IR 05000346/2009006

IR 05000346-09-006; on 03/23/2009 - 04/10/2009; Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, Routine Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection

ML091410525
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	05/21/2009
From:	Jamnes Cameron NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B6
To:	Allen B FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-09-006
Download: ML091410525 (32)

Text

May 21, 2009

SUBJECT:

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION 05000346/2009-006

Dear Mr. Allen:

On April 10, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 10, 2009, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that implementation of the corrective action program (CAP) at Davis-Besse was generally good.

The team noted that the licensee reviewed operating experience for applicability to station activities. Audits and self-assessments were determined to be performed at an appropriate level to identify deficiencies. During interviews conducted during the inspection, workers at the site expressed freedom to raise safety concerns.

Based on the results of this inspection, one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance was identified. The finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because the issue was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a non-cited violation (NCV) in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000346/2009-006

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl:

The Honorable Dennis Kucinich

J. Hagan, President and Chief

Nuclear Officer - FENOC

J. Lash, Senior Vice President of

Operations and Chief Operating Officer - FENOC

Manager - Site Regulatory Compliance - FENOC

D. Pace, Senior Vice President of

Fleet Engineering - FENOC

K. Fili, Vice President, Fleet Oversight - FENOC

P. Harden, Vice President, Nuclear Support

D. Jenkins, Attorney, FirstEnergy Corp.

Director, Fleet Regulatory Affairs - FENOC

Manager - Fleet Licensing - FENOC

C. OClaire, State Liaison Officer, Ohio Emergency Management Agency

R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health

Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

President, Lucas County Board of Commissioners

President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000346/2009-006; 03/23/2009 - 04/10/2009; Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, Routine Biennial

Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection. Identification and Resolution of Problems

This inspection was performed by five NRC regional inspectors and the Davis-Besse resident inspector. One Green finding was identified by the inspectors. The finding was considered a Non-Cited Violation of NRC regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Problem Identification and Resolution On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that implementation of the corrective action program (CAP) was generally good. The licensee had a low threshold for identifying problems and entering them in the CAP. Items entered into the CAP were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria; were properly evaluated commensurate with their safety significance; and corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance. The team noted that the licensee applied operating experience to station activities. Audits and self-assessments were determined to be performed at an appropriate level to identify deficiencies. On the basis of discussions and interviews conducted during the inspection, workers at the site expressed freedom to raise safety concerns.

NRC-Identified

and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for the failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality regarding the expired qualification of molded case circuit breakers as safety-related components. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that unqualified safety-related molded case circuit breakers were a condition adverse to quality and, as a result, the corrective actions were not prompt in that a 6 year replacement frequency was specified without an evaluation as to the acceptability of that frequency. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program.

The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to have resulted in loss of operability or functionality in service.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision making, because the licensee made a nonconservative determination that unqualified breakers were not a condition adverse to quality based on anecdotal history that suggested that no known problem existed at the time with any specific breaker. H.1(b)

Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

The activities documented in Sections

.1 through.4 constituted one biennial sample of

problem identification and resolution as defined in IP 71152.

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees Corrective Action (CA) program implementing procedures and attended plant meetings to assess the implementation of the CA program by site personnel.

The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensees CA program since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection in October 2006. The selection of issues ensured an adequate review of issues across NRC cornerstones. The inspectors used issues identified through NRC generic communications, department self assessment, licensee audits, operating experience reports, and NRC documented findings as sources to select issues. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed condition reports (CRs) generated as a result of facility personnels performance in daily plant activities. In addition, the inspectors reviewed condition reports and a selection of completed investigations from the licensees various investigation methods, which included root causes, apparent causes, and limited apparent causes.

The inspectors selected molded case circuit breakers to review in detail because they are associated with high risk systems. The inspectors review was to determine whether the licensee staff were properly monitoring and evaluating the performance of these components through effective implementation of station monitoring programs. A 5 year review on the molded case circuit breakers was also undertaken to assess the licensee staffs efforts in monitoring for system degradation due to aging aspects. The inspectors reviewed a sample of work requests, condition reports, thermography results, and maintenance procedures. The inspectors also performed a walkdown through the plant to assess plant conditions.

During the reviews, the inspectors determined whether the licensee staffs actions were in compliance with the facilitys corrective action program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements. Specifically, the inspectors evaluated whether licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the plant issues into the stations CA program in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also assessed whether the licensee staff assigned the appropriate investigation method to ensure the proper determination of root, apparent, and contributing causes. The inspectors evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected condition reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings, including non-cited violations.

b.

Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification Based on the information reviewed, including initiation rates of CRs and interviews, the inspectors concluded that the threshold for initiating condition reports was appropriate.

In addition, the inspectors noted that the licensee trends equipment and human performance on a regular basis.

Observations Inspector Issues During the plant walkdown, inspectors identified some minor deficiencies that the plant staff had not put into the CA program. One example was fire blankets missing from a cable tray. The licensee was not able to identify why it was removed or any mechanism to restore it. A CR was initiated for this issue.

In addition, inspectors identified that when operating experience that was not relevant to the work was included in work packages, this deficiency was not fed back to the package preparers.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors determined that in general the evaluations in apparent cause and root cause reports that were reviewed were adequate. However, the inspectors identified one finding for an inadequate evaluation and another example where the conclusion of a selected sample of licensees past-operability determinations was inadequately supported (refer to the observations below).

Observations Weakness in Searching Through the Corrective Action Tracking System When performing the vertical slice on the molded case circuit breakers, the inspectors observed that the capability to perform searches through the corrective action tracking system is limited. Specifically, the inspectors noted that when performing a search for a specific topic multiple search entries are needed. The result is that different people may obtain different outcomes when performing the same search. The inspectors noted another example when the licensee provided a list of condition reports for a specific topic. The inspectors performed an independent search through the system that resulted in the identification of an additional condition report that met the criteria to be included in the list provided by the licensee. This is a weakness, for example, when relying on the corrective action tracking system to perform extent of conditions or attempting to understand the history of an issue.

Potential for missed opportunity during a past operability evaluation The inspectors identified that a past operability evaluation of a mispositioned valve of the service water system only considered the thermal performance of the service water systems components and net positive suction head of the pumps. The past operability evaluation failed to consider the possibility that the water hammer analyses performed for any of the associated components could be affected by the mispositioned valve, as well as any other hydraulic effects. The licensee initiated CR 09-56907 to review and address this issue. By the end of the inspection the licensee was able to demonstrate that none of the associated components were significantly affected with respect to the hydraulic performance of the service water system with the mispositioned valve.

Discrepancy between plant procedures and vendor recommendations The inspectors identified that the plant maintenance procedures for molded case circuit breakers do not list the torque values specified by the vendor of these components. The licensee relies in the skill of the craft to set these torque values. Industry operating experience documents the possibility of connectivity issues because of insufficient tightness as well as the development of longitudinal cracks in the connections due to excessive torque. However, there have been no known issues with this procedure in Davis Besse. The licensee initiated CR 09-56755 to review and address this issue.

The SAP database The licensee has a database for tracking items determined to not be corrective actions using data entries called SAP Notifications. These are administered in accordance with procedure NOP-SS-8001, FENOC Activity Tracking. Similar to the CA database, licensee staff were limited in their ability to do consistent data searches. The inspectors reviewed a sample of SAP notifications for issues that should have been in the CA program and did not find any examples.

Findings Failure to evaluate molded case circuit breakers that exceed their qualified life

Introduction:

A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified by the inspectors for the failure to identify unqualified safety-related molded case circuit breakers as a condition adverse to quality and to promptly correct it.

Description:

On April 8, 2009, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to recognize that unqualified safety-related molded case circuit breakers were a condition adverse to quality and that, as a result, the licensees corrective actions were not prompt.

Section 3.11.1, Equipment Qualification Program, of the Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR) states that safety-related electrical equipment and components are qualified to meet their performance requirements under normal, test, and accident operating conditions during which they need to function. Section 3.11.1.1, Qualification Evaluation, states that electrical equipment is classified into two categories:

(1) equipment with a satisfactory 40 year design life to Institute of Electrical

& Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 323-1974 by type test, or combination of type test/analysis; or

(2) equipment requiring an on-going qualification and/or replacement program to continue its life for the design life of the plant. Furthermore, it states that a specified value of 40 years has been used for aging evaluation of all components and that the simulated aging conditions are reviewed against IEEE 323-1974 requirements.

IEEE 323-1974 defines equipment qualification as the generation and maintenance of evidence to assure that the equipment will operate on demand to meet the system performance requirements. Therefore, an unqualified safety-related molded case circuit breaker does not provide reasonable assurance that it will operate on demand to meet its performance requirements and, thus, is a condition adverse to quality.

In 2004, the licensee received the Westinghouse Electric technical bulletin TB-04-13 02, dated June 28, 2004, which was subsequently superseded by TB-06-02, dated March 23, 2006, alerting about molded case circuit breakers aging issues. Specifically, grease and red oil used in these breakers were found to be key limiting factors for continued operability within published specifications. As grease and red oil age beyond 20 years, their lubrication properties are reduced, resulting in slower trip times beyond the published time-current curves. The bulletin further concluded that the qualified life of molded case circuit breakers was reduced to 20 years.

The licensee captured the 2004 bulletin in their corrective action program as CR 04-04561. The corrective action was to replace the safety-related molded case circuit breakers that are greater than 20 years old during their regular 6 year preventative maintenance. This implied that for a period of at least 6 years after the receipt of this bulletin the licensee would continue to operate with a number of unqualified molded case circuit breakers. As of April 8, 2009, the licensee had not replaced all of the molded case circuit breakers that were older than 20 years in safety-related applications and had not performed an evaluation to generate evidence of assurance that these circuit breakers could perform their safety function until their replacement.

Analysis:

The inspectors determined that the failure to evaluate the safety-related molded case circuit breakers that exceeded their qualified life in order to justify continuous operation of these components was a performance deficiency.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, an unqualified safety-related molded case circuit breaker could lead to higher trip times that would result in the unnecessary loss of other safety-related systems or components associated with the bus when a circuit fault is present. The inspectors concluded that this finding was associated with the Mitigating System and Containment Barrier Cornerstones.

The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 3b for the Mitigating System Cornerstone. Although the molded case circuit breakers associated with this performance deficiency affected systems and components in both the Mitigating System Cornerstone and the Containment Barrier Cornerstone, the number of mitigating systems affected was significantly higher than the systems associated with the Containment Barrier Cornerstone. As an example, the failure to trip breaker BF1259, associated with one of the battery room vent fans, during a fault, would result in the trip of breaker BF115, which would result in the loss of power to nine components associated with: emergency diesel generator #2, including one air compressor and one fuel oil transfer pump; one spray valve of pressurizer #1; and the discharge of auxiliary feedwater pump #2 to steam generator #2. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, a history review was conducted on molded case circuit breakers failures and no documented failures were determined to be associated with this performance deficiency.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision making, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and did not adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize that unqualified breakers were a condition adverse to quality based on anecdotal history that suggested that no known problem existed at the time with any specific breaker. The finding is reflective of current performance because the licensee had multiple opportunities to recognize the condition adverse to quality until recently. Specifically, the 2004 bulletin was superseded in 2006, a CR referenced the bulletin in 2008, and a current maintenance procedure references and quotes the bulletin regarding the aging issue.

H.1(b)

Enforcement:

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, in 2004, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality regarding the expired qualification of molded case circuit breakers as safety-related components. Specifically, although the licensee captured the bulletin in their corrective action program as a CR, it failed to identify that unqualified safety-related molded case circuit breakers were a condition adverse to quality.

Because the licensee failed to identify this, the corrective actions were not prompt, in that a 6 year replacement frequency was specified without an evaluation as to the acceptability of that frequency. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 09-57013, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000346/2009006-01).

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions In general, the inspectors noted that the corrective actions addressed the cause of the identified problem, and appeared to have been effective. The inspectors also noted that the licensee recently identified that the corrective actions taken to address a licensee identified adverse trend in human performance were not effective and implemented more aggressive corrective actions.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the facilitys Operating Experience (OE) program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the implementation of operating experience program procedures, attended OE program meetings, and reviewed completed evaluations of OE issues and events identified through NRC generic communications and external OE in order to observe the use, disposition, and dissemination of OE information. In addition, the inspectors evaluated actions taken in response to reports made under 10 CFR Part 21, conducted interviews with licensee employees and examined work packages to assess OE use at the working levels, and reviewed selected monthly assessments of the OE composite performance indicators.

The inspectors also reviewed corrective actions taken to address a 2007 incident where the failure to properly implement OE to address the presence of degraded hoses on the licensees Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) led to an air start failure during a monthly surveillance.

The inspectors review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensees program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed whether corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented.

b.

Assessment The inspectors determined that the overall performance of the operating experience program was adequate. The licensee utilized a program that had established reasonable objectives and appeared to be making progress in meeting those objectives.

The documents reviewed presented evidence that the licensee has committed to continually assess its program and take appropriate corrective actions when an objective is not being met. The independent and self assessments appeared to be effective in identifying negative trends and areas of improvement for the program. Additionally, the evaluations of external OE and NRC generic communications the inspectors reviewed seemed to appropriately address the issues identified in the OE. The inspectors did not have any observations of note that were not already being addressed by the licensees corrective action program.

Observations Relevance of Operating Experience in Work Packages The inspectors noted multiple instances in which operating experience included in work packages during the planning stages of the work process was not relevant to the work being performed. This was noted in a few condition reports and duty team observations, but the issue was highlighted during interviews with plant personnel and sampled work packages. The inspectors reviewed various work packages and noted that in multiple instances, where irrelevant OE was included in the package, there was no feedback documented on the work feedback form to ensure that planners were aware of the issue.

Personnel interviews confirmed that these deficiencies were not being documented.

Some individuals commented that up to 50 percent of the work order OEs may be subject to this condition. To combat the issue, a work-around had been created, suggesting that test leaders, called test leads, should locate their own OE to be used in the pre-job brief. While in some cases this process has served as a short term remedy to the problem, the inspectors noted that this instruction may put unnecessary strain on the test leads. Additionally, interviews indicated that personal experience with past tests and work processes was frequently utilized as internal operating experience and discussed at pre-job briefs, but was not being documented for future use.

As a result of the licensees Corporate Midcycle Assessment, many of these issues were noted, and CR 08-45509 was initiated to address this trend as an area for improvement.

The corrective actions were mainly focused on procedural changes, and one corrective action implementing an effectiveness review remained open at the time of this inspection. Additionally, this issue was noted in the Operating Experience Program Self-Assessment.

Tracking of 10 CFR Part 21 Notifications In addition, it was noted during this inspection that not all notifications issued under 10 CFR Part 21 are formally tracked by the licensee. Specifically, there is no formalized procedure guidance for the Vendor Information Coordinator (VIC) or other licensee personnel describing a process to track incoming 10 CFR Part 21 reports. The VIC noted that Part 21 listings are voluntarily checked every 3 to 4 weeks, but not at the direction of a procedure. While the inspectors did not find any Part 21 Notifications that had not been identified by the licensee, the lack of an organized tracking process creates a significant vulnerability that leaves open the potential for missing Part 21 Notifications. This could impair the ability of the licensee to verify that Part 21 procedural, evaluation, and timeliness expectations are being met, and hence could degrade the ability of the licensee to identify and correct conditions adverse to quality in a timely manner. The licensee has identified process tracking issues (documented in CR 09-54570) and was in the process of creating a new Vendor Technical Information procedure at the time of this inspection.

Documentation of Operating Experience Screening Conclusions During their review of the external operating experience screening and evaluation process, the inspectors noted that, by procedure, incoming operating experience was systematically screened and then either evaluated or provided to others as information only. While the process was tracked through the SAP database, including the final outcome of the screening and the written evaluation of issues related to the Davis-Besse site if one was performed, the screening conclusions were not fully documented.

Specifically, documentation of the screening process showed that screening occurred, and documented whether the OE would be evaluated, passed along as information only, or summarized and distributed in the weekly newsletter. The documentation did not describe the basis for passing the OE along under the lower, information only thresholds rather than performing an evaluation. This could impair the licensees ability to review OEs screened as information only and their screening bases, and ensure that evaluations are performed for those that are in need of them. Additionally, documenting these conclusions may be useful in performing effectiveness reviews of the screening process.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee staffs ability to identify and enter issues into the CA program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits. Inspectors reviewed schedules, procedures, and completed audits and self-assessments.

b.

Assessment The team noted the effectiveness of the self-assessments and audits in their ability to identify, characterize, and correct performance issues and problems. Specifically, procedures for performing assessments were in place and implemented providing guidance and consistency. The site used their processes to evaluate and follow through on items that came out of the Audits and Assessments. The assessment and auditing assessment findings matched those of the team.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees safety conscious work environment through the reviews of the facilitys employee concern program implementing procedures, discussions with the coordinator of the employee concern program, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. The inspectors also reviewed the results from a Safety Culture Survey.

Assessment The inspectors concluded that the licensee was maintaining a safety conscious work environment while continuing efforts to reinforce a management message supporting the raising of safety issues.

All interviewees indicated that they would raise safety issues and were comfortable doing so. All individuals knew that, in addition to the CAP, they could raise issues to their management, the Employee Concerns Program, or the NRC. None of the individuals interviewed indicated they had been retaliated against for raising issues nor were they aware of anyone who had been retaliated against. No negative issues relating to safety conscious work environment were raised by individuals interviewed by the inspectors.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On April 10, the inspectors presented the inspection results to B. Allan and other members of the licensees staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

C. Ackerman Staff Nuclear Specialist, Performance Improvement

B. Allen, Vice President, Davis-Besse Station

J. Barron, Manager, Site Projects

S. Brower, Nuclear Engineer, Plant Engineering

K. Byrd, Manager, Design Engineering

G. Wolf, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance

T. Chowdary, Staff Nuclear Engineer, Regulatory Compliance

S. Cope, Senior Nuclear Specialist, Emergency Planning

J. Cuff, Superintendent, Electrical Maintenance

B. Hennesey, Supervisor, Performance Improvement

R. Jarosi, Employee Concerns Program Manager

V. Kaminskas, Director, Site Operations

G. Kendrick, Director, Work Management and Oversight Management

M. Lewczynski, Supervisor, Oversight

J. Mallornee, CR Analyst, Maintenance

B. Melssen, Senior Nuclear Specialist, Radiation Protection

D. Moul, Director, Site Engineering

S. Plymale, Manager, Plant Engineering

C. Price, Director, Site Performance Improvement

A. Schimming, Senior Nuclear Specialist, Design-Configuration Control

J. Sturdavant, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance

P. Wadsworth, Senior Nuclear Specialist, Operations

D. Wahlers, Supervisor, Oversight

A. Wise, Manager, Technical Services Engineering

D. Wuokko, Acting Manager, Regulatory Compliance

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. Rutkowski, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS

Opened

2009006-01 NCV Failure to evaluate molded case circuit breakers that exceed their qualified life

Closed

2009006-01 NCV Failure to evaluate molded case circuit breakers that exceed their qualified life