IR 05000344/1993009
| ML20046D122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1993 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046D121 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-93-09, 50-344-93-9, NUDOCS 9308160156 | |
| Download: ML20046D122 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No.
50-344/93-09 Docket No.
50-344 License No.
NPF-I Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:
Trojan Nuclear Plant Inspection At:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection Conducted:
June 1 - July 5, 1993 Inspector:
J. F. Mel
, Resident Inspector Approved By:
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-/er-7!f7!93 P. /H. Johnson, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 1 Summary:
Inspection on June 1 - July 5.1993 (Inspection Report No. 50-344/93-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced, resident inspection of operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, and followup of previously identified items.
Inspection procedures 40500, 61726, 62700, 62702, 62703, 71707, 92700, 92701, 92720 and 93702 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspection.
Results:
Ceneral Conclusions and Soecific Findinas:
The inspector reviewed the licensee's review committees, maintenance program and corrective action program to assess the changes in these programs since plant closure. The inspector concluded that these programs were still satisfactory for safety-related activities. The licensee has reduced the number of activities or components that are safety-related due to system deactivation and license changes. This reduction has reduced the number of-items these programs need to assess. These program reductions generally appear appropriate.
Sianificant Safety Matters:
None 9308160156 930727 PDR ADOCK 05000344 G
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Summary of Violations and Deviations: None Open items Summary.
One followup item was opened (Paragraph 7). One enforcement item (Paragraph
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10), one unresolved item (Paragraph 10), and one followup item (Paragraph 10)
were closed.
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DETAILS j
1.
Persons Contacted a.
Portland General Electric J. E. Cross, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer j
S. M. Quennoz, Plant General Manager
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D. L. Nordstrom, General Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- T. D.. Walt, General Manager, Technical Functions
- C. P. Yundt, Project Manager, Special Projects H. K. Chernoff, Manager, Licensing L. K. Houghtby, Manager, Plant Support M. B. Lackey, Manager, Planning and Control J. P. Sullivan, Nuclear Plant Engineering Manager J. M. Mihelich, Manager, Technical Services i
T. O. Meek, Manager, Personnel Protection
- J. A. Vingerud, Manager, Maintenance
- J. D. Westvold, Manager, Quality Assurance W. J. Williams, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
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- S. A. Schneider, Manager, Operations C. M. Dieterle, Supervisor, Individual Plant Examination E. W. Ford, Compliance Specialist
- B. R. Hugo, Compliance Specialist b.
Oreaon Department of Enerav A.
Bless, Resident Safety Manager V.
Sarte, Resident Inspector The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors,
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reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
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Plant Status Trojan remained defueled throughout the reporting period. The licensee made progress in changing their license including submitting a new security plan, canceling operator licenses and finishing the final defueled program.
At the end of the reporting period, about 300 people remained onsite.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined-plant activities to verify the safety of the licensee's facility. The inspector observed these activities on a daily, weekly or bi-weekly -
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The inspector observed control room activities daily to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed
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in the facility Technical Specifications. The inspector examined logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records to obtain information on plant conditions, trends and compliance with
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regulations. On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the inspector observed turnover of plant information to determine that on-shift operators relayed pertinent information to oncoming shift personnel.
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Each week the inspector toured accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items:
General plant and equipment conditions
Maintenance requests and repairs
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment
Ignition sources and flammable material control
Conduct of activities according to the licensee's
administrative controls and approved procedures Plant housekeeping and cleanliness
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Radioactive waste systems
Proper storage of compressed gas bottles
Each week the inspector conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training and other topics related to in-progress work activities.
The inspector periodically observed radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee implemented them in conformance with facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements. The inspectors verified that health physics supervisors and professionals conducted plant tours to observe activities in progress and were aware of significant plant activities, particularly those related to radio-logical conditions and/or challenges. ALARA considerations were found an integral part of each RWP (Radiation Work Permit).
The inspector conducted routine inspections of selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program.
During inspection activities and periodic tours of plant areas, the inspectors verified proper use of personnel monitoring equipment, observed individuals leaving the radiation controlled area and signing out on appropriate RWP's, and observed the posting of radiation areas and contaminated areas.
The involvement of health physics supervisors and engineers and their awareness of significant plant activities was assessed through conversations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Maintenance (62703)
During the inspection period, the inspector observed portions of and
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reviewed documentation associated with maintenance activities on the "D" Service Water Booster Pump (SWBP). Qualified craftsmen conducted this activity according to regulatory requirements and procedures including proper use of clearance tags, proper equipment alignment and proper retesting. The licensee performed corrective and preventive maintenance on the pump and motor using Maintenance Requests (MRs) 93-00388 and 92-04741.
During the pump disassembly, the licensee identified a marred shaft underneath the outboard bearing.
Since this bearing was compression fit to the shaft, it should not have slipped and marred the shaft.
The licensee measured the shaft and found it undersized. The licensee sent the shaft to a vendor for chrome buildup in the affected area to meet the minimum design radius. The inspector verified that the shaft had the proper diameter. The licensee reassembled the pump and tested it satisfactorily. The inspector concluded that the licensee performed the pump maintenance according to their work instructions using qualified equipment.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Surveillance (61726. 627031 The inspector observed portions of the semi-annual calibration of the
"A" meteorological tower, required by Technical Specification (TS)
i 3.3.3.4.
Qualified technicians using approved equipment performed this
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calibration.
The licensee performed these calibrations per Maintenance
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Request (MR) 93-00509 and referenced procedures.
During this observation, the inspector and the licensee observed i
evidence of rodents in part of the meteorological tower circuitry. The rodents nested by the circuit cards in the transmitter cabinet in the meteorological shack. The transmitter relays the instrument signals from the tower to the control room. The licensee previously had tried to prohibit rodents into the meteorological tower shack by closing all openings or blocking them with steel wool. The licensee is not certain whether they adequately cleaned the cabinet previously or if the previous corrective actions were effective. To assure that there will be no more rodents near the circuitry, the licensee cleaned the cabinet and committed to perform weekly inspections.
One thermometer used to check the meteorological tower temperature instruments exceeded its calibration interval, but was within the 25%
grace period allowed by the licensee's procedures.
The licensee used this thermometer to verify the delta temperature difference between the 53 foot and 220 foot temperature elements. The licensee is verifying that this thermometer is accurate and in calibration. The absence of rodents and the calibration verification of the thermometer will be followed up by the inspector during routine inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Review Committees (40500)
The inspector reviewed the activities of the onsite and offsite review committees. The onsite review committee is the Plant Review Board (PRB)
I and the offsite review committee is the Trojan Nuclear Operations Board (TNOB). These committees provide independent oversight and review of the plant operation and activities. Technical Specifications (TSs)
6.5.1 and 6.5.2 apply to the PRB and TNOB respectively.
The inspector reviewed written minutes for the PRB and TNOB.
From this review, the inspector found that the licensee met the TS requirements
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for meeting frequency, quorum and qualification levels. From the review of these meeting minutes, the inspector found that the review committees
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adequately performed their functions. The PRB reviewed Licensee Change i
Requests (LCAs), Licensee Event Reports (LERs), special reports, l
selected Corrective Action Requests (CARS), Notices of Violation (NOVs)
and selected procedure revisions and program changes. The TN0B reviewed
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items in their charter including license submittals, QA audits and i
program changes.
Both groups initiated and tracked items requiring
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further review.
Their control and review of items seem appropriate.
The inspector will monitor future PRB and TN0B meetings to assess the licensee's effectiveness in assessing items.
7.
Corrective Action Proaram (92720)
The inspector reviewed portions of the licensee's corrective action program. To document non-conforming conditions, the licensee writes Corrective Action Requests (CARS) in accordance with Trojan Plant Procedure (TPP)17-1, " Corrective Action Program." The inspector reviewed ten CARS initiated this year and found that the licensee effectively dispositioned the CARS and that the root cause determination was appropriate.
The inspector found that although the licensee has not changed their corrective action program, the amount of quality-related activities has declined since plant shutdown. The total number of CARS written at the
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time of the review this year was 59, while 632 were written last year.
Nevertheless, the ratios of severity levels between II and III CARS is about the same.
The inspector noted that the CAR initiation rate has declined as plant staff and activities declined.
The licensee initiated 27 CARS in the first two months of this year; 21 in March and April and 11 in the next two months.
While the scope of activities, the total number of CARS, and the CAR initiations rates declined, the inspector could not determine if the threshold for initiating CARS had changed. The QA organization raised the same question and intends to assess this in the next audit of the corrective action program. The inspector will followup on this item this QA audit, which is scheduled for August, 1993, (50-344/93-09-01).
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Maintenance Procram (62700. 62702)
The inspector reviewed the changes in the maintenance organization made due to the premature shutdown of the plant. The licensee's maintenance i
program is focussed on systems that are required to support their
defueled status. The licensee has permanently deactivated non-required systems. These remaining systems currently include electrical power distribution, spent fuel pool cooling, service water, component cooling water and the emergency diesel generator. These and several other systems are the remaining Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)
covered by the maintenance program.
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The licensee's maintenance program includes corrective and preventive maintenance activities on equipment, and processes for tagging out this
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equipment. The licensee also has requirements for special processes (e.g freeze seals, welding), cleanliness and housekeeping. The licensee
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also must train the remaining personnel to work on the equipment. The
procedures the licensee uses to describe their maintenance program are:
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Trojan Plant Procedures (TPP) 13-17, " Trojan Holdout and Tagging Procedure," TPP 14-3, " Work Control," and TPP 14-8, " Foreign Material Exclusion." The inspector found that for the remaining systems required to be operable, that the maintenance program has essentially not changed. Although the licensee reduced the number of required systems, the licensee is maintaining most of the previous requirements.
For corrective maintenance, the licensee continues to use written
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l procedures to repair components and reviews these procedures prior to work on the component. The licensee still maintains the administrative requirements for identification of personnel, cause of the failure and post-maintenance tests. The inspector verified these administrative requirements during routine monthly observations.
The licensee implemented Preventive maintenance (PM) schedules to maintain remaining safety-related SSC's. The licensee is implementing their PM program with a master schedule to complete these activities. The licensee's control for tagging out systems (TPP 13-17) remains unchanged since this i
involves personnel safety. The licensee's control of special processes and requirements for housekeeping has not changed. The cleanliness controls for foreign material exclusion have not changed; however, the licensee does not foresee a requirement to work on systems that need an A or B cleanliness class (i.e., RCS).
The licensee has reduced their total maintenance backlog by eliminating Maintenance Requests (MRs) on deactivated systems, combining MRs on other systems or performing the work on the MR. The licensee has
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i reduced the number of MRs from about 5500 in January to about 850 at the end of the inspection period. The licensee has also reduced their maintenance backlog on the important systems by working them. At the
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end of the reporting period, about 33% was corrective and 67% was preventive. The inspector reviewed the backlog of MRs on important remaining systems and the backlog did not seem excessive.
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The licensee's training program has changed.
Prior to plant closure,
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the training department conducted maintenance _ training. 'The licensee-
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has eliminated the training department and the maintenance' organization.
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now conducts maintenance training. 'There is one trainer within the
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maintenance organization to maintain the craftsmen qualification.. He maintains training and training records for m&intenance personnel. New-personnel brought onsite,'will be trained On-the-Job Training (0JT)~.
No violations or_ deviations were identified.
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Follow-up of Licensee Event Reports (927001
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LER 93-03. R'evision 0.-(Closed) "Liahtnina Strike Causes Undervoltaae Condition and Results in Emeroency Diesel Generator (EDG) Start From
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Non-Encineered Safety Feature Sianal." On May 31,1993, lightning - _
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strikes on one train of offsite power caused the "A" train EDG to start.
The "A" train EDG started from an temporary undervoltage of' offsite l
power seen by the startup transformers due to the lightning.
l Approximately an 80-percent undervoltage on a startup transformer t
provides an anticipatory nonsafety-related start of the affected EDG.-
There is no time delay in this circuit.
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Offsite power was not lost during this event and the diesel did not load onto the emergency bus. There was only a momentary voltage transient on offsite power. The inspector reviewed the circumstances for this LER in
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NRC Inspection Repurt (50-344/93-08). Due to the limited safety-significance of this LER, and the permanent plant closure, this LER is closed.
i No violations or deviations were identified, j
10.
Follow-up of Enforcement. Unresolved and Followup Items (92701)
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Enforcement Item 92-24-03 (Closed). "Inadeouate Corrective Actions-for Identified Weaknesses."-
The inspector previously identified several concerns regarding the licensee's Industry Experience Review Program, specifically involving the review of Information Notices. A previous Quality Assurance (QA) audit found similar problems and concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were not fully effective in resolving these concerns. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found that they were appropriate. The inspector reviewed the licensee's current Information Notice review program. Although the licensee continues to review Information Notices for applicability, most of the ins are not applicable since plant closure. The inspector concluded that the licensee is reviewing the Information Notices effectively and in a
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timely manner. Based on the plant's closure and the licensee's actions, this item is closed.
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93-06-02. (ClosedL ' Drawina Revision Timelin'ess."
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Unresolved Item The inspector and licensee Quality Control,noted two items of concern during'a maintenance observation on a Control Room Emergency. Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
temperature element.
These ' involved (1). an incorrect electrical drawing used during this maintenance, and (2) a discovery that the temperature element was not securely installed.
The inspector and the licensee'found that the drawings used in
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this maintenance activity had not been revised to reflect a modification performed in the last outage.
Further review noted
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adequately being tracked. Since this was a previous problem noted l
and corrected by the licensee, the inspector wanted to understand-why there were overdue drawings. The licensee found that there
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was a large influx of drawings submitted in October 1992. 'After the permanent plant shutdown on January 4,1993, the licensee did not submit weekly reports documenting the progress to update.
drawings. Without these reports, management was not aware of the increasing backlog. At the same time, the personnel working on the drawing revisions also went through training to help in finding a new job. This training had the effect of increasing the drawing backlog, since the personnel were not working on the drawing updates. Prior to the inspector's questions, the licensee started reducing the backlog. During this report, the licensee prioritized the drawings they would update based on the plant condition and remaining operable systems.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee had reduced their backlog.
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I The inspector reviewed the licensee's assessment of. the temperature element that was not securely installed. The temperature element was not threaded in as designed and was held
.in place by silicon sealant. The licensee determined that there-had been poor communicat a ns between an Instrument and Controls (I&C) technician and the system engineer during previous-maintenance. The I&C technician said that he had discussed the configuration with the system engineer and that the system engineer had found it to be acceptable. The system engineer did not recall this discussion and did not have any documentation of it. The system engineer said that the'use of silicon sealant was acceptable for use on the Control Room Emergency HVAC system, but only to prevent air leaks. The licensee intends to issue a
" lessons-learned" memo on the importance of effective communications and to document engineering evaluations of existing conditions.
Based on the licensee's corrective actions, this item is closed.
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Followup Item 93-06-03. (Closed). " Followup of Wood in Service Water (SW) system Strainers."
The "B" train SW strainer shear pin broke due to a wood wedge in the bottom of the strainer. The inspector wanted to assess (1)
the source of the wood, (2) whether the operability of the SW system could be affected and (3) review the licensee's previous evaluations of wood in the strainer.
The source of the wood was the intake structure.
The wood was there either due to original construction or was inadvertently introduced during maintenance activities. The licensee has implemented foreign material exclusion practices during work on the intake structure. The licensee has previously evaluated operability of SW system due to debris in the SW strainer. The inspector reviewed these evaluations. The effect on system operability for a broken shear pin is that the backwash arm does not rotate, and if this is not repaired, the strainer may become more plugged. This would lead to a higher differential pressure (delta P) across the strainer and could affect Service Water Booster Pump (SWBP) suction pressure and total overall flow.
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operability of the SW system is affected, but would take days to
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affect SW system operability.
In response to previous, similar events, the licensee performed an l
engineering calculation to show the maximum differential pressure they could tolerate. The licensee monitors this differential pressure to assure that it is less than this calculation shows.
The inspector reviewed this calculation and determined that it provided a conservative setpoint.
Further, based on current plant status, the amount of required flow is much less. This suggests that the SW strainer could have a much higher delta P and not affect SW operability. The inspector found that wood would affect the SW strainer by affecting the strainer delta P.
The licensee analyzed this effect and SW differential pressure is monitored to assure operability. Based on the licensee's actions, this item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 on July 21, 1993, and with licensee management throughout the inspection period. During these meetings the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee verified that there is no proprietary information in this report.
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