IR 05000335/1996019
| ML17229A222 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1997 |
| From: | Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Plunkett T FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17229A223 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-96-457, EA-96-458, EA-96-464, NUDOCS 9702100487 | |
| Download: ML17229A222 (16) | |
Text
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SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IHPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES-
$100.000 (NRC INSPECTION REPORTS NOS. 50-335 AND 50-389/96-19, 96-18, AND 96-22)
Dear Mr. Plunkett:
This refers to three inspections conducted during the period October 7 through November 26, 1995. at your St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.
The inspections included a review of the plant security access control program.
the emergency preparedness program, and recent modifications to nuclear instrumentation.
The results of the three inspections were formally transmitted to you by letters dated November 15 and 26, 1996.
A closed predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on December 10, 1996. with you and members of'our staff to discuss the apparent violations. the root causes'nd corrective actions to preclude recurrence.
A list of conference attendees, NRC slides; and a copy of Florida Power and Light Company's (FPL)
presentation materials are enclosed.
Based on the information developed during the inspections and the information provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred.
The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice).
The circumstances surrounding the violations as well as the other'issues addressed at the conference were described in detail in the subject inspection reports and are addressed in the enclosures with respect to NRC's disposition of the issues'ctual and potential safety consequence, and application of the Enforcement Policy.
Overall, the violations involved issues of'ignificant regulatory concern in three areas:
the security access control program, the emergency preparedness program, and the design control process as described below:
~
The fai lure of the access control program to limit access to protected and vital areas of the p'lant to only 'those individuals who were authorized,
- as required by 10 CFR 73.55.
In addition, upon identification of an unauthorized entry, there was a
failure'o notify the NRC within one hour, as requi red by 10 CFR 73, Appendix G.
(EA 96-458)
Attachment
FPL The failure to appl"opriately implement various aspects of the Radiological Emergency Plan (REP), including maintaining the capability to augment the onsite staff in a timely manner, adequately incorporating REP requi rements into implementing procedures, and conducting required training for emergency response organization personnel.
(EA 96-464)
~
The failure to accurately translate design requirements into drawings and to provide independent review of a modification to excore nuclear instrumentation.
The failure to specify clearly design requi rements for. incore flux monitoring software and a
fai lure to provide independent review of the adequacy of the new software.
In addition, the fai lure to prepare a Condition Report as requi red by plant procedures when markings for electrical terminal connectors'n a replacement excore neutron detector were found to be different from existing cable markings.
(EA 96-457)
To emphasi ze the importance of prompt recognition of violations and the need for timely and comprehensive corrective actions, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director. Office of Enforcement. to issue the enclosed Notice with proposed civil penalties totalling $100,000.
A proposed civil penalty of $50,000 was assessed for a Severity Level III problem in Part I of the enclosed Notice that related to the access control program (EA 96-458).
A proposed civi 1 penalty of $50,000 was assessed for* a Severity Level III problem in Part II of the enclosed Notice that related to emergency preparedness (EA 96-464).
The application of the Enforcement Policy and the assessment process for each of the cases are discussed in detail in the enclosures to this letter.
Although the violations in these three areas are functionally unrelated.
the NRC is concerned that collectively they reflect particularly poor overall performance by FPL.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions prescribed in the enclosed Notice (Enclosure 4) when preparing your response.
In addition, your attention is also directed to Enclosure 2 which requests you to provide a response regarding 'the identified emergency preparedness program weakness.
The NRC will consider your response.
in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
In addition, the NRC is very concerned about FPL's apparent lack of responsiveness and sensitivity to emergency preparedness issues that were raised by a concerned employee with FPL management.
As discussed in Enclosure 2 to this letter. there were multiple opportunities to pursue these concerns when they were brought to your attention yet you failed to do so.
We will be contacting you in the near future to confirm arrangements for a meeting to further discuss your views as to the actions required to maintain a
safety-conscious work envi ronment. the effectiveness of your programs designed to ensure employees are free to raise safety concerns, and your, actions to ensure that empl6yee concerns are promptly dispositioned with appropriate resolution feedback to the concerned employee.
We would also expect to discuss at, this meeting the results of'he NRC's Annual Re ort of the
FPL Alle ation Advisor, dated October 7.
1996, which contains an analysis indicating a substantial increase in the number of allegations received regarding activities at the St.
Lucie facility during the period October 1992 through May 1996.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
a copy of this letter. its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the 'NRC Public Document Room.
Sincerely, Luis A. Reyes Regional Adm'astrator Docket Nos.
50-335.
50-389 License Nos.
Enclosures:
1.
.Description of Violations for EA 96-458 2.
Description of Violations for EA 96-464 3.
Description of Violations for EA 96-457 4.
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties 5.
Conference Attendees (Not to be Published in NUREG-0940)
6.
Licensee Presentation Material (Not to be Published in NUREG-0940)
7.
NRC Presentation Material (Not to be Published in NUREG-0940)
Inspection Report
No. 50-335.
389/96-18
was discussed
regarding your failure
to incorporate the requirements
to "establish,
maintain,
and implement"
procedures
for the Emergency
Plan
and the Security Plan into these
same
documents following the removal of the requirements
from the Technical
Specifications,
as committed in your August 16.
1995, license
amendment
application.
After considering your arguments
at the conference,
the
NRC has
concluded that,
although
no specific revisions to the Emergency
Plan or
Security Plan were implemented to meet the aforementioned
commitment, the
requi rements to establish,
maintain,
and implement procedures
are addressed
in
a general
manner in both documents.
Plan references to procedures
in concert
with your administrative
requirements for procedural
adherence
have been
deemed
an acceptable
approach for complying with your August 16,
1995,
commitment.
However, the
NRC continues to believe that the language utilized
in both the plans is imprecise
and could be revised to improve clarity and
intent.
Second, after considering your statements
at the conference,
the apparent
violation originally identified in Inspection Report
No. 50-'335,
389/96-18
regarding inadequate
EPIPs for the relocation of the
OSC is being
characteri zed
as
a program weakness.
Although your procedure
addressed
the
need to consider relocation of this facility in an emergency,
no guidance or
selection criteria were provided to emergency
management
personnel
to
facilitate this decision-making
process.
In your response,
we request that
you address this emergency
preparedness
program weakness
and describe
any
actions you have taken or will take to correct it.
EA 96-457
DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATIONS
NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION.
Violation A in Part III.of the Notice involved two examples of the failure to
establish
adequate
design control measures.
The first example involved a
fai lure to translate
design requi rements 'correctly 'into drawings
and
a failure
to provide adequate
independent
review of a modification to excore nuclear
~ instrumentation.
The second
example involved a failure to identify clearly
design constraints
and attributes for software designated
as
SQA1 and the
failure to verify independently the adequacy of newly developed software.
Specifically, the use of a modeling offset in.the core design software was not
formally documented,
and
an independent
review of'he
BEACON software
specifications
was not performed.
As a result,
the software
was
inappropriately modified to account for a physical shift in the reactor
core
midplane.
The root causes
of Example I of Violation A in Part III of the Notice were
(1) errors introduced into the Unit I controlled drawings
as
a result of
inaccurate
assumptions
that
a Unit 2 excore instrumentation modification could
be used to derive information for a Unit 1 modification; (2) development of
the modification without approved
vendor
manuals
and drawings
and the
subsequent
fai lure to check vendor
documents
against the modification package
when the vendor
documents
were received;
and (3)
a weakness
in the
verification process that resulted in a drafting check of the drawings rather
than
an independent
review to confirm that the drawings
implemented the
necessary
wiring instructions.
The root causes of Example
2 of Violation A in
Part III of the Notice were (I) the failure to document formally the use of a
modeling offset in the safety analysis for the core midplane offset such that
individuals working on subsequent
software input would understand that the
core midplane offset had already
been incorporated.
and (2) the fai lure to
verify independently that the final software assumptions
corresponded
to the
safety analysis
assumptions
that formed the basis for the design input for
software development..
The actual safety consequence
of Example III.A.1,
i.e., 'reversing the detector
inputs for the excore instrument'ation,
was
a
reduction in the margin between the thermal margin/low pressure trip setpoint
and the analysis limit.
Although the actual safety consequence
of
. Example III.A.2 was minimal, the
NRC is concerned that it also exemplifies
deficiencies in the design control process
and the lack of adequate
independent verification.
Violation B in Part III of the Notice involved the failure of your plant staff
to prepare
a Condition Report as required
by plant procedures
when markings
for electrical terminal connectors
on
a replacement
excore neutron detector
were found to be different from existing cable markings.
The wires were
connected incorrectly,
and the miswired detector
was placed in service before
the error
was identified.
A Condition Report
on the marking differences
would
have provided
an independent
review of, this discrepancy
and could have
prevented the installation error.
The root causes of Violation III.B were
personnel
error and the informal approach
used for resolving discrepancies
identified in the field.
a
Enclosure
-0
EA 96-457
The
NRC is concerned that.the root causes of'iolations III.A and III.B both
oint to a serious
lack of attention to detail in the design control area.
he violations are of significant regulatory concern
because of the potential
adverse
impact of concurrent errors in both the excore nuclear
instrumentation
and the core flux monitoring systems.
Considering the vital role. of these
systems
and.the scope'f the modification's
made to these
systems
'during the
same outage,
additional precautions to ensure
proper
implementation of'hese
modifications should have
been instituted.
Therefore,
Viola'tions A and
B in
Part III of the Notice are classified in the aggregate
in accordance with the
a Severity Level III problem.
. In accordance
with the Enforcement Policy,
a base civil penalty in the amount
of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III problem.
Because your
facility has
been the subject of escalated
enforcement
action within the last
two years',
the
NRC considered
whether credit was warranted for
Identification and Corrective Actiori in accordance
with the civil penalty
assessment
process
described
in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
In
this case,
the
NRC has concluded that credit for Identii'ication was warranted
because
Violations III.A and III.B were identified by you'r staff during
routine review of reactor
physics data.
At the conference.
you stated that
your corrective actions included:
(1) immediate corrective actions to ensure.
equipment operabi lity; (2) procedural
revisions to ensure
adequate testing
and
independent verification; (3) revision of the
BEACON software;
(4) verification of the accuracy of the
BEACON software:
(5) revision of fuel
design standards
to incorporate
a list of key design features;
and (6) review
of Condition Report procedural
requirements with your staff.
In considering
these facts.
the
NRC concluded that credit was warranted for the factor of
Corrective Action, resulting in no civil penalty.
However, significant
violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.
NRC Inspection
Report 50-335/96-22.
50-389/96-22 also identified an apparent
violation for failure to verify and validate the
BEACON software against the
results
from the functionally equivalent
and previously validated
INPAX
software.
This comparison
could have identified the design error concerning
core midplane offset.
Ouring the enforcement
conference,
your staff indicated
that your procedures
allowed for different methods of verifying and validating
software performance chbracteristics.
Your staff stated that
FPL performed
a
site validation acceptance
test for
BEACON that met your procedural
requi rements.
In view of the determination that the software error
was
introduced
by differences in the safety analysis
and the software design,
which is cited in Example
2 of Violation III.Athis apparent violation is
withdrawn.
'A Notice of Violation was issued
on September
19,
1996. associated
with
the fai lure to comply with 10 CFR 50.59
(EA 96-326).
and Proposed
Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued
on Harch 28,
1996, for multiple violations associated
with a dilution event
(EA 96-040).
A Notice of Violation and Proposed
Imposition of Civil Penalty
in the amount of $50,000
was issued
on November
13,
1995, related to
power operated relief valves
(EA 95-180).