IR 05000352/2025010
| ML25069A592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/2025 |
| From: | Erin Carfang Division of Operating Reactors |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation |
| References | |
| IR 2025010 | |
| Download: ML25069A592 (1) | |
Text
March 11, 2025
SUBJECT:
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - COMPREHENSIVE ENGINEERING TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000352/2025010 AND 05000353/2025010
Dear David Rhoades:
On January 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, and discussed the results of this inspection with Michael Gillin, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 205550001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Erin E. Carfang, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 05000352 and 05000353 License Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000352 and 05000353
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000352/2025010 and 05000353/2025010
Enterprise Identifier: I-2025-010-0022
Licensee:
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
Facility:
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Sanatoga, PA
Inspection Dates:
January 13, 2025 to January 31, 2025
Inspectors:
C. Bickett, Senior Reactor Analyst
P. Cataldo, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Kulp, Senior Reactor Inspector
S. McClay, Reactor Inspector
D. McHugh, Reactor Inspector
A. Patel, Senior Reactor Inspector
B. Pinson, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Erin E. Carfang, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a comprehensive engineering team inspection at Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Diesel Generator Load Reject Surveillance Test Procedure Acceptance Criteria Not In Accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements.
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000352,05000353/2025010-01 Open/Closed
[H.3] - Change Management 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS)6.8.1.d, Procedures and Programs, when Constellation did not implement diesel generator load-reject surveillance requirements (SR) into their surveillance test acceptance criteria.
Specifically, they did not implement SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c into surveillance test procedure ST-6-092-324-2, D24 Diesel Generator LOCA/Load Reject Testing and Fast Start Operability Test Run. SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c verifies that emergency diesel generator (EDG) steady-state frequency is within the band of 59.8 to 60.8 Hz after rejection of a load greater than or equal to the single largest post-accident load.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) (IP section 03.01)===
- (1) Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger (1BE205)
- Process medium (water, air, electrical signal) will be available and unimpeded during accident/event conditions.
- Energy sources (fuel, air, steam, electricity), including those used for control functions, will be available and adequate during accident/event conditions.
- Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions.
- Operating procedures (normal, abnormal, or emergency) are consistent with operator actions for accident/event conditions.
- Instrumentation and alarms are available to operators for making necessary decisions.
- Installed configuration will support its design basis function under accident/event conditions.
- Component operation and alignments are consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions.
- Design bases and design assumptions have been appropriately translated into design calculations and procedures.
- Performance capability of selected components have not been degraded through modifications.
- Acceptance criteria for tested parameters are supported by calculations or other engineering documents to ensure that design and licensing bases are met.
- Tests and/or analyses validate component operation under accident/event conditions.
- Potential degradation is monitored or prevented.
- Equipment is adequately protected from environmental hazards.
The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.
- (2) D22 EDG and Associated Safety Bus
- Process medium (water, air, electrical signal) will be available and unimpeded during accident/event conditions.
- Energy sources (fuel, air, steam, electricity), including those used for control functions, will be available and adequate during accident/event conditions.
- Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions.
- Operating procedures (normal, abnormal, or emergency) are consistent with operator actions for accident/event conditions.
- Instrumentation and alarms are available to operators for making necessary decisions.
- Installed configuration will support its design basis function under accident/event conditions.
- Component operation and alignments are consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions.
- Design bases and design assumptions have been appropriately translated into design calculations and procedures.
- Performance capability of selected components have not been degraded through modifications.
- Acceptance criteria for tested parameters are supported by calculations or other engineering documents to ensure that design and licensing bases are met.
- Tests and/or analyses validate component operation under accident/event conditions.
- Potential degradation is monitored or prevented.
- Equipment is adequately protected from environmental hazards.
The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.
- (3) D Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pump
- Process medium (water, air, electrical signal) will be available and unimpeded during accident/event conditions.
- Energy sources (fuel, air, steam, electricity), including those used for control functions, will be available and adequate during accident/event conditions.
- Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions.
- Operating procedures (normal, abnormal, or emergency) are consistent with operator actions for accident/event conditions.
- Instrumentation and alarms are available to operators for making necessary decisions.
- Installed configuration will support its design basis function under accident/event conditions.
- Component operation and alignments are consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions.
- Design bases and design assumptions have been appropriately translated into design calculations and procedures.
- Performance capability of selected components have not been degraded through modifications.
- Acceptance criteria for tested parameters are supported by calculations or other engineering documents to ensure that design and licensing bases are met.
- Tests and/or analyses validate component operation under accident/event conditions.
- Potential degradation is monitored or prevented.
- Equipment is adequately protected from environmental hazards.
The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.
- (4) RHRSW Bypass Valve (HV-51-048B), Valve and Risk Significant Operator Action to Recover Valve
- Process medium (water, air, electrical signal) will be available and unimpeded during accident/event conditions.
- Energy sources (fuel, air, steam, electricity), including those used for control functions, will be available and adequate during accident/event conditions.
- Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions.
- Operating procedures (normal, abnormal, or emergency) are consistent with operator actions for accident/event conditions.
- Instrumentation and alarms are available to operators for making necessary decisions.
- Installed configuration will support its design basis function under accident/event conditions.
- Component operation and alignments are consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions.
- Design bases and design assumptions have been appropriately translated into design calculations and procedures.
- Performance capability of selected components have not been degraded through modifications.
- Acceptance criteria for tested parameters are supported by calculations or other engineering documents to ensure that design and licensing bases are met.
- Tests and/or analyses validate component operation under accident/event conditions.
- Potential degradation is monitored or prevented.
- Equipment is adequately protected from environmental hazards.
The team used Appendix B guidance for Instrumentation, Circuit Breakers and Fuses, Cables, Electrical Loads, Motor Control Centers, and As-Built System.
- (5) Station Blackout Procedure E-1
- Process medium (water, air, electrical signal) will be available and unimpeded during accident/event conditions.
- Energy sources (fuel, air, steam, electricity), including those used for control functions, will be available and adequate during accident/event conditions.
- Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions.
- Operating procedures (normal, abnormal, or emergency) are consistent with operator actions for accident/event conditions.
- Instrumentation and alarms are available to operators for making necessary decisions.
- Installed configuration will support its design basis function under accident/event conditions.
- Component operation and alignments are consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions.
- Design bases and design assumptions have been appropriately translated into design calculations and procedures.
- Performance capability of selected components have not been degraded through modifications.
- Acceptance criteria for tested parameters are supported by calculations or other engineering documents to ensure that design and licensing bases are met.
- Tests and/or analyses validate component operation under accident/event conditions.
- Potential degradation is monitored or prevented.
- Equipment is adequately protected from environmental hazards.
The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.
- (6) Suppression Pool Vent Valve (HV-57-204) and Depressurize Containment Procedure
- Process medium (water, air, electrical signal) will be available and unimpeded during accident/event conditions.
- Energy sources (fuel, air, steam, electricity), including those used for control functions, will be available and adequate during accident/event conditions.
- Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions.
- Operating procedures (normal, abnormal, or emergency) are consistent with operator actions for accident/event conditions.
- Instrumentation and alarms are available to operators for making necessary decisions.
- Installed configuration will support its design basis function under accident/event conditions.
- Component operation and alignments are consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions.
- Design bases and design assumptions have been appropriately translated into design calculations and procedures.
- Performance capability of selected components have not been degraded through modifications.
- Acceptance criteria for tested parameters are supported by calculations or other engineering documents to ensure that design and licensing bases are met.
- Tests and/or analyses validate component operation under accident/event conditions.
- Potential degradation is monitored or prevented.
The team used Appendix B guidance for Instrumentation, Circuit Breakers and Fuses, Cables, Electrical Loads, Motor Control Centers, and As-Built System.
(7)1A2 Battery and Charger
- Process medium (electrical signal) will be available and unimpeded during accident/event conditions.
- Energy sources (electricity), including those used for control functions, will be available and adequate during accident/event conditions.
- Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions.
- Operating procedures (normal, abnormal, or emergency) are consistent with operator actions for accident/event conditions.
- Instrumentation and alarms are available to operators for making necessary decisions.
- Installed configuration will support its design basis function under accident/event conditions.
- Component operation and alignments are consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions.
- Design bases and design assumptions have been appropriately translated into design calculations and procedures.
- Performance capability of selected components have not been degraded through modifications.
- Acceptance criteria for tested parameters are supported by calculations or other engineering documents to ensure that design and licensing bases are met.
- Tests and/or analyses validate component operation under accident/event conditions.
- Potential degradation is monitored or prevented.
- Equipment is adequately protected from environmental hazards.
The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.
- (8) D214 480V Switchgear
- Process medium (water, air, electrical signal) will be available and unimpeded during accident/event conditions.
- Energy sources (fuel, air, steam, electricity), including those used for control functions, will be available and adequate during accident/event conditions.
- Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions.
- Operating procedures (normal, abnormal, or emergency) are consistent with operator actions for accident/event conditions.
- Instrumentation and alarms are available to operators for making necessary decisions.
- Installed configuration will support its design basis function under accident/event conditions.
- Component operation and alignments are consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions.
- Design bases and design assumptions have been appropriately translated into design calculations and procedures.
- Performance capability of selected components have not been degraded through modifications.
- Acceptance criteria for tested parameters are supported by calculations or other engineering documents to ensure that design and licensing bases are met.
- Tests and/or analyses validate component operation under accident/event conditions.
- Potential degradation is monitored or prevented.
- Equipment is adequately protected from environmental hazards.
The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.
Modifications (IP section 03.02) (7 Samples)
(1)
===631464, Implementation EC for D24 Governor Replacement Reference EC 627703, Revision 0 (2)633190, RPS UPS Inverter - Class 1E DC Feeder Breaker Replacements, Revision 0 (3)620491, Change MOV HV-011-015A to Manual Valve 011-0124A and Convert Manual Valve 011-0124A to MOV HV-011-015A Configuration Change Package (4)625439, Replace 'A' ESW Return to 'B' RHRSW Return Piping - Online Work (Downstream of HV-011-015A)
(5)628755, ESW Pump Vent Modification (6)637740, Resolve DC Ground Associated with HPCI IR 04529359 (IR 04529355)
(7)631040 - Issue 125/250V DC System ETAP Calculations, Revision 1
10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations/Screening (IP section 03.03)===
- (1) LG2022E001, EC 636016 Revision 0, TCCP to Bypass FT-087-220B Signal to Return Drywell Cooler Drain Flow Monitoring System to Service
- (2) LG2024E001, EC 640509 Revision 0, TCCP to Bypass FT-087-220B Signal to Return Drywell Cooler Drain Flow Monitoring System to Service
- (4) EC 638196, TCCP - Lift Leads and Jumper to Defeat 2C Main Steam Line Rad Monitor Alarms
- (5) EC 628238, 8A/8B Transformer Replacement
High Temperature Isolation Thermocouple Groups 119/219 Warm Weather Periods Supplemental Cooling Procedurally Controlled Temporary Configuration Change (PCTCC)
- (7) EC 631464 Revision 1, Implementation EC for D24 Governor Replacement
- (9) UFSAR Change Package 2023-016, BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking
- (10) UFSAR Change Package 23-012, Frequency change of LR Commitment of Charcoal Filter Air Tests and Visual Inspections of FP Deluge Piping
- (11) EC 640700, Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Pressure Switch
- (12) EC 641478, Temporary Bypass of the Sensor Trip inputs to the Robertshaw Motor and Bearing Temperature Modules (0B CE Chiller)
- (13) EC 625439, Replace A Emergency Service Water (ESW) Return to B Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Return Piping
Operating Experience Samples (IP section 03.04) (2 Samples)
- (2) IN 17-06 Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution System
INSPECTION RESULTS
Diesel Generator Load Reject Surveillance Test Procedure Acceptance Criteria Not In Accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements.
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000352,05000353/2025010-01 Open/Closed
[H.3] - Change Management 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS)6.8.1.d, Procedures and Programs, when Constellation did not implement diesel generator load-reject surveillance requirements (SR) into their surveillance test acceptance criteria.
Specifically, they did not implement SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c into surveillance test procedure ST-6-092-324-2, D24 Diesel Generator LOCA/Load Reject Testing and Fast Start Operability Test Run. SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c verifies that emergency diesel generator (EDG) steady-state frequency is within the band of 59.8 to 60.8 Hz after rejection of a load greater than or equal to the single largest post-accident load.
Description:
In January 2023, the NRC issued Licensee Amendments 258 and 220 (ML22272A037) for Limerick Generating Station (LGS), Units 1 and 2, which corrected a non-conservative TS identified during a 2015 Component Design Basis Inspection (Inspection Report 05000352/2015007 and 05000353/2015007, ML15251A438). SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c requires that the licensee verify each diesel generator's capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to that of its single largest post-accident load on a periodic basis. The license amendments modified SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c. to include a steady-state frequency operating band for the EDG following rejection of the single largest post-accident load. In April 2023, LGS had completed activities to implement the changes to TSs. As of January 2025, LGS completed surveillance testing for 7 out of the 8 station EDGs utilizing the revised surveillance test procedures for fast start and load rejection testing.
On January 14, 2025, while evaluating the modification package associated with the D24 EDG governor replacement, the inspectors determined that the steady-state frequency band specified in SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c was omitted from the acceptance criteria for the D24 post-modification testing. The inspectors then reviewed ST-6-092-324-2, D24 Diesel Generator LOCA/Load Reject Testing and Fast Start Operability Test Run, to determine if the steady state frequency was verified as part of the periodic (48 month) surveillance test. The inspectors found that the frequency band verification had been omitted from the procedure when it had been updated for the implementation of the license amendments in 2023.
LGS performed an extent of condition review for the remaining 7 EDGs and determined that the surveillance procedures for all the EDGs were missing the acceptance criteria for the steady-state frequency and that one EDG had not yet been tested. LGS was able to retrieve testing data from on the data logger for the last testing activities and verified that all 7 tested EDGs met the frequency band requirements of SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c.
Corrective Actions: Verification of surveillance testing data for all EDGs, revised applicable test procedures to include the test acceptance criteria resulting from implementation of the License Amendments 258 and 220, and updated maintenance procedures to ensure that data and traces from data recorders are attached to completed surveillance test procedures.
Corrective Action References: LGS entered the issue into the corrective action program as IR 4830283.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: LGS did not maintain procedures governing the surveillance testing of safety-related equipment as required by TSs and was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, surveillance test procedure ST-6-092-321(2,3,4)-1(2), Diesel Generator LOCA/Load Reject Testing and Fast Start Operability Test Run, did not verify that the EDG met steady-state frequency criteria required by TS SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c.
Screening: This performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The performance deficiency would lead to a reasonable doubt of operability and could have adversely affected the ability to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent adverse consequences.
Specifically, if the diesel generator load-reject surveillance test procedure was left uncorrected without SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c, the capability of the diesel to operate appropriately at steady-state would not be ensured.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because when screened utilizing Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Question 1, it was determined that the diesel generators maintained their operability and probabilistic risk analysis functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.3 - Change Management: Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.
Specifically, the licensee did not effectively implement a process to ensure a changed SR was added to their surveillance procedures.
Enforcement:
Violation: TS 6.8.1.d, Programs and Procedures, requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the surveillance and testing activities of safety-related equipment.
Contrary to the above, from April 2023 to January 2025, LGS did not adequately maintain surveillance procedure ST-6-092-321(2,3,4)-1(2), D24 Diesel Generator LOCA/Load Reject Testing and Fast Start Operability Test Run. Specifically, ST-6-092-321(2,3,4)-1(2) did not incorporate changes to SR 4.8.1.1.2.e.2.c resulting in steady-state diesel generator frequency not being verified to be within the specified band after rejection of the largest post-accident load, calling into question the operability of the diesel generators.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 31, 2025, the inspectors presented the 2025 Limerick Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Exit Meeting inspection results to Michael Gillin, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Calculations
6300E.20
Voltage Regulation Study
Revision 17
6380E.07
Diesel Generator Loading (Steady State)
Revision 15F
6900E.02
Safeguard Auxiliary System - Phase Overcurrent Relays
Selection and Coordination
Revision 11
6900E.02
Safeguard Aux Sys-Phase Overcurrent Relays Selection
and Coordination
Revision 11
6900E.11
Load Center Circuit Breakers - Overcurrent Trip Devices
Revision 14
ECR 07-00392
RCIC Blackout Rule Calculations and Documentation
Revision 0
LE-0130
Class 1E 125/250V DC System Analysis
Revision 1
LM-0060
Blackout Analysis RCIC Room
Revision 2
LM-0638
RHR Heat Exchanger Min. RHRSW Flow/Structural
Evaluation for Tube Plugging-Suppression Pool Cooling
Service
Revision 4
LM-0640
RHR Heat Exchanger Min. RHRSW Flow/Fouling
Factor/Tube Plugging Limits for Shutdown Cooling
Revision 3
LM-0689
RCIC Pump Room Temperatures for Extended Loss of AC
Power Post-Fukushima Scenario
Revision 0
TODI-14-00019-
04-DC
DC Battery Load Shedding Input for Fukushima FLEX ECR
Development at LGS
Revision 0
Corrective Action
Documents
4352540
4389680
4389684
4475750
4491715
4494135
29355
29359
4541869
4555478
20918
47993551
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
4804978
4813711
4815024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
28704
29315
29322
29324
29614
29904
29913
29913
29918
29918
29920
29920
4830283
4830369
4832043
4832817
4833261
4833261
4833632
Drawings
8031-M-87
P&ID Drywell Chilled Water (Unit 1) Sh 4 & 5
Revision 42
E-0027
MCC Load Tabulation D214-R-G1
Revision 33
Engineering
Changes
631464
Implementation EC for D24 Governor Replacement
Revision 1
643468
Post RHR Reject Data Documentation
Revision 0
Engineering
Evaluations
633213
Technical Evaluation of Potential Reportability Related to
Breakers 72-20307 and 72-20308
Revision 0
LIM-0-2024-0124
Simple Issue Risk Assessment - B CECW Chiller Trip
Bypass
Revision 0
Miscellaneous
NRC Letter LIMERICK GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1
AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS NOS. 258 AND
20 REGARDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.8.1,
dated
01/03/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AC SOURCES-OPERATING AND 3/4.5.1, ECCS-
OPERATING (EPID L-2020-LLA-0233) (ML22272A037)
294652
MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheet
Dated
5/27/2023
L-S-02
Emergency Service Water System Design Baseline
Document
Revision 15
ESW Loop A Flow Balance
Performed
8/29/2023
ESW Loop B Flow Balance
Performed
9/24/2024
Division I 1A2D101 Safeguard Battery Modified Performance
Test
Performed
4/5/2020
ST-4-LLR-582-2
Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust
Performed
5/8/2023
B RHR Pump, Valve and Flow Test
Performed
9/6/2024
Procedures
Fire Area 044W Fire Guide
Revision 12
E-D214
Loss of D214 Safeguard Load Center
Revision 14
ER-LG-330-1002
LGS ISI Augmented Inspection Program
Revision 10
S.12.1.A
RHR Service Water System Startup
Revision 59
D24 Diesel Generator LOCA/Load Reject Testing and Fast
Start Operability Test Run
Revision 32
D24 Diesel Generator LOCA/LOAD Reject Testing and Fast
Start Operability Test Run
Revision 32
Work Orders
247310
05177184
05548912
274413
R09352424