IR 05000348/2002005

IR 05000348-02-005 & IR 05000364-02-005, on 09/29/2002 Through 01/04/2003, Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc., Birmingham, AL, Event Followup

ML030240492
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	01/24/2003
From:	Brian Bonser NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To:	Beasley J Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-02-005
Download: ML030240492 (27)

Text

ary 24, 2003

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-348/02-05 AND 50-364/02-05

Dear Mr. Beasley:

On January 4, 2003, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Farley Nuclear Plant. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings discussed on January 13, 2003, with Mr. Don Grissette and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license relating to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green).

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC has issued two Orders (dated February 25, 2002, and January 7, 2003) and several threat advisories to licensees of commercial power reactors to strengthen licensee capabilities, improve security force readiness, and enhance access authorization. The NRC also issued Temporary Instruction 2515/148 on August 28, 2002, that provided guidance to inspectors to audit and inspect licensee implementation of the interim compensatory measures (ICMs) required by the February 25th Order. Phase 1 of TI 2515/148 was completed at all commercial nuclear power plants during calendar year (CY) 02, and the remaining inspections are scheduled for completion in CY 03. Additionally, table-top security drills were conducted at several licensees to evaluate the impact of expanded adversary characteristics and the ICMs on licensee protection and mitigative strategies. Information gained and discrepancies identified during the audits and drills were reviewed and dispositioned by the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. For CY 03, the NRC will continue to monitor overall safeguards and security controls, conduct inspections, and resume force-on-force exercises at selected power plants.

Should threat conditions change, the NRC may issue additional Orders, advisories, and temporary instructions to ensure adequate safety is being maintained at all commercial power reactors.

SNC 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be publicly available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects, Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure:

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-348/02-05 and 50-364/02-05

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report Nos.: 50-348/02-05 and 50-364/02-05 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: 7388 N. State Highway 95 Columbia, AL 36319 Dates: September 29, 2002 to January 4, 2003 Inspectors: T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector (SRI), Reactor Projects Branch 2 C. Rapp, Senior Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Branch 2 G. McCoy, Resident Inspector (RI), Reactor Projects Branch 5 M. Morgan, SRI, Reactor Projects Branch 5 M. King, RI, Reactor Projects Branch 5 S. Shaeffer, SRI, Reactor Projects Branch 1 E. Testa, Senior Health Physics Specialist, Plant Support Branch (Sections 2OS1, 2OS2, and 2PS2)

D. Forbes, Health Physics Specialist, Plant Support Branch (Sections 2OS1, 2OS2, and 2PS2)

A. Nielsen, Health Physics Specialist, Plant Support Branch (Sections 2OS1, 2OS2, and 2PS2)

K. Davis, Security Specialist, Plant Support Branch (Section 4OA5)

Approved by: Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects, Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348/02-05, IR 05000364/02-05, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, September 29, 2002, through January 4, 2003, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, Event Followup.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspection by regional health physics inspectors and a regional physical security inspector. One Green finding was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649,

Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

Improper scheduling of vendor recommend 10 year overhaul of 1C Service Water pump motor.

A self-revealing finding was identified for the 1C Service Water pump motor failure. This finding is greater than minor significance because it adversely impacted the ultimate heat sink reliability and affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective. Because there was no loss of system function, this finding is of very low safety significance. (Section 4OA3.2)

B. Licensee Identified Violation None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the period at 100% rated thermal power (RTP). On October 15, the unit was manually tripped when control rod F-6 dropped from 221 steps to 198 steps during routine control rod insertion. The licensee determined that a diode in the control rod drive control cabinet failed. The diode was replaced and the unit was restarted on October 16. The unit operated at 100% RTP until December 10 when the unit was manually tripped due to the loss of both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) . The licensee determined that the SGFPs tripped when a worker bumped a breaker that controlled the pumps. The unit was restarted on December 11. The unit operated at 100% RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the period shut down for a planned refueling outage. The unit restarted on October 27 and achieved 100% RTP on October 31. The unit operated at 100% RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of Procedure FNP-0-AP-21.0, Severe Weather; and Procedure FNP-0-SOP-0.12, Cold Weather Contingencies, to determine if required compensatory measures for equipment affected by cold weather were satisfactorily completed. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of licensee procedure FNP-1(2)-EMP-1383.01, Freeze Protection Inspections, which checked the units freeze protection circuit thermostats. The inspectors walked down safety-related, risk significant, and fire protection equipment to verify adequate cold weather protection measures were taken. The equipment included the following:

• Unit 1 & 2 Condensate Storage Tanks and associated instrumentation

• Unit 1 & 2 Reactor Water Storage Tanks

• Fire Protection Tanks and associated pump house

• Unit 1 & 2 Plant Vent Stack Radiation Monitors

• Unit 1 Circulating Water Structure

• Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Flow Transmitters

• Unit 1 & 2 Steam Generator pressure transmitters.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walk downs of the following three systems to verify the systems listed below were properly aligned when redundant systems or trains were out of service. The walk downs were performed using the criteria in licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group; and FNP-0-SOP-0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel. The walk downs included reviewing the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), plant procedures and drawings listed in the attachment, and checks of control room and plant valves, switches, components, electrical power line-ups, support equipment, and instrumentation. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 A train Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System

• 1B and 2B Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)

• Units 1 and 2 Service Water (SW) Systems

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a walk down of the six fire areas listed below to verify the licensees control of transient combustibles, the operational readiness of the fire suppression system, and the material condition and status of fire dampers, doors, and barriers. The inspectors also checked that compensatory measures, including fire watches, were in place for degraded fire barriers. The requirements were described in licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-36, Fire Surveillance and Inspection; FNP-0-AP-38, Use of Open Flame; and FNP-0-AP-39, Fire Patrols and Watches. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The fire areas checked included the following:

• Diesel Generator Building Fire Areas 57 and 62

• Auxiliary Building Fire Areas 1-6, 1-18A, 1-19A, and 2-34A

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of the licensed operator training and testing program to verify implementation of procedures FNP-0-AP-45, Farley Nuclear Plant Training Program, FNP-0-TCP-17.6, Simulator Training Evaluation Documentation, and FNP-0-TCP-17.3, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program. The inspectors observed scenarios conducted in the licensees simulator for a loss of off-site power, loss of coolant accident, and an off-site radioactive release. The inspectors observed high risk operator actions, overall performance, self-critiques, training feedback, and management oversight to verify operator performance was evaluated against the performance standards of the licensees scenario. In addition, the inspectors observed implementation of the applicable emergency operating procedures listed in the attachment to verify that licensee expectations in procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-TCP-17.6 were met.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed condition report (CR) 2002002089, 1-2A EDG Speed Control Failure, to verify implementation of licensee procedures FNP-0-M-87, Maintenance Rule Scoping Manual; FNP-0-SYP-19, Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria; and FNP-0-M-89, FNP Maintenance Rule Site Implementation Manual; and compliance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors assessed the licensees evaluation of functional failures, maintenance preventable functional failures, repetitive failures, availability and reliability monitoring, and system specialist involvement. The inspectors also interviewed maintenance personnel, system specialists, the maintenance rule coordinator, and operations personnel to assess their knowledge of the program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees planning and control for the following six planned licensee activities to verify the requirements in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance; AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization; and FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group; and the Maintenance Rule risk assessment guidance in 10 CFR 50.65 a(4) were met.

• Unit 2 outage activities affecting Unit 1 shared systems

• Unit 1 A RHR pump outage

• Unit 1 and Unit 2 1-2A EDG speed control failure concurrent with switch yard work

• 1-2A EDG two-year overhaul

• Unit 1 A SW pump preventive maintenance

• 2A Charging pump maintenance concurrent with a rod drive motor generator set overhaul

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

For the non-routine events described below, the inspectors assessed the licensees use of operating procedures, annunciator procedures, abnormal and emergency operating procedures, control room actions, command and control, post trip recovery, management involvement, training expectations, and communication. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, control room strip charts, post trip report, and discussed actions with operations personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• On October 15, the inspectors observed the site response to a Unit 1 dropped control rod. Control rod F-6 dropped from 221 steps to 198 steps during a routine rod insertion of the D control bank. The unit was manually tripped as required by procedure FNP-1-AOP-19, Control Rod Malfunction. The licensee determined that a diode in the control rod drive control cabinet failed. The diode was replaced and the unit restarted on October 16.

• On December 10, the inspectors observed the site response to a Unit 1 loss of all main feedwater. The loss of feedwater occurred when the switchgear feeder breaker that controlled the SGFPs was inadvertently opened causing both operating SGFPs to trip. The breaker was reset and the unit was restarted on December 11.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five operability evaluations to verify they met the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-ACP-9.2, Operability Determination (OD), and reviewed for technical adequacy, consideration of degraded conditions, and identification of compensatory measures. The inspectors reviewed the evaluations against the design bases, as stated in the UFSAR and Functional System Descriptions (FSD), to verify system operability was not affected.

• OD-02-10, Unit 2 TDAFW suction relief valve body to bonnet leak

• OD-02-09, Unit 2 A train SW minimum flow line pin hole leak

• EVAL-02-154, Unit 2 Stuck Control Rod and Loose Parts Evaluation (Westinghouse)

• OD-02-06, 1C Charging pump in service test parameter changes

• 1-2A EDG exhaust leak

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following three operator work-arounds to verify that system functional capability or human performance were not affected, and the prioritization of required actions met the requirements of licensee procedure FNP-0-ACP-17, Operator Work-Arounds.

• Unit 6A feedwater heater relief valve isolation

• Unit 1 1A Heater Drain Pump (HDP) failure to trip on low tank level

• Unit 2B HDP failure to trip on low tank level The inspectors also reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator work-arounds to verify they did not affect the operators ability to perform actions in both abnormal and emergency operating procedures, did not increase initiating event frequency, and did not affect multiple mitigating systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five plant modifications to verify the implementation of licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. This included verification that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems, and components would not be degraded through the modifications, and the modifications would not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors also observed the Plant Operations Review Committee approval of these Design Change Packages (DCPs), discussed the modifications with engineering and operations personnel, and reviewed the related procedures and drawings. The inspectors reviewed the following DCPs:

• 02-1-9788, Unit 1 Cooling Towers Replacement

• 02-2-9705, TDAFW Pump Monitoring and Testing System

• 02-2-9731, Unit 2 Main Steam Hangar and Support Replacements

• 02-2-9777, Unit 2 Main Steam Hangar and Support Replacements

• 02-2-9801, Unit 2 Main Steam Hangar and Support Replacements

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the criteria contained in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, and AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, to verify post-maintenance test procedures and test activities for the following six systems were adequate to demonstrate system operability and functional capability.

• 1A RHR pump post-maintenance outage testing

• 1B battery charger testing

• 1-2A EDG 24 month post-overhaul testing

• 1A SW pump post-maintenance outage testing

• 2A Charging pump post-maintenance outage testing

• Unit 1 control rod drive system

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following activities related to the Unit 2 refueling outage for conformance to licensee Procedures FNP-0-UOP-4.0, General Outage Operations Guideline; and FNP-2-UOP-4.1, Refueling Outage Operation. Surveillance tests were reviewed to verify results were within the Technical Specification (TS) required specification. Shut down risk, management oversight, procedural compliance, and operator awareness were evaluated for each of the following activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Refueling risk plans, contingencies, and schedules

• Decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling systems operations

• Core refueling operations

• Outage-related surveillance tests

• Reactor coolant drain down and reduced inventory activities

• Reactor mode changes, and unit heat up and pressurization activities

• Work and test control, task manager conduct, outage control center oversight and communications, clearance activities, inventory and reactivity control, and operations outage conduct

• Refueling outage risk and safety oversight

• Electrical system alignments and availability

• Problem identification and resolution activities

• Reactor startup and initial criticality testing

• Unit power ascension and full power testing

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following seven surveillances to determine if the test adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met the TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-24, Test Control; FNP-0-M-050, Master List of Surveillance Requirements; and FNP-0-AP-16; and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• FNP-1-STP-11.1, 1A RHR Pump Inservice Test

• FNP-2-STP-18.4, Containment Refueling Integrity Verification

• FNP-2-STP-40.0, Safety Injection With Loss of Offsite Power Test

• FNP-0-STP-80.1, 1-2A EDG Operability Test

• FNP-2-STP-22.1, 2A AFW Pump Quarterly Inservice Test

• FNP-2-STP-22.2, 2B AFW Pump Quarterly Inservice Test

• FNP-1-STP-29.6, Calculation of Estimated Critical Position

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed minor departure MD-02-2719, Unit 2 Fuel Transfer Assembly Sheaves and Bushings, and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening criteria against the system design bases information and documentation, and the licensees temporary modifications procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. The inspectors reviewed implementation, configuration control, post-installation test activities, drawing and procedure updates, and operator awareness for this temporary modification.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency and simulator drill on November 7 to verify the licensee was properly classifying the event, making required notifications, making protective action recommendations, and conducting self-assessments. The drill included activation of all emergency response facilities. The inspectors used procedure FNP-0-EIP-15.0, Emergency Drills, as the inspection criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas

a. Inspection Scope

Access Controls: During the week of September 16, 2002, licensee activities for controlling and monitoring worker access to radiologically significant areas and tasks associated with the Unit 2 Refueling Outage were evaluated. The inspectors evaluated procedural guidance; directly observed implementation of administrative and established physical controls; appraised radiation worker and technician proficiency in implementing radiation protection (RP) activities and assessed worker exposures to radiation and radioactive material.

The inspectors evaluated work in airborne radioactivity areas, radiation areas, high radiation areas (HRAs), locked high radiation areas (LHRAs) defined as exclusion areas by the licensee, and very high radiation areas (VHRAs). The tasks observed included shielding and scaffolding activities, reactor head inspection, movement of the upper internals, reactor coolant pump maintenance, and a pressurizer valve handling and movement evolution.

The inspectors attended pre-job briefings and reviewed radiation work permits (RWPs)to evaluate communication of radiological control requirements to workers.

Occupational workers adherence to selected RWPs and Health Physics (HP) technician proficiency in providing job coverage were evaluated through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff.

For HRA tasks involving significant dose gradients, the inspectors evaluated the use and placement of dosimetry to monitor worker exposure. Electronic dosimetry (ED)alarm set points and worker stay times were evaluated against area radiation survey results where dose rates could change significantly as a result of plant shutdown and refueling operations.

Postings for access to radiological control areas (RCAs) and physical controls for Reactor Building and Auxiliary Building locations designated as LHRAs and VHRAs were evaluated during facility tours. The inspectors independently measured radiation dose rates and directly observed conduct of licensee radiation surveys and results for three high radiation areas. Survey results were compared to current surveys and assessed against established postings and controls.

Licensee controls for airborne radioactivity areas with the potential for individual worker internal exposures of greater than 50 millirem (mrem) Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) were evaluated. For selected RWPs identifying potential airborne areas, i.e., head inspection activities and cavity flood-up following reactor head lift, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of administrative and physical controls including barrier integrity, engineering controls, and postings.

Radiation protection activities were evaluated UFSAR § 12, Radiation Protection; 10 CFR 19.12; 10 CFR 20, Subparts B, C, F, G, H, and J; TS § 5.7, High Radiation Area Controls; and procedures listed in the Attachment to this report.

Problem Identification and Resolution: Licensee corrective actions associated with access controls were reviewed. Licensee CRs reviewed and evaluated in detail during inspection of this program area are identified in the Attachment. The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with the licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-30, Preparation and Processing Condition Reports.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

ALARA: Implementation of the licensees ALARA program during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage 15 was observed and evaluated by the inspectors during the weeks of September 16, 2002, and September 30, 2002. The inspection included evaluation of ALARA activities for high person-rem jobs, assessment of licensee source-term reduction efforts, and review of historical dose data. The high dose jobs evaluated were:

• Inspection underneath reactor head

• Upper internals removal

• Lower internals replacement The jobs and implementation of ALARA principles were observed via closed-circuit television. Projected dose was compared to actual dose and any differences were discussed with the ALARA staff. Any changes to dose budgets relative to changes in job scope were also discussed. The inspectors reviewed ALARA committee meeting minutes and evaluated ALARA initiatives for these and other outage jobs. The inspectors attended pre-job briefings and evaluated communication of ALARA goals, RWP requirements, and industry lessons-learned to job crew personnel. Maintenance department understanding of dose budgets and ALARA concepts was assessed through discussions with radiation workers and job sponsors. Management support for ALARA was evaluated through interviews with ALARA staff and the Radiation Protection Manager. The inspectors reviewed applicable parts of four procedures and one exposure reduction plan to assess procedural and administrative guidance for ALARA activities.

The licensees source term reduction program was evaluated through discussions with the chemistry supervisor and review of dose rate trends for primary side piping.

Selected parts of a temporary shielding procedure and the outage shielding plan were assessed. The inspectors interviewed the Radiation Protection Manager and reviewed parts of a cobalt reduction plan, a valve specification, and a technical guide to evaluate the licensees program for reduction of activated cobalt.

Historical dose data for collective exposure was reviewed from April 1999 through March 2002. The inspectors examined the dose record of a declared pregnant worker to evaluate gestation dose. Relevant parts of a dosimetry procedure were reviewed to assess licensee controls for declared pregnant workers. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

The licensees ALARA program was evaluated against the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and TS § 5.4.1, commitment to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, as well as the guidance contained in RG 8.8, Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations will be As Low As Reasonably Achievable and RG 8.13, Instruction Concerning Prenatal Radiation Exposure.

Problem Identification and Resolution: Four CRs and one self-assessment associated with ALARA activities were reviewed and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with AP FNP-O-AP-30, Preparation and Processing Condition Reports. In the case of CRs 2002002366 and 2002002399, the inspectors directly observed the specific events and followed the CR process from initial discovery to problem resolution.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation

a. Inspection Scope

Waste Processing and Characterization: During the weeks of September 16 and September 30, 2002, the configuration status and operability of selected radioactive waste (radwaste) processing systems and equipment were evaluated. Inspection activities included document review, direct inspection of processing equipment, and interviews with plant personnel.

The document review of the radwaste program included evaluation of guidance for waste classification, and procedures for clearing clean trash and processing spent resin.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees 10 CFR Part 61 contract laboratory sample gamma analysis results for the waste streams. The 2001 data were evaluated for consistency with the most current 10 CFR Part 61 sample data collected in 2002. The licensees use of scaling factors for hard-to-detect nuclides was assessed for the primary resin waste stream. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedure for clearing clean trash from the RCA. The inspectors reviewed procedures for transferring and de-watering spent resin to ensure compliance with the process descriptions in the Process Control Program and the system diagrams in the UFSAR § 11. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The direct inspection of radwaste equipment included walk-downs of resin lines, examination of abandoned equipment, observation of clean trash monitoring, observation of the Low Level Waste Storage Building and inspection of the Solidification Dewatering Facility.

Licensee personnel were interviewed regarding waste classification analyses and radwaste processing equipment. The inspectors assessed the individuals knowledge of regulations, understanding of licensee procedures, and familiarity with radwaste systems. Waste stream sampling frequency, response to changing plant conditions, and laboratory counting techniques were discussed with waste shipping representatives.

The licensees program for classifying and processing solid radwaste was evaluated against 10 CFR Part 61, the Branch Technical Position on Waste Classification and Waste Form January 1995, the Process Control Program, the UFSAR § 11, Radioactive Waste Management, and licensee procedures.

Transportation: The inspectors evaluated the licensees activities related to transportation of radioactive material. The evaluation included document review and direct observation of shipping activities.

The documents reviewed included shipping procedures, records, and training specifications. The inspectors evaluated five shipping procedures for compliance with regulatory requirements. Records for five shipments, listed in the Attachment to this report, were reviewed for compliance with regulations and consistency with licensee procedures. Training records for five technicians qualified to ship radioactive material were checked for completeness. In addition, training curricula provided to these workers were assessed. The inspectors discussed Department of Transportation shipping paper requirements and shipper training requirements with the Radioactive Material Control Supervisor.

During the week of September 16, 2002, the inspectors directly observed the preparation of pressurizer safety relief valves being transported as a Limited Quantity shipment. The inspectors assessed the technicians performance in completing the required paperwork via the RADMAN computer code and in conducting appropriate surveys of the loaded package.

Transportation program guidance and implementation were reviewed against regulations detailed in 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Parts 170-189, and licensee procedures. In addition, training activities were assessed against Subpart H of 49 CFR Part 172 and the guidance documented in NRC Bulletin 79-19.

Problem Identification and Resolution: Licensee CR reports and self-assessments associated with radwaste processing and transportation were reviewed. Five CRs and one self-assessment were reviewed and evaluated in detail and are listed in the to this report. The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-30, Preparation and Processing Condition Reports.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below for the period from April 2001 through March 2002. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2, and licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-54, Preparation and Review of NRC Performance Indicator Data, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.

Reactor Safety Cornerstone

• Safety System Functional Failures

• Reactor Coolant System Activity

• Reactor Coolant System Leakage To verify the accuracy of the third quarter of 2002 PI data submitted by the licensee, the inspectors reviewed portions of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operator Logs for 2002, the daily morning reports including the daily CR descriptions, the monthly operating reports, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), NRC Inspection Reports, and several Limiting Conditions for Operation. The inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel associated with the PI data collection, evaluation, and distribution.

Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone

• Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness The Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI results were reviewed for the period January 2002 through August 2002. Monthly files were reviewed to determine whether the procedurally specified sources of information for the PI were collected each month and whether potential and PI occurrences were accurately assessed for reportability. Selected CRs issued during the review period and exposure event data documented were reviewed and assessed for potential PI reportability.

Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone

• Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (RETS/ODCM)

The Radiological Effluent RETS/ODCM PI results were reviewed for the period January 2002 through August 2002. Monthly files regarding offsite doses were reviewed to determine whether the procedurally specified sources of information for the PI were collected each month and whether potential and PI occurrences were accurately assessed for reportability. Selected CRs, issued during the period under review, concerning potential PI occurrences were also assessed for reportability.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) LER 50-348/2002-002-00: Manual Reactor Trip Due to Partially Dropped

Control Rod On October 15, Unit 1 was manually tripped when control rod F-6 dropped from 221 steps to 198 steps during a routine rod insertion of the D control bank. This event is further discussed in Section 1R14. The LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no findings of significance were identified. The licensee documented this condition in CR 2002002579

.2 Unit 1 C Service Water Pump Motor Failure

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause analysis for the 1C SW pump motor failure that occurred on August 21, 2002, to determine if a performance deficiency existed.

b. Findings

Introduction:

A Green self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to adequately monitor pump motor age which contributed to the failure of the 1C SW pump motor.

Description:

On August 21, with the 1B and 1C SW pumps supplying the SW system, the 1C SW pump motor failed. The 1B SW pump maintained SW system pressure and flow. Unnecessary heat loads to the SW system were reduced to ensure adequate heat removal from critical components. The 1C SW pump motor was replaced and the 1C SW pump returned to service on August 22. This event was initially discussed in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-348, 364/2002-04.

The licensees review identified that the motors age was a contributor to the failure.

The motor had been installed for 14 years exceeding the vendor recommendation of an overhaul every 10 years. The licensee scheduled the 1C pump motor for an overhaul in October 2002 based on a nine year inservice period between 1993 and 2002. The licensees investigation following the motor failure found the motor was initially installed on the 1C SW pump in 1988. The motor had been removed in 1993 for overhaul; however, when the replacement motor began overheating the original motor was reinstalled on the 1C SW pump. Because the MWO did not specify that the same motor had been reinstalled on the 1C SW pump, the licensee failed to include the five year inservice period from 1988 to 1993 when scheduling the 1C SW pump motor overhaul.

Analysis:

The deficiency associated with this finding is inadequate scheduling of vendor recommend maintenance which contributed to the failure of the 1C SW pump motor.

This finding is greater than minor significance because it adversely impacted the ultimate heat sink reliability and effected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective.

Because there was no loss of system function, this finding is of very low safety significance.

Enforcement:

While the motor failure caused the A train of SW to be inoperable, the train was returned to service within the allowed completion time in TS 3.7.8.A.

Therefore, this finding did not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements. This finding is identified as Finding (FIN) 50-348/2002-005-01, Improper Scheduling of Pump Motor Overhaul. The licensee documented this condition in CR 2002001887.

4OA5 Other Activities

Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/148, Appendix A, Pre-inspection Audit for Interim Compensatory Measures (ICMs) at Nuclear Power Plants

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted an audit of the licensees actions in response to a February 25, 2002, Order which required the licensee to implement certain interim security compensatory measures. The audit consisted of a broad-scope review of the licensees actions in response to the Order in the areas of operations, security, emergency preparedness, and information technology as well as additional elements prescribed by the TI. The inspectors selectively reviewed relevant documentation and procedures; directly observed equipment, personnel, and activities in progress; and discussed licensee actions with personnel responsible for development and implementation of the ICM actions. A more in-depth review of the licensees implementation of the February 25, 2002, Order utilizing Appendix B and C of TI 2515/148 was conducted during the week of January 13, 2003. The results of this review will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-348/2003-03 and 50-463/2003-03.

The licensees activities were reviewed against the requirements of the February 25, 2002, Order; the provisions of TI 2515/148, Appendix A; the licensees response to the Order; and the provisions of the NRC-endorsed NEI Implementation Guidance, dated July 24, 2002.

b. Findings

During the audit, the inspectors were informed that on November 18, 2002, the licensee had identified a failure to comply with Provision B.2.a(1) of the February 25, 2002, Order. Although the licensees responses to the Order dated March 18, May 10 and June 20, 2002, stated that this provision of the Order had been completed, the licensee had failed to make a determination related to certain resources, as required by the Order. At the time of the onsite inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee had implemented adequate compensatory measures; had initiated actions to complete the determination and take any subsequent actions required by Provision B.2.a(2) of the Order; and was developing an amended response to the Order for submittal to the NRC.

Pending further review, the failure to comply with Provision B.2.a(1) of the Order and 10 CFR 50.9 is being identified as an Unresolved Item (URI) 50-348, 364/2002-005-02, Failure to Comply with a Commission Order.

4OA6 Meetings including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Don Grissette, General Manager, and other members of licensee management on January 13, 2003. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

Supplemental Information

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

R. V. Badham, Administration Manager

C. L. Buck, Chemistry/Health Physics Manager

R. M. Coleman, Outage and Modification Manager

C. D. Collins, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support

K. C. Dyar, Security Manager

D. E. Grissette, Plant General Manager

J. R. Johnson, Assistant General Manager - Operations

R. R. Martin, Engineering Support Manager

B. L. Moore, Maintenance Manager

C. D. Nesbitt, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

W. D. Oldfield, Safety Audit Engineering Review Supervisor

L. M. Stinson, Nuclear Support General Manager, Farley Project

R. J. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

T. Youngblood, Operations Manager

P. Crone, Licensing Supervisor

P. Harlos, Health Physics Superintendent

T. Livingston, Chemistry Manager

M. Mitchell, Health Physics Superintendent

R. Wells, Operations Superintendent

NRC personnel

B. Bonser, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 2

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

50-348, 364/2002-005-01 FIN Improper Scheduling of Pump Motor Overhaul (Section 4OA3.3)

50-348, 364/2002-005-02 URI Failure to Comply with a Commission Order (Section 4OA5.1)

Closed

50-348/2002-002-00 LER Manual Reactor Trip Due to Partially Dropped Control Rod (Section 4OA3.1)