IR 05000354/1982003
| ML20042C606 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1982 |
| From: | Bateman W, Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042C589 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354-82-03, 50-354-82-3, 50-355-82-02, 50-355-82-2, NUDOCS 8203310562 | |
| Download: ML20042C606 (10) | |
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U.S. fiUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTI0ft AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-354/82-03 Report No. 50-355/82-02 50-354 Docket No. 50-355
~ PP 61Y0 C
Category A
License No. CPPR-121 Priority
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Licensee: P.u bli c_S etv i c e_G ec ttigad_G aLC ompany 80 Park Plaza 17C Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey inspection conducted February 1 - 28, 1982 fnspectors:
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_jfffp W. H. Bateman, Senior Resident Inspector date signed date signed date signed Approved by:
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%_q E. G. Greenman, Chief, Projects Section 2A
'da te's i g ned Inspection Summary:
Un_it 1 Inspection of February _1
__28, 19_82 (Report No. 50-354/82-03):
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Areas inspected:
Routine unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspector (73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br />) of work in progress includirg Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS)
foundation cleanup operations, equipment maintenance and storage, structural steel erection inside the drywell, reactor pressure vessel (RPV) internals installation, bioshield welding and internal cleanliness, fire protection and housekeeping, rebar installation, and pipe, hanger, and valve handling, fitup, and welding. The inspector also made tours of the site, reviewed licencee action on previous inspection findings, and evaluated the system for material traceability of safety related pipe supports.
Resul ts: Nonccmpliances - nonc.
Unit 2_ Inspection of February 1 - 28_,_1982 (Report No. 50-355/82-02):
No safety inspection conducted - unit construction tenninated.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8203310562 820312 PDR ADOCK 05000354 O
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)
A. Barnabei, Site QA Engineer R. Bravo, Principal Construction Engineer A. E. Giardino, Froject QA Engineer P. Kudless, Project Construction Manager
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K. McJunkin, Senior Construction Engineer Bechtel P_o_wer Corporation (Bechtel)_
l B. Bain, Lead Welding Engineer
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A. J. Bryan, Assistant Project QC Engineer C. Colletto, Assistant Lead QCE Civil W. Dorman, Assistant Project Field Engineer M. Drucker, Lead Site QA Engineer R. Hanks, Project QC Engineer M. Henry, Project Field Engineer W. Hindle, Superintendent of Services R.' Mackey, Resident Project Engineer K. Mills, Lead QCE Mechanical G. Moulton, Project QA Engineer L. Rosetta, Field Construction Manager D. Sakers, Assistant Project QC Engineer J. Serafin, Assistant Project Field Engineer D. Stover, Project Superintendent, Contract Administration i
R. Tringale, Resident Project Engineer S. Vezendy, Lead Welding QC Engineer
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General Electric Installation and Services Engineering (GEI&SE)
R. Burke, Site Project Manager M. Hart, Site QC Supervisor
General Electric Nucl_ ear Energy Division (GENED)
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J. Cockroft, Site Engineer
C. Brinson, Site QA Engineer
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J. Rich Steers (Steersl
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M. Russell, Site QC Supervisor Reactor Controls, Inc. (RCI)
K. Aspinwall, Site Manager
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J. Benedetti, Site QA Supervisor l
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Site Tour Foutine inspections were made to observe the status of work and con-struction activities in progress. The inspector noted the presence of and interviewed QC and construction personnel.
Inspection personnel were ob-served performing required inspection and those interviewed were knowledgeable in their work activities. Work iteris were examined for obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory requiraments or license conditions. Areas inspected included:
Unit 1: Structural steel erection in the drywell, SWIS cleanup operations, bioshield welding, rebar installation, and housekeeping and fire protection.
l Unit 2: No site tours made - unit construction tenninated.
Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems The licensee is committed by PSAR to meet the requirements of the 1974 Edition
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of ASME III, Division 1-Subsection NF Code for component supports. Article NF-5000 of Subsection NF discusses NDE requirements and paragraph NF-5212 describes the particular NDE requirements for Class 1 linear type support l
welds. NF-5212 states in.part:
All full penetration butt welded joints, full penetration tee joints,
corner joints, and full fillet welds... shall be radiographed. When~
radiography does not yield meaningful examination results, ultrasonic examination shall be performed.
In addition, the weld... joint shall be examined by either the magnetic particle or liquid penetrant method.
This paragraph'further states that if volumetric examination cannot be per-formed then it is acceptable to examine the welds by either the magnetic particle or liquid penetrant methods.
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The inspector perfomed a survey of several Class 1 supports and their specified NDE requirements and determined that volumetric examination of full fillet welds was not planned. The inspector questioned the rationale for not perfoming the Code required volumetric examination of full fillet welds and was infomed that geometric considerations precluded obtaining meaningful results. The inspector agreed with this rationale in most cases, but stated that volumetric examinations of certain geometries were needed to demonstrate that meaningful results could not be obtained. Susbsequent dis-cussions on this subject between the inspector, the licensee, Bechtel, and other NRC personnel resulted in the detemination that the Winter 1978 Addenda to the 1977 Edition of ASME III Subsection NF Code changed the NDE requirements for Class 1 support welds.
Paragraph NF-5211 states:
(a) All full penetration br+.t welded joints in primary members shall be examined by the radiographic method.
(b) All other welded joints in primary members shall be examined by the liquid penetrant or magnetic particle method.
The change in Code required NDE for Class 1 supports from 1972 to 1978 to perform volumetric examination of all full penetration butt welded joints, full penetration tee joints, corner joints, and full fillet welds, to radiography of all full penetration butt welded joints indicates that ASME detemined the 1974 NF Class 1 NDE requirements were not practical.
(One point mentioned during discussions was the definition of a full fillet weld and whether er not Class 1 supports were designed using full fillets.
This subject was not pursued because the licensee intended to take a con-servative approach and assume all fillets were full for the purpose of detemining NDE requirements.)
The licensee is presently comitted to the Class 1 NDE requirements as stated in Subsection NF of the 1974 ASME III Code. - As described above a later edition of Subsection NF changed the NDE requirements for Class 1 supports. This later edition has received NRC endorsement. The NDE requirements in the later edition appear to be consistent with those planned at this site. This is an unresolved item pending a licensee decision to either follow their original PSAR comitment, i.e., to perfom NDE of Class 1 supports per 1974 Subsection NF requirements, or to modify the PSAR to comit to perfom NDE of Class 1 supports per the 1977 Code, Winter of 1978 Addenda, Subsection NF requirements.
(354/82-03-01)
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (354/80-14-02):
Failure to establish a code, standard, or procedura as a basis for installation and inspection and failure to properly qualify a welding procedure prior to starting welding of the CRDM housing support brackets. The licensee responses to this noncompliance stated the following:
(1) AWS was the code basis for the subject welds as stated on GENEBG Drawing No. 761E724, Rev. 6.
(2) Welding to ASME welding requirements was acceptable provided that a mockup was conducted to determine and compensate for lack of penetration caused by the skewed tee joint configuration.
The inspector reviewed the following documentation as part of the closeout action for this item:
(1)
GENEBG Field Deviation Disposition Request (FDDR) KT1-042 Rev. 0 and Rev. 1 (2)
GENEBG Drawing No. 761E724. Rev. 6. "CRD Housing Support" (3)
GENEBG letter to Bechtel GB-80-198 dated 8/28/30 from Larrew to Morris (4) GEI&SE Detail Weld Procedure HC79-1000D, Rev. 2 (5) GEI&SE Procedure Qualification ISE-PQ-102, Rev. 1 Item (3) above contained the designer's (GENEBG) statement that CRD support beam seats, beams, rods, and CRD restraint beams were to be installed in accordance with AWS D1.1 except welding procedures could be in accordance with ASME Section IX.
Items (4) and (5) above tcgether formed a properly qualified ASME welding procedure to make the welds.
Item (2) above clearly stated that field welds and shop welds were to AWS D1.1 requirements. Re-vision 1 to Item (1) above deleted the requirement for a mockup to determine lack of penetration.
Instead it required that the distance from the vee-groove root to the centerline of a welding electrode wedged into the vee-groove be assumed the amount of lack of penetration. This distance was then added to the design weld size and resulted in the final acceptable weld size.
The diameter of the electrode used in the determination was the maximum size used. The vee-groove geometry was formed by a skewed tee joint.
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Based on satisfactory review of action taken on this issue and licensee performance since its original identification, this item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (354/81-04-03):
Licensee to determine cause of thread damage to skewed bolts used in assembly of drywell structural steel, how these bolts became skewed, and the apparent relaxation of bolt tension
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after final tensioning operation.
Investigations by tSe licensee deter-mined that four connections contained bolts skewed in excess of AISC criteria and that these connections were made prior to identification of the hydraulic jacking problem discussed in NRC Inspection Repcrt 80-19.
It was, therefore, the licensee's contention that the thread damage and skewing were caused by improper bolting practices that have since been corrected. The licensee removed all the A490 bolts in the four affected connections and reassembled them where possible using new bolts and beveled washers. Where this was not possible the connections were welded. NCR's were generated as necessary to address damage sustained by the base metal. All misalignments since the hydraulic jacking problem have been resolved by either:
(1) Reaming the holes up to a maximum of 3/16" increase in diameter
and using oversized bolts, or
(2) Welding.the connection.
The licensee consulted with Lehigh University on the damaged 1h" A490 bolt threads that were identified on site. These particular bolts were sent to I
the Fritz Engineering Laboratory at Lehigh University. The results of the j
Lehigh analysis indicated that "... the damaged threads should not adversely influence the behav;or of these bolts in shear provided they can be installed
in the joint." The report also stated that establishment of bolt pretension by torquing is in reality not a requirement for bearing type connections to function properly. (The connections involved are bearing type connections.)
The inspector reviewed the various documents associated with this item and inspected the physical condition of the bolted connections. As a result of this inspection, the inspector had no further questions and this item
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is closed.
(Closed) Noncompliance (354/81-18-01):
Recurrent failure of GEI&SE to con-trol issuance of weld filler metal in accordance with procedure requirements.
GEI&SE, as a result of this item, elected to modify their filler metal issue procedure. The inspector reviewed the new procedure and its implementation
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and determined both to be satisfactory. The inspector also reviewed per-sonnel training reccrds documenting that affected personnel here trained in the workings of the new procedure. GEI&SE also implemented a procedure to indoctrinate all supervisory and QA personnel in a review of all site GEI&SE applicable NCR's, Corrective Action Requests (CAR's), and NRC Violations.
Based on the effective corrective action taken, which in large part has resulted from the recent appointment of a more experienced and effective GEI&SE QC supervisor, this item is closed.
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Reactor Vessel Internals - Observation of Work and Work Activities During this inspection report period, the shroud and core support plate were installed inside the RPV. Just prior to this activity, flow instrumen-tation lines were leak and drop tested. After shroud set an optical measuring device was set up to use for final shroud alignment prior to making the con-necting weld between the shroud and shroud support ledge. The optical measuring device was also used to monitor movement of the shroud during welding. The inspector witnessed setup, alignment, and use of the optical measuring device and welding of portions of the root pass of the shroud to shroud support ledge. Additionally, the inspector questioned GEI&SE production and QA personnel to determine understanding of their assigned tasks. The inspector also witnessed correct implementation of the filler metal control procedure, adequate RPV access cMtrol, and satisfactory cleanliness control.
As part of a documentation review the inspector reviewed the following items associated with the welding of the shroud to shroud support ledge:.
(1) GEI&SE Weld Procedure Specification HC40010, Rev. 4 (2) GEI&SE Procedure Qualification Record ISE-PQ-407 (3) gel &SE welder qualifications for two of the five welders welding the joint (4) GEI&SE Travelers hcl-11-T-1 and hcl-11-T-1R1 (5) GEI&SE Joint Process Control Sheet HC1-11-J-1 The inspector found the above documents satisfactory as regards conformance to ASME IX Code and GEI&SE QA Manual requirements.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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6.
Safety Related Pipe, Hanger, Valye, and Pump Installation - Observation _of_
Work and Work Activities The. inspector observed handling, fitup, in-process welding, and completed welding of safety related piping, hangers, valves, and pumps. QCIR's and weld filler metal issue slips were examined for correct signoff, consistent dates, completeness, and proper posting. When accessibility permitted ob-servation, pipe internal cleanliness was verified.
In most cases it was evident that preventive maintenance activities were continuir.g after in-sta11ation of valves and pumps in the power block. The inspector notified the licensee in those cases he identified where preventive maintenance was lacking or nearby construction activity had caused a problem. Prompt corrective action was taken to correct these discrepancies. Finished welds were visually examined and areas adjacent to finished welds were observed for arc strikes. The finished welds were found visually acceptable and no l
arc strikes were found. A sampling of as-built hanger configurations were compared to design drawing requirements and found acceptable. Check valves were verified to be installed in the correct direction of flow.
The inspector questioned crafts as to cold pulling limitations and in-structions they have received on this and other pipe fitting practices.
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The crafts questioned were knowledgeable of the jobsite requirements.
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Because many of the inspection steps on QCIR's are on a surveillance basis,
the inspector questioned QC inspectors and reviewed QCIR's to determine if a reasonable amount of surveillance inspection was being performed. The inspector determined that a high percentage of surveillance inspections were being witnessed.
The inspector questioned the attachment of ASME III NF Class 2 supports supporting CRDM hydraulic piping to the non-safety related steel reactor-.
vessel pedestal liner. Based on program requirements, it is not permissable to attach a safety related support to a non-safety related structure. The licensee informed the inspector that Bechtel had previously identified this problem and was pursuing a resolution.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Safety-Related Structures - Observation of Work and Work Activities _
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The inspector observed welding activities in progress on the upper biological shield (bioshield). The majority of the welding required to completely ass ~ mble e
this structure has been completed. The inspector visually examined a-sampling l
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of completed welds and determined that AWS D1.1 criteria were met for. weld quality. He also observed in-process welding of a penetration into its design position in the upper bioshield. During this inspection activity, the inspector noted accumulations of trash in various areas in the annular space bounded by the bioshield inner and outer walls. The inspector also noted that as each penetration was welded into place, access for observa-tion of cleanliness and cleanup, if required, became increasingly difficult.
The upper bioshield annular space is designed to be filled with high density concrete for raciation shielding. Based on this consideration, the-inspector informed the licensee of his concern over the accumulation of trash and eventual difficulty performing effective cleanup of the space prior to con-crete placement. The licensee shared the inspector's concern and commited
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to thorough cleanup prior to concrete placement.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Material Traceability of Component Supports The inspector reviewed onsite storage of component supports and bulk materials used as part of component supports. The requirements for material traceability are contained in Subsection NF of the 1974 ASME III Code.
Various Bechtel site documents explain how the Code requirements are implemented. The follow-ing is a simplified summary of the Hope Craek system:
(1) Component standard supports for use inside the drywell are pur-chased as NF Class 1 and are color codel. Certified Material Test Reports (CMTR's) are required.
(2) Component supports for use inside the drywell are purchased or site fabricated to the rules of NF Class 1.
CMTR's are required.
(3) Component standard supports for use outside the drywell are purchased as NF Class 2 whether for use on Class 2 or Cle.,s 3 pipe. A Certificate of Compliance (C of C) is required for material. They are color coded by vendor.
(4) Bulk items such as U-bolts, nuts, clevises, and rods are pur-chased as NF Class 2 C of C is required.
(5) Class 2 material is required to have an identifying symbol-to enable, through use of the C of C and referenced documents, material identification.
(6) No bulk Class 1 material is kept onsite except for rods. C of C's are required for sizes up to 1" diameter and CMTR's are required for sizes 1" and greater in diameter.
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The inspector discussed implementation of this system with responsible site personnel. Although the system is complex, responsible individuals appeared to understand it. The inspector also observed proper implementation of the
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system for Class 2 supports as evidenced by unique markings on bulk items as well as on clamps, spring cans, snubbers, etc. that permitted material traceability through use of the applicable C of C.
CMTR's for certain
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Class 1 supports are being pursued in NRC Unresolved Item 81-18-04.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or items of noncompliance.
An unresolved item identified during the inspection is identified in para-graph 3, 10.
Exit Interview The' inspector met with licensee and contractor personnel at periodic in-
tervals during this inspection report period. At these times the inspector
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summarized the scope and findings of his inspection activities.
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