IR 05000338/2025004
| ML26037A163 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/2026 |
| From: | Shawn Smith NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB6 |
| To: | Carr E Dominion Energy |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26037A163 (0) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2025004 AND 05000339/2025004
Dear Eric S. Carr:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On February 5, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with J. Jenkins, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
February 9, 2026
Sincerely, Steven P. Smith, Chief Projects Branch 6 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000338 and 05000339 License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000338 and 05000339
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000338/2025004 and 05000339/2025004
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-004-0029
Licensee:
Dominion Energy, Inc.
Facility:
North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Mineral, Virginia
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2025, to December 31, 2025
Inspectors:
M. Donithan, Senior Operations Engineer
A. Ruh, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Turpin, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Steven P. Smith, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch #6
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Specify Appropriate Test Acceptance Criteria for High and Low Head Safety Injection Systems Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000338,05000339/2025004-02 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152A The NRC identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control when the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of the design when translating the high head (HHSI) and low head (LHSI) safety injection pumps' design bases into acceptance criteria for Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance (SR) 3.5.2.4.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000338/2025004-01 Maintenance Rule Treatment for 1A High Head Safety Injection Pump 71111.12 Open
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period shut down for refuel outage 1R31. The unit was restarted on October 16, 2025. During power ascension on October 21, 2025, the unit experienced a high neutron flux rate trip from 74 percent rated thermal power. The unit was restarted on October 23, 2025, and returned to rated thermal power on October 28, 2025, where it continued to operate for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Offsite power alignments during a long duration 'A' reserve station service transformer outage between November 4, 2025, and December 10, 2025.
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the service water system between October 1, 2025, and November 14, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Area 15-1, Unit 1 quench spray pump house, on December 15, 2025
- (2) Fire Area 9B-1 and 9B-2, Unit 1 and Unit 2, 'J' emergency diesel generator rooms, on December 17, 2025
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations and biennial written examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), "Requalification Requirements," of the NRC's "Operator's Licenses." The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, the crew simulator operating examinations, and the biennial written examinations in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance." These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.03, "Requalification Examination Results," of IP 71111.11.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating tests completed on 2/20/2025 and the biennial written examinations also completed on 2/20/2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) CR1286395, 2-SI-MOV-2864B would not open locally (Hardened Grease), on March 20, 2025, and CR1286613, water leak in HBC housing of 2-SW-MOV-201A, on March 22, 2025
- (2) CR1284775, 2-EG-LS-2JB failed to operate properly during 2-PT-82.5J, on October 7, 2025
- (3) CR1280551, Outside operator identified TSC diesel not in auto, November 18, 2025
- (4) CR1296410, 2-CH-P-1A exceeded maintenance rule unavailability hours, on December 3, 2025
Aging Management (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the aging management program for the following SSCs that did not meet their inspection or test acceptance criteria:
- (1) Recirculation spray heat exchanger dry layup verifications and potential service water in-leakages on Units 1 and 2 discovered after not meeting acceptance criteria of "RSHX SW Inleakage" periodic tests 1/2-PT-62.2.1 and/or 2-PT-62.2.1A on multiple occasions between October and December 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 shutdown risk during reactor coolant drain down and reactor head lift the week of October 5, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) CR1253967, 1J EDG operability verification following engineering evaluation of load sequencing timer being tagged out, on October 8, 2025
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 1R31 activities from October 1, 2025, to October 18, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)1-SW-MOV-123B PMT following actuator replacement under WO59203406195, on November 19, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, 'C' charging pump PMT following maintenance under WOs 59102975147, 59102975207, and 59203398355, on December 12, 2025
- (3) Unit 1, 'J' EDG battery specific gravity checks following electrolyte additions and charging under WO59203473170, on December 15, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Periodic completions of 2-PT-62.2.1 and 2-PT-62.2.1A, RSHX SW Inleakage, on October 27 through December 10, 2025
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)1-PT-61.3, Containment Isolation Valve Test Penetration 90 and 91, on October 11, 2025
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025)
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2024)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2024) 71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) High head and low head safety injection pump test acceptance criteria concerns from CRs 1192802, 1264366, 1278459, and 1278478
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in human performance that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unresolved Item (Open)
Maintenance Rule Treatment for 1A High Head Safety Injection Pump URI 05000338/2025004-01 71111.12
Description:
An unresolved item (URI) was identified when inspectors discovered that the licensee did not consider placing the Unit 1 'A' high head safety injection (HHSI) pump under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for establishing goals and monitoring against the goals following a maintenance preventable functional failure and exceeding unavailability performance criteria.
On June 18, 2025, the licensee declared the pump inoperable due to the speed increaser gearbox flange leaking oil. The licensee determined that the pump would not be able to meet its required mission time of 30 days and the leak was repaired on June 21, 2025. As a result of this unplanned inoperability, the licensee documented the issue as a maintenance rule functional failure (MRFF) and created an assignment on July 29, 2025, to perform an (a)(1)evaluation in accordance with attachment 12 of licensee procedure, ER-AA-MRL-100, "Implementing Maintenance Rule."
On July 21, 2025, the licensee identified that the same pump accrued 589 unavailability hours and exceeded the 438-hour threshold, which required an additional (a)(1) evaluation. The Condition Report Review Team decided to perform a single (a)(1) evaluation for both of the above issues in CR1296410.
On December 2, 2025, while reviewing the completed (a)(1) evaluation, the inspectors identified that the licensee only discussed the exceedance of unavailability hours and did not include an evaluation of the MRFF associated with the oil leak. The equipment was approved to remain in (a)(2) status and the assignment was closed on September 5, 2025. The basis for remaining in (a)(2) status was premised on the fact that the station forecasted the exceedance of unavailability hours when they deliberately planned extended maintenance periods as dayshift only activities rather than the usual around-the-clock activities. Although the strategy caused the maintenance to take longer than normal, the station considered the maintenance was of normal scope since cutting the unavailability hours in half would result in a total that was in line with historical maintenance hours and would be below the 438-hour limit.
Inspectors noted that the licensee no longer had an open assignment to complete a review for the MRFF. Creation of these assignments is required by procedure and typically completed within 90 days of the event date using available information. Additionally, inspectors questioned the licensee's basis for remaining in (a)(2) after exceeding unavailability hours since the chosen maintenance strategy physically caused the equipment to be unavailable to operators to perform its significant function beyond the time limits established by the risk-informed program.
Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," Example 8.g addresses a similar issue noting that the determination of whether the issue is more-than-minor and whether a violation exists depends on whether or not the equipment should have been placed in (a)(1) status. Since this is yet to be determined by the licensee, the inspectors cannot determine if a more-than-minor violation exists.
Planned Closure Actions: The inspectors will review the licensee's completed (a)(1)evaluation(s) and re-assessments when completed to determine whether the issue of concern is a more-than-minor violation.
Licensee Actions: The licensee initiated an action to perform an (a)(1) evaluation of the MRFF and assess the validity of the determination for exceeding unavailability hours to determine if the component is required to enter (a)(1) status.
Corrective Action References: CRs 1293094, 1294348, 1310835, 1297270, 1296410 Failure to Specify Appropriate Test Acceptance Criteria for High and Low Head Safety Injection Systems Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000338,05000339/2025004-02 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152A The NRC identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control when the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of the design when translating the high head (HHSI) and low head (LHSI) safety injection pumps' design bases into acceptance criteria for Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance (SR) 3.5.2.4.
Description:
A quarterly pump test per 2-PT-14.2 of the 2B HHSI pump (2-CH-P-1B) on December 10, 2024, initially failed to meet an established acceptance criteria of 2520 psid at a test flow of approximately 150 gpm when it achieved only 2517 psid. An engineering evaluation justified lowering the acceptance criteria to 2513 psid based on previously unaccounted for temperature effects. To gain additional test margin, engineers later established new reference values for the 2B HHSI pump in February 2025 resulting in the minimum acceptance being lowered substantially to 2281 psid and removing the requirement to use high-accuracy test instruments. This change was approved based on a new interpretation of the sites TS Bases for TS SR 3.5.2.4. Previously, the acceptance range was tied to an equation from site calculation ME-0417, Minimum Delivered HHSI Flow for LOCA Analysis and PT-138.1, -138.3A/B/C, and -14.4 Flow Test Acceptance Criteria, North Anna 1 &
2. The equation represented a minimum pump characteristic curve used in a hydraulic model
for deriving the minimum delivered accident flow for the safety analyses. This equation is also called the test limit pump curve. During an accident, the pump was expected to operate at flows higher than the 150 gpm quarterly test flow, but a valid equation could be used to extrapolate test performance into the expected flow regimes (350-650 gpm). Similarly, a comprehensive test was performed during refueling outages at a test flowrate of approximately 630 gpm and the same equation was used to set the minimum acceptance at 1248 psid.
Engineers concluded the methods in ME-0417 were overly conservative for the quarterly test because the TS Bases described the quarterly test as being purposed for detecting gross degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component problems and that the test was not a good indicator of expected pump performance at high flow conditions. The quarterly test only needed to verify that the measured performance [was]
within an acceptable tolerance of the original pump baseline performance per the ASME OM Code and did not need to verify that the performance at the test flow was greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the safety analysis. This description, included in the TS Bases, originated from a self-approved change and was described in a letter to the NRC in 2002 (ML022460155) shortly after the station converted to Improved Technical Specifications (ITS).
The original ITS Bases described that all testing for TS SR 3.5.2.4 needed to accomplish both objectives by measuring the pump developed head at one point of the pump characteristic curve. Due to design margins, the more limiting objective for the HHSI and LHSI systems was to verify that the performance at the test flow is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the safety analysis. This original language permitted the quarterly test to measure pump developed head at any applicable test flowrate as a means to verify the performance (i.e. pump developed head at a given flowrate) was greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the safety analysis via the pumps characteristic curve. The licensee revised this language because it can be construed to imply that the quarterly test had to be performed at a test flowrate greater than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis, which was impractical. Instead, the original TS Bases required performance at the test flow be greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the safety analysis. As a result, the new language caused engineers in 2025, faced with low margin test results, to consider the methods of ME-0417, intended to verify the pump meets or exceeds performance requirements of the safety analysis, as being overly conservative.
Inspectors identified two concerns with the licensees translation of the HHSI design basis into quarterly and comprehensive test procedures. First, the expansion of the quarterly test acceptance limit to 2281 psid did not ensure the design basis would be met. This level of performance represented an allowance for the full generic 10% degradation in pump head allowed by the ASME OM Code, but the analyses in ME-0417 relied on a pump having no more than approximately 2% degradation at the 350 gpm flow regime. Inspectors concluded there was no technical basis in ME-0417 to support that a pump performing at -10% during a quarterly test would be degraded no more than 2% at 350 gpm. Station procedure ER-AA-IST-PMP-101, ASME IST Program - Inservice Testing of Pumps Implementation, section 3.5.3 required engineers to use the design basis requirements in the acceptance criteria when it was more restrictive than the generic ASME OM Code limits. This same guidance was also stated in section 5.8 of NUREG-1482, revision 3, Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants: Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves and Inservice Examination and Testing of Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers) at Nuclear Power Plants. Secondly, inspectors identified that the characteristic curve equation used in ME-0417 was shaped significantly different than the actual 2B HHSI pump curve. At high comprehensive test flowrates, there was approximately 8% margin between the manufacturers certified pump curve and the equation used in ME-0417. As a result, the pumps have successfully passed the comprehensive test with sizeable margin which provides operational flexibility to accommodate future degradation or changes to the safety analysis. However, for mid-range flows (around 350 gpm), due to the distorted shape of the equation used in ME-0417, the margin to the manufacturers curve was only approximately 2%. In effect, although the comprehensive test results appeared to reflect sizeable margin, they were set to accept a level of degradation that would be beyond analysis assumptions at mid-range flowrates expected in an accident.
A similar concern was identified for the LHSI system. Historically the quarterly test was conducted at approximately 260 gpm and exhibited narrow margins (<2%) to the 158 psid limit sourced from the test limit pump curve in ME-0628, Minimum Delivered HIS Flow for LB LOCA Analysis and Acceptance Criteria for LHSI Pump Operability Verification Testing - North Anna 1 & 2. A comprehensive test was performed during refueling outages near 3,000 gpm.
In 2011, system piping resistance changes necessitated greater pump performance and slightly higher acceptance criteria. There was sufficient margin available for the high flowrate comprehensive test to accommodate this change, but due to the limited margin available for the quarterly flow test, engineers made a modification to the limits for the low flow range. The curve was lowered to the full -10% allowed by the ASME OM Code. This change was premised on the fact that the safety analyses had the pump operating at flowrates well above 260 gpm, so reducing performance in the low flow regime would not affect the safety analysis results. In July 2024, inspectors previously identified to the licensee that although there was no analytical consequence to reducing performance at low flow, the resulting equation no longer reflected the physical performance of the stations LHSI pumps, and it could not be used to extrapolate quarterly test performance to design conditions (CR 1264366). In terms of the design basis, there was no technical basis in ME-0628 to support the implication that a pump performing at the new quarterly test minimums would perform above the safety analysis minimum during an accident. Inspectors estimated that a minimally acceptable quarterly test could represent a 6% flow deficit under design conditions. The licensee corrective action plan to address this error was extended three times on an incorrect basis that the quarterly test was valid as written, had no vulnerabilities and that the acceptance criteria could be further expanded by making use of the same TS Bases interpretation used for the HHSI system.
Corrective Actions:
As an immediate corrective action, the licensee evaluated the operability of the Unit 1 and 2 pumps and initiated corrective action to develop new acceptance criteria.
Corrective Action References: CR1312803
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to establish acceptance criteria that met design and licensing basis requirements per section 3.5.3 of ER-AA-IST-PMP-101 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee used the generic acceptance limits of the ASME OM Code and failed to use the more restrictive design basis hydraulic requirements for the HHSI and LHSI pumps TS surveillance requirement.
Screening:
The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the errors affected the objective of ensuring the capability of the HHSI and LHSI pumps.
Significance:
The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Inspectors determined the deficiency was Green because the licensee evaluated the operability of the HHSI and LHSI pumps and determined they were operable based on results from recently completed tests.
Cross-Cutting Aspect:
H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe to stop. In this case, the decision to rely on an interpretation of the TS Bases in lieu of established guidance and to use distorted test limit pump curves were decisions that did not reflect a conservative bias.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, stated, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into procedures, and that design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, and that "design control measures shall be applied to items such as: accident analyses, and delineation of acceptance criteria for tests." Contrary to the above, since February 2025, the licensees design control measures failed to correctly translate the design basis into procedures that established the acceptance criteria for TS SR 3.5.2.4 tests and failed to verify the adequacy of the design since credited margins were incorrectly assessed and maintained. This nonconformance affected the ability to ensure minimum delivered flow of safety injection systems under accident conditions.
Enforcement Action:
This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On February 5, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to J.
Jenkins, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
11715-FE-1B
4160V One Line Diagram - Sh. 1 Bus 1A & 1
& E North Anna Power Station
Engineering
Changes
NA-24-00033
Replacement of the Transfer Bus D, E, & F 4160V Feeder
Cables
0-OP-49.1A
Valve Checkoff - Service Water
1-OP-26.1
Transferring 4160-Volt Busses
Procedures
2-OP-26.1
Transferring 4160-Volt Busses
11715-FAR-200
Site Fire boundaries
11715-FAR-201,
SH. 1-3
Appendix R Equipment Location
11715-FAR-206
SH. 1+5
Equipment Location - Appendix R service Building Plans
2/17/2025
11715-FE-46K
SH.1
Conduit Plans & Details Main Steam Valve House & Quench
Spray EL 256-0
11715-FE-46Q SH.
Conduit Plan & Details Main Steam Valve House & Quench
Spray Area EL 272-0 & 274-2 North Anna Power Station Unit 1
11715-FE-51F
CND Plan & DETS EMERG Diesel Gen & POPH CO2 SYS &
Smoke DET SYS
Drawings
11715-FE-57AH
SH. 1
CND Plans & DETS INST MN STM Valve & Quench Spray EL
256-0
1-FS-DR-1
Unit 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Engine Rooms
Fire Plans
1-FS-QS-1
Quench Spray Building 274 FT (SG-74) Unit 1
Corrective Action
Documents
1307373,
1305533,
1303006,
2189045,
1132014, 009532,
286172,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
291851,
296466,
280871,
289559,
293328,
293943, 1295986
ER-AA-AMP-101
Implementation of Activities Performed by License Renewal
Aging Management Coordinators
ER-AA-HTX-1003
Heat Exchanger Monitoring and Assessment
ER-NA-SYS-320
Generic Letter 89-13 Program
Procedures
ETE-CEP-2014-
0003
License Renewal Project Aging Management Activities: Service
Water System Inspections: North Anna Power Station (LR-
2754)
Corrective Action
Documents
CR1091753
Drawings
11715-FM-093B
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Reactor coolant
System North Anna Power Station Unit 1
25 Outage Plan Safety Review
08/07/2025
0-MCM-1110-01
Removal of the Reactor Vessel Head
0-MCM-1110-02
Installation of the Reactor Vessel Head
1-OP-1.4
Unit Startup from Mode 4 to Mode 3
1-OP-1.7
Unit Startup from Mode 3 to Mode 2 Following Refueling
1-OP-2.1
Unit Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1
134
1-OP-5.4
Draining the Reactor Coolant System
Fatigue Management and Work Hour Limits for Covered
Workers
Work Hour Limits for Non-covered Workers
Procedures
N1C32 BOC
Reactor Startup
Reactivity Plan
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
1-PT-61.3.5
Containment Purge Valves Type C Test
10/14/2025
1-PT-53.3
Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity - I-131 Dose
Equivalent Analysis
Various
71151
Procedures
2-PT-53.3
Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity - I-131 Dose
Equivalent Analysis
Various
Corrective Action
Documents
CRs 1305269,
1305209,
1305356, 1301942