ML17229A224
| ML17229A224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17229A223 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-96-457, EA-96-458, EA-96-464, NUDOCS 9702100496 | |
| Download: ML17229A224 (19) | |
Text
'ROPOSED IHPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos.
EA 96-464.
and EA 96-457 During NRC inspections conducted during the period of October 7 through
'ovember 26, 1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified.
In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions." NUREG-1600. the NRC proposes to impose civi 1 penalties pursuant to Sec&on 234 of the Atomic Energy.Act of 1954.
as amended (Act),
42 U.S.C.
- 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205.
The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:
I.
Violations Assessed a Civil Penalt Related to Securit Access EA 96-458 A.
10 CFR 73.55(7) states that licensees shall establish an access authorization system to limit unescorted access to vital areas duri ng non-emergency conditions to individuals who require access in order to perform their duties.
The licensee's Physical Security Plan (PSP),
Revision 48, dated February 23, 1996. states.
"Only those individuals with identified
, need for access and having appropriate authorization shall be granted unescorted Vital Area access'
Contrary to the above.
between July 28 and September 19,
- 1996, an individual, whose employment terminated on July 28,
- 1996, had unescorted access to protected and vital areas without appropriate authorization.
and on August 7. August 9, and August 15.
- 1996, actually entered the protected area and had access to vital areas.
In addition, as of the end of the onsite inspection on October 25, 1996, five additional individuals whose employment'erminated during the period July 27 through September 19.
1996, were identified by the licensee as having had unescorted access to the protected and vital areas, without appropriate authorization.
(01013) 4 10 CFR 73, Appendix G.Section I(b) requires that an actual entry of an unauthorized person into a protected area or vital area be
'eported to the NRC within one hour of 'discovery.
10 CFR 73. Appendix G,Section II(a) states that any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area or a vital area had compensatory measures not been'stablished, be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery in the safeguards event log.
Enclosure 4
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties Gontrary to the above, on October 9, 1996. the licensee failed to report to the NRC an actual entry of an unauthorized person into the protected area within one hour of discovery.
Specifically, on October 9,
1996, the licensee discovered that an unauthorized individual who had been terminated on July 28,
- 1996, had entered the protected area on five different occasions, yet the licensee did not report the incident to the NRC until October 16.
1996.
In addition.
on September 19, 1996. the licensee failed to record a vulnerability of the safeguards system in the safeguards event log.
Specifica'lly, the licensee discovered three individuals who had been terminated on July 27, 28, and August 24, 1996.
who could have accessed the protected areas of the plant due to their access badges not being terminated.
The licensee failed to report this discovery in the safeguards event log.
(01023)
These violations represent a Severity Level III problem (Supplement III)
Civil Penalty
$50.000 II
, Violations Assessed a Civil Penalt Related to Emer enc Pre aredness EA 96-464 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that nuclear power plant licensees follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
A.
Section 2.4 of the licensee's Radiological Emergency Plan (REP)
~
Revision 31, stated that activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC) will be initiated by the Emergency Coordinator in the event of an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency, and that arrangements have been made to staff the TSC and OSC in a timely manner.
Also specified is that activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is required for a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, and that arrangements have been made to activate the EOF in a timely, manner.
The REP requirements delineated above were implemented, in part, by Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)
- 3100023E, "On-Site Emergency Organization and Call Directory," Revision 72.
The instruction in Section 8.2 of this procedure stated that, upon the declaration of an emergency classification, "the Duty Call Supervisor will initiate staff'ugmentation" using the "Emergency Recall System or Appendix A. Duty Call Supervisor Call Directory, to notify persons...."
Contrary to the above, from approximately July 22 to October 3.
1996.
arrangements were not available to staff or activate the
- TSC, OSC, or EOF in a timely manner because the licensee did not have the capability to adequately implement either the primary method (using the Emergency Recall System) or the backup method
4
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (using the Duty Call Supervisor Call Directory) f'r notifying its personnel during off-hours.
(02013)
B.
Section.1.3 of the REP stated, "This plan outlines company responsibilities within the framework of the overall emergency response organization.
and provides a conceptual basis for the development of'he detailed procedures necessary to implement the plan.
Section 1.4 of'he REP stated.
"Associated with this Emergency Plan are implementing procedures which provide a source of'ertinent information and data requi red by the response organization during an emergency."
Contrary to the above, as of November 1,
1996, detailed procedures to provide a source of pertinent information required by the response organization during an emergency were not adequately developed with respect to the following aspects of the Emergency Plan:
C 1.,
recovery activities, as discussed conceptually in REP Section 5.4, and C.
2.
the description and delineation of the licensee's emergency response organization (ERO) and the detailed means for notifying ERO members in an emergency, as discussed generally in REP Section 2.2.
(02023)
REP Section 7.2. 1. "Objectives," stated the f'ollowing: "The primary objectives of emergency'response training are as follows:
1.
Fami liarize appropriate individuals with Emergency Plan and related implementing procedures.
- 2. Instruct individuals in thei r specific duties to ensure effective and expeditious action during an emergency.
- 3. Periodically present significant changes in the scope or content of the Emergency Plan.
- 4. Provide refresher training to ensure that personnel are familiar with their duties and responsibilities."
REP Section 7.2.2.
"Training of On-Site Emergency
Response
Organization Personnel,"
- stated, in part, "For employees with specific assignments or authorities as members of emer enc
- teams, initial training and annual retraining programs wi 11 be provided.
Training must be current to be maintained on the site Emergency Team Roster."
REP Section 7.3.2 stated, "The Plant Training Hanager will ensure that on-site Emergency
Response
Organization personnel are informed of relevant changes in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures."
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to adequately implement the training requirements specified in the REP as evidenced by'the following examples:
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties 1.
4 In calendar year 1994, the licensee failed to provide initial training or annual retraining for 17 positions (approximately 92 individuals) identified as part of the onsite response organization.
In calendar year 1995, the licensee failed to provide initial training or annual retraining for eight positions (approximately 54 individuals) identified as part of the onsite response organization.
During calendar years 1994 and 1995. the licensee's training program failed to include initial training or annual retraining on certain procedures required to be implemented by ERO personnel in several identified positions.
Examples include:
EPIP 3100027E, "Re-entry," required to be implemented by the Emergency Coordinator, Radiation Team
- Leader, Operations Support Center (OSC) Supervisor, Re-entry Team Supervisor, Re-entry Team Hember',
OSC Status Board
"Criteria for
. and Conduct of Evacuation,"
required to be implemented by the Emergency Coordinator,'ssembly Area Supervisor, and TSC Security Supervisor:
and EPIP 3100035E, "Off-site Radiation Honitoring," required to be implemented by the Radiation Team Leader and TSC Supervisor.
In addition, during calendar years 1994 and 1995. the Plant Training Hanager failed to ensure that ERO personnel in several identified positions were informed of relevant changes in procedures.
Specifically, EPIP 3100026E was significantly revised in September 1994 and in February 1995 yet the positions required to implement it, the Emergency Coordinator, Assembly Area Supervisor, and TSC Security Supervisor, had not been informed of the changes.
3.
For calendar year 1995, the licensee failed to remove from the. emergency response organization two individuals who had not completed retraining as required and whose ualifications had expired in 1994.
The licensee. also ailed to remove six individuals from the emergency team roster effective October 6.
- 1996, who had not remained qualified to f'ill response team requirements as a result of allowing thei r respirator qualifications to lapse.
(02033)
These violations represent a Severity Level III problem (Supplement VIII).
Civil Penalty
$50,000
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties III. Violations not Assessed a Civil Penalt Related to Unit 1 Nuclear Instrumentation EA 96-457 A.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part. that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 and as specified.in the license application. for those structures.
systems.
and components to which this appendix
- applies, are correctly translated into specifications,
- drawings, procedures, and instructions.
The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of the design.
The verifying or checking process shall'be performed by individuals or groups other than those who performed the original design, but who ma'y be from the same organization.
FPL Topical Quality Assurance Report.
TQR 3.0. Revision 11, "Desi gn Control. " Section 3.2.4.
"Desi gn Verificati on, " stated, in part.
"Design control measures shall be established to independently verify design input....Design verification shall be performed by technically qualified individuals or groups other than those who performed the design."
Engineering Quality Instructions (QI) 1.7, Design Input/
Verification, dated July 5, 1995. stated.
in part, "Design verification is the process whereby a competent individual, who has remained independent of the design process.
reviews the design inputs....
and design output to verify design adequacy.
This independent review is provided to minimize the likelihood of design errors in items that are important to nuclear safety."
Engineering QI 3.7, Computer Software Control, dated July 5, 1995.
- stated, in part, (1) a Software Requirements Specification shall be prepared which identifies and describes the function.
perf'ormance.
constraints, attributes.
external interfaces, and user documentation requirements of the computer software; (2) validation and verification (V8V) of newly developed computer software shall be completed prior to use; and (3)
Y8V results shall be reviewed by an independent individual other than the developer of the software.
Contrary to the above:
As of July 30, 1996, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of design change PC/H 009-195 by individuals other than those who performed the original design.
in that design change PC/H 009-195, which was utilized to install new safety-related nuclear instrumentation system drawers on Unit 1. did not receive an independent design verification by a competent individual independent of the design process.
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties As of July 30.
1996. the licensee.failed to provide for verifying the adequacy of a new core flux monitoring computer code on Unit 1, which was procured as category SQA1 software, in that the software constraints and attributes with regard to adjustments f'r the core= midplane offset were not clearly documented 'and verification and validation by a competent individual independent of the design process was not conducted.
(03013)
Technical Specification 6.8, Procedures and Programs, Paragraph 6.8. 1. requi res. in part, that written procedures recommended. in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, dated February 1978, shall be established and implemented.
Administrative Procedure No. 0006130, Condition Reports, Revision
.4, dated March 22.
- 1996, Paragraph
- 8. 1. 1.A, stated, in part, that "Any individual who becomes aware of a problem or discrepant condition...should initiate a CR (Condition Report].
If doubt exists, a
CR form should be initiated."
Contrary to the above, on July 30, 1996.
Instrument and Control technicians installing Modification PC/M 009-195 did not initiate a Condition Report when they became aware of a discrepant condition, i.e., that markings for electrical terminal connectors on. replacement detectors differed from cable markings identified on the control wiring diagrams.
The failure to resolve the discrepant condition resulted in incorrectly installing an excore nuclear instrumentation system detector in Unit 1.
(03023)
These violations represent a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, the Florida Power and Light Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or exp1anation to the
.Director
. Office of Enforcement.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice).
This reply should be clear ly
~
marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation:
(1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results
- achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice.'an order or a
Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified.
suspended.
or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.
Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
- 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalties proposed
- above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part.
by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified.
an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued.
Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an "Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may:
(1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances.
(3) show error in this Notice.
or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed.
In addition to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties.
Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition.
The attention of the Licensee is di rected to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalties.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalties, unless compromised,
- remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
2282c.
The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to:
Mr. James Lieberman, Director. Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockvi lie Pike, Rockvi lie, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction.
If'ersonal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable
- response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a
redacted copy of your response that deletes such information.
If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b).to support a'equest for withholding confidential commercial or financial information).
If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable
- response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 10th day of January 1997
PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ATTENDEES DECEMBER 10 1996 Florida Power and Li ht Com an T.
J.
J.'.
E.
- Plunkett, President.
Nuclear Division Stall, Site Vice President, St. Lucie Plant (STL)
- Scarola, Plant General
- Manager, STL Fadden.
Services
- Manager, STL Weinkam, Licensing Manager, STL Nuclear Re ul ator Commission S.
- Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)
L. Reyes.
Deputy Regional Administrator, RII E. Herschoff, Director. Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII A. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RII F.
Hebdon, Director. Project Directorate II-3, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
C.
- Evans, Regional Counsels RII B. Uryc, Director, Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff'EICS),
RII P. Fredrickson, Chief, Special Inspection
- Branch, ORS, RII C. Julian, Chief, Projects Branch 3.
ORP. RII H. Hiller, Senior Resident Inspector, DRP, RII C.
Rapp.
Reactor Inspector, DRS, RII L. Stratton, Security Inspector, DRS, RII J.
- Kreh, Emergency Preparedness Inspector, DRS, RII D. Thompson, Security Inspector.
DRS, RII D. Barss.
Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR L. Watson.
Enforcement Specialist.
EICS, RII A. Boland, Enforcement Specialist, EICS, RII S.
- Campbell, Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Enforcement*
- Participated by telephone.
Enclosure 5
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF INSPECTION REPORT 50-335,50-389/96-22 I. Caudle Julian(CJ) was assigned;in November.
1996 to act as the Projects Branch Chief for the Turkey Point and St. Lucie plants.
As part of that job, I traveled to St. Lucie on ll/18-19/96 and on to Turkey Point on 'll/19-20/96. to meet the FP8L managers and to confer with the NRC residents.
On ll/15/96, I obtained a
draft copy of report 96-22 for advance review as I knew I would be expected to concur in it soon.
The report was a
DRS report to be signed out by Al Gibson(AG) but it would normally receive concurrence by the DRP BC.
The report was to support a possible escalated enf'orcement action and an Enforcement Conference to be held on 12/10/96.
Therefore our deadline was to get the report issued and to FP8L two weeks before the conference and thus the report needed to be signed by ll/26/96.
I read the report draft on the plane flying to Florida on the morning of 11/18/96.
The report was a combination of the work of John York(JY) and Curt Rapp(CR) who apparently did multiple inspections at various times over several weeks.
The topic was NRC inspection of the FP8L errors made during a
summer outage when they connected their new nuclear instrumentation drawers backwards and proceeded to start up and achieve full power operation before they recognized what was wrong.
When the error was recognized, FP8L promptly entered and action statement.
reversed the leads and cor rected the technical problem.
We subsequently on 1/10/97, issued FP8L a civil penalty for that incident.
When I
read the report on ll/18/96, it was in poor condition.
It was disconnected, contained typos.
and vague statements without sufficient information for an average technically knowledgable person to understand what the NRC meant.
I made proposed corrections on it as best I could and when I arrived at St.
- Lucie, I
discussed it with Hark Hiller (MH), the Senior Resident Inspector.
He had read it and thought it needed a lot of work too.
He stated that he was going to produce significant input to the report either that night or the next morning.
I gave him my input and asked him to incorporate my comments as he saw fit.
The next morning, when I arrived at the site, HH told me had completed his input and sent it to Chuck Casto (CC).
the Engineering Branch Chief in the RII offices in Atlanta-,
who was responsible for completing the report.
Later in the day HH and I talked with CC on the phone about the report.
CC said he would take HH's input and flair it in with the existing report and try to make a better product.
CC was going in the hospital on ll/20 for an operation so 11/19 would be his last chance to work on it.
I asked CC to E-mail me a copy late on ll/19 while I was driving to Turkey Point and I would get it off the LAN at Turkey Point and read it on the plane home.
CC told me he had E-mailed a copy of his revised version to CR and JY and asked for a E-mail reply of'oncurrence.
Both inspectors were apparently at separate sites that week and not in RII.
I told CC that I would try to move the report along when I returned to RII on thursday.
Even though the report was not a DRP one but a DRS one.
I was willing
'o work on 'it to try to meet the goal of issuing it by ll/26, because I wanted FPL to have adequate review. time before the enforcement conference.
I did review it on the plane and thought it to be in very good shape, and far higher quality than the earlier draft.
On 11/21, my morning was consumed with other immediate demands and I believe that afternoon was the day.we closed the office due to the downtown water main break h++srhmon+
and the loss of water supply to the building.
In any case, I didn't get to work on the report on thursday 11/21.
On friday ll/22. I came in about 8 a.m.
and was told by my Project Engineer Son Ninh (SN). that CR had come by his office and said he had some comments on the report.
When time allowed after the morning
- meetings, I went up to DRS to see about the report.
CC was out of the office so Harold Christensen (HC) was the acting.Branch Chief for CC's Branch.
He was on a conference call so I didn't disturb him but went to see CR to see what his comments were.
I found CR in his office working on the computer.
He said he had gotten a copy of the report from Pat Davenport (PD). his Branch secretary and was making changes to it.
I told him the version PD had given him was the old one and not the latest one CC had prepared..but CR's portion was unchanged so it didn't make any difference if'e was only editing his own portion.
CR had a paper copy of the report laying on his computer desk that had numerous comments written in the side margins, some in pen and some in pencil as if two people had commented on that copy.
I did not read the comments'ut I asked CR to give them to HC. his supervisor that day.
CR proceeded,to tell me there were a lot of things wrong with the report.
and I asked
- what, as I thought it was pretty good.
He told me that it was his experience that Nuclear Instrumentation readings at 5X power are so unreliable that it would be "impossible" for the operators to see a difference in behavior of the 4 NI channels and from that conclude. that part of them were wired up backwards.
He said it was his opinion that we should delete from the report the language that said that there was an opportunity for FP&L to detect the wiring error at the 5K power level but they missed it.
I replied that that portion of the writeup was MM's and that he had a FP8L document that states that very thing.
Therefore MM was only repeating a
conclusion that FP8L had reached themselves and I saw nothing wrong with it.
CR proceeded to edit on the computer and I asked him if he was changing only his portion or was he changing other inspector 's work.
He replied that he was only changing his portion and he would not change the other inspector's portion's.
I asked him to send his edited version to PD when he was finished and I asked him when he would be done.
He replied that he planned to leave by 12:30 and would be gone all the next week on annual leave.
I left his office and proceeded to work on other things.
I wondered about JY's concurrence and so I sent him an E-mail at North Anna resident office and asked him if he concurred.
He replied about 10:30 and said, I sent the attached to CC, but JY forgot to attach the reply to CC.
When I sent back a reply saying there was nothing attached, JY never replied, so I presumed he had left the site f'r the day.
Late morning I got a reply phone call from HC who said CR had some comments on the report.
I told him I knew, had spoken with CR, and had asked CR to give his paper copy comments to HC for us to consider.
In a few minutes, I got a call from HC and CR on a speaker phone so I went up to.see them in CR's office.
CR said he was done with his edits and had sent them to PD.
He again reoeated that he had comments on the rest of the report and that it was "impossible" =for the operators to have recognized the miswired detectors from observation of the NI behavior at 5X.power.
I replied that nevertheless, it was my understanding that FP&L reported that the operators had seen an anomaly. at 5X power and questioned it but were talked out of it by the reactor engineers.
I told CR that I would discuss the issue with MM and tell him of CRs comments.
CR waved the paper copy and said he had some other comments on the report.
I told him fine. give them to HC, his acting supervisor, and management would consider them and decide
4 II%
V'hether to incorporate them or not.
He said he was leaving for the day.
I asked CR if we had further questions on his edits or his comments, could we call him at home that afternoon.
CR didn't reply. but started talking about something else.
I again asked. if we had questions could. we call him at home that afternoon.
CR replied he probably would not be home until 5:30. or 6:00.
I replied fine, if we had questions on the report, would it be OK to call him at home that evening.
CR did not reply but, began to talk to HC on an unrelated
.topic, so I left the room and began to work on other things.
I went by and told PD that there were two versions of the report and that she should find CC's version and block replace CR's edits into CC's version without change.
She said she would do that and E-mail it to me.
In all our conversations on 1l/22 CR and I were both very calm and controlled and.
never got angry.
I took the encounter to be a technical discussion.
CR never once stated that if we didn't change the wording of the report, that he did not concur.
In fact, the word concur was never said in our conversations, and I
presumed, that CR had concurred in the report as a result of making his edits to his portion and giving his written comments to his acting supervisor HC for management consideration.
The day was consumed in other urgent things and I realized at about 5:30 that I would not get the report out.
I called CC at home where he was recovering from his operation and told him the status.
I told him I would not be in f'r all next week as I was leaving town on annual leave for Thanksgiving.
I told him in
.detail of my dealings with CR and MC and that HC should have CR's additional
- comments, whatever they were.
on the margin marked paper copy.
I told him my opinion was.that MM had an FP8L document that stated that the operators observed an anomaly at 5X in the NI behavior and FP&L missed an, opportunity to detect the miswiring by ignoring the operators'uestions.
therefore I thought the report was OK as is.
I told him I thought the report was in good shape and that I
concurred in issuing it as is, although I had not had time review CR's changes.
I told CC that I was turning the task back to him for monday, and he said he would be in RII and take the task.
I returned to work on 12/3/96, and noted that the report had been issued with the signature of Al Gibson (AG),
DRP Division Director on 11/26/96.
When I next saw CC. I asked him how the report completio'n went and he said it was hard because AG had a lot of'uestions and did some editing on it.
I didn't ask if AG changed the report text or just the cover letter, but I presumed he just edited the cover letter as was his usual custom.
The next day CC told me that CR had sent me a
"nasty" E-mai l.
I was surprised, and told him I had not got around to reading it yet.
I subsequently did read it and it. read as follows:
From:
Curtis Rapp To:
ATP2.CAJ Date.
12/2/96.9:53am
Subject:
St. Lucie Special Report As I discussed with you on 11/22/96, the.above report is technically incorrect.
I provided an explaination for my conclusion and a way to resolve the problem.
- However, my solution was not implemeted; therefore the report is technically incorrect.
As I told you verbally on ll/22/96. I would NOT concur with the report as written.
The report was not changed as I specifically said and issued over my direct objections..
CC.
- CAC1, AFG. ATP2.SDE The E-mail was a complete surprise to me as CR had certainly not stated on 11/22/96 that he would not concur on the report unless. we changed the wording as he specifically said.
On 11/22/96.
CR was very calm and appeared to be offering his technical opinion for management to take or leave.
I had replied to him that management would consider his comments and that seemed to be enough to satisfy him on 11/22/96.
So I was quite surprised by the sharp tone of this E-mail.
On 12/10/96 the enforcement conference was held with FP8L, and CR attended the'arts of it relating to the NI issues.
Me came and went several times during the meeting and I presume he got to see and hear all he wanted.
He asked several questions and made several comments and was a full participant.
He also was a full participant in the post conference NRC caucus and expressed his views on enforcement at length.
But, during neither meeting, did CR question or comment on the 5X issue.
so I presumed it was no longer important to him.
During the enforcement conference, Hr. J. Scarola (JS), St. Lucie plant manager stated in his presentation that FP8L missed an opportunity to discover the'NI miswiring at 5X power level. 'S stated that the operators observed one of the axial shape index meters responding differently from the other three and raised the question to the reactor engineers.
JS stated that the reactor engineers explained away the questions by saying that the detectors had been replaced and needed calibration before they could be relied on.
CR was in the meeting when JS made those statements and he made no comment in response.
Attached are pages from the FP&L presentation slides that JS used for his presentation.
With no further discussion of the 5X issue from CR. I presumed he was satisfied.
To summarized the situation, on 11/22/96.
I thought our discussions were technical in nature where he expressed his opinion that HH's report input was incorrect and should be deleted from the report before issue by the NRC.
That was the only technical issue discussed between us that day and the word "concur" never arose in our discussion.
CR's E-mail of '12/2/96. states that the report as already issued is "technically incorrect" in some unspecified way and says that he "would not concur with the report as written".
His memo of 1/6/97 escalates his concern to a "differing professional opinion".
That is the first time that language was used about this issue.
I don't know what different actions I could have taken,. or can take now. to placate such unpredictable exaggeration.
I did not have lead responsibility for completion of the inspection report.
but I tried to move it along to meet the NRC's goals.
I made no changes to the words in the report, did not see the final version, and was not present when the Division Director of DRS signed it out.
I verbally passed along to my fellow Branch Chiefs my encounter with CR on 11/22/96.
I have no further knowledge of the events that occurred on 11/25-26/97, for I was on annual leave.
I believe that CR did functionally concur in the report.
He had free reign to write and revise his portion, and to my knowledge, no one changed a word of
his portion.
I certainly did not.
He gave me, and I passed on to others, his technical opinion on the 5X issue, and I told him management would consider his opinion.
Management decided to not delete the portion of MM's input that dealt with the SX issue.
and that is management's prerogative..
I have searched the NRC documents f'r the meaning of concurrence and have not been wholly successful.
- However, NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0610.
Inspection Reports",
issued 2/2/96.
page 31 gives guidance for inspection report cover 1etters, and references NRC Management Directive 3.57, "Cor respondence Management".
That document, dated August 4,
- 1994, page II-I6 states "An individual's concurrence does not mean that he or she agrees with the structure or every detai 1 of the document.
Concur rence indicates agreement with the overall approach.
objective, and technical content in the individual's area of functional responsibility.
along with the belief that the document does not or will not adversely affect or conflict with other NRC programs and policies."
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