leads is required once per week.
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(3)
Program for identification, tracking, and removal of are strikes is being formulated.
(4) Each welder is required to rollup his lead after completing his welding in a given area.
(5) All welding leads are required to be disconnected each shift.
(6) All major power supply cables are being rerouted in more secure locations and a more centralized power distribution system is being organized.
(7) ASME Code piping and valves are being covered with protective material.
(8)
Supervision was instructed to emphasize to all welders the importance of minimizing arc strikes.
(9) Subcontractors were also instructed to take steps to minimize arc strikes.
The inspector identified evidence that indicated welders may have been removing their arc strikes by grinding. Because removal of an arc strike might require steps in addition to grinding, it was requested that welders not remove arc strikes unless controlled by the program that is being formulated for arc strike identification, tracking, and removal. Bechtel supervision was instructed to emphasize to all welders not to remove arc strikes unless removal was controlled.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
12.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee and contractor personnel at periodic in-tervals during this inspection report period at which time he summarized the scope and findings of his inspection activities.