IR 05000344/1989024
| ML19332D449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1989 |
| From: | Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332D447 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-89-24, NUDOCS 8912010215 | |
| Download: ML19332D449 (13) | |
Text
- .
,
\\
.
~
,
,
L,
.c
,
-
n
[,
'
- U..S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
\\
Report No.
' 50-344/89-24
,.
Docket No.
50-344
}-
License No.
NPF-1 p
ticensee:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S.W. Salmon Street f
Portland, OR. 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted:- September 9,1989 - October 13, 1989
,
.
,(
Inspectors:
R.- C. Barr Senior Resident Inspector
'J. F. Melfi Resident inspector
<
Approved By:
Dm N
'b'-
A'/'#4 M. M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed ReactorProjectsSection1
'
Summary:
Inspection on September 9 - October 13, 1989 (Report 50-344/89-24)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection of operational safety verification,.
l maintenance, surveillance, event follow-up, system engineering, and open item
'
follow-up.
Inspection procedures 30703, 37702 61726, 62703, 71707, 90712, 92700,92701,92702,and93702wereusedasguIdanceduringtheconductofthe
l inspection.
Results-This inspection identified two apparent violations of regulatory requirements.
l L
. Weaknesses included (1) a failure to include dial indicators in the licensee's calibration program (paragraph 4); (2) a failure to perform an out-of-calibration investigation on the high voltage power supply to the power
' range nuclear detector (paragraph 6),
'
e9120%[phbb f ppR
. p.
,=i o
E
.
p
,
.
.
.-
,
.
..
DETAILS i
g 1.
Persons Contacted j
o
'
- D. W. Cockfield, Vice President, Nuclear
{
- C. P. Yundt,' Plant General Manager
- T. D. Walt, General Manager, Technical Functions
,
- -
- A. N. Roller, Manager, Nuclear Plant Engineering
' +
- C. K. Seaman, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance D. W. Swan, Manager, Technical Services M. J. Singh, Manager, Plant Modifications
.
J. D. Reid, Manager, Quality Support Services
- J. W. Lentsch, Manager, Personnel Protection
- J.
Whelan, Branch Manager, Maintenance J.
Mody, Branch Manager, Plant Systems Engineering
- D. L. Nordstrom, Branch Manager, Quality Operations
- J. P. Fischer, PM/EA Branch Manager T. O. Meek Branch Manager, Radiation Protection
-
R.N.Prewlt, Supervisor,QualitySystems
- R. L. Russell, Branch Manager, Operations
- J. C. Heitzman, Acting Assistant Operations Supervisor
,
J.A.Benjamln,nstrumentandControlSupervisor j
N. A. Regoli I
Supervisor, Quality Audits J. D. Guberski, Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department Engineer
- W. J. Williams, Compliance Engineer The inspectors elso interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
'
i 2.
Plant Status l
l At the beginning of this inspection period, the plant was in mode 1, 99%
power.
On September 9, 1989, anomalous control rod movement was observed i
during the performance of a surveillance.
The anomalous control rod movement was determined by the licensee to be dirty contacts on a bypass switch.
On September 16, the loop 2 Tave meter oscillated several times i
on its full range of indication (see paragraph 6).
The licensee was having problems with the pressurizer relief tank heating up due to a l
1eaking Pressurizer Safety Valve (PSV 80100) and a leaking let-down relief valve.
To fix these valves the plant shutdown on September 16,
'
t 1989.
During the outage, the condition of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) racks was noted to be poor, and additional cleaning and maintenance l
was required.
The plant began its heatup on October 1, 1989.
When the RCS approached Normal Operating Temperature (NOT) and Normal Operating Pressure (N0P), the Pressurizer Safety Valve (PSV 80108) was'noted to be leaking.
The valve lift setting was ceasured and adjusted higher on i
October 2-3, 1989 (see paragraph 5).
The plant reached Mode 1 on October
'
3,'1989, and began power ascension.
A safety concern over the Reactor
t
-.
.
.
.-
..
p
~
'
'
'
.
'
.
Coolant System (RCS) average temperature (Tave) and reference temperature (Tref) was raised during t1e outage (see aaragraph 6) and power was limitea to 97% pending its resolution.
11e plant continued in Mode 1 at i
97% power until the end of the inspection period.
3.
Safety Verification (71707)
<
Operational Safety Verification During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly or biweekly basis.
Daily the ins)ectors observed control room activities to verify the licensee's ad1erence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed in the-facility Technical Specifications.
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions,. trends and compliance with regulations.
'On.occasionswhenashiftturnoverwasInprogress the turnover of
informationonplantstatuswasobservedtodetermInethatpertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift personnel.
Each week the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to l
observe the following items
_
,
(a) General plant and equipment conditions.
Maintenance requests and repairs.-
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
'
= Ignition sources and flammable material control.
) Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures.
() Interiors of electrical and control panels.
i ( ), Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
l Radiation protection controls.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
Radioactive waste systems.
,
() Proper storage of compressed gas bottles.
Weekly, the inspectors examined the licensee's equipment clearance control with respect to removal of equipment from service to determine that the-licensee complied with technical specification limiting i
i conditions for operation.
Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure l
that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance
'
evolutions.
Logsofjumpers, bypasses,cautionandtesttagswere
,
examined by the inspectors.
'
Each week the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel.
The discussions centered on pertinent u
'
topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training and other topics related to in progress work activities.
L The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCRs) to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
,
i
W
-
'
,
...
,
,
'
'
,
..
-
.
p Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action, i
,
'
Routine inspections of the licensee's physical security program were
.
h performed in the areas of access control, organization and staffing, and i
detection and assessment systems.
The insaectors observed the access control measures used at the entrance to tie protected area, verified the i
integrity of portions of the protected area barrier and vital area i
barriers [orymeasuresuponbreachof~vitalareabarriers.and observed in several c
,
compensa Portions of i
'
[:
the isolation zone were verified to be free of obstructions.- Functioning
E of central and secondary alarm stations (including the use of CCTV
'
F monitors) was observed.
On a sampling basis, the inspectors verified
,
i L'
that the required minimum number of armed guards and individuals
'
authorized to direct security activities were on site.
b The inspectors conducted routine inspections of selected activities of L
the licensee's radiological protection program.
A sampling of radiation work permits (RWP) was reviewed for completeness and adequacy of information.
During the course of inspection activities and periodic
,
tours of plant areas, the inspectors verified proper use of personnel monitoring equipment, observed individuals leaving'the radiation controlled area and signing out on appropriate RW? s, and observed the posting of radiation areas and contaminated areas.
Posted radiation
. levels at locations within the fuel and auxiliary buildings were verified using both-NRC and licensee portable survey meters.
The involvement of health physics supervisors and engineers and their awareness of significant plant activities was assessed through conversations and review of RW sign-in records.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety features.
This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable.
,
No violations or deviations were identified.
,
,
4.
Maintenance (62703)
1989, the north Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) was On September 23,inutes with the supply of water to the pump isolated.
operated for 6 m E
This event was the result of improper valve lineup and is further discussed in paragraph 6.
The operator stopped the pump when low flow annunicators to the Reactor Coolant Pump seals annuciated.
Subsequent discussion with licensee personnel revealed that the seal was checked to see if it was " hot"
<
p within 15 minutes after the event happened.
The licensee ran the In-Service Testing (IST) flow tests for the pump and the pump passed
. design flows at design pressure, Due to the importance of the pump, and since the pump had to be replaced i~
'
before when (in 1983) the manual suction isolation valve to the pump was
,"
left closed, the licensee discussed tH s recent event with the pump
-
,
-.
..
-
-
.
'
.
manufacturer. The pump manufacturer recommended a disassembly of the
- -
pum).
After these discussions, the licensee decided to only look at the out)oard thrust bearings to determine if any pump degradation had taken place.
It was decided not to inspect the seals, since there were other H
indications available to determine if the seals were degraded.
The licensee initiated Maintenance Request (MR) 89-9141 to inspect the thrust bearin The workers entered under and adhered to Radiological Work Permit (g.RWP)89-017.The licensee obtained the proper clearances
<
and no Limiting Conditions for 0)erations (LCO) were exceeded.
The inspector noted that the thrust ) earing (QI) hold points on MRdid not show any i
abnormal wear.
The Quality Inspection 89-9141'
L were observed, and the equipment was restored to service.
During the observation of the work activity, the inspector noted a dial indicator was used:to obtain the initial thrust bearing readings.
The value of 0.010 inches was obtained.
The licensee stated that the thrust bearing axial clearance was noted in the vendor manual to be 0.011 to 0.013 inches.
The licensee personnel stated that this was for a dry bearing and since the bearing had oil on it after the work was performed, the licensee set the thrust bearing for the same reading (0.010 inches).
The inspector noted that the dial indicator used did not have a calibration sticker on it.
When questioned on this, the licensee replied l
that the dial indicators were not required to be calibrated since they either worked or did not; and if it works, it is accurate.
The system
,
was then restored to service.
l The inspector further investigated the use of dial indicators by the
!
licensee.
It was determined that the licensee does not regularly verify L
that their dial indicators are in calibration.
If the dial indicator is L
requested by the worker to be a calibrated dial indicator, the licensee uses lower t1er Maintenance Department Procedure (MDP) 1-12, " Dial Indicators," to calibrate a dial indicator.
Due to the questions asked by the inspector, the dial indicator used was subsequently verified to be in calibration.
The Quality..ispection (QI) person involved became aware of the issue and investigated independent of the resident inspector.
He reported back to the inspector of the licensee's practices.
The inspector related his concerns, and then the QI inspector initiated Non-Conforming Activity Report (NCAR) P89-0428 to document the concern.
The licensee's calibration program for Portable Measuring and Test Equipment (PM and TE) is described in Maintenance Procedure (MP) 3-1,
" Calibration of Portable Measuring and Test Equipment." Step 5.7 of this procedure notes that:
"When plant characteristics, efficiencies, capabilities or other parameters are measured or adjusted to assure compliancewithTechnicalSpecifications,theinstrument(s)usedmust have adequate accuracy to determine the measured quantity to the precision required by the stated limits of the specification.
In order to maintain these requirements, measuring and test equipment shall be calibrated or inspected either on a regular scheduled basis or prior to its use, depending o,1 the requirements of the procedure for the PM&TE."
. -
.. -
p
'
t
.
,
.
e
,
,
.
i-
.
!
This is done, in part. to meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XII, i
" Control of Measuring and Test Equipment, which states:
" Measures shall
<
be established to assure that tools, gages, instruments and other
'
<
..
measuringandtestingdevicesusedinactivitiesaffectIngqualityare properly controlled calibrated,andadjustedatspecifiedperiodsto l
,
maintain accuracy wIthin necessary limits." Since the licensee was o
g i
taking measurements on an activity that affected quality with equipment
!
that was not properly controlled calibratedoradjustedat-specified
periods, this is an apparent violation of regulatory requirements (50-344/89-24-01).
i One violation was identified and no deviations were identified, i
5.-
Surveillance (61726)
The inspector observed the licensee perform a retest / surveillance on
!
Pressurizer Safety Valve (PSV) 80108.
This valve is one of three safety
'
valves that provides overpressure protection for the Reactor Coolant Sy/4.3.1 as having a lift setting of 2485 Psig 12%.These three valve setpoints a
'
stem.
This safety valve was l
observed leaking when the licensee was in Mode 3 on October 1,1989,
approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after Normal Operating Temperatures (NOT) and Pressures (N0P).
The licensee came down slightly in pressure to get the B Pressurizer Safety Valve (PSV 80108) to reseat.
This effort apparently reseated the valve as evidenced by decreased valve discharge tailpipe temperature and pressure was returned to normal.
This activity was also
'
performed to determine the initial setting (2485 psig 12%), if possible.
of the safety valve, and
readjustithigherinitsacceptanceband The licensee generated Maintenance Request (Mii) 89-9345 to perform this
[
testingandlossiblereadjustment.
The licensee did the work under
Maintenance )rocedure (MP 5-1), " Pressurizer Safety Valve Inservice Test" and procedure deviations89-545 and 89-605.
The licensee used a process (Trevitest) to evaluate the as-found condition.
This process consisted of taking a calibrated hydraulic lifting device, attaching it to the safety valve, and increasing the hydraulic pressure until the valve lifts.
The pressure where the valve lifts can be calculated from the
'
initial RCS pressure, how much force is needed to lift the valve, the
!
cross-sectional area of the valve seat, and the weight of the test equipment.
The inspector attended the Pre-Job briefing and the workers involved in
~1 thejobwerenresent.
The specifics of the job were mentioned, the Radiological Nork Permit (RWP) and the safety aspects of the work were Mechanical Maintenance, Quality Inspections). groups (I&C, Security,The Trev discussed, as was the work interface between was brought onsite, and calibrated in the maintenance shop.
The procedure used by the licensee was reviewed prior to use.
The workers went in under RWP 89-411, and the provisions of the RWP were noted to be adhered to.
The inspector and the Quality Operations (QO)
inspector concurrently observed that the test was conducted in accordance L
with the provisions of Periodic Engineering Test (PET) 5-6, " Containment l_
and Recirculation Sump Surveillance," (issued 9/26/89).
This procedure l
.
-
-
-
y
?
',
'
/
.
.
.
s was issued in response to observations by the inspectors in inspection j
p report 50-344/89-19.
j
w
.-
!
?
The inspector observed that the administrative tagouts were obtained prior to. test initiation.
The inspector observed )ortions of the test
-and restoration to service of the Safety Valve.
T1e testing was done by i
qualified personnel.
The system pressure was maintained approximately at j
'
1900 asig.
The inspector subsequently reviewed the test documentation for t1e valve and performed independent calculations from the test.
No j
discrepancies were identified.
I The valve was initially found with a setting of 2466 psig.
The valve was then adjusted 3/8 of a flat clockwise and then retested.
The new adjustment for the valve was found to be 2514 and 2519 psig.
The j
as-found value and.as-left values met the TS requirements.
]
,
After exiting containment, the form for PET 5-6 was delivered to the
,
Shift Supervisor for his review and signature.
The particular attachment was not adequate since there was no provision for inspectors entering i
containment for work observation if they did not take in or remove any material. The licensee is currently revising this procedure to reflect these concerns and other concerns with this procedure from operations,
~ maintenance, and outage management personnel.
No violations or' deviations were identified.
6.
Event Follow-up (71707, 92700, 93702)
i
Temperature Oscillations of loop 3 Thot At 7:00 a.m. on September 11, 1989, while conducting routine inspection
-
activities in the control room, control board annunciators for Reactor Coolant System temperature annunciated.
The loop 2 indication of delta T
,
(Thot-Tcold) and Tave ((Thot+Tcold)/2) were noted to be oscillating.
The loop 2 temperature indications of Tave, delta T, Over Temperature delta Temperature (OT delta T) and Over Power delta Temperature (OP delta T)
,
are grouped together on the control board along with the other channels nearby.
The other loop temperature indications were stable.
The temperature oscillations were full scale on the Tave and delta T meters.
The licensee placed the rods in manual and defeated the Tave nnd delta T
-
inputs for loop 2 following the actions of Off-Normal Instruction (0NI)
,
2-6.
The temperature indications returned to normal within 10 minutes after the initiation of the oscillation.
The reactor protection system bistables with loop 2 Temperature inputs were placed in the tripped condition within 10 minutes.
The licensee entered Technical Specification Action Statement 3.3.3.1 and 3.3.3.2.
l The licensee had recorders monitoring all the loop Tave and delta T
inputs due to a previous OT delta T reactor trip that occurred about 5 weeks previously.
From these recorder traces, it was noted that loop 2 l
Tave and delta T were rising and falling together, with OT delta T L
oscillating more often.
The OT delta T oscillation was probably due to l
-
,.
... -
.
-_
--
-
.
--
y4 p
.
.
b
..
.
t
=
., -
,
,
e !-
\\
,
E
.the anticipatory circuit in the OT delta T calculator.
It was quickly
_ concluded that loop 2'Thot was the indicator that was oscillating.
,
f-The licensee shutdown and reached Mode 3 by 12:38 a.m. on September-16,
,
E
'1989 to fix problems with the pressurizer safety valve not seating.
It-system (RPS) module TY-421A (y the licensee that reactor protection was subsequently determined.b Thot low Level Amplifier) was not engaged-
!L when last installed in the RPS cabinet.
The work instructions for the E
craft were not specific for the module tightness for the ELC0 connector
!!
on Module TY-421 A. -
if Improper Terminations and Connections
After repairing the relief valves, the licensee performed inspections to determine the cause of Tave oscillating and to-inspect for loose
.
connections due to the reactor trip on OT delta T..The licensee performed an inspection and-found seven loose connectors on the OT delta
'_
'T modules. As followup to regional _ concerns, the licensee committed to
'the NRC to investigate the HAGAN protection racks.
b
=A Shift Supervisor investigated several of the other HAGAN control racks
~
and~found several other connectors that were loose or questionable.
The-licensee then performed further inspections in the racks to identify loose or questionable; connections.
What was found by the licensee was documented in a Lessons Learned i
Summary, dated September 29, 1989.
The findings included:
I 1):
Inadequate ' spade' lug engagement under the terminal screw.
2)
Improper lug installation.
,
3);
Lug " cocked"~on " crossed" under the lock washer.
4) : Terminal screws not tight.
>
5)_.
Missing cabinet mounting hardware.
6)
Incomplete or incorrect connection of connectors.
7)
Cabinets not kept clean and free of nonpermanent items.
~
8)'
" Frayed" wiring at terminations.
4:
The amount of inadequate terminations was a small fraction of the total.
I
'
However, the licensee attributed this to technicians and supervisors not
-
'
doing a thorough job.
It was also noted that the rack cleanliness could
%
be improved and actions were taken to put cleaning of the racks on the
.
preventative maintenance program.
'
,
'
Tave'- Tref deviatio:
I Technical Specification (TS) maximum value for RCS Tave is 589 degrees F.
(TS 3.2.5) which relates to Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB), and
b
O j
.
.-
x
. u the_ nominal 100% power value of 585 degrees F. The 589 degrees F. number
,
is an absolute value for temperature in the core and does not take into
account instrument inaccuracies.
The licensee had one Reactor Coolant
,
Loop (loop D) that was reading higher than the.other loops.
'
To account for all the inaccuracies and still be below~the temperature t
limit, the licensee reduced power to 97%.
At the end of the inspection
'
period the licensee was evaluating methods-to return to 100% power i
i conditions..
'
N-43 High Voltage Power Supply Out of Calibration
'On September 19, 1989, during the channel check performed on Power Range
,
' Nuclear Instrument N43, the licensee discovered that the )ower range high voltage supply was out of its expected range along with tie RPS trip
.
resets associated with N43.
t The inspector looked at the four previous channel checks for channel N43..
The inspector determined that the previous check (9/7/89) of N43 showed
that the detector high voltage supply had been out of its acceptance band.
The licensee's initial review or subsequent re-review did not
-
reveal that the power range high voltage setpoint had drifted. lower than the criteria noted in the PICT 11-1 data sheet.
In discussing the importance of having.the detector high voltage supply
with a lower voltage setting, the licensee produced graphs showing that
-
the detector output is relatively insensitive to large changes in the i
voltage power supply.
Further, the high-voltage power su) ply would not have an affect on the trip or reset functions of N43-if tie voltage remains as pure direct' current.
The licensee also contacted Westinghcuse, who concurred with this evaluation.
The licensee then concentrated on the low voltage power supplies for a possible explanation of the problem.
The licensee hooked up monitoring equipment on the detector output signal, and noticed that the detector output was oscillating with an 8 mi;11second frequency.
The licensee suspected.this oscillation to be due to a faulty capacitor.
Since the i
high voltage power supply and the channel signal are connected at the l:
detector, the oscillation of the power supply directly induced (via capacitive coupling) the noticed change in the detector output. This oscillation had a larger negative amplitude than positive amplitude.
In L
tracing out the circuit of the detector output to the trips and trip resets, the induced oscillation would cause the resets to come in higher, due to the large negative amplitude.
The failure of the power su) ply was caur,ing the resets to conservatively shift to higher voltages.
T1e licensee replaced the power supply, and channel N43 was calibrated.
The licensee did not conduct an out-of-calibration investigation as recuired by Maintenance Procedure (MP) 2-0, " Installed Plant Maintenance
'
anc Calibration".
MP 2-0 notes that, "If the As Found readings for quality-related instruments are outside the stated tolerance (or if the instrument is completely failed), the I&C technician shall complete the testing portion of the procedure where applicable and bring it to the attention of the I&C Supervisor or his designee.
They shall initiate a
ge g
n
,.
.
P g
.
<
,
,
,
('+h
)
'
m
I
-
.
.
.-
.
.
.
. Form I&C-10 " Installed Instrument Out-of-Calibration' Investigation for Quality-RelatedInstruments." The. failure to perform an out of
" calibration investigation is an apparent violation (50-344/89-24-02).
InadveEtentAuxiliaryFeedwaterInitiation-At 12:30 am on September 16, 1989,- the licensee had an Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Auto Start..The licensee was"in Mode 2 at the time.and hadjusttriapedthesecondMainFeedwaterPump(MFW).
The AFW pump's
.'
auto start w1en both MFW-pumps are. tripped unless the signal-is blocked.
The operators' performed a General Operating Instruction (G01)-3 step out
'
,
of sequence, therefore causing the auto start.
The licensee wrote'an Event Report on-this-event, A similar event happened previously.
The licensee reemphasized this event to their operators.
^
Running Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) Without Water Supply l
On September 23,1989, at 2:52 am, the North Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) was run for approximately 6 minutes with both suctions from the Volume-Control Tank (VCT) ch sed (valves -112B and 112C).
Six minutes later, when low flow annunciators came in for low Reactor Coolant Pump
'
Seal flow, and low charging flow, the suction valves were noticed to be closed-from the VCT and:the RWST.
The pump was immediately stopped and declared inoperable.
An operator'was dispatched to the puma, and no
indication of overheating was observed.
The oil was also clecked for discolorization.
Subsequent inspection found that maintenance personnel
'
present at the time of the event also noted that the CCP seals were' cool 15 minutes after.the event.
The pump was rotated by hand approximately-a
.two' hours later to verify there was no rubbing.
'
Since'the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was out of service, the
,
emergency.boration Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.1.2.5.was a concern.
The licensee-verified that there was an emergency boration flow path to meet the~T.S. 3.1.2.5.
-
The licensee's maintenance personnel discussed this event with the pump manufacturer. The licensee performed an inspection of the pump bearing.
This is also discussed in paragraph 4.
-The procedure used did not explicitly state for the operator to verify that the suction valves are open, but it does state to verify that there is a flow path-to the pump.
The operator was subsequently relieved by the licensee of control room operator responsibilities.
'
One violation was identified and no deviations were identified, a
"
7.-
Follow-up of Licensee Event Reports [LERs] (90712, 92700)
'LER 88-49, Revision 0,- (Closed), " Partial Containment Isolations Result from Signal Spike and Operator Error." This LER reported partial containment isolations of the steam generator blowdown system (SGBD) on three different occasions within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
The licensee determined two of the isolations resulted from electronics noise spikes-that exceeded the alarm setpoint.
Subsequent licensee investigation, as
,
.
r
..-
- lf
..- V
,
,
-
'
^
Jreported in LER 50-344/88-46 Revision 1, found that solenoid valve x
control-circuits generated electrical noise in the aower supply circuitry of the radiation monitors.
As corrective action, tie licensee installeo noisesuppressiondevices(capacitors)inthesecircuits.
No unexpected isolations, as a result of noise,- have been experienced since.
The third SGBD isolation occurred when an operator, who was evaluating an
'
-a) parent abnormally low reading took the PRM-10 control switch out of tie CALIBRATE position toward the OFF position and unintentionally, momentarily de-energized the radiation monitoring c,ircuitry.
The licensee concluded the consequences of troubleshooting needed to be fully evaluated prior to commencing the troubleshooting.
The licensee conducted a lessons learned session with licensed operators on the
,
subjectoftroubleshooting.
LER 89-17, Revision 0, (Closed), " Reactor Trip on Over Temperature Delta Temperature Signal." This LER reported an automatic reactor shutdown (trip) from 50% power due to the over temperature 6 elta temperature (OT delta T) protection feature.
The trip occurred rhile the OT delta T logic was in one out of three protection logic do, to conducting a technical-specification surveillance.
The licensee concluded the trip was caused by an intermittent spike of another channel of GT delta T.
The licensee, after investigating, could not identify what protection channel the spikes originated from or what caused the spikes.
Prior to
returning to power, the-licensee recalibrated all OT delta T channels, i
replaced three electronic modules in Channel 4 OT delta T (the most suspect channel and modules), and instrumented all the channels to further attempt to identify and locate the source of the spikes.
After a subsequent startup and shutdown during a separate investigation, the licensee did find several loose connectors that potentially could have i
resulted in intermittent signal spiking.
The details of licensee actions
!
.and-inspector followup are contained in paragraph 6.
!
" Additionally, during the reactor trip, a feedwater suction relief valve
!
lifted and failed to reseat.
The licensee determined the relief valve
'
, lifted due to a pressure surge caused by the closing of the feedwater j
regulating valves.
The relief valves stuck open because of subcomponent l
l failures due to corrosion and vibration damage.
The relief valve was
!
L repaired and returned to service.
The licensee plans on further evaluating the timing of the feedwater regulating valves to minimize the pressure surges that occur during the valves' closure.
LER 89-18, Revision 0, (closed), "Both Trains of Residual Heat Removal
!
(RHR) Inoperable due to Cognitive Error."
The licensee determined the causes of the event were an error by the Operations crew to recognize the maintenance on FIS-611 resulted in B RHR system inoperability, inadequate administrative controls, and a lack of
'
indepth review of planned wark.
As short term corrective actions, members of the operating crew were disciplined, an administrative procedure was implemented to improve coordination of safety train
- outages, and operations crew briefings were conducted to emphasize the importance of OPERABILITY determinations.
As a long term corrective action, the licensee will research other facility programs for
e
m
_.
-
e
,
,
~
. ;.
11~
l
'L
.
,
,
.f controlling: work and will. consider changes in Trojan's administrative control ~ program.
NRC-inspection report 50-344/89-27 documents inspection
on this event.
No' violations or deviations were identified.
l
' 8.
Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations-(92702).
!
~
Emergency Control Room Ventilation System not Tested in accordance with Technical Specification (0 pen Item 89-09-08, Open)
,
i i
The licensee plans to revise their response to this violation to reflect t
their current assessment to assure consistency with Technical
.
Specification requirements.- The inspectors will review the licensee's response at that time and wi11' include assessment of open item 89-09-06-in this review.
.
The following violations were reviewed to verify acceptability of selected licensee response and corrective actions, identification of: root-causes, generic implications, and actions to prevent recurrence.
Visual Examination of Pipe Supports using Unapproved Guidelines for i
Acceptance Criteria (0 pen Item 88-26-01, Closed)
Unverified Assumption used in Inverter Calculation (0 pen Item 89-09-02,
Closed)
-Failure to write Non-Conformance Report for Inverter Swings-(0 pen Item-89-09-03, Closed)
Failure to account for Design Bases Wind Load in Calculation (0 pen Item
'89-09-05, Closed)
,
Inadequate 50.59 Review CB-16 as Potential Missile to CB-1 (0 pen Item 89-09-07, Closed)
Failure' to update Off-Normal Instruction for Annunciator Change (0 pen I
Item 89-09-11, Closed)
'
Failure to Calibrate Inverter Instrumentation (0 pen Item 89-09-13, Closed)
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup on'0 pen Items (92701)
The inspector verified selected actions and reviewed the licensees Commitment Tracking List to assure acceptable resolution and tracking of c
,
the following:
Verification of Temperature Variations in Containment to assure Environmental Qualification assumption remain Valid (0 pen Item 88-43-02, Closed)
y a
e m
.s G!
I
_
p,
- - -
i' ' l
..g PGE Walkdown to Verify Valve List Accuracy (0 pen Item 89-09-01, Closed)
PGE Containment Spray Header Structural Support Evaluation (0 pen Item-
'
,
' 89-10-04, Closed)-
' Lubrication of Brown /Boveri Circuit Breakers (0 pen Item 89-14-P, Closed)
-
,
- Evaluation 'of Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. EMD 150 BMP Model D Air-Start s
Motors (0 pen Item 69-19-P, Closed)
,
.
Evaluation of Defe'ctive' Clip Connector in Solid State Protection System
P
. (0 pen Item 89-20-P,-Closed)
~
No violations or deviations were identified.
-10.
Exit Interview (30703)
{
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in aaragraph 1 on November 9' 1989,'and with licensee management throughout tie inspection period.
In these. meetings the inspectors summarized-the scope
-
and findings of the inspection activities.
,
I i
?
.